

Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 19:58:01 -0800  
From: Lynette Mehall <lmehall@attglobal.net>  
Reply-To: lmehall@attglobal.net  
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.04 (Win95; I)  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Hallman Reunion 2004

Dear Howard,

Wow! I am impressed with your thinking ahead! This would be a great place for the next reunion! Lynette

Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2001 17:46:12 -0600  
From: lmehall@attglobal.net  
Reply-To: lmehall@attglobal.net  
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.04 (Win95; I)  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: What you doing on April 14?

Yes, you are welcome to come! I had tried unsuccessfully to e-mail you a birthday card last week! I finally purchased a paper card, and it is in the mail. Rick will probably be at work on April 14, unless he is all caught up! I will plan to be here to serve you lunch. You will take I-74 around Bloomington. It merges with I-55 for awhile. Do not continue on I-74 to Peoria, but stay on I-55 North. You will come to an exit for Route 39 to Rockford (at the northwest edge of Normal). Take the long... exit to get on 39. You will be heading north. Go to the Hudson exit (onlye 2 1/2 or 3 miles). Get off on the ramp and turn right. You will go through Hudson (past a Casey's gas station). It is just a 1/2 mile or so. Continue past the cemetary into the country to the first stop (4 miles or so) (four-way stop). Turn left. Go to the end of the road (2 miles or so). Turn right. Go to the first left (about 3/4 mile) and turn left. You will see a green house on the northeast corner. Go to the first stop sign. Turn right. Go up 3/4 mile. The road will turn left. You will see a street sign that says Iroquois Lane. We are the 6th house up or the house after the sign on the mailbox that says 24665 Iroquois Lane. Our driveway is just past the mailbox. There is also a boat parked out front with a green tarp on it that belongs to the neighbor. It is easier to find us now that the E-911 is being put into place. We actually have street signs. Let me know if these directions are clear! We will look forward to seeing you! Love, Lynette

Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 08:25:12 -0500  
From: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
Subject: NMD letters ready to sign  
Sender: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Dear Howard:

Please sign me on as follows.

Rev. Lonnie Turner  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, Washington Office  
1233 Mass. Ave., SE  
Washington, DC 20003

Phone 202.675.0687

Shalom!  
Lonnie

To: dkimball@clw.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Religious leaders letter on NMD  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: C:\My Documents\icnd.069.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Daryl,

Here is the final version of the letter from religious organizations to President Bush on national missile defense. We are also sending a modified version to all members of Congress. We expect this to be accomplished early next week.

I will send a news release and copies of the letters to the religious press. I could send it selectively to reporters in the secular press if you or some one else would offer me some names. However, I lack the resources to distribute it broadly. Perhaps some element of the publicity machine of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers would want to pick up on this.

We are in the process of organizing delegations of state religious leaders to call on senators to discuss four issues: de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, CTBT, and national missile defense. For the latter we will give them this letter to present and indicate that they endorse the ideas. As back-up we would like to give some briefing material on NMD. Would the Coalition be able to help us?

Such briefing material can late to the three reasons against NMD stated in the letter.

(1) That Russian weapons are the greatest risk and that there are important ways to deal with them. We need (a) data on deployed and stored Russian weapons (plus some data on Chinese weapons), (b) a description of strategies for de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and fissile material control, and (c) an indication of how NMD could thwart the arms reduction strategy.

(2) That a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy would be more effective than NMD for dealing with small nations and terrorist groups. The letter list elements of such a strategy. A brief paragraph on each one would be helpful. Maybe also scenarios on how these strategies could be applied to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

(3) Budgetary information. A little more data on money spent on NMD since 1983 and the projected cost of the Bush plan. I can get information on "Leave No Child Behind" from the Children's Defense Fund.

I imagine that much of this information is in your briefing material. What we need is a digest that state religious leaders can make use of. It would also be useful to religious representatives in Washington.

Thanks for whatever help you can provide.

Howard

###

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides the breeding ground for terrorist groups

Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications. Since 1983 the United States has spent \$69 billion on national missile defense, enriching major defense contractors but producing no effective system. President Clinton's plan, which you have criticized as inadequate, would cost \$60 billion. Indications are that the layered approach you favor could cost more than \$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this magnitude along with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with other urgent domestic needs.

For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

To: jdi@clw.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Religious leaders letter on NMD  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: C:\My Documents\icnd.069.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

John,

Here is the final version of the letter from religious organizations to President Bush on national missile defense. We are also sending a modified version to all members of Congress. We expect this to be accomplished early next week.

Thanks for your input. You will notice that I adopted several of your suggestions.

Howard

###

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

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For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

To: mwashing@ucc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: NMD sign-on letter  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Here's my original communication with the letter as text.

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

I have finalized the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense by incorporating suggestions received. I edited the opening sentence, added some language in the first and second reasons, and dropped what was the third reason, the need for rigorous testing.

Will you or some other representative from your organization sign these letters? For denominations we are suggesting heads of Washington offices or social action agencies rather than heads of communion, but that is your choice to make. I request your response by Wednesday, February 28. For your convenience, you can fill in the blanks.

Yes, we will sign the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense.

Name and title of signer:  
Name of organization:

The letters will have no letterhead, only the date of transmission. Signers will be in alphabetical order by organization. At the end it will indicate: "This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036; phone: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org."

Shalom,  
Howard

###

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now

scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides the breeding ground for terrorist groups

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For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

###

Dear Senator/Representative:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share the desire to keep God's people everywhere, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense. We ask you to share our concerns with President Bush.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

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For these reasons we ask you to urge President Bush to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

To: "Rev. Sharon Key" <ricouncil@aol.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Talking to senators about nuclear disarmament  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Rev. Key,

As I mentioned in our phone conversation, the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is trying to build bipartisan support for several important measures related to nuclear weapons. We are encouraging faith leaders in a number of key states to talk with their senators on these issues. Rhode Island is one of them because Senator Chafee is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and is a voice of moderation among Republicans. Therefore, we are wondering if your Advocacy/Justice and Service Committee would take the lead organizing a delegation of faith leaders to meet with Senator Chafee. You could also meet with Senator Reed if you want to.

Attached below is a set of questions that might be posed to the senators on four important issues: de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, CTBT, and national missile defense. We have available back-up information on these issues that we can supply to your committee and to the persons who will be meeting with the senators. We can also arrange for a conference call briefing if you wish.

On de-alerting the Friends Committee on National Legislation has served as facilitator for a letter from national religious leaders to President Bush (it's on their web site at [www.fcnl.org](http://www.fcnl.org)). Faith groups in several states are using a state version of this letter addressed to their senators and getting signatures from religious leaders around the state. Perhaps you would want to consider doing this in Rhode Island and present the signed letter to the senators when you meet with them. You can also discuss the other issues in your meeting, but this signed letter would show the breadth of concern of the Rhode Island faith community on nuclear disarmament.

I greatly appreciate your interest. Let me know what you decide about joining this effort.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

#### Questions for U.S. Senators on Nuclear Disarmament Issues

Senator, we thank you meeting with us. Many faith groups have a strong interest in nuclear disarmament issues. We would like to discuss some of them with you.

#### De-alerting and strategic arms reduction

During the past 20 years bilateral arms reduction treaties between the United States and Russia have used to lessen the risk of nuclear war. What are the prospects for completion of the ratification process for START II? Do you think there should be a START III agreement for further reductions?

Last May in a campaign speech President Bush said that "the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status." He said, "It should be possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II without compromising our security in any way." He further stated that de-alerting and strategic arms reduction could come about through executive leadership without waiting for years of treaty negotiations. What do you think of these ideas? Do you favor de-alerting? Do you

support strategic arms reduction through executive action?

### Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In January General John Shalikashvili proposed that the Senate reconsider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ratify it. He suggested that the treaty be reviewed after ten years by a commission set up by the president and Congress. He suggested a more integrated approach to non-proliferation. He offered several other ideas. What do you think of General Shalikashvili's recommendations?

### National Missile Defense

Persons in the faith community have grave doubts about National Missile Defense (NMD). They believe that the threat of attack on the United States by long-range missiles by small nations is greatly exaggerated, that deployment of NMD by the United States would risk a renewed nuclear arms race with Russia and China, that it wouldn't guard against more likely means of attack by terrorists and small nations, that the cost of NMD is wasteful and takes money away from other needs. What are your views on National Missile Defense?

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Next meeting: March 13  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

The next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will take place from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Wednesday, March 13 in Conference Room 4, Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C.

Special guest will be Ken Myers from the staff of Senator Lugar. He will discuss the Nunn-Lugar program of cooperative threat reduction. This program assists Russia in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and secure storage of fissile material. Although Nunn-Lugar has strong supporters in Congress, we may want to give our support at crucial phases of the appropriations process.

I hope we will have a good turn out for Ken Myers. Among Senate staff he is the one that many other Republican staffers turn to for information and advice. Senator Lugar plays a similar leadership role among senators. If you can't come, maybe you can get some one from your office to represent you.

I'll be mailing you some background information on the Nunn-Lugar program.

Shalom,  
Howard

Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 08:25:12 -0500  
From: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
Subject: NMD letters ready to sign  
Sender: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Dear Howard:

Please sign me on as follows.

Rev. Lonnie Turner  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, Washington Office  
1233 Mass. Ave., SE  
Washington, DC 20003

Phone 202.675.0687

Shalom!  
Lonnie

From: Caron Johnson <CJohnson@UMC-GBCS.ORG>

To: "mamalo777@aol.com" <mamalo777@aol.com>, "jameswest53@juno.com" <jameswest53@juno.com>, "jgeorgieff@earthlink.net" <jgeorgieff@earthlink.net>, "Jimvert@worldnet.att.net" <Jimvert@worldnet.att.net>, "joumc@aol.com" <joumc@aol.com>, "kastolz@aol.com" <kastolz@aol.com>, "kenttumc@kentland.ffni.com" <kenttumc@kentland.ffni.com>, "kidsmom@ocsonline.com" <kidsmom@ocsonline.com>, "ljbursen@yahoo.com" <ljbursen@yahoo.com>, "lynn4530@aol.com" <lynn4530@aol.com>, "Martmeth@aol.com" <Martmeth@aol.com>, "mupj@igc.org" <mupj@igc.org>, "paxmlh@juno.com" <paxmlh@juno.com>, "pwjp@juno.com" <pwjp@juno.com>, "revgwen1@aol.com" <revgwen1@aol.com>, "revjim@pa.net" <revjim@pa.net>, "revpt@accessflint.com" <revpt@accessflint.com>, "ricked@mindspring.com" <ricked@mindspring.com>, "rlynn@wavetech.net" <rlynn@wavetech.net>, "RWaldenPA@aol.com" <RWaldenPA@aol.com>, "s\_and\_s\_porter@juno.com" <s\_and\_s\_porter@juno.com>, "sandy@citlink.net" <sandy@citlink.net>, "uswest.net" <stmarksbak@aol.comwah>, "WHolcomb@umcswtx.org" <WHolcomb@umcswtx.org>, "wlparker@bayou.com" <wlparker@bayou.com>, "zunguza@zebra.uem.mz" <zunguza@zebra.uem.mz>, "afong@jps.net" <afong@jps.net>, "aheart1000@cs.com" <aheart1000@cs.com>, "annfprice@aol.com" <annfprice@aol.com>, "bbhardt@mail.esc4.com" <bbhardt@mail.esc4.com>, "cawindrum@yahoo.com" <cawindrum@yahoo.com>, "desmetucc-umc@juno.com" <desmetucc-umc@juno.com>, "dlsmith3@juno.com" <dlsmith3@juno.com>, "em86610@goodnet.com" <em86610@goodnet.com>, "EmK.GFS.Graelse@t-online.de" <EmK.GFS.Graelse@t-online.de>, "fitzlee@erols.com" <fitzlee@erols.com>, "hjfisher@alaska.net" <hjfisher@alaska.net>, "hughes123@aol.com" <hughes123@aol.com>, "imipj@totalnetnh.net" <imipj@totalnetnh.net>

Subject: Memory Book for Robin Ringler

Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 09:10:50 -0500

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)

> This bittersweet message is a reminder of Robin Ringler's imminent  
> departure from our board effective March 31, 2001. We plan to celebrate  
> Robin's service to the board with a testimonial reception at the spring  
> board meeting. One of the gifts we would like to present to her is a  
> collection of letters from friends, colleagues, and associates who have  
> had the privilege of working and witnessing with Robin throughout her  
> service with the agency that is on the forefront of the United Methodist  
> Church. I invite you to send me your letter/poem of tribute, unfolded,  
> in a 9X12 manila envelope, by March 15, 2001.

>  
> Robin has been the Peace with Justice program director since February  
> 1992. With her leadership skill, she has expanded the advocacy work and  
> strengthened the legislative network of Peace with Justice coordinators  
> across the United Methodist denomination. Prior to GBCS, she served as a  
> parish secretary at an Episcopal Church in Virginia, a GBGM mission intern  
> for three years in New York City and an intern in an ecumenical church and  
> community house serving congregations in both East and West Berlin for a  
> year. In addition, she worked for two years as an assistant director of  
> youth ministries in Georgia and for a year worked as the editorial  
> assistant of the Navy League of the United States. Robin completed two

> years toward a Master of Divinity degree after she received her Bachelor  
> of Arts degree in Journalism at the University of Georgia. Married to  
> Mr. James Winkler for many years, she is the loving mother of Grace Louise  
> and Samuel Arthur.

>  
> Let us keep this letter of tribute a surprise. Also, please circulate  
> this letter to your colleagues and friends.

>  
> Evelyn Y. Ruiz  
> Director of Human Resources  
> General Board of Church and Society  
> The United Methodist Church  
> 100 Maryland Avenue, NE, Suite 300  
> Washington, D.C. 20002  
> (202) 488-5628  
> Email: [Eruiz@umc-gbcs.org](mailto:Eruiz@umc-gbcs.org)

>  
>  
>

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.3  
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 10:46:53 -0500  
From: "Catherine Gordon" <cgordon@ctr.pcusa.org>  
To: <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Request for assistance

Howard,

I was out of the country last week and just got your message. We will be able to sign on to the letter on NMD. We could also possible do the individual letter if that is what is decided upon.

Let me know.

Regards,  
Catherine

From: Robin Ringler <DRingler@UMC-GBCS.ORG>  
To: "'mupj@igc.org'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: NMD letters  
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 10:30:09 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)

Howard,

Please sign Jim's name to both letters.

Jim Winkler  
General Secretary  
General Board of Church & Society  
United Methodist Church

Thanks!

Jaydee's in a meeting now and I'll ask him about copying the letters and preparing them for mailing when I see him.

Robin

X-Sender: epf@pop.igc.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32)  
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 10:59:22 -0500  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
From: Episcopal Peace Fellowship <epf@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Next meeting: March 13  
Cc: Bill Stuart-Whistler <stuwhis@enter.net>,  
Bill Yates <wmkyates@earthlink.net>

Howard,

As you know, I will not be able to attend the March 13th meeting. Bill Stuart-Whistler is planning to come from Philadelphia for that meeting.

Contrary to what I said to you before I left for a conference last week, I really am not going to be able to put in the time and energy to reach Bishop Cate Waynick in Indianapolis. I'm sorry. You'd better proceed on it without EPF. If a representative from another denomination is willing to contact her, my name and EPF can be used as reference.

My successor has been chosen; she'll start July 1st officially; the office will be moving to Chicago. The next few months are going to be *very* busy. I'll hope to get to at least one more meeting, just not the March one - that's ballot-counting day in my shop.

peace,  
mary miller

At 11:12 AM 2/27/01 -0500, you wrote:

>To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

>

>Dear Colleagues:

>

>The next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will  
>take place from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Wednesday, March 13 in Conference Room  
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>Special guest will be Ken Myers from the staff of Senator Lugar. He will  
>discuss the Nunn-Lugar program of cooperative threat reduction. This  
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>storage of fissile material. Although Nunn-Lugar has strong supporters in  
>Congress, we may want to give our support at crucial phases of the  
>appropriations process.

>

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>is the one that many other Republican staffers turn to for information and  
>advice. Senator Lugar plays a similar leadership role among senators. If  
>you can't come, maybe you can get some one from your office to represent you.

>

>I'll be mailing you some background information on the Nunn-Lugar program.

>

>Shalom,  
>Howard

>  
>  
>  
>Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
>1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

>  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of  
>laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.  
>

Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 11:39:41 -0500  
From: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
Subject: Sign On Letter  
Sender: Lonnie & Fran Turner <76622.637@compuserve.com>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>, "Baldrige, Gary" <gb@worldmail.org>

Dear Howard:

Here are the names for the sign on letter.

Rev. Lonnie Turner  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, Washington Office  
1233 Mass. Ave., SE  
Washington, DC 20003

Phone: 202.675.0687

Gary Baldrige  
Global Missions Coordinator  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship  
P.O.Box 450329  
Atlanta, GA 31145-0329

Phone: 770.220.1600

Shalom!  
Lonnie Turner

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
Subject: NEW RESOURCES AVAILABLE FROM THE BRINK CAMPAIGN  
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 04:17:25 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Dear Friends and Supporters of the Brink Campaign,

Thanks to all of you who made the February National Call-In Days a huge success. The White House now knows there is a public demand for de-alerting nuclear weapons. If you haven't already told us how you mobilized your friends and contacts, please let us hear from you. We are compiling a full report and will distribute it to all of you.

We know the Call-In Days' success was due to all your efforts. NOW, we would like to enlist your participation in a concentrated six-month public education campaign. To help, the Brink Campaign has 3 NEW RESOURCES AVAILABLE for very little, or no, cost.

A 20-page Briefing Book, "Short Fuse to Catastrophe: The Case for Taking Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-trigger Alert." An in-depth look at what it means to have nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, realistic steps to de-alerting nuclear weapons, ways you can help and how to arrange for a speaker to visit your community.

A 10 x 17 2-color poster "Defuse the Nuclear Threat" which is suitable for announcing events and calling attention to the nuclear threat in your community.

The Video "Back From the Brink," up-dated as of February 2001, along with a new Organizer's Kit for 2001 that contains a Religious Leaders sign-on letter and Tips for Working Within the Faith-Based Community, Tips on Talking with your Member of Congress and new resources for working with the media.

These resources, along with our popular "Timeline to Catastrophe," "Questions and Answers," Back From the Brink and Women's brochure are available free, or for only a small shipping and handling charge as outlined in the attached Resource Order Form. Or, visit our website at [www.backfromthebrink.org](http://www.backfromthebrink.org), download the order form and fax it back to the Brink Campaign at 202-545-1004. Or, call 1-877 55BESAFE. You can also just let me know by return e-mail which resources you want and where you would like them sent. We'll get them out to you immediately.

Hope to hear from you soon,

Peace,  
Esther Pank

\*\*\*\*\*

Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
202.545.1004 fax  
brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
www.backfromthebrink.org

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Resources available.doc"

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.2  
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 14:18:56 -0500  
From: "LOGA 33" <LOGA33@elcaloga.org>  
To: mupj@igc.org  
Subject: meeting date?

The interfaith committee for nuclear disarmament meeting is scheduled for Wed. Mch 13.

Wed. is March 14.

thnx - just let me know -  
Jane V Maltzahn  
LOGA

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Tuesday, March 13 is meeting date  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Colleagues:

In my notice of the next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament I erroneously stated the day of the week as Wednesday. The correct date is Tuesday, March 13 from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Thanks to LOGA for catching the error.

Howard

Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 07:10:01 -0800 (PST)  
From: Egbert Lawrence <egbertl4pj@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Larry Egbert concerning next meeting: March 13  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Howard,

Thanks for the reminder but I lecture at the University of Maryland twice a year and the 13th is the spring lecture.

Also, I have your name reserving all day the 6th of March and the morning of the 7th. I need some more instructions on what we are going to do and what homework I should do before. And where to go.

PEACE! Larry

--- "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org> wrote:  
> To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
>

> Dear Colleagues:

>  
> The next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for  
> Nuclear Disarmament will  
> take place from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Wednesday, March  
> 13 in Conference Room  
> 4, Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue, NE,  
> Washington, D.C.

>  
> Special guest will be Ken Myers from the staff of  
> Senator Lugar. He will  
> discuss the Nunn-Lugar program of cooperative threat  
> reduction. This  
> program assists Russia in the dismantlement of  
> nuclear weapons and secure  
> storage of fissile material. Although Nunn-Lugar  
> has strong supporters in  
> Congress, we may want to give our support at crucial  
> phases of the  
> appropriations process.

>  
> I hope we will have a good turn out for Ken Myers.  
> Among Senate staff he  
> is the one that many other Republican staffers turn  
> to for information and  
> advice. Senator Lugar plays a similar leadership  
> role among senators. If  
> you can't come, maybe you can get some one from your  
> office to represent you.

>  
> I'll be mailing you some background information on  
> the Nunn-Lugar program.

>  
> Shalom,  
> Howard

>

- >
- >
- > Howard W. Hallman, Chair
- > Methodists United for Peace with Justice
- > 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
- > Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org
- >
- > Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a
- > membership association of
- > laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any
- > Methodist denomination.

---

Do You Yahoo!?

Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.

<http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/>

To: ronsider@esa-online.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter on national missile defense  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

This was sent on February 21 to the "esa" general e-mail address.

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

I have finalized the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense by incorporating suggestions received. I edited the opening sentence, added some language in the first and second reasons, and dropped what was the third reason, the need for rigorous testing.

Will you or some other representative from your organization sign these letters? For denominations we are suggesting heads of Washington offices or social action agencies rather than heads of communion, but that is your choice to make. I request your response by Wednesday, February 28. [An extension to March 2 is okay.] For your convenience, you can fill in the blanks.

Yes, we will sign the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense.

Name and title of signer:  
Name of organization:

The letters will have no letterhead, only the date of transmission. Signers will be in alphabetical order by organization. At the end it will indicate: "This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036; phone: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org."

Shalom,  
Howard

###

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national

missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides the breeding ground for terrorist groups

Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications. Since 1983 the United States has spent \$69 billion on national missile defense, enriching major defense contractors but producing no effective system. President Clinton's plan, which you have criticized as inadequate, would cost \$60 billion. Indications are that the layered approach you favor could cost more than \$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this magnitude along with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with other urgent domestic needs.

For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

###

Dear Senator/Representative:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share the desire to keep God's people everywhere, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense. We ask you to share our concerns with President Bush.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

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For these reasons we ask you to urge President Bush to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5  
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 10:13:13 -0500  
From: "Gary Baldrige" <gbaldrige@cbfnet.org>  
Sender: Postmaster@cbfnet.org  
Reply-To: gbaldrige@cbfnet.org  
To: <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Tuesday, March 13 is meeting date

I will be out of the country from 2/28/01 through 3/12/01 and will not be able to access email.

Gary Baldrige

>>> mupj 02/28/01 10:02 >>>

Dear Colleagues:

In my notice of the next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament I erroneously stated the day of the week as Wednesday. The correct date is Tuesday, March 13 from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Thanks to LOGA for catching the error.

Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

From: "bruce edwards" <b3ruce@socket.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: methodists united meeting in march  
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 14:15:47 -0600  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4133.2400  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400

howard, i will not be able to attend the meeting on march 24th after all. i am sorry, but i have recently been given the opportunity to speak at an area-wide confirmation day.

i wish you and my friends well.

bruce

Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 21:22:24 -0500  
From: Ken Sehested <ken@bpfna.org>  
Reply-To: ken@bpfna.org  
Organization: Baptist Peace Fellowship  
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 (Macintosh; I; PPC)  
X-Accept-Language: en  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: NMD letters ready to sign

Howard,

Yes, add my name to the letter:

Ken Sehested, Executive Director  
Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America  
-----

"Howard W. Hallman" wrote:

> To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

>

> Dear Colleagues:

>

> I have finalized the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on  
> national missile defense by incorporating suggestions received. I edited  
> the opening sentence, added some language in the first and second reasons,  
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> choice to make. I request your response by Wednesday, February 28. For  
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> national missile defense.

>

> Name and title of signer:

> Name of organization:

>

> The letters will have no letterhead, only the date of transmission.  
> Signers will be in alphabetical order by organization. At the end it will  
> indicate: "This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, chair,  
> Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW,  
> Washington, DC 20036; phone: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org."

>

> Shalom,  
> Howard

>

> ###

>

> The Honorable George W. Bush  
> The White House

> Washington, DC 20500

>

> Dear Mr. President:

>

> We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with  
> you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland,  
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> First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States  
> comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert  
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>

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> speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements  
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> include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous  
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>

> For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a  
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> Respectfully yours,

>

> Representatives of  
> faith-based organizations

>

> ###

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>  
> Respectfully yours,

>  
> Representatives of  
> faith-based organizations

>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

>  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of

> laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

To: david@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Today's 1:30 meeting  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

David,

I've invited Greg Laszakovits of the Church of the Brethren office to join us today at our 1:30 p.m. meeting. He is the source of many of our contacts in Indiana.

Howard

To: abolition-caucus-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Unsubscribe  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

We would like to unsubscribe from the abolition caucus list serve. It's too cluttered with too many irrelevant messages.

Howard W. Hallman  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
mupj@igc.apc.org

To: brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Request for publication  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Esther,

Will you please bring me 20 copies of your briefing book to our 1:30 meeting today? It is excellent. I want to send it to some of our key contacts. Also I'd like to get a copy of your Tips for Working within the Faith-Based Community.

Thanks,  
Howard

From: J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mail.mcc.org  
X-Lotus-FromDomain: MCC  
To: mupj@igc.apc.org  
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2001 10:09:34 -0500  
Subject: sign-on

To: Howard Hallman  
From: J. Daryl Byler  
Date: 3/1/2001 10:08:44 AM  
Subj: sign-on

Hi Howard:

Please add my name to the sign-on (as listed below); and let me know which Senate office building I can cover as far as delivering letters.

Warm regards,

J. Daryl Byler, Director  
MCC U.S. Washington Office

X-eGroups-Return: sentto-1300601-331-983458022-mupj=igc.org@returns.onelist.com  
X-Sender: MingoMae@aol.com  
X-Apparently-To: bumc@egroups.com  
To: <bumc@yahoogroups.com>  
X-Mailer: Unknown (No Version)  
From: mingomae@aol.com  
Mailing-List: list bumc@yahoogroups.com; contact bumc-owner@yahoogroups.com  
Delivered-To: mailing list bumc@yahoogroups.com  
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:bumc-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>  
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2001 09:46:51 EST  
Subject: [bumc] Fwd: UMNS #102-Help end child poverty, NCC board told

To unsubscribe from this list, send a message with "unsubscribe" in the message body to mingomae@aol.com

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Return-Path: <owner-umnsdn@LISTSERV.UMC.ORG>  
Received: from rly-zc03.mx.aol.com (rly-zc03.mail.aol.com [172.31.33.3]) by air-zc04.mail.aol.com (v77\_r1.21) with ESMTP; Wed, 28 Feb 2001 21:44:38 -0500  
Received: from smtp.umcom.net (host81.umcom.org [209.194.114.81]) by rly-zc03.mx.aol.com (v77\_r1.21) with ESMTP; Wed, 28 Feb 2001 21:44:04 -0500  
Received: from umcom2c01 (youth.umc.org [209.194.114.78])  
by smtp.umcom.net (8.9.3/8.8.7) with ESMTP id OAA09358;  
Wed, 28 Feb 2001 14:46:43 -0600  
Received: from LISTSERV.UMC.ORG by LISTSERV.UMC.ORG (LISTSERV-TCP/IP release 1.8d) with spool id 7454 for UMNSDN@LISTSERV.UMC.ORG; Wed, 28 Feb 2001 20:48:03 -0800  
Received: from 10.1.2.62 by LISTSERV.UMC.ORG (SMTPPL release 1.0d) with TCP; Wed, 28 Feb 2001 20:48:03 -0800  
Received: by UMCOM\_EXCHANGE.UMCOM.UMC.ORG with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) id <FZK3TBL2>; Wed, 28 Feb 2001 20:37:37 -0600  
X-Message-Flag:  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"

Message-ID: <12D3A4B3A9088E40AA238B45466662340278D0@UMCOM\_EXCHANGE.UMCOM.UMC.ORG>  
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2001 20:37:37 -0600  
Reply-To: newsdesk@UMCOM.UMC.ORG  
Sender: UMNS Daily News <UMNSDN@LISTSERV.UMC.ORG>  
From: NewsDesk <NewsDesk@UMCOM.UMC.ORG>  
Subject: UMNS #102-Help end child poverty, NCC board told  
To: UMNSDN@LISTSERV.UMC.ORG

Help end child poverty, NCC board told

Feb. 28, 2001 News media contact: Linda Bloom·(212) 870-3803·New York 10-21-71B{102}

NOTE: This report is accompanied by a sidebar, UMNS story #103.

NEW YORK (UMNS) - The leader of the Children's Defense Fund has challenged National Council of Churches (NCC) members to join a new campaign to eliminate child poverty within 10 years.

Marian Wright Edelman, speaking during the Feb. 26-27 NCC executive board meeting, pointed out that her organization's new effort to "Leave No Child Behind" meshes well with the NCC's own mobilization against poverty.

The longtime children's advocate talked about Martin Luther King Jr.'s commitment to the poor and used statistics to show that an even higher percentage of America's children live in poverty than in 1968, the year King was assassinated. Despite the past eight years of unprecedented economic growth, she noted, "our children are in great peril when we have a great capacity to do something about it."

Goals of "Leave No Child Behind" include laying out a broad national vision for dealing with child poverty, reducing the number of poor children by half by 2004 and eliminating the problem within 10 years.

But Edelman doesn't believe that a traditional campaign, with a focus on legislation and lobbying, is enough. What's required, she told NCC board members, is a massive, powerful moral witness - a movement as strong as the civil rights movement was back in the 1960s.

The Rev. Robert Edgar, a United Methodist who serves as the NCC's chief executive, agreed during the meeting to serve on the "Leave No Child Behind" steering committee. Another NCC executive, the Rev. Eileen Lindner, has been giving staff time to the Children's Defense Fund.

The NCC has started its own decade of the Mobilization to Overcome Poverty by consulting with its committees and ecumenical and interfaith groups; developing partnerships with organizations such as the Children's Defense Fund, Call to Renewal, Habitat for Humanity and Bread for the World; and sponsoring a February consultation with ecumenical agencies to assess the effects of welfare reform. In the following months, teams for planning, research, communications and fund raising will be developed. A consultation to identify priority issues for a legislative agenda is set for October.

In other business, Edgar described the agency's financial situation as something of a miracle. "We had a \$5.9 million deficit in 1999 and in calendar year 2000, we balanced the budget," he said. Part of the miracle he attributes to \$2 million in contributions from member communions.

It was noted during the budget report that one denomination still owes \$153,000 of its commitment. Bishop Melvin Talbert, ecumenical officer for the United Methodist Council of Bishops, said later that he expects the denomination to honor that pledge.

Barbara Ellen Black, the NCC's general manager, reported that revenues have continued to lag, particularly because expected money from Americorp and foundation grants has not been received yet. However, she said expenditures are stabilizing. Edgar pledged the staff would achieve a balanced budget for the six-month period between January and July of this year.

Executive board members elected Wesley M. "Pat" Pattillo, a Southern Baptist from Birmingham, Ala., as the agency's new associate general secretary for communications. He will begin his duties on April 16, overseeing communications for both the NCC and its international ministry, Church World Service.

Currently North American representative for Hong Kong Baptist University, Pattillo previously served the Southern Baptist Convention's flagship institution, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Ky., for 14 years and Samford University in Birmingham for eight years.

Concern over the situation in Colombia led board members to adopt a resolution on "Peace in Colombia and U.S. Counter-narcotics Policy," referring specifically to the "Plan Colombia" aid package before Congress.

That package "will draw the U.S. deeper into Colombia's civil war, potentially intensifying the conflict, undermining democracy and the rule of law, and making the U.S. complicit in human rights violations," the resolution stated.

Instead, the NCC, Church World Service, and their member communions will advocate for policies and programs that would support drug treatment and prevention programs to reduce drug demand in the United States. They also reject an increased U.S. military involvement in Colombia and the Andean region. The groups support a negotiated peace process; humanitarian, development and environmental initiatives; and other reforms for Colombia, along with strengthening cooperation with ecumenical partners and civil society organizations there.

In other action, NCC executive board members:

- Endorsed Campaign Exxon/Mobil, a national coalition of religious and environmental groups working to urge Exxon/Mobil to take full responsibility for its role in climate change and end its false claims about global warming.
- Called upon the United States and the international community to address banning the production, transfer and use of depleted uranium weapons, and upon NATO countries to repair the environmental damage done to Yugoslavia.
- Endorsed the concept of a proposed Second Conference on Faith and Order in North America.

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To leave this list at any time, please send an email to [listserv@listserv.umc.org](mailto:listserv@listserv.umc.org) with SIGNOFF UMNSDN in the body.

To: glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org, kathy@fcnl, david@fcnl, irashorr@hotmail.com, brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

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Shalom,  
Howard

To be sent to Jane Haldeman, Indianapolis Peace and Justice Center; Carol Cosby, Disciples Peace Fellowship; Rev. Linda McKiernan-Allen, a Disciples minister who is helping; and Larry Hayes in Fort Wayne

Dear Hoosier Friends:

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From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
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References:

I sent this message to you without the .org, so this is my second try. I've also sent it to Greg, Ira, and Esther. You can reply to them to if you want to.

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From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana message  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

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Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana  
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2001 22:47:18 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600  
Importance: Normal

Thanks for sharing this with us, Howard and I appreciate your willingness to put off your agenda for a few weeks.

Two things stand out that differ slightly from our understanding.

1) The question of who is going to coordinate Indiana--we were all unsure about that, but, there was a great deal of conversation that Jane might not be the right person. Could we ask that you hold off on asking her until I have an opportunity to see if there might be someone at the Joan Kroc institute at Notre Dame who might be interested?

2) Also, we prefer that the Washington Office of the Methodist Church be the contact to the Bishop Indiana at this point. So, could you also please hold off on that piece let the process we are working with with Robin go forward.

At some point we agreed that we need to write letters to Lugar and Bayh so that we are not viewed as "targetting," a no no for 501(c)3s.

Thanks you, Howard for all of your dedication and hard work to disarmament, in general, and to this issue in particular.

Esther

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 10:04 AM  
To: glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org; kathy@fcnl; david@fcnl; irashorr@hotmail.com; brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
Subject: Indiana

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Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

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From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana  
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 11:08:02 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

Sounds fine to me. Kathy Guthrie is tied up in a day-long meeting and won't see this e-mail. If you want her input, you'll need to wait until Monday.

David

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 10:08 AM  
To: kathy@fcnl.org; david@fcnl.org  
Subject: Indiana

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Reply-To: <ronsider@esa-online.org>  
From: "Ron Sider" <ronsider@esa-online.org>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Sign-on letter on national missile defense  
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 11:28:32 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300  
X-SLUIDL: 8D01874B-0F2811D5-B51B0090-27B0F6E1

Dear Howard,

I am glad to sign the letter (February 28/01 e-mail) as:

Ronald J. Sider  
President  
Evangelicals for Social Action

Sincerely,

Ron Sider

P.S. Please confirm receipt.

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2001 2:02 PM  
To: ronsider@esa-online.org  
Subject: Sign-on letter on national missile defense

This was sent on February 21 to the "esa" general e-mail address.

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

I have finalized the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense by incorporating suggestions received. I edited the opening sentence, added some language in the first and second reasons, and dropped what was the third reason, the need for rigorous testing.

Will you or some other representative from your organization sign these letters? For denominations we are suggesting heads of Washington offices or social action agencies rather than heads of communion, but that is your choice to make. I request your response by Wednesday, February 28. [An extension to March 2 is okay.] For your convenience, you can fill in the blanks.

Yes, we will sign the letters to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense.

Name and title of signer:

Name of organization:

The letters will have no letterhead, only the date of transmission.

Signers will be in alphabetical order by organization. At the end it will indicate: "This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036; phone: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org."

Shalom,  
Howard

###

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides the breeding ground for terrorist groups

Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications. Since 1983 the United States has spent \$69 billion on national missile defense, enriching major defense contractors but producing no effective system. President Clinton's plan, which you have criticized as inadequate, would cost \$60 billion. Indications are that the layered approach you favor

could cost more than \$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this magnitude along with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with other urgent domestic needs.

For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Representatives of  
faith-based organizations

###

Dear Senator/Representative:

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Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

To: lisaw@nccusa.org, conoverp@ucc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\abolish.339.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Lisa and Pat,

Here is another draft of a statement on the nuclear posture review. On the previous draft Lisa wondered whether we should use the National Cathedral statement because it is so watered down. She thinks that NCC has had stronger statements in the past. That is true of some of the denominations, too, such as United Methodist and Episcopal. I've thought about but have stuck with the Cathedral statement's language, in fact, opened with it. Here's my reasoning.

What if Bob Edgar took the lead and sent this statement to the signers of the Cathedral statement (which includes Orthodox, Jews, Muslims), saying, "Dear fellow signer, last June we offered our views, etc. Now is time for the next step. The nuclear posture review is underway. We should speak truth to power. Etc." He could also send it to heads of communion who didn't sign, especially African American denominations and to representatives of the peace churches. Once it is signed by these various leaders, Bob, on behalf of the signers, could request a meeting with President Bush, VP Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell.

The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches recently issued a "Statement on Nuclear Disarmament, NATO Policy and the Churches". (See [www.wcc-coe.org](http://www.wcc-coe.org))

Their statement makes ample use of the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference, claiming that it represents a broad international consensus. This reinforces my desire to draw on the "practical steps" of the Final Document.

What to do next? If you think this makes sense, the three of us can work over my draft statement. Then Lisa will need to talk with Bob Edgar to see whether he would accept the suggested approach. I can talk with him, too, if you think it would be helpful. If he goes along, we can share the statement with the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament for information but not ask for endorsement. Washington people need to know about it because often heads of communion turn to them for advice on signing such statements.

What do you think?

Shalom,  
Howard

###

The U.S. Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century  
A Statement by Religious Leaders

"We deeply believe that the long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, and the ever-present danger of their acquisition by others is morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. They constitute a threat to the security of our nation, a peril to world peace, a danger to the whole human family."

Thus spoke 21 national religious leaders and 18 retired generals in a joint statement issued at the Washington National Cathedral in June 2000. They continued by propounding two truths:

"first, that the most commonly postulated threats to our national security are not susceptible to nuclear deterrence;

"second, that our nation's efforts to provide effective leadership in opposing the growing threat of nuclear proliferation will be credible only if our policies and those of the other nuclear powers demonstrate a commitment to the universal outlawing of these weapons."

They further stated:

It is...time for a great national and international discussion and examination of the true and full implications of reliance on nuclear weapons, to be followed by action leading to the international prohibition of these weapons."

We the signers of this present statement share this perspective. We affirm that nuclear weapons are morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. We agree that time has arrived for the American people to engage in public discussion on nuclear weapons and on how to achieve their elimination. We note that an excellent opportunity for such discussion now exists as part of the nuclear posture review that is now underway.

Mandated by Congress, the Secretary of Defense is now conducting "a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." Among other requirements this review is supposed to consider "the relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting, and arms control objectives."

What are the arms control objectives of the United States? Legally they are defined by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which the U.S. Senate ratified in 1969 by a bipartisan vote of 83 to 15. In Article VI the United States and other nuclear-weapon states agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." They reaffirmed this commitment in May 2000 in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which contains a promise to "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

To convert this promise into action, the Final Document specifies a series of "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI." They include:

- v Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- v A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that treaty.
- v Negotiation of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material.
- v Early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- v Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- v Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- v Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- v A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- v The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

We propose that these steps leading toward nuclear disarmament should now be incorporated into the U.S. nuclear

posture. We suggest that the concept of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons should serve as a guiding principle for the next five to ten years. This time span would thereby serve as a transitional period between (i) full and widespread deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and (ii) the future time when the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is achieved.

In this manner the United States, along with other nuclear-weapon states, could make substantial progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons during the first decade of the 21st century. This would enable the world to move away from the outmoded, 20th century reliance on nuclear weapons. This would constitute true moral progress for humankind.

In order to obtain full public participation in the nuclear posture review we call for public hearings by the Department of Defense and by appropriate committees of Congress. We ask that a draft nuclear posture statement be published for widespread public discussion with provision for ample feedback before it is finally adopted.

Signers

Draft of March 3, 2001  
Written by Howard W. Hallman

To: dringler@umc-gbcs.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Robin,

I think it's fine if you contact Bishop Woodie White. It is my understanding that we are asking him three things.

(1) Would he join other prelates in Indiana in being an initial signer of a statement on de-alerting addressed to Senators Lugar and Bayh, based upon the letter from national religious leaders to President Bush, handled by FCNL. That version is on [www.fcnl.org](http://www.fcnl.org). FCNL can give you a printed version if you want to send one to Bishop White. You can point out that Bishop Talbert and Jim Winkler were signers of the national statement. You can also note that the resolution on "Saying No to Nuclear Deterrence" recommends "immediately take all nuclear weapons off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles and by other means" (p. 784, Book of Resolutions)

(2) Would he participate in a meeting with Senator Lugar (and maybe Senator Bayh, too) to talk about the content of the letter?

(3) Would he be willing to request such a meeting in behalf of the signers and have his office work out the time and place?

If what Esther asked you is different, I would like to discuss it with you.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <NEBBKJHCMLACLOPKCPPBOEJKCBAA.prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
References: <3.0.3.32.20010302100347.0068f630@pop2.igc.org>

At 10:47 PM 3/1/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Thanks for sharing this with us, Howard and I appreciate your willingness to  
>put off your agenda for a few weeks.

Comment: You'll note that I said "six weeks". That's more leeway than the four weeks you and Ira mentioned. It's more realistic.

>Two things stand out that differ slightly from our understanding.

>

>1) The question of who is going to coordinate Indiana--we were all unsure  
>about that, but, there was a great deal of conversation that Jane might not  
>be the right person. Could we ask that you hold off on asking her until I  
>have an opportunity to see if there might be someone at the Joan Kroc  
>institute at Notre Dame who might be interested?

Answer: Okay, I'll indicate that this is to be determined. However, I don't see why Jane couldn't be the recipient of sign-ons if no one else is available.

>2) Also, we prefer that the Washington Office of the Methodist Church be the  
>contact to the Bishop Indiana at this point. So, could you also please hold  
>off on that piece let the process we are working with with Robin go forward.

Answer: I don't mind if Robin writes Bishop White, though I have an active relationship with UM bishops and often write them. Robin is extremely busy, getting ready for a major meeting and preparing for her departure, so she may not get around to it until some time next week. This may hold back the letter. I've talked with Robin and suggested that she cite the UM resolution on "Saying No to Nuclear Deterrence", which has a strong de-alerting position. I also suggested that she note that Bishop Talbert and Jim Winkler had signed the national statement.

>At some point we agreed that we need to write letters to Lugar and Bayh so  
>that we are not viewed as "targetting," a no no for 501(c)3s.

Query: My understanding is that the Indiana version of the FCNL statement will be addressed to both senators. Are you suggesting that delegations must meet with both of them, too?

Howard

X-eGroups-Return: sentto-1606632-18-983556082-mupj=igc.apc.org@returns.onelist.com  
X-Sender: info@abolition2000.org X-Apparently-To: sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com  
X-Sender: abolition2000@abolition2000.org To: sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com  
From: Carah Lynn Ong X-eGroups-Approved-By: info@abolition2000.org via email; 2 Mar  
2001 18:01:20 -0000 Mailing-List: list sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com; contact  
sunflower-napf-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-  
To: mailing list sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com List-Unsubscribe:  
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 10:00:58 -0700 Reply-To: sunflower-napf-owner@yahoogroups.com  
Subject: [sunflower-napf] Sunflower No. 46  
Yahoo! Groups      My Groups | sunflower-napf Main Page

The Sunflower Newsletter No. 46 March 2001  
Online monthly newsletter of the  
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

The Sunflower  
March 2001 (No. 46)

The Sunflower is a monthly e-newsletter providing educational information on nuclear weapons  
abolition and other issues relating to global security. Back issues are available.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS  
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### Russia Presents Its Own Ballistic Missile Defense System to NATO

Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev presented Russian plans to build its own ballistic missile  
system to NATO Secretary-General George Robertson on 20 February. The proposed Russian  
system would be based on using existing theater-range weapons that can destroy ballistic missiles  
in their "boost-phase" which differs from US plans to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in

space. According to NATO officials, the Russian system under consideration would likely fall within the limits of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty only permits the construction of anti-missile systems that would destroy incoming ballistic missiles with a limited range (3,500 km).

The Russian proposal was welcomed by US and NATO allies as it signified Russia's acknowledgement of missile proliferation threats.  
(source: Reuters, 22 February 2001)

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STAR WARRIORS (SPACE PATROL)  
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The following quotes from current and former ranking US officials gives voice to US plans to "control and dominate" outer space as outlined in the US Space Command's Joint Vision for 2020.

"Our position depends upon space, space sensors, space communications, space intelligence and, also, guiding our weapons accurately from space. All of this is a marvelous achievement, but it creates for us a potential vulnerability-and that is if we are somehow or other cut off, or our ability to utilize space is reduced, we are going to be engaged around the world in ways that the US public will not particularly tolerate, in that we are likely to come home with large numbers of bodies in bags. The consequence is that the public will be turned off. So our international role might come crashing down. And the moral of the story is that we have to protect the usage of space."

-James Schlesinger  
Former CIA Chief and Secretary of Defense

"Having shown the world the utility of space systems, it would be pretty naïve to think that our adversaries are just going to be sitting around idly and not developing their own space-based information capabilities and the tools and techniques to counter the current US space advantage."  
-The Rumsfeld Commission

"The importance of space control and space superiority will continue to grow as our economy becomes more reliant on space. As space becomes more integral-and critical-to military land, sea and air operations, the US must devote more attention to the sensitive issues of space control and superiority."

-General Ralph E. Eberhart  
Commander in Chief, US Space Command

"Whoever controls space will control the destiny of the Earth. And when you look at the options out there, I would ask you, who do you want it to be? Iran? Russia? Iraq? China?"

-Senator Robert Smith  
Republican, New Hampshire

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## DEPLETED URANIUM

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### UK Fires DU Munitions off Coast of Scotland

Despite increased international attention about the use of depleted uranium in munitions, the UK test-fired depleted uranium shells at a range off the coast of Scotland on 20 February for the first time since the munitions were linked to a possible risk of cancer. The UK insists, along with the US and some other NATO allies, that there is no proof the munitions pose any health risks.

The tests received criticism from surrounding communities. The UK Ministry of Defense justified the use of depleted uranium shells as the only ammunition the British forces have for penetrating modern heavy armor effectively. A spokeswoman for the Campaign Against Depleted Uranium stated, "We believe in precautionary principle. It seems the height of folly to still be test-firing them."

(source: ENN, 21 February 2001)

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## NUCLEAR MATTERS

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### North Korea Threatens to Scrap Missile Test Deal

On 22 February, North Korea threatened to discard a moratorium on long-range missile tests. North Korea agreed in September 1999 to suspend missile tests for the duration of negotiations with the US on the country's missile program and in exchange the US agreed to ease sanctions and provide assistance to the country's nuclear energy program.

The threats to disregard the missile test moratorium came after the Bush Administration announced it would take a "hard-line" policy with Pyongyang. A spokesman for North Korean foreign ministry stated, "The new US foreign and security team is making a fuss by saying it will take a hard-line stance on us. But this is an attempt to reverse the past course of conciliatory and cooperative relations between us and the United States, and break our will with force. We promised not to test-fire long-range missiles during the duration of talks on the missile issue, but we cannot do so indefinitely."

(source: AP, 21 February 2001)

### Kursk Tragedy Caused by Torpedo Misfire

A sailor on the Kursk reportedly left a note on the nuclear submarine charging that the ship was sunk by the explosion of a practice torpedo. According to the Izvestia, a Russian daily newspaper, the note was written by Lt. Rashid Aryapov. Russian Navy Officials have so far

declined to comment on the claim, stating that the accident was likely caused by an internal malfunction, a collision with a foreign submarine or a World War II mine. However, most Russian and foreign experts agree that the accident was likely caused by misfiring a practice torpedo.

(source: AP, 26 February 2001)

### German Intelligence Reports on Iraq Nuclear Weapons Capability

On 24 February, a German Intelligence report was published in German newspapers claiming that Iraq would have nuclear weapons capability within three years and would be able to fire a missile as far as Europe by 2005. The US and British forces conducted severe bombing raids on Iraqi radar sites on 16 February. Arab reaction to the bombings was greater than anticipated by the US Administration.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was visiting the Middle East when the German reports were released, used the opportunity to reiterate to neighboring countries the need for continued U.N. sanctions on Iraq. Powell noted that the weapons Saddam is developing would be aimed at the people of the region. Powell stated, "We have to make sure that we do everything we can to contain him, constrain him, to get inspectors back in under the terms of the U.N. resolutions." (source: Reuters, 25 February 2001)

### Concern Over British Nuclear Sub Deepens

Concern has deepened over the HMS Tireless, the British nuclear submarine that has been stranded in Gibraltar since May 2000 because of a fracture in its reactor cooling system. Although repairs are expected to be finished in March and the sub is expected to return to the UK in April, citizens and organizations alike continue to voice worries about radiation leaks contaminating Gibraltar's main water desalination plant.

Anxiety about radiation concerns has been reinforced by admission from the British Ministry of Defense that similar fractures have appeared in the cooling system of four out of 12 of the other nuclear submarines in the British fleet. Vaughan Starkey, a Ministry of Defense civil servant in Gibraltar, recently admitted that up to 90 liters of coolant water containing low levels of radiation was pumped overboard before the sub docked in Gibraltar last year.

The Environmental Safety Group in Gibraltar is considering taking legal action against the British Ministry of Defense. Additionally, ten Spanish Greenpeace activists were arrested in January for boarding the submarine in a non-violent action to raise awareness about the sub's presence in the British colony. Private opinion polls in Gibraltar estimate that between 50% and 70% of the population oppose the presence of the sub in the colony. (source: The Guardian, 27 January 2001)

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NUCLEAR ENERGY  
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## Price Anderson Act Up for Renewal

The Price Anderson Act, passed in the US Congress in 1957, will once again come up for renewal on 1 August 2001. Without this irresponsible Congressional Act, which limits operator liability for a nuclear reactor accident, there would be no nuclear industry. According to official government estimates, in the event of a nuclear accident that could cause up to \$314 billion in damages, the Act will pay up to a limit of \$7 billion. The Price Anderson Act establishes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the sole judge and distributor of payments in the case of a nuclear accident.

The Act also applies a statute of limitations in which victims of an accident can not claim damages after ten years, despite the fact that cancers take more than ten years to develop. The Price Anderson Act demonstrates the nuclear industry's refusal to accept responsibility for actions that could cause harm not only to human health, but also to the environment. Each time the Act comes up for renewal, the nuclear lobby threatens to shut down every power plant unless the Act is renewed. The Price Anderson Act has discouraged development of more environmentally safe sources of renewable energy.

## Take Action!

1. Call or write your elected officials and urge them not to renew the Price Anderson Act. Tell your elected officials that it is time for the nuclear industry to take full responsibility for its actions.
2. Sign an online petition calling upon US Senators and Members of Congress not to renew the Price Anderson Act. <http://www.PetitionOnline.com/repealpa/petition.html>

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FAQ of the MONTH  
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## What is MOX Fuel?

MOX, or mixed oxide plutonium, is an experimental fuel in which plutonium, usually from dismantled nuclear weapons, is mixed with uranium for use in commercial nuclear reactors. The MOX projects require transporting plutonium by rail, ship or truck. The use of plutonium MOX fuel creates serious security threats as the transportation of plutonium increases the possibilities for theft and/or diversion of plutonium.

In a study conducted in 1999, the Nuclear Control Institute determined that a severe accident at a

civilian reactor powered by plutonium or MOX fuel could cause twice as many fatal cancers as an identical accident at a reactor that uses uranium fuel. MOX plutonium fuel produces more radioactivity than does uranium fuel.

The use of plutonium MOX fuel also greatly exacerbates the problem of storing and disposing high-level radioactive waste. The use of plutonium in a nuclear reactor will not get rid of plutonium, which is an impossible goal. The idea behind using MOX plutonium, rather, is to render it less approachable by terrorists or "states of concern" because, mixed with other high-level radioactive substances, it is so lethal.

For more information about MOX fuel, please visit the Nuclear Information Resource Service at <http://www.nirs.org>

Do you have a question about nuclear issues that you would like answered? Send your question to [abolition2000@napf.org](mailto:abolition2000@napf.org) or visit the Foundation's website and type in your question at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/resources/answers.html>

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#### NUCLEAR INSANITY

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"Developing new defense technology and new weapons is a critical need for this country and great news for the economy of North Alabama."

Bud Cramer,  
US Congressman  
Democrat-Huntsville

Javier Solana, the European Union's Foreign Policy Chief, on the ABM Treaty

"It's not a Bible." (5 February 2001, AP)

Missile Defense is Bush's Idee Fixe

Definition of Idee Fixe from Dictionary.com:

An idea that dominates the mind; a fixed idea; an obsession.

The reality of obsession-its incessant return to the same few themes, scenarios and questions; its meticulous examination and re-examination of banal minutiae for hidden meanings that simply aren't there; the cancerous way an idee fixe usurps other, more interesting thoughts-is that it is confining, not rebellious, and not fascinating but maddeningly dull.

--Laura Miller,  
New York Times,  
20 August 2000

In an attempt to win approval for US plans to deploy its controversial National Missile Defense (NMD) system, President Bush has called for a review to assess how deeply the US nuclear arsenal can be reduced. Although receiving opposition from the Pentagon, Bush has stated that the US can unilaterally reduce the number of offensive nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Reductions in the nuclear arsenal could help the Bush administration pacify Russia and China, who oppose the NMD system, as well as win support from skeptical allies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed further reductions for START III levels to 1,500 or below on each side. The Russian proposal, along with implementation of START II reductions, hinges on the fact that the US not deploy a national missile defense. NMD deployment would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a treaty that Russia considers a cornerstone for global arms control efforts.

In his "State of the Union Address" to Congress on 27 February, Bush stated, "To protect our own people, our allies and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile defenses. And as we transform our military, we can discard Cold War relics and reduce our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs."

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#### NAPF HAPPENINGS

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### Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Kicks Off International Membership Campaign By JP Wilson

From March 1st through September 30th, 2001, Foundation members will participate in our first-ever Membership Campaign, People For Peace. Teams of 4-6 people will embark on sustained efforts to increase the Foundation's membership locally, and members across the country and around the world will be campaigning in their respective communities. These dedicated members will be talking to their friends, co-workers, family and anyone else that would consider becoming a member to add their voice to creating conditions for peace.

Foundation members bring more voices and resources to strengthen the Foundation's efforts towards abolishing nuclear weapons and creating a more peaceful future. This campaign will play a major role in engaging people around the world to become members.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has been working to create a peaceful world since 1982. The Foundation is a non-profit educational organization with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and is recognized by the United Nations as a Peace Messenger Organization. The Foundation initiates and supports worldwide efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, to strengthen international law and institutions, to use technology responsibly and sustainably, and to empower youth to create a more peaceful world.

If you would like to become involved in this exciting 6-month effort, please contact JP Wilson at

<communications@napf.org>. The fun is just beginning! Find out more by visiting the Foundation's website at <http://www.wagingpeace.org>

Wagingpeace.org Update by Jason Sattler

Wagingpeace.org is now offering our award winning content in English, French, Spanish and Japanese (coming soon). Following the lead of the Ash.org web site, we have taken steps to make our site available in as many languages as possible. The translation is not perfect but meets our goal of establishing an international presence that will develop in the coming months and years.

When international users explore our site they will find the height of discourse on global peace issues. Our page presenting International Perspectives on International Ballistic Defense (<http://www.wagingpeace.org/resources/index.html>) now has 16 important articles from experts around the world. On the same page you will find an animated movie that questions the "Star Wars" mentality and a message board to post your thoughts.

Our Peace Heroes section of the site (<http://www.wagingpeace.org/hero/index2.html>) recently won an Editor's Choice Award from Awesome Library as being the top in the field of K-12 education. Thousands of people each week visit this area of the site to learn about exemplary lives such as Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi and Eleanor Roosevelt.

In January we completed the implementation of our site's new look, the "front end," as its known. With that out of the way, we are now sharpening up our "back end." We recently implemented a new database system that automates many of the aspects of our online membership campaign. Already 50 plus people a week are joining our site as an online member or signing the electronic version of our Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. Our new capabilities allow us to stay in contact with our new members and gives us the capacity for hundreds of people to join us everyday from all around the world. In addition, almost any page on our site offers the feature "mail to a friend." By filling out a simple form, a user can refer their friends to a specific page on our site. We believe that when a friend refers you to a site you are much more likely to pay attention to it, so we are making it as easy as possible for our users.

WagingPeace.org strives towards constantly publishing dynamic, current and vital content for all peace-minded people on the web. We seek a personal connection with our users to let them know that real people are working on this issue. To facilitate dialogue, we answer questions that our users pose to us about any nuclear or peace related issue regularly on our site (<http://www.wagingpeace.org/resources/answers.html>). Further we seek to anticipate our users needs with the latest information and resources available such as current lists of contact information for political leaders and major media (<http://www.wagingpeace.org/action/actionresources.html> ).

Please visit our site soon and let us know how we can serve you better. Comments and suggestions can be emailed to [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org).

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## ACTIONS YOU CAN TAKE

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### Urge the US to Ratify the Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty!

1 March 2001 is the anniversary of the entry into force of the Landmines treaty. While 139 nations have so far signed the treaty and 110 have ratified, the US refuses to do so. Write a letter to your elected officials or a US embassy in your country, urging the new administration to sign the treaty to rid the world of anti-personnel landmines.

From 6-10 March, the "Ban Landmines Week," as proclaimed by Mayor Williams of Washington DC, mine survivors, deminers, campaigners and researchers from all 50 States and over 90 countries will gather in Washington DC to take part in a series of meetings. Additionally, they will urge the Bush Administration to take a stand against the use of anti-personnel mines as well as sign and ratify the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

### 29 January-4 April: A Season for Nonviolence

29 January to 4 April is the fourth annual Season for Nonviolence. A Season for Nonviolence was inspired by the 50th memorial anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi (January 30, 1998) and the 30th memorial anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (April 4, 1998). The overall mission of A Season for Nonviolence is to make peace a way of life and to create a society that honors the dignity and worth of every human being.

For more information on A Season for Nonviolence or for action ideas and daily inspiration, please visit <http://www.nonviolenceworks.com>

### 29 March-2 April: School of the Americas Resistance in Washington D.C.

On 17 January, the School of Americas (SOA) reopened as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The "cosmetic" change was included in the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2001. The new military school will ensure that the SOA can continue its mission and operation to train Latin American soldiers in combat, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. Graduates of the SOA have been responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in Latin America. The Western Hemisphere for Security Cooperation is the "same shame under a new name."

The SOA Watch is holding Spring Days of Resistance in Washington D.C. from 29 March to 2 April to vigil and lobby at the capitol. An optional six day fast will coincide with the days of resistance. For more information or to obtain an organizing packet, please visit <http://www.soaw.org>

14-16 July: LANL 2001-Action for Abolition

16 July 2001 marks the 56th anniversary of the first atomic bomb explosion in New Mexico called Trinity. To commemorate the event, Peace Action New Mexico is hosting panels and practical workshops on organizing and nuclear issues in Santa Fe, New Mexico from 14-15 July. Following the conference, there will be a rally and peaceful demonstration at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to send a high-profile message to policy makers in Washington D.C. and to allies around the world who, want a safe, nuclear-free world.

For more information, please contact Peace Action New Mexico (505) 989-4812 or LANLaction@aol.com

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#### RESOURCES

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Visit the new and improved website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at [Http://www.wagingpeace.org](http://www.wagingpeace.org)

Order a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation T-shirt! Visit <http://napf.org/secure/tshirts.html>

Take a journey through the Nuclear Age. Visit the Nuclear Files at <Http://www.nuclearfiles.org>

View frequently asked questions on nuclear dangers and nuclear disarmament <http://www.wagingpeace.org/krieger-morefaq.html>

"State of the World 2001", a downloadable report from the World Watch Institute is available in pdf format at: <http://secure.worldwatch.org/cgi-bin/wwinst/SOW01P>

The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) has released a three part report, "Plutonium: The Last Five Years," documenting plutonium hazards and inventories and revealing the Department of Energy's mismanagement of its plutonium storage responsibilities. The report is available online at [http://www.bredl.org/press/2001/Pu\\_Report.htm](http://www.bredl.org/press/2001/Pu_Report.htm)

Using information from the Center for Responsive Politics, Project Abolition has put together a profile of the campaign contributions and lobbying expenses of the Big Four Star Wars contractors, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW. Project Abolition has also compiled a list of these contractors' plants and offices around the country. <http://projectabolition.org/cprojects.html>

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#### EDITORS

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Carah Ong  
David Krieger

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Carah Lynn Ong  
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[Http://www.abolition2000.org](http://www.abolition2000.org)

"He aha te nui mea o te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata." (A Maori Saying)

"What is the most important thing in the world? It is the people, the people, the people."

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Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2001 13:19:12 -0500

From: Kevin Martin

X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win98; U) X-Accept-Language: en To: Kevin Martin

Subject: commentary on Star Wars Dear Friends of Peace,

Following is a commentary on Star Wars National Missile Defense I did for my local public radio station in Northern Indiana. It aims to de-bunk Star Wars proponents' argument that missile defense offers a more moral nuclear policy. I also pose nuclear weapons abolition as a more realistic, safe alternative.

I send this not because I'm enamored of my own brilliant analysis or anything, but as a contribution to shaping our message against Star Wars. In addition to attempting to address head-on the baloney that missile defense offers a more moral option to mutual assured destruction (as if we Star Wars opponents support MAD) this piece shows how we can use the Star Wars issue to raise our arguments for abolition.

I've heard from some folks that they are concerned a focus on stopping Star Wars will detract from our work for abolition, but I disagree. In my opinion, Star Wars, in addition to being a fight that we have no choice but to fight if we are serious about averting a new arms race and the militarization of space, offers us the opportunity to raise abolition as the more moral, more realistic, safer, and cheaper alternative. Star Wars is a "gateway issue" for us to address abolition, keeping outer space for peace, and also critiquing the future of U.S. nuclear and conventional war-fighting strategy. Please give me the benefit of your comments.

Apologies for duplicate postings.

In Peace,

Kevin Martin

Director, Project Abolition

\*\*\*\*\*

Commentary on Star Wars National Missile Defense, public radio station WVPE, Elkhart, Indiana

by Project Abolition Director Kevin Martin

Supporters of a Star Wars National Missile Defense (NMD) system often frame their argument in appealing terms, stating that missile defense would offer us freedom from the threat of a nuclear missile attack. Proponents paint missile defense as an antidote to the immoral, outmoded Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction or MAD, which holds that nuclear-armed adversaries will be deterred from launching a nuclear strike by the threat of certain retaliation and annihilation.

For example, conservative Christian political activist Chuck Colson, whose daily BreakPoint commentary is carried by over 1,000 radio stations around the country, opined on January 19 that

deploying a national missile defense "...can restore sanity to our national security policies and deliver us from the moral insanity imposed by a forty-year relic of the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)." On the moral insanity of continuing to base our security on the threat to incinerate millions of people, politely called "nuclear deterrence", Colson was silent.

If we raise morality in the context of nuclear weapons, as we must, then we are "in for a dime, in for a dollar", and have to realize that no religious, moral or ethical code can justify the use, threat to use, or even existence of nuclear weapons. Far from posing a more moral policy, missile defense advocates shrink from moral leadership by accepting the continued existence of these horrific weapons that could end life on Earth as we know it.

It is unfair and inaccurate to allege that opponents of Star Wars seek to maintain MAD, or what has more appropriately been called the nuclear balance of terror. Advocates of the only real solution to the nuclear threat – the total, verifiable, enduring elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth – are not defenders of MAD. We oppose Star Wars because, while supporters say it will make us more secure, it in fact will do the opposite by starting a new nuclear arms race with Russia and China, which will then likely spread to India and Pakistan.

There are the other important reasons to oppose Star Wars. Independent scientists including 50 Nobel Prize laureates say it won't work. Star Wars will rob tens or more likely hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars from education, health care, and the environment. The alleged threats NMD is supposed to counter, an attack by a "rogue" state or an accidental missile launch by Russia, are overstated. None of the "states of concern" as they are now called, North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, has ever flight-tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead, and while U.S. relations with Iraq remain adversarial, remarkable steps toward rapprochement with Iran and particularly North Korea have occurred in the last few years. The threat of an accidental launch by Russia, while real and a cause for serious concern, is better addressed by working with Russia to improve its security, command and control over its nuclear arsenal, and by striving to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

Add it all up and it looks like the Star Wars' real role is not to defend the United States, but rather the interests of the weapons contractors who pumped over \$13 million in campaign cash into election campaigns over the last two years to make sure Star Wars and other exorbitant Cold War dinosaurs get funded by your tax dollars and mine. Dr. Nira Schwartz, a former TRW senior engineer who blew the whistle on the contractor's fraudulent reporting of Star Wars radar test results, said it best: "It's not a defense of the United States. It's a conspiracy to allow them to milk the government. They are creating for themselves a job for life." Dr. Schwarz is suing TRW and lead Star Wars contractor Boeing for violation of the False Claims Act and wrongful employment retaliation. Boeing recently had its contract renewed by the Pentagon for \$6 billion. With options, the amount could balloon to \$13.7 billion by 2007.

Predictably, supporters of missile defense scoff at the notion of abolishing nuclear weapons worldwide. "You can't put the genie back in the bottle," they say. The knowledge of how to build nuclear arms is widely available and can never be wiped from the collective human memory, so we are doomed to live with nuclear weapons forever.

Eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide, while not a simple matter, is much more realistic, and would make the U.S. and the world more secure, than an illusory and ultimately fruitless pursuit of security through the provocative, unproven, so far failed technology of missile defense. Cheaper, too, by far. The land-, sea-, and space-based version of Star Wars favored by the Bush Administration would likely cost at least \$100 billion, maybe several times that, on top of the \$60 billion we've spent on missile defense schemes since Ronald Reagan proposed Star Wars in 1983, with absolutely nothing to show for it. That's your tax dollars and mine that could be better used for education, health care, affordable housing and the environment.

Nobody believes nuclear weapons can be eliminated tomorrow. But serious, thoughtful people including former heads of state like Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev and former admirals and generals who had their fingers on nuclear triggers have come out for the global abolition of nuclear weapons. High-level commissions have outlined the necessary steps toward total nuclear disarmament, including measures for verification and control of nuclear materials. A draft model treaty on eliminating nuclear weapons, similar to the treaty that outlawed chemical weapons, has been circulated for discussion at the United Nations. Abolishing nuclear weapons would be a process; nations would negotiate the steps, work together to verify progress, agree on how to deal with potential violators. Confidence would be built along the way; we'd be building the path by walking it.

There's no such thing as a risk-free world, especially because the nuclear genie is out of the bottle. So there are two choices: work to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide, understanding the risks and benefits involved, or pursue security through missile defense, with our eyes wide open that it will spur nuclear proliferation and a new arms race. It seems to me there's only one moral option here.

Kevin Martin is the Director of Project Abolition, a coalition of seven national peace and disarmament groups advocating worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons, based in Goshen. More information on Star Wars, particularly the main weapons contractors, is available at [www.projectabolition.org](http://www.projectabolition.org)

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Star Wars commentary for WVPE.doc"

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana  
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 01:35:06 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

I did notice the six weeks and appreciate that. Let's stay with Robin making the contact to the Bishop even if it isn't until next week. I am sending her a copy of the letter now.

We didn't really address the issue of having delegations to both Senators, but it makes sense to us, if it isn't too much.

Your briefing books are on the way.  
E

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 1:12 PM  
To: prgrm@backfromthebrink.net  
Subject: RE: Indiana

At 10:47 PM 3/1/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Thanks for sharing this with us, Howard and I appreciate your willingness to  
>put off your agenda for a few weeks.

Comment: You'll note that I said "six weeks". That's more leeway than the four weeks you and Ira mentioned. It's more realistic.

>Two things stand out that differ slightly from our understanding.  
>

>1) The question of who is going to coordinate Indiana--we were all unsure  
>about that, but, there was a great deal of conversation that Jane might not  
>be the right person. Could we ask that you hold off on asking her until I  
>have an opportunity to see if there might be someone at the Joan Kroc  
>institute at Notre Dame who might be interested?

Answer: Okay, I'll indicate that this is to be determined. However, I don't see why Jane couldn't be the recipient of sign-ons if no one else is available.

>2) Also, we prefer that the Washington Office of the Methodist Church be the  
>contact to the Bishop Indiana at this point. So, could you also please hold  
>off on that piece let the process we are working with with Robin go forward.

Answer: I don't mind if Robin writes Bishop White, though I have an active relationship with UM bishops and often write them. Robin is extremely busy, getting ready for a major meeting and preparing for her departure, so she may not get around to it until some time next week. This may hold back the letter. I've talked with Robin and suggested that she cite the UM resolution on "Saying No to Nuclear Deterrence", which has a strong de-alerting position. I also suggested that she note that Bishop Talbert and Jim Winkler had signed the national statement.

>At some point we agreed that we need to write letters to Lugar and Bayh so >that we are not viewed as "targetting," a no no for 501(c)3s.

Query: My understanding is that the Indiana version of the FCNL statement will be addressed to both senators. Are you suggesting that delegations must meet with both of them, too?

Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.2  
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2001 04:49:22 -0600  
From: "Greg Laszakovits" <glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org>  
To: mupj@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Re: Indiana

Howard,

I hope you are happy with the way things ended yesterday. I'm glad we could all work things out.

Several things on your email:

- 1) I think there's a type-o under your "#1". "...the two Indiana senators with a request that the Y talk with President Bush..." Add the "Y" to they.
- 2) For the sake of clarity: You would like me to ask the President of Bethany Seminary in Richmond, IN to sign on to the letter you mention?
- 3) Now, Back From the Brink will email me the sample letters for me to copy and distribute to IN people?

Thanks, Greg

>>> "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org> 03/02/01 10:03AM >>>  
Dear Colleagues:

We had a productive meeting yesterday and forged a higher level of cooperative action. I appreciate that we could talk things through, even with a little heat, and work out a consensus. As follow up, here's a draft of an e-mail I want to send to our contacts in Indiana. I would appreciate your feedback by no later than mid-afternoon if possible so that I get it out today.

Shalom,  
Howard

To be sent to Jane Haldeman, Indianapolis Peace and Justice Center; Carol Cosby, Disciples Peace Fellowship; Rev. Linda McKiernan-Allen, a Disciples minister who is helping; and Larry Hayes in Fort Wayne

Dear Hoosier Friends:

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is merging its outreach work in Indiana with related efforts initiated by Back from the Brink Campaign (which concentrates on de-alerting) and the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL). Greg Laszakovits of the Church of the Brethren and I met yesterday with Ira Shorr and Esther Pank from the Brink Campaign and Kathy Guthrie and David Culp from FCNL to work out a common plan. I want to share our ideas with you. This may change somewhat the ways in which we've asked you to help us -- if that's all right with you.

We are proposing to focus primarily on de-alerting for the next six weeks but with a broader variety of approaches.

1. Religious leaders letter on de-alerting. We would use the text of the

letter of national religious leaders to President Bush (on [www.fcnl.org](http://www.fcnl.org)) but address it to the two Indiana senators with a request that the talk with President Bush about de-alerting.

(a) We want to ask several top religious leaders to be the initial signers, such as United Methodist Bishop Woodie White, Episcopal Bishop Catherine E.M. Waynick, Disciples Regional Minister Ed Weisheimer, similar Lutheran, Presbyterian, UCC, and Catholic leaders. I will contact Bishop White and Bishop Waynick (upon reference from the Episcopal Peace Fellowship). Back from the Brink will seek somebody from Notre Dame. Kathy Guthrie will seek a leading Quaker. Carol, could you help us with Rev. Weisheimer? Or send me his address if you want me to. Is there any other top religious leader in Indiana who should be approached?

(b) We would like your help in sending the letter with these initial signers to various religious leaders and religious organizations around the state. I hope that the United Methodist peace with justice coordinators will help, and similar officers from other denominations.

(c) We need to work out a central recipient of signatures. Jane, is this something you could handle?

2. Seeing Lugar. We propose that we ask Bishop White and other top leaders to seek an appointment with Senator Lugar to talk about the letter.

We suggest this because we know it's not easy to get an appointment with Senator Lugar and because he might be more receptive to hearing the message from these top leaders. We have to figure out who will contact Lugar's office. I may see if Bishop White would do so, since Lugar is a United Methodist. Until we get this figured out, I suggest you hold off on your contacts with Lugar's office.

3. Letters to Lugar, letters to the editor. The Brink campaign wants to get a lot of letters to Senator Lugar, asking him to provide leadership on de-alerting and to talk with President Bush about it. The Brink campaign also wants to encourage letters to the editor on this subject. They will provide samples. We would ask you to urge people in your networks to write such letters. Larry, could you help us find the best ways to get letters to the editor and op-ed pieces printed? Jane, I understand that you and your husband also have a knack for this.

4. After we finish six-weeks concentration on de-alerting, we will want to pick up on other nuclear disarmament issues that will be on the national agenda. We'll keep in contact with you on this.

I would like your feedback on these ideas. We greatly appreciate your help with this endeavor.

Shalom,  
Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

To: "Greg Laszakovits" <glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Re: Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <sa9f91cb.039@brethren.org>  
References:

At 04:49 AM 3/1/01 -0600, you wrote:

>2) For the sake of clarity: You would like me to ask the President of Bethany Seminary in Richmond, IN to sign on to the letter you mention?

Greg, yes please do. I've added that to the letter.

Howard

To: "Jane Haldeman" <ronjane@igc.org>, "Carol Cosby" <ccosby@dhm.disciples.org>, "Linda McKiernan-Allen" <lmckiern@juno.com>, "Larry Hayes" <LJHayes@aol.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana activities  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

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Shalom,  
Howard

To: brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Indiana contacts  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Esther,

Greg Laszakovits reminded me that he agreed to contact the president of Bethany Seminary in Richmond, IN to sign the letter. I added this in the letter to the Indiana folks.

Greg will need the text of the letter we are asking the religious leaders in Indiana to sign. So will I.

Howard

Foundry UMC will present a special service on the power of spirituals featuring poetry by Don Marbury and an "appearance" by Sojourner Truth on Sunday, March 11, at 2:30 p.m. Eileen Guenther, minister of music and liturgy at Foundry and lecturer in church music at Wesley Seminary, will direct singing by members of Foundry's choral groups, the Foundry Choir and Jubilate, along with members from Wesley Theological Seminary. "The reaction to this service was so positive when we offered it in chapel at Wesley Seminary that I wanted to create a service for the public that reaches to our souls about this important music form in our society," Gunther said. There are between 8,000 and 12,000 spirituals, many of these were written during the 19th century during the years of slavery. A free-will offering will be taken to benefit the after-school program of Congress Heights UMC in Anacostia. Foundry is located at 1500 16th Street, N.W. (the corner of 16th and P streets) Washington, D.C.

To: LJHayes38@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Indiana activities  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Larry,

This is my second attempt. The first time I made an error in your e-mail address. This same letter went to Jane Haldeman, Carol Cosby, and Rev. Linda McKiernan-Allen in Indianapolis.

Howard

Dear Hoosier Friends:

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I would like your feedback on these ideas. We greatly appreciate your help with this endeavor.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: Pank, david@fcnl.org, kathy@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Larry Hayes volunteers  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

As you can see, Larry Hayes is willing to help get letters and columns in Indiana newspapers. Why don't one of you pick up on this and get in touch with Larry? I'll stay out of this phase.

Howard

>From: LJHayes38@aol.com  
>Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 21:41:00 EST  
>Subject: Re: Indiana activities  
>To: mupj@igc.org  
>X-Mailer: AOL 3.0.1 for Mac sub 84  
>  
>  
>Howard,  
>  
>I'm glad to make suggestions for getting letters and columns in daily Indiana  
>newspapers.  
>  
>Let me know what format you want - whether e-mail or fax. Most libraries  
>would have Editor and Publisher Yearbook, which has the names, addresses,  
>phone numbers, etc of all American newspapers. Locally, the papers will  
>usually carry info on how to get letters and columns in the paper. Beyond  
>that, there's a whole art to an effective letter and column.  
>  
>Also, if somebody wants to run a proposed letter or column by me, they should  
>feel free to e-mail me a copy, and I'll do my best to help.  
>  
>Larry  
>

To: Egbert Lawrence <egbertl4pj@yahoo.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Delivering letters  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <20010228151001.22932.qmail@web11106.mail.yahoo.com>  
References: <3.0.3.32.20010227111213.0068f9bc@pop2.igc.org>

Larry,

Emily and Ali from the UUA office are willing to delivery letters on the Hill on Tuesday, March 6. I could ask them to do all three House office buildings and save you a trip to Washington. I have the Senate buildings covered. What is your pleasure?

Howard

From: Marsusab@aol.com  
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2001 18:33:11 EST  
Subject: NMD Sign Ons to President and Congress  
To: mupj@igc.org  
X-Mailer: AOL 5.0 for Windows sub 129

Howard:

Please sign us on as follows:

The Rev. Mark B. Brown  
Assistant Director, International Affairs and Human Rights  
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs  
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Please send the final letter with signers via E-mail to me.

Thanks.

Mark

From: "Lisa Wright" <lisaw@nccusa.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>, <conoverp@ucc.org>  
Subject: RE: NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW  
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2001 12:27:31 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300

Howard, with the landmines conference next week, I really won't be able to focus on this for the short term. I do want to think about this more, however, and go back and re-read earlier statements because we've got some very eloquent language there. I am still leaning more towards something that begins by saying that our policy has been, and will continue to be... We can still mention the review, etc. - AND the Nat'l Cath. thing too as something more recent (make that a second paragraph, in other words) but I think we need to go back to ground zero on this. We can acknowledge that there's a tremendous gap between the ideal and reality, but still I think we need to go back to a real basic, bottom line, posture on nuclear abolition.

Thanks for all you're doing on this, Howard. I really do appreciate your taking the lead tremendously.

Lisa

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 12:40 PM  
To: lisaw@nccusa.org; conoverp@ucc.org  
Subject: NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Dear Lisa and Pat,

Here is another draft of a statement on the nuclear posture review. On the previous draft Lisa wondered whether we should use the National Cathedral statement because it is so watered down. She thinks that NCC has had stronger statements in the past. That is true of some the denominations, too, such as United Methodist and Episcopal. I've thought about but have stuck with the Cathedral statement's language, in fact, opened with it. Here's my reasoning.

What if Bob Edgar took the lead and sent this statement to the signers of the Cathedral statement (which includes Orthodox, Jews, Muslims), saying, "Dear fellow signer, last June we offered our views, etc. Now is time for the next step. The nuclear posture review is underway. We should speak truth to power. Etc." He could also send it to heads of communion who didn't sign, especially African American denominations and to representatives of the peace churches. Once it is signed by these various leaders, Bob, on behalf of the signers, could request a meeting with President Bush, VP Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell.

The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches recently issued a "Statement on Nuclear Disarmament, NATO Policy and the Churches". (See [www.wcc-coe.org](http://www.wcc-coe.org))

Their statement makes ample use of the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference, claiming that it represents a broad international consensus. This reinforces my desire to draw on the "practical steps" of the Final Document.

What to do next? If you think this makes sense, the three of us can work over my draft statement. Then Lisa will need to talk with Bob Edgar to see whether he would accept the suggested approach. I can talk with him, too, if you think it would be helpful. If he goes along, we can share the statement with the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament for information but not ask for endorsement. Washington people need to know about it because often heads of communion turn to them for advice on signing such statements.

What do you think?

Shalom,  
Howard

###

#### The U.S. Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century A Statement by Religious Leaders

"We deeply believe that the long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, and the ever-present danger of their acquisition by others is morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. They constitute a threat to the security of our nation, a peril to world peace, a danger to the whole human family."

Thus spoke 21 national religious leaders and 18 retired generals in a joint statement issued at the Washington National Cathedral in June 2000. They continued by propounding two truths:

"first, that the most commonly postulated threats to our national security are not susceptible to nuclear deterrence;

"second, that our nation's efforts to provide effective leadership in opposing the growing threat of nuclear proliferation will be credible only if our policies and those of the other nuclear powers demonstrate a commitment to the universal outlawing of these weapons."

They further stated:

It is...time for a great national and international discussion and examination of the true and full implications of reliance on nuclear weapons, to be followed by action leading to the international prohibition of these weapons."

We the signers of this present statement share this perspective. We affirm that nuclear weapons are morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable.

We agree that time has arrived for the American people to engage in public discussion on nuclear weapons and on how to achieve their elimination. We note that an excellent opportunity for such discussion now exists as part of the nuclear posture review that is now underway.

Mandated by Congress, the Secretary of Defense is now conducting "a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." Among other requirements this review is supposed to consider "the relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting, and arms control objectives."

What are the arms control objectives of the United States? Legally they are defined by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which the U.S. Senate ratified in 1969 by a bipartisan vote of 83 to 15. In Article VI the United States and other nuclear-weapon states agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." They reaffirmed this commitment in May 2000 in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which contains a promise to "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

To convert this promise into action, the Final Document specifies a series of "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI." They include:

- v Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- v A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that treaty.
- v Negotiation of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material.
- v Early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- v Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- v Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- v Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- v A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- v The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

We propose that these steps leading toward nuclear disarmament should now be incorporated into the U.S. nuclear posture. We suggest that the concept of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons should serve as a guiding principle for the next five to ten years. This time span would thereby serve as a transitional period between (i) full and widespread deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and (ii) the future time when the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is achieved.

In this manner the United States, along with other nuclear-weapon states, could make substantial progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons during the first decade of the 21st century. This would enable the world to move away from the outmoded, 20th century reliance on nuclear weapons. This would constitute true moral progress for humankind.

In order to obtain full public participation in the nuclear posture review we call for public hearings by the Department of Defense and by appropriate committees of Congress. We ask that a draft nuclear posture statement be published for widespread public discussion with provision for ample feedback before it is finally adopted.

Signers

Draft of March 3, 2001  
Written by Howard W. Hallman

Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2001 10:02:03 -0800 (PST)  
From: Egbert Lawrence <egbertl4pj@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Re: Larry not Delivering letters on Tuesday  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Howard,

Thanks for your note. That would be great for Emily and Ai to do the deliveries on Tuesday.

I will see you our your materials at the desk in the entrance of the Methodist Building unless I hear from you to the contrary OR UNLESS THERE IS AN EXCESS OF SNOW!

PEACE! Larry

--- "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org> wrote:

> Larry,  
>  
> Emily and Ali from the UUA office are willing to  
> delivery letters on the  
> Hill on Tuesday, March 6. I could ask them to do  
> all three House office  
> buildings and save you a trip to Washington. I have  
> the Senate buildings  
> covered. What is your pleasure?  
>  
> Howard  
>  
>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org  
>  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a  
> membership association of  
> laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any  
> Methodist denomination.

---

Do You Yahoo!?

Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.

<http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/>

X-Sender: dkimball@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32)  
Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2001 08:54:12 -0500  
To: dkimball@clw.org  
From: Daryl Kimball <dkimball@clw.org>  
Subject: N-Testing Update: N.Z. controversy; Bush to increase SSP budget

March 4, 2001

TO: Coalition members and friends

FR: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director

RE: N-Testing Update -- Novaya Zemlya activities; Bush to request increase in SSP budget

Once again, a small group of U.S. intelligence analysts are suggesting that ongoing activities at Russia's nuclear test site may be small nuclear weapon test explosions. In a detailed and well-balanced article in yesterday's edition of The New York Times (see below), reporters Bill Broad and Patrick Tyler report that the same analysts that incorrectly charged that Russia conducted a nuclear test explosion in 1997 are again suggesting that Russia may be secretly conducting nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya. The NYTimes also reports that other intelligence analyst believe the activities at Novaya Zemlya are likely the same "subcritical experiments" that have been conducted by the United States since 1995.

The concerns about the Russian test site activities highlight the fact that the Bush administration's current stance on the test ban treaty places the United States in an awkward position. With or without the CTBT, the U.S. still has a national security interest in deterring and detecting possible nuclear test explosions by other nations. But without CTBT ratification, the United States denies itself the benefits of the added monitoring capabilities and the option of short-notice on-site inspections. Furthermore, U.S. nuclear weapons experiments at its own Nevada Test Site make it difficult for the U.S. to question similar Russian test site activities. In addition to pursuing CTBT ratification global entry into force, the Bush administration should support:

- \* the completion of the International Monitoring System;
- \* rules that allow immediate and open access to IMS data;
- \* the completion of the United States' enhanced Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) network;
- \* and an agreement with Russia for reciprocal, voluntary transparency measures to clarify ambiguous activities at the U.S. and Russian test sites.

For further discussion and analysis, see:

"Final Report of the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," November 7, 2000.  
<<http://www.ctbtcommission.org/>>

False and Misleading Claims about Verification during the Senate Debate on

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, By Lynn R. Sykes, F.A.S. Public Interest Report (Journal of the Federation of American Scientists), May/June 2000. <<http://www.fas.org/faspir/v53n3.htm>>

U.S. Security Benefits from Test Ban Monitoring & On Site Inspections: But Test Ban Treaty Verification Tools Depend on Ratification and Entry Into Force, Coalition Issue Brief, September 27, 1999. <<http://www.clw.org/coalition/briefv3n14.htm>>

False Accusations, Undetected Test And Implications for the CTB Treaty, by Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennem. Arms Control Today, May 1998. <<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/may98/vimy98.htm>>

## BUSH TO REQUEST STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP FUNDING INCREASE

According to preliminary FY 2002 Bush administration budget documents released last week, the Bush administration will request an increase in funding for the Department of Energy "Stockpile Stewardship Program." According to the summary document: "The Stockpile Stewardship Program maintains our nuclear arsenal. The program is an essential safeguard to our national security and is in significant need of reform and repair. The budget increases funding for activities in this area by five percent to approximately \$5.3 billion."

While the details of the proposed SSP budget padding are not yet available, the Bush team seems to be responding to generalized uncertainties about maintaining the stockpile without nuclear testing and further pressure from the Laboratory Directors for additional funds. Such an approach is simplistic and wrong. President Clinton's FY 2001 Stockpile Stewardship Program budget request was \$4.594 billion, which is much higher than spending in this category for most of the Cold War.

Rather, effective maintenance of the arsenal will depend on focusing resources on the already proven Stockpile Stewardship Program elements that are most relevant to maintaining the arsenal — these are the programs and facilities that involve surveillance, refurbishment, and possibly new infrastructure requirements to allow for limited remanufacture of plutonium pits to replace those in existing weapon types. As General Shalikashvili suggests, enhanced surveillance and monitoring activities should be the focus of SSP and not be squeezed by costly, higher-profile, but less-relevant experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility.

The new Administration should also consider whether some the nuclear weapons laboratories are engaged in activities may be eroding — rather than preserving — warhead reliability. The greatest threat to future certifications of the arsenal may come from the weapons designers themselves who, in their quest to improve the existing warhead types and develop their skills, continue to modify existing weapons types at the risk of making changes that reduce confidence.

## U.S. CONDUCTED NON-NUCLEAR TESTS ON DEFEATING HARDENED AND DEEPLY-BURIED TARGETS

According to a Norwegian NRK public television report aired on February 27, the United States used non-nuclear test explosions in the 1990s near Norway's Arctic border with Russia to help develop weapons for destroying underground bunkers.

The report said the explosions were conducted in disused mines about a mile from the Russian frontier and were funded both by the Norwegian armed forces and by the Pentagon's Defence Nuclear Agency.

Norway had said that the tests were aimed at improving Norwegian technology to defend against attacks on bunkers or civilian bomb shelters, but the United States may have used the data for offensive weapons projects.

- DK

NOTE: Further information on the CTBT is available on the Coalition web site <<http://www.crnd.org>> For previous editions of the Coalition's "Nuclear Testing Update," see <<http://www.clw.org/coalition/n-testing.htm>>

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#### 1. "Dispute Over Russian Testing Divides U.S. Nuclear Experts"

The New York Times, March 4, 2001

By WILLIAM J. BROAD with PATRICK E. TYLER

For half a decade, Russia has conducted what it says are nonnuclear tests under the ground of an Arctic island, as the United States says it does beneath the Nevada desert.

But the tests have caused bitter divisions among intelligence officials and nuclear analysts in Washington. Some have concluded that Russia is lying and is instead detonating small nuclear blasts; other experts say that charge is reckless and probably wrong.

"This question," one intelligence analyst said, "is tearing the community into pieces."

Beyond the dispute is the question of what, if anything, to do if Russia is lying. Led by Republicans, the Senate rejected the global ban on nuclear explosions and it is unclear whether the United States would now accuse Russia of violating it.

Paradoxically, the rejected test-ban treaty had provisions for inspections by which the United States could have sought to examine the Russian test site.

Still, Russia's truthfulness is relevant since underground tests serve to perfect new kinds of nuclear warheads.

President Clinton was briefed on the dispute shortly before he left office and the Bush administration is reviewing it, federal scientists and

officials said. The White House offered no view. "We're not going to comment on intelligence matters," said Mary Ellen Countryman, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council.

Russia strongly denies any deception and says the tests comply with permitted practice. And some federal experts called the charge most likely false, saying the evidence is weak and the analyses flawed.

The intelligence analysts behind the charge have a history of suspecting the worst of Russia, and in one case of embarrassing the United States by accusing Moscow of conducting a nuclear blast that turned out to be an earth tremor. Such analysts have criticized the test ban treaty as hard to monitor. Moreover, the nuclear scientists who are taking part in the analyses often oppose bans on testing weapons they have designed, and some have argued for renewed American testing.

But both sides are said to agree that Moscow is doing more at the Arctic island, Novaya Zemlya, than it has acknowledged. "It's certain," a federal official said, "that the announced activity doesn't tell the whole story."

A positive outcome of the current dispute, said a senior federal science adviser, could be more intrusive means of verification at the nuclear test sites of both sides, which might cut through the fog of suspicion. "These are examples," he said, "of why we need more transparency."

The silence at most of the world's nuclear test sites comes after a half century of explosions in which new and old designs were checked to see how well they worked. The ban on such tests seeks to curb arms developments and races.

To diplomatic acclaim, President Clinton signed the test ban in 1996 after championing its adoption. It allows small tests in which nuclear materials are thrown together as long as the experiments have an energy output equal to zero. In other words, "zero yield" experiments are to produce absolutely no burst of nuclear energy, however tiny, and are widely agreed to have no use in designing new warheads.

The dispute centers on an inherently tricky area of test-ban verification in which nuclear blasts have yields too small to produce the kind of powerful shock waves that distant nations can track easily as faint rumbles in bedrock. Because of that, the debate tends to turn on sketchy evidence, worst-case scenarios and skeptical retorts.

Russian officials, in denying any violations of the ban, said military scientists on Novaya Zemlya are doing nothing more than simple experiments far too weak to represent an atomic blast.

In an interview, the head of the development and testing of nuclear weapons at Moscow's Atomic Energy Ministry, Nikolai P. Voloshin, said "We are not violating the treaty, absolutely."

Russia says it is doing so-called subcritical tests that are allowed under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which 160 nations have signed. While so far unratified, the ban is mostly observed in practice; Moscow has pledged

to abide by its rules.

Subcritical explosions use nuclear fuel like plutonium in small discharges that stop short of producing a self-sustaining chain reaction that releases any nuclear energy.

But some federal intelligence analysts charge that Russia is engaging in a type of outlawed test known as hydronuclear. In those tests, metallic bomb parts are thrown together explosively, liquefying (thus the hydro) while releasing small amounts of nuclear energy. The tests stop short of a large blast, releasing perhaps a millionth of the energy of the Hiroshima bomb.

Experts agree that hydronuclear tests can have some use in the design of new nuclear arms, although the extent is debated.

The intelligence team that says Russia is lying includes Lawrence Turnbull, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst, and Charles Craft, a Sandia National Laboratory analyst, officials said.

Mr. Craft leads a panel of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a group that represents the nuclear views of many federal agencies.

The two, officials added, form the core of a group within the intelligence community that believes that it has evidence that Moscow is going over the hydronuclear line in an effort to develop new kinds of nuclear arms.

Part of the team's evidence, a federal official said, centers on highly sensitive intelligence sources that are seen as giving Washington a clearer view into Moscow's activities on Novaya Zemlya. Neither Mr. Turnbull nor Mr. Craft responded to requests for comment.

Officials said the State Department is skeptical of the accusation and has written formal rebuttals.

The differing sides in the dispute are trying to influence the formal process by which the federal government periodically makes judgments about secret foreign activities. This National Intelligence Estimate seeks to describe the likely state of development in the Russian nuclear program.

Fueling mistrust, officials said, is the sheer bustle on the hilly island, a seemingly barren place about 500 miles long and 500 miles east of Murmansk, inside the Arctic Circle. They said American surveillance has observed a flurry of experimental work as well as Russian planes and ships ferrying supplies and nuclear crews back and forth.

"There's lots of interest, activity and money involved," said a top federal science adviser. "So you can understand why people are suspicious."

Mr. Turnbull and his allies have a history of faulty analyses. In August 1997 they told the White House that the Russians might have conducted an underground test at Novaya Zemlya. But after seismic experts challenged that assessment, the C.I.A. retracted that finding and said the tremor was actually a nearby undersea earthquake.

"They've got an ax to grind and are still trying to save face from that," said one federal science adviser.

Defenders of Mr. Turnbull note that Russia has often cheated on arms-control treaties, and that top Russian experts are arguing for new nuclear arms. In Moscow, Viktor N. Mikhailov, a former minister of atomic energy who still wields much power, has been quoted as advocating "a new generation of super precise nuclear weapons."

But Frank von Hippel, a physicist at Princeton University who advised the Clinton administration on the nuclear test ban, said he had heard rumors of the intelligence dispute and considered the violation charge irresponsible. "As far as I can tell," he said, Washington has no evidence "that would prove that the Russian activities are any different than those that the U.S. conducts at the Nevada test site."

If the intelligence team's finding becomes the American view, it might stir a political storm. Even though the Senate in 1999 rejected the test ban by a vote of 51 to 48, the United States is currently conducting no nuclear tests, and weapons experts said the perception of a Russian violation could erode or end support for testing restraint.

Many arms-control experts see small nuclear tests such as those allegedly being done by Russia as too small to be militarily significant, and argue that branding Russia as a test-ban violator on the basis of slim evidence poses more risks than benefits.

But some intelligence analysts argue that Moscow over the decades has learned to tease so much information from small tests that the secretive work could produce new classes of nuclear arms.

Federal experts said the dispute does not appear to be politically motivated or timed to the change of administrations.

Novaya Zemlya is covered with snow and ice most of the year. Starting in 1955, Russia conducted more than 100 nuclear blasts there, the last in October 1990. Since 1995, Russia has used the remote wilderness for what it says are permissible underground experiments to maintain the reliability of its nuclear arms.

From last August through October, Russia announced a series of small tests there.

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## 2. "U.S. tested nuke anti-bunker weapons in Norway-report"

OSLO, Feb 27 (Reuters) - The United States used test explosions near Norway's Arctic border with Russia to help develop weapons for destroying underground bunkers, Norway's NRK public television said on Tuesday.

A documentary said that explosions in the 1990s in disused mines about two kms (1.2 miles) from the Russian frontier were funded both by the Norwegian armed forces and by the Pentagon's Defence Nuclear Agency.

Norway had said that the tests, in granite similar to rocks on the Kola Peninsula which is the base of Russia's Northern fleet, were aimed at improving Norwegian technology to defend against attacks on bunkers or civilian bomb shelters.

Defence Ministry spokeswoman Kirsti Skjerven told NRK that Norway used data from the tests for purely defensive purposes but that it would be "quite natural" for the United States to use the joint information for weapons projects.

NRK's documentary, entitled "Bombs and Illusions," said Washington wanted data from the explosions partly to develop specialised nuclear warheads that could destroy underground military bunkers.

It said the 1991 Gulf War showed the Pentagon could carry out precise bombings on enemy targets but could not destroy military installations buried deep underground.

NRK said U.S. planes had landed in Kirkenes, northern Norway, carrying specialised explosives for use in the tests. The programme said U.S. officials had declined comment on the report.

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Daryl Kimball, Executive Director  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505  
Washington, DC 20002  
(ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970  
website <<http://www.crnd.org>>

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X-Sender: dkimball@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32)  
Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2001 08:58:15 -0500  
To: dkimball@clw.org  
From: Daryl Kimball <dkimball@clw.org>  
Subject: REMINDER: CTBT wkg. grp. mtg., 3/6 @ 930am @ UCS

March 5, 2001

TO: Coalition members and friends

RE: CTBT & Stockpile Stewardship Wkg. Grp. meeting on March 6 at 9:30am  
at UCS, 1707 H. St., NW, Suite 600

FR: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director

A brief reminder that on Tuesday there will be a CTBT/SSP Working Group meeting. The meeting is open to all Coalition member organizations, as well as like-minded NGOs outside the Coalition.

Please note that this is a WORKING MEETING so please be prepared to contribute to the meeting, offer your suggestions about what the Coalition and member organizations should do to advance our common agenda, and be prepared to report on projects that your organization is undertaking or planning that may be of interest to others.

Attached below is the draft agenda and a summary of the results of our last meeting.

Please contact Stacie Robinson at 546-0795 x137 if you have any agenda suggestions.

- DK

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Draft Agenda

CTBT/SSP Working Group Meeting, March 6, 2001

9:30-11:00am

UCS Conference Room, 1707 H St. NW

1. report and discussion on Novaya Zemlya controversy (see latest N-Testing Update for details)
  - encouraging an appropriate Congressional response
2. stockpile stewardship program developments
  - draft NGO letter on stockpile stewardship
  - Foster panel report
  - Bush budget request

### 3. other developments

- hearings on Shali report and other issues in SASC
- EIF conference process

### 4. announcements and next meeting

\*\*\*\*\*

Summary of Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers CTBT/Stockpile Stewardship Working Group Meeting, January 23, 2001

#### SUMMARY:

After short reports and discussion about reactions to General Shaliskashvili's CTBT report and about statements on the CTBT from the Powell and Rusmsfeld confirmation hearings the group discussed how to advance our agenda in several key areas:

#### 1. Build support within the Bush Admin. and the Senate for prompt CTBT ratification

\* the group agreed that we should meet with and write to key Senators requesting that they hold hearings on the Shalishashvili report and recommend a list of appropriate topics and witnesses. John Isaacs agreed to draft a letter for group signatures that the Coalition will circulate. Daryl Kimball will collect suggestions about possible witnesses.

\* it was also suggested that the Hagel-Lieberman CTBT Study Group should be encouraged to invite General Shalishashvili to brief them on the results of his report. Theresa Hitchens of BASIC agreed to make an initial contact with Hagel's office about this. Daryl Kimball will follow up with Lieberman's office.

\* the Coalition has arranged to sponsor a public seminar on CTBT verifiability and its role in U.S. non- proliferation efforts on February 6 from 12-2pm at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The speakers will be Trevor Findlay, Chairman of the Independent Commission on CTBT Verifiability and Ambassador James Goodby, deputy to President Clinton's Special Advisor on the CTBT, Gen. Shalishashvili. To RSVP, please contact Stacie Robinson at the Coalition at 202-546-0795 x137.

\* the Council for a Livable World suggested that other organizations consider alerting their members about the Shalishashvili report and urging them to ask their Senators for a response. (See attached CLW alert.)

Organizations planning to contribute to these types of efforts include: ISIS; FAS; BASIC; LAWS; PSR; 20/20; CLW; and Coalition staff.

#### 2. Encourage international leadership for CTBT ratification and entry into force:

\* To encourage good media coverage of the upcoming Article XIV Conference on accelerating CTBT entry into force in September, it was suggested that a letter from former heads of state supporting early ratification and EIF of

the CTBT be organized and released prior to the Conference. Scott Cantor of LAWS said that he would discuss with his LAWS colleagues whether they might be able to pursue this idea.

\* to raise awareness and encourage high-level participation at the conference, it was also suggested that a letter urging support for the conference be sent to foreign ministers of states parties, which the Coalition staff will draft. In addition, the Coalition plans to produce a report on status of entry into force worldwide and on EIF conference process and the EIF conference by late spring.

### 3. Maintaining support for completing the International Monitoring System:

In FY 2000, the U.S. Congress approved the full administration request for 21.5 million for the U.S. contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. The group agreed that funding at the full level in the FY 2002 Commerce, Justice, State Appropriation bill will be difficult to maintain. It was suggested that the Coalition find some way to bring Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman to Washington for briefings on the importance of the CTBTO's efforts.

### 4. Blocking research and development on new nuclear weapon types and limiting modifications to existing nuclear warheads, which could reduce warhead reliability:

It was reported that the Congressionally-mandated report on defeating hardened and deeply-buried targets has not been completed and is due by July, that the SASC might recommend changes in the legislation that bars DOE from conducted R&D on new types of low-yield nukes, and the Nuclear Posture Review may produce new missions and requirements for nuclear weapons. It was also noted that the Shalikashvili report provides good arguments against new nuclear weapon development and against unnecessary modification of existing warheads that might reduce warhead reliability.

\* Rob Nelson reported that he will soon complete a detailed FAS Public Interest Report on the infeasibility of using earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to defeat deeply-buried and hardened targets.

\* FCNL, PSR and other organizations will be monitoring the Hill for any legislation on mini-nukes.

It was suggested that we try to meet with officials at the DOE to learn more about the status of the study on hardened and deeply buried targets and plans for warhead modifications.

### 5. Review of the stockpile stewardship program and pursuit of less-costly, alternative stockpile stewardship approaches that are consistent with non-proliferation policies and goal of maintaining existing nuclear weapons arsenal

\* It was reported that the SSP budget request is likely to increase for FY 2002 and that some Senate supporters might support such increases in the false hope that it will gain Bush administration and Republican support for the CTBT.

\* Henry Kelly of FAS agreed to draft a letter to Congress for sign-on by organizations in agreement that Congress should support proven technologies for stockpile maintenance and avoid unnecessary and costly new investments in experimental facilities that have little or not bearing on core stewardship missions. It was also agreed that organizations with expertise on this issue (including NRDC, FAS, and ANA) should try to brief key offices on this matter within the next 1 to 2 months.

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Daryl Kimball, Executive Director  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505  
Washington, DC 20002  
(ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970  
website <<http://www.crnd.org>>

---

To: dringler@umc-gbcs.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Leaving letters at Methodist Building  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Robin,

The Unitarian office is going to delivery letters on national missile defense to representatives in the House office buildings. May I leave packets of these letters at your reception desk for them to pick up on Tuesday, March 6?

Howard

From: Robin Ringler <DRingler@UMC-GBCS.ORG>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Leaving letters at Methodist Building  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 09:36:24 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Yes, Howard, that's fine. Just be sure the recipient's name is on the packet and which office they're with.

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2001 9:15 AM  
To: Robin Ringler  
Subject: Leaving letters at Methodist Building

Robin,

The Unitarian office is going to delivery letters on national missile defense to representatives in the House office buildings. May I leave packets of these letters at your reception desk for them to pick up on Tuesday, March 6?

Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

From: "Rutledge, Philip"

To: "'Surratt, Doris'" , Social Equity Panel Cc: "Rutledge, Philip" , "'adrian.gardner@eh.doe.gov'"

Subject: RE: Social Equity Panel Meeting April 27-29

Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 11:17:39 -0500

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Colleagues:

As Doris Surratt indicated in an earlier e-mail, the next full meeting of the Standing Panel on Social Equity in Governance will be held in Indianapolis, Indiana, as a mini-conference, April 27-29, 2001. The venue is listed in Doris' communication, included below, and will be hosted by the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs. Hotel and food costs will be covered by SPEA, however Panel members are expected to cover their own travel. By reserving flights early, members should be able to secure very favorable airfares because of the Saturday night stay-over. For room reservations and other planning, we need to know by March 26 if you plan to attend. Please respond directly to me on your attendance plans. At the present time, I would anticipate that 20 - 30 of the 90 Fellows who have selected the Panel might be able to attend.

The Program is taking shape as follows:

1. Friday, April 27 --- 6:00 PM - 6:45 PM Reception and Social Hour at University Place Conference Center

6:45 PM - 7:30 PM Dinner

7:30 PM - 9:00 PM Discussion of Social Equity Issues in the President's Faith Based Office Initiatives and the Charitable Choice Provisions of recent welfare reform legislation.

Speakers: Professor Sheila Kennedy, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, former Executive

Director, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Principal Investigator, Ford Foundation grant studying implementation of Charitable Choice legislation

Professor Leslie Lenkowsky, SPEA and College of Liberal Arts, Former President, Hudson Institute, Advisor to President Bush

2. Saturday, April 28 -- 9:00 AM to 12:00 Noon Discussion of Social Equity Issues in Central Indiana

Among the speakers and participants: John Kirlin, Director, Center for Urban

Policy and the Environment, SPEA, members of the Center staff, members of the Indianapolis Urban League Environmental Coalition, others from state and local government.

3. 12:00 -- 1:30 Lunch (Invited Speaker -- Congresswoman Julia Carson)
4. 1:30 PM -- 4:30 PM Case study of an environmental justice confrontation involving the Northwest Indiana Regional Planning Commission, Northwest Indiana community activists, the Department of Transportation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Congress, Indiana University Northwest, and others.
- 5.: Saturday Evening -- Dinner on your own or arranged social programs
6. Sunday April 29 --- 9:00-11:00 Business meeting of Social Equity Panel
7. Optional luncheon or arranged tours

The above program is still a work in progress, and changes you wish to suggest will be welcomed. My e-mail is [rutledge@indiana.edu](mailto:rutledge@indiana.edu) telephone: 317-274-2016

Phil

-----Original Message-----

From: Surratt, Doris [<mailto:DSurratt@NAPAWASH.ORG>]

Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2001 3:21 PM

To: Social Equity Panel

Cc: Rutledge, Philip

Subject: Social Equity Panel Meeting April 27-29

Phil asked me to remind you that the next meeting of the Standing Panel on Social Equity in Governance will be held at the University Place Conference Center, on the campus of Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 850 W. Michigan Street, Indianapolis, IN. Reservations for rooms must be made by March 26th. Phil will provide additional information.

Doris Surratt  
[dsurratt@napawash.org](mailto:dsurratt@napawash.org)  
PH: 202-347-3190

To: nsmall@paxchristiusa.org, dave@paxchristiusa.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: De-alerting campaign  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Nancy and David,

I am working with Back from the Brink and the Friends Committee on National Legislation to get religious leaders in several states to sign a joint letter to their senators on de-alerting. The letter will be an adaptation of the FCNL letter that Nancy signed (see below), modified to ask the senators to talk with President Bush on de-alerting.

We want to get bishops and other heads of judicatories in these states to be initial signers of these letters. The states we are dealing with at the moment are Rhode Island, Virginia, Indiana, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and Oregon. Are there Pax Christi bishops in any of these states who might sign such a letter? Can you contact them for this purpose? (I can provide you the state version of the letter and tell you who else we know is signing.) Once the letter has initial signers in particular states, would you be in a position to ask other Pax Christi members to sign it?

Give me a call at 301 896-0013 if you want to discuss this.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

January 25, 2001

President George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President George W. Bush,

We, leaders and members of national religious organizations, join in an interfaith appeal for you to take action to reduce the threat of accidental nuclear war. Specifically we ask for your commitment to work with Russian leaders to take all nuclear weapons off "hair-trigger" alert.

Although the Cold War ended over a decade ago, the United States and Russia combined have five thousand nuclear weapons-the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs- on hyper-alert status, ready to be fired at a moment's notice. In a time of crisis or perceived attack, decision makers on both sides have only minutes to decide whether to launch a nuclear strike.

A single miscalculation or computer error could lead to nuclear war. We have already come too close to this ultimate catastrophe. In 1995, a U.S. research rocket launched off the coast of Norway appeared on Russian radar screens. Because the rocket had a profile similar to that of a nuclear missile from a U.S. Trident submarine, Russian radar could not distinguish the research rocket from a U.S. nuclear missile. Russia came within minutes of launching their own nuclear missiles at the United States. The United States and Russia narrowly avoided nuclear disaster, instigated because of poor communications and the hair-trigger alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear missiles.

The continued deterioration of Russia's radar and early warning systems only increases the nuclear danger. The poor conditions of Russian facilities, substandard training and pay, and low morale of personnel increases the likelihood of mistakes. The recent Russian Kursk submarine tragedy reminds us that we are just one accident away from nuclear war. The security of the United States-and the world-now rests with an increasingly fragile and vulnerable Russian nuclear system.

The United States and Russia should move now to end the threat of accidental nuclear war, by "de-alerting" their arsenals-taking them off the hair-trigger. De-alerting means lengthening the time needed to prepare nuclear missiles for launch. One method of de-alerting, endorsed by General George Lee Butler, USAF (Ret.), former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. strategic command, is separating nuclear warheads from their missiles. This would give U.S. and Russian officials more time to make an assessment of any threat. It would provide a critical margin of safety in case of a failure of early warning systems or nuclear command and control.

Lengthening the launch time of nuclear missiles from minutes to hours, days, or even weeks is like putting a safety lock on nuclear weapons.

To protect the world from nuclear disaster, the United States can and should take the lead on de-alerting. There is a precedent. In 1991, President Bush removed hundreds of U.S. warheads from high-alert status, which prompted President Gorbachev to do the same.

De-alerting is a critical step toward reducing the nuclear threat and building common security among nations. We seek to achieve these goals through a continuing process of arms control and multilateral diplomacy.

Within our faith communities, policies concerning nuclear weapons raise profound questions about our moral responsibilities, the integrity of God's creation, and human destiny. These moral questions persist as long as the threat of nuclear war continues. As an interfaith community, we assert that the de-alerting of all nuclear weapons is a prudent and necessary step toward eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

We urge you, as the President of the United States, to take action to remove all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger status. We await your response and would welcome the opportunity to meet with you on this important matter.

Sincerely,

(Faith Groups listed in Alphabetical Order) -- not include

To: srobinson@clw.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Letter to senators on NMD  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\icnd.078.doc; A:\icnd.071.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Stacie,

Attached is the letter to senators from representatives of 25 religious organizations opposing missile defense. We want to personalize it to the senators c/o their defense and foreign relations aides. David Culp has the information indicated by brackets that would have to be merged. He can provide it in a format suitable to your computer. Hopefully the data will be in order of room number in the Senate office buildings for ease in delivery.

For your information I am also attaching the list of signers. We will take care of stapling the page of signers on the personalized letters that you would produce.

We would greatly appreciate your assistance. We don't have an absolute deadline, but I'd like to get it done this week. The date used would reflect anticipated delivery day.

I've tried to get some help from the denominational offices, but they are all tied up this week with the land mines campaign and other activities. I am getting help, though, in delivering the letters to senators and a form letter to representatives.

We have a separate letter to President Bush that uses the same three reasons to oppose national missile defense.

Call me if you have any questions.

Thanks,  
Howard

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: 'Ira Shorr' <irashorr@hotmail.com>, 'Esther Pank'  
<prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
Cc: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>, Kathy Guthrie <kathy@fcnl.org>  
Subject: RE: Larry Hayes volunteers  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 15:00:16 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

> As you can see, Larry Hayes is willing to help get letters and columns in  
> Indiana newspapers. Why don't one of you pick up on this and get in  
touch  
> with Larry? I'll stay out of this phase.

I nominate Ira. He has the most media experience. We are very lucky to get  
Larry Hayes' help. He was the long-time editorial page editor for the Fort  
Wayne  
(Ind.) Journal-Gazette. He is a smart and talented.

He is probably why Ira got the article in the Journal Gazette that Sen.  
Lugar read.

David

X-Originating-IP: [63.22.25.139]  
From: "Ira Shorr" <irashorr@hotmail.com>  
To: david@fcnl.org  
Cc: mupj@igc.org, kathy@fcnl.org  
Subject: RE: Larry Hayes volunteers  
Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2001 15:56:41 -0500  
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Mar 2001 20:56:41.0562 (UTC) FILETIME=[C7794BA0:01C0A5B6]

David, Howard,

I'll be glad to work with him -- get sample letters to him etc.--if that works for you folks.

David- I didn't see contact info for him in your message-- was it omitted?

Ira

>From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
>To: 'Ira Shorr' <irashorr@hotmail.com>, 'Esther Pank'  
><prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
>CC: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>, Kathy Guthrie <kathy@fcnl.org>  
>Subject: RE: Larry Hayes volunteers  
>Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 15:00:16 -0500  
>  
>> As you can see, Larry Hayes is willing to help get letters and columns  
>in  
>> Indiana newspapers. Why don't one of you pick up on this and get in  
>touch  
>> with Larry? I'll stay out of this phase.  
>  
>  
>I nominate Ira. He has the most media experience. We are very lucky to  
>get  
>Larry Hayes' help. He was the long-time editorial page editor for the Fort  
>Wayne  
>(Ind.) Journal-Gazette. He is a smart and talented.  
>  
>He is probably why Ira got the article in the Journal Gazette that Sen.  
>Lugar read.  
>  
>David

---

Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at <http://explorer.msn.com>

To: "Ira Shorr" <irashorr@hotmail.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Larry Hayes volunteers  
Cc: david@fcnl.org  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <F81QN1RmpS31bTVn2AI00007516@hotmail.com>  
References:

Ira,

You can reach Larry Hayes at 219 745-1324; LJHayes38@aol.com; 5405 South Wayne Avenue, Fort Wayne, IN 46807.

We made contact with him originally at Greg Laszakovits suggestion.

Howard

To: dealert  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: State contacts  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Friends,

As a follow-up of our meeting last Thursday, I wrote to persons in several states who I talked with previously about our multi-issue agenda. I encouraged them in the next few weeks to give priority to use of a state-version of the FCNL-developed letter from religious leaders on de-alerting, to be addressed to their senators, and to seek bishops and other heads of judicatories as initial signers. I indicated that organizations participating in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament would be willing to encourage their contacts in these states to be signers.

With a copy of the FCNL letter enclosed, I wrote the executive director of the Interchurch Ministries of Nebraska and similar persons in Rhode Island, Virginia, and New Mexico. Also to Bill Peachy in Kansas. who I had contacted earlier about our broader agenda. Already Bob Kinsey of the Peace and Justice Task Force, United Church of Christ in Colorado is working with the letter to senators. With Oregon already underway and Indiana getting started, we will be covering a number of key states.

I'll be calling these persons later in the week to follow up. I'll keep you informed.

Shalom,  
Howard

X-Sender: [abolition2000@abolition2000.org](mailto:abolition2000@abolition2000.org)  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 18:29:20 -0700  
To: [abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com](mailto:abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com)  
From: Carah Lynn Ong  
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) update on Abolition 2000 treaty  
Sender: [owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com](mailto:owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com)  
Reply-To: [abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com](mailto:abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com)

Dear All,

In response to Joan's recent message about the progress of Abolition 2000, below is an Abolition 2000 update, which will be mailed to member organizations very shortly.

Best,  
Carah Ong

#### ABOLITION 2000 UPDATE

##### Abolition 2000 Review and Strategy Meeting

From 17-20 November, a Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was held in Nagasaki, Japan. The Assembly had several unique features in that it was the last antinuclear NGO conference of the 20th century and was held in the last city bombed by an atomic weapon. Antinuclear non-governmental organization leaders from around the world joined world citizens to generate a new vision for the 21st century based on activities and experiences of the past. At the conclusion of the Assembly, the enclosed Nagasaki Appeal was adopted. As part of the Nagasaki Meeting Abolition 2000 also held a Review and Strategy Meeting prior to the conference and Abolition 2000 activities were also introduced and discussed during the formal plenary and workshop sessions.

##### Adoption of Amendment to Abolition 2000 Statement and Petition

In October 2000, the Abolition 2000 Coordinating Committee (ACC) put forward a proposal to Network Members participating on the various abolition listserves to amend the Abolition 2000 statement and asking for input prior to the Review and Strategy Meeting in Nagasaki. After consulting with the Global Council, the ACC proposed the deletion of the phrase "by the year 2000" from the Abolition 2000 Statement with a footnote explaining that this was removed in the year 2000. Many email messages from member organizations were received prior to the conference in Nagasaki agreeing to the proposed changes. Those in attendance at the Review and Strategy Meeting adopted by consensus the proposed amendment to both the Abolition 2000 Statement and Petition. The meeting agreed to amend the A2000 statement and the A2000 petition to remove the words "by the year 2000" in the paragraph calling for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. The full text of the amended statement and a new petition is enclosed with this Mailing.

The Atomic Mirror presented the Abolition 2000 Report Card "Must Try Harder" to the meeting as an overview of what the Network had achieved since it was created. This, and the annual Report Cards for 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, are available on the Abolition 2000 Website at: <http://www.abolition2000.org/reports/reportcard2000.html>

For a hard copy contact the Atomic Mirror at:

P.O. Box 220

Port Hueneme, CA 93044

tel: 805 985 5073

fax: 805 985 7563

email: [info@atomicmirror.org](mailto:info@atomicmirror.org)

#### Developing the Network:

- \* There is a need for better methods of rapid information sharing and dissemination as well as more translation into different languages of Network materials and issue updates.
- \* The Network and its members should issue expressions of global solidarity to organizations and movements working on similar or connected issues. (See enclosed Abolition 2000 Message of Support to the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in India.)
- \* The Network needs better coordination of actions and activities.
- \* The Network needs more Regional Contacts who are active in order to stimulate Network actions and information sharing, particularly in regional languages.
- \* The Network needs to maintain both a simple message in order to create a critical mass as well as an expertise in nuclear issues.
- \* The Network needs to maintain a balance between head and heart.

#### Ideas for Action:

- \* The Network should use and support mechanisms, like the NPT, already in place to apply pressure on both the NWS and the NNWS.
- \* The Network should promote the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) and use it as a tool to outreach to the media and general public.
- \* Ballistic Missile Defense is currently a hot topic and the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space also acts and should be supported as the Abolition 2000 Working Group on this subject.
- \* The Network should continue to explore the idea of an International Control Regime. There is currently an Abolition 2000 Working Group in development on this subject.

- \* There was interest from the participants at the Nagasaki meeting to support Secretary General Koffi Annan's proposal for an International Conference on Nuclear Dangers.
- \* The Network should explore and support regional conferences (among national governments) in order to create preconditions for a broader international conference on nuclear abolition.
- \* The Network should approach nuclear weapons abolition in terms of a step towards general and complete disarmament.
- \* The Network should initiate and support speaking tours on the NWC in various countries.

#### Staff Changes:

Carah Ong, who has served as the Abolition 2000 Coordinator since 1998, has accepted a position with Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF). NAPF will pledge the equivalent of one day per week of Carah's time to answer queries, edit the Grassroots Newsletter and continue to maintain the A2000 database and website.

The Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE) has agreed to fund the position of an Outreach and Development Coordinator for the Network for one year who will work out of the New York office of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (see attached job description). The Outreach and Development Coordinator will be managed by the ACC.

The ACC will also develop a forward looking proposal for funding for a fulltime coordinator matching the location of the successful candidate with the location of an organization willing to host the office.

#### What your group can do:

- \* Use the amended petition to raise the profile of Abolition 2000
- \* Plan activities for the Abolition 2000 Week of Action from March 1 to 8 this year
- \* Generate lots of letters to your government with a copy to Koffi Annan in support of the UN Secretary General's Millennial Summit call for an International Conference on the issue of nuclear abolition. Enclosed is a copy of the draft letter, which was sent to him by the Abolition Coordinating Committee. Please copy Carah Ong with anything you, your organization or your individual members send.
- \* Let your members know about our Working Groups and see if any are interested in representing your organization on the various Working Groups in the Network.

September 1, 2000

Honorable Kofi Annan  
Secretary General  
United Nations  
38th Floor  
New York, NY 10017

Dear Secretary General Kofi Annan,

We are writing to you on behalf of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000, which was formed at the time of the 1995 NonProliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, has grown to a network of over 2,000 organizations and municipalities in 95 countries. Enclosed is a copy of the Abolition 2000 Statement, the founding document of the Network, with its eleven-point program for the complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.

We strongly support your proposal for a global conference on nuclear disarmament. We see this as a pragmatic and necessary step to break the current deadlock in nuclear disarmament efforts and to forward the commitment made at the recent NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference for "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals..."

The Abolition 2000 Global Network will actively lobby governments before, during and after the Millennium Summit for a global conference on nuclear disarmament. Please let us know if there are any specific ways in which we can help you furthering this goal.

With very best wishes.

Sincerely,

The Abolition 2000  
Coordinating Committee

From: Ned Stowe <ned@fcnl.org>  
To: "Monday Lobby (E-mail)" <No.One@fcnl.org>  
Subject: Military spending sign on request  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 17:50:04 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

SIGN-ON LETTER TO OPPOSE  
FY2001 SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY SPENDING BILL

ACTION: We hope that your organization can join the following sign-on letter to the full House. This letter will be sent early next week (week of March 12). Please e-mail/fax your response to Ned Stowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation, at fax: 202-547-6019 or e-mail ned@fcnl.org by close of business Monday, March 12.

Organization name (as it should appear): \_\_\_\_\_

Contact person: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ Fax: \_\_\_\_\_ E-mail \_\_\_\_\_

For more information, read the background information that follows or call Ned Stowe, 202-547- 6000 ext. 117.

SIGN-ON LETTER: Dear Representative,

We, the undersigned organizations, urge you to oppose H.R. 576, an "emergency" supplemental bill for the Department of Defense for FY01. We believe that the Pentagon has been a relatively poor steward of the resources entrusted to it by the American people. We urge you to speak out against more military spending this year and next.

We are not alone in our assessment:

Admiral William Owens, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes the government can save as much as \$40 billion per year by cutting obsolete, wasteful, and redundant programs. "I believe that some of the dollars could be found rather quickly. . . , and that those dollars could flow in a matter of months, not a matter of years (Testimony, Senate Budget Committee, Feb. 12, 2001)."

General Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Ret.): "If we can't defend this country for \$300 billion a year, we ought to get some new generals (Washington Post, February 8, 2001)."

Senator Charles Grassley (IA): "The Pentagon does not know how much it spends. It does not know if it gets what it orders in goods and services. And the Pentagon, additionally, does not have a handle on its inventory. If the Pentagon does not know what it owns and spends, then how does the Pentagon know if it needs more money? Ramping up the Pentagon

budget when the books are a mess is highly questionable at best. To some it might seem crazy (Senate Floor, February 13, 2001)."

Senator Robert Byrd (WV): "The Defense Department, which is talking about an additional \$50 billion a year to meet readiness requirements, does not know with any certainty how much money it currently has available and cannot pass the test of receiving a clean audit opinion on its financial statements (Senate Floor, February 8, 2001)."

Business Executives for National Security (co-chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman (NH)) believes \$15-30 billion can be saved each year through better management practices in the Pentagon and shutting down bases that are no longer needed (Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2001).

The Pentagon should cut wasteful programs and practices and fully account for the resources entrusted to its stewardship before it seeks more funds from U.S. taxpayers. We urge you to speak out against more military spending this year or next.

END SIGN-ON LETTER

BACKGROUND: Dismayed that President Bush has put plans for a mid-year supplemental military spending bill on hold, some Democrats have apparently decided to get out in front of the President in support of adding more to this year's military budget (FY2001). On February 14, Rep. Dicks (WA) introduced a \$6.7 billion supplemental military spending bill (H.R. 576). Cosponsors include: Reps. Skelton (MO), Sisisky (VA), Frost (TX), Edwards (TX), and Tauscher (CA). They are currently seeking additional cosponsors for this bill.

On the Senate side, on February 21, Sen. Landrieu (LA) sent a letter to President Bush urging him to consider adding \$5-10 billion more to the Pentagon's budget for this year. Congress has already appropriated \$337 billion\* for the military this year (\*includes budget authority for the Department of Defense, nuclear weapons programs in the Department of Energy, foreign military aid, financing, and training, and mandatory spending on military retirement).

In the mean time, President Bush's FY2002 budget outline (Feb. 28) calls for increasing military spending by another \$14.2 billion over the current FY01 level. The administration is expected to seek even more for FY2002 pending completion of a comprehensive assessment of U.S. national security needs.

But wait, not so fast.

Business Executives for National Security (co-chaired by former Republican senator Rudman (NH)) just released a report (Feb. 21) that identified \$15-\$30 billion in potential annual savings in the current military budget that could be achieved by privatizing various commercial services now provided by the Pentagon, reforming the acquisitions process, modernizing the military budget and accounting system, and shutting down dozens of military bases that are not needed.

This report follows on the heels of testimony before the Senate Budget

Committee (Feb. 12) by Admiral William Owens (ret.), former Vice-Chairman of the military Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he estimated that the Pentagon could save as much as \$40 billion per year by eliminating redundant programs between the rival armed services, and by dropping the current, obsolete military strategy which is now guiding military weapons procurement decisions. He was especially critical of rivalry and lack of cooperation between the armed services and the redundant systems which have been created as a result. He wonders why each of the armed services needs to have its own separate budget and accounting system, research and development program, air force, intelligence service, and medical corps.

General McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), Senators Grassley (IA) and Byrd (WV), and Business Executives for National Security have raised similar concerns. It is time for Congress to apply the same level of critical analysis and fiscal discipline to military programs that it has applied to other programs of the federal government in recent years.

Edward (Ned) W. Stowe  
Legislative Secretary  
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)  
245 Second Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20002 - 5795  
Phone: 202-547-6000  
Toll Free: 1-800-630-1330  
Fax: 202-547-6019  
E-mail: ned@fcnl.org  
website: <http://www.fcnl.org>

From: "CAROL Q. COSBY" <carol@dhm.disciples.org>  
Organization: Division of Homeland Ministries  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2001 08:44:01 -500 EST  
Subject: Re: Indiana activities  
CC: lmckiern@juno.com  
X-Confirm-Reading-To: "CAROL Q. COSBY" <carol@dhm.disciples.org>  
X-pmrqc: 1  
Priority: normal  
X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v3.01d)

Good morning, Howard, Ed Weisheimer's address is The Christian Church in Indiana, 1100 W. 42nd St., Indianapolis, IN 46208-3375. Phone is 317-926-6051, FAX is 317-931-2034 and his email is cci@ccindiana.org Ed's office would be much more helpful in terms of supplying names and addresses of Indiana folk; our offices have the national information which links us to each region/state.  
CQC

X-Sender: jdi@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32)  
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001 09:22:36 -0500  
To: jdi@clw.org  
From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Missile defense: 3 items

1. "Tests Of Missile Defense Are Called Too Simplistic" - Reuters
2. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea" - N.Y. Times
3. "Does Russia Already Have A National Missile Defense?" - W.S. Journal

=====  
1. "Tests Of Missile Defense Are Called Too Simplistic"  
Washington Post - March 6, 2001 - by Reuters

Tests of a proposed multibillion-dollar U.S. missile shield are too simplistic to make decisions about moving from research to deployment, the Pentagon's testing and evaluation office said yesterday.

The test program is "not aggressive enough to match the pace of acquisition to support deployment and the test content does not yet address important operational questions," wrote Philip Coyle, the former director, before resigning in January.

In his annual report to Congress, Coyle said more aggressive testing would be necessary "to adequately stress design limits and achieve an effective initial operational capability by the latter half of this decade."

President Bush has committed to fielding a shield as soon as technically feasible to defend at least the United States and possibly allies against a limited strike of ballistic missiles from a "rogue state."

China, Russia and many U.S. allies strongly oppose national missile defense (NMD) on the grounds it would upset the strategic balance and trigger new arms races.

Coyle said that while the flight test program had demonstrated "a very basic functionality of NMD surrogates and prototypes," decoys and other countermeasures the major nuclear powers would use with their missiles go beyond the level of sophistication projected in current U.S. tests.

A spokesman for the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization defended the current countermeasure test mix as representative of "an unsophisticated threat" of the type projected to come from North Korea or Iran.

But Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Lehner said the Pentagon office in charge of the program had already integrated a number of Coyle's earlier suggestions for upgrading the testing and was still mulling others.

=====  
2. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea"  
New York Times - March 6, 2001 - By Michael R. Gordon

WASHINGTON, March 5 — Wendy R. Sherman brought along an extra suitcase of cold-weather gear even when she joined Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright for a December trip through Africa.

As the Clinton administration's senior policy coordinator on North Korea, Ms. Sherman was prepared to fly to Pyongyang on a moment's notice. Her task there would be to clear away the final barriers to an accord that would neutralize the North Korean missile threat, which has been a central justification for the hotly debated American national missile defense project. Had she succeeded, the framework of an agreement would have been signed by President Clinton and Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, in Pyongyang, the North's capital.

But Ms. Sherman never made the trip.

In a decision that is still hotly debated by national security experts, the Clinton administration put North Korea diplomacy aside while the Republican and Democratic presidential contenders wrestled over the vote count in Florida, a decision that Clinton aides have sought to justify on the premise that the president could not travel abroad during a potential constitutional crisis.

By the time the dust settled in Florida, and confronting a lukewarm response from the victorious Republicans, Mr. Clinton's team reluctantly decided that it had run out of time.

"Although there were still critical details to be worked out, it appeared that an agreement was within reach," Ms. Sherman said in an interview this week, reflecting the dominant view in the Clinton team.

The episode remains vitally relevant because the North Korean missile threat has been the driving force behind the debate in Washington over missile defenses, and because President Bush has yet to declare whether he plans to carry through or modify the Clinton strategy.

The Bush team has been generally skeptical about North Korea, and it is not clear how much they will use diplomacy to try to head off missile threats, instead of relying primarily on their plans for missile defense.

The South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, who will meet with Mr. Bush on Wednesday, is expected to press the new administration to engage with Pyongyang. And while the negotiations are still shrouded in secrecy, they apparently made more progress than generally thought.

According to current and former government experts, Kim Jong Il promised in confidential talks not to produce, test or deploy missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. That offer would prevent North Korea from fielding missiles that could strike the United States.

North Korea, the experts said, also offered to halt the sale of missiles, missile components, technology and training. The pledge would ban systems that North Korea had already contracted to provide to aspiring third world powers.

And North Korea dropped its demand that it be paid cash for giving up its long-range missile programs.

Several important issues remained unresolved, including how to verify the agreements; whether North Korea was willing to destroy missiles it had already produced, and the value of the nonmonetary aid North Korea should receive in lieu of cash.

"We got further than we thought was possible on the missile issue," one government specialist said. "But there is still more work to do on the details before we know if we will have something substantial."

When it comes to ballistic missiles, North Korea has been a major source of concern for Washington. North Korea shocked American defense experts when it tried to put a satellite into orbit in August 1998 on a Taepo Dong-1 missile.

The attempt failed when the solid-fuel third stage exploded. And the Taepo Dong-1 lacked the ability to reach American territory with a nuclear payload.

But experts were worried that with time, North Korea would field a more capable successor, the Taepo Dong-2, which could threaten the United States. North Korea is also one of the major sellers of missile technology around the world. The Iranian and Pakistani missile programs, for instance, are heavily dependent on North Korean technology.

The Taepo Dong test and a general deterioration in relations between Pyongyang and Washington prompted the Clinton administration to ask former Defense Secretary William J. Perry to conduct a policy review.

Traveling to Pyongyang in May 1999, Mr. Perry told the North Koreans that there were two paths they could follow: cooperation, or a collision course with the United States and its Asian allies.

If North Korea chose cooperation, Mr. Perry advised, it needed to give up its missile program. Specifically, the North Koreans should agree not to sell or deploy missiles that exceeded the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime — that is, missiles that can carry an 1,100-pound payload more than 180 miles.

Mr. Perry recalled in an interview that he was initially discouraged by what he heard in Pyongyang.

But the Korea experts on Mr. Perry's team detected a shift in the North Korean stance, and over the next 18 months, developments appeared to prove them right.

North Korea declared a moratorium on its long-range missile tests, and in June, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung met. And as the clock wound down on the Clinton administration in September, it was asked to receive a high-level Korean envoy.

The envoy was Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, the head of the North Korean

military, and his visit was taken by most Clinton aides as an indication that Mr. Kim was trying to bring his skeptical generals around.

"I think Kim poked his head out of the groundhog hole, looked around and decided that his regime is not sustainable unless it is somehow connected with the rest of the world," Samuel R. Berger, Mr. Clinton's national security adviser, said today.

Marshal Cho also brought an invitation for Mr. Clinton to visit Pyonyang — and thus underscored a fundamentally different approach to diplomacy. While media-conscious American administrations prefer to carry out painstaking negotiations in advance for a carefully scripted summit meeting, the authoritarian Kim Jong Il believed that agreements should first be resolved at the highest level, leaving details to be worked out later by subordinates.

The invitation also underscored the enormous political value the North Korean government attached to a visit by the American president, seeing a Clinton visit would signify an end to enmity and acceptance by the international community.

Marshal Cho offered the Americans something they wanted as well. He reaffirmed an earlier proposal that Mr. Kim had raised with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia: that North Korea was willing to forgo its long-range missiles if the West would agreed to launch civilian satellites for Pyongyang.

The Clinton administration decided to send Dr. Albright to Pyongyang to see if there was the basis for a Clinton trip. Her visit narrowed the gap with the North Koreans still further and challenged the Western image of Mr. Kim as an irrational leader.

Zippered up in a khaki jump suit, Mr. Kim offered several important concessions during six hours of talks. He offered to "forgo" missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. That concession was tied to an American willingness to provide satellite- launching services.

He also indicated that he was willing to halt all missile exports, including missile components, technical advice and brokering services. And North Korea was no longer asking for a \$1 billion a year in cash in return, but was prepared to accept \$1 billion worth of nonmonetary assistance, like food, coal or other commodities for its stricken economy.

Little progress was made on verification. The North Korean leader insisted that Washington had adequate means to monitor compliance through satellite and other technical means and did not welcome intrusive inspections.

North Korea's existing stock of missiles was another big issue. Mr. Kim's offer to forgo long-range missiles did not apply to weapons that the North had already produced.

Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the North Koreans to destroy their missile stocks, which were a threat to Japan and to American troops in South Korea. Still, the mood at the Pyongyang meetings was good. Mr. Kim invited Dr. Albright to a huge Communist-style

celebration by his party in which workers held colored placards in the shape of the Taepo-Dong missile. The North Korean leader turned to Dr. Albright and said this was the first satellite launching and would be the last.

To iron out the remaining differences and set the stage for a summit meeting, the Clinton administration organized expert-level talks in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur.

But without Mr. Kim, the North's experts had no authority to negotiate. When the Americans tried to clarify Pyongyang's position, the North Koreans complained that their move was an insult.

To keep the negotiations moving, the American team gave the North Koreans two documents: a draft framework agreement that could be made public and signed at a summit meeting, and a confidential letter outlining each side's obligations.

Those obligations went beyond the proposals Mr. Kim had made in Pyongyang. The Americans wanted to ban the production, testing and deployment of all missiles with a range of more than 180 miles that could carry a 1,000-pound payload — the same standard that Mr. Perry had cited in his 1999 talks.

The Americans also wanted verification provisions, including a declaration by the North Koreans of the numbers and types of missiles in their arsenal. And the Americans pressed the North Koreans for a commitment to destroy their existing stocks, although some officials would have settled for a promise to negotiate this in the future.

The Americans did not quantify how much assistance they were willing to provide North Korea, though they reportedly considered providing several hundred million dollars a years worth of food aid.

Before the administration could consider a Clinton trip, it was clear there would have to be another session in which the North's negotiators could consult with the one man who could make decisions: Kim Jong Il.

So plans were made to send Ms. Sherman and a team of Pentagon, National Security Council and State Department officials to Pyongyang. Ms. Sherman would be authorized to give the North Koreans a date for a Clinton summit meeting if they made more concessions on missiles.

In an ideal world, officials said, Ms. Sherman would have gone to Pyongyang in November, and if the North Koreans made the needed concessions, she could have arranged a Clinton visit. He would then have signed a broadly written accord, while verification and other technical issues were tackled later.

But the election wrangle intruded. Mr. Berger was reluctant to send an envoy with the election in doubt. He said the administration did not deem it wise for the president to leave the country at the time of a potential "constitutional crisis."

As the weeks dragged on, Dr. Albright and Ms. Sherman kept an anxious eye

on Florida. At one point, they were monitoring the Florida events from Mauritius, wondering if the Korea operation would proceed.

After the election was decided in mid-December, Ms. Sherman and the White House Asia expert, Jack Pritchard, briefed Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza Rice. The Bush team made it clear that it would not undercut Mr. Clinton, but not would it endorse a deal, former Clinton aides said. That attitude was one factor that led the Clinton team not to send Ms. Sherman, according to a former ranking Clinton official. The concern was that the new administration would not support or even complete a deal hammered out then.

Finally, the Clinton administration announced on Dec. 29 that there was no longer enough time for its talks.

Critics inside and outside the government say Mr. Clinton made a mistake by not sending Ms. Sherman ahead. The White House, they say, could have consulted with the Bush team before the election was decided, but refrained for fear of lending legitimacy to Mr. Bush's claims to the White House.

"They did not run out of time; they ran out of courage," said Leon V. Sigal, the author of a book on Korean diplomacy.

Dr. Albright insists that the administration did the best it could. But even she has some regrets.

"Of the various places in the world where there is a chance to change the dynamic, this was it," she said last week. "Do I regret that we did not go forward? I personally do. I wish we could have."

=====

3. "Does Russia Already Have A National Missile Defense?"  
Wall Street Journal - March 6, 2001 - Melanie Kirkpatrick OpEd

Bad treaties are bound to be violated.

The current flap over Russia's underground testing in the Arctic is one example: Some U.S. intelligence officials believe Russia is detonating small nuclear blasts in violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Understanding that it was all too easy to violate, the Republican Senate was right to reject the CTBT in 1999.

But there is no better example of this treaty-violating rule than the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, subject of so much debate today. The most clear-cut violation was the Soviets' Krasnoyarsk phased-array radar, which by the '90s even the Russians agreed was a violation.

Curiously, in all the current talk about the ABM Treaty -- to withdraw or not withdraw, to amend or not amend, is it "a relic" or a "cornerstone of strategic stability" -- no one seems to be talking about violations anymore. Which is why it's a good time to take a look at the work of William T. Lee.

Mr. Lee is a retired spook, one of the guys in white hats whose unsung efforts helped the West win the Cold War. From 1951 until his retirement a

few years ago, he toiled in the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations. His specialty was Soviet military and economic affairs.

Like Mr. Lee, the Soviet generals whose Cold War adventures he used to follow from afar are now also retired. Many are spending their golden years writing their memoirs, proud of their work in building one of history's great military powers and, in the new openness that prevails in Russia, finally able to tell the story of their accomplishments and even brag a little.

Their reminiscences provide a stack of interesting reading material for Mr. Lee, who, in his own golden years, has plenty of time for perusing such Russian-language volumes as "The Rocket Shield of the Motherland" and "Soviet Military Might From Stalin to Gorbachev." The writers include: G.V. Kisunko, chief designer of the Moscow ABM system; Gen. Col. Yuri Votintsev, commander of ABM and space-defense forces from 1967-85; and B.V. Bunkin, designer of the SA-5 and SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. There are many others.

Along the way, having pieced together information from memoirs and recently declassified material, Mr. Lee says he has discovered hard evidence of something the U.S. long suspected but was never able to prove: Russia already has a national missile defense. Started by the Soviets even before the ABM Treaty took effect, the original defense was pretty rough. But, as Mr. Lee says, unlike the Americans, the Soviets realized that "some defense is better than none," and kept upgrading its NMD even after it signed the ABM Treaty. Russia has continued to modernize the NMD system over the past decade, he adds.

If true, all this would make a mockery of the ABM Treaty, which explicitly forbids the U.S. and the Soviet Union (now Russia) from developing any national defense against ballistic missiles. It would also make a mockery of Russian President Vladimir Putin's call for President Bush to abandon his plan to build a national missile defense. Mr. Putin can hardly denounce an American defense when Russia has one of its own.

Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles (SAMs) carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.

Mr. Lee also says he has evidence that Russia's early warning radars are much more capable than the treaty permits. In addition, he says, they are illegally interlocked into a battle-management system that allows Moscow to track incoming missiles and pass the targeting data to command posts, which in turn hand the data over to the SAMs.

Krasnoyarsk, now closed, was one such radar; the only reason Moscow was caught out on it was because of its inland location, which is illegal under

the treaty. It was a battle-management radar, passing along tracking and targeting information to a command-and-control system in Moscow -- precisely what the radars on Russia's periphery are doing today, Mr. Lee says. He cites the 1991 visit of an American inspection team to the Pechora radar in the Arctic Circle, when inspectors learned that the radar was passing along target-tracking information to a central command. The U.S. objected at the time but didn't follow through to the logical conclusion: that all the radars were networked.

Mr. Lee wrote up his research in a 1997 book, "The ABM Treaty Charade" and in a series of subsequent articles in scholarly journals. Henry Cooper, former head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, says of Mr. Lee: "I think he's got a very good case." Frank Gaffney, a former Reagan defense official, calls Mr. Lee's work "scrupulously documented" and says that while some aspects of Mr. Lee's analysis aren't new, "Bill stitches it together for the first time."

In particular, Mr. Cooper calls Mr. Lee's evidence on the radars "pretty compelling." This issue has been raised before, he says, "but we never got to a point that we called them on the treaty." The Russians, he says, intentionally improved their radars, taking "advantage of the ambiguities in the treaty." In the U.S., on the other hand, "we restrained our engineers" in order to stay within the limits imposed by the treaty. In other words, the U.S. is honest.

There are many good reasons for the U.S. to exercise its option to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as Article XV permits. Proof of continuing violations by the Russians would surely be one of them.

Melanie Kirkpatrick is the assistant editor of the Journal's editorial page.

John Isaacs  
Council for a Livable World  
110 Maryland Avenue, NE - Room 409  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x.131  
www.clw.org

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana contacts  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 23:30:28 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

I gather from your other e-mail that you are coordinating the sign-ons to the religious leader's letter. That's fine with me. We expect the letter to be the FCNL letter. Here is a copy if you haven't got it in electronic form. Thanks for your work on this, Howard.  
Esther

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 4:16 PM  
To: brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
Subject: Indiana contacts

Esther,

Greg Laszakovits reminded me that he agreed to contact the president of Bethany Seminary in Richmond, IN to sign the letter. I added this in the letter to the Indiana folks.

Greg will need the text of the letter we are asking the religious leaders in Indiana to sign. So will I.

Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL-LTR FINAL\_3\_00.doc"

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Religious letter  
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 23:33:56 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Howard, your message about the text of a letter for Indiana confuses me. Are you asking about the Religious sign-on letter? If so, why would it be any different from any other state. You are using the FCNL letter in all the other states, aren't you? That is what I udnerstand we all agreed to. Did I misunderstand?

Esther

Esther Pank  
Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
202.545.1004 fax  
brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
www.backfromthebrink.org

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: RE: Indiana contacts 2  
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2001 01:10:46 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

I talked to Greg and am getting the state revised Religious letter for signature out to him this afternoon along with a draft of a letter to the president of Bethany seminary. We are recommending attaching Greg, and will send to you, a sample letter for folks in Indiana to send to Lugar along with a sample letter to the editor. We are using these samples in Indiana, Nebraska and New Mexico. Feel free to use them.

Esther

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.apc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2001 4:16 PM  
To: brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
Subject: Indiana contacts

Esther,

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Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
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1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2001 11:56:01 -0800 (PST)  
From: Egbert Lawrence <egbertl4pj@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Re: Delivery by Larry Egbert  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Cc: UUAWO@aol.com

Dear Howard,

Got your mail. I will pick up and deliver the letters for the representatives. I will be at the Methodist Building around 9 AM.

And, thanks, Howard, for your great leadership on this. Is it possible I get a copy of what we are delivering if Ali or Emily didn't get one?

Sorry I cannot make the meeting next Tuesday. Might try to have a Unitarian intern do for me.

PEACE! Larry

--- "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org> wrote:

> Larry,

>

> I left letters to U.S. representatives in the

> Rayburn Building for you to

> deliver. They are at the receptionist desk in the

> Methodist Building, 100

> Maryland Avenue, NE. If this won't work out for you

> or for any other

> reason, call me at 301 896-0013 or reply by e-mail.

>

> Emily and Ali, Unitarian volunteers, are doing the

> other two House

> buildings today. I and the Mennonite office will

> cover the Senate when I

> get the letters done.

>

> Thanks for your help,

> Howard

> Howard W. Hallman, Chair

> Methodists United for Peace with Justice

> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036

> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

>

> Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a

> membership association of

> laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any

> Methodist denomination.

---

Do You Yahoo!?

Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.

<http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/>

To: egbertl4pj@yahoo.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Delivery  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Larry,

I left letters to U.S. representatives in the Rayburn Building for you to deliver. They are at the receptionist desk in the Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue, NE. If this won't work out for you or for any other reason, call me at 301 896-0013 or reply by e-mail.

Emily and Ali, Unitarian volunteers, are doing the other two House buildings today. I and the Mennonite office will cover the Senate when I get the letters done.

Thanks for your help,  
Howard

Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 07:53:39 -0800 (PST)  
From: "Tiffany L. Heath" <tlh\_churchwomen@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Question  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Good morning Howard,

This is Tiffany Heath from CWU. I am just planning my schedule for next week and I unfortunately deleted the meeting notice for the Arms group.

When and where will it take place next week?

Thank you.

Blessings,

Tiffany Heath

---

Do You Yahoo!?  
Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail.  
<http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/>

To: "Tiffany L. Heath" <tlh\_churchwomen@yahoo.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Question  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <20010307155339.20708.qmail@web1607.mail.yahoo.com>  
References: <3.0.3.32.20010108171332.0069587c@pop2.igc.org>

At 07:53 AM 3/7/01 -0800, you wrote:

>  
>Good morning Howard,  
>  
>This is Tiffany Heath from CWU. I am just planning my  
>schedule for next week and I unfortunately deleted the  
>meeting notice for the Arms group.  
>  
>When and where will it take place next week?

Tiffany,

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will meet from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, March 13 in Conference Room 3 of the Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue, NE. I hope to see you then.

Howard

From: Ricouncil@aol.com  
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 11:24:39 EST  
Subject: De-Alert of Nuclear Weapons  
To: mupj@igc.org (Howard Hallman)  
X-Mailer: AOL 5.0 for Windows sub 129

Dear Mr. Hallman

I received your letter this morning with the enclosed letter to President Bush. I will send this letter out today and will urge the members of our Advocacy/Justice/Service Department to do the same when we meet this afternoon. Let me know if there is anything further that I can do.

Thank you again.

Sincerely,

Sharon Key

Interim Executive Minister

Rhode Island State Council of Churches

To: Ricouncil@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: De-Alert of Nuclear Weapons  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <49.857db47.27d7bac7@aol.com>  
References:

At 11:24 AM 3/7/01 EST, you wrote:

>Dear Mr. Hallman  
>I received your letter this morning with the enclosed letter to President  
>Bush. I will send this letter out today and will urge the members of our  
>Advocacy/Justice/Service Department to do the same when we meet this  
>afternoon. Let me know if there is anything further that I can do.  
>Thank you again.  
>Sincerely,  
>Sharon Key  
>Interim Executive Minister  
>Rhode Island State Council of Churches  
>

Thanks for following through on this. I'm glad you're encourage people to contact President Bush. But my actual suggestion was to have the letter adapted to be addressed to Senator Reed and Senator Chafee, the signatures collected together, and try to present the multi-signed statement to the senators.

I'll call you on Thursday to discuss this further.

Shalom,  
Howard

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>,  
"Greg Laszakovits" <glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org>  
Subject: Materials for Indiana  
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2001 23:56:19 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Dear Howard and Greg,  
Attached are three items.

- 1) The original FCNL letter to Bush with 70 national religious leaders names.
- 2) A version of that sign-on letter to go to Lugar and Bayh
- 3) A sample letter to accompany the sign-on letter

I will send the sample letter we are sending out to the secular world for use by individuals to send to their Senators along with a sample letter-to-the editor tomorrow.

There are so many letters involved, I hope I got this right and I hope this helps.  
Peace,  
Esther

Esther Pank  
Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
202.545.1004 fax  
brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
www.backfromthebrink.org

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL-LTR FINAL\_3\_001.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL\_STATE\_LTR.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\State coverletter.doc"

*Please use these only as a sample. Your personal letters will mean so much more.*

### **Sample Letter to Senator ...**

The Honorable ....

I urge you to speak out on the need to get nuclear weapons off high alert. I know President Bush expressed his concerns about the danger of this cold war policy during his campaign, and I agree. [It seems to me that the thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert—ready to be launched at a moment's notice--is the greatest missile threat facing the US, and the world.] *Additional talking points are provided. Please select one, or make up your own.*

Please use your leadership role in the Senate to urge the President to follow through on his promise to reduce the threat of accidental nuclear war. It's critical that we work with the Russians to get all these off high alert.

Lengthening the time need to launch these weapons would be the single most important step to reduce the nuclear threat.

### **Sample Letter to the Editor**

I have read where the Bush administration is rethinking US nuclear weapons policy. One immediate step they should take is to work with the Russians to get all their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Together the two nations have some 5,000 nuclear weapons on high alert—ready to be launched in minute's time. This is the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs.

In a time of crisis or perceived attack, decision makers on both sides have just minutes to decide whether to launch a massive nuclear strike. The security of the US—and the world—now rests with deteriorating Russian nuclear command and early warning systems.

Human beings make mistakes. Machines break down. Having nuclear weapons on high- alert is an accident waiting to happen. As former President Ronald Reagan said: "Six minutes to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon! How can anyone apply reason at a time like that."

This is the reason we need to lengthen the time needed to launch these weapons of mass destruction. Getting all nuclear missiles off the hair-trigger should be the first step in any new policy on nuclear weapons.

Provided by Back From the Brink Campaign  
3/2001

Dear \_\_\_\_\_

I am writing to engage your help in a matter of deep moral and humanitarian importance. The threat of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons is perhaps greater today than at any time during the Cold War. In part, this is because the US and Russia still have thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert status, ready to be fired at a moment's notice.

As over 70 religious leaders noted in a recent letter to President Bush (enclosed): "In a time of crisis or perceived attack, decision makers on both sides have only minutes to decide whether to launch a nuclear strike. A single miscalculation or computer error could lead to nuclear war...the continued deterioration of Russia's radar and early warning system only increases the danger."

The President was urged to work with the Russia to "end the threat of accidental nuclear war by "de-alerting" their arsenals—taking them off the hair-trigger."

Our state's Senators need to hear the same message and I hope you can add your voice to this all-important call to peace. In this mailing you will find a state version of the national sign-on letter that was sent to President Bush. Our goal is to have our Senators receive this message from as many state religious leaders as possible. If you would like to join in this effort please sign the letter and return it to the address above.

Please contact me if you have any questions or would to receive more information on the de-alerting issue.

Thank you for your consideration of this request, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>, "Lisa Legwidge" <lisa.l@mindspring.com>  
Subject: Tips on working with Religious Leaders  
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 03:07:03 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Here is a draft of the Tips with Working with Religious Leaders piece.  
Please give me your advice for changing or adding. Thanks.  
Esther

Esther Pank  
Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
202.545.1004 fax  
brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
www.backfromthebrink.org

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>,  
"Greg Laszakovits" <glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org>  
Subject: Sample letters  
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 03:08:34 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Attached are the Sample letters to Senators, some talking points, and a sample letter to the editor.

Hope this helps.

Esther

Esther Pank  
Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
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brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
www.backfromthebrink.org

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Sample letters.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\TALKING POINTS.doc"

To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Materials for Indiana  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <NEBBKJHCMLACLOPKCPPBEEKHCBA.A.prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
References:

Esther,

Thanks for all the drafts. However, the one on tips for working with religious leaders wasn't attached.

In the letter to Senators Lugar and Bayh I suggest an opening and closing paragraph derived from the Oregon letter Jay Penniman is using, follows:

"We, leaders and members of religious organizations in Indiana, join in an interfaith appeal for you to take leadership to reduce the threat of accidental nuclear war. Specifically we ask you talk with President Bush and ask him to work with Russian leaders to take all nuclear weapons off 'hair-trigger' alert."

at the end:

"Therefore, we urge you to speak with President Bush, urging him to take action to remove all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. We await your response and would welcome an opportunity to meet with you to discuss this important matter."

It's a little repetitive, but it emphasizes the point.

But do whatever you think is best.

Howard

At 11:56 PM 3/6/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Dear Howard and Greg,  
>Attached are three items.  
>1) The original FCNL letter to Bush with 70 national religious leaders  
>names.  
>2) A version of that sign-on letter to go to Lugar and Bayh  
>3) A sample letter to accompany the sign-on letter  
>  
>I will send the sample letter we are sending out to the secular world for  
>use by individuals to send to their Senators along with a sample  
>letter-to-the editor tomorrow.  
>  
>There are so many letters involved, I hope I got this right and I hope this  
>helps.  
>Peace,  
>Esther  
>

>  
>Esther Pank  
>Back from the Brink Campaign  
>6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
>Washington DC 20012  
>202.545.1001 ph  
>202.545.1004 fax  
>brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
>www.backfromthebrink.org  
>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL-LTR FINAL\_3\_001.doc"  
>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL\_STATE\_LTR.doc"  
>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\State coverletter.doc"  
>

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: "Stacie Robinson (E-mail)" <srobinson@clw.org>  
Cc: "Howard W. Hallman (E-mail)" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Senate Staff  
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 12:02:18 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

Stacie here is the file.

David

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Senate Staff.csv"

# Back From the Brink

A Campaign to Take Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger Alert

## TALKING POINTS—DE-ALERTING

Introduction: The threat of nuclear war is still with us, though the Cold War ended ten years ago.

The United States and Russia have 4,500 nuclear weapons aimed at each other- the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs- on hair-trigger alert, ready to launch within minutes.

The danger of an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon has increased dramatically in the last six years.

The reason is that the Russian early warning and command-in-control systems are deteriorating, increasing the likelihood of an accident or an unintended launch.

The United States has had its own difficulty with nuclear missile silos—with the fire that occurred December 1, 2000 in North Dakota.

The Russian nuclear arsenal remains the only significant threat today to the survival of the United States.

A Russian nuclear warhead can reach an American city 25 minutes after launch, creating almost unimaginable damage.

Russia is far more dependent on its nuclear weapons than the United States, because it cannot afford to maintain its conventional forces, which are more expensive than its nuclear arsenal.

And the Russians feel defensive. The expansion of NATO right to its borders, the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya, and U.S. plans for a missile defense have added to Russian fears of attack or encirclement.

In fact, Russian military leaders are so worried about an attack and a warning-systems failure that they have shortened their “launch” decision-making process to six minutes.

The de-alerting of our nuclear warheads-by removing the weapons from missiles and storing them separately, or locking their triggers – is a way of increasing the time it would take to launch a nuclear weapon.

## **DE-ALERTING TALKING POINTS page 2**

While our arms control treaties aim to decrease the size of our mutual nuclear arsenals, we must also address the readiness of our nuclear arsenals. And both efforts must go forward simultaneously.

The de-alerting of all-or even a portion- of U.S. and Russian high-alert weapons would reduce dangers immediately.

It would also set the stage for further reductions in nuclear arsenals by signaling confidence.

Deploying a National Missile Defense system while nuclear weapons are on hair-trigger alert will further de-stabilize an already highly dangerous situation.

We don't need Jesse Helms' approval to de-alert our nuclear weapons: it can be done by presidential initiative. And Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev did it in 1991.

There is a growing concern on the part of lawmakers and military officials that high-alert status is a dangerous posture.

What is needed to de-alert is public pressure

SEE "Experts—ON Taking Nuclear Weapons Off Hair Trigger Alert for statements about de-alerting.

**Back From the Brink Campaign**  
**6856 Eastern Avenue, NW #322, WDC 20012**  
**201.544-1001/202.545-1004 fax**  
**[www.backfromthebrink.org](http://www.backfromthebrink.org)**  
**For information [www.bradm@backfromthebrink.net](mailto:www.bradm@backfromthebrink.net)**

X-Sender: dkimball@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32)  
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2001 15:54:28 -0500  
To: dkimball@clw.org  
From: Daryl Kimball <dkimball@clw.org>  
Subject: NMD/START Wkg Grp Mtg, 3/9 @ 930am @UCS

March 7, 2001

TO: Coalition member and friends  
RE: NMD/Deep Cust Working Group Mtg, Friday, 3/09 at 9:30am at UCS, 1707 H.  
St., NW, Suite 600

FR: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director

This Friday there will be a joint meeting of the NMD and Deep Cuts Working Groups. The meeting is open to all Coalition member organizations, as well as like-minded NGOs outside the Coalition.

Please note that this is a WORKING MEETING so please be prepared to contribute to the meeting, offer your suggestions, and volunteer to work on aspects of our developing NMD strategy. Please be prepared to report on projects that your organization is undertaking or planning that may be of interest to others.

Attached below are:

- \* DRAFT MEETING AGENDA
- \* LIST OF NEAR-TERM ASSIGNMENTS FROM 2/9 MTG.
- \* FEB. 9 DRAFT NMD STRATEGY

If you have any questions or agenda suggestions please contact me or Stacie Robinson (546-0795 x137).

Thanks,

DK

\*\*\*\*\*

Draft Agenda

NMD/START Working Group Meeting  
March 9, 2001

Location: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1707 H Street NW, 6th floor  
Time: 9:30am to 11:00am

I. Introductions

II. National Missile Defense

\* brief summary of Coyle report, timing of next flight test (S. Young)

- \* reactions to Russian NMD proposal
- \* report on Euro-related NMD efforts
  - summary of Wilton Park NMD conference (D. Kimball)
  - update on NGO work in Europe (C. Kucia)
- \* report on legislative activities
  - report on recent Hill briefings (J. Isaacs)
  - consultations with NMD skeptics (D. Kimball)
- \* report on grassroots plans on NMD (M. Butcher)
- \* brief report on efforts to engage NMD validators (J. Isaacs)

### III. Deep Cuts (incl. de-alerting and NPR)

- \* discussion of draft talking points on expected Bush NMD/deep reductions proposal (Ira Schorr)
- \* status of legislative efforts on de-alerting (Ira Schorr)

### IV. Brief announcements

### V. Set next meeting dates and adjourn

\*\*\*\*\*

### NMD/DEEP CUTS WORKING GROUP NEAR-TERM ASSIGNMENTS, 2/9

Given the likelihood that Bush Administration nuclear weapons and NMD policy reviews may be completed within 60-90 days, and given the possibility that the U.S. may be ready to give notice of withdrawal from the ABM treaty by the end of the year, the NMD/Deep Cuts Working Group hopes to make progress on the following items ASAP:

- \* One page point paper on likely Bush proposal on combining NMD with deeper offensive reductions: Spurgeon Keeny, Tom Collina, Ira Shorr (DRAFT WILL BE AVAILABLE AT 3/9 MTG.)
- \* Approach Carnegie Corporation about second letter of from "validators" on NMD issues: John Isaacs, Alise Frye, Spurgeon Keeny
- \* UCS paper on possible Shemya Island radar construction decision: Stephen Young
- \* Compile list of NMD experts for news media: Coalition
- \* Compile list of Op-Ed editors to help publish European and U.S. editorials critical of NMD: Theresa Hitchens, Stacie Robinson, Chuck Woolery
- \* Compile European statements in opposition to NMD and distribute as Issue Brief: BASIC/Coalition (DONE)

\* schedule meetings with key European embassy officials in DC (M. Butcher)

\* Pursue meetings with members of Congress on developing their strategy according to assignments taken at meeting (Coalition, CLW, UCS, BASIC, others)

\*\*\*\*\*

## DRAFT NGO STRATEGY on National Missile Defense (NMD)

February 9, 2001

**PRIMARY GOAL:** Postpone a actions leading to U.S. deployment of an NMD system and prevent withdrawal from or abrogation of the ABM Treaty that would undermine prospects for nuclear arms reductions, while encouraging more effective and less destabilizing alternative approaches to deal with ballistic missile proliferation.

\***QUESTION:** do we or do we not decide to oppose advanced development and field testing of sea-based, air-based, and space-based ABM components that would violate the ABM Treaty long before any of these are ready for a deployment decision?

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR 2001:** (i.e. What is needed to achieve the Primary Goals and we can help influence)

\* Re-establish the importance of the four common sense deployment criteria (see below)

\* Support of major U.S. opinion-leaders for our primary goals and arguments

\* Support from majority of Congress for holding Bush accountable on meeting four criteria (see below) before committing to deployment or withdrawing from ABM Treaty

\* Continued, public expression of concern and opposition about NMD from major U.S. Allies

\* Demonstrate that the proposed system is not operationally effective, the damage to arms control and natl/intl. security too great, the threat overstated, and the cost enormous

\* Support alternatives to NMD: maintain diplomatic support for efforts to achieve a permanent freeze of the N. Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs and curb missile proliferation

### KEY VARIABLES:

? Outcome of scheduled NMD tests

? Level of Congressional support or opposition to Bush NMD plans

? Unwillingness/willingness of Russia/China to agree to proposed modifications to ABM Treaty

? Support/non-support of U.S. allies in Europe and Japan for NMD deployment

? North Korean missile program activities/progress on diplomatic initiatives to freeze program

PRIMARY ARGUMENTS CRITERIA — There is no workable NMD system available and the Bush Administration should not take action to deploy NMD and/or withdraw or violate the ABM Treaty; before a concrete commitment to deployment is made, the Bush administration must be able to demonstrate that common sense criteria for deployment can be met.

1. Technology and Operational Effectiveness. Operational capability of existing or proposed NMD technology cannot be proven any time soon. Current and future NMD test programs should be reconfigured to provide a sufficient basis to prove that the system is operationally effective against realistic threats.

The current GBI test program will not provide rigorous testing against the full range of targets and countermeasures that could be launched by a country capable of fielding a long-range missile; and a national missile defense system cannot defend against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered by other means.

2. Cost of a "layered" NMD system is high and will go higher. The GBI system will cost \$60 billion or more over the next decade. Additional sea and space-based layers will increase the cost to \$100 or more. The U.S. taxpayer has already spent more than \$120 billion over the life of the ballistic missile defense program, without deploying a workable system. A significant investment in NMD will incur significant opportunity costs in other, more cost-effective efforts to curb and respond to WMD threats and may impinge on other areas of the defense budget.

3. Decision to deploy NMD will decrease -- not increase -- U.S. and international security. Taking into account the impact on arms reductions, non-proliferation objectives, and U.S. relations with Russia, China, and our close allies, a decision to deploy and/or to withdraw from the ABM Treaty will decrease rather than increase U.S. security. National missile defenses are a "last line" of defense should only be pursued only if they work and if they do not undercut our "first lines" of defense to prevent and reduce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons threats, including Nunn- Lugar-Domenici Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. (NOTE: A U.S./Russian agreement to modify the ABM Treaty to allow limited NMD deployment would likely change this assessment.)

4. The long-range ballistic missile threat from North Korea has not and will not materialize if the United States and other nations work cooperatively to permanently freeze that nation's missile program and take action to strengthen existing ballistic missile controls (such as the MTCR) and implement new restrictions on such technologies (including variations on the Russian Global Control System proposal).

---

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505  
Washington, DC 20002  
(ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970

website <<http://www.crnd.org>>

---

To: Bishopnyac@aol.com, dwhite@edgenet.net  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Korean missile diplomacy; Bush-Kim remarks  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Bishop Lyght and Bishop White,

Knowing your interest in North Korea, I want to share with you several reports about how the Bush Administration is approaching North Korea. Not properly, in my view. The statement by Secretary Powell is contradicted by President Bush's reluctance to deal with North Korea. The Washington Post today had a story on this, which I'll send you.

I hope your committee will take this up vigorously and rally the faith community to urge the Bush Administration to work out a deal for North Korea to abandon its ballistic missile program. I'm usually not cynical, but I wonder whether they fear that resolving the North Korean situation would undermine their case for national missile defense, which they are pursuing for ideological reasons as much as for defense purposes.

Perhaps your committee, possibly with leaders from other denominations, should seek a meeting with President Bush. If not him, at least with his national security advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell. On Capitol Hill you could talk with Senator Joe Biden (DE), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Dick Lugar (IN), ranking Republican after Chairman Helms, and a United Methodist (Bishop Woodie White might help you get an appointment).

If I can assist you in any way, please let me know.

Shalom,  
Howard

Dear Bishop Lyght and Bishop White,

Knowing your interest in North Korea, I want to share with you several reports about how the Bush Administration is approaching North Korea. Not properly, in my view. The statement by Secretary Powell is contradicted by President Bush's reluctance to deal with North Korea. The Washington Post today had a story on this, which I'll send you.

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If I can assist you in any way, please let me know.

Shalom,  
Howard

>March 7, 2001

>

>TO: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers members and friends

>

>FR: Daryl Kimball, Exec. Director; Victoria Samson, Senior Policy Assoc.

>

>RE: NMD/START Update -- Korean peninsula/missile diplomacy; Bush-Kim remarks

>

>MISSILE DIPLOMACY ON KOREAN PENINSULA - BUSH NOT INTERESTED IN RESUMING

>TALKS WITH NORTH, YET

>

>As President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea visits the White House today,

>there is renewed attention on the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough:

>a verifiable agreement to permanently freeze the North Korean missile

>program. In an excellent op-ed in today's New York Times, Wendy R. Sherman,

>former special adviser to the president and the secretary of state on North

>Korea policy, writes:

>

>"President George Bush campaigned on a promise to defend America against

>missile threats from countries like North Korea. His intention is to build

>a national missile defense system. But such a system is not only unproven;

>it would undoubtedly be costly in both dollars and in diplomacy.

>

>Although there is some logic in trying to construct a missile defense

>system, there is also logic in seizing every opportunity to reduce or

>eliminate the missile threats through the less costly means of arms control

>negotiations. In dealing with North Korea, President Bush has an

>opportunity to take this latter approach. The question now is whether he

>will seize it."

>

>Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate

>today calling on President Bush to pursue such an agreement. He said in

>part: "It would be irresponsible not to explore, to discover, whether North

>Korea is prepared to abandon its pursuit of long-range missile in response

>to a serious proposal from the United States and its friends and allies."

>

>Unfortunately, President Bush told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung this

>afternoon that the United States views North Korea as a threat and would

>not immediately resume negotiations with the communist regime. See

>statements and articles below.

>

>Also, attached below are related articles on the Kim Dae Jung visit, the

>story behind the Clinton administration's failure to secure a last minute

>missile freeze deal with North Korea, and an report on Bush administration

>interest in pursuing such an agreement.

>

>For a useful analysis of issues relating to implementation of the 1994

>Agreed Framework with North Korea, see the Institute for Science and

>International Security's press release and policy brief urging the Bush

>administration to continue to engage North Korea. A copy of the Policy

>Brief can be found at:

>

><<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/policybrief301.html>> A copy  
>of the press release can be found at:

><<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/policybrief301pr.html>>

>

>

>**BUSH-KIM REMARKS**

>

>The full transcript of President Bush's and President Kim's remarks are  
>attached below.

>

>**NOTE:** The attached articles are for educational purposes only. For previous  
>editions of the Coalition's "NMD/START Update," see

><http://www.clw.org/coalition/nmdnews.htm>

>

>\*\*\*\*\*

>

>**IN THIS UPDATE:**

>

>1. "Talking To The North Koreans," New York Times, March 7, 2001, By Wendy  
>R. Sherman

>

>2. "Bush To Pick Up Clinton Talks On N. Korean Missiles," Washington Post,  
>March 7, 2001

>

>3. "Korean To Visit Bush, But They Could Be At Odds," New York Times, March  
>7, 2001

>

>4. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea," New York Times,  
>March 6, 2001

>

>5. Remarks By President Bush And President Kim Dae-Jung Of South Korea,  
>March 7

>

>6. "Bush: North Korea a Threat to U.S.," by PAULINE JELINEK, Associated  
>Press 2:06pm, March 7, 2001

>

>\*\*\*\*\*

>

>1. "Talking To The North Koreans," New York Times, March 7, 2001, By Wendy  
>R. Sherman

>

>**WASHINGTON** — President George Bush campaigned on a promise to defend  
>America against missile threats from countries like North Korea. His  
>intention is to build a national missile defense system. But such a system  
>is not only unproven; it would undoubtedly be costly in both dollars and in  
>diplomacy.

>

>Although there is some logic in trying to construct a missile defense  
>system, there is also logic in seizing every opportunity to reduce or  
>eliminate the missile threats through the less costly means of arms control  
>negotiations. In dealing with North Korea, President Bush has an  
>opportunity to take this latter approach. The question now is whether he  
>will seize it. We may know the answer after President Kim Dae Jung of South  
>Korea meets with President Bush today.

>  
>Reconciliation and engagement with North Korea have been the centerpiece of  
>President Kim's three years in office. Although some believe that continued  
>international isolation would bring a welcome demise of the dictatorial  
>North Korean regime, its sudden collapse would pose terrible security and  
>economic challenges that South Korea and the world can ill afford. Any  
>international crisis with North Korea, particularly one involving the  
>United States, would be likely to halt efforts, heightened by last year's  
>summit between North and South Korea, to bring the North out of its  
>isolation. Undoubtedly, such a crisis would also doom for the foreseeable  
>future prospects for a final peace agreement between the North and the South.

>  
>Because Mr. Kim knows that North Korea's long-range missile threat is  
>uppermost among America's concerns, he will most likely want to know if  
>President Bush will close the deal with North Korea that came tantalizingly  
>close for President Bill Clinton in his final days in office. That  
>agreement, when completed, would both halt North Korea's exports of  
>missiles and related technology and stop further production, deployment and  
>testing of long-range missiles.

>  
>The clock ran out on the Clinton administration before it could nail down  
>the final details. For two years, the administration had pursued a  
>practical, step-by-step policy that achieved a moratorium on missile  
>testing by Pyongyang, gained access to an underground area suspected of  
>being a nuclear reactor site and saw the first visit of a high-ranking  
>North Korean military official, Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, to the United  
>States.

>  
>After a series of negotiations that led to Secretary of State Madeleine  
>Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000, North Korea's leader, Kim  
>Jong Il, appears ready to make landmark commitments about the missile  
>program. To ensure the survival of his regime, he has to improve the  
>country's disastrous economy by reducing the burden of a vast missile  
>program and opening the doors to trade.

>  
>There are many challenges in ending this lingering Cold War conflict, and  
>many would assume that Kim Dae Jung would first want to get North Korea to  
>move back its million-man army from deployment along the North-South  
>border. But he knows that he can counter that with conventional forces. So  
>his priority is to reduce the destabilizing force of weapons of mass  
>destruction, particularly long-range nuclear missiles. The world saw the  
>threat they pose in 1998, when a missile being tested by North Korea flew  
>over Japan and set off an international crisis that could have undone the  
>1994 nuclear agreement with the United States that halted the North's  
>fissile material production.

>  
>President Bush, for his part, does not need to make a false choice between  
>negotiating a missile agreement with North Korea and pursuing his already  
>stated intention to build a national missile defense. It will take time to  
>achieve a missile agreement and test North Korea's compliance with it. It  
>will also take considerable time to develop and test virtually any national  
>missile defense system. So Mr. Bush can move forward on both strategies  
>without foreclosing any options. If negotiations do achieve a real  
>reduction or elimination of the North Korean missile threat, Mr. Bush can

>then decide if he should change his approach to national missile defense.  
>  
>Although President Bush has time to consider his approach to negotiations,  
>North Korea, a country of immense pride, will not wait forever. Kim Jong Il  
>is capable of creating a crisis absent a clear signal that negotiations are  
>possible. He is certain to be listening closely to the tone and substance  
>of reports from this week's meeting between Mr. Bush and Kim Dae Jung.  
>President Bush should restart talks with North Korea, and if an agreement  
>is at hand, be ready to meet with Kim Jong Il.  
>  
>Some are understandably concerned that a summit with President Bush would  
>only legitimize the North Korean leader. But, if such a meeting verifiably  
>eliminated a major missile threat to the United States and the world, drew  
>North Korea into the international community and began to open a window of  
>freedom for that country's starved and desperate citizens, it would be more  
>than worth the risk.  
>  
># # #  
>  
>Wendy R. Sherman was special adviser to the president and the secretary of  
>state on North Korea policy in the Clinton administration.  
>  
>\*\*\*\*\*  
>  
>2. "Bush To Pick Up Clinton Talks On N. Korean Missiles," Washington Post,  
>March 7, 2001  
>  
>By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer  
>  
>The Bush administration intends to pick up where the Clinton administration  
>left off in negotiations with North Korea over its missile programs,  
>Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday.  
>  
>Powell spoke on the eve of a visit to the White House by South Korean  
>President Kim Dae Jung, who is seeking President Bush's support for his  
>"sunshine policy" of trying to open the isolated regime in North Korea.  
>  
>In the last days of the Clinton administration, the United States had been  
>close to completing a deal to normalize relations with North Korea and  
>provide substantial economic aid in return for a permanent end to North  
>Korea's missile development and proliferation programs. "We do plan to  
>engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his  
>administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising  
>elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."  
>  
>He also praised South Korea's Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his  
>overture to Pyongyang, and said the United States would coordinate policy  
>with him before engaging North Korea.  
>  
>"And so we are not avoiding North Korea; quite the contrary," Powell said.  
>"We think we have a lot to offer that regime, if they will act in ways that  
>we think are constructive -- ways that reduce the threat of proliferation  
>of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and ways that help open their  
>society and give transparency into their society."

>  
>Some notes of caution, however, were injected by another senior  
>administration official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity.  
>  
>"We're all for what Kim Dae Jung is trying to do by trying to open up the  
>regime and engage the regime," the senior official said, "but you have to  
>have a very clear-eyed view of what [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il is  
>trying to do . . . because it's a failed regime that is trying to stabilize  
>itself."  
>  
>The official also responded sharply to a Feb. 22 threat by North Korea's  
>foreign ministry to restart long-range missile tests if the United States  
>did not continue negotiations on normalizing relations and supplying aid.  
>"We sent a very strong message to North Korea that if the intention was to  
>get our attention, it did -- but in the wrong direction," the official said.  
>  
>Noting that the new administration is still "taking stock" of the  
>situation, the official said that North Korea remains a "bazaar for missile  
>sales to just about everybody else we're worried about" and that any  
>agreement on missiles would require extensive verification procedures. "You  
>cannot rely on Kim Jong Il's word to verify what would be an extremely  
>important agreement," the official said.  
>  
>Still, the official added, the United States is likely to continue to  
>supply food aid to North Korea, despite concerns that much of it is  
>diverted to leading party members and the military. And the official said  
>that the Bush administration was "not just looking to walk away from" a  
>1994 nuclear agreement known as the Agreed Framework, but rather would look  
>at whether to restructure it. Under that accord, North Korea stopped work  
>on a nuclear reactor in return for \$5 billion of U.S., South Korean and  
>Japanese assistance in building newer, safer nuclear power plants.  
>  
>While the Bush administration has hailed South Korea's importance as an  
>ally in Asia, the approach to North Korea is just one of several issues  
>that threaten to strain relations between the two allies. South Korea's Kim  
>also is skeptical about the need for a U.S. missile defense system.  
>  
>Separately, some members of Congress are also pressing Kim to buy American  
>military equipment, especially F-15 fighter jets. House Minority Leader  
>Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.) and Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.), who  
>represent the state where McDonnell Douglas makes F-15s, both traveled to  
>South Korea recently. Sen. Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.) pressed Bush's nominee for  
>deputy secretary of defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, at his confirmation hearing  
>on whether the administration would support the sale.  
>  
>In fiscal 2000, South Korea budgeted \$4.45 billion for military  
>modernization, a \$1 billion increase from the year before. Chyung Dai-Chul,  
>a leading member of the South Korean assembly's defense committee, said in  
>a recent interview that South Korea is also considering Russian and  
>European fighter jets. He said South Korea also plans to buy offensive  
>helicopters, such as the U.S.-made Apache.  
>  
>Wolfowitz said the administration would stress the advantages of using  
>compatible equipment because of the close U.S.-South Korea alliance. Chyung

>said South Korea was concerned about price, restrictions on technology  
>transfers and the danger of being too dependent on the United States.

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>3. "Korean To Visit Bush, But They Could Be At Odds," New York Times, March  
>7, 2001

>

>By David E. Sanger

>

>WASHINGTON, March 6 — South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung, arrived here  
>tonight for what could prove to be a clash with the Bush administration  
>over the right strategy for dealing with North Korea as it emerges from  
>self-imposed isolation for the first time in nearly 50 years.

>

>Mr. Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year for his efforts to end the  
>armed standoff that has existed with the North since the end of the Korean  
>War, has told his aides and some visiting Americans that he intends to sign  
>a peace "declaration" with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong Il, in  
>the next few months. While that declaration would fall short of a peace  
>treaty, Mr. Kim believes that it is essential to making irreversible the  
>North's tentative moves to engage the outside world.

>

>But it comes just as the Bush administration is undertaking what it calls a  
>"thorough review" of American policy toward North Korea, with a clear view  
>toward taking a far harder line than the Clinton administration did when it  
>negotiated a major nuclear deal in 1994, and tried, unsuccessfully, to  
>close a deal on missile controls last year.

>

>Senior administration officials indicate that they continue to view North  
>Korea as a major threat, and they are clearly wary that Mr. Kim's peace  
>initiatives have moved too fast, with too few concessions from the North.  
>One senior American official told reporters today that "the North Korean  
>regime is a problem and Kim Jong Il is a problem."

>

>American military and intelligence officials, fearful that the North is  
>stringing out negotiations while it hardens its military emplacements along  
>the demilitarized zone, recently warned the Bush administration that the  
>North had begun laying fiber-optic cables just north of the DMZ so that it  
>could stymie American intelligence gathering and bolster its ability to  
>unleash a devastating conventional attack on Seoul and the 37,000 American  
>troops still on the Korean Peninsula.

>

>This conflict in views between the new occupants of the White House and a  
>Nobel Prize winner who "is in a big hurry," in the words of one of his  
>occasional advisers, poses a major challenge for Mr. Bush. Until now his  
>encounters with foreign leaders have been largely friendly get-togethers  
>with the leaders of Mexico, Canada and Britain. On Wednesday he will meet  
>an American ally who views the world very differently, and believes that  
>Washington could get in the way of a strategy that is working.

>

>"Bush is like a cop and Kim Dae Jung is like a priest," said Douglas Paal,  
>who heads the Asia Pacific Policy Center here and is allied with many  
>critics of Kim Dae Jung in the Bush administration. "The cop wants to get

>the North Koreans disarmed and off the streets and the priest wants to give  
>him the resources to become a very different person."

>

>The two leaders will doubtless appear to straddle the difference on  
>Wednesday, and the White House has made sure that they are not subjected to  
>more than brief questioning.

>

>Mr. Bush's aides say the president will mostly be listening on Wednesday,  
>assuring Mr. Kim that the alliance between Seoul and Washington is strong  
>and that he will review North Korea issues in the next few months. Already  
>Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has expressed some interest in picking  
>up the missile negotiations that never came to fruition last year, saying  
>today that he saw "promising elements" in those talks and offering to "pick  
>up where President Clinton and his administration left off."

>

>But the South Koreans know that other aides rank among their greatest critics.

>

>Among them is Paul D. Wolfowitz, nominated as Deputy Secretary of Defense,  
>who told Congress two years ago that the 1994 deal that froze North Korea's  
>one known nuclear weapons production facility was deeply flawed. "The real  
>issue is how much are they producing elsewhere, covertly, and possibly  
>underground," he said. He has also offered blistering critiques of Mr.  
>Clinton and Mr. Kim's strategy of paying the North — with food, oil or a  
>commitment to build nuclear power plants in North Korea — to give up its  
>weapons programs.

>

>Today the senior American official said the administration would not walk  
>away from the 1994 deal, saying "it was a commitment involving several  
>governments," including Japan. Privately, however, many Bush administration  
>officials say they want to explore a way to stop delivery of two  
>conventional nuclear power plants to the North — the quid pro quo for  
>halting its operations to reprocess nuclear waste — and to replace them  
>with conventional coal- fired plants. The nuclear facilities, they worry,  
>could ultimately provide the North with the raw material to make small  
>nuclear weapons.

>

>President Kim's view is that any effort to reopen the 1994 accord would be  
>disastrous, and could kill the nascent peace talks between North and South.  
>He has quietly told visiting American officials and the administration that  
>he is ready to sign a peace "declaration" with Kim Jong Il even if the  
>North does not back it up by pulling its army back from the DMZ, or make  
>progress on the missile deal with Washington.

>

>That has left White House officials clearly wary. "We will ask President  
>Kim to consult us before he goes forward with anything like that," one  
>official said today.

>

>But President Kim is not likely to be deterred. He is coming under  
>increasing criticism at home for his handling of the South Korean economy,  
>and opposition leaders contend that he has been seduced by the North.  
>Meanwhile, he is racing to build rail links and trade ties that could  
>ultimately bring North and South Korea into a commercial, if not a  
>political, confederation.

>

>"This is his legacy, and he believes he does not have much time to make  
>sure the North Koreans don't reverse course," said one South Korean who has  
>talked about the plans with President Kim. "And he's ready to go his own  
>way if he has to."

>  
>But Mr. Kim needs Washington's cooperation. Few doubt that North Korea's  
>real aim is to normalize relations with the United States, in hopes of  
>opening the spigot of aid from the World Bank and others who could provide  
>the starving country with a chance to rebuild a country shattered by war  
>and mismanagement.

>  
>At the Wednesday meeting, Mr. Kim will also have to step lightly around  
>another conflict with Washington, over national and regional missile  
>defense systems.

>  
>Last week Mr. Kim angered the Bush administration when he stood alongside  
>President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and strongly suggested that he shared  
>Russia's distaste for Mr. Bush's plans for a missile shield — and said the  
>1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty was "a cornerstone of strategic  
>stability" around the world.

>  
>"We certainly don't consider it the cornerstone," said the senior  
>administration official, whose protests to South Korea led to a  
>half-hearted retraction of the statement as soon as Mr. Putin had left Seoul.

>  
>President Kim's aides say they fear that the Bush administration, in its  
>enthusiasm to promote the missile shield, is not too eager to have North  
>Korea defanged as the prime example of a "rogue state" capable of hitting  
>the United States.

>  
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>  
>4. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea," New York Times,  
>March 6, 2001

>  
>By Michael R. Gordon

>  
>WASHINGTON, March 5 — Wendy R. Sherman brought along an extra suitcase of  
>cold-weather gear even when she joined Secretary of State Madeleine K.  
>Albright for a December trip through Africa.

>  
>As the Clinton administration's senior policy coordinator on North Korea,  
>Ms. Sherman was prepared to fly to Pyongyang on a moment's notice. Her task  
>there would be to clear away the final barriers to an accord that would  
>neutralize the North Korean missile threat, which has been a central  
>justification for the hotly debated American national missile defense  
>project. Had she succeeded, the framework of an agreement would have been  
>signed by President Clinton and Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, in  
>Pyongyang, the North's capital.

>  
>But Ms. Sherman never made the trip.

>  
>In a decision that is still hotly debated by national security experts, the  
>Clinton administration put North Korea diplomacy aside while the Republican

>and Democratic presidential contenders wrestled over the vote count in  
>Florida, a decision that Clinton aides have sought to justify on the  
>premise that the president could not travel abroad during a potential  
>constitutional crisis.

>

>By the time the dust settled in Florida, and confronting a lukewarm  
>response from the victorious Republicans, Mr. Clinton's team reluctantly  
>decided that it had run out of time.

>

>"Although there were still critical details to be worked out, it appeared  
>that an agreement was within reach," Ms. Sherman said in an interview this  
>week, reflecting the dominant view in the Clinton team.

>

>The episode remains vitally relevant because the North Korean missile  
>threat has been the driving force behind the debate in Washington over  
>missile defenses, and because President Bush has yet to declare whether he  
>plans to carry through or modify the Clinton strategy.

>

>The Bush team has been generally skeptical about North Korea, and it is not  
>clear how much they will use diplomacy to try to head off missile threats,  
>instead of relying primarily on their plans for missile defense.

>

>The South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, who will meet with Mr. Bush on  
>Wednesday, is expected to press the new administration to engage with  
>Pyongyang. And while the negotiations are still shrouded in secrecy, they  
>apparently made more progress than generally thought.

>

>According to current and former government experts, Kim Jong Il promised in  
>confidential talks not to produce, test or deploy missiles with a range of  
>more than 300 miles. That offer would prevent North Korea from fielding  
>missiles that could strike the United States.

>

>North Korea, the experts said, also offered to halt the sale of missiles,  
>missile components, technology and training. The pledge would ban systems  
>that North Korea had already contracted to provide to aspiring third world  
>powers.

>

>And North Korea dropped its demand that it be paid cash for giving up its  
>long-range missile programs.

>

>Several important issues remained unresolved, including how to verify the  
>agreements; whether North Korea was willing to destroy missiles it had  
>already produced, and the value of the nonmonetary aid North Korea should  
>receive in lieu of cash.

>

>"We got further than we thought was possible on the missile issue," one  
>government specialist said. "But there is still more work to do on the  
>details before we know if we will have something substantial."

>

>When it comes to ballistic missiles, North Korea has been a major source of  
>concern for Washington. North Korea shocked American defense experts when  
>it tried to put a satellite into orbit in August 1998 on a Taepo Dong-1  
>missile.

>

>The attempt failed when the solid- fuel third stage exploded. And the Taepo  
>Dong-1 lacked the ability to reach American territory with a nuclear payload.  
>  
>But experts were worried that with time, North Korea would field a more  
>capable successor, the Taepo Dong-2, which could threaten the United  
>States. North Korea is also one of the major sellers of missile technology  
>around the world. The Iranian and Pakistani missile programs, for instance,  
>are heavily dependent on North Korean technology.  
>  
>The Taepo Dong test and a general deterioration in relations between  
>Pyongyang and Washington prompted the Clinton administration to ask former  
>Defense Secretary William J. Perry to conduct a policy review.  
>  
>Traveling to Pyongyang in May 1999, Mr. Perry told the North Koreans that  
>there were two paths they could follow: cooperation, or a collision course  
>with the United States and its Asian allies.  
>  
>If North Korea chose cooperation, Mr. Perry advised, it needed to give up  
>its missile program. Specifically, the North Koreans should agree not to  
>sell or deploy missiles that exceeded the guidelines of the Missile  
>Technology Control Regime — that is, missiles that can carry an 1,100-  
>pound payload more than 180 miles.  
>  
>Mr. Perry recalled in an interview that he was initially discouraged by  
>what he heard in Pyongyang.  
>  
>But the Korea experts on Mr. Perry's team detected a shift in the North  
>Korean stance, and over the next 18 months, developments appeared to prove  
>them right.  
>  
>North Korea declared a moratorium on its long-range missile tests, and in  
>June, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung met. And as the clock wound down on the  
>Clinton administration in September, it was asked to receive a high-level  
>Korean envoy.  
>  
>The envoy was Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, the head of the North Korean  
>military, and his visit was taken by most Clinton aides as an indication  
>that Mr. Kim was trying to bring his skeptical generals around.  
>  
>"I think Kim poked his head out of the groundhog hole, looked around and  
>decided that his regime is not sustainable unless it is somehow connected  
>with the rest of the world," Samuel R. Berger, Mr. Clinton's national  
>security adviser, said today.  
>  
>Marshal Cho also brought an invitation for Mr. Clinton to visit Pyongyang —  
>and thus underscored a fundamentally different approach to diplomacy. While  
>media-conscious American administrations prefer to carry out painstaking  
>negotiations in advance for a carefully scripted summit meeting, the  
>authoritarian Kim Jong Il believed that agreements should first be resolved  
>at the highest level, leaving details to be worked out later by subordinates.  
>  
>The invitation also underscored the enormous political value the North  
>Korean government attached to a visit by the American president, seeing a  
>Clinton visit would signify an end to enmity and acceptance by the

>international community.

>

>Marshal Cho offered the Americans something they wanted as well. He  
>reaffirmed an earlier proposal that Mr. Kim had raised with President  
>Vladimir V. Putin of Russia: that North Korea was willing to forgo its  
>long-range missiles if the West would agreed to launch civilian satellites  
>for Pyongyang.

>

>The Clinton administration decided to send Dr. Albright to Pyongyang to see  
>if there was the basis for a Clinton trip. Her visit narrowed the gap with  
>the North Koreans still further and challenged the Western image of Mr. Kim  
>as an irrational leader.

>

>Zippered up in a khaki jump suit, Mr. Kim offered several important  
>concessions during six hours of talks. He offered to "forgo" missiles with  
>a range of more than 300 miles. That concession was tied to an American  
>willingness to provide satellite- launching services.

>

>He also indicated that he was willing to halt all missile exports,  
>including missile components, technical advice and brokering services. And  
>North Korea was no longer asking for a \$1 billion a year in cash in return,  
>but was prepared to accept \$1 billion worth of nonmonetary assistance, like  
>food, coal or other commodities for its stricken economy.

>

>Little progress was made on verification. The North Korean leader insisted  
>that Washington had adequate means to monitor compliance through satellite  
>and other technical means and did not welcome intrusive inspections.

>

>North Korea's existing stock of missiles was another big issue. Mr. Kim's  
>offer to forgo long-range missiles did not apply to weapons that the North  
>had already produced.

>

>Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the  
>North Koreans to destroy their missile stocks, which were a threat to Japan  
>and to American troops in South Korea. Still, the mood at the Pyongyang  
>meetings was good. Mr. Kim invited Dr. Albright to a huge Communist-style  
>celebration by his party in which workers held colored placards in the  
>shape of the Taepo-Dong missile. The North Korean leader turned to Dr.  
>Albright and said this was the first satellite launching and would be the  
>last.

>

>To iron out the remaining differences and set the stage for a summit  
>meeting, the Clinton administration organized expert-level talks in the  
>Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur.

>

>But without Mr. Kim, the North's experts had no authority to negotiate.  
>When the Americans tried to clarify Pyongyang's position, the North Koreans  
>complained that their move was an insult.

>

>To keep the negotiations moving, the American team gave the North Koreans  
>two documents: a draft framework agreement that could be made public and  
>signed at a summit meeting, and a confidential letter outlining each side's  
>obligations.

>

>Those obligations went beyond the proposals Mr. Kim had made in Pyongyang.  
>The Americans wanted to ban the production, testing and deployment of all  
>missiles with a range of more than 180 miles that could carry a 1,000-pound  
>payload — the same standard that Mr. Perry had cited in his 1999 talks.  
>  
>The Americans also wanted verification provisions, including a declaration  
>by the North Koreans of the numbers and types of missiles in their arsenal.  
>And the Americans pressed the North Koreans for a commitment to destroy  
>their existing stocks, although some officials would have settled for a  
>promise to negotiate this in the future.  
>  
>The Americans did not quantify how much assistance they were willing to  
>provide North Korea, though they reportedly considered providing several  
>hundred million dollars a years worth of food aid.  
>  
>Before the administration could consider a Clinton trip, it was clear there  
>would have to be another session in which the North's negotiators could  
>consult with the one man who could make decisions: Kim Jong Il.  
>  
>So plans were made to send Ms. Sherman and a team of Pentagon, National  
>Security Council and State Department officials to Pyongyang. Ms. Sherman  
>would be authorized to give the North Koreans a date for a Clinton summit  
>meeting if they made more concessions on missiles.  
>  
>In an ideal world, officials said, Ms. Sherman would have gone to Pyongyang  
>in November, and if the North Koreans made the needed concessions, she  
>could have arranged a Clinton visit. He would then have signed a broadly  
>written accord, while verification and other technical issues were tackled  
>later.  
>  
>But the election wrangle intruded. Mr. Berger was reluctant to send an  
>envoy with the election in doubt. He said the administration did not deem  
>it wise for the president to leave the country at the time of a potential  
>"constitutional crisis."  
>  
>As the weeks dragged on, Dr. Albright and Ms. Sherman kept an anxious eye  
>on Florida. At one point, they were monitoring the Florida events from  
>Mauritius, wondering if the Korea operation would proceed.  
>  
>After the election was decided in mid-December, Ms. Sherman and the White  
>House Asia expert, Jack Pritchard, briefed Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza  
>Rice. The Bush team made it clear that it would not undercut Mr. Clinton,  
>but not would it endorse a deal, former Clinton aides said. That attitude  
>was one factor that led the Clinton team not to send Ms. Sherman, according  
>to a former ranking Clinton official. The concern was that the new  
>administration would not support or even complete a deal hammered out then.  
>  
>Finally, the Clinton administration announced on Dec. 29 that there was no  
>longer enough time for its talks.  
>  
>Critics inside and outside the government say Mr. Clinton made a mistake by  
>not sending Ms. Sherman ahead. The White House, they say, could have  
>consulted with the Bush team before the election was decided, but refrained  
>for fear of lending legitimacy to Mr. Bush's claims to the White House.

>  
>"They did not run out of time; they ran out of courage," said Leon V.  
>Sigal, the author of a book on Korean diplomacy.  
>  
>Dr. Albright insists that the administration did the best it could. But  
>even she has some regrets.  
>  
>"Of the various places in the world where there is a chance to change the  
>dynamic, this was it," she said last week. "Do I regret that we did not go  
>forward? I personally do. I wish we could have."  
>  
>\*\*\*\*\*  
>  
>5. Remarks By President Bush And President Kim Dae-Jung Of South Korea  
>  
>WASHINGTON, March 7  
>  
>The following is a transcript of remarks by President Bush and President  
>Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea:  
>  
>                  The Oval Office  
> 12:03 P.M. EST  
>  
> PRESIDENT BUSH: Everybody in? It's been my honor to welcome President  
>Kim here to the Oval Office. We had a very good discussion. We confirmed  
>the close relationship between our two countries. We talked about a lot of  
>subjects. And we'll be glad to answer questions on some of those subjects,  
>but first let me say how much I appreciate this man's leadership in terms  
>of reaching out to the North Koreans.  
> He is leading, he is a leader. He is -- and we've had a very frank  
>discussion about his vision for peace on the Peninsula. It's a goal we  
>share. After all, we've got vested interests there. And we had a very good  
>discussion. I made it clear to the President we look forward to working  
>toward peace on the Peninsula, that we'll consult closely, that we'll stay  
>in touch; that I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea,  
>but that's not going to preclude us from trying to achieve the common  
>objectives.  
> So, Mr. President, welcome. Thank you for being here.  
> PRESIDENT KIM: First of all, I would like to express my deepest  
>gratitude to President Bush for inviting me to visit Washington and have  
>this meeting with him, despite his very busy schedule, I'm sure, in these  
>early weeks after inauguration.  
> I'm delighted to have had this opportunity to start building  
>friendship and close cooperative working relationship with President Bush  
>on a variety of issues. I thank the President for sharing his insight and  
>wisdom with me concerning the situation in Northeast Asia and the world, in  
>general. And while discussing things with him I could feel that I was  
>sitting next to a leader who would take the world to greater peace and  
>prosperity in the 21st century.  
> President Bush and I covered the whole variety of issues in ROK-U.S.  
>relations. It has been a most useful exchange of views. We have agreed to  
>work together towards the further strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance,  
>and our close policy coordination in dealing with North Korea towards to  
>goal of ending the Cold War and strengthening peace and stability on the

>Korean Peninsula.

> And taking this opportunity, I would like to invite you, Mr.

>President, to come and visit us in Seoul as early as you can, so that we  
>will have another opportunity to further strengthen the close cooperative  
>working relationship between our two allies.

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, sir.

> I'm going to take a couple of questions from the American press. I  
>would hope that the South Korean press would be willing -- we'll  
>alternate.

> Fournier.

> Q: Mr. President, the Secretary of State just told us that you made it  
>clear you would not be fooled by the North Korean regime. Can you expand on  
>that? And are you afraid that the South Koreans, in their haste, their  
>energy to make peace, might be not forcing North Korea to make certain  
>concessions that need to be made?

> PRESIDENT BUSH: First, we had a very frank discussion about North  
>Korea. There's no question in my mind that the President of the Republic of  
>Korea is a realist. He knows exactly with whom we're dealing. He's under no  
>illusions. I also told the President that we look forward to, at some point  
>in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any  
>negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential  
>agreement.

> And so I look forward to strengthening our relationship, first and  
>foremost. And we will have a constant dialogue as to the progress that is  
>being made on the Peninsula, and our foreign policy will respond in a way  
>that will reinforce the efforts of the President, but at the same time --  
>and at the same time, make it clear to all parties concerned that any  
>agreement must make the Peninsula more peaceful and we must be able to  
>verify that it is more peaceful.

> I am concerned about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping  
>weapons around the world. And any agreement that would convince them not to  
>do so would be beneficial, but we want to make sure that their ability to  
>develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was, in fact, stopped --  
>they're willing to stop it -- and that we can verify that, in fact, they  
>had stopped it.

> But, Ron, there's no question that this President takes a realistic  
>view of the man with whom we're dealing.

> Q: Mr. President, do you believe that North Korea is living up to its  
>other agreements with the United States, Japan, South Korea?

> PRESIDENT BUSH: South Korean press? I'll get you in a minute, Jim.

> Q: A question to President Kim of South Korea. Mr. President, you say  
>that you've had sufficient, fruitful exchange of views with President Bush.  
>This is a transitional period in which you have to deal with a new  
>administration, a change from the Clinton administration now to the Bush  
>administration. You say that you do not expect any major changes in the  
>work that you do together. But President Bush has greatly emphasized the  
>pragmatic and realistic approaches in dealing with North Korea. In that  
>regard, do you detect any change, and what do you think is the greatest  
>outcome of this summit meeting today?

> PRESIDENT KIM: The greatest outcome today has to be that through a  
>frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean  
>Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding.

> On North Korea, yes, there are many problems that remain. But  
>President Bush has clearly expressed his strong support for our efforts to

>further the dialogue with North Korea. On my part, I have assured him that  
>as we try to advance the dialogue with North Korea, we will consult with  
>the United States every step of the way, so that the progress in  
>South-North Korean relations serves the interest of our two countries, and  
>that it serves to strengthen peace on the Korean Peninsula.

> President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his  
>perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader,  
>and this is very important for me to take back home and to consider.

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Jim.

> Q: Yes, sir. Sorry to go out of order, sir.

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Do you remember the question?

> Q: I believe I do, sir. There are some other agreements that the U.S.,  
>Japan and South Korea are party to with North Korea. Do you believe that  
>they are living up to the agreements they have made?

> And if I could, sir, a question for President Kim, as well. You had  
>said last week with Mr. Putin that the 1972 ABM Treaty was the foundation  
>of stability in the world. Do you still believe that, and were you quoted  
>accurately, sir?

> PRESIDENT KIM: On the controversy surrounding that inclusion of that  
>reference to the ABM in the South Korea-Russia joint statement recently,  
>our foreign ministry negotiated that statement with the Russians, and that  
>phrase -- in coming up with that phrase we've taken into consideration the  
>documents that came out of the G-8 Okinawa Summit and various other  
>international consultations that the United States was part of.

> This in no way reflects our position on the NMD issues. This is not an  
>indication of our opposition to the NMD. The Russian side, in fact,  
>initially very strongly wished to include such a phrase that would indicate  
>an opposition and we resisted to the very end.

> And so when we saw this controversy unexpectedly arising after the  
>joint statement came out, I regretted the misunderstanding. And so I  
>ordered my foreign ministry to come out with an immediate clarification of  
>our position.

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea,  
>there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not  
>they're keeping all terms of all agreements. And that's part of the issue  
>that the President and I discussed, is when you make an agreement with a  
>country that is secretive, how do you -- how are you aware as to whether or  
>not they're keeping the terms of the agreement.

> The President was very forthright in describing his vision, and I was  
>forthright in describing my support for his vision, as well as my  
>skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country  
>that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand -- don't  
>have the free press like we have here in America.

> Q: President Kim, do you believe that it would strengthen South  
>Korea's security for the United States to immediately resume the  
>negotiations that President Clinton's administration had taken with North  
>Korea regarding its missile program? And if so, did you make that case to  
>President Bush today?

> PRESIDENT KIM: First of all, we sincerely hope that the North Korean  
>missile issue will be resolved with transparency. But, of course, the  
>United States is the counterpart dealing with North Korea in the  
>negotiations over the missile issue. We have not made any suggestion  
>whether the negotiations should be resumed now, or whatever. This is an  
>issue for the United States to make.

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Let's make sure we get the members of the South Korean  
>press -- get to ask some questions, too. I'm not saying you're being overly  
>aggressive or anything. Any further questions? Did you get to ask all the  
>questions?

> Q: Mr. President, one more. Was there any discussion concerning the  
>agreed framework, the Geneva agreed framework, at the summit today?

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Anybody else?

> Q: Mr. President, what is your general view about President Kim's  
>Sunshine policy? Do you think that that contributes to peace and  
>stability on the Korean Peninsula?

> PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, I do. I do. I think that the idea of trade, flows  
>of capital, will lead to a more peaceful Peninsula. I think open dialogue,  
>I think reunification of families will lead to a more peaceful Peninsula.  
>Hopefully, the efforts that the President makes will convince the North  
>Koreans that we are peaceful people and that they need not be fearful about  
>the intentions of America and of the Republic of Korea, that we want the  
>peace. But we must be wise and strong and consistent about making sure that  
>peace happens.

> But I believe the President is on a policy that has got peace as its  
>goal and peace as its intentions; and with the right alliance and the right  
>formulation of policy, hopefully, it will achieve the peace that we all  
>want.

> Thank you all for coming.

> END 12:27 P.M. EST

>  
>White House Press Office, 202-456-2580

>  
>\*\*\*\*\*

>  
>6. "Bush: North Korea a Threat to U.S.," by PAULINE JELINEK, Associated  
>Press 2:06pm, March 7, 2001

>  
>WASHINGTON -- President Bush told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on  
>Wednesday that the United States views North Korea as a threat and would  
>not immediately resume negotiations with the communist regime.

>  
>Even as Kim engages in peace negotiations with his northern counterparts,  
>Bush said he is skeptical of the North Korean leadership and wary of the  
>regime's abilities to build and spread weapons of mass destruction.

>  
>"I ... told the president that we're looking forward to at some point in  
>the future having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but any negotiations  
>would require complete verification of the terms," Bush said at a  
>question-and-answer session between meetings with the president.

>  
>Secretary of State Colin Powell, briefing reporters while the meetings were  
>under way, said negotiations will wait until the administration completes  
>its review of U.S.-North Korean relations. He said Bush would not be  
>"fooled" by North Korea.

>  
>Bush called the Oval Office meeting with Kim "frank and candid," a signal  
>that the two countries are taking slightly different approaches to the same  
>goal of a peaceful peninsula

>

>Under the Clinton administration, the United States came close to  
>normalizing relations with North Korea in exchange for North Korea's ending  
>its missile program. Until the end of his term, President Clinton held out  
>hope of visiting the communist nation.

>

>In advance of their meeting, Kim had signaled his intention to sign a peace  
>"declaration" with his North Korean counterparts.

>

>Senior administration officials have said privately they are wary that  
>Kim's peace efforts may be moving too quickly, with too few concessions  
>from North Korea. They said Bush was making that point with Kim, though the  
>president went out of his way to tell reporters that the South Korean  
>leader is a "realist."

>

>"I am concerned that the North Koreans are shipping weapons of mass  
>destruction around the world," Bush said. "We want to make sure their  
>ability to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was in fact  
>stopped."

>

>Kim conceded "many problems remain" in North Korea and agreed with Bush  
>that verifying the nation's compliance with any agreement is important.

>

>He also backpedaled from remarks in Russia that seemed to suggest he  
>opposed Bush's plans for a missile defense shield. Kim told reporters the  
>statement issued during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin did  
>not reflect his views.

>

>Bush praised Kim, who won the Nobel Prize last year for his efforts to end  
>the long standoff with the north. "I do have some skepticism about the  
>leader of North Korea but that's not going to preclude us from trying to  
>achieve the common objective," he said.

>

>Powell spoke even more bluntly about the U.S.-North Korean relationship.

>

>"He understands the nature of that regime, and won't be fooled by the  
>nature of that regime," the secretary of state said of Bush.

>

>Bush applauded Kim for his peace efforts and said they could eventually  
>lead to a safer world. "Hopefully, the efforts that the president will  
>convince the North Koreans that we are peaceful peoples and that we want  
>the peace but we must be wise and strong and consistent about making sure  
>that peace happens," Bush said. "I  
>believe the president is on a policy that has peace as its goal, and peace  
>as its intentions, and with the right alliance and right formulation of  
>policy, hopefully will achieve the peace that we all want."

>

>Powell said that with North Korea's ability to build and spread weapons of  
>mass destruction, "It is a threat. It's got a huge army poised on the  
>border within artillery and rocket distance of South Korea. The president  
>forcefully made this point to President Kim Dae-jung."

>

>Powell had taken a much more conciliatory approach Tuesday, when he said  
>the Bush administration would examine "some promising elements" of  
>Clinton's policies but was holding off on any policy decisions until after

>consulting Kim. "In due course, you'll hear about our plans" he said.  
>  
>Kim's government has been worried that the Bush administration could strike  
>a new stance toward the communist North that might upset the work done  
>under Kim's "sunshine" policy of reconciliation and engagement on the  
>divided peninsula.  
>  
>And the North last weekend signaled impatience with the slow process of the  
>U.S. administration's review of policy options. Government officials in the  
>North Korean capital of Pyongyang reaffirmed a warning that they might  
>scrap a moratorium on long-range missile tests and revive a nuclear program  
>that Washington fears was  
>being used to develop nuclear weapons.  
>  
>"We haven't begun that consultative process yet with the North Koreans  
>because we thought it was important to first talk with our South Korean  
>friends," Powell said.  
>  
>"And so we are not avoiding North Korea," he said. "Quite the contrary,  
>we think we have a lot to offer that regime if they will act in ways that  
>we think are constructive, ways that reduce the threat of proliferation of  
>weapons of mass destruction and missiles and ways that help open their  
>society and give transparency into  
>their society."  
>  
>Analysts have noted the difference between Bush's approach and that of  
>Clinton, who was rushing to finish an agreement with North Korea but ran  
>out of time.  
>  
>"The Bush administration seems to be in no particular hurry to come out  
>with a new policy or to embrace the old policy," said Nick Eberstadt of  
>the American Enterprise Institute, which will host Kim for lunch on  
>Thursday. "It seems to feel comfortable with weighing and waiting and  
>evaluating. And my guess is President  
>Bush will have his ears open and will listen to President Kim, who is very  
>persuasive."  
>  
>  
>\*>  
>Daryl Kimball, Executive Director  
>Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
>110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505  
>Washington, DC 20002  
>(ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970  
>website <<http://www.crnd.org>>  
>  
>  
>

Reply-To: "Stacie Robinson"

From: "Stacie Robinson"

To:

Subject: letter to Senators

Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 16:48:03 -0500

Organization: CRND X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft  
MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Howard,

Let me know if you have any problems opening the attachment. I can also send it to David Culp and see if he can open it.

Stacie

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Hallman merge.doc"

X-Sender: dkimball@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32)  
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2001 17:02:02 -0500  
To: dkimball@clw.org,vsamson@clw.org  
From: Daryl Kimball <dkimball@clw.org>  
Subject: NMD/START Update: Korean missile diplomacy; Bush-Kim remarks

March 7, 2001

TO: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers members and friends

FR: Daryl Kimball, Exec. Director; Victoria Samson, Senior Policy Assoc.

RE: NMD/START Update -- Korean peninsula/missile diplomacy; Bush-Kim remarks

## MISSILE DIPLOMACY ON KOREAN PENINSULA - BUSH NOT INTERESTED IN RESUMING TALKS WITH NORTH, YET

As President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea visits the White House today, there is renewed attention on the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough: a verifiable agreement to permanently freeze the North Korean missile program. In an excellent op-ed in today's New York Times, Wendy R. Sherman, former special adviser to the president and the secretary of state on North Korea policy, writes:

"President George Bush campaigned on a promise to defend America against missile threats from countries like North Korea. His intention is to build a national missile defense system. But such a system is not only unproven; it would undoubtedly be costly in both dollars and in diplomacy.

Although there is some logic in trying to construct a missile defense system, there is also logic in seizing every opportunity to reduce or eliminate the missile threats through the less costly means of arms control negotiations. In dealing with North Korea, President Bush has an opportunity to take this latter approach. The question now is whether he will seize it."

Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate today calling on President Bush to pursue such an agreement. He said in part: "It would be irresponsible not to explore, to discover, whether North Korea is prepared to abandon its pursuit of long-range missile in response to a serious proposal from the United States and its friends and allies."

Unfortunately, President Bush told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung this afternoon that the United States views North Korea as a threat and would not immediately resume negotiations with the communist regime. See statements and articles below.

Also, attached below are related articles on the Kim Dae Jung visit, the story behind the Clinton administration's failure to secure a last minute missile freeze deal with North Korea, and an report on Bush administration interest in pursuing such an agreement.

For a useful analysis of issues relating to implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, see the Institute for Science and International Security's press release and policy brief urging the Bush administration to continue to engage North Korea. A copy of the Policy Brief can be found at:

<<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/policybrief301.html>> A copy of the press release can be found at:

<<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/policybrief301pr.html>>

## BUSH-KIM REMARKS

The full transcript of President Bush's and President Kim's remarks are attached below.

## HANS BINNENDIJK ON NMD

Another former Clinton Administration official - former NSC official Hans Binnendijk - has publicly urged the Bush Administration to take a more deliberate, slower-paced approach to national missile defense. In an International Herald Tribune opinion editorial, Binnendijk's prescription is similar to that of some other former Clinton officials who have recently spoken up on this issue. He proposes moving ahead with a single-site, mid-course, NMD option and pursuit of a boost-phase intercept system that minimizes Russian and Chinese concerns. He argues this would avoid a rush towards a system that would alienate U.S. allies and provoke Russia and China respond in ways that would undermine U.S. security.

While Binnendijk's advice about a deliberate and cautious approach is constructive, his proposals for a mid-course and boost-phase NMD systems would have a negative effect on U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons alert postures and force levels. Note that his proposal suggests that China can and should increase the size of its strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to preserve China's ability to overwhelm the NMD systems proposed. His NMD proposals would also certainly encourage Russia to maintain a large number of its strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert.

## CLARIFICATION ON MARCH 5 NMD/START UPDATE:

In the last update we wrote that President George W. Bush on Wednesday proposed an increase in the overall U.S. military budget to \$310.5 billion for FY 2002, but it is more accurate also to include Department of Energy Defense-related activities, which brings the total to \$324.8 billion.

## BUSH NAMES NEGROPONTE FOR U.N. AMBASSADORSHIP

President Bush has nominated John D. Negroponte to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. The nomination requires confirmation by the Senate. According to a report in today's Washington Post, "Negroponte has been involved in a number of controversial policies that could raise questions from senators. But he has received Senate confirmation for three senior diplomatic posts during the past 15 years." The Post also reports that:

"Negroponte, a high-ranking official in the Reagan administration, previously worked for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on the National Security Council. He most recently served as U.S. ambassador to Mexico and the Philippines. But his most controversial stint was as the U.S. ambassador to Honduras during the contra war."

-- DK

NOTE: The attached articles are for educational purposes only. For previous editions of the Coalition's "NMD/START Update," see <http://www.clw.org/coalition/nmdnews.htm>

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IN THIS UPDATE:

1. "Talking To The North Koreans," New York Times, March 7, 2001, By Wendy R. Sherman
2. "Bush To Pick Up Clinton Talks On N. Korean Missiles," Washington Post, March 7, 2001
3. "Korean To Visit Bush, But They Could Be At Odds," New York Times, March 7, 2001
4. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea," New York Times, March 6, 2001
5. Remarks By President Bush And President Kim Dae-Jung Of South Korea, March 7
6. "Bush: North Korea a Threat to U.S.," by PAULINE JELINEK, Associated Press 2:06pm, March 7, 2001
7. "Putin's webcast missile warning," BBC.com, Tuesday, 6 March, 2001
8. "How To Build An International Consensus For Missile Defense," International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2001, By Hans Binnendijk

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1. "Talking To The North Koreans," New York Times, March 7, 2001, By Wendy R. Sherman

WASHINGTON — President George Bush campaigned on a promise to defend America against missile threats from countries like North Korea. His intention is to build a national missile defense system. But such a system is not only unproven; it would undoubtedly be costly in both dollars and in diplomacy.

Although there is some logic in trying to construct a missile defense system, there is also logic in seizing every opportunity to reduce or

eliminate the missile threats through the less costly means of arms control negotiations. In dealing with North Korea, President Bush has an opportunity to take this latter approach. The question now is whether he will seize it. We may know the answer after President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea meets with President Bush today.

Reconciliation and engagement with North Korea have been the centerpiece of President Kim's three years in office. Although some believe that continued international isolation would bring a welcome demise of the dictatorial North Korean regime, its sudden collapse would pose terrible security and economic challenges that South Korea and the world can ill afford. Any international crisis with North Korea, particularly one involving the United States, would be likely to halt efforts, heightened by last year's summit between North and South Korea, to bring the North out of its isolation. Undoubtedly, such a crisis would also doom for the foreseeable future prospects for a final peace agreement between the North and the South.

Because Mr. Kim knows that North Korea's long-range missile threat is uppermost among America's concerns, he will most likely want to know if President Bush will close the deal with North Korea that came tantalizingly close for President Bill Clinton in his final days in office. That agreement, when completed, would both halt North Korea's exports of missiles and related technology and stop further production, deployment and testing of long-range missiles.

The clock ran out on the Clinton administration before it could nail down the final details. For two years, the administration had pursued a practical, step-by-step policy that achieved a moratorium on missile testing by Pyongyang, gained access to an underground area suspected of being a nuclear reactor site and saw the first visit of a high-ranking North Korean military official, Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, to the United States.

After a series of negotiations that led to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, appears ready to make landmark commitments about the missile program. To ensure the survival of his regime, he has to improve the country's disastrous economy by reducing the burden of a vast missile program and opening the doors to trade.

There are many challenges in ending this lingering Cold War conflict, and many would assume that Kim Dae Jung would first want to get North Korea to move back its million-man army from deployment along the North-South border. But he knows that he can counter that with conventional forces. So his priority is to reduce the destabilizing force of weapons of mass destruction, particularly long-range nuclear missiles. The world saw the threat they pose in 1998, when a missile being tested by North Korea flew over Japan and set off an international crisis that could have undone the 1994 nuclear agreement with the United States that halted the North's fissile material production.

President Bush, for his part, does not need to make a false choice between negotiating a missile agreement with North Korea and pursuing his already stated intention to build a national missile defense. It will take time to

achieve a missile agreement and test North Korea's compliance with it. It will also take considerable time to develop and test virtually any national missile defense system. So Mr. Bush can move forward on both strategies without foreclosing any options. If negotiations do achieve a real reduction or elimination of the North Korean missile threat, Mr. Bush can then decide if he should change his approach to national missile defense.

Although President Bush has time to consider his approach to negotiations, North Korea, a country of immense pride, will not wait forever. Kim Jong Il is capable of creating a crisis absent a clear signal that negotiations are possible. He is certain to be listening closely to the tone and substance of reports from this week's meeting between Mr. Bush and Kim Dae Jung. President Bush should restart talks with North Korea, and if an agreement is at hand, be ready to meet with Kim Jong Il.

Some are understandably concerned that a summit with President Bush would only legitimize the North Korean leader. But, if such a meeting verifiably eliminated a major missile threat to the United States and the world, drew North Korea into the international community and began to open a window of freedom for that country's starved and desperate citizens, it would be more than worth the risk.

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Wendy R. Sherman was special adviser to the president and the secretary of state on North Korea policy in the Clinton administration.

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2. "Bush To Pick Up Clinton Talks On N. Korean Missiles," Washington Post, March 7, 2001

By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration intends to pick up where the Clinton administration left off in negotiations with North Korea over its missile programs, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday.

Powell spoke on the eve of a visit to the White House by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, who is seeking President Bush's support for his "sunshine policy" of trying to open the isolated regime in North Korea.

In the last days of the Clinton administration, the United States had been close to completing a deal to normalize relations with North Korea and provide substantial economic aid in return for a permanent end to North Korea's missile development and proliferation programs. "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."

He also praised South Korea's Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his overture to Pyongyang, and said the United States would coordinate policy with him before engaging North Korea.

"And so we are not avoiding North Korea; quite the contrary," Powell said. "We think we have a lot to offer that regime, if they will act in ways that we think are constructive -- ways that reduce the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and ways that help open their society and give transparency into their society."

Some notes of caution, however, were injected by another senior administration official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity.

"We're all for what Kim Dae Jung is trying to do by trying to open up the regime and engage the regime," the senior official said, "but you have to have a very clear-eyed view of what [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il is trying to do . . . because it's a failed regime that is trying to stabilize itself."

The official also responded sharply to a Feb. 22 threat by North Korea's foreign ministry to restart long-range missile tests if the United States did not continue negotiations on normalizing relations and supplying aid. "We sent a very strong message to North Korea that if the intention was to get our attention, it did -- but in the wrong direction," the official said.

Noting that the new administration is still "taking stock" of the situation, the official said that North Korea remains a "bazaar for missile sales to just about everybody else we're worried about" and that any agreement on missiles would require extensive verification procedures. "You cannot rely on Kim Jong Il's word to verify what would be an extremely important agreement," the official said.

Still, the official added, the United States is likely to continue to supply food aid to North Korea, despite concerns that much of it is diverted to leading party members and the military. And the official said that the Bush administration was "not just looking to walk away from" a 1994 nuclear agreement known as the Agreed Framework, but rather would look at whether to restructure it. Under that accord, North Korea stopped work on a nuclear reactor in return for \$5 billion of U.S., South Korean and Japanese assistance in building newer, safer nuclear power plants.

While the Bush administration has hailed South Korea's importance as an ally in Asia, the approach to North Korea is just one of several issues that threaten to strain relations between the two allies. South Korea's Kim also is skeptical about the need for a U.S. missile defense system.

Separately, some members of Congress are also pressing Kim to buy American military equipment, especially F-15 fighter jets. House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.) and Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.), who represent the state where McDonnell Douglas makes F-15s, both traveled to South Korea recently. Sen. Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.) pressed Bush's nominee for deputy secretary of defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, at his confirmation hearing on whether the administration would support the sale.

In fiscal 2000, South Korea budgeted \$4.45 billion for military modernization, a \$1 billion increase from the year before. Chyung Dai-Chul, a leading member of the South Korean assembly's defense committee, said in a recent interview that South Korea is also considering Russian and

European fighter jets. He said South Korea also plans to buy offensive helicopters, such as the U.S.-made Apache.

Wolfowitz said the administration would stress the advantages of using compatible equipment because of the close U.S.-South Korea alliance. Chyung said South Korea was concerned about price, restrictions on technology transfers and the danger of being too dependent on the United States.

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3. "Korean To Visit Bush, But They Could Be At Odds," New York Times, March 7, 2001

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, March 6 — South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung, arrived here tonight for what could prove to be a clash with the Bush administration over the right strategy for dealing with North Korea as it emerges from self-imposed isolation for the first time in nearly 50 years.

Mr. Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year for his efforts to end the armed standoff that has existed with the North since the end of the Korean War, has told his aides and some visiting Americans that he intends to sign a peace "declaration" with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong Il, in the next few months. While that declaration would fall short of a peace treaty, Mr. Kim believes that it is essential to making irreversible the North's tentative moves to engage the outside world.

But it comes just as the Bush administration is undertaking what it calls a "thorough review" of American policy toward North Korea, with a clear view toward taking a far harder line than the Clinton administration did when it negotiated a major nuclear deal in 1994, and tried, unsuccessfully, to close a deal on missile controls last year.

Senior administration officials indicate that they continue to view North Korea as a major threat, and they are clearly wary that Mr. Kim's peace initiatives have moved too fast, with too few concessions from the North. One senior American official told reporters today that "the North Korean regime is a problem and Kim Jong Il is a problem."

American military and intelligence officials, fearful that the North is stringing out negotiations while it hardens its military emplacements along the demilitarized zone, recently warned the Bush administration that the North had begun laying fiber-optic cables just north of the DMZ so that it could stymie American intelligence gathering and bolster its ability to unleash a devastating conventional attack on Seoul and the 37,000 American troops still on the Korean Peninsula.

This conflict in views between the new occupants of the White House and a Nobel Prize winner who "is in a big hurry," in the words of one of his occasional advisers, poses a major challenge for Mr. Bush. Until now his encounters with foreign leaders have been largely friendly get-togethers with the leaders of Mexico, Canada and Britain. On Wednesday he will meet an American ally who views the world very differently, and believes that

Washington could get in the way of a strategy that is working.

"Bush is like a cop and Kim Dae Jung is like a priest," said Douglas Paal, who heads the Asia Pacific Policy Center here and is allied with many critics of Kim Dae Jung in the Bush administration. "The cop wants to get the North Koreans disarmed and off the streets and the priest wants to give him the resources to become a very different person."

The two leaders will doubtless appear to straddle the difference on Wednesday, and the White House has made sure that they are not subjected to more than brief questioning.

Mr. Bush's aides say the president will mostly be listening on Wednesday, assuring Mr. Kim that the alliance between Seoul and Washington is strong and that he will review North Korea issues in the next few months. Already Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has expressed some interest in picking up the missile negotiations that never came to fruition last year, saying today that he saw "promising elements" in those talks and offering to "pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."

But the South Koreans know that other aides rank among their greatest critics.

Among them is Paul D. Wolfowitz, nominated as Deputy Secretary of Defense, who told Congress two years ago that the 1994 deal that froze North Korea's one known nuclear weapons production facility was deeply flawed. "The real issue is how much are they producing elsewhere, covertly, and possibly underground," he said. He has also offered blistering critiques of Mr. Clinton and Mr. Kim's strategy of paying the North — with food, oil or a commitment to build nuclear power plants in North Korea — to give up its weapons programs.

Today the senior American official said the administration would not walk away from the 1994 deal, saying "it was a commitment involving several governments," including Japan. Privately, however, many Bush administration officials say they want to explore a way to stop delivery of two conventional nuclear power plants to the North — the quid pro quo for halting its operations to reprocess nuclear waste — and to replace them with conventional coal-fired plants. The nuclear facilities, they worry, could ultimately provide the North with the raw material to make small nuclear weapons.

President Kim's view is that any effort to reopen the 1994 accord would be disastrous, and could kill the nascent peace talks between North and South. He has quietly told visiting American officials and the administration that he is ready to sign a peace "declaration" with Kim Jong Il even if the North does not back it up by pulling its army back from the DMZ, or make progress on the missile deal with Washington.

That has left White House officials clearly wary. "We will ask President Kim to consult us before he goes forward with anything like that," one official said today.

But President Kim is not likely to be deterred. He is coming under increasing criticism at home for his handling of the South Korean economy,

and opposition leaders contend that he has been seduced by the North. Meanwhile, he is racing to build rail links and trade ties that could ultimately bring North and South Korea into a commercial, if not a political, confederation.

"This is his legacy, and he believes he does not have much time to make sure the North Koreans don't reverse course," said one South Korean who has talked about the plans with President Kim. "And he's ready to go his own way if he has to."

But Mr. Kim needs Washington's cooperation. Few doubt that North Korea's real aim is to normalize relations with the United States, in hopes of opening the spigot of aid from the World Bank and others who could provide the starving country with a chance to rebuild a country shattered by war and mismanagement.

At the Wednesday meeting, Mr. Kim will also have to step lightly around another conflict with Washington, over national and regional missile defense systems.

Last week Mr. Kim angered the Bush administration when he stood alongside President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and strongly suggested that he shared Russia's distaste for Mr. Bush's plans for a missile shield — and said the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty was "a cornerstone of strategic stability" around the world.

"We certainly don't consider it the cornerstone," said the senior administration official, whose protests to South Korea led to a half-hearted retraction of the statement as soon as Mr. Putin had left Seoul.

President Kim's aides say they fear that the Bush administration, in its enthusiasm to promote the missile shield, is not too eager to have North Korea defanged as the prime example of a "rogue state" capable of hitting the United States.

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4. "How Politics Sank Accord On Missiles With North Korea," New York Times, March 6, 2001

By Michael R. Gordon

WASHINGTON, March 5 — Wendy R. Sherman brought along an extra suitcase of cold-weather gear even when she joined Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright for a December trip through Africa.

As the Clinton administration's senior policy coordinator on North Korea, Ms. Sherman was prepared to fly to Pyongyang on a moment's notice. Her task there would be to clear away the final barriers to an accord that would neutralize the North Korean missile threat, which has been a central justification for the hotly debated American national missile defense project. Had she succeeded, the framework of an agreement would have been signed by President Clinton and Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, in Pyongyang, the North's capital.

But Ms. Sherman never made the trip.

In a decision that is still hotly debated by national security experts, the Clinton administration put North Korea diplomacy aside while the Republican and Democratic presidential contenders wrestled over the vote count in Florida, a decision that Clinton aides have sought to justify on the premise that the president could not travel abroad during a potential constitutional crisis.

By the time the dust settled in Florida, and confronting a lukewarm response from the victorious Republicans, Mr. Clinton's team reluctantly decided that it had run out of time.

"Although there were still critical details to be worked out, it appeared that an agreement was within reach," Ms. Sherman said in an interview this week, reflecting the dominant view in the Clinton team.

The episode remains vitally relevant because the North Korean missile threat has been the driving force behind the debate in Washington over missile defenses, and because President Bush has yet to declare whether he plans to carry through or modify the Clinton strategy.

The Bush team has been generally skeptical about North Korea, and it is not clear how much they will use diplomacy to try to head off missile threats, instead of relying primarily on their plans for missile defense.

The South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, who will meet with Mr. Bush on Wednesday, is expected to press the new administration to engage with Pyongyang. And while the negotiations are still shrouded in secrecy, they apparently made more progress than generally thought.

According to current and former government experts, Kim Jong Il promised in confidential talks not to produce, test or deploy missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. That offer would prevent North Korea from fielding missiles that could strike the United States.

North Korea, the experts said, also offered to halt the sale of missiles, missile components, technology and training. The pledge would ban systems that North Korea had already contracted to provide to aspiring third world powers.

And North Korea dropped its demand that it be paid cash for giving up its long-range missile programs.

Several important issues remained unresolved, including how to verify the agreements; whether North Korea was willing to destroy missiles it had already produced, and the value of the nonmonetary aid North Korea should receive in lieu of cash.

"We got further than we thought was possible on the missile issue," one government specialist said. "But there is still more work to do on the details before we know if we will have something substantial."

When it comes to ballistic missiles, North Korea has been a major source of concern for Washington. North Korea shocked American defense experts when it tried to put a satellite into orbit in August 1998 on a Taepo Dong-1 missile.

The attempt failed when the solid-fuel third stage exploded. And the Taepo Dong-1 lacked the ability to reach American territory with a nuclear payload.

But experts were worried that with time, North Korea would field a more capable successor, the Taepo Dong-2, which could threaten the United States. North Korea is also one of the major sellers of missile technology around the world. The Iranian and Pakistani missile programs, for instance, are heavily dependent on North Korean technology.

The Taepo Dong test and a general deterioration in relations between Pyongyang and Washington prompted the Clinton administration to ask former Defense Secretary William J. Perry to conduct a policy review.

Traveling to Pyongyang in May 1999, Mr. Perry told the North Koreans that there were two paths they could follow: cooperation, or a collision course with the United States and its Asian allies.

If North Korea chose cooperation, Mr. Perry advised, it needed to give up its missile program. Specifically, the North Koreans should agree not to sell or deploy missiles that exceeded the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime — that is, missiles that can carry an 1,100-pound payload more than 180 miles.

Mr. Perry recalled in an interview that he was initially discouraged by what he heard in Pyongyang.

But the Korea experts on Mr. Perry's team detected a shift in the North Korean stance, and over the next 18 months, developments appeared to prove them right.

North Korea declared a moratorium on its long-range missile tests, and in June, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung met. And as the clock wound down on the Clinton administration in September, it was asked to receive a high-level Korean envoy.

The envoy was Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, the head of the North Korean military, and his visit was taken by most Clinton aides as an indication that Mr. Kim was trying to bring his skeptical generals around.

"I think Kim poked his head out of the groundhog hole, looked around and decided that his regime is not sustainable unless it is somehow connected with the rest of the world," Samuel R. Berger, Mr. Clinton's national security adviser, said today.

Marshal Cho also brought an invitation for Mr. Clinton to visit Pyongyang — and thus underscored a fundamentally different approach to diplomacy. While media-conscious American administrations prefer to carry out painstaking negotiations in advance for a carefully scripted summit meeting, the authoritarian Kim Jong Il believed that agreements should first be resolved

at the highest level, leaving details to be worked out later by subordinates.

The invitation also underscored the enormous political value the North Korean government attached to a visit by the American president, seeing a Clinton visit would signify an end to enmity and acceptance by the international community.

Marshal Cho offered the Americans something they wanted as well. He reaffirmed an earlier proposal that Mr. Kim had raised with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia: that North Korea was willing to forgo its long-range missiles if the West would agree to launch civilian satellites for Pyongyang.

The Clinton administration decided to send Dr. Albright to Pyongyang to see if there was the basis for a Clinton trip. Her visit narrowed the gap with the North Koreans still further and challenged the Western image of Mr. Kim as an irrational leader.

Zippered up in a khaki jump suit, Mr. Kim offered several important concessions during six hours of talks. He offered to "forgo" missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. That concession was tied to an American willingness to provide satellite-launching services.

He also indicated that he was willing to halt all missile exports, including missile components, technical advice and brokering services. And North Korea was no longer asking for a \$1 billion a year in cash in return, but was prepared to accept \$1 billion worth of nonmonetary assistance, like food, coal or other commodities for its stricken economy.

Little progress was made on verification. The North Korean leader insisted that Washington had adequate means to monitor compliance through satellite and other technical means and did not welcome intrusive inspections.

North Korea's existing stock of missiles was another big issue. Mr. Kim's offer to forgo long-range missiles did not apply to weapons that the North had already produced.

Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the North Koreans to destroy their missile stocks, which were a threat to Japan and to American troops in South Korea. Still, the mood at the Pyongyang meetings was good. Mr. Kim invited Dr. Albright to a huge Communist-style celebration by his party in which workers held colored placards in the shape of the Taepo-Dong missile. The North Korean leader turned to Dr. Albright and said this was the first satellite launching and would be the last.

To iron out the remaining differences and set the stage for a summit meeting, the Clinton administration organized expert-level talks in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur.

But without Mr. Kim, the North's experts had no authority to negotiate. When the Americans tried to clarify Pyongyang's position, the North Koreans complained that their move was an insult.

To keep the negotiations moving, the American team gave the North Koreans two documents: a draft framework agreement that could be made public and signed at a summit meeting, and a confidential letter outlining each side's obligations.

Those obligations went beyond the proposals Mr. Kim had made in Pyongyang. The Americans wanted to ban the production, testing and deployment of all missiles with a range of more than 180 miles that could carry a 1,000-pound payload — the same standard that Mr. Perry had cited in his 1999 talks.

The Americans also wanted verification provisions, including a declaration by the North Koreans of the numbers and types of missiles in their arsenal. And the Americans pressed the North Koreans for a commitment to destroy their existing stocks, although some officials would have settled for a promise to negotiate this in the future.

The Americans did not quantify how much assistance they were willing to provide North Korea, though they reportedly considered providing several hundred million dollars a years worth of food aid.

Before the administration could consider a Clinton trip, it was clear there would have to be another session in which the North's negotiators could consult with the one man who could make decisions: Kim Jong Il.

So plans were made to send Ms. Sherman and a team of Pentagon, National Security Council and State Department officials to Pyongyang. Ms. Sherman would be authorized to give the North Koreans a date for a Clinton summit meeting if they made more concessions on missiles.

In an ideal world, officials said, Ms. Sherman would have gone to Pyongyang in November, and if the North Koreans made the needed concessions, she could have arranged a Clinton visit. He would then have signed a broadly written accord, while verification and other technical issues were tackled later.

But the election wrangle intruded. Mr. Berger was reluctant to send an envoy with the election in doubt. He said the administration did not deem it wise for the president to leave the country at the time of a potential "constitutional crisis."

As the weeks dragged on, Dr. Albright and Ms. Sherman kept an anxious eye on Florida. At one point, they were monitoring the Florida events from Mauritius, wondering if the Korea operation would proceed.

After the election was decided in mid-December, Ms. Sherman and the White House Asia expert, Jack Pritchard, briefed Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza Rice. The Bush team made it clear that it would not undercut Mr. Clinton, but not would it endorse a deal, former Clinton aides said. That attitude was one factor that led the Clinton team not to send Ms. Sherman, according to a former ranking Clinton official. The concern was that the new administration would not support or even complete a deal hammered out then.

Finally, the Clinton administration announced on Dec. 29 that there was no longer enough time for its talks.

Critics inside and outside the government say Mr. Clinton made a mistake by not sending Ms. Sherman ahead. The White House, they say, could have consulted with the Bush team before the election was decided, but refrained for fear of lending legitimacy to Mr. Bush's claims to the White House.

"They did not run out of time; they ran out of courage," said Leon V. Sigal, the author of a book on Korean diplomacy.

Dr. Albright insists that the administration did the best it could. But even she has some regrets.

"Of the various places in the world where there is a chance to change the dynamic, this was it," she said last week. "Do I regret that we did not go forward? I personally do. I wish we could have."

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## 5. Remarks By President Bush And President Kim Dae-Jung Of South Korea

WASHINGTON, March 7

The following is a transcript of remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea:

The Oval Office

12:03 P.M. EST

**PRESIDENT BUSH:** Everybody in? It's been my honor to welcome President Kim here to the Oval Office. We had a very good discussion. We confirmed the close relationship between our two countries. We talked about a lot of subjects. And we'll be glad to answer questions on some of those subjects, but first let me say how much I appreciate this man's leadership in terms of reaching out to the North Koreans.

He is leading, he is a leader. He is -- and we've had a very frank discussion about his vision for peace on the Peninsula. It's a goal we share. After all, we've got vested interests there. And we had a very good discussion. I made it clear to the President we look forward to working toward peace on the Peninsula, that we'll consult closely, that we'll stay in touch; that I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea, but that's not going to preclude us from trying to achieve the common objectives.

So, Mr. President, welcome. Thank you for being here.

**PRESIDENT KIM:** First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to President Bush for inviting me to visit Washington and have this meeting with him, despite his very busy schedule, I'm sure, in these early weeks after inauguration.

I'm delighted to have had this opportunity to start building friendship and close cooperative working relationship with President Bush on a variety of issues. I thank the President for sharing his insight and wisdom with me concerning the situation in Northeast Asia and the world, in general. And while discussing things with him I could feel that I was sitting next to a leader who would take the world to greater peace and prosperity in the 21st century.

President Bush and I covered the whole variety of issues in ROK-U.S. relations. It has been a most useful exchange of views. We have agreed to work together towards the further strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and our close policy coordination in dealing with North Korea towards to goal of ending the Cold War and strengthening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

And taking this opportunity, I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to come and visit us in Seoul as early as you can, so that we will have another opportunity to further strengthen the close cooperative working relationship between our two allies.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, sir.

I'm going to take a couple of questions from the American press. I would hope that the South Korean press would be willing -- we'll alternate.

Fournier.

Q: Mr. President, the Secretary of State just told us that you made it clear you would not be fooled by the North Korean regime. Can you expand on that? And are you afraid that the South Koreans, in their haste, their energy to make peace, might be not forcing North Korea to make certain concessions that need to be made?

PRESIDENT BUSH: First, we had a very frank discussion about North Korea. There's no question in my mind that the President of the Republic of Korea is a realist. He knows exactly with whom we're dealing. He's under no illusions. I also told the President that we look forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.

And so I look forward to strengthening our relationship, first and foremost. And we will have a constant dialogue as to the progress that is being made on the Peninsula, and our foreign policy will respond in a way that will reinforce the efforts of the President, but at the same time -- and at the same time, make it clear to all parties concerned that any agreement must make the Peninsula more peaceful and we must be able to verify that it is more peaceful.

I am concerned about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world. And any agreement that would convince them not to do so would be beneficial, but we want to make sure that their ability to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was, in fact, stopped -- they're willing to stop it -- and that we can verify that, in fact, they had stopped it.

But, Ron, there's no question that this President takes a realistic view of the man with whom we're dealing.

Q: Mr. President, do you believe that North Korea is living up to its other agreements with the United States, Japan, South Korea?

PRESIDENT BUSH: South Korean press? I'll get you in a minute, Jim.

Q: A question to President Kim of South Korea. Mr. President, you say that you've had sufficient, fruitful exchange of views with President Bush. This is a transitional period in which you have to deal with a new administration, a change from the Clinton administration now to the Bush administration. You say that you do not expect any major changes in the work that you do together. But President Bush has greatly emphasized the pragmatic and realistic approaches in dealing with North Korea. In that regard, do you detect any change, and what do you think is the greatest outcome of this summit meeting today?

PRESIDENT KIM: The greatest outcome today has to be that through a frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding.

On North Korea, yes, there are many problems that remain. But President Bush has clearly expressed his strong support for our efforts to further the dialogue with North Korea. On my part, I have assured him that as we try to advance the dialogue with North Korea, we will consult with the United States every step of the way, so that the progress in South-North Korean relations serves the interest of our two countries, and that it serves to strengthen peace on the Korean Peninsula.

President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader, and this is very important for me to take back home and to consider.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Jim.

Q: Yes, sir. Sorry to go out of order, sir.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Do you remember the question?

Q: I believe I do, sir. There are some other agreements that the U.S., Japan and South Korea are party to with North Korea. Do you believe that they are living up to the agreements they have made?

And if I could, sir, a question for President Kim, as well. You had said last week with Mr. Putin that the 1972 ABM Treaty was the foundation of stability in the world. Do you still believe that, and were you quoted accurately, sir?

PRESIDENT KIM: On the controversy surrounding that inclusion of that reference to the ABM in the South Korea-Russia joint statement recently, our foreign ministry negotiated that statement with the Russians, and that phrase -- in coming up with that phrase we've taken into consideration the documents that came out of the G-8 Okinawa Summit and various other international consultations that the United States was part of.

This in no way reflects our position on the NMD issues. This is not an indication of our opposition to the NMD. The Russian side, in fact, initially very strongly wished to include such a phrase that would indicate an opposition and we resisted to the very end.

And so when we saw this controversy unexpectedly arising after the joint statement came out, I regretted the misunderstanding. And so I ordered my foreign ministry to come out with an immediate clarification of our position.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements. And that's part of the issue that the President and I discussed, is when you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how do you -- how are you aware as to whether or not they're keeping the terms of the agreement.

The President was very forthright in describing his vision, and I was forthright in describing my support for his vision, as well as my skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand -- don't have the free press like we have here in America.

Q: President Kim, do you believe that it would strengthen South Korea's security for the United States to immediately resume the negotiations that President Clinton's administration had taken with North Korea regarding its missile program? And if so, did you make that case to President Bush today?

PRESIDENT KIM: First of all, we sincerely hope that the North Korean

missile issue will be resolved with transparency. But, of course, the United States is the counterpart dealing with North Korea in the negotiations over the missile issue. We have not made any suggestion whether the negotiations should be resumed now, or whatever. This is an issue for the United States to make.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Let's make sure we get the members of the South Korean press -- get to ask some questions, too. I'm not saying you're being overly aggressive or anything. Any further questions? Did you get to ask all the questions?

Q: Mr. President, one more. Was there any discussion concerning the agreed framework, the Geneva agreed framework, at the summit today?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Anybody else?

Q: Mr. President, what is your general view about President Kim's Sunshine policy? Do you think that that contributes to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, I do. I do. I think that the idea of trade, flows of capital, will lead to a more peaceful Peninsula. I think open dialogue, I think reunification of families will lead to a more peaceful Peninsula. Hopefully, the efforts that the President makes will convince the North Koreans that we are peaceful people and that they need not be fearful about the intentions of America and of the Republic of Korea, that we want the peace. But we must be wise and strong and consistent about making sure that peace happens.

But I believe the President is on a policy that has got peace as its goal and peace as its intentions; and with the right alliance and the right formulation of policy, hopefully, it will achieve the peace that we all want.

Thank you all for coming.

END 12:27 P.M. EST

White House Press Office, 202-456-2580

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6. "Bush: North Korea a Threat to U.S.," by PAULINE JELINEK, Associated Press 2:06pm, March 7, 2001

WASHINGTON -- President Bush told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on Wednesday that the United States views North Korea as a threat and would not immediately resume negotiations with the communist regime.

Even as Kim engages in peace negotiations with his northern counterparts, Bush said he is skeptical of the North Korean leadership and wary of the regime's abilities to build and spread weapons of mass destruction.

"I ... told the president that we're looking forward to at some point in the future having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but any negotiations would require complete verification of the terms," Bush said at a question-and-answer session between meetings with the president.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, briefing reporters while the meetings were under way, said negotiations will wait until the administration completes its review of U.S.-North Korean relations. He said Bush would not be "fooled" by North Korea.

Bush called the Oval Office meeting with Kim "frank and candid," a signal that the two countries are taking slightly different approaches to the same goal of a peaceful peninsula

Under the Clinton administration, the United States came close to normalizing relations with North Korea in exchange for North Korea's ending its missile program. Until the end of his term, President Clinton held out hope of visiting the communist nation.

In advance of their meeting, Kim had signaled his intention to sign a peace "declaration" with his North Korean counterparts.

Senior administration officials have said privately they are wary that Kim's peace efforts may be moving too quickly, with too few concessions from North Korea. They said Bush was making that point with Kim, though the president went out of his way to tell reporters that the South Korean leader is a "realist."

"I am concerned that the North Koreans are shipping weapons of mass destruction around the world," Bush said. "We want to make sure their ability to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was in fact stopped."

Kim conceded "many problems remain" in North Korea and agreed with Bush that verifying the nation's compliance with any agreement is important.

He also backpedaled from remarks in Russia that seemed to suggest he opposed Bush's plans for a missile defense shield. Kim told reporters the statement issued during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin did not reflect his views.

Bush praised Kim, who won the Nobel Prize last year for his efforts to end the long standoff with the north. "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea but that's not going to preclude us from trying to achieve the common objective," he said.

Powell spoke even more bluntly about the U.S.-North Korean relationship.

"He understands the nature of that regime, and won't be fooled by the nature of that regime," the secretary of state said of Bush.

Bush applauded Kim for his peace efforts and said they could eventually lead to a safer world. "Hopefully, the efforts that the president will convince the North Koreans that we are peaceful peoples and that we want the peace but we must be wise and strong and consistent about making sure that peace happens," Bush said. "I believe the president is on a policy that has peace as its goal, and peace as its intentions, and with the right alliance and right formulation of policy, hopefully will achieve the peace that we all want."

Powell said that with North Korea's ability to build and spread weapons of mass destruction, "It is a threat. It's got a huge army poised on the border within artillery and rocket distance of South Korea. The president

forcefully made this point to President Kim Dae-jung."

Powell had taken a much more conciliatory approach Tuesday, when he said the Bush administration would examine "some promising elements" of Clinton's policies but was holding off on any policy decisions until after consulting Kim. "In due course, you'll hear about our plans" he said.

Kim's government has been worried that the Bush administration could strike a new stance toward the communist North that might upset the work done under Kim's "sunshine" policy of reconciliation and engagement on the divided peninsula.

And the North last weekend signaled impatience with the slow process of the U.S. administration's review of policy options. Government officials in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang reaffirmed a warning that they might scrap a moratorium on long-range missile tests and revive a nuclear program that Washington fears was being used to develop nuclear weapons.

"We haven't begun that consultative process yet with the North Koreans because we thought it was important to first talk with our South Korean friends," Powell said.

"And so we are not avoiding North Korea," he said. "Quite the contrary, we think we have a lot to offer that regime if they will act in ways that we think are constructive, ways that reduce the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and ways that help open their society and give transparency into their society."

Analysts have noted the difference between Bush's approach and that of Clinton, who was rushing to finish an agreement with North Korea but ran out of time.

"The Bush administration seems to be in no particular hurry to come out with a new policy or to embrace the old policy," said Nick Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute, which will host Kim for lunch on Thursday. "It seems to feel comfortable with weighing and waiting and evaluating. And my guess is President Bush will have his ears open and will listen to President Kim, who is very persuasive."

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7. EXCERPTS FROM BBC.com, Tuesday, 6 March, 2001, 21:02 GMT

"Putin's webcast missile warning"

Moment of history: The Kremlin leaps into cyberspace

President Vladimir Putin has delivered a stark warning to new US President George W Bush over the dangers of pressing ahead with the "Son of Star Wars" programme.

Mr Putin, speaking during a historic live webcast on BBC News Online, said US insistence on the missile programme would jeopardise the entire international system of arms control.

The president's warning came as he spent nearly an hour answering some of the 24,000 questions e-mailed to the BBC and two Russian websites from readers around the world.

The event, carried live on BBC News Online, was conducted from inside the Kremlin. A relaxed-looking Mr Putin revealed aspects of his private life, as well as dealing with major political issues.

Mr Putin's comments on Star Wars came as he answered a question from a News Online reader in Australia, who asked what Russia's response would be if the US pressed ahead with its anti-missile defensive shield.

Mr Putin replied sharply to some questions....

"The entire international system of arms control would be jeopardised if the project continued," he warned, as it would contravene the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

Russia's ratification of the Start II treaty was based on the ABM treaty, Mr Putin said, and if one ceased to operate, the other would too.

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8. "How To Build An International Consensus For Missile Defense,"  
International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2001

By Hans Binnendijk

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration can make a quick decision on national missile defenses or it can make the right decision. There is time to build a new national consensus on missile defenses that could be supported by allies and agreed to by Russia.

Without such a national consensus, support for missile defenses will eventually dissipate under the crush of high costs, technological problems and allied opposition. To build a national consensus, the administration should set up a bipartisan commission, akin to the Scowcroft commission on the MX missile, to review options and recommend a missile defense architecture that meets the threat, minimizes the cost, embraces available technology and maintains strategic stability with Russia. As a starting point, the commission should consider a multi-layered architecture using the first phase of the existing plan (to build midcourse interceptors) as an insurance policy and relies on boost phase interceptors as the primary line of defense. This concept would draw on elements of both the U.S. and the Russian proposals. Space-based sensors would enhance the efficiency of both defensive layers.

Boost phase interceptors can be made available within a decade by adapting emerging theater missile defenses and exploiting other technologies. They

could be deployed on land, at sea or possibly in the air near threatening states such as North Korea and Iran.

They would not threaten Russia's or even China's deterrent force because the interceptors' location would place their missiles out of range. Cooperation with Russia would be important but not vital for these deployments.

Technical problems such as assured early detection, fast interceptors and detecting the missile in its plume can probably be solved.

An insurance policy is needed for the United States in case some missiles penetrate this first line of defense. One site with 100 midcourse interceptors should be adequate to deal with any warheads that leak through the primary defenses. It could also deal with a small accidental launch from either Russia or China.

This architecture also envisions development of space-based infrared satellites placed both in high and low earth orbit to ensure that the two layers of interceptors receive early and accurate information on missile launches. No weapons have to be deployed in space. America's allies should warm to this proposal. A boost phase system would protect Europe against intermediate and longer-range missiles launched from the Middle East, and Japan would be better protected against North Korea's No Dong missile. Concerns about decoupling U.S. and European security should be put to rest.

Such an architecture could well soften Russia's objections to the ABM Treaty amendments that would be required. Russia should have no objection to either boost phase defenses deployed to their south or 100 midcourse interceptors that would have no effect on their deterrent. Russia, too, is threatened by the proliferation of regional missile capabilities. and the boost phase system would protect it as well.

Russia has suggested cooperation in developing a boost phase system, and the United States could pursue such suggestions vigorously without relying too heavily on Russian technology or on Russian territory for deployment.

China will oppose this missile defense proposal at first because today it has only about 20 missiles that can strike the United States, and even the proposed midcourse insurance policy might negate that force. However, Beijing has missile modernization plans that are already under way and will allow it to retain its deterrent under this NMD architecture.

There are those who want a more robust system. But overreaching could divide the Atlantic alliance and possibly drive Russia and China together in a true strategic partnership.

There is time to establish a commission on missile defenses, consider this proposed architecture and develop a national consensus. The threat is real but the timing of its evolution is vague and can be influenced. The United States needs to continue missile talks with North Korea and press Russia to discontinue support for Iran's missile programs.

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The writer holds the chair in national security and technology at the National Defense University and was previously special assistant to the president for defense policy and arms control. He contributed this comment, which does not represent the views of the U.S. government, to the International Herald Tribune.

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X-Sender: jdi@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32)  
Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2001 09:17:49 -0500  
To: jdi@clw.org  
From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Missile defense + North Korea

1. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense" - Defense Daily
2. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now" - N.Y. Times
3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks" - Wash. Post
4. "Bush Talks Tough on N. Korea U.s. Frustrated Over Arms Exports, Skeptical of Communist Leadership" - Chicago Tribune

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1. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense" Defense Daily - March 8, 2001 - By Kerry Gildea

The European leadership has stopped questioning whether the United States will build a national missile defense (NMD) and is starting to discuss how one will be built with allied participation, George Robertson, secretary general of NATO and former British minister of defence, said yesterday.

This shift in thinking, however, "is not a resounding endorsement for building NMD," he said at a seminar on Capitol Hill sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.). But, the fact that the Bush administration is moving to make missile defense more inclusive to its allies addresses Europeans' concerns, he added.

"I am very confident that, instead of seeing a trans-Atlantic row over missile defense, we will see serious consultation on how a broader missile defense system will come into effect," Robertson said.

And, Robertson agreed that it makes sense to take a fresh look at the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and any other arms control issues that would impede missile defense.

Visiting with government officials in Moscow two weeks ago, Robertson said he viewed the Russian proposal for missile defense, but added the "details at the moment are still pretty sketchy."

Part of the Russian tactic on missile defense, may be to drive a wedge between the United States and NATO countries, he noted.

Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), chair of the Senate Government Affairs subcommittee on security and proliferation, reported last month that the tide seemed to be changing on European leaders' resistance to missile defense (Defense Daily, Feb. 16). Cochran noted that Robertson recently said the Europeans now have to accept that the Americans really intend to go ahead with NMD and discussion is needed inside NATO on the specifics.

Thompson, who has been hosting a series of talks on missile defense recently, said NATO has been the most successful alliance of its time, but

the United States and Europe each have to understand that global security and threats are changing. A broader view of security must come into play as the European Union considers NMD, and also as the United States reviews the European proposal for a new European rapid response force, Thompson said. Both of those issues have been received with "a lukewarm response on their respective sides of the Atlantic," he added.

Robertson stressed the proposed new European security force outside of NATO would allow Europeans to take a more active role in their defense, which the United States has been promoting for years.

The new European security force "can never take the place of NATO and doesn't want to," he said.

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2. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now"

New York Times - March 8, 2001 - By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, March 7 — President Bush told President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea today that he would not resume missile talks with North Korea anytime soon, putting aside the Clinton administration's two-year campaign for a deal and the eventual normalization of relations with the reclusive Communist state.

Mr. Bush's comments, while couched in reassuring statements about the American alliance with South Korea, came as a clear rebuff to President Kim. Awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to open dialogue across one of the most heavily armed borders on earth, the South Korean leader has told American officials that he believes there is only a narrow window of opportunity to seize on North Korea's recent willingness to emerge from its diplomatic seclusion.

Just days before President Kim arrived, one of his top advisers said in an interview that "timing is critical" and expressed concern that North Korea might retreat to its hard-line positions if it concluded that the new administration in Washington was not willing to pick up where Mr. Clinton — who was planning a last-minute trip to North Korea — left off.

Today Mr. Bush made it clear that he had little intention of following Mr. Clinton's path, at least not now. In a brief exchange with reporters after meeting Mr. Kim in the Oval Office, Mr. Bush said: "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

But the United States has only one agreement with North Korea — the 1994 accord that froze North Korea's plutonium processing at a suspected nuclear weapons plant. And at a briefing this afternoon two senior administration officials, asked about the president's statement, said there was no evidence that North Korea is violating its terms.

Later, a White House spokesman said that Mr. Bush was referring to his concern about whether the North would comply with future accords, even though he did not use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said.

Mr. Bush had said, "When you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of the agreement?"

The White House insisted that today's meeting was cordial, and said that Mr. Bush embraced Mr. Kim's "vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula." But they also distanced Mr. Bush from the details of that vision, including Mr. Kim's statements, outside the meeting today, that he plans to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea if its leader, Kim Jong Il, visits Seoul this spring.

American officials said that President Kim Dae Jung made no specific references to those plans today. But he did promise, during the brief encounter with reporters, that "we will consult with the United States every step of the way."

Nonetheless, Mr. Kim, sitting next to Mr. Bush in the Oval Office, offered a tepid assessment of his conversation with the American president. "The greatest outcome today has to be that, through a frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding," Mr. Kim said, using a phrase often used in diplomacy to skim past substantive disagreement.

He added later that President Bush, who has visited Asia only once, a trip to China a quarter-century ago, "was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader."

In another sign of Washington's new, harder line toward North Korea, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell appeared to back away from his statements on Tuesday that he hoped to "pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off." His comments seemed at odds with those of a senior administration official who had invited a group of reporters to the White House that same day to stress that a complete review of North Korea policy was under way.

Today General Powell stepped out of the Oval Office meeting to tell reporters that North Korea was "a threat" and "we have to not be naïve about the nature of this threat, but at the same time realize that changes are taking place."

"There are suggestions that there are imminent negotiations about to take place" between the United States and North Korea, General Powell added. "That is not the case."

That is a political blow to Mr. Kim, who has hoped to leverage his status as a Nobel laureate and his long history as South Korea's most prominent dissident voice during a series of military governments to negotiate a broad peace on the Korean peninsula.

But he knows that he has little time. Mr. Kim has less than two years left in office, not long to put together all the moving parts of a deal: An agreement to stop North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, a pullback from the Demilitarized Zone, and full commercial interactions between the

two Koreas.

Even as Mr. Kim's international stature has grown, his influence in Seoul is ebbing. After presiding over South Korea's revival from the Asian economic crisis, he has seen country's economy once again decline. Opposition leaders, including his predecessor, Kim Young Sam, have charged him with naïveté in dealing with the North.

Mr. Bush's new administration is struggling to bridge differences within the Republican Party over how to deal with the North Korean threat.

Conservatives in the party have long been critical of the 1994 "Agreed Framework," struck by the Clinton administration after a confrontation over nuclear inspections.

Under the agreement, North Korea froze its nuclear-processing operations, and international inspectors regularly monitor compliance. But conservatives and other critics say that the West essentially gave in to blackmail, offering to build two nuclear power plants for the North and supply it with fuel oil until construction is completed. Mr. Bush's aides have said they will respect the deal, but some want to reopen it, in hopes of replacing the two plants with coal-fired generators that would not create more nuclear waste.

The 1994 agreement did nothing to restrict the North's production or sale of missiles, and it has become a major provider of missile technology to other states described as sponsors of terrorism by the State Department. So after a lengthy review of North Korean policy, the Clinton administration opened talks on limiting missile research, production and sales.

It was close to reaching such an accord in December, but ran out of time — in part because of the long election recount here, and in part because of North Korean intransigence on allowing regular verification that all missile work and research has stopped.

Mr. Kim, meanwhile, has been pursuing a North-South agreement, mindful that he cannot get too far ahead of his American ally. But his philosophy differs sharply from Mr. Bush's. He believes that the major problem with North Korea is that it is an insecure regime, and that he must change the atmosphere of confrontation.

"I think Kim is correct that the window is narrow," Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said this evening. "I don't know whether what's on the other side of the window is worth it, but we sure should go and look."

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3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks"

Washington Post - March 8, 2001 - By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush yesterday cast doubt on the future of talks to end North Korea's missile program, saying he was concerned about how to verify such an agreement and putting himself somewhat at odds with visiting South

Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

Bush said he supported Kim's effort to ease tensions with North Korea, but said any deal to restrict its missiles must come with some means of verifying the terms of such a pact.

"Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency," Bush said in a joint news conference with Kim. He added that "we're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

The Bush-Kim meeting was an awkward start to a relationship the Bush administration has described as important to U.S. interests and regional security in northeast Asia. It also underscored the administration's leery view of a country Bush often calls a "rogue state" and whose long-range missile program has been one rationale for a national missile defense system, which the Bush administration strongly supports.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who came seeking support for his increasingly unpopular "sunshine policy" of engaging communist North Korea, described his talks with Bush as "a frank and honest exchange of views" that had "increased the mutual understanding," phrases often used to describe meetings where the two sides disagree.

A senior administration official, however, called the meetings "very positive." And Bush praised Kim for "leadership" and "his vision," and called him a "realist."

Kim had encouraged the Clinton administration in its pursuit of an agreement that would have sent U.S. economic aid to isolated, famine-stricken North Korea in exchange for a commitment to stop development of long-range missiles and halt exports of missiles to other nations, such as Iran and Pakistan. The South Korean president saw the negotiations as contributing to an easing of tensions on the heavily armed and divided Korean peninsula.

Bush's remarks also showed some of the new administration's difficulty in finding a common voice on foreign policy. The president's comments about talks with North Korea struck a markedly more cautious tone than comments Tuesday by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who said the administration intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," and examine "some promising elements [that] were left on the table."

Analysts saw the series of remarks as a sign of differences, or at least a failure of coordination. "It did not seem as coordinated as one would wish," said Larry Wortzel, director of Asia studies at the Heritage Foundation. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said, "I still don't know if this is good cop, bad cop or confusion or what."

Yesterday, Powell seemed to change emphasis, saying, "There was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin—that is not the case." He added, "in due course, when our review is finished, we'll determine at what pace and when we will engage with the North Koreans."

Opponents of missile defense were dismayed by Bush's comments. "It is disappointing and self-defeating for President Bush not to pursue the possibility of verifiable agreement to freeze North Korea's missile program, which would be a lot more efficient than a high-priced missile defense system," said Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Biden said he was disappointed Bush didn't signal that he is "willing to talk and negotiate if certain things happen, as opposed to emphasizing that these guys are bad guys, period."

During the presidential campaign, Bush stressed the importance of cultivating ties with U.S. allies, and South Korea has been a key ally in the half century since the Korean War. There are still 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there, substantial U.S. investments, and a significant trade relationship.

The Bush administration wanted to clarify key issues. In a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim endorsed language about missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty adopted at the Okinawa summit of the Group of Eight leading nations. That language is at odds, however, with Bush administration policy and the South Korean foreign ministry later scrambled to back away from the statement. Kim said yesterday that he "regretted the misunderstanding."

Missile defense would do little to protect South Korea, whose capital, Seoul, is within easy artillery range of North Korea, and Kim is not a missile defense supporter. But the South Korean president yesterday signed a communique with Bush that included language the United States is trying to extract from all missile defense critics.

In language similar to that endorsed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Bush-Kim communique said, "new types of threats, including from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery, have emerged that require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures."

Discussion of North Korea dominated about half of the meeting yesterday between Bush and Kim, a senior administration official said. Vice President Cheney, Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer attended. Powell and senior State Department officials met with Kim separately earlier.

At the news conference, Kim said, "President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader, and this is very important for me to take back home and to consider."

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4. "Bush Talks Tough on N. Korea U.s. Frustrated Over Arms Exports, Skeptical of Communist Leadership"

Chicago Tribune- March 8, 2001 - By Naftali Bendavid, Washington Bureau & John Diamond

WASHINGTON -- President Bush signaled Wednesday that U.S. policy on North Korea has shifted toward a dramatically harder line as he ruled out negotiations with the country any time soon, expressed frustration at its arms exports and voiced skepticism about its leader.

Bush took these positions as he met with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, perhaps the most sensitive foreign policy session of his presidency so far.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has launched a "sunshine" policy of reconciliation with the North, and he prefers a more conciliatory approach by the United States like the one pursued by former President Bill Clinton. Bush, while saying he supported Kim's policies, made it clear he would not be dissuaded from his tough stand on negotiations or agreements with North Korea.

"I was forthright in describing my support for his vision, as well as my skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand," Bush said after meeting with Kim.

"I am concerned about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world," Bush added. "We want to make sure that their ability to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was, in fact, stopped."

Secretary of State Colin Powell was even harsher as he spoke about North Korea.

"It is a threat," Powell said. "It's got a huge army poised on the border within artillery and rocket distance of South Korea, and the president forcefully made this point to President Kim Dae Jung. And they still have weapons of mass destruction, and missiles that can deliver those weapons of mass destruction, so we have to see them as a threat."

Later Wednesday, in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Powell called North Korea "this despotic, broken regime."

These comments were especially striking because Powell had made far more conciliatory comments the day before, suggesting the administration was ready to immediately resume the talks with North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong Il, that Clinton had begun.

"We do plan to engage North Korea, to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said Tuesday.

It was apparent Powell had been reined in by the White House after his initial remarks. This was the second time that has happened: Several weeks ago, Powell spoke of easing sanctions against Iraq, and those relatively conciliatory comments were also disavowed by the White House.

A few months ago, U.S. policy toward Korea was quite different.

Clinton--encouraged by Kim's outreach efforts, the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, and Clinton's perpetual desire to bring nations together--had aggressively pursued warmer relations with the secretive communist country.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright headed the first official U.S. delegation to North Korea, and Clinton made little secret of his own desire to visit, though he never did so.

Now all that is on hold as the Bush administration conducts a "review" of policy toward North Korea. The review's slow pace has frustrated allies and adversaries.

One of Bush's cherished policy goals is building a national missile defense system to shoot down projectiles from hostile nations before they hit U.S. soil. Supporters of such a system frequently cite North Korea as an example of a country that makes this necessary, and warmer relations with that nation would undermine such arguments.

"An adversarial relationship with North Korea makes it easier to sell national missile defense to the American people and the Congress," said John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World. "The administration does this regularly. They like to talk about Russians, Chinese and the North Koreans as threats rather than negotiate with them quietly and solve the problems."

In their public statements, Bush and Kim stressed that the United States supports Kim's peace efforts, and Kim will consult with Washington before undertaking any significant actions. But Kim also made it clear he understood Bush's tough message.

"President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader," Kim told reporters in a brief Oval Office exchange. "This is very important for me to take back home and to consider."

Kim dramatically backed off a communique that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued last week restating the importance of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Because Bush's proposed missile defense program would violate that treaty, U.S. officials had been characterizing the ABM treaty as outdated.

The communique appeared to undermine the U.S. position and suggest South Korean opposition to the national missile defense system, but on Tuesday, Kim said he had been misunderstood. "This in no way reflects our position on the [national missile defense] issues," Kim said.

The Russians wanted to insert a direct criticism of the missile defense system, Kim added, but "we resisted to the very end."

As part of Clinton's move toward reconciling with North Korea, the U.S. and Japan agreed in 1994 to supply oil to the country and build two nuclear power plants there in exchange for North Korea's agreement to abandon its nascent nuclear weapons program.

Bush officials are lukewarm about that deal, saying they will stick to it while also looking for ways to improve it. North Korea, frustrated with the Bush administration's review of the two countries' relations, signaled recently that it might scrap the 1994 agreement on its own.

The Clinton administration had also been negotiating with North Korea toward a sweeping agreement that would require North Korea to abandon its entire missile program in exchange for goods and assets worth up to \$1 billion a year.

Bush officials made it clear they have no intention of resuming those talks any time soon.

"Any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement," Bush said. "Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

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Subject: Missile defense + North Korea

1. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense" - Defense Daily
2. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now" - N.Y. Times
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1. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense" Defense Daily - March 8, 2001 - By Kerry Gildea

The European leadership has stopped questioning whether the United States will build a national missile defense (NMD) and is starting to discuss how one will be built with allied participation, George Robertson, secretary general of NATO and former British minister of defence, said yesterday.

This shift in thinking, however, "is not a resounding endorsement for building NMD," he said at a seminar on Capitol Hill sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.). But, the fact that the Bush administration is moving to make missile defense more inclusive to its allies addresses Europeans' concerns, he added.

"I am very confident that, instead of seeing a trans-Atlantic row over missile defense, we will see serious consultation on how a broader missile defense system will come into effect," Robertson said.

And, Robertson agreed that it makes sense to take a fresh look at the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and any other arms control issues that would impede missile defense.

Visiting with government officials in Moscow two weeks ago, Robertson said he viewed the Russian proposal for missile defense, but added the "details at the moment are still pretty sketchy."

Part of the Russian tactic on missile defense, may be to drive a wedge between the United States and NATO countries, he noted.

Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), chair of the Senate Government Affairs subcommittee on security and proliferation, reported last month that the tide seemed to be changing on European leaders' resistance to missile defense (Defense Daily, Feb. 16). Cochran noted that Robertson recently said the Europeans now have to accept that the Americans really intend to go ahead with NMD and discussion is needed inside NATO on the specifics.

Thompson, who has been hosting a series of talks on missile defense recently, said NATO has been the most successful alliance of its time, but

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WASHINGTON, March 7 — President Bush told President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea today that he would not resume missile talks with North Korea anytime soon, putting aside the Clinton administration's two-year campaign for a deal and the eventual normalization of relations with the reclusive Communist state.

Mr. Bush's comments, while couched in reassuring statements about the American alliance with South Korea, came as a clear rebuff to President Kim. Awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to open dialogue across one of the most heavily armed borders on earth, the South Korean leader has told American officials that he believes there is only a narrow window of opportunity to seize on North Korea's recent willingness to emerge from its diplomatic seclusion.

Just days before President Kim arrived, one of his top advisers said in an interview that "timing is critical" and expressed concern that North Korea might retreat to its hard-line positions if it concluded that the new administration in Washington was not willing to pick up where Mr. Clinton — who was planning a last-minute trip to North Korea — left off.

Today Mr. Bush made it clear that he had little intention of following Mr. Clinton's path, at least not now. In a brief exchange with reporters after meeting Mr. Kim in the Oval Office, Mr. Bush said: "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

But the United States has only one agreement with North Korea — the 1994 accord that froze North Korea's plutonium processing at a suspected nuclear weapons plant. And at a briefing this afternoon two senior administration officials, asked about the president's statement, said there was no evidence that North Korea is violating its terms.

Later, a White House spokesman said that Mr. Bush was referring to his concern about whether the North would comply with future accords, even though he did not use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said.

Mr. Bush had said, "When you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of the agreement?"

The White House insisted that today's meeting was cordial, and said that Mr. Bush embraced Mr. Kim's "vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula." But they also distanced Mr. Bush from the details of that vision, including Mr. Kim's statements, outside the meeting today, that he plans to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea if its leader, Kim Jong Il, visits Seoul this spring.

American officials said that President Kim Dae Jung made no specific references to those plans today. But he did promise, during the brief encounter with reporters, that "we will consult with the United States every step of the way."

Nonetheless, Mr. Kim, sitting next to Mr. Bush in the Oval Office, offered a tepid assessment of his conversation with the American president. "The greatest outcome today has to be that, through a frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding," Mr. Kim said, using a phrase often used in diplomacy to skim past substantive disagreement.

He added later that President Bush, who has visited Asia only once, a trip to China a quarter-century ago, "was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader."

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"There are suggestions that there are imminent negotiations about to take place" between the United States and North Korea, General Powell added. "That is not the case."

That is a political blow to Mr. Kim, who has hoped to leverage his status as a Nobel laureate and his long history as South Korea's most prominent dissident voice during a series of military governments to negotiate a broad peace on the Korean peninsula.

But he knows that he has little time. Mr. Kim has less than two years left in office, not long to put together all the moving parts of a deal: An agreement to stop North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, a pullback from the Demilitarized Zone, and full commercial interactions between the

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Conservatives in the party have long been critical of the 1994 "Agreed Framework," struck by the Clinton administration after a confrontation over nuclear inspections.

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Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

Bush said he supported Kim's effort to ease tensions with North Korea, but said any deal to restrict its missiles must come with some means of verifying the terms of such a pact.

"Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency," Bush said in a joint news conference with Kim. He added that "we're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

The Bush-Kim meeting was an awkward start to a relationship the Bush administration has described as important to U.S. interests and regional security in northeast Asia. It also underscored the administration's leery view of a country Bush often calls a "rogue state" and whose long-range missile program has been one rationale for a national missile defense system, which the Bush administration strongly supports.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who came seeking support for his increasingly unpopular "sunshine policy" of engaging communist North Korea, described his talks with Bush as "a frank and honest exchange of views" that had "increased the mutual understanding," phrases often used to describe meetings where the two sides disagree.

A senior administration official, however, called the meetings "very positive." And Bush praised Kim for "leadership" and "his vision," and called him a "realist."

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4. "Bush Talks Tough on N. Korea U.s. Frustrated Over Arms Exports, Skeptical of Communist Leadership"

Chicago Tribune- March 8, 2001 - By Naftali Bendavid, Washington Bureau & John Diamond

WASHINGTON -- President Bush signaled Wednesday that U.S. policy on North Korea has shifted toward a dramatically harder line as he ruled out negotiations with the country any time soon, expressed frustration at its arms exports and voiced skepticism about its leader.

Bush took these positions as he met with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, perhaps the most sensitive foreign policy session of his presidency so far.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has launched a "sunshine" policy of reconciliation with the North, and he prefers a more conciliatory approach by the United States like the one pursued by former President Bill Clinton. Bush, while saying he supported Kim's policies, made it clear he would not be dissuaded from his tough stand on negotiations or agreements with North Korea.

"I was forthright in describing my support for his vision, as well as my skepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn't enjoy the freedoms that our two countries understand," Bush said after meeting with Kim.

"I am concerned about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world," Bush added. "We want to make sure that their ability to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was, in fact, stopped."

Secretary of State Colin Powell was even harsher as he spoke about North Korea.

"It is a threat," Powell said. "It's got a huge army poised on the border within artillery and rocket distance of South Korea, and the president forcefully made this point to President Kim Dae Jung. And they still have weapons of mass destruction, and missiles that can deliver those weapons of mass destruction, so we have to see them as a threat."

Later Wednesday, in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Powell called North Korea "this despotic, broken regime."

These comments were especially striking because Powell had made far more conciliatory comments the day before, suggesting the administration was ready to immediately resume the talks with North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong Il, that Clinton had begun.

"We do plan to engage North Korea, to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said Tuesday.

It was apparent Powell had been reined in by the White House after his initial remarks. This was the second time that has happened: Several weeks ago, Powell spoke of easing sanctions against Iraq, and those relatively conciliatory comments were also disavowed by the White House.

A few months ago, U.S. policy toward Korea was quite different.

Clinton--encouraged by Kim's outreach efforts, the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, and Clinton's perpetual desire to bring nations together--had aggressively pursued warmer relations with the secretive communist country.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright headed the first official U.S. delegation to North Korea, and Clinton made little secret of his own desire to visit, though he never did so.

Now all that is on hold as the Bush administration conducts a "review" of policy toward North Korea. The review's slow pace has frustrated allies and adversaries.

One of Bush's cherished policy goals is building a national missile defense system to shoot down projectiles from hostile nations before they hit U.S. soil. Supporters of such a system frequently cite North Korea as an example of a country that makes this necessary, and warmer relations with that nation would undermine such arguments.

"An adversarial relationship with North Korea makes it easier to sell national missile defense to the American people and the Congress," said John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World. "The administration does this regularly. They like to talk about Russians, Chinese and the North Koreans as threats rather than negotiate with them quietly and solve the problems."

In their public statements, Bush and Kim stressed that the United States supports Kim's peace efforts, and Kim will consult with Washington before undertaking any significant actions. But Kim also made it clear he understood Bush's tough message.

"President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader," Kim told reporters in a brief Oval Office exchange. "This is very important for me to take back home and to consider."

Kim dramatically backed off a communique that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued last week restating the importance of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Because Bush's proposed missile defense program would violate that treaty, U.S. officials had been characterizing the ABM treaty as outdated.

The communique appeared to undermine the U.S. position and suggest South Korean opposition to the national missile defense system, but on Tuesday, Kim said he had been misunderstood. "This in no way reflects our position on the [national missile defense] issues," Kim said.

The Russians wanted to insert a direct criticism of the missile defense system, Kim added, but "we resisted to the very end."

As part of Clinton's move toward reconciling with North Korea, the U.S. and Japan agreed in 1994 to supply oil to the country and build two nuclear power plants there in exchange for North Korea's agreement to abandon its nascent nuclear weapons program.

Bush officials are lukewarm about that deal, saying they will stick to it while also looking for ways to improve it. North Korea, frustrated with the Bush administration's review of the two countries' relations, signaled recently that it might scrap the 1994 agreement on its own.

The Clinton administration had also been negotiating with North Korea toward a sweeping agreement that would require North Korea to abandon its entire missile program in exchange for goods and assets worth up to \$1 billion a year.

Bush officials made it clear they have no intention of resuming those talks any time soon.

"Any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement," Bush said. "Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

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[www.clw.org](http://www.clw.org)

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Materials for Indiana  
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2001 21:47:44 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Good suggestions. I thought I attached the tips in a message yesterday, but here it is again. I will be producing these today for a workshop I am giving in Notre Dame, leaving tomorrow. Thanks. Esther

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2001 3:30 PM  
To: prgrm@backfromthebrink.net  
Subject: Re: Materials for Indiana

Esther,

Thanks for all the drafts. However, the one on tips for working with religious leaders wasn't attached.

In the letter to Senators Lugar and Bayh I suggest an opening and closing paragraph derived from the Oregon letter Jay Penniman is using, follows:

"We, leaders and members of religious organizations in Indiana, join in an interfaith appeal for you to take leadership to reduce the threat of accidental nuclear war. Specifically we ask you talk with President Bush and ask him to work with Russian leaders to take all nuclear weapons off 'hair-trigger' alert."

at the end:

"Therefore, we urge you to speak with President Bush, urging him to take action to remove all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. We await your response and would welcome an opportunity to meet with you to discuss this important matter."

It's a little repetitive, but it emphasizes the point.

But do whatever you think is best.

Howard

At 11:56 PM 3/6/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Dear Howard and Greg,  
>Attached are three items.  
>1) The original FCNL letter to Bush with 70 national religious leaders  
>names.  
>2) A version of that sign-on letter to go to Lugar and Bayh  
>3) A sample letter to accompany the sign-on letter  
>  
>I will send the sample letter we are sending out to the secular world for  
>use by individuals to send to their Senators along with a sample  
>letter-to-the editor tomorrow.  
>  
>There are so many letters involved, I hope I got this right and I hope this  
>helps.  
>Peace,  
>Esther

>  
>  
>Esther Pank  
>Back from the Brink Campaign  
>6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
>Washington DC 20012  
>202.545.1001 ph  
>202.545.1004 fax  
>brinkprogram@backfromthebrink.net  
>www.backfromthebrink.org

>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\REL-LTR  
FINAL\_3\_001.doc"

>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program  
Files\Internet\download\REL\_STATE\_LTR.doc"

>  
>Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\State  
coverletter.doc"

>  
Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of  
laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Tips on Working Within the Faith.doc"

X-Sender: dkimball@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32)  
Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2001 10:55:27 -0500  
To: dkimball@clw.org,vsamson@clw.org  
From: Daryl Kimball <dkimball@clw.org>  
Subject: NMD/START Update: more on Bush's "not now" stance on N. Korea

March 8, 2001

TO: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers members and friends

FR: Daryl Kimball, Exec. Director

RE: NMD/START Update -- more on Bush's "not now" stance toward N. Korea

President Bush is perhaps risking his best opportunity to defeat potential, long-range North Korean missiles -- by resuming talks with N. Korea to reach a deal on a verifiable freeze of the DPRK's missile program. In an apparent shift away from remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell and the preference of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush said that there could be a resumption of talks "at some point in the future," but not now. Bush did not rule out such talks, but the window of opportunity may close if he delays and if his tough rhetoric incites North Korea's leaders. Some news reports suggest the harder-line Bush remarks signal a rift among Bush's national security principals. (See news articles and analysis, below.)

Bush's "no talks now" line also contradicts advice from senior Democratic leaders in the House and the Senate and former Clinton and Albright special North Korea envoy Wendy Sherman. In a March 6 letter to President Bush, the House and Senate Democratic leaders and the ranking Democratic members the armed services and international relations committees wrote:

"Your meeting with President Kim offers an opportunity to stand with our South Korean friends to test whether North Korea is indeed committed to peace. Given North Korea's often far-reaching demands and record of disregarding international norms, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of getting comprehensive and verifiable agreements with North Korea that address our concerns about its current and future nuclear and ballistic missile activities.

We believe, however, the stakes are high and the issues involved demand urgent attention, and it is evident to us that the continued engagement of the U.S. Government on this matter could serve to reduce a serious potential threat to our national security.

We therefore hope you thoroughly explore the possibility of reaching agreements that are in our national interest, and ask that you clearly demonstrate to President Kim our government's ongoing commitment to working constructively with the Republic of Korea to confront this major strategic challenge."

The full text of the letter is below.

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), one of the signatories of the letter, also gave an extensive statement on the floor of the Senate making the case for engagement with North Korea to diminish the threats it poses. (See below.)

-- DK

NOTE: The attached articles are for educational purposes only. For previous editions of the Coalition's "NMD/START Update," see <http://www.clw.org/coalition/nmdnews.htm>

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IN THIS UPDATE:

1. EXCERPTS OF BUSH-KIM Q&A WITH REPORTERS, MARCH 7
2. Text of Letter the President Bush from Democratic Congressional Leaders
3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks," Washington Post, March 8, 2001
4. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now," New York Times, March 8, 2001
5. "Mixed Signals On N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift," USA Today, March 8, 2001
6. EXCERPTS FROM: "Don't Drop the Ball with North Korea," Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congressional Record, March 7, 2001. FOR FULL TEXT SEE: <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl::>>
7. Joint Statement Between The United States Of America And The Republic Of Korea, The White House, March 7, 2001
8. Council for a Livable World Education Fund PRESS RELEASE, March 7, 2001
9. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense," Defense Daily, March 8, 2001
- 10 "Germany's Schroeder takes wait-and-see stance on NMD," Agence France Presse, Thursday, March 8, 2001

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1. EXCERPTS OF BUSH-KIM Q&A WITH REPORTERS, MARCH 7:

Q: Mr. President, the Secretary of State just told us that you made it clear you would not be fooled by the North Korean regime. Can you expand on that? And are you afraid that the South Koreans, in their haste, their energy to make peace, might be not forcing North Korea to make certain concessions that need to be made?

PRESIDENT BUSH: First, we had a very frank discussion about North Korea. There's no question in my mind that the President of the Republic of Korea is a realist. He knows exactly with whom we're dealing. He's under no illusions. I also told the President that we look forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.

Q: President Kim, do you believe that it would strengthen South Korea's security for the United States to immediately resume the negotiations that President Clinton's administration had taken with North Korea regarding its missile program? And if so, did you make that case to President Bush today?

PRESIDENT KIM: First of all, we sincerely hope that the North Korean missile issue will be resolved with transparency. But, of course, the United States is the counterpart dealing with North Korea in the negotiations over the missile issue. We have not made any suggestion whether the negotiations should be resumed now, or whatever. This is an issue for the United States to make.

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## 2. Text of Letter the President Bush from Democratic Congressional Leaders

March 6, 2001

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to your upcoming meeting with Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung. Korea is a steadfast ally in a strategic part of the world, and we are pleased you will meet with President Kim early in your administration.

We understand that President Kim's efforts toward rapprochement with North Korea will be a subject of your meeting. In the context of those efforts, late last year North Korea suggested it may be ready to permanently address U.S. and allied concerns regarding its nuclear and missile capability - a major destabilizing force in East Asia and a principal threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region.

Your meeting with President Kim offers an opportunity to stand with our South Korean friends to test whether North Korea is indeed committed to peace. Given North Korea's often far-reaching demands and record of disregarding international norms, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of getting comprehensive and verifiable agreements with North Korea that address our concerns about its current and future nuclear and ballistic missile activities.

We believe, however, the stakes are high and the issues involved demand urgent attention, and it is evident to us that the continued engagement of the U.S. Government on this matter could serve to reduce a serious potential threat to our national security.

We therefore hope you thoroughly explore the possibility of reaching agreements that are in our national interest, and ask that you clearly demonstrate to President Kim our government's ongoing commitment to working constructively with the Republic of Korea to confront this major strategic challenge.

Should you choose this path to work with the Republic of Korea to address these critical concerns, we stand ready to support you.

Sincerely,

Senator Tom Daschle  
Senator Joseph Biden  
Senator Carl Levin  
Representative Richard Gephardt  
Representative Tom Lantos  
Representative Ike Skelton

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### 3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks"

Washington Post, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush yesterday cast doubt on the future of talks to end North Korea's missile program, saying he was concerned about how to verify such an agreement and putting himself somewhat at odds with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

Bush said he supported Kim's effort to ease tensions with North Korea, but said any deal to restrict its missiles must come with some means of verifying the terms of such a pact.

"Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency," Bush said in a joint news conference with Kim. He added that "we're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

The Bush-Kim meeting was an awkward start to a relationship the Bush administration has described as important to U.S. interests and regional security in northeast Asia. It also underscored the administration's leery view of a country Bush often calls a "rogue state" and whose long-range missile program has been one rationale for a national missile defense system, which the Bush administration strongly supports.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who came seeking support for his increasingly unpopular "sunshine policy" of engaging communist North Korea,

described his talks with Bush as "a frank and honest exchange of views" that had "increased the mutual understanding," phrases often used to describe meetings where the two sides disagree.

A senior administration official, however, called the meetings "very positive." And Bush praised Kim for "leadership" and "his vision," and called him a "realist."

Kim had encouraged the Clinton administration in its pursuit of an agreement that would have sent U.S. economic aid to isolated, famine-stricken North Korea in exchange for a commitment to stop development of long-range missiles and halt exports of missiles to other nations, such as Iran and Pakistan. The South Korean president saw the negotiations as contributing to an easing of tensions on the heavily armed and divided Korean peninsula.

Bush's remarks also showed some of the new administration's difficulty in finding a common voice on foreign policy. The president's comments about talks with North Korea struck a markedly more cautious tone than comments Tuesday by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who said the administration intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," and examine "some promising elements [that] were left on the table."

Analysts saw the series of remarks as a sign of differences, or at least a failure of coordination. "It did not seem as coordinated as one would wish," said Larry Wortzel, director of Asia studies at the Heritage Foundation. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said, "I still don't know if this is good cop, bad cop or confusion or what."

Yesterday, Powell seemed to change emphasis, saying, "There was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin—that is not the case." He added, "in due course, when our review is finished, we'll determine at what pace and when we will engage with the North Koreans."

Opponents of missile defense were dismayed by Bush's comments. "It is disappointing and self-defeating for President Bush not to pursue the possibility of verifiable agreement to freeze North Korea's missile program, which would be a lot more efficient than a high-priced missile defense system," said Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Biden said he was disappointed Bush didn't signal that he is "willing to talk and negotiate if certain things happen, as opposed to emphasizing that these guys are bad guys, period."

During the presidential campaign, Bush stressed the importance of cultivating ties with U.S. allies, and South Korea has been a key ally in the half century since the Korean War. There are still 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there, substantial U.S. investments, and a significant trade relationship.

The Bush administration wanted to clarify key issues. In a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim endorsed language about missile

defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty adopted at the Okinawa summit of the Group of Eight leading nations. That language is at odds, however, with Bush administration policy and the South Korean foreign ministry later scrambled to back away from the statement. Kim said yesterday that he "regretted the misunderstanding."

Missile defense would do little to protect South Korea, whose capital, Seoul, is within easy artillery range of North Korea, and Kim is not a missile defense supporter. But the South Korean president yesterday signed a communique with Bush that included language the United States is trying to extract from all missile defense critics.

In language similar to that endorsed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Bush-Kim communique said, "new types of threats, including from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery, have emerged that require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures."

Discussion of North Korea dominated about half of the meeting yesterday between Bush and Kim, a senior administration official said. Vice President Cheney, Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer attended. Powell and senior State Department officials met with Kim separately earlier.

At the news conference, Kim said, "President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader, and this is very important for me to take back home and to consider."

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#### 4. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now"

New York Times, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, March 7 — President Bush told President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea today that he would not resume missile talks with North Korea anytime soon, putting aside the Clinton administration's two-year campaign for a deal and the eventual normalization of relations with the reclusive Communist state.

Mr. Bush's comments, while couched in reassuring statements about the American alliance with South Korea, came as a clear rebuff to President Kim. Awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to open dialogue across one of the most heavily armed borders on earth, the South Korean leader has told American officials that he believes there is only a narrow window of opportunity to seize on North Korea's recent willingness to emerge from its diplomatic seclusion.

Just days before President Kim arrived, one of his top advisers said in an

interview that "timing is critical" and expressed concern that North Korea might retreat to its hard-line positions if it concluded that the new administration in Washington was not willing to pick up where Mr. Clinton — who was planning a last-minute trip to North Korea — left off.

Today Mr. Bush made it clear that he had little intention of following Mr. Clinton's path, at least not now. In a brief exchange with reporters after meeting Mr. Kim in the Oval Office, Mr. Bush said: "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

But the United States has only one agreement with North Korea — the 1994 accord that froze North Korea's plutonium processing at a suspected nuclear weapons plant. And at a briefing this afternoon two senior administration officials, asked about the president's statement, said there was no evidence that North Korea is violating its terms.

Later, a White House spokesman said that Mr. Bush was referring to his concern about whether the North would comply with future accords, even though he did not use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said.

Mr. Bush had said, "When you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of the agreement?"

The White House insisted that today's meeting was cordial, and said that Mr. Bush embraced Mr. Kim's "vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula." But they also distanced Mr. Bush from the details of that vision, including Mr. Kim's statements, outside the meeting today, that he plans to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea if its leader, Kim Jong Il, visits Seoul this spring.

American officials said that President Kim Dae Jung made no specific references to those plans today. But he did promise, during the brief encounter with reporters, that "we will consult with the United States every step of the way."

Nonetheless, Mr. Kim, sitting next to Mr. Bush in the Oval Office, offered a tepid assessment of his conversation with the American president. "The greatest outcome today has to be that, through a frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding," Mr. Kim said, using a phrase often used in diplomacy to skim past substantive disagreement.

He added later that President Bush, who has visited Asia only once, a trip to China a quarter-century ago, "was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader."

In another sign of Washington's new, harder line toward North Korea, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell appeared to back away from his statements on Tuesday that he hoped to "pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off." His comments seemed at odds with those of a senior administration official who had invited a group of reporters to the

White House that same day to stress that a complete review of North Korea policy was under way.

Today General Powell stepped out of the Oval Office meeting to tell reporters that North Korea was "a threat" and "we have to not be naïve about the nature of this threat, but at the same time realize that changes are taking place."

"There are suggestions that there are imminent negotiations about to take place" between the United States and North Korea, General Powell added. "That is not the case."

That is a political blow to Mr. Kim, who has hoped to leverage his status as a Nobel laureate and his long history as South Korea's most prominent dissident voice during a series of military governments to negotiate a broad peace on the Korean peninsula.

But he knows that he has little time. Mr. Kim has less than two years left in office, not long to put together all the moving parts of a deal: An agreement to stop North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, a pullback from the Demilitarized Zone, and full commercial interactions between the two Koreas.

Even as Mr. Kim's international stature has grown, his influence in Seoul is ebbing. After presiding over South Korea's revival from the Asian economic crisis, he has seen country's economy once again decline. Opposition leaders, including his predecessor, Kim Young Sam, have charged him with naïveté in dealing with the North.

Mr. Bush's new administration is struggling to bridge differences within the Republican Party over how to deal with the North Korean threat.

Conservatives in the party have long been critical of the 1994 "Agreed Framework," struck by the Clinton administration after a confrontation over nuclear inspections.

Under the agreement, North Korea froze its nuclear-processing operations, and international inspectors regularly monitor compliance. But conservatives and other critics say that the West essentially gave in to blackmail, offering to build two nuclear power plants for the North and supply it with fuel oil until construction is completed. Mr. Bush's aides have said they will respect the deal, but some want to reopen it, in hopes of replacing the two plants with coal-fired generators that would not create more nuclear waste.

The 1994 agreement did nothing to restrict the North's production or sale of missiles, and it has become a major provider of missile technology to other states described as sponsors of terrorism by the State Department. So after a lengthy review of North Korean policy, the Clinton administration opened talks on limiting missile research, production and sales.

It was close to reaching such an accord in December, but ran out of time — in part because of the long election recount here, and in part because of North Korean intransigence on allowing regular verification that all

missile work and research has stopped.

Mr. Kim, meanwhile, has been pursuing a North-South agreement, mindful that he cannot get too far ahead of his American ally. But his philosophy differs sharply from Mr. Bush's. He believes that the major problem with North Korea is that it is an insecure regime, and that he must change the atmosphere of confrontation.

"I think Kim is correct that the window is narrow," Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said this evening. "I don't know whether what's on the other side of the window is worth it, but we sure should go and look."

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##### 5. "Mixed Signals On N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift"

USA Today, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By Barbara Slavin, USA Today

WASHINGTON — President Bush on Wednesday staked out a hard line toward North Korea that disappointed South Korea's president and appeared to catch even Secretary of State Colin Powell off-guard. Just a day before, Powell had stated a more conciliatory stance toward the North when he said the Bush administration planned "to pick up where President Clinton left off." That referred to a policy of outreach toward the North that nearly produced a Clinton visit to Pyongyang, the capital.

But on Wednesday, Powell left in the middle of Bush's talks with South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung at the White House to give reporters a different version of administration policy. "There's no hurry" to resume negotiations with a country the United States still regards as a "threat," Powell said.

Other administration officials said Powell's earlier comments had been misinterpreted. Analysts said, however, that there seems to be a rift between Powell and more hawkish Bush officials. "Powell, by temperament, will look more toward diplomacy," said Leslie Gelb, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. "But the center of gravity in this administration is to the right of where it was."

Bush said talks to curb North Korea's production and sale of ballistic missiles, which nearly produced a deal under Clinton, could resume "at some point in the future." He also stressed the need to verify an accord.

Before the meeting, administration officials said Bush intends to move more cautiously than Clinton in improving relations with one of the world's most repressive regimes.

The administration has even resurrected the term "rogue state" in referring to troublesome countries such as North Korea. Clinton had dropped that term last year in favor of "states of concern."

Bush's preference to go slow in engaging the North conflicts with Kim's

"sunshine policy" of rapid reconciliation between two halves of a peninsula divided for 50 years. "We are in a hurried mode," Kim adviser Moon Chung In said last week.

Critics of Bush's harder line say he wants to portray North Korea as threatening to justify development of a national missile defense. Kim opposes a missile defense but avoided taking a position on the issue after his meeting with Bush.

Clinton aides shared Kim's concern over Bush's shift on U.S.-North Korean policy. "I'm frankly disappointed because there's an opportunity to be seized," said Wendy Sherman, Clinton's North Korea policy coordinator. She accompanied Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on a groundbreaking visit to the North last fall.

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## 6. EXCERPTS FROM:

"Don't Drop the Ball with North Korea," Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

[Page: S1916] Congressional Record, March 7, 2001

FOR FULL TEXT SEE:

<[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl:~>](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl:)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the situation in North Korea. Today President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea is meeting with President Bush as part of his official state visit. His visit occurs against a hopeful backdrop of the third round of family reunions on the divided Korean peninsula. Fathers are greeting their grownup sons; sisters are hugging their sisters they haven't seen for a generation. Grandmothers are meeting their grandchildren who they have never met.

Tomorrow the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and I will host the President of South Korea for coffee here on Capitol Hill. Kim's visit will give us a chance to renew the close bonds forged in blood in the common struggle against the forces of oppression which unite our people in the United States and South Korea.

I rise today to talk a little bit about the Korean peninsula and the important role the United States can play in concert with our South Korean allies and other friends to help build lasting peace on that peninsula.

Yesterday the New York Times published an article by veteran defense correspondent Michael Gordon which suggests that a missile deal with North Korea may have been within reach last year. As fascinating as this rendition of events was and as fascinating as the policies were, we now have a new President. The failure or the judgment to not proceed with negotiations into the month of January of this year on the part of the new President is in fact at this moment irrelevant. We have a new President and a new administration. The question squarely now is not whether President Clinton should have gone to North Korea; the question is whether this administration, the Bush administration, is going to build on the progress

made over the past 5 years since we narrowly averted a nuclear showdown on the Korean peninsula.

I was pleased to see Secretary of State Powell quoted in a Washington Post article today, suggesting this administration was going to pursue the possibilities of a better relationship with North Korea and was going to leave nothing on the table. I was slightly dismayed to read of an informed source in the administration who chose not to be identified, demonstrating a great deal more of what seemed to me in the article to be not only skepticism, which I share about the intentions of North Korea, but willingness to pursue vigorously the possibilities of further negotiations. Hopefully, I am misreading that unidentified highly placed administration official.

In my view, there is only one correct answer and that is the one Secretary Powell has indicated today. For it would be irresponsible not to explore to discover whether North Korea is prepared to abandon its pursuit of long-range missiles in response to a serious proposal from the United States, our friends, and our allies.

North Korea confronts the United States with a number of security challenges. North Korea maintains a huge army of more than 1 million men and women in uniform, about 5 percent of its entire population. Many of that army are poised on the South Korean border. The threat that North Korea opposes extends well beyond the Korean peninsula. Its Nodong missile can not only strike all of South Korea but can also threaten our ally, Japan. North Korea sells those same missiles to anyone who has the cash to buy them. North Korean missile exports to Iran and Pakistan have guaranteed, unfortunately, that any future war in the Middle East or South Asia will be even more dangerous and more destructive than past conflicts in that region.

North Korean missiles and the very real concern that North Korea might even build longer range missiles capable of striking the United States are a driving force behind our plans to build a national missile defense system.

If we can remove that threat, that is, the threat from North Korea long-range missile possibility, the impact will be huge, not only on the security of Northeast Asia but also on our own defense strategy as we debate how best to deal with our vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction....

.... We have an obligation, it seems to me, not to drop the ball. We have a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. We have good friends and allies--like President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea--who stand ready to work with us toward that goal. It is vital that we not drop the ball; miss an opportunity to end North Korea's deadly and destabilizing pursuit of long range missiles. I don't know that an agreement can be reached. In the end North Korea may prove too intransigent, too truculent, for us to reach an accord.

But I hope the Bush administration will listen closely to President Kim today, and work with him to test North Korea's commitment to peace. We should stay the course on an engagement policy that has brought the

peninsula to the brink, not of war, but of the dawning of a brave new day for all the Korean people.

I yield the floor.

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## 7. Joint Statement Between The United States Of America And The Republic Of Korea

The White House

March 7, 2001

President George W. Bush and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea today reaffirmed the fundamental importance and strength of the U.S.-ROK security alliance, which has prevented war and promoted stability, prosperity, and democracy on the Korean Peninsula for over five decades. The two Presidents pledged to deepen further the comprehensive partnership shared by the United States and the Republic of Korea through enhanced security, political, economic and cultural cooperation.

The two Presidents agreed that reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula and lasting stability in Northeast Asia. President Bush expressed support for the Republic of Korea Government's policy of engagement with North Korea and President Kim's leading role in resolving inter-Korean issues. The two leaders shared the hope that a second inter-Korean summit will make a positive contribution to inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asian security.

Both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to continue the 1994 Agreed Framework and called on North Korea to join in taking the needed steps for its successful implementation. They agreed to encourage North Korea to take actions to address the concerns of the international community. The Presidents agreed on the importance of maintaining close consultations and coordination on policy toward North Korea, both bilaterally and trilaterally with Japan.

President Bush and President Kim agreed that the global security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. New types of threats, including from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery, have emerged that require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active non-proliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures. They concurred on the importance of consultations among allies and other interested parties on these measures, including missile defenses, with a view to

strengthening global peace and security.

President Bush and President Kim noted that the United States and the Republic of Korea are developing more mature and mutually beneficial bilateral economic and trade relations. Both sides agreed to work together closely to support Korea's economic reform efforts and to address bilateral trade issues. The two leaders endorsed the early launch of a new round of trade negotiations in the WTO.

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## 8. Council for a Livable World Education Fund PRESS RELEASE

For immediate release:  
March 7, 2001

"Bush to North Korea: The Engagement is off"

Contact: Steve LaMontagne 202.543.4100 x119  
John Isaacs 202.543.4100 x131

Washington - Only a day after the U.S. hinted that it would resume a policy of engagement with North Korea, President Bush has abruptly changed course and decided that name calling rather than negotiations is the best policy.

In his meeting today with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush labeled North Korea a threat and indicated that the U.S. was not ready to resume negotiations on ending the country's development and export of ballistic missiles and related technologies.

"If the U.S. does view North Korea as a threat, all the more reason to accelerate negotiations, not postpone them," said Steve LaMontagne, Non-Proliferation Research Analyst at Council for a Livable World Education Fund. The Council is a Washington DC-based arms control advocacy organization.

"The administration's overnight shift in rhetoric will only make it more difficult to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs," continued LaMontagne

Secretary of State Colin Powell echoed the President's remarks, "It [North Korea] is a threat. It's got a huge army poised on the border within artillery and rocket distance of South Korea."

Powell's remarks stand in sharp contrast to comments he made yesterday. "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."

Today's comments come at a crucial time. The 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program in exchange for two light-water reactors from an international consortium led by the U.S., is

being heavily criticized. Last month North Korea stated that it may end its moratorium on missile tests.

"The Bush Administration remarks threaten to push North Korea back into isolation and antagonize it into resuming its pursuit of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons," LaMontagne argued. "North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il is already upset at what it perceives as a hard-line stance from the Bush administration." he added.

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#### 9. "NATO Secretary General Reports EU View Shifting On Missile Defense"

Defense Daily, March 8, 2001

By Kerry Gildea

The European leadership has stopped questioning whether the United States will build a national missile defense (NMD) and is starting to discuss how one will be built with allied participation, George Robertson, secretary general of NATO and former British minister of defence, said yesterday.

This shift in thinking, however, "is not a resounding endorsement for building NMD," he said at a seminar on Capitol Hill sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.). But, the fact that the Bush administration is moving to make missile defense more inclusive to its allies addresses Europeans' concerns, he added.

"I am very confident that, instead of seeing a trans-Atlantic row over missile defense, we will see serious consultation on how a broader missile defense system will come into effect," Robertson said.

And, Robertson agreed that it makes sense to take a fresh look at the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and any other arms control issues that would impede missile defense.

Visiting with government officials in Moscow two weeks ago, Robertson said he viewed the Russian proposal for missile defense, but added the "details at the moment are still pretty sketchy."

Part of the Russian tactic on missile defense, may be to drive a wedge between the United States and NATO countries, he noted.

Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), chair of the Senate Government Affairs subcommittee on security and proliferation, reported last month that the tide seemed to be changing on European leaders' resistance to missile defense (Defense Daily, Feb. 16). Cochran noted that Robertson recently said the Europeans now have to accept that the Americans really intend to go ahead with NMD and discussion is needed inside NATO on the specifics.

Thompson, who has been hosting a series of talks on missile defense recently, said NATO has been the most successful alliance of its time, but the United States and Europe each have to understand that global security and threats are changing. A broader view of security must come into play as

the European Union considers NMD, and also as the United States reviews the European proposal for a new European rapid response force, Thompson said. Both of those issues have been received with "a lukewarm response on their respective sides of the Atlantic," he added.

Robertson stressed the proposed new European security force outside of NATO would allow Europeans to take a more active role in their defense, which the United States has been promoting for years.

The new European security force "can never take the place of NATO and doesn't want to," he said.

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#### 10. "Germany's Schroeder takes wait-and-see stance on NMD"

Thursday, March 8, 2001

BERLIN, March 7 (AFP) - German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, headed to Washington later this month for talks with US President George W. Bush, said Wednesday he would wait and see before taking a stand on US plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

Asked about his views on NMD by the daily Saarbruecker Zeitung in an interview to be published Thursday, Schroeder said a range of questions had to be addressed before the plans for NMD could be evaluated.

"I have always pointed out that there are two aspects," he was quoted as saying.

"First there are the questions: What is the threat analysis? Is it technically feasible? What does it cost? What effect does it have on Russia and China?"

Advising "calmness" in debate on the issue, he said another aspect to consider was the opportunities for technological cooperation that development of NMD might offer Germany if the United States moves forward with it.

Schroeder had initially expressed reservations about a missile shield when it was proposed last year under former US president Bill Clinton, saying it could lead to a new arms race.

But he caused a stir in German media last week when he said that Germany would seek to share in the economic and technological benefits of building the system if it goes ahead, which indicated an apparent change in policy in favor of NMD.

Schroeder told the newspaper that his comments did not reflect a change of heart but rather an open attitude to US-German dialogue on the matter.

"There are of course varying opinions on certain issues in America and Germany," he said.

"And of course there is the necessity to have a dialogue if foreign or security policy on an important issue changes."

The United States has proposed extending the shield that it plans to develop against any missiles fired by so-called rogue states, like Iran or North Korea, to its European allies.

In a press interview last week, Schroeder suggested the proposed shield was unthinkable without the participation of the NATO allies, but acknowledged there were doubts about whether Washington would be prepared to share the technology if the plan goes ahead.

"On this point the Americans would probably be, to put it in a friendly way, very reticent," Schroeder said.

Schroeder will visit Bush in Washington March 29. NMD is expected to be at the top of the agenda.

His defense minister, Rudolf Scharping, arrived in Washington Wednesday for a three-day visit where he will meet with his US counterpart, Donald Rumsfeld, and other military and security officials.

---

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 505  
Washington, DC 20002  
(ph) 202-546-0795 x136 (fax) 202-546-7970  
website <<http://www.crnd.org>>

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From: Ned Stowe <ned@fcnl.org>  
To: "Monday Lobby (E-mail)" <No.One@fcnl.org>  
Subject: Press for FY 2001 supplemental is on  
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2001 12:04:48 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

TO: Monday Lobby Participants

The following news report regarding the press for a military supplemental bill underscores the importance of the sign-on letter that is now circulating for signatures (see below for text and sign on form).

The following organizations have signed so far:

American Friends Service Committee Washington Office  
Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities Action Fund  
Church of the Brethren Washington Office  
Council for a Livable World  
Friends Committee on National Legislation  
Fund for New Priorities in America  
Mennonite Central Committee Washington Office  
NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby  
Project On Government Oversight  
Women's Action for New Directions (WAND)  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, United States Section

If your organization is not on this list, please consider joining us. Also, if you know of an organization that should be on the list, but is not, please forward this sign on request to them.

Thanks for your help.

Ned

Edward (Ned) W. Stowe  
Legislative Secretary  
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)  
245 Second Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20002 - 5795  
Phone: 202-547-6000  
Toll Free: 1-800-630-1330  
Fax: 202-547-6019  
E-mail: ned@fcnl.org  
website: <http://www.fcnl.org>

Daily News Summary [usbudget.com](http://usbudget.com) reports the following on March 7, 2001

**DEFENSE INSIDERS PRESS FOR FY 2001 SUPPLEMENTAL (3/7/01)**

Any decision about a FY 2001 supplemental is still officially on hold, but we're being told that the Services are getting nervous and that there's perhaps some sort of revolt brewing, as accounts for training and other O&M

head toward deficit this summer.

The Pentagon is currently in the middle of a "strategic review," a top to bottom assessment of defense programs and strategies scheduled for completion in time to influence the forthcoming defense budget. Officially, any FY 2001 supplemental is on hold. It's an open secret, however, that DoD officials as well as their allies in Congress strongly favor extra funding this year and are impatient with the delay that's been forced on them by the White House and the congressional leadership.

The reasons for the delay in supplemental funding are "artificial," according to one defense analyst. Another put it more strongly, "When [Vice President] Cheney said help is on the way, they [Pentagon officials] believed him."

On February 14, Rep. Norm Dicks, the third ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee introduced H.R. 576, a \$6.7 billion emergency FY 2001 supplemental (see 2/14 Bulletin). Although that bill now has 14 cosponsors, there's no indication that it has advanced since then.

A spokesperson for House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jerry Lewis told us today that there is "no supplemental on the horizon." He noted, however, that there's a possibility of FY 2001 funding in one of the FY 2002 appropriations bills. He specifically mentioned the military construction bill, one of the easiest to draft/pass and thus one of the first to come to the floor. Placing the FY 2001 funding in one of the regular appropriations bills, the spokesperson said, would also make it easier to withstand the "Christmas tree effect" that can afflict a standalone supplemental appropriations bill.

Meanwhile, other sectors are gearing up to take advantage of supplemental fever. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Young said he intended to press for \$100 million for the Coast Guard in any DoD supplemental. "It's extremely important that we start fully funding the Coast Guard each fiscal year instead of having to play catch up and seek supplemental funds after-the-fact," Young said.

In three out of the last four years, the Coast Guard has secured supplemental funding. The House Transportation Committee's Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee holds a hearing tomorrow (10am, 2167 Rayburn) on the Coast Guard's supplemental funding needs.

**SIGN-ON LETTER TO OPPOSE  
FY2001 SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY SPENDING BILL**

**ACTION:** We hope that your organization can join the following sign-on letter

to the full House. This letter will be sent early next week (week of March 12). Please e-mail/fax your response to Ned Stowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation, at fax: 202-547-6019 or e-mail ned@fcnl.org by close of business Monday, March 12.

Organization name (as it should appear): \_\_\_\_\_

Contact person: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ Fax: \_\_\_\_\_ E-mail \_\_\_\_\_

For more information, read the background information that follows or call Ned Stowe, 202-547- 6000 ext. 117.

SIGN-ON LETTER: Dear Representative,

We, the undersigned organizations, urge you to oppose H.R. 576, an "emergency" supplemental bill for the Department of Defense for FY01. We believe that the Pentagon has been a relatively poor steward of the resources entrusted to it by the American people. We urge you to speak out against more military spending this year and next.

We are not alone in our assessment:

Admiral William Owens, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes the government can save as much as \$40 billion per year by cutting obsolete, wasteful, and redundant programs. "I believe that some of the dollars could be found rather quickly. . . , and that those dollars could flow in a matter of months, not a matter of years (Testimony, Senate Budget Committee, Feb. 12, 2001)."

General Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Ret.): "If we can't defend this country for \$300 billion a year, we ought to get some new generals (Washington Post, February 8, 2001)."

Senator Charles Grassley (IA): "The Pentagon does not know how much it spends. It does not know if it gets what it orders in goods and services. And the Pentagon, additionally, does not have a handle on its inventory. If the Pentagon does not know what it owns and spends, then how does the Pentagon know if it needs more money? Ramping up the Pentagon budget when the books are a mess is highly questionable at best. To some it might seem crazy (Senate Floor, February 13, 2001)."

Senator Robert Byrd (WV): "The Defense Department, which is talking about an additional \$50 billion a year to meet readiness requirements, does not know with any certainty how much money it currently has available and cannot pass the test of receiving a clean audit opinion on its financial statements (Senate Floor, February 8, 2001)."

Business Executives for National Security (co-chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman (NH)) believes \$15-30 billion can be saved each year

through better management practices in the Pentagon and shutting down bases that are no longer needed (Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2001).

The Pentagon should cut wasteful programs and practices and fully account for the resources entrusted to its stewardship before it seeks more funds from U.S. taxpayers. We urge you to speak out against more military spending this year or next.

#### END SIGN-ON LETTER

**BACKGROUND:** Dismayed that President Bush has put plans for a mid-year supplemental military spending bill on hold, some Democrats have apparently decided to get out in front of the President in support of adding more to this year's military budget (FY2001). On February 14, Rep. Dicks (WA) introduced a \$6.7 billion supplemental military spending bill (H.R. 576). Cosponsors include: Reps. Skelton (MO), Sisisky (VA), Frost (TX), Edwards (TX), and Tauscher (CA). They are currently seeking additional cosponsors for this bill.

On the Senate side, on February 21, Sen. Landrieu (LA) sent a letter to President Bush urging him to consider adding \$5-10 billion more to the Pentagon's budget for this year. Congress has already appropriated \$337 billion\* for the military this year (\*includes budget authority for the Department of Defense, nuclear weapons programs in the Department of Energy, foreign military aid, financing, and training, and mandatory spending on military retirement).

In the mean time, President Bush's FY2002 budget outline (Feb. 28) calls for increasing military spending by another \$14.2 billion over the current FY01 level. The administration is expected to seek even more for FY2002 pending completion of a comprehensive assessment of U.S. national security needs.

But wait, not so fast.

Business Executives for National Security (co-chaired by former Republican senator Rudman (NH)) just released a report (Feb. 21) that identified \$15-\$30 billion in potential annual savings in the current military budget that could be achieved by privatizing various commercial services now provided by the Pentagon, reforming the acquisitions process, modernizing the military budget and accounting system, and shutting down dozens of military bases that are not needed.

This report follows on the heels of testimony before the Senate Budget Committee (Feb. 12) by Admiral William Owens (ret.), former Vice-Chairman of the military Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he estimated that the Pentagon could save as much as \$40 billion per year by eliminating redundant programs between the rival armed services, and by dropping the current, obsolete military strategy which is now guiding military weapons procurement decisions. He was especially critical of rivalry and lack of cooperation between the armed services and the redundant systems which have been created as a result. He wonders why each of the armed services needs to have its own separate budget and accounting system, research and development program, air force, intelligence service, and medical corps.

General McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), Senators Grassley (IA) and Byrd (WV), and Business Executives for National Security have raised similar concerns. It is time for Congress to apply the same level of critical analysis and fiscal discipline to military programs that it has applied to other programs of the federal government in recent years.

X-Sender: jdi@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32)  
Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2001 14:53:22 -0500  
To: jdi@clw.org  
From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Bush Administration's refusal to negotiate with North Korea

March 8, 2001  
Steve LaMontagne

Key Issues for North Korea Policy:  
Missile Negotiations and The 1994 Agreed Framework

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington yesterday hoping to encourage the Bush administration to continue the policy of engagement toward North Korea initiated by former President Clinton. Kim wants the U.S. to resume negotiations to end North Korea's development and export of ballistic missiles and to honor a 1994 agreement under which North Korea suspended its nuclear program in exchange for two light-water nuclear power reactors and heavy fuel oil supplies.

Instead, President Bush expressed skepticism about the North Korean regime and concern that the country still engages in proliferation activity. Calling North Korea a threat, Bush stated that the U.S. would not resume negotiations with Pyongyang anytime soon.

President Bush's comments mark an abrupt shift in rhetoric. Only a day before, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the U.S. would continue the work started by the Clinton administration. "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."

Last year the U.S. came close to reaching an agreement with North Korea that would have ended its development and export of ballistic missiles and related technologies. Proposals included launching North Korean satellites on foreign launchers or providing humanitarian aid packages in return for a cessation of North Korean missile activity. The U.S. rejected the idea of giving North Korea space launch vehicle technology or direct cash payments.

Time ran out on the Clinton administration before an agreement could be completed, and the Bush administration remained largely silent on the matter during its first month in office. Unsure of the new administration's position, North Korea threatened last month to end its moratorium on missile tests.

The change in tone threatens to push Pyongyang back into isolation and toward possible resumption of proliferation activity, thus undermining important opportunities to reduce security tensions in East Asia and eliminate a potential threat to the U.S.

=====  
1994 Agreed Framework

=====

Another agreement with North Korea-the 1994 Agreed Framework- stands at risk of collapse. Under the pact, North Korea pledged to dismantle a five-Megawatt nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon while the U.S., South Korea, and Japan agreed to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear power reactors that would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. In addition, the U.S. promised to provide up to 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet North Korea's energy needs until the first reactor begins operation.

The framework has encountered numerous problems, causing construction of the reactors to fall several years behind schedule:

==North Korea has not provided a satisfactory history of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons-a prerequisite for construction to begin on the promised light water reactors. Nor has North Korea agreed to inspections of all of its nuclear facilities, another provision of the framework.

==General Electric, which was supposed to supply the turbines for the light-water reactors, withdrew because of questions surrounding liability for accidents.

==The price of heavy fuel oil has tripled over the past five years, causing the cost of U.S. contributions to soar above \$100 million a year.

==North Korea is demanding pay raises for its workers at the reactor sites and is not cooperating in training technicians to work at the site.

==North Korea's power grid cannot handle the output of the planned nuclear reactors.

Critics of the agreement worry that the reactor technology and radioactive byproducts will benefit North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and argue that the reactors-once fully operational-will produce enough plutonium to make 100 nuclear bombs each year. This argument is misleading. The reactors will produce approximately 500kg of reactor grade plutonium each year, but this plutonium will be mixed with highly radioactive spent fuel elements. If North Korea wants to build nuclear weapons, it must have the capability to reprocess the spent reactor fuel in order to separate out the plutonium. North Korea's only reprocessing plant was shut down as part of the Agreed Framework and is now under IAEA monitoring. Building another one in secret would risk almost certain detection and could be accomplished only at considerable cost and in violation of international agreement.

Even if North Korea could clandestinely separate plutonium from spent fuel, reactor-grade plutonium is less suitable for weapons development than weapons-grade plutonium, the type that would have been produced by North Korea's Yongbyon reactors had the Agreed Framework not shut them down.

Rumors are now floating that the U.S. might consider revising the agreement so that North Korea will receive conventional power facilities instead of the two nuclear reactors. However, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary Powell insisted that "We will abide by and agree to the commitments made under the Agreed Framework, provided that North Korea does the same." Last week State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated that the Bush administration would abide by the framework provisions "completely and fully." Yet, given the uneven nature of the administration's foreign policy, such statements must be viewed with

skepticism.

The Bush administration must realize that a missile agreement with North Korea is not beyond reach and that the 1994 Agreed Framework is not beyond repair. If, as President Bush stated, North Korea does pose a threat to the U.S., then negotiations should be resumed as quickly as possible. These agreements provide genuine opportunities to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and thus serve U.S. national security interests. President Bush and President Kim should focus not on whether these agreements should be pursued, but rather on how they can be realized.

For more information contact Steve LaMontagne at 202.543.4100 x119

Attachment Converted: "C:\EUDORA\Attach\NK\_backgrounder4.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\NK\_backgrounder.doc"

John Isaacs  
Council for a Livable World  
110 Maryland Avenue, NE - Room 409  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x.131  
[www.clw.org](http://www.clw.org)

To: srobinson@clw.org, david@fcn1.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: NMD letters to senators  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Stacie and David,

The letters came through. I downloaded and printed them all. I had never handled such a long document before, but it went well.

Thanks for your assistance: David for sharing the list of Senate aides, and Stacie for executing the merge.

Howard

To: jdi@clw.org, dkimball@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: NMD letters from religious leaders  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: C:\My Documents\icnd.069.doc; A:\iclt.071.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear John and Daryl,

We have now sent the letter from faith-based organizations opposing national missile defense to President Bush (through Condoleezza Rice) and to Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld. It is attached along with the list of signers.

I also released it to the religious press and to a dozen or so secular press outlets. That's all I could manage, but if any one else wants to work with press contacts, I would welcome it.

We delivered similar letters to members of Congress with the same three reasons and asked them to share our concerns with President Bush.

Do you think we should ask a senator to put the letter in the Record some time when he or she is giving a speech on NMD? If so, who?

In this task David Culp provided us names of Senate defense and foreign policy aides to direct the letter to. Stacie Robinson handled the merge. I did the printing. Thanks, Daryl, for allowing Stacie to do this for us.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: matureyears@umpublishing.org  
From: "Carlee L. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Submitting an article  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\HECK301.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Marvin Cropsey:

Greetings. Hope all is going well.

Attached you will find an article, "Christmas Spirit." It is approximately 1250 words. I started writing it for "Fragments of Life," but as you can see, it grew.

I look forward to hearing from you and will be interested in any comments.

Would you be interested in an article on making a ginger-bread house with my grandson and neighborhood children? With a recipe, dimensions, and pictures?

Hope to hear from you soon.

Peace and joy,

Carlee L.

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Letter on NMD  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments: C:\My Documents\icnd.069.doc; A:\icnd.071.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

The letter from religious leaders to President Bush opposing national missile defense has been dispatched. The final version and list of signers is attached. A similar letter has been delivered to all members of Congress, asking them to share our concerns with President Bush.

Thanks for all who signed the letter. Thanks to David Culp of FCNL for providing name of Senate defense and foreign policy aides so that the letter to senators could be sent to their attention. Thanks to Stacie Robinson of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers for performing the merge for 155 Senate aides. Thanks to Emily and Ali, Unitarian interns, for delivering letters to House members and to Daryl Byler for taking care of half of the Senate. I did the other half.

You can now make use of the letter by sharing it with your constituents and asking them to express these concerns to President Bush and to their senators and representatives. Delegations in states talking with their senators can also use the letter.

Would any one be interested in posting letter and signers on your web site?

Shalom,  
Howard

To: epf@peacenet.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Letter on NMD attachment  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Mary,

Here are the attachments.

Howard

###

March 5, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Re: National Missile Defense

Dear Mr. President:

We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland, safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile defense.

First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S. homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation might develop years from now.

Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy, financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation, and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides the breeding ground for terrorist groups

Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications. Since 1983 the United States has spent \$69 billion on national missile defense, enriching major defense contractors but producing no effective system. President Clinton's plan, which you have criticized as inadequate, would cost \$60 billion. Indications are that the layered approach you favor could cost more than \$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this magnitude along with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with other urgent domestic needs.

For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a premature decision on national missile defense

and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Respectfully yours,

Rev. Dr. Stan Hastey, Executive Director  
Alliance of Baptists  
(organization listed for identification only)

Curtis Ramsey-Lucas  
Director of Legislative Advocacy  
National Ministries  
American Baptist Churches

Ken Sehested, Executive Director  
Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America

David Radcliff  
Director of Brethren Witness  
Church of the Brethren General Board

Greg Laszakovits  
Director, Washington Office  
Church of the Brethren General Board

Tiffany Heath  
Interim Legislative Director  
Church Women United

Gary Baldrige  
Global Missions Coordinator  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship

Rev. Lonnie Turner  
Washington Office  
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship

Joel Heim, Moderator  
Disciples Peace Fellowship

Thomas H. Hart  
Director of Government Relations  
Episcopal Church, USA

Rev. Mark Brown, Assistant Director  
International Affairs and Human Rights  
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs  
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Ronald J. Sider, President  
Evangelicals for Social Action

Mary H. Miller, Executive Director  
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Murray Polner, President  
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Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice

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Muslim Peace Fellowship

Brenda Girton-Mitchell, JD  
Assoc. General Secretary for Public Policy  
& Director of the Washington Office  
National Council of Churches

Nancy Small, National Coordinator  
Pax Christi, USA

Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory  
Director, Washington Office  
Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

L. William Yolton  
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

Ann Rutan, csjp , President  
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace

Rev. Meg A. Riley  
Washington Office for Faith in Action  
Unitarian Universalist Association

Ron Stief  
Justice and Witness Ministries  
United Church of Christ

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General Board of Church and Society  
United Methodist Church

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This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC Phone/fax: 301 896-0013 mupj@igc.org

# NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT

March 8, 2001

## *Key Issues for North Korea Policy: Missile Negotiations and The 1994 Agreed Framework*



COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD  
EDUCATION FUND

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington yesterday hoping to encourage the Bush administration to continue the policy of engagement toward North Korea initiated by former President Clinton. Kim wants the U.S. to resume negotiations to end North Korea's development and export of ballistic missiles and to honor a 1994 agreement under which North Korea suspended its nuclear program in exchange for two light-water nuclear power reactors and heavy fuel oil supplies.

Instead, President Bush expressed skepticism about the North Korean regime and concern that the country still engages in proliferation activity. Calling North Korea a threat, Bush stated that the U.S. would not resume negotiations with Pyongyang anytime soon.

President Bush's comments mark an abrupt shift in rhetoric. Only a day before, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the U.S. would continue the work started by the Clinton administration. "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."

Last year the U.S. came close to reaching an agreement with North Korea that would have ended its development and export of ballistic missiles and related technologies. Proposals included launching North Korean satellites on foreign launchers or providing humanitarian aid packages in return for a cessation of North Korean missile activity. The U.S. rejected the idea of giving North Korea space launch vehicle technology or direct cash payments.

Time ran out on the Clinton administration before an agreement could be completed, and the Bush administration remained largely silent on the matter during its first month in office. Unsure of the new administration's position, North Korea threatened last month to end its moratorium on missile tests.

The change in tone threatens to push Pyongyang back into isolation and toward possible resumption of proliferation activity, thus undermining important opportunities to reduce security tensions in East Asia and eliminate a potential threat to the U.S.

### **1994 Agreed Framework**

Another agreement with North Korea—the 1994 Agreed Framework—stands at risk of collapse. Under the pact, North Korea pledged to dismantle a five-Megawatt nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon while the U.S., South Korea, and Japan agreed to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear power reactors that would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. In addition, the U.S. promised to provide up to 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet North Korea's energy needs until the first reactor begins operation.

The framework has encountered numerous problems, causing construction of the reactors to fall several years behind schedule:

North Korea has not provided a satisfactory history of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons—a

prerequisite for construction to begin on the promised light water reactors. Nor has North Korea agreed to inspections of all of its nuclear facilities, another provision of the framework.

General Electric, which was supposed to supply the turbines for the light-water reactors, withdrew because of questions surrounding liability for accidents.

The price of heavy fuel oil has tripled over the past five years, causing the cost of U.S. contributions to soar above \$100 million a year.

North Korea is demanding pay raises for its workers at the reactor sites and is not cooperating in training technicians to work at the site.

North Korea's power grid cannot handle the output of the planned nuclear reactors.

Critics of the agreement worry that the reactor technology and radioactive byproducts will benefit North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and argue that the reactors—once fully operational—will produce enough plutonium to make 100 nuclear bombs each year. This argument is misleading. The reactors will produce approximately 500kg of reactor grade plutonium each year, but this plutonium will be mixed with highly radioactive spent fuel elements. If North Korea wants to build nuclear weapons, it must have the capability to reprocess the spent reactor fuel in order to separate out the plutonium. North Korea's only reprocessing plant was shut down as part of the Agreed Framework and is now under IAEA monitoring. Building another one in secret would risk almost certain detection and could be accomplished only at considerable cost and in violation of international agreement.

Even if North Korea could clandestinely separate plutonium from spent fuel, reactor-grade plutonium is less suitable for weapons development than weapons-grade plutonium, the type that would have been produced by North Korea's Yongbyon reactors had the Agreed Framework not shut them down.

Rumors are now floating that the U.S. might consider revising the agreement so that North Korea will receive conventional power facilities instead of the two nuclear reactors. However, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary Powell insisted that "We will abide by and agree to the commitments made under the Agreed Framework, provided that North Korea does the same." Last week State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated that the Bush administration would abide by the framework provisions "completely and fully." Yet, given the uneven nature of the administration's foreign policy, such statements must be viewed with skepticism.

The Bush administration must realize that a missile agreement with North Korea is not beyond reach and that the 1994 Agreed Framework is not beyond repair. If, as President Bush stated, North Korea does pose a threat to the U.S., then negotiations should be resumed as quickly as possible. These agreements provide genuine opportunities to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and thus serve U.S. national security interests. President Bush and President Kim should focus not on whether these agreements should be pursued, but rather on how they can be realized.

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From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Missile defense + Korea: 7 items

1. "Allies Keep Balking At US Missile Defense" - Christ. Sci. Monitor
2. "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod On NMD" - Korea Times
3. "Mixed Signals Sent On Evolving Bush Foreign Policy " - Wash. Times
4. "Macho On North Korea" - Friedman column
5. "Losing Momentum On Korea" - N.Y. Times editorial
6. "Putting Korea On Hold" - Wash. Post editorial
7. "The Visitor From South Korea" - Wash. Times editorial

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1. "Allies Keep Balking At US Missile Defense"  
Christian Science Monitor - March 9, 2001 - By Brad Knickerbocker, Staff  
writer of The Christian Science Monitor

But some NATO members are resigned to Bush pressing ahead with plans.

WASHINGTON-- For years, the idea of being able to shoot down enemy missiles - hit a bullet with a bullet - has remained a distant technological dream. That's kept it far down the list of military and diplomatic concerns, despite the billions of dollars spent to achieve it.

But the Bush administration has brought it to the forefront, and in the process missile defense now stands as a major point of argument in how the US relates to its allies in Europe and in Asia.

As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush promised "to build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date," making this one of his top military priorities. Before he became Mr. Bush's Defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld headed a congressionally sponsored commission that found nations such as North Korea and Iran could soon have the capability to produce ballistic missiles armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads - weapons of mass destruction.

Since then, Mr. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell have suggested that the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which governs defenses against attacking missiles, might have to be scrapped. In his Senate confirmation hearings, Rumsfeld called the ABM Treaty "ancient history."

NATO's worries

European countries in the 19-member NATO worry that this could provoke another arms race in a post-cold-war world that has become more complex. There's also concern that a unilateral move by the US to construct a national missile defense (NMD) could "decouple" the US from its European allies, weakening a body that has helped protect much of the world for half a century.

NATO Secretary-General George Robertson acknowledged as much this week in meeting with US officials here. "Many Europeans ... continue to fear the effects of the United States proceeding with deployment of a missile-defense system," he told a forum sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute.

Halfway around the world, the Bush administration's goal of accelerating an NMD system has stirred discussions over the future of the Korean peninsula.

Meeting in Seoul last week with Russian President Vladimir Putin, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung expressed skepticism about US plans for an NMD system. In a joint communiqué, the two leaders described the ABM Treaty as "a cornerstone of strategic stability."

In Washington this week, Mr. Kim and Bush downplayed differences over missile defense. Still, Bush described their White House talks as "frank," diplomatic code indicating all is not sweetness and light.

The issue reflects fundamentally different goals for the region. Kim emphasizes what he calls a "sunshine" policy of rapprochement with North Korea. Bush's defense and foreign policy team stresses North Korea's apparently growing ability to threaten not only South Korea but other countries as well.

"They still have weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver those," Mr. Powell said at the White House this week. "So we have to see them as a threat."

### Scaled-back plans

Over the years, Pentagon planning for missile defense has become more modest. Gone are the days of space-based lasers blasting Soviet missiles, as envisioned in former President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative - which was quickly dubbed "star wars." Most experts say that such a system - even if it worked - could be overwhelmed by thousands of multiple warheads or fooled by decoys.

Instead, current planning is for ground-based antimissile missiles poised to protect the US, and perhaps other countries, against an accidental launch or sneak attack by a "rogue state" such as North Korea, Iran, or even Libya (which was recently reported to have acquired missiles capable of hitting Europe).

But even these plans for a scaled-back missile-defense system have been confounded in practice. Two of three test firings have failed to hit their target. And the General Accounting Office recently warned Congress that a crucial satellite-surveillance system designed to detect enemy missiles "is at high risk" of being late, more costly than anticipated, and unlikely to perform as advertised. The GAO (Congress's investigative arm) also reported that the system's software would not be ready until three years after the first satellites are scheduled to be launched.

Rep. Jerry Lewis (R) of California, who chairs the defense appropriations subcommittee, says he finds this "very troubling."

More troublesome at the moment may be the diplomatic effects of the Bush administration's focus on national missile defense as a key element in its review of the US military.

Spurgeon Keeny, head of the private Arms Control Association in Washington, says it's "in clear violation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

"Unless the United States backs off from its explicit threat to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and its implicit threat to eschew arms-control treaties that would in any way restrict US freedom of action, the international community is unlikely to follow the US lead when it jeopardizes other countries' economic and political interests," says Mr. Keeny, a former senior government official responsible for arms control and nuclear-policy issues.

Nations resigned to US plans

For the moment, European members of NATO are resigned to the US pressing ahead with missile defense - especially if, as the Bush administration now promises, it will consult with its allies along the way. And, says NATO Secretary-General Robertson, the full alliance remains in agreement on its "common values, shared risks, and shared burdens."

"These debates, as tough as they can be, are not about first principles," he says. "The first principles still hold."

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## 2. "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod On NMD"

Korea Times - March 9, 2001 - By Son Key-young, Staff Reporter

South Korea has clearly embraced Washington's desire to erect an anti-missile shield against attacks by rogue states, but called on it to first resolve those new security concerns through intensive diplomacy.

At first glance, the joint press statement, issued following Wednesday's summit between Presidents Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in Washington, indicated that Seoul supported Washington's efforts to build the National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

"The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures," the statement said.

Two notions stand out from the statement -- "active nonproliferation diplomacy" and "defensive systems."

A Foreign Affairs-Trade Ministry official said that U.S. officials wanted to include only "defensive systems" in the statement as part of a broad strategy, but the attempt was stopped by their Korean counterparts.

"Our side made efforts to convince the United States that NMD is the last resort, which should come in the event of an ultimate failure of active

diplomacy," he said.

In fact, it is the first time that the Bush administration has accepted the notion of "active nonproliferation diplomacy" as a first step to address threats from rogue states, he said.

Meanwhile, a senior U.S. administration official stressed the inclusion of "defensive systems" in the statement.

"President Kim made his clear statement that he's not opposed to NMD, and there was discussion about the importance, as was mentioned in the joint statement, there was a discussion about the President's point that the times have changed, and that there was a role to play for defensive systems, which President Kim agreed to," he said.

In conclusion, the joint press statement is seen as South Korea's conditional consent on the necessity of the U.S. missile shield project.

Seoul urged Washington to first launch active diplomacy by opening dialogue with China and North Korea on those issues.

At first, the United States okayed the inclusion of consultations with allies, like South Korea, but refused to accept the idea of launching talks with "the other interested parties" such as China and North Korea.

Vice Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said that the confusion caused by a joint Korea-Russia statement had been alleviated after the clarifications of Seoul's stances through the Kim-Bush meeting.

Following a summit last month, President Kim Dae-jung and Russian President Vladimir Putin described the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as "the cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation of international efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation." Kim and Putin also said they hoped to "preserve and strengthen" the treaty banning the United States and Russia from erecting large-scale anti-missile shields. However, controversy over the summit agreement snowballed, as Korean and foreign media organizations interpreted the statement as Seoul's implicit support for Russia's opposition to the NMD project.

In an effort to convince Bush that he is not opposed to NMD, President Kim was also quoted as telling Bush, "I'm sorry for the issue in the media."

As part of its efforts to put an end to the controversy, the ministry is mulling taking punitive steps against officials involved in authoring the joint Korea-Russia statement.

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3. "Mixed Signals Sent On Evolving Bush Foreign Policy "

Washington Times - March 9, 2001 - By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

News Analysis

The celebrated Bush administration foreign policy team, in its first major tests, can't seem to decide who bats leadoff and who hits cleanup.

Mixed messages and public confusion have plagued the administration in its early weeks, first on U.S. policy toward Iraq and then on President Bush's willingness to continue the Clinton administration's rapprochement with North Korea.

"I think it's fair to say that the rhetoric to date hasn't been well coordinated yet," says Anthony H. Cordesman, a former Pentagon and State Department official who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"That's not unusual when the people in a new administration have not had time to develop a nuanced policy in the crush of events," he says.

But the muddle has surprised Washington because of the experience and depth of the foreign-policy team Mr. Bush recruited.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell came to their posts trailing glittering resumes and long records of government service at the highest level. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was a rising star in Republican foreign-policy circles even before signing up for Texas Gov. George W. Bush's successful presidential campaign.

But in the space of two days this week, the administration effectively reversed itself on what it would do about missile talks with North Korea, which were left unfinished when President Clinton left office.

Mr. Powell on Tuesday said the new administration planned "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."

A day later, following a meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, Mr. Bush publicly questioned key parts of the Clinton strategy and signaled he planned to go much slower on thawing relations with Pyongyang.

A senior White House briefer spent considerable time afterward trying to persuade skeptical reporters that the abrupt change in tone did not signal either an abrupt change in tone or an internal rift between senior policy-makers.

By yesterday, Mr. Powell was suggesting stiff new conditions for any deal with North Korea and even talking about trying to reopen a deal made in 1994.

On Iraq, the administration has struggled to coordinate its evolving policy on international sanctions against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Powell told a House hearing Wednesday that it is critical that U.N. weapons inspectors be allowed back into Iraq to keep Baghdad in check.

Mr. Cheney had told a luncheon meeting with editors and reporters of The Washington Times, in an interview published earlier this week: "I don't think we want to hinge our policy just to the questions of whether or not inspectors go back in there."

The administration has struggled to explain its efforts to "re-energize" the sanctions against Iraq while at the same time decreasing the number of goods banned from sale to the regime.

The stature and bureaucratic skills of the Bush team's heavy hitters had led some analysts to expect that policy and turf clashes were inevitable.

Mr. Cheney has built a personal staff with broad security and foreign-policy credentials. Mr. Powell has vowed to restore the influence of an often demoralized department, partly through the strength of his own charisma. And Mr. Rumsfeld, backed by the Pentagon's resources and budget clout, has literally written the book on how to lead and how to follow at the highest levels of U.S. government.

Open criticism of any one of the three is rare. "I have some ideas [about the Bush team's early policy miscues,] one veteran Republican foreign policy official says, "but I'd rather not see them in print."

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Democrat who was national security adviser under President Carter, praises Mr. Bush's skeptical stance on North Korea and his go-slow approach to any deal with the Communist regime.

"I never understood the pell-mell rush by the last administration to get a deal with Pyongyang, or why the president would want to go there in the last days of his term," says Mr. Brzezinski.

One problem he finds in the Bush administration struggle to present a united front is that so many sub-Cabinet policy posts have yet to be filled as nominees slowly work their way through the confirmation system.

"Some serious issues like the Middle East, like China, aren't going to wait," he says. "That's when you need talented people and staff so that you are better prepared to shape policy."

Mr. Powell, appearing at a budget hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was asked how many of the State Department's senior officials had been confirmed.

"You're looking at him," Mr. Powell joked.

German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, in town for talks with senior Bush administration officials, says he is not concerned as he watches the new team settle in.

"This is an administration that is in that phase of defining its policies, its standpoints, its interests," says Mr. Scharping. "There is no tendency on our part to overestimate the importance of any particular statement."

Nevertheless, Democratic legislators yesterday told Mr. Powell that the apparent confusion over message could have real consequences in places like the Korean Peninsula, especially with regional powers like China, Japan and South Korea all seeking clues to the new president's thinking.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware said he was "puzzled and disappointed" by the apparent abrupt change in tone on North Korea this week.

Added Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts: "I have a sense that we may be sending messages that are subject to misinterpretation."

Replied Mr. Powell: "I think there's less difference here than meets the eye."

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4. "Macho On North Korea"

New York Times - March 9, 2001 - Thomas L. Friedman column

Pay attention to the brouhaha at the White House Wednesday, when President Bush shot down the hopes of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea that the Bush team would quickly resume negotiations with North Korea. This episode highlights the fine line between a tough, effective foreign policy and a tough, ineffective foreign policy, and it raises the question: On which side of that line does Mr. Bush plan to reside?

On Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell, who represents the pragmatic, hard-nosed internationalists within the administration, declared that the Bush team intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off" in negotiations with North Korea to curb its production and sale of ballistic missiles. But President Bush, after meeting President Kim Wednesday, brusquely indicated that the missile talks with the North would not be resumed any time soon.

What gives? This is the second time in two weeks that Mr. Powell has been out of step. Last week it was his signaling a willingness for "smarter," but smaller, sanctions on Iraq to hold our Arab allies together. That sparked grumbling from the Dick Cheney-Don Rumsfeld camps. (If this were the Clinton administration, the New York Post headline would read "White House in Chaos — Who's in Charge?")

Question: Is the Bush foreign policy going to be a more hard-nosed internationalism, in which we galvanize our allies around tougher policies toward North Korea, Iraq, Russia and China but still get meaningful things done and hold our alliances together? Or is it going to be an ideologically driven, hard-line approach in which the White House is always looking over its shoulder at the right wing of the Republican Party, and our allies become alienated and nothing meaningful gets done?

Personally, I think there is nothing wrong with President Bush, in his first dealings with North Korea, coming on as a real skeptic. Kim Jong Il, the "dear leader" of North Korea, is a wild man who understands only force and thinks that's all we understand too. That's why whenever his people are starving more than usual, and he needs a quick influx of potatoes, he digs a suspicious, reactor-size hole and we pay him with potatoes or oil or a harmless reactor to stop. It's sort of silly, but it's worked to keep peace and restrain the North's nuclear capabilities. Given this background, though, it is legitimate for President Bush to signal the North that we're not buying that carpet again.

But then what? One approach says: "We don't have an interest in just letting North Korea collapse, because it could blow up the whole peninsula and even threaten Japan. So we're going to take a very hard-nosed approach to securing a verifiable deal that would curb North Korea's missiles and promote rapprochement with South Korea."

The other approach says: "We're the tough guys. We don't really believe in arms control. And we don't care if North Korea collapses. Deep down we don't even want a deal with North Korea, because that would eliminate the very missile threat we've been hyping to justify spending \$60 billion on a missile defense shield. If the allies don't like it — too bad."

Which is Mr. Bush's approach?

You have to wonder whether Mr. Bush knows. He declared Wednesday that when it comes to North Korea, "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements." But as the Times reporter David Sanger pointed out, the U.S. has only one agreement with North Korea — the 1994 accord that froze its plutonium processing. And Bush aides admitted there was no evidence that this deal was being violated. Later a White House official, trying to clean up for the president, said Mr. Bush was referring to concerns about whether North Korea would comply with a future deal, even though he didn't use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said. O.K.

Well, if that's how he speaks, is that how he thinks? Confused? Which approach Mr. Bush adopts depends in part on how he understands North Korea's past behavior. But if he doesn't understand that, or he hasn't applied himself to understanding it, or he is so wedded to his own Star Wars missile shield he doesn't want anything to get in the way, or he is so worried about being accused by Republican hard-liners, as his father was, of being a "wimp" that he'll never take yes for an answer from the North — then, Houston, we have a problem.

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5. "Losing Momentum On Korea"

New York Times editorial - March 9, 2001

Regrettably, President Bush has decided for the time being not to renew discussions with North Korea aimed at shutting down Pyongyang's development and sales of long-range missiles. Reaching acceptable agreements with the North is never easy, and the new administration is entitled to take some time to develop its own strategy and goals. But by suspending the constructive talks that were begun by the Clinton administration, Washington has forfeited an opportunity to explore North Korea's true intentions. It has also complicated the challenges facing South Korea, whose president, Kim Dae Jung, has been trying to coax the North from confrontation to diplomacy.

North Korea had offered the Clinton administration some of the essential elements of a missile deal. But there was still a considerable way to go. Late last year the North proposed to halt further development and exports of its long-range missiles in exchange for food and fuel aid and a commitment by other countries to launch North Korean space satellites. If a

verifiable agreement along those lines could be completed, it would eliminate the threat of North Korea's building missiles that can reach the United States. That in turn would reduce the pressure on Washington to rush ahead with development of a missile defense system, one of the Bush administration's core defense goals. It would also end the North's current missile exports to danger zones like Iran and Pakistan.

But acutely difficult issues remained unresolved as the Clinton presidency ended. North Korea has not yet agreed to permit the international on-site inspections needed to verify its compliance. Nor has it agreed to destroy the long-range missiles it already has or even to provide a detailed inventory of its current missile arsenal. Washington would need such an inventory to determine whether new missiles are being added.

Most of the arms control agreements Washington negotiated with Moscow during the cold war were based on a long period of familiarity and mutual observation. There is no comparable history yet between the United States and North Korea. There are also suspicions by some analysts that North Korea seeks only to buy time and extort Western compensation without really committing itself to a peaceful course.

Yet there have been encouraging signs, particularly in the past year, that North Korea is serious about improving relations with South Korea and the West. The Bush administration appears still to be debating its next moves on North Korea. It should carefully review the unresolved missile issues, then resume discussions with the North later this year in an effort to complete a sound agreement.

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## 6. "Putting Korea On Hold"

Washington Post editorial - March 9, 2001

THE BUSH administration has applied the brakes to what had been an accelerating effort by the United States and South Korea to engage with the reclusive Communist government of North Korea. Over the past two years South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has brought about a breakthrough in relations with the North and recently had been laying the groundwork for a possible peace declaration by the two Koreas. Meanwhile, in its last weeks in office the Clinton administration came close to striking a deal under which North Korea would have given up its production and export of ballistic missiles in exchange for economic aid and improved relations with the United States.

On Wednesday, President Bush told a disappointed Mr. Kim that he would not, as the Koreans clearly hoped, pick up the diplomatic process where Mr. Clinton left it. Though he said he supported Mr. Kim's initiatives, Mr. Bush said he was skeptical that verifiable agreements could be made with a state as secretive and Stalinist as North Korea. Behind the scenes, his briefers told reporters that a policy review was underway and that no negotiations with the North would be arranged soon.

The administration has some good reasons for the diplomatic pause. Though there is no evidence that North Korea has violated the accords it has so far signed, it is unquestionably hard to know what its military

establishment is doing, or even to verify relatively simple questions such as whether food aid is really delivered to the nation's hungry. The detente between the two Koreas has not yet led to any change in the North's massive military deployments along the border, or any apparent relaxation in Pyongyang's repressive rule of its population. And the Clinton administration's rush to embrace a regime guilty of some of the world's worst human rights violations and acts of terrorism offered it unprecedented political recognition, including a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, without sufficient returns.

Still, Kim Dae Jung made a forceful argument here this week for continuing some form of engagement policy. For years North Korea's relations with the West were limited to extorting aid in exchange for curbing weapons programs; now, Kim Jong Il seems interested in leading a broader opening of his country to the world, signaled in a recent trip to Shanghai and planned visits to Moscow and Seoul. Engagement offers the North the chance to avert economic collapse by opening its economy to outside investments and free market reforms, as China did; for South Korea and the United States, it holds the possibility that one of the world's oldest and most dangerous military standoffs could be peacefully defused, along with a ballistic missile threat to the United States.

The fact that the Bush administration has not yet settled on a policy was evident from the somewhat mixed messages it sent this week. The day before Mr. Bush's downbeat remarks, Secretary of State Colin Powell had said that "some promising elements were left on the table" by the Clinton administration and that "we do plan to engage with North Korea." In fact, there seems no reasonable alternative to a policy that would continue to explore, if more deliberately and cautiously, whether North Korea can be induced to drop its missile programs while opening itself to the extensive outside inspections that would be needed to ensure compliance. To reject that path would be to abandon the most hopeful scenario for change on the Korean peninsula, and undercut an initiative by South Korea's president that has already justly earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. It would leave military deterrence, including as-yet undetermined and unproven missile defense systems, as the only U.S. tool for managing the transformation, or collapse, of the world's last Stalinist state. Those military means are still needed; but so is an active diplomacy.

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7. "The Visitor From South Korea"

Washington Times editorial - March 9, 2001

After a day of full and "frank" discussions on Wednesday between President Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, it was time yesterday for the South Korean visitor to pour a little oil on the troubled waters. Several critical circumstances made this visit a good bit less triumphant than Mr. Kim's first, just after his election three years ago.

The White House has not been pleased about Mr. Kim's stated intent to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea. And it certainly was not pleased that he put his name to a communique with Russian President Vladimir Putin, just before leaving for Washington, stating that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) was "a cornerstone of strategic stability," and suggesting

that American missile defense plans were a problem.

Yesterday, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Kim said that he "deeply regrets such a controversy had to arise." Mr. Kim said that contrary to reports, the communique did not contain a clause about missile defense (though the Russians pushed it to the very end) and that the statement about ABM was nothing new, and in fact had been the U.S. position for years (which was true under President Clinton). "But I now regret it was included," he said. It certainly was not smart for South Korea to be seen siding with the Russians against the United States.

The desire of South Koreans for warmer relations with the North is understandable. Though South Korea is a wonder of free enterprise, in stark contrast with the devastated totalitarian North, 10 million Korean families are still separated, and many live with the memory of the horrors of the North Korean invasion 50 years ago. Mr. Kim is deeply concerned about time running out on his peace efforts. As he repeatedly stressed at AEI, "We must not lose this opportunity. We must assist so that North Korea can continue on the path of change. We must help so that it does not return to its old ways, which would be unwelcome by other countries and would not be good for North Korea itself."

However, time is not so pressing that the Bush administration should not be deliberate in its policy review towards North Korea, which is badly needed. Mr. Kim has achieved Nobel Peace Prize-winning successes by holding out the olive branch to North Korea, trade has grown and political exchanges have taken place. Still, the United States should proceed with caution, given our role as guarantor of the peace with 37,000 troops still on duty in the Korean Peninsula.

The Clinton administration's specialty was to answer North Korea's duplicity with concessions, whether dangerous nuclear reactors were the problem or missile development and sales. Bill Clinton was narrowly dissuaded from traveling to Pyongyang in the last weeks of his presidency to offer American rockets to the North Koreans for "satellite launches" in return for a supposed halt in North Korea's missile program.

Now, the Bush administration needs to take a firmer line to ensure that North Korea lives up to its nuclear commitments, stops sales of its Nodong missiles to countries like Libya, and agrees to relax its belligerent military posture. As the South Korean president remarked, openness and peacefulness is entirely in the interest of North Korea. This will not change even with a dose of realism administered along with the olive branches.

John Isaacs  
Council for a Livable World  
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From: "Cropsey, Marvin" <Mcropsey@umpublishing.org>  
To: "Carlee L. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Cc: "Czynszak, Kathy" <Kczynszak@umpublishing.org>  
Subject: RE: Submitting an article  
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2001 07:52:06 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Hi, Carlee. I am glad to hear from you. We will log and begin your article in the review process. Please note, however, that I will not be accepting any Christmas/Winter pieces until sometime in the Fall.

Sincerely,  
Marvin W. Cropsey, editor

-----Original Message-----

From: Carlee L. Hallman [SMTP:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2001 11:11 AM  
To: matureyears@umpublishing.org  
Subject: Submitting an article

Dear Marvin Cropsey:

Greetings. Hope all is going well.

Attached you will find an article, "Christmas Spirit." It is approximately 1250 words. I started writing it for "Fragments of Life," but as you can see, it grew.

I look forward to hearing from you and will be interested in any comments.

Would you be interested in an article on making a ginger-bread house with my grandson and neighborhood children? With a recipe, dimensions, and pictures?

Hope to hear from you soon.

Peace and joy,

Carlee L. << File: HECK301.doc >>

To: lyght, whitedale  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Articles on North Korea  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\10308.18.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Bishops,

At the risk of overburdening you, here are some more articles on North Korea and the Bush Administration.

I've asked a couple of dominational offices about what they are doing. It's possible that some kind of statement or sign-on letter might emerge. Nevertheless, episcopal leadership would be useful. Also, the United Methodist General Board of Church and Society meets in two weeks, so you might want to propose something to it.

Let me know if I can assist you.

Shalom,  
Howard

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March 8, 2001

TO: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers members and friends

FR: Daryl Kimball, Exec. Director

RE: NMD/START Update -- more on Bush's "not now" stance toward N. Korea

President Bush is perhaps risking his best opportunity to defeat potential, long-range North Korean missiles -- by resuming talks with N. Korea to reach a deal on a verifiable freeze of the DPRK's missile program. In an apparent shift away from remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell and the preference of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush said that there could be a resumption of talks "at some point in the future," but not now. Bush did not rule out such talks, but the window of opportunity may close if he delays and if his tough rhetoric incites North Korea's leaders. Some news reports suggest the harder-line Bush remarks signal a rift among Bush's national security principals. (See news articles and analysis, below.)

Bush's "no talks now" line also contradicts advice from senior Democratic leaders in the House and the Senate and former Clinton and Albright special North Korea envoy Wendy Sherman. In a March 6 letter to President Bush, the House and Senate Democratic leaders and the ranking Democratic members the armed services and international relations committees wrote:

"Your meeting with President Kim offers an opportunity to stand with our South Korean friends to test whether North Korea is indeed committed to peace. Given North Korea's often far-reaching demands and record of

disregarding international norms, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of getting comprehensive and verifiable agreements with North Korea that address our concerns about its current and future nuclear and ballistic missile activities.

We believe, however, the stakes are high and the issues involved demand urgent attention, and it is evident to us that the continued engagement of the U.S. Government on this matter could serve to reduce a serious potential threat to our national security.

We therefore hope you thoroughly explore the possibility of reaching agreements that are in our national interest, and ask that you clearly demonstrate to President Kim our government's ongoing commitment to working constructively with the Republic of Korea to confront this major strategic challenge."

The full text of the letter is below.

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), one of the signatories of the letter, also gave an extensive statement on the floor of the Senate making the case for engagement with North Korea to diminish the threats it poses. (See below.)

-- DK

NOTE: The attached articles are for educational purposes only. For previous editions of the Coalition's "NMD/START Update," see <http://www.clw.org/coalition/nmdnews.htm>

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#### IN THIS UPDATE:

1. EXCERPTS OF BUSH-KIM Q&A WITH REPORTERS, MARCH 7
2. Text of Letter the President Bush from Democratic Congressional Leaders
3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks," Washington Post, March 8, 2001
4. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now," New York Times, March 8, 2001
5. "Mixed Signals On N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift," USA Today, March 8, 2001
6. EXCERPTS FROM: "Don't Drop the Ball with North Korea," Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congressional Record, March 7, 2001. FOR FULL TEXT SEE: <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl::>>
7. Joint Statement Between The United States Of America And The Republic Of Korea, The White House, March 7, 2001

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## 1. EXCERPTS OF BUSH-KIM Q&A WITH REPORTERS, MARCH 7:

Q: Mr. President, the Secretary of State just told us that you made it clear you would not be fooled by the North Korean regime. Can you expand on that? And are you afraid that the South Koreans, in their haste, their energy to make peace, might be not forcing North Korea to make certain concessions that need to be made?

PRESIDENT BUSH: First, we had a very frank discussion about North Korea. There's no question in my mind that the President of the Republic of Korea is a realist. He knows exactly with whom we're dealing. He's under no illusions. I also told the President that we look forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.

Q: President Kim, do you believe that it would strengthen South Korea's security for the United States to immediately resume the negotiations that President Clinton's administration had taken with North Korea regarding its missile program? And if so, did you make that case to President Bush today?

PRESIDENT KIM: First of all, we sincerely hope that the North Korean missile issue will be resolved with transparency. But, of course, the United States is the counterpart dealing with North Korea in the negotiations over the missile issue. We have not made any suggestion whether the negotiations should be resumed now, or whatever. This is an issue for the United States to make.

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## 2. Text of Letter the President Bush from Democratic Congressional Leaders

March 6, 2001

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to your upcoming meeting with Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung. Korea is a steadfast ally in a strategic part of the world, and we are pleased you will meet with President Kim early in your administration.

We understand that President Kim's efforts toward rapprochement with North Korea will be a subject of your meeting. In the context of those efforts, late last year North Korea suggested it may be ready to permanently address U.S. and allied concerns regarding its nuclear and missile capability - a major destabilizing force in East Asia and a principal threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region.

Your meeting with President Kim offers an opportunity to stand with our South Korean friends to test whether North Korea is indeed committed to peace. Given North Korea's often far-reaching demands and record of disregarding international norms, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of getting comprehensive and verifiable agreements with North Korea that address our concerns about its current and future nuclear and ballistic missile activities.

We believe, however, the stakes are high and the issues involved demand urgent attention, and it is evident to us that the continued engagement of the U.S. Government on this matter could serve to reduce a serious potential threat to our national security.

We therefore hope you thoroughly explore the possibility of reaching agreements that are in our national interest, and ask that you clearly demonstrate to President Kim our government's ongoing commitment to working constructively with the Republic of Korea to confront this major strategic challenge.

Should you choose this path to work with the Republic of Korea to address these critical concerns, we stand ready to support you.

Sincerely,

Senator Tom Daschle  
Senator Joseph Biden  
Senator Carl Levin  
Representative Richard Gephardt  
Representative Tom Lantos  
Representative Ike Skelton

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### 3. "Bush Casts A Shadow On Korea Missile Talks"

Washington Post, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush yesterday cast doubt on the future of talks to end North Korea's missile program, saying he was concerned about how to verify such an agreement and putting himself somewhat at odds with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

Bush said he supported Kim's effort to ease tensions with North Korea, but said any deal to restrict its missiles must come with some means of verifying the terms of such a pact.

"Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency," Bush said in a joint news conference with Kim. He added that "we're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

The Bush-Kim meeting was an awkward start to a relationship the Bush administration has described as important to U.S. interests and regional security in northeast Asia. It also underscored the administration's leery view of a country Bush often calls a "rogue state" and whose long-range missile program has been one rationale for a national missile defense system, which the Bush administration strongly supports.

Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who came seeking support for his increasingly unpopular "sunshine policy" of engaging communist North Korea, described his talks with Bush as "a frank and honest exchange of views" that had "increased the mutual understanding," phrases often used to describe meetings where the two sides disagree.

A senior administration official, however, called the meetings "very positive." And Bush praised Kim for "leadership" and "his vision," and called him a "realist."

Kim had encouraged the Clinton administration in its pursuit of an agreement that would have sent U.S. economic aid to isolated, famine-stricken North Korea in exchange for a commitment to stop development of long-range missiles and halt exports of missiles to other nations, such as Iran and Pakistan. The South Korean president saw the negotiations as contributing to an easing of tensions on the heavily armed and divided Korean peninsula.

Bush's remarks also showed some of the new administration's difficulty in finding a common voice on foreign policy. The president's comments about talks with North Korea struck a markedly more cautious tone than comments Tuesday by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who said the administration intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," and examine "some promising elements [that] were left on the table."

Analysts saw the series of remarks as a sign of differences, or at least a failure of coordination. "It did not seem as coordinated as one would wish," said Larry Wortzel, director of Asia studies at the Heritage Foundation. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said, "I still don't know if this is good cop, bad cop or confusion or what."

Yesterday, Powell seemed to change emphasis, saying, "There was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin-that is not the case." He added, "in due course, when our review is finished, we'll determine at what pace and when we will engage with the North Koreans."

Opponents of missile defense were dismayed by Bush's comments. "It is disappointing and self-defeating for President Bush not to pursue the possibility of verifiable agreement to freeze North Korea's missile program, which would be a lot more efficient than a high-priced missile defense system," said Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Biden said he was disappointed Bush didn't signal that he is "willing to talk and negotiate if certain things happen, as opposed to emphasizing that these guys are bad guys, period."

During the presidential campaign, Bush stressed the importance of cultivating ties with U.S. allies, and South Korea has been a key ally in the half century since the Korean War. There are still 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there, substantial U.S. investments, and a significant trade relationship.

The Bush administration wanted to clarify key issues. In a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim endorsed language about missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty adopted at the Okinawa summit of the Group of Eight leading nations. That language is at odds, however, with Bush administration policy and the South Korean foreign ministry later scrambled to back away from the statement. Kim said yesterday that he "regretted the misunderstanding."

Missile defense would do little to protect South Korea, whose capital, Seoul, is within easy artillery range of North Korea, and Kim is not a missile defense supporter. But the South Korean president yesterday signed a communique with Bush that included language the United States is trying to extract from all missile defense critics.

In language similar to that endorsed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Bush-Kim communique said, "new types of threats, including from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery, have emerged that require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures."

Discussion of North Korea dominated about half of the meeting yesterday between Bush and Kim, a senior administration official said. Vice President Cheney, Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer attended. Powell and senior State Department officials met with Kim separately earlier.

At the news conference, Kim said, "President Bush was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader, and this is very important for me to take back home and to consider."

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#### 4. "Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won't Resume Now"

New York Times, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, March 7 - President Bush told President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea today that he would not resume missile talks with North Korea anytime soon, putting aside the Clinton administration's two-year campaign for a deal and the eventual normalization of relations with the reclusive Communist state.

Mr. Bush's comments, while couched in reassuring statements about the American alliance with South Korea, came as a clear rebuff to President Kim. Awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to open dialogue across one of the most heavily armed borders on earth, the South Korean leader has told American officials that he believes there is only a narrow window of opportunity to seize on North Korea's recent willingness to emerge from its diplomatic seclusion.

Just days before President Kim arrived, one of his top advisers said in an interview that "timing is critical" and expressed concern that North Korea might retreat to its hard-line positions if it concluded that the new administration in Washington was not willing to pick up where Mr. Clinton - who was planning a last-minute trip to North Korea - left off.

Today Mr. Bush made it clear that he had little intention of following Mr. Clinton's path, at least not now. In a brief exchange with reporters after meeting Mr. Kim in the Oval Office, Mr. Bush said: "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

But the United States has only one agreement with North Korea - the 1994 accord that froze North Korea's plutonium processing at a suspected nuclear weapons plant. And at a briefing this afternoon two senior administration officials, asked about the president's statement, said there was no evidence that North Korea is violating its terms.

Later, a White House spokesman said that Mr. Bush was referring to his concern about whether the North would comply with future accords, even though he did not use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said.

Mr. Bush had said, "When you make an agreement with a country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of the agreement?"

The White House insisted that today's meeting was cordial, and said that Mr. Bush embraced Mr. Kim's "vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula." But they also distanced Mr. Bush from the details of that vision, including Mr. Kim's statements, outside the meeting today, that he plans to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea if its leader, Kim Jong Il, visits Seoul this spring.

American officials said that President Kim Dae Jung made no specific references to those plans today. But he did promise, during the brief encounter with reporters, that "we will consult with the United States every step of the way."

Nonetheless, Mr. Kim, sitting next to Mr. Bush in the Oval Office, offered a tepid assessment of his conversation with the American president. "The greatest outcome today has to be that, through a frank and honest exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have increased the mutual understanding," Mr. Kim said, using a phrase often used in diplomacy to skim past substantive disagreement.

He added later that President Bush, who has visited Asia only once, a trip

to China a quarter-century ago, "was very frank and honest in sharing with me his perceptions about the nature of North Korea and the North Korean leader."

In another sign of Washington's new, harder line toward North Korea, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell appeared to back away from his statements on Tuesday that he hoped to "pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off." His comments seemed at odds with those of a senior administration official who had invited a group of reporters to the White House that same day to stress that a complete review of North Korea policy was under way.

Today General Powell stepped out of the Oval Office meeting to tell reporters that North Korea was "a threat" and "we have to not be naïve about the nature of this threat, but at the same time realize that changes are taking place."

"There are suggestions that there are imminent negotiations about to take place" between the United States and North Korea, General Powell added. "That is not the case."

That is a political blow to Mr. Kim, who has hoped to leverage his status as a Nobel laureate and his long history as South Korea's most prominent dissident voice during a series of military governments to negotiate a broad peace on the Korean peninsula.

But he knows that he has little time. Mr. Kim has less than two years left in office, not long to put together all the moving parts of a deal: An agreement to stop North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, a pullback from the Demilitarized Zone, and full commercial interactions between the two Koreas.

Even as Mr. Kim's international stature has grown, his influence in Seoul is ebbing. After presiding over South Korea's revival from the Asian economic crisis, he has seen country's economy once again decline. Opposition leaders, including his predecessor, Kim Young Sam, have charged him with naïveté in dealing with the North.

Mr. Bush's new administration is struggling to bridge differences within the Republican Party over how to deal with the North Korean threat.

Conservatives in the party have long been critical of the 1994 "Agreed Framework," struck by the Clinton administration after a confrontation over nuclear inspections.

Under the agreement, North Korea froze its nuclear-processing operations, and international inspectors regularly monitor compliance. But conservatives and other critics say that the West essentially gave in to blackmail, offering to build two nuclear power plants for the North and supply it with fuel oil until construction is completed. Mr. Bush's aides have said they will respect the deal, but some want to reopen it, in hopes of replacing the two plants with coal-fired generators that would not create more nuclear waste.

The 1994 agreement did nothing to restrict the North's production or sale of missiles, and it has become a major provider of missile technology to other states described as sponsors of terrorism by the State Department. So after a lengthy review of North Korean policy, the Clinton administration opened talks on limiting missile research, production and sales.

It was close to reaching such an accord in December, but ran out of time - in part because of the long election recount here, and in part because of North Korean intransigence on allowing regular verification that all missile work and research has stopped.

Mr. Kim, meanwhile, has been pursuing a North-South agreement, mindful that he cannot get too far ahead of his American ally. But his philosophy differs sharply from Mr. Bush's. He believes that the major problem with North Korea is that it is an insecure regime, and that he must change the atmosphere of confrontation.

"I think Kim is correct that the window is narrow," Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said this evening. "I don't know whether what's on the other side of the window is worth it, but we sure should go and look."

##### 5. "Mixed Signals On N. Korea May Indicate Cabinet Rift"

USA Today, March 8, 2001, Pg. 1

By Barbara Slavin, USA Today

WASHINGTON - President Bush on Wednesday staked out a hard line toward North Korea that disappointed South Korea's president and appeared to catch even Secretary of State Colin Powell off-guard. Just a day before, Powell had stated a more conciliatory stance toward the North when he said the Bush administration planned "to pick up where President Clinton left off." That referred to a policy of outreach toward the North that nearly produced a Clinton visit to Pyongyang, the capital.

But on Wednesday, Powell left in the middle of Bush's talks with South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung at the White House to give reporters a different version of administration policy. "There's no hurry" to resume negotiations with a country the United States still regards as a "threat," Powell said.

Other administration officials said Powell's earlier comments had been misinterpreted. Analysts said, however, that there seems to be a rift between Powell and more hawkish Bush officials. "Powell, by temperament, will look more toward diplomacy," said Leslie Gelb, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. "But the center of gravity in this administration is to the right of where it was."

Bush said talks to curb North Korea's production and sale of ballistic missiles, which nearly produced a deal under Clinton, could resume "at some point in the future." He also stressed the need to verify an accord.

Before the meeting, administration officials said Bush intends to move more cautiously than Clinton in improving relations with one of the world's most

repressive regimes.

The administration has even resurrected the term "rogue state" in referring to troublesome countries such as North Korea. Clinton had dropped that term last year in favor of "states of concern."

Bush's preference to go slow in engaging the North conflicts with Kim's "sunshine policy" of rapid reconciliation between two halves of a peninsula divided for 50 years. "We are in a hurried mode," Kim adviser Moon Chung In said last week.

Critics of Bush's harder line say he wants to portray North Korea as threatening to justify development of a national missile defense. Kim opposes a missile defense but avoided taking a position on the issue after his meeting with Bush.

Clinton aides shared Kim's concern over Bush's shift on U.S.-North Korean policy. "I'm frankly disappointed because there's an opportunity to be seized," said Wendy Sherman, Clinton's North Korea policy coordinator. She accompanied Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on a groundbreaking visit to the North last fall.

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#### 6. EXCERPTS FROM:

"Don't Drop the Ball with North Korea," Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

[Page: S1916] Congressional Record, March 7, 2001

FOR FULL TEXT SEE:

<[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl:~>](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:8:./temp/~r107zWpSWl:)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the situation in North Korea. Today President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea is meeting with President Bush as part of his official state visit. His visit occurs against a hopeful backdrop of the third round of family reunions on the divided Korean peninsula. Fathers are greeting their grownup sons; sisters are hugging their sisters they haven't seen for a generation. Grandmothers are meeting their grandchildren who they have never met.

Tomorrow the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and I will host the President of South Korea for coffee here on Capitol Hill. Kim's visit will give us a chance to renew the close bonds forged in blood in the common struggle against the forces of oppression which unite our people in the United States and South Korea.

I rise today to talk a little bit about the Korean peninsula and the important role the United States can play in concert with our South Korean allies and other friends to help build lasting peace on that peninsula.

Yesterday the New York Times published an article by veteran defense correspondent Michael Gordon which suggests that a missile deal with North Korea may have been within reach last year. As fascinating as this

rendition of events was and as fascinating as the policies were, we now have a new President. The failure or the judgment to not proceed with negotiations into the month of January of this year on the part of the new President is in fact at this moment irrelevant. We have a new President and a new administration. The question squarely now is not whether President Clinton should have gone to North Korea; the question is whether this administration, the Bush administration, is going to build on the progress made over the past 5 years since we narrowly averted a nuclear showdown on the Korean peninsula.

I was pleased to see Secretary of State Powell quoted in a Washington Post article today, suggesting this administration was going to pursue the possibilities of a better relationship with North Korea and was going to leave nothing on the table. I was slightly dismayed to read of an informed source in the administration who chose not to be identified, demonstrating a great deal more of what seemed to me in the article to be not only skepticism, which I share about the intentions of North Korea, but willingness to pursue vigorously the possibilities of further negotiations. Hopefully, I am misreading that unidentified highly placed administration official.

In my view, there is only one correct answer and that is the one Secretary Powell has indicated today. For it would be irresponsible not to explore to discover whether North Korea is prepared to abandon its pursuit of long-range missiles in response to a serious proposal from the United States, our friends, and our allies.

North Korea confronts the United States with a number of security challenges. North Korea maintains a huge army of more than 1 million men and women in uniform, about 5 percent of its entire population. Many of that army are poised on the South Korean border. The threat that North Korea opposes extends well beyond the Korean peninsula. Its Nodong missile can not only strike all of South Korea but can also threaten our ally, Japan. North Korea sells those same missiles to anyone who has the cash to buy them. North Korean missile exports to Iran and Pakistan have guaranteed, unfortunately, that any future war in the Middle East or South Asia will be even more dangerous and more destructive than past conflicts in that region.

North Korean missiles and the very real concern that North Korea might even build longer range missiles capable of striking the United States are a driving force behind our plans to build a national missile defense system.

If we can remove that threat, that is, the threat from North Korea long-range missile possibility, the impact will be huge, not only on the security of Northeast Asia but also on our own defense strategy as we debate how best to deal with our vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction....

.... We have an obligation, it seems to me, not to drop the ball. We have a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. We have good friends and allies--like President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea--who stand ready to work with us toward that goal. It is vital that we not drop the ball; miss an opportunity to end North Korea's deadly and destabilizing

pursuit of long range missiles. I don't know that an agreement can be reached. In the end North Korea may prove too intransigent, too truculent, for us to reach an accord.

But I hope the Bush administration will listen closely to President Kim today, and work with him to test North Korea's commitment to peace. We should stay the course on an engagement policy that has brought the peninsula to the brink, not of war, but of the dawning of a brave new day for all the Korean people.

I yield the floor.

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## 7. Joint Statement Between The United States Of America And The Republic Of Korea

The White House

March 7, 2001

President George W. Bush and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea today reaffirmed the fundamental importance and strength of the U.S.-ROK security alliance, which has prevented war and promoted stability, prosperity, and democracy on the Korean Peninsula for over five decades. The two Presidents pledged to deepen further the comprehensive partnership shared by the United States and the Republic of Korea through enhanced security, political, economic and cultural cooperation.

The two Presidents agreed that reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula and lasting stability in Northeast Asia. President Bush expressed support for the Republic of Korea Government's policy of engagement with North Korea and President Kim's leading role in resolving inter-Korean issues. The two leaders shared the hope that a second inter-Korean summit will make a positive contribution to inter-Korean relations and Northeast Asian security.

Both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to continue the 1994 Agreed Framework and called on North Korea to join in taking the needed steps for its successful implementation. They agreed to encourage North Korea to take actions to address the concerns of the international community. The Presidents agreed on the importance of maintaining close consultations and coordination on policy toward North Korea, both bilaterally and trilaterally with Japan.

President Bush and President Kim agreed that the global security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. New types of threats, including from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery, have emerged

that require new approaches to deterrence and defense. The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active non-proliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures. They concurred on the importance of consultations among allies and other interested parties on these measures, including missile defenses, with a view to strengthening global peace and security.

President Bush and President Kim noted that the United States and the Republic of Korea are developing more mature and mutually beneficial bilateral economic and trade relations. Both sides agreed to work together closely to support Korea's economic reform efforts and to address bilateral trade issues. The two leaders endorsed the early launch of a new round of trade negotiations in the WTO.

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From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Bush Administration's refusal to negotiate with North Korea

March 8, 2001  
Steve LaMontagne

Key Issues for North Korea Policy:  
Missile Negotiations and The 1994 Agreed Framework

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington yesterday hoping to encourage the Bush administration to continue the policy of engagement toward North Korea initiated by former President Clinton. Kim wants the U.S. to resume negotiations to end North Korea's development and export of ballistic missiles and to honor a 1994 agreement under which North Korea suspended its nuclear program in exchange for two light-water nuclear power reactors and heavy fuel oil supplies.

Instead, President Bush expressed skepticism about the North Korean regime and concern that the country still engages in proliferation activity. Calling North Korea a threat, Bush stated that the U.S. would not resume negotiations with Pyongyang anytime soon.

President Bush's comments mark an abrupt shift in rhetoric. Only a day before, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the U.S. would continue the work started by the Clinton administration. "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off," Powell said at a news conference. "Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."

Last year the U.S. came close to reaching an agreement with North Korea that would have ended its development and export of ballistic missiles and related technologies. Proposals included launching North Korean satellites on foreign launchers or providing humanitarian aid packages in return for a cessation of North Korean missile activity. The U.S. rejected the idea of

giving North Korea space launch vehicle technology or direct cash payments.

Time ran out on the Clinton administration before an agreement could be completed, and the Bush administration remained largely silent on the matter during its first month in office. Unsure of the new administration's position, North Korea threatened last month to end its moratorium on missile tests.

The change in tone threatens to push Pyongyang back into isolation and toward possible resumption of proliferation activity, thus undermining important opportunities to reduce security tensions in East Asia and eliminate a potential threat to the U.S.

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1994 Agreed Framework  
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Another agreement with North Korea-the 1994 Agreed Framework- stands at risk of collapse. Under the pact, North Korea pledged to dismantle a five-Megawatt nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon while the U.S., South Korea, and Japan agreed to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear power reactors that would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. In addition, the U.S. promised to provide up to 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet North Korea's energy needs until the first reactor begins operation.

The framework has encountered numerous problems, causing construction of the reactors to fall several years behind schedule:

==North Korea has not provided a satisfactory history of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons-a prerequisite for construction to begin on the promised light water reactors. Nor has North Korea agreed to inspections of all of its nuclear facilities, another provision of the framework.

==General Electric, which was supposed to supply the turbines for the light-water reactors, withdrew because of questions surrounding liability for accidents.

==The price of heavy fuel oil has tripled over the past five years, causing the cost of U.S. contributions to soar above \$100 million a year.

==North Korea is demanding pay raises for its workers at the reactor sites and is not cooperating in training technicians to work at the site.

==North Korea's power grid cannot handle the output of the planned nuclear reactors.

Critics of the agreement worry that the reactor technology and radioactive byproducts will benefit North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and argue that the reactors-once fully operational-will produce enough plutonium to make 100 nuclear bombs each year. This argument is misleading. The reactors will produce approximately 500kg of reactor grade plutonium each year, but this plutonium will be mixed with highly radioactive spent fuel elements. If North Korea wants to build nuclear weapons, it must have the capability to reprocess the spent reactor fuel in order to separate out the plutonium. North Korea's only reprocessing plant was shut down as part of the Agreed Framework and is now under IAEA monitoring. Building another one in secret would risk almost certain detection and could be accomplished only at considerable cost and in violation of international agreement.

Even if North Korea could clandestinely separate plutonium from spent fuel, reactor-grade plutonium is less suitable for weapons development than weapons-grade plutonium, the type that would have been produced by North Korea's Yongbyon reactors had the Agreed Framework not shut them down.

Rumors are now floating that the U.S. might consider revising the agreement so that North Korea will receive conventional power facilities instead of the two nuclear reactors. However, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary Powell insisted that "We will abide by and agree to the commitments made under the Agreed Framework, provided that North Korea does the same." Last week State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated that the Bush administration would abide by the framework provisions "completely and fully." Yet, given the uneven nature of the administration's foreign policy, such statements must be viewed with skepticism.

The Bush administration must realize that a missile agreement with North Korea is not beyond reach and that the 1994 Agreed Framework is not beyond repair. If, as President Bush stated, North Korea does pose a threat to the U.S., then negotiations should be resumed as quickly as possible. These agreements provide genuine opportunities to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and thus serve U.S. national security interests. President Bush and President Kim should focus not on whether these agreements should be pursued, but rather on how they can be realized.

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From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Missile defense + Korea: 7 items

1. "Allies Keep Balking At US Missile Defense" - Christ. Sci. Monitor
2. "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod On NMD" - Korea Times
3. "Mixed Signals Sent On Evolving Bush Foreign Policy " - Wash. Times
4. "Macho On North Korea" - Friedman column
5. "Losing Momentum On Korea" - N.Y. Times editorial
6. "Putting Korea On Hold" - Wash. Post editorial
7. "The Visitor From South Korea" - Wash. Times editorial

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1. "Allies Keep Balking At US Missile Defense"  
Christian Science Monitor - March 9, 2001 - By Brad Knickerbocker, Staff  
writer of The Christian Science Monitor

But some NATO members are resigned to Bush pressing ahead with plans.

WASHINGTON-- For years, the idea of being able to shoot down enemy missiles - hit a bullet with a bullet - has remained a distant technological dream. That's kept it far down the list of military and diplomatic concerns, despite the billions of dollars spent to achieve it.

But the Bush administration has brought it to the forefront, and in the process missile defense now stands as a major point of argument in how the

US relates to its allies in Europe and in Asia.

As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush promised "to build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date," making this one of his top military priorities. Before he became Mr. Bush's Defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld headed a congressionally sponsored commission that found nations such as North Korea and Iran could soon have the capability to produce ballistic missiles armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads - weapons of mass destruction.

Since then, Mr. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell have suggested that the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which governs defenses against attacking missiles, might have to be scrapped. In his Senate confirmation hearings, Rumsfeld called the ABM Treaty "ancient history."

NATO's worries

European countries in the 19-member NATO worry that this could provoke another arms race in a post-cold-war world that has become more complex. There's also concern that a unilateral move by the US to construct a national missile defense (NMD) could "decouple" the US from its European allies, weakening a body that has helped protect much of the world for half a century.

NATO Secretary-General George Robertson acknowledged as much this week in meeting with US officials here. "Many Europeans ... continue to fear the effects of the United States proceeding with deployment of a missile-defense system," he told a forum sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute.

Halfway around the world, the Bush administration's goal of accelerating an NMD system has stirred discussions over the future of the Korean peninsula.

Meeting in Seoul last week with Russian President Vladimir Putin, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung expressed skepticism about US plans for an NMD system. In a joint communiqué, the two leaders described the ABM Treaty as "a cornerstone of strategic stability."

In Washington this week, Mr. Kim and Bush downplayed differences over missile defense. Still, Bush described their White House talks as "frank," diplomatic code indicating all is not sweetness and light.

The issue reflects fundamentally different goals for the region. Kim emphasizes what he calls a "sunshine" policy of rapprochement with North Korea. Bush's defense and foreign policy team stresses North Korea's apparently growing ability to threaten not only South Korea but other countries as well.

"They still have weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver those," Mr. Powell said at the White House this week. "So we have to see them as a threat."

Scaled-back plans

Over the years, Pentagon planning for missile defense has become more modest. Gone are the days of space-based lasers blasting Soviet missiles, as envisioned in former President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative - which was quickly dubbed "star wars." Most experts say that such a system - even if it worked - could be overwhelmed by thousands of multiple warheads or fooled by decoys.

Instead, current planning is for ground-based antimissile missiles poised to protect the US, and perhaps other countries, against an accidental launch or sneak attack by a "rogue state" such as North Korea, Iran, or even Libya (which was recently reported to have acquired missiles capable of hitting Europe).

But even these plans for a scaled-back missile-defense system have been confounded in practice. Two of three test firings have failed to hit their target. And the General Accounting Office recently warned Congress that a crucial satellite-surveillance system designed to detect enemy missiles "is at high risk" of being late, more costly than anticipated, and unlikely to perform as advertised. The GAO (Congress's investigative arm) also reported that the system's software would not be ready until three years after the first satellites are scheduled to be launched.

Rep. Jerry Lewis (R) of California, who chairs the defense appropriations subcommittee, says he finds this "very troubling."

More troublesome at the moment may be the diplomatic effects of the Bush administration's focus on national missile defense as a key element in its review of the US military.

Spurgeon Keeny, head of the private Arms Control Association in Washington, says it's "in clear violation of the Antibalistic Missile Treaty."

"Unless the United States backs off from its explicit threat to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and its implicit threat to eschew arms-control treaties that would in any way restrict US freedom of action, the international community is unlikely to follow the US lead when it jeopardizes other countries' economic and political interests," says Mr. Keeny, a former senior government official responsible for arms control and nuclear-policy issues.

Nations resigned to US plans

For the moment, European members of NATO are resigned to the US pressing ahead with missile defense - especially if, as the Bush administration now promises, it will consult with its allies along the way. And, says NATO Secretary-General Robertson, the full alliance remains in agreement on its "common values, shared risks, and shared burdens."

"These debates, as tough as they can be, are not about first principles," he says. "The first principles still hold."

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2. "Seoul Offers Conditional Nod On NMD"

Korea Times - March 9, 2001 - By Son Key-young, Staff Reporter

South Korea has clearly embraced Washington's desire to erect an anti-missile shield against attacks by rogue states, but called on it to first resolve those new security concerns through intensive diplomacy.

At first glance, the joint press statement, issued following Wednesday's summit between Presidents Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in Washington, indicated that Seoul supported Washington's efforts to build the National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

"The two leaders shared the view that countering these threats requires a broad strategy involving a variety of measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defensive systems, and other pertinent measures," the statement said.

Two notions stand out from the statement -- "active nonproliferation diplomacy" and "defensive systems."

A Foreign Affairs-Trade Ministry official said that U.S. officials wanted to include only "defensive systems" in the statement as part of a broad strategy, but the attempt was stopped by their Korean counterparts.

"Our side made efforts to convince the United States that NMD is the last resort, which should come in the event of an ultimate failure of active diplomacy," he said.

In fact, it is the first time that the Bush administration has accepted the notion of "active nonproliferation diplomacy" as a first step to address threats from rogue states, he said.

Meanwhile, a senior U.S. administration official stressed the inclusion of "defensive systems" in the statement.

"President Kim made his clear statement that he's not opposed to NMD, and there was discussion about the importance, as was mentioned in the joint statement, there was a discussion about the President's point that the times have changed, and that there was a role to play for defensive systems, which President Kim agreed to," he said.

In conclusion, the joint press statement is seen as South Korea's conditional consent on the necessity of the U.S. missile shield project.

Seoul urged Washington to first launch active diplomacy by opening dialogue with China and North Korea on those issues.

At first, the United States okayed the inclusion of consultations with allies, like South Korea, but refused to accept the idea of launching talks with "the other interested parties" such as China and North Korea.

Vice Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said that the confusion caused by a joint Korea-Russia statement had been alleviated after the clarifications of Seoul's stances through the Kim-Bush meeting.

Following a summit last month, President Kim Dae-jung and Russian President

Vladimir Putin described the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as "the cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation of international efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation." Kim and Putin also said they hoped to "preserve and strengthen" the treaty banning the United States and Russia from erecting large-scale anti-missile shields. However, controversy over the summit agreement snowballed, as Korean and foreign media organizations interpreted the statement as Seoul's implicit support for Russia's opposition to the NMD project.

In an effort to convince Bush that he is not opposed to NMD, President Kim was also quoted as telling Bush, "I'm sorry for the issue in the media."

As part of its efforts to put an end to the controversy, the ministry is mulling taking punitive steps against officials involved in authoring the joint Korea-Russia statement.

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3. "Mixed Signals Sent On Evolving Bush Foreign Policy "  
Washington Times - March 9, 2001 - By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

#### News Analysis

The celebrated Bush administration foreign policy team, in its first major tests, can't seem to decide who bats leadoff and who hits cleanup.

Mixed messages and public confusion have plagued the administration in its early weeks, first on U.S. policy toward Iraq and then on President Bush's willingness to continue the Clinton administration's rapprochement with North Korea.

"I think it's fair to say that the rhetoric to date hasn't been well coordinated yet," says Anthony H. Cordesman, a former Pentagon and State Department official who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"That's not unusual when the people in a new administration have not had time to develop a nuanced policy in the crush of events," he says.

But the muddle has surprised Washington because of the experience and depth of the foreign-policy team Mr. Bush recruited.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell came to their posts trailing glittering resumes and long records of government service at the highest level. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was a rising star in Republican foreign-policy circles even before signing up for Texas Gov. George W. Bush's successful presidential campaign.

But in the space of two days this week, the administration effectively reversed itself on what it would do about missile talks with North Korea, which were left unfinished when President Clinton left office.

Mr. Powell on Tuesday said the new administration planned "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."

A day later, following a meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, Mr. Bush publicly questioned key parts of the Clinton strategy and signaled he planned to go much slower on thawing relations with Pyongyang.

A senior White House briefer spent considerable time afterward trying to persuade skeptical reporters that the abrupt change in tone did not signal either an abrupt change in tone or an internal rift between senior policy-makers.

By yesterday, Mr. Powell was suggesting stiff new conditions for any deal with North Korea and even talking about trying to reopen a deal made in 1994.

On Iraq, the administration has struggled to coordinate its evolving policy on international sanctions against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Powell told a House hearing Wednesday that it is critical that U.N. weapons inspectors be allowed back into Iraq to keep Baghdad in check.

Mr. Cheney had told a luncheon meeting with editors and reporters of The Washington Times, in an interview published earlier this week: "I don't think we want to hinge our policy just to the questions of whether or not inspectors go back in there."

The administration has struggled to explain its efforts to "re-energize" the sanctions against Iraq while at the same time decreasing the number of goods banned from sale to the regime.

The stature and bureaucratic skills of the Bush team's heavy hitters had led some analysts to expect that policy and turf clashes were inevitable.

Mr. Cheney has built a personal staff with broad security and foreign-policy credentials. Mr. Powell has vowed to restore the influence of an often demoralized department, partly through the strength of his own charisma. And Mr. Rumsfeld, backed by the Pentagon's resources and budget clout, has literally written the book on how to lead and how to follow at the highest levels of U.S. government.

Open criticism of any one of the three is rare. "I have some ideas [about the Bush team's early policy miscues,] one veteran Republican foreign policy official says, "but I'd rather not see them in print."

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Democrat who was national security adviser under President Carter, praises Mr. Bush's skeptical stance on North Korea and his go-slow approach to any deal with the Communist regime.

"I never understood the pell-mell rush by the last administration to get a deal with Pyongyang, or why the president would want to go there in the last days of his term," says Mr. Brzezinski.

One problem he finds in the Bush administration struggle to present a united front is that so many sub-Cabinet policy posts have yet to be filled as nominees slowly work their way through the confirmation system.

"Some serious issues like the Middle East, like China, aren't going to wait," he says. "That's when you need talented people and staff so that you are better prepared to shape policy."

Mr. Powell, appearing at a budget hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was asked how many of the State Department's senior officials had been confirmed.

"You're looking at him," Mr. Powell joked.

German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, in town for talks with senior Bush administration officials, says he is not concerned as he watches the new team settle in.

"This is an administration that is in that phase of defining its policies, its standpoints, its interests," says Mr. Scharping. "There is no tendency on our part to overestimate the importance of any particular statement."

Nevertheless, Democratic legislators yesterday told Mr. Powell that the apparent confusion over message could have real consequences in places like the Korean Peninsula, especially with regional powers like China, Japan and South Korea all seeking clues to the new president's thinking.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware said he was "puzzled and disappointed" by the apparent abrupt change in tone on North Korea this week.

Added Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts: "I have a sense that we may be sending messages that are subject to misinterpretation."

Replied Mr. Powell: "I think there's less difference here than meets the eye."

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#### 4. "Macho On North Korea"

New York Times - March 9, 2001 - Thomas L. Friedman column

Pay attention to the brouhaha at the White House Wednesday, when President Bush shot down the hopes of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea that the Bush team would quickly resume negotiations with North Korea. This episode highlights the fine line between a tough, effective foreign policy and a tough, ineffective foreign policy, and it raises the question: On which side of that line does Mr. Bush plan to reside?

On Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell, who represents the pragmatic, hard-nosed internationalists within the administration, declared that the Bush team intended "to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off" in negotiations with North Korea to curb its production and sale of ballistic missiles. But President Bush, after meeting President Kim Wednesday, brusquely indicated that the missile talks with the North would not be resumed any time soon.

What gives? This is the second time in two weeks that Mr. Powell has been out of step. Last week it was his signaling a willingness for "smarter,"

but smaller, sanctions on Iraq to hold our Arab allies together. That sparked grumbling from the Dick Cheney-Don Rumsfeld camps. (If this were the Clinton administration, the New York Post headline would read "White House in Chaos - Who's in Charge?")

Question: Is the Bush foreign policy going to be a more hard-nosed internationalism, in which we galvanize our allies around tougher policies toward North Korea, Iraq, Russia and China but still get meaningful things done and hold our alliances together? Or is it going to be an ideologically driven, hard-line approach in which the White House is always looking over its shoulder at the right wing of the Republican Party, and our allies become alienated and nothing meaningful gets done?

Personally, I think there is nothing wrong with President Bush, in his first dealings with North Korea, coming on as a real skeptic. Kim Jong Il, the "dear leader" of North Korea, is a wild man who understands only force and thinks that's all we understand too. That's why whenever his people are starving more than usual, and he needs a quick influx of potatoes, he digs a suspicious, reactor-size hole and we pay him with potatoes or oil or a harmless reactor to stop. It's sort of silly, but it's worked to keep peace and restrain the North's nuclear capabilities. Given this background, though, it is legitimate for President Bush to signal the North that we're not buying that carpet again.

But then what? One approach says: "We don't have an interest in just letting North Korea collapse, because it could blow up the whole peninsula and even threaten Japan. So we're going to take a very hard-nosed approach to securing a verifiable deal that would curb North Korea's missiles and promote rapprochement with South Korea."

The other approach says: "We're the tough guys. We don't really believe in arms control. And we don't care if North Korea collapses. Deep down we don't even want a deal with North Korea, because that would eliminate the very missile threat we've been hyping to justify spending \$60 billion on a missile defense shield. If the allies don't like it - too bad."

Which is Mr. Bush's approach?

You have to wonder whether Mr. Bush knows. He declared Wednesday that when it comes to North Korea, "We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements." But as the Times reporter David Sanger pointed out, the U.S. has only one agreement with North Korea - the 1994 accord that froze its plutonium processing. And Bush aides admitted there was no evidence that this deal was being violated. Later a White House official, trying to clean up for the president, said Mr. Bush was referring to concerns about whether North Korea would comply with a future deal, even though he didn't use the future tense. "That's how the president speaks," the official said. O.K.

Well, if that's how he speaks, is that how he thinks? Confused? Which approach Mr. Bush adopts depends in part on how he understands North Korea's past behavior. But if he doesn't understand that, or he hasn't applied himself to understanding it, or he is so wedded to his own Star Wars missile shield he doesn't want anything to get in the way, or he is so

worried about being accused by Republican hard-liners, as his father was, of being a "wimp" that he'll never take yes for an answer from the North - then, Houston, we have a problem.

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5. "Losing Momentum On Korea"

New York Times editorial - March 9, 2001

Regrettably, President Bush has decided for the time being not to renew discussions with North Korea aimed at shutting down Pyongyang's development and sales of long-range missiles. Reaching acceptable agreements with the North is never easy, and the new administration is entitled to take some time to develop its own strategy and goals. But by suspending the constructive talks that were begun by the Clinton administration, Washington has forfeited an opportunity to explore North Korea's true intentions. It has also complicated the challenges facing South Korea, whose president, Kim Dae Jung, has been trying to coax the North from confrontation to diplomacy.

North Korea had offered the Clinton administration some of the essential elements of a missile deal. But there was still a considerable way to go. Late last year the North proposed to halt further development and exports of its long-range missiles in exchange for food and fuel aid and a commitment by other countries to launch North Korean space satellites. If a verifiable agreement along those lines could be completed, it would eliminate the threat of North Korea's building missiles that can reach the United States. That in turn would reduce the pressure on Washington to rush ahead with development of a missile defense system, one of the Bush administration's core defense goals. It would also end the North's current missile exports to danger zones like Iran and Pakistan.

But acutely difficult issues remained unresolved as the Clinton presidency ended. North Korea has not yet agreed to permit the international on-site inspections needed to verify its compliance. Nor has it agreed to destroy the long-range missiles it already has or even to provide a detailed inventory of its current missile arsenal. Washington would need such an inventory to determine whether new missiles are being added.

Most of the arms control agreements Washington negotiated with Moscow during the cold war were based on a long period of familiarity and mutual observation. There is no comparable history yet between the United States and North Korea. There are also suspicions by some analysts that North Korea seeks only to buy time and extort Western compensation without really committing itself to a peaceful course.

Yet there have been encouraging signs, particularly in the past year, that North Korea is serious about improving relations with South Korea and the West. The Bush administration appears still to be debating its next moves on North Korea. It should carefully review the unresolved missile issues, then resume discussions with the North later this year in an effort to complete a sound agreement.

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6. "Putting Korea On Hold"

THE BUSH administration has applied the brakes to what had been an accelerating effort by the United States and South Korea to engage with the reclusive Communist government of North Korea. Over the past two years South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has brought about a breakthrough in relations with the North and recently had been laying the groundwork for a possible peace declaration by the two Koreas. Meanwhile, in its last weeks in office the Clinton administration came close to striking a deal under which North Korea would have given up its production and export of ballistic missiles in exchange for economic aid and improved relations with the United States.

On Wednesday, President Bush told a disappointed Mr. Kim that he would not, as the Koreans clearly hoped, pick up the diplomatic process where Mr. Clinton left it. Though he said he supported Mr. Kim's initiatives, Mr. Bush said he was skeptical that verifiable agreements could be made with a state as secretive and Stalinist as North Korea. Behind the scenes, his briefers told reporters that a policy review was underway and that no negotiations with the North would be arranged soon.

The administration has some good reasons for the diplomatic pause. Though there is no evidence that North Korea has violated the accords it has so far signed, it is unquestionably hard to know what its military establishment is doing, or even to verify relatively simple questions such as whether food aid is really delivered to the nation's hungry. The detente between the two Koreas has not yet led to any change in the North's massive military deployments along the border, or any apparent relaxation in Pyongyang's repressive rule of its population. And the Clinton administration's rush to embrace a regime guilty of some of the world's worst human rights violations and acts of terrorism offered it unprecedented political recognition, including a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, without sufficient returns.

Still, Kim Dae Jung made a forceful argument here this week for continuing some form of engagement policy. For years North Korea's relations with the West were limited to extorting aid in exchange for curbing weapons programs; now, Kim Jong Il seems interested in leading a broader opening of his country to the world, signaled in a recent trip to Shanghai and planned visits to Moscow and Seoul. Engagement offers the North the chance to avert economic collapse by opening its economy to outside investments and free market reforms, as China did; for South Korea and the United States, it holds the possibility that one of the world's oldest and most dangerous military standoffs could be peacefully defused, along with a ballistic missile threat to the United States.

The fact that the Bush administration has not yet settled on a policy was evident from the somewhat mixed messages it sent this week. The day before Mr. Bush's downbeat remarks, Secretary of State Colin Powell had said that "some promising elements were left on the table" by the Clinton administration and that "we do plan to engage with North Korea." In fact, there seems no reasonable alternative to a policy that would continue to explore, if more deliberately and cautiously, whether North Korea can be induced to drop its missile programs while opening itself to the extensive

outside inspections that would be needed to ensure compliance. To reject that path would be to abandon the most hopeful scenario for change on the Korean peninsula, and undercut an initiative by South Korea's president that has already justly earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. It would leave military deterrence, including as-yet undetermined and unproven missile defense systems, as the only U.S. tool for managing the transformation, or collapse, of the world's last Stalinist state. Those military means are still needed; but so is an active diplomacy.

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#### 7. "The Visitor From South Korea"

Washington Times editorial - March 9, 2001

After a day of full and "frank" discussions on Wednesday between President Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, it was time yesterday for the South Korean visitor to pour a little oil on the troubled waters. Several critical circumstances made this visit a good bit less triumphant than Mr. Kim's first, just after his election three years ago.

The White House has not been pleased about Mr. Kim's stated intent to sign a peace "declaration" with North Korea. And it certainly was not pleased that he put his name to a communique with Russian President Vladimir Putin, just before leaving for Washington, stating that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) was "a cornerstone of strategic stability," and suggesting that American missile defense plans were a problem.

Yesterday, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Kim said that he "deeply regrets such a controversy had to arise." Mr. Kim said that contrary to reports, the communique did not contain a clause about missile defense (though the Russians pushed it to the very end) and that the statement about ABM was nothing new, and in fact had been the U.S. position for years (which was true under President Clinton). "But I now regret it was included," he said. It certainly was not smart for South Korea to be seen siding with the Russians against the United States.

The desire of South Koreans for warmer relations with the North is understandable. Though South Korea is a wonder of free enterprise, in stark contrast with the devastated totalitarian North, 10 million Korean families are still separated, and many live with the memory of the horrors of the North Korean invasion 50 years ago. Mr. Kim is deeply concerned about time running out on his peace efforts. As he repeatedly stressed at AEI, "We must not lose this opportunity. We must assist so that North Korea can continue on the path of change. We must help so that it does not return to its old ways, which would be unwelcome by other countries and would not be good for North Korea itself."

However, time is not so pressing that the Bush administration should not be deliberate in its policy review towards North Korea, which is badly needed. Mr. Kim has achieved Nobel Peace Prize-winning successes by holding out the olive branch to North Korea, trade has grown and political exchanges have taken place. Still, the United States should proceed with caution, given our role as guarantor of the peace with 37,000 troops still on duty in the Korean Peninsula.

The Clinton administration's specialty was to answer North Korea's duplicity with concessions, whether dangerous nuclear reactors were the problem or missile development and sales. Bill Clinton was narrowly dissuaded from traveling to Pyongyang in the last weeks of his presidency to offer American rockets to the North Koreans for "satellite launches" in return for a supposed halt in North Korea's missile program.

Now, the Bush administration needs to take a firmer line to ensure that North Korea lives up to its nuclear commitments, stops sales of its Nodong missiles to countries like Libya, and agrees to relax its belligerent military posture. As the South Korean president remarked, openness and peacefulness is entirely in the interest of North Korea. This will not change even with a dose of realism administered along with the olive branches.

John Isaacs  
Council for a Livable World  
110 Maryland Avenue, NE - Room 409  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x.131  
[www.clw.org](http://www.clw.org)

X-Sender: epf@pop.igc.org (Unverified)  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32)  
Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2001 08:48:09 -0500  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
From: Episcopal Peace Fellowship <epf@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Letter on NMD

Howard,

I'm afraid that - as usual - I can't open the attachments you sent yesterday. Can you send plain text please of icnd.069 and icnd.071, the NMD correspondence? Thanks.

Our website is woefully inactive - otherwise we'd post - good idea.

mary miller

At 04:22 PM 3/8/01 -0500, you wrote:

>To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

>

>Dear Colleagues:

>

>The letter from religious leaders to President Bush opposing national  
>missile defense has been dispatched. The final version and list of signers  
>is attached. A similar letter has been delivered to all members of  
>Congress, asking them to share our concerns with President Bush.

>

>Thanks for all who signed the letter. Thanks to David Culp of FCNL for  
>providing name of Senate defense and foreign policy aides so that the  
>letter to senators could be sent to their attention. Thanks to Stacie  
>Robinson of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers for performing the  
>merge for 155 Senate aides. Thanks to Emily and Ali, Unitarian interns,  
>for delivering letters to House members and to Daryl Byler for taking care  
>of half of the Senate. I did the other half.

>

>You can now make use of the letter by sharing it with your constituents and  
>asking them to express these concerns to President Bush and to their  
>senators and representatives. Delegations in states talking with their  
>senators can also use the letter.

>

>Would any one be interested in posting letter and signers on your web site?

>

>Shalom,

>Howard

>

>

>

>Attachment Converted: "c:\program files\eudora\attach\icnd.069.doc"

>

>Attachment Converted: "c:\program files\eudora\attach\icnd.071.doc"

>

>Howard W. Hallman, Chair

>Methodists United for Peace with Justice

>1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036

>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

>

>Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of  
>laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

X-Sender: epf@pop.igc.org (Unverified)  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32)  
Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2001 08:49:49 -0500  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
From: Episcopal Peace Fellowship <epf@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Letter on NMD attachment

Scrap my last message! - got 'em - thank you. mary

At 04:24 PM 3/8/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Mary,

>

>Here are the attachments.

>

>Howard

>

>###

>

>March 5, 2001

>

>The Honorable George W. Bush

>The White House

>Washington, DC 20500

>

>Re: National Missile Defense

>

>Dear Mr. President:

>

>We the undersigned representatives of faith-based organizations share with  
>you the desire to keep God's people, including those in the U.S. homeland,  
>safe from nuclear attack. However, we are deeply concerned about the haste  
>to make a commitment to deploy unproven technology for national missile  
>defense.

>

>First, the real and present danger for nuclear attack on the United States  
>comes from the several thousand Russian missiles now on hair trigger alert  
>and thousands of Russian nuclear weapons in reserve with inadequate  
>security. The best remedies are mutual de-alerting, strategic arms  
>reduction, and stable control of fissile material. These opportunities  
>could be jeopardized if the United States withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic  
>Missile (ABM) Treaty to erect a national missile defense. Russia might  
>then withdraw from other arms control treaties and retain multi-warhead  
>missiles now scheduled for elimination under START II. Also, China might  
>increase its nuclear arsenal. This would pose far greater danger to U.S.  
>homeland security than the remote threat of a few missiles a small nation  
>might develop years from now.

>

>Second, heavy emphasis on unproven anti-missile technology to counter a  
>speculative future threat from a few small nations neglects other elements  
>of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. More promising methods  
>include international monitoring of nuclear test explosions, rigorous  
>fissile material control, stringent missile technology control, diplomacy,  
>financial assistance to nations cooperating in nuclear non-proliferation,

>and countering social, economic, and political instability that provides  
>the breeding ground for terrorist groups  
>  
>Third, we are seriously concerned about budgetary implications. Since 1983  
>the United States has spent \$69 billion on national missile defense,  
>enriching major defense contractors but producing no effective system.  
>President Clinton's plan, which you have criticized as inadequate, would  
>cost \$60 billion. Indications are that the layered approach you favor  
>could cost more than \$100 billion. A budgetary commitment of this  
>magnitude along with the tax cut you are promoting would preclude achieving  
>the goal of "Leave No Child Behind" and dealing with other urgent domestic  
>needs.  
>  
>For these reasons we urge you to pull back from the dangerous rush to a  
>premature decision on national missile defense and withdrawal from the ABM  
>Treaty.  
>  
>Respectfully yours,  
>  
>  
>Rev. Dr. Stan Hastey, Executive Director  
>Alliance of Baptists  
>(organization listed for identification only)  
>  
>Curtis Ramsey-Lucas  
>Director of Legislative Advocacy  
>National Ministries  
>American Baptist Churches  
>  
>Ken Sehested, Executive Director  
>Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America  
>  
>David Radcliff  
>Director of Brethren Witness  
>Church of the Brethren General Board  
>  
>Greg Laszakovits  
>Director, Washington Office  
>Church of the Brethren General Board  
>  
>Tiffany Heath  
>Interim Legislative Director  
>Church Women United  
>  
>Gary Baldrige  
>Global Missions Coordinator  
>Cooperative Baptist Fellowship  
>  
>Rev. Lonnie Turner  
>Washington Office  
>Cooperative Baptist Fellowship  
>  
>Joel Heim, Moderator  
>Disciples Peace Fellowship

>  
>Thomas H. Hart  
>Director of Government Relations  
>Episcopal Church, USA  
>  
>Rev. Mark Brown, Assistant Director  
>International Affairs and Human Rights  
>Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs  
>Evangelical Lutheran Church in America  
>  
>Ronald J. Sider, President  
>Evangelicals for Social Action  
>  
>Mary H. Miller, Executive Director  
>Episcopal Peace Fellowship  
>Murray Polner, President  
>Jewish Peace Fellowship  
>  
>Rev. Carroll Houle  
>Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns  
>  
>J. Daryl Byler, Director  
>Washington Office  
>Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.  
>  
>Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
>  
>Rabia Terri Harris, Coordinator  
>Muslim Peace Fellowship  
>  
>Brenda Girton-Mitchell, JD  
>Assoc. General Secretary for Public Policy  
> & Director of the Washington Office  
>National Council of Churches  
>  
>Nancy Small, National Coordinator  
>Pax Christi, USA  
>  
>Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory  
>Director, Washington Office  
>Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.  
>  
>L. William Yolton  
>Presbyterian Peace Fellowship  
>  
>Ann Rutan, csjp , President  
>Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace  
>  
>Rev. Meg A. Riley  
>Washington Office for Faith in Action  
>Unitarian Universalist Association  
>  
>Ron Stief

>Justice and Witness Ministries  
>United Church of Christ  
>  
>Jim Winkler, General Secretary  
>General Board of Church and Society  
>United Methodist Church  
>  
>William J. Price  
>World Peacemakers  
>  
>This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Interfaith  
>Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC  
>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013 mupj@igc.org  
>  
>  
>  
>Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
>1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org  
>  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of  
>laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.  
>

To: david@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Corrections  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

David,

When I delivered letters to the Hart Building yesterday I found the following errors on your listings.

Senator Cantwell not in SH-717. Office is under reconstruction, so she may be moving in.

Senator Carper not in SH-513.

For Senator Nickles you had listings for Stephan Moffitt and Steve Moffitt. I chose the full name

For Senator Jack Reed you had listings for Elizabeth King and Liz King. I chose the full name.

Again, thanks for the list.

Howard

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Corrections  
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2001 12:59:03 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

Thanks for the corrections.

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2001 10:15 AM  
To: david@fcnl.org  
Subject: Corrections

David,

When I delivered letters to the Hart Building yesterday I found the following errors on your listings.

Senator Cantwell not in SH-717. Office is under reconstruction, so she may be moving in.

Senator Carper not in SH-513.

For Senator Nickles you had listings for Stephan Moffitt and Steve Moffitt. I chose the full name

For Senator Jack Reed you had listings for Elizabeth King and Liz King. I chose the full name.

Again, thanks for the list.

Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

To: Ned Stowe <ned@fcnl.org>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Military spending sign on request  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <E9BA445D76C0D21182F30090273DFAF63999AD@local.fcnl.org>  
References:

At 05:50 PM 3/5/01 -0500, you wrote:

>SIGN-ON LETTER TO OPPOSE  
>FY2001 SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY SPENDING BILL  
>  
>ACTION: We hope that your organization can join the following sign-on letter  
>to the full House. This letter will be sent early next week (week of March  
>12). Please e-mail/fax your response to Ned Stowe, Friends Committee on  
>National Legislation, at fax: 202-547-6019 or e- mail ned@fcnl.org by close  
>of business Monday, March 12.  
>

I'll sign it.

>Organization name (as it should  
>appear): Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
>  
>Contact  
>person: \_Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
>  
>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013 E-mail mupj@igc.org

X-Sender: johnburroughs@mail.earthlink.net  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.0.1  
Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2001 11:18:04 -0500  
To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
From: John Burroughs <johnburroughs@earthlink.net>  
Subject: (abolition-usa) Resolution on complete nuclear disarmament  
Cc: alynw@attglobal.net, nya@mobilixnet.dk  
Sender: owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
Reply-To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

In the new Congress, Representative Lynn Woolsey has introduced the resolution calling for multilateral negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention that she also sponsored in the last Congress. The wording appears to be identical. It is now House Resolution 17. The text can be found at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c107:./temp/~c107x99qZE>

The cosponsors follow. You may wish to ask your representative to cosponsor. This can be an opportunity to make the case for abolition to your representative and his or her staff.

COSPONSORS(17), ALPHABETICAL:

Rep DeFazio, Peter A. - 1/31/2001  
Rep Filner, Bob - 1/3/2001  
Rep Frank, Barney - 1/31/2001  
Rep Hinchey, Maurice D. - 1/3/2001  
Rep Kucinich, Dennis J. - 1/3/2001  
Rep Lee, Barbara - 1/3/2001  
Rep Maloney, Carolyn B. - 2/14/2001  
Rep Markey, Edward J. - 2/14/2001  
Rep McGovern, James P. - 1/3/2001  
Rep McKinney, Cynthia A. - 1/31/2001  
Rep Mink, Patsy T. - 2/14/2001  
Rep Nadler, Jerrold - 2/14/2001  
Rep Olver, John W. - 2/14/2001  
Rep Pelosi, Nancy - 1/3/2001  
Rep Rush, Bobby L. - 2/14/2001  
Rep Sanders, Bernard - 2/14/2001  
Rep Slaughter, Louise McIntosh - 2/8/2001

-  
To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.  
For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message.

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Agenda for March 13 meeting  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd, Pank  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

Here is the agenda for the next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, scheduled for 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, March 13 in Conference Room 4 of the Methodist Building.

You will note that Ken Myers of Senator Lugar's staff will be our special guest to talk about the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Let's have a good turnout for him.

He'll be with us from 1:30 to 2:00. We'll probably start our discussion of grassroots mobilization before then, break off for him, and then return to the subject.

I'll see you then.

Howard

###

Agenda for meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Tuesday, March 13, 2001  
Methodist Building, Conference Room 4

1. Introductions
2. National Missile Defense
  - a. Sign-on letter
  - b. Legislation
  - c. North Korea
3. Hill Visits
4. Nunn-Lugar Program (1:30 to 2:00)  
Special guest: Ken Myers, Office of Senator Lugar
5. Grassroots Mobilization
  - a. States
  - b. Issues:
    - De-alerting
    - Strategic arms reduction
    - CTBT
    - National missile defense
6. De-alerting: Action in Washington
7. Nuclear Posture Review
8. Other matters

Next meeting: Tuesday, April 10, 2001, 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Methodists Building, Conference Room 4



To: jwyerman@2020vision.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Meeting of Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Jim,

Now that Tim Barner has left 20/20, would you want some one else from your staff to attend meetings of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. If so, the next meeting will be on Tuesday, March 13 from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m. in Conference Room 4 of the Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue, NE. The agenda is attached.

Howard

###

Agenda for meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Tuesday, March 13, 2001  
Methodist Building, Conference Room 4

1. Introductions
2. National Missile Defense
  - a. Sign-on letter
  - b. Legislation
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Special guest: Ken Myers, Office of Senator Lugar
5. Grassroots Mobilization
  - a. States
  - b. Issues:
    - De-alerting
    - Strategic arms reduction
    - CTBT
    - National missile defense
6. De-alerting: Action in Washington
7. Nuclear Posture Review
8. Other matters

To: phil  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Host housing  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Phil,

John Mecartney is coming to the MUPJ meeting and needs host housing. Is there any one at Foundry who could accommodate him for Thursday and Friday night, March 22 and 22? Especially in the vicinity of the church.

I'm taking care of the Hipkins. Sherman is in Africa and doesn't get back until March 12. I'll ask him about John then. Meanwhile I think I'll get a reservation for John at the Davis House on R Street as a standby. We can afford to pay for it.

Shalom,  
Howard

Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2001 06:01:29 -0800 (PST)  
From: hipkins james <debate44646@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Meeting on March 23  
To: Howard Hallman <mupj@igc.apc.org>

Howard:

Is the meeting still on? Also, you said we can stay at your house. We will need to come on the 22nd. If it is one yet, hopefully we can stay on Thurs and Fri. night at your place. Let us know..

Jim Hipkins

---

Do You Yahoo!?

Yahoo! Auctions - Buy the things you want at great prices.

<http://auctions.yahoo.com/>

To: hipkins char <debate44646@yahoo.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: 1999 board meeting  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <20010310140129.8927.qmail@web10708.mail.yahoo.com>  
References:

Char,

The agenda for the April 9, 1999 board meeting is shown below. I don't have any detailed notes. I guess I was relying on you.

I do know that we decided to continue. We reaffirmed our commitment to focus on nuclear disarmament as our primary interest. We discussed the campaign for CTBT ratification and noted that I was chair of the Interfaith Group for the CTBT. We worked on the resolution on "Nuclear Abolition" for the 2000 UM General Conference. We decided to have another Peace with Justice Breakfast and to seek cosponsorship with the UM conference peace with justice coordinators. I gave a report on a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. I have a note that says "Dale White's book" next to the Peace Leaf item, so we must have decided to mention it there. We expressed an interest in keeping in touch with the African American Methodist denominations and with the ethnic caucuses of the United Methodist Church.

We elected Bruce Edwards, Howard Hallman, John Mecartney, Phillip Miller, and Donald Whitmore to a term ending January 2002.

Perhaps from these recollections, your own, and the agenda you can construct a concise set of minutes.

We look forward to your arrival on the evening of Thursday, April 22 for a two night stay at our house.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036

Meeting of Board of Directors  
April 9, 1999

#### AGENDA

1. Introductions
2. Worship
3. Treasurer's report
4. Future of MUPJ (preliminary)
5. Review of program activities
  - a. CTBT
  - b. Nuclear abolition
  - c. Other
6. Peace Leaf
7. Relationships with Methodist bodies
  - a. UMC Peace with Justice Program
  - b. UMC General Conference

- i. Peace with Justice Breakfast
  - ii. Resolutions
- c. National Youth Ministry Organization
- d. Methodist Student Movement
- e. Other Methodist denominations
- 8. Future of MUPJ (full discussion)
  - a. Operations
  - b. Membership
  - c. Finance
- 9. Election
  - a. Board of Directors
  - b. Officers
- 10. Other matters

From: Rachel Labush <rlabush@rac.org>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Agenda for March 13 meeting  
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2001 12:05:20 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)

I'm sorry I won't be able to make it - I'm going to be in the middle of our every-other-year policy conference.

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2001 11:23 AM  
To: mupj@igc.org  
Subject: Agenda for March 13 meeting

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

Here is the agenda for the next meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, scheduled for 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, March 13 in Conference Room 4 of the Methodist Building.

You will note that Ken Myers of Senator Lugar's staff will be our special guest to talk about the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Let's have a good turnout for him.

He'll be with us from 1:30 to 2:00. We'll probably start our discussion of grassroots mobilization before then, break off for him, and then return to the subject.

I'll see you then.

Howard

###

Agenda for meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
1:00 to 2:30 p.m. Tuesday, March 13, 2001  
Methodist Building, Conference Room 4

1. Introductions
2. National Missile Defense
  - a. Sign-on letter
  - b. Legislation
  - c. North Korea
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Special guest: Ken Myers, Office of Senator Lugar
5. Grassroots Mobilization
  - a. States
  - b. Issues:

De-alerting  
Strategic arms reduction  
CTBT  
National missile defense

6. De-alerting: Action in Washington
7. Nuclear Posture Review
8. Other matters

Next meeting: Tuesday, April 10, 2001, 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Methodists Building, Conference Room 4

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

From: "Bob Kinsey"

To:

Subject: abolition caucus

Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2001 10:17:47 -0700

X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0) Importance: Normal

X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Howard,

I have been trying to find some contacts for the sign on letter.

I have also been trying to get back on the Abolition caucus list and don't understand why I have been unsuccessful. Is it still going???

Bob Kinsey

Peace and Justice Task Force

Rocky Mountain Conference, United Church of Christ

303-425-0348

6555 Ward Road, Arvada, Colorado 80004

"Unlimited growth is the ideology of the cancer cell"

From: "Bob Kinsey"

To: "Howard W. Hallman"

Subject: sign on letter

Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2001 17:05:35 -0700

X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0)

Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Can you send another copy of the letter. I seem to have misplaced it. I gave a copy to our SE assn and hope they get some action.

Bob Kinsey

Peace and Justice Task Force

Rocky Mountain Conference, United Church of Christ

303-425-0348

6555 Ward Road, Arvada, Colorado 80004

"Unlimited growth is the ideology of the cancer cell"

To: "Bob Kinsey" <bobkinsey@earthlink.net>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: sign on letter  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <MABBLBDKGGGOAINLDLNCOKEMJCDA.A.bobkinsey@earthlink.net>  
References:

At 05:05 PM 3/9/01 -0700, you wrote:  
> Can you send another copy of the letter.

Dear Bob,

Here is a fresh copy of the sign-on letter from state religious leaders to their U.S. senators on de-alerting. I am sending it as text and also as an attachment.

I hope that you can make use of it. One pattern would be to get bishops and other heads of judicatories to be initial signers and then get others to sign it. Or you can go directly to various networks.

You may want to form a delegation to present the signed letter to the senators, especially Senator Allard because he is an influential member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

If you want, I can ask national denominational offices and religious peace fellowships to encourage their constituents in Colorado to sign the letter.

Let me know how I can help further. Thanks for doing this.

Shalom,  
Howard

P.S. I'll try to find the abolition-caucus address for you. I've dropped off because it became too cluttered with irrelevancy. Abolition 2000 continues. I'll seek a contact for you.  
###

A Religious Leaders' Appeal on De-alerting Nuclear Weapons

To: The Honorable [names of senators]:

We, leaders and members of religious organizations in [name of state], join in an interfaith appeal for you to help reduce the threat of accidental nuclear war. Specifically we ask you to meet with President Bush and urge him to work with Russian leaders to take all nuclear weapons off "hair-trigger" alert.

From a faith perspective, policies concerning nuclear weapons raise profound questions about our moral responsibilities, the integrity of God's creation, and human destiny. As an interfaith community, we assert that de-alerting all nuclear weapons is a prudent and necessary step toward eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

Although the Cold War ended over a decade ago, the United States and Russia combined have five thousand nuclear weapons -- the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs -- on high-alert status, ready to be fired at a moment's notice. In a time of crisis or perceived attack, decision makers on both sides have only minutes to decide whether to launch a nuclear strike.

A single miscalculation or computer error could lead to nuclear war. We have already come too close to this ultimate

catastrophe. In 1995 a U.S. research rocket launched off the coast of Norway appeared on Russian radar screens. Because the rocket had a profile similar to that of a nuclear missile from a U.S. Trident submarine, Russian radar could not distinguish the research rocket from a U.S. nuclear missile. Russia came within minutes of launching its own nuclear missiles at the United States. The United States and Russia narrowly avoided nuclear disaster, instigated because of poor communications and the hair-trigger alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear missiles.

The continued deterioration of Russia's radar and early warning systems only increases the nuclear danger. The poor conditions of Russian facilities, substandard training and pay, and low morale of personnel increases the likelihood of mistakes. The security of the United States -- and the world --now rests with an increasingly fragile and vulnerable Russian nuclear system.

The United States and Russia should move now to end the threat of accidental nuclear war by de-alerting their arsenals - taking them off the hair-trigger. De-alerting means lengthening the time needed to prepare nuclear missiles for launch. One method of de-alerting, endorsed by General George Lee Butler, USAF (Ret.), former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, is separating nuclear warheads from their missiles. This would give U.S. and Russian officials more time to make an assessment of any threat. It would provide a critical margin of safety in case of a failure of early warning systems or nuclear command and control.

Therefore, we urge you to speak with President Bush, urging him to initiate action to remove all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status. We await your response and would welcome the opportunity to meet with you to discuss this important matter.

Sincerely,

[Note: This statement is based upon one developed by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, addressed to President Bush, and signed by national religious leaders.]

To: lisaw@nccusa.org, conoverp@ucc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Another new draft on nuclear posture  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: C:\My Documents\abolish.342.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Lisa and Pat,

Lisa thought my March 3 draft statement on nuclear posture should draw upon other statements by religious body in the opening. I have done that in the attached new draft (maybe excessively!). I have also rewritten some of the other sections.

What do you think of this attempt?

Howard

P.S. If you can't download the attachment, let me know, and I'll send it as e-mail text.

To: Edward Brueggemann <edbruegge@mediaone.net>, <MMBruegg@aol.com>, Jeanette Hallman <vhall110@southwind.net>, Edgar Hallman <halledee@aol.com>, Brian Hallman <bhallman@slb.com>, Gordon Hallman <JoanHallman@hotmail.com>, Jim Brueggemann <jbbruegg@aol.com>, John Brueggemann <jbruegge@skidmore.edu>, Debby Guarino <Guari@mediaone.net>, David Sanborn <bdq@mediaone.net>, Howard Anderson <howardfran@yahoo.com>, Terri McQueen <maxandlil@yahoo.com>, Don Knudson <dknudsonr@aol.com>, Ben Spencer <spencbe@opp.51.edu>, Lynette Mehall <lmehall@attglobal.net>, <Spencersage@aol.com>

From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Subject: Hallman Reunion 2004

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

In-Reply-To:

References:

Dear Cousins -- First, Once Removed, Whatever,

Last fall Jeanette Spencer and Marge Knutson visited us while on a trip to Washington and the Amish country, and to see Ben Spencer. They had such a good time in Washington that I raised the question of having the Hallman 2004 Reunion in the nation's capitol. They thought it might be a possibility. Now I pose the question to the rest of you, even though it's a long ways off.

The best location would be a Holiday Inn two short blocks from the Air and Space Museum on the Washington Mall. The rest of the Smithsonian museums and the U.S. Capitol are within a reasonable walk. Ben works for the Smithsonian, so he could provide guidance on what to see.

One set of dates would be the three nights of Friday, July 2 through Sunday, July 4, 2004. This would add an extra day to our typical reunion, but there are lots of things to do in Washington. These dates would enable people to see the July 4th fireworks at the Washington Monument. Also, there is a folklife festival on the Mall those days. We could also try to arrange a special visit to the White House on Saturday (I'm not sure I can guarantee "special", but maybe). Likely Congress will be adjourning early on July 2, but those who want to see Congress in session could come early. Also, those who want a longer visit in Washington could come earlier or stay longer.

Hotel rates would be higher than what we have been paying. Their current rate for family reunions is a flat rate of \$139/day +14% tax, which can be up to five persons in a room with two doubles and a folding bed, or a room with a king size bed. They think this might rise to \$159 by 2004. However, for the 4th of July weekend it would go up to \$179 in 2004. This isn't absolute, and I didn't attempt to negotiate a three-day rate, or to ask if a longer stay could get a lower rate, but it's an approximation. Our typical Saturday evening banquet might run \$30+/person.

We could get a lesser rate by scheduling the reunion the previous week, that is, Friday, June 25 and Saturday, June 26 in our usual pattern. The folklife festival would be on by then, and people could come early and stay longer if they wanted to. We could also find a more outlying location, but that would present transportation logistics to get to the Mall.

There's no need for a decision until we gather in North Carolina this summer. But I want to throw out this possibility for your consideration. You can reply to me or reply to all. Also, if you know any more family e-mail addresses, please forward the message to them and let me know the additions.

I'm looking forward to seeing all of you in June.

With best regards,  
Howard

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817  
Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

From: MMBuegg@aol.com  
Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 19:21:12 EST  
Subject: Re: Hallman Reunion 2004  
To: mupj@igc.org  
X-Mailer: AOL 5.0 for Windows sub 128

Howard, I got your email and will pass it along to Walter. I think that Washington, DC would be a great place for a family reunion. Probably finding the right weekend re rates and hotel is the hardest thing to do. So when you come to Montreat, see if you can bring an estimate for both weekends. That may help the group make a decision.

Thanks for taking the leadership on planing this.

Cordially, Mary Brueggemann

Walter and Mary Miller Brueggemann  
4 Downshire Lane  
Decatur, GA 30033-1414

Tel 404/327-9159

Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 19:58:01 -0800  
From: Lynette Mehall <lmehall@attglobal.net>  
Reply-To: lmehall@attglobal.net  
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.04 (Win95; I)  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Hallman Reunion 2004

Dear Howard,

Wow! I am impressed with your thinking ahead! This would be a great place for the next reunion! Lynette

User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022

Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 21:16:16 -0500

Subject: FW: Hallman Reunion 2004

From: Edward Brueggemann <edbruegge@mediaone.net>

To: Jeanette Hallman <vhall110@southwind.net>,

Edgar Hallman <halledee@aol.com>, Brian Hallman <bhallman@slb.com>,

Gordon Hallman <JoanHallman@hotmail.com>,

Jim Brueggemann <jbbruegg@aol.com>,

John Brueggemann <jbruegge@skidmore.edu>,

Debby Guarino <Guari@mediaone.net>, David Sanborn <bdq@mediaone.net>,

Howard Anderson <howardfran@yahoo.com>, Terri McQueen <maxandlil@yahoo.com>,

Howard Hallman <mupj@igc.org>, Don Knutson <dknutsonr@aol.com>,

Elisha/ Paul Churchill <paulnlish@aol.com>,

Eric / Mitzi Hallman <jems0615@aol.com>, Joy Hallman <jlhallman@aol.com>,

Ellen and Brian Burns <ea.burns@aol.com>,

Lisa and David Briggs <lisahbriggs@msn.com>,

Katrina Hallman <katrinaeh@yahoo.com>,

Jennifer and Jeff Moore <jenhallman\_moore@yahoo.com>,

Jeanette and Ken Spencer <SPENCERSAGE@aol.com>,

Sara Vettraino <mvettraino@aol.com>, Carol Pepper <cpepper@towerhill.org>,

Bruce Hallman <hallman7@juno.com>, Diane Gniadek <pgni@aol.com>,

David Hallman <dhall29106@aol.com>, Suzanne Knutson <sknutsone@aol.com>,

Karen and Greg Walaitis <walaitis@uswest.net>,

John and Corine Knutson <knutson6@juno.com>,

Ben Spencer <spencbe@opp.51.ecu>

-----  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 19:06:21 -0500

To: Edward Brueggemann <edbruegge@mediaone.net>, <MMBruegg@aol.com>,

Jeanette Hallman <vhall110@southwind.net>, Edgar Hallman <halledee@aol.com>,

Brian Hallman <bhallman@slb.com>, Gordon Hallman <JoanHallman@hotmail.com>,

Jim Brueggemann <jbbruegg@aol.com>, John Brueggemann

<jbruegge@skidmore.edu>, Debby Guarino <Guari@mediaone.net>, David Sanborn

<bdq@mediaone.net>, Howard Anderson <howardfran@yahoo.com>, Terri McQueen

<maxandlil@yahoo.com>, Don Knudson <dknudsonr@aol.com>, Ben Spencer

<spencbe@opp.51.ecu>, Lynette Mehall <lmehall@attglobal.net>,

<Spencersage@aol.com>

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I'm looking forward to seeing all of you in June.

With best regards,  
Howard

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817  
Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: mupj@igc.org

From: CarolCWalker@aol.com  
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2001 00:20:43 EST  
Subject: Re: PwJ Gathering  
To: akimpact@mosquionet.com, ChapLarry@aol.com  
CC: Lsabin1313@aol.com, kentkathyb@earthlink.net, mupj@igc.org,  
CarolCWalker@aol.com, jefffrancis@juno.com, wholcomb@umcswtx.org,  
afong@jps.net, Revgwen1@aol.com, pwjp@juno.com, paxmlb@juno.com,  
RevMMBird@aol.com, jgeorgieff@earthlink.net, jimvert@worldnet.att.net,  
bbhardt@mail.esc4.com, AHeart1000@cs.com, hendricksrev@usa.net,  
Hughes123@aol.com, claralou@uswest.net, milsomhart@hotmail.com,  
Mayjudy@aol.com, icpierce@msn.com, ANNFPRICE@aol.com,  
kenttunc@ffni.com, wlparker@bayou.com, lwayman@gte.net, 3RDM@gte.net,  
cawindrum@yahoo.com, sandy@citlink.net  
X-Mailer: AOL 5.0 for Mac sub 28

Hi, folks,  
Did you think I had forgotten you??? This is to report that I have deposited over \$400 as of Mar. 10 in the fund for a gift for Robin. I sent a note to all those on the PWJ coordinators list and have heard from a number of them as well as the e-mail list.

One of the suggestions, of several, which came forth was that we give a Peace Pole to the UM Bldg. in Robin's honor. I broached the subject with Jim Winkler and he replied that he was deeply touched and wholeheartedly agreed that it would be a wonderful thing for us to do. There seems to be no problem with our assuming that the GBCS would like to have one. I will get in touch with the Peace Pole business tomorrow and get it in the works - **UNLESS YOU VEHEMENTLY DISAGREE WITH THE IDEA.** There will be enough money still left to make a fine contribution.

After pondering the info on the pole, may I suggest this: that we order the small brass plaque in honor of Robin Ringler's years of service to the PWJ program. And that the four languages be English, Latin (for the European and So. American connection), Chinese or Japanese (for the Asian connection), and sign language. In addition we can add a small Braille plate. I know that this excludes an African language, but I don't know which one we would use. Also, there are several Native American languages available which might be instead of the Asian language. I'm trying to make this as clean a choice as possible.

I further suggest, re: Jim's suggestion, that the contribution be either to the UMC PWJ program OR to the Parenting for Peace with Justice (which Robin serves as a Brd. Member). And that a smaller amount, maybe about \$75 be a gift certificate from Barnes & Noble.

Please reply by Monday evening if at all possible so I can get the order underway.

FYI, I am very sorry to tell you that I won't be able to be with you all in Washington. I'll miss being there and trust that you will represent all the rest of us absent ones. I'm confident that I'll be able to be there next year!  
for peace, carol walker

To: CarolCWalker@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: PwJ Gathering  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <8b.38a888f.27ddb6ab@aol.com>  
References:

Carol,

A Peace Pole is a great idea. As to the contribution, I suggest Parenting for Peace and Justice rather than the official Peace with Justice Program. Of course, we all support the latter, but it has churchwide funding (though always precarious) while the Parenting program depends on voluntary support. But I'll accept whatever the majority favors.

Howard