

From: "J. Matlack" <jmatlack@erols.com>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: REPLY FROM JIM MATLACK  
Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2001 12:40:47 -0400  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600  
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

Dear Howard,

YES. Sign me on to the (revised) version of the letter.  
JAMES MATLACK  
Director, Washington Office  
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

----- Original Message -----

From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
To: <jmatlack@erols.com>  
Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 11:12 AM  
Subject: Letter to Bush on nuclear issues

> Dear Jim,

>

> Here sign on letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the war  
> on terrorism. I hope that you can sign it.

>

> Howard

>

> ###

>

> Dear Colleagues:

>

> It is a month since the horrible terrorist attacks on the World Trade  
> Center, the Pentagon, and the plane downed in Pennsylvania. We have  
> grieved. We have wondered why and what next. We have seen the U.S.  
> government treat the attack as an act of war rather than an international  
> crime against humanity. Various religious groups have responded in  
> different ways.

>

> As the war on terrorism and against Afghanistan have gotten underway,  
there

> remains the issue of nuclear weapons, first in dealing with terrorism and  
> then in the broader perspective of global security in the 21st century.  
> With that in mind I have drafted the following sign-on letter to President  
> Bush. It deals with three issues: no first use, non-proliferation, and  
> nuclear disarmament.

>

> I invite a representative of your organization to sign. I suggest a  
> deadline of the close of business on Friday, October 19. If you have any  
> questions or comments about the letter, please contact me by return e-mail  
> or by phone at 301 896-0013.

>

> Shalom,  
> Howard

> ###

> Sign on letter for representatives of religious organizations.

> The Honorable George W. Bush  
> The White House  
> Washington, D.C. 20500

> Dear Mr. President:

> The campaign against terrorism is raising new and important questions  
about

> the role and future of nuclear weapons in the global security framework of  
> the 21st century. We would like to share with you our thinking on this  
> matter.

> First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government  
> favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states  
> that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in  
> response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would  
> reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily  
as

> a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy  
of  
> the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any  
> state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time  
> under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral  
> and would constitute a crime against humanity.

> Second, we note that in January 2001 the Task Force chaired by Howard  
Baker

> and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet national security threat  
> to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction  
> or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to  
terrorists  
> or hostile nation states and used against American troops or citizens at  
> home." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States emphasize  
> the importance of this finding. Therefore, we believe that a substantial  
> portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of the  
> Baker-Cutler report. In terms of relative priority, we suggest that funds  
> be transferred from the missile defense budget to this and other urgent  
> non-proliferation initiatives.

> Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the United States  
> and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should be treated as  
an

> opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the security of  
> deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear arsenals still in  
> place more than a decade after the Cold War ended. Specifically we ask  
> you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia to de-alert and  
> stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in

> strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the security of  
> the  
> United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of accidental launch,  
> it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of  
> deployed nuclear weapons and use them for terrorist attack on the United  
> States.  
>  
> We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a  
> safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.  
>  
> Sincerely yours,  
>  
> Representatives of religious organizations.  
>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org  
>  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of  
> laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.  
>

From: PVmsmagic@aol.com  
Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2001 19:05:10 EDT  
Subject: Conference Contribution  
To: mupj@igc.apc.org  
X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 118

In which fund would you like the conference contribution deposited?

Phil

To: PVmsmagic@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Conference Contribution  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <164.2aa6d25.2904aea6@aol.com>  
References:

At 07:05 PM 10/21/01 EDT, you wrote:

>In which fund would you like the conference contribution deposited?  
> Phil

Phil,

Put it in the general fund. There is a check for \$500 coming from Bethesda UMC, which you can put in the education fund.

Howard

X-Sender: johnburroughs@mail.lcnp.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.0.1  
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 08:41:07 -0400  
To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
From: John Burroughs <johnburroughs@lcnp.org>  
Subject: (abolition-usa) a new Marshall plan?  
Sender: owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
Reply-To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

October 9, 2001

A New Marshall Plan?  
Advancing Human Security and Controlling Terrorism

By Dick Bell & Michael Renner  
Worldwatch Institute

What do you think of this advice from a senior U.S. military officer and statesman about how the people of the United States should deal with a part of the world torn by war, poverty, disease, and hunger:

"...it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment....It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment."

The speaker was General George C. Marshall, outlining the Marshall Plan in an address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. Surveying the wrecked economies of Europe, Marshall noted the "possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned." He said that there could be "no political stability and no assured peace" without economic security, and that U.S. policy was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

As President Bush and his advisors review the results of the initial bombing campaign, they might also consider the relevance of Marshall's strategy to the moral and political problems America now confronts. Of course we should find the people responsible for the deaths of September 11 and bring them to justice, and work with other nations to root out other terrorist networks. But we must do so in a way that does not result in the deaths of even more innocent people, deaths that would only deepen the cycle of anger and rage that led to September 11.

What is largely missing from the administration's rhetoric is recognition of the scale of the underlying problems that have to be addressed, regardless of how successful we may be in the short run in tracking down the perpetrators of the September 11th terrorist assaults. As Marshall's words so plainly suggest,

finding the terrorists should be part of a much more ambitious campaign, one in which the rich countries approach the appalling inequities of the world with the same boldness and determination that the United States brought to bear in Europe under the Marshall Plan.

We don't really need to spend another dime on "intelligence" to recognize the conditions that leave whole countries in a state of despair and misery. Some 1.2 billion people worldwide struggle to survive on \$1 day or less. 1.2 billion people lack access to safe drinking water and 2.9 billion have inadequate access to sanitation. About 150 million children are malnourished, and more than 10 million children under 5 will die in 2001 alone. At least 150 million people are unemployed and 900 million are "underemployed"-contending with inadequate incomes despite long hours of backbreaking work.

Globalization has raised expectations, even as modern communications make the rising inequality between a rich, powerful, and imposing West and the rest of the world visible to all. Poverty and deprivation do not automatically translate into hatred. But people whose hopes have worn thin, whose aspirations have been thwarted, and whose discontent is rising, are far more likely to succumb to the siren song of extremism. This is particularly true for the swelling ranks of young people whose prospects for the future are bleak. Some 34 percent of the developing world's population is under 15 years of age.

The United States and the other industrial nations should launch a global "Marshall Plan" to provide everyone on earth with a decent standard of living. We can already hear the cries of people claiming that such a global plan would "cost too much." But let's look at the numbers. The cost of our initial response has soared into the tens of billions of dollars, on top of an already large proposed defense budget of \$342.7 billion.

For the sake of comparison, let's assume that the United States will spend an additional \$100 billion on military actions in the next 12 months. What could we buy if we matched this \$100 billion military expenditure dollar-for-dollar with spending on programs to alleviate human suffering?

A 1998 report by the United Nations Development Programme estimated the annual cost to achieve universal access to a number of basic social services in all developing countries: \$9 billion would provide water and sanitation for all; \$12 billion would cover reproductive health for all women; \$13 billion would give every person on Earth basic health and nutrition; and \$6 billion would provide basic education for all.

These sums are substantial, but they are still only a fraction of the tens of billions of dollars we are already spending. And these social and health expenditures pale in comparison with what is being spent on the military by all nations some \$780 billion each year.

There is a sad irony in watching the Bush Administration's strenuous efforts to build an international coalition. There is no such muscular effort

underway in the United States, or in any of the other rich nations, to build a coalition to eradicate hunger, to immunize all children, to provide clean water, to eradicate infectious disease, to provide adequate jobs, to combat illiteracy, or to build decent housing.

The cost of failing to advance human security and to eliminate the fertile ground upon which terrorism thrives is already escalating. Since September 11, we know that sophisticated weapons offer little protection against those who are out to seek vengeance, at any cost, for real and perceived wrongs. Unless our priorities change, the threat is certain to keep rising in coming years.

By choosing to mobilize adequate resources to address human suffering around the world, President Bush has a unique opportunity to seize the terrible moment of September 11 and earn a truly exalted place in human history. But first, we must all understand that in the end, weapons alone cannot buy us a lasting peace in a world of extreme inequality, injustice, and deprivation for billions of our fellow human beings.

Dick Bell is Vice President for Communications at the Worldwatch Institute (dbell@worldwatch.org)

Michael Renner is a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute (mrenner@peconic.net)

For further information, please contact Niki Clark, 202-452-1992 x 517, nclark@worldwatch.org

The Worldwatch Institute web site is at <http://www.worldwatch.org>

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To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message.

Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 09:51:40 -0400 (EDT)  
To: nuclearcalendar@lists.his.com  
Subject: Nuclear Calendar  
From: "FCNL Nuclear Calendar" <owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org>  
X-Mailer: Html Mime Mail Class  
Sender: owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org  
Reply-To: nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org

## Friends Committee on National Legislation

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### Nuclear Calendar

**Note:** With congressional offices being closed last Thursday, Friday and today, the congressional schedule is more uncertain than usual. An on-line version of the *Nuclear Calendar* is updated regularly at [www.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendar](http://www.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendar), or by clicking the "Twelve Month Calendar" button on the left.

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on the international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism, 419 Dirksen. Broadcast on <a href="http://CapitolHearings.org">CapitolHearings.org</a> . |
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | House Appropriations Committee, markup of the defense appropriations bill  |
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | House International Relations committee, markup of the Export Extension Act of 2001, H.R. _____, 2172 Rayburn. Broadcast on the <a href="#">Committee web site</a> .   |
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, markup of defense appropriations bill   |
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | House-Senate conference committee continues on the defense authorization bill, <a href="#">H.R. 2586</a> and <a href="#">S. 1438</a>   |
| <b>Week of<br/>Oct. 22</b> | House-Senate conference committee on the energy and water appropriations bill, <a href="#">H.R.2311</a>  |
| <b>Oct. 22-30</b>          | <a href="#">U.N. General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security)</a> , debate on disarmament and international security resolutions, New York  |

- Oct. 23** 9:30 am, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, hearing on the public health response to the recent anthrax exposures, 192 Dirksen
- Oct. 23** 10 am, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, hearing on law enforcement's response to biological threats, 226 Dirksen. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](http://CapitolHearings.org).
- Oct. 23** 10 am, Senate cloture vote on the foreign operations appropriations bill, [H.R. 2506](http://H.R.2506). Broadcast on [C-SPAN 2](http://C-SPAN2).
- Oct. 24** 9 am-12:30 pm, Carnegie Endowment and Center for Defense Information, "[U.S. Defense and Proliferation Policy Conference](http://U.S.DefenseandProliferationPolicyConference)" at the Carnegie Endowment. RSVP by Oct. 22 to Marshall Breit, [mbreit@ceip.org](mailto:mbreit@ceip.org) or (202) 939-2296.
- Oct. 24** 2 pm, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, hearing on issues relating to the identity of the world's most wanted terrorists, 226 Dirksen. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](http://CapitolHearings.org).
- Oct. 24** [United Nations Day](http://UnitedNationsDay)
- Oct. 25** 10 am, House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, hearing on federal bioterrorism preparedness programs: building an early warning public health surveillance system, 2322 Rayburn. Broadcast on the [Committee web site](http://CommitteeWebSite).
- Oct. 25** 2 pm, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on international campaign against terrorism with Secretary of State Colin Powell, 419 Dirksen. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](http://CapitolHearings.org).
- Oct. 25** 2:30 pm, Senate Armed Services Committee, [hearing on the role of the Defense Department in homeland security](http://hearingontheroleofthedefense), 216 Hart. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](http://CapitolHearings.org).
- Oct. 25** 7 pm, John Holdren, Harvard University, "Science, Technology, and the State of the World: Some Reflections after September 11," sponsored by Student Pugwash USA, at the U.D.C. Law School, 4200 Connecticut Ave.,

N.W. RSVP by Oct. 23 to Susan Veres, [sveres@spusa.org](mailto:sveres@spusa.org) or (202) 393-6555.

**Oct. 26** 8 am-6 pm, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, "Weapons and War: A Symposium on International Accords towards World Security and Their Significance after September 11," Lutheran Church of the Reformation, 212 E. Capitol St., N.E.

The *Nuclear Calendar* is published every Monday when Congress is in session. To subscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "subscribe NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body. To unsubscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "unsubscribe NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body.

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From: Tom Hart <thart@episcopalchurch.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 13:44:08 -0400  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)

Thanks for the calls and email. With anthrax across the street, it's been a bit hectic. I don't think we will sign this one, but keep us in mind for others.

Tom

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Monday, October 22, 2001 8:52 AM  
To: thart@dfms.org  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush

Dear Tom,

Today, Monday, October 22, I would like to finish collecting sign-ons for the letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the war on terrorism. We have 17 signers so far. Will you join them? If so, please reply by e-mail or call me at 301 896-0013.

A copy of the letter is below.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

Sign on letter for representatives of religious organizations.

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The campaign against terrorism is raising new and important questions about the role and future of nuclear weapons in the global security framework of the 21st century. We would like to share with you our thinking on this matter.

First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside

of government  
favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and  
against states  
that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of  
nuclear weapons in  
response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons.  
This would  
reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear  
weapons primarily as  
a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe  
that the policy of  
the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons  
against any  
state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other  
adversary at any time  
under any circumstance. We believe that such first use  
would be immoral  
and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also  
believe that  
nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an  
attack by biological  
and chemical weapons.

Second, we note that in January 2001 the Russia Task Force  
chaired by  
Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet  
national  
security threat to the United States today is the danger  
that weapons of  
mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could  
be stolen and  
sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against  
American  
troops or citizens at home." The September 11 terrorist  
attacks on the  
United States emphasize the importance of this finding.  
Therefore, we  
believe that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds  
should go for  
full implementation of the Baker-Cutler report. In terms of  
relative  
priority, we suggest that funds be transferred from the  
missile defense  
budget to this and other urgent non-proliferation  
initiatives.

Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the  
United States  
and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should  
be treated as an  
opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the  
security of  
deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear  
arsenals still in

place more than a decade after the Cold War ended.  
Specifically we ask  
you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia  
to de-alert and  
stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve  
deep cuts in  
strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the  
security of the  
United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of  
accidental launch,  
it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could  
gain control of  
nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and use them for terrorist  
attack on the  
United States.

We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of  
achieving a  
safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

Representatives of religious organizations.

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership  
association of  
laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist  
denomination.

## **Topics for Talking Points/FAQ on US Military Operations:**

### **I. Humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and regional security implications**

- **What is the scope of the current humanitarian crisis and what are the security implications?**

The tragedy of the Afghan people has its roots in the two-decade conflict and three year drought that has plagued the country. The situation is rapidly deteriorating in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the response by the U.S. in the form of air strikes. 6 million people in Afghanistan need humanitarian aid to survive—20% of these are children under the age of five. Tens of thousands of Afghans are fleeing to join the already 2 million refugees in Pakistan; all six neighboring countries - Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and China— have closed their borders. Aid officials believe that as many as 1.5 million Afghans will flee as a result of U.S. military retaliation. The increased influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran and other neighboring nations could put severe political and economic strain on these countries.

In South Asia, a protracted military campaign using Pakistan as a staging ground will lead to a more intensified humanitarian crisis in the region and internal unrest in Pakistan. Although the current Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, continues to promise Pakistan's support for U.S. military action against Taliban, many in Pakistan oppose Musharraf's decision. Pakistan is home to over 2 million Afghan refugees and some 140 million Muslims, many of them strongly oppose Pakistan's role in helping to fight the United States' war against Afghanistan. Religious parties like the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Harkat-ul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad have strongly supported the Taliban and agree with their extremist interpretation of Islam. Many of their members have fought alongside the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and continue to organize large and violent protests opposing Pakistan's assistance in U.S. military strikes against Taliban.

In South Asia, a region home to two nuclear-armed arch rival countries, India and Pakistan, the situation could become very dangerous if an unmanaged humanitarian crisis led to a collapse of Pakistan's already fragile government. A politically unstable Pakistan will have serious consequences for regional peace and the security of nations in the region. India, Pakistan's nuclear armed rival, has been in constant conflict with Pakistan because of the two countries' territorial claims on Kashmir, the major portion of which has been controlled by India since independence from Britain in 1947. India and Pakistan have fought four wars. The armed forces of the two countries continue to clash in Kashmir. Indian officials claim that Pakistan provides military and financial support to Muslim separatist groups active in Kashmir. Many of these groups are based in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. During times of internal unrest, the two countries have tried to exploit their deep-seated hostilities for each other to unite their masses and overcome domestic crises. Indian policy makers fear that, should Pakistan become seriously divided over governmental support for the United States, a call for Kashmir's liberation could be used as a diversionary tactic. Given that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons associated with questionable command and control systems, a military conflict between the two countries could become the worst nightmare for regional and international security. In fact, the situation is already

becoming dangerous. As confirmed by Indian and Pakistani officials, border forces of the two countries exchanged fire on October 15, 2001, and continue to engage each other in military action along the “line of control.”

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

War on Terrorism: The Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan, PSR Fact Sheet

War on Terrorism: U.S. Policy and Stability in South Asia, PSR Issue Brief

Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan

Abid Aslam

<http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0109afghanistan.html>

FAS Resources

Other Groups??

#### **Experts on the Topic**

T. Kumar (Amnesty Intl.)

Stephen P. Cohen, Director, South Asia Project, Brookings

George Perkovich, WAJ Foundation

Others??

#### **➤ What is the likely impact of US military operations on Central Asia and Russia?**

There will be no significant short-term impact of military operations in Afghanistan on Central Asia and Russia. Large refugee flows into Central Asia are unlikely. The fighting will be carried to the south, not the north, and the one border at any real risk--Tajikistan's--is sealed by Russian troops.

The countries in the region and particularly Uzbekistan will likely take the opportunity to tighten up already strong restrictions on political and social dissidence and opposition, whether Islamic or not. In this connection there is no short-term danger of increased anti-Americanism, but if these countries do not reduce such restrictions in the medium-term, then there is the risk of public opinion identifying the U.S. with those repressive policies. The danger then would be negative public attitudes towards the U.S. in the long term, especially during the future post-authoritarian transition. That would influence not only the given country's domestic politics but also its future foreign and security policy.

Yet there is another long-term factor affecting the region's future that is neglected in the focus on the present, and that is China's policy. It is to be expected that if China succeeds in drowning its own Muslims--the Uyghurs in Xinjiang province--under the present tidal wave of ethnic-Han Chinese immigration, then within a decade (or at most two) Beijing will turn around and support Islamic militancy in Central Asia.

China will support Islamic militancy, once this ceases to be a threat to its own internal security, so

as to continue and increase its pressure on governments in the region to acquiesce in its diplomatic designs on Central Asia. Beijing's spokesmen used a great deal of rhetoric about anti-terrorism this past summer when China formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia and four Central Asian states. Yet despite that, on September 11 itself, a delegation from Beijing was in Kabul to sign a long-term economic and technical cooperation agreement with the Taliban regime, which is on record as providing logistical support to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In view of this, the need for current U.S. operations in the region to be cogently and sensitively followed up in non-military ways is only heightened.

Consequently, in the longer run, a great deal depends on whether the U.S. strategic commitment to Uzbekistan is temporary and on how sensitive the follow-through is. Uzbekistan is the country whose stability is most at risk in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Also it is viewed in Beijing as the only country in the region that is capable of resisting the westward demographic expansionism of which Beijing makes no secret. Indeed, specialists on China's Asia policy in Beijing have been known to describe that policy approvingly as the search for "Lebensraum."

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

Cozying up to Karimov?

Robert M. Cutler

<http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0110kari.html>

Central Asia: On the Periphery of New Global War

Abid Aslam

<http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0109istans.html>

CDI Publications

??

**Experts on the Topic:**

Bruce Blair (CDI)

Robert Cutler, Research Fellow, Institute of European and Russian Studies, Carleton University, Canada

➤ **What are the possible actions the US might take against Iraq?**

There has been some pressure by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and other hawks within the administration for a dramatic escalation in the ongoing air strikes against Iraq and perhaps even a full-scale invasion to topple the government of Saddam Hussein. Despite leaks to the media about alleged evidence of contact between an Iraqi intelligence officer and one of the hijackers of the doomed airplanes, U.S. officials from Vice-President Cheney on down have consistently stated that there is no indication of any Iraqi connection to the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. British and Israeli officials have reaffirmed that same position in recent days. Given the history of the decidedly secular Baathist regime's savage suppression of Islamists within Iraq, close links between Baghdad and Bin Laden and his followers are extremely unlikely. State Department allegations Iraq's "support for terrorism" have largely been limited to links between

secular and mostly inactive Palestinian groups as Abu Nidal, and attacks on Iraqi dissidents abroad.

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

??

**Experts on the Topic:**

Stephen Zunes, FPIF/Univ. San Francisco

Phyllis Bennis, IPS

Erik Gustafson, EPIC

Denis Halliday, Former UN Assistant Secretary-General & Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq

Peter Lems, AFSC Iraq Program Coordinator

➤ **What is the impact on and reaction from other Arab states to the US military operations?**

Most Arab governments have expressed great sympathy for the United States in light of the enormous loss of life on September 11 and many of them feel threatened by Osama Bin Laden and his followers. Indeed, some in the Al-Qaida network have been involved in terrorist activities targeted against the governments of Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Most Arab governments would welcome decisive action to break up the terrorist cells, particularly if it is part of an international effort. However, there are varying degrees of disagreement about unilateral U.S. military action, particularly if it goes beyond Afghanistan to strike Iraq or any other country.

Arab leaders already face significant opposition from their own populations to assisting or joining Washington's anti-terrorism campaign. Large-scale bombing of Muslim countries—particularly if civilian lives are lost—will make it even more difficult to assist the United States in its campaign against terrorism. The U.S. asserts there are Al-Qaida cells throughout Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. In order to track them down and break them up, the United States needs to join forces with the police and intelligence services of these nations, an effort which is already problematic because of widespread popular reaction against on-going policies in the region and against U.S. military attacks on Afghanistan. The larger the U.S.-led military operation, the less forthcoming will be Arab government support.

Also problematic is the awareness that while few Arabs support Bin Laden's methods or tactics, the grievances he has articulated— regarding the ongoing presence of American troops in the Middle East, the humanitarian consequences of the U.S.-led sanctions against Iraq, the U.S. support for Arab dictatorships and U.S. acquiescence and provision of military aid facilitating Israeli repression of Palestinians—have widespread resonance throughout the Middle East. Pressure for the United States to alter such policies is already increasing, though the U.S. has thus far shown itself to be unwilling to acknowledge the political roots of anti-Americanism in the region, insisting that the terrorists and people who do not unequivocally condemn the September 11 attacks are actually motivated by a hatred towards the United States' tradition of freedom and democracy.

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

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**Experts on the Topic:**

Stephen Zunes, FPIF and Univ. of San Francisco

Phyllis Bennis, IPS

Naseer Aruri, Professor Emiriti, Dept. of Political Science, Univ of Massachusetts, Dartmouth

Chris Toensing, MERIP

Clovis Maksoud, Center for the Global South, American University

➤ **What is the Afghan woman's perspective of political options in Afghanistan?**

[We will find someone to write this]

Is there an NGO working on women's right in Afghanistan? Can we contact someone from Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International to give us more information on this?

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International?

Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan

<http://www.feminist.org/afghan/intro.asp>

**Experts on the Topic:**

Eleanor Smeal, Feminist Majority

➤ **Humanitarian aid: Is it window dressing or a serious effort to help?**

As the Bush administration continues its military attacks, there are roughly five million people inside Afghanistan dependent on international food aid for survival. These citizens not only have to contend with the military campaign but with how to survive the coming winter. The options for these people are grim. They can stay at home, where food is becoming increasingly scarce. They can flee to Pakistan or Iran, under threat of commando attacks, bombing, or freezing traveling through the mountain passes. The final option is to seek areas where they have heard that food is being dropped.

The current strategy of air drops is woefully inadequate. Air drops, in a country besieged with landmines and with starving people on the ground fighting for food are dangerous at best. This short term drops are mostly cosmetic, and as such are expensive and a clear example of politicized humanitarian aid. While they have helped garner international support for the military actions, this support will quickly erode as our partners realize we are pursuing a bankrupt strategy. They must be stopped at the first opportunity for ground assistance.

International aid workers are trying to overcome these difficulties to devise strategies to deliver food to a starving, embattled and isolated population both within and outside of Afghanistan's borders. The international community should be committing funds and begin planning for

effective long-term solutions to the starvation of Afghanistan's internally displaced people and refugees. UNHCR's current efforts to build refugee sites are notable but woefully inadequate given the estimate of an additional 1.5 million refugees. The U.S. and the international community must provide greater support for this and other UN agencies seeking to aid Afghanistan's people. Without such support, the foundation for nation building will be incredibly weak.

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

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**Experts on the Topic:**

??

## **II. U.S. goals, policy, long term strategy in Afghanistan**

- **What is the end game/long term strategy of the US military operation? What are the possible scenarios for targets, length, objectives? When and how will the US declare "victory" over international terrorism? Does the Bush administration have a clear plan or have they started something without a clear course or plan for where it will end?**

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

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**Experts on the Topic:**

- **What are the U.S. objectives in Afghanistan? Is the aim to break the cells, capture suspected terrorists, and/or topple Taliban?**

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

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**Experts on the Topic:**

??

- **Assessment of the Northern Alliance, and other anti-Taliban forces, and U.S. relationship to these forces/factions.**

The Northern Alliance is the remnants of the fractious coalition of ethnic factions and warlords, which governed Afghanistan between the fall of the communist government in 1992 and the victory of the Taliban in 1996. Their period of rule was marked by chaos, fundamentalist rule, and internecine violence that leveled nearly one-third of capital city of Kabul. Corruption was widespread. Bandits and opium magnates controlled much of the countryside. The Taliban was able to seize power in large part because the desire for stability and order was so great that people were initially willing to put up with their totalitarian rule. The widespread refugee flows from Kabul in recent weeks have come not just in anticipation of U.S. bombing but fear that the Northern Alliance might once again take the city. The Pakistanis -- who play an important support role in the U.S. military efforts -- are particularly concerned about their possible return to power. Attacks against Taliban military positions far from the Al-Qaida strongholds and Defense

Department statements about “redressing the power balance” give some indications that the United States might indeed be supporting a Northern Alliance victory.

Ethnic politics is a major part of Afghanistan’s political equation. The Taliban – unlike the northern alliance, the monarchy, and most Afghan governments in recent history – are largely from the country’s Pushtun majority.

There has been some support for a Congress representative of the country’s varied ethnic, political, religious and geographical communities, perhaps under the titular leadership of the country’s exile octogenarian king, which could lead to the establishment of a more pluralistic and stable post-Taliban government. Such an effort would require the active involvement of the United Nations and presumably a U.S. role in the kind of “nation-building” effort that candidate George W. Bush so strongly criticized in the 2000 election campaign.

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

Military Assistance to the Afghan Opposition  
Human Rights Watch Backgrounder  
October 2001  
<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1005.htm>

Afghanistan Conflict Profile  
Jim Lobe and Abid Aslam, FPIF  
<http://www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/afghan.html>

#### **Experts on the Topic:**

???

- **What’s the role of drugs/heroin in Afghanistan conflict? What has Bush administration said re involvement of Taliban and Northern Alliance in poppy growing and heroin trafficking and what is the reality?**

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

#### **Experts on the Topic:**

- **What other terrorist groups (outside Afghanistan) are possible US targets? What range of actions might the US take against each of these?**

The next steps in Bush’s war, in all likelihood, will include raids on terrorist camps in other countries. Likely candidates include Islamic extremist groups in Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It is also likely that Washington will step up its indirect war against the guerrilla groups in Colombia. In some cases, these operations may be relatively modest. But

others could evolve into much larger campaigns, entailing multiple air strikes and the extended deployment of ground troops.

President Bush has also spoken of the need to punish governments that harbor or support terrorists, aside from the Taliban. There is no mystery about the favored target for U.S. attack: the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Ever since the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, members of the President's inner circle have hinted at their desire to go after Hussein and finish the job that, it is said, was left unfinished after the Gulf War of 1991.

At this point, it is impossible to predict which of these outcomes is likely to materialize. But one thing is clear: President has not placed any limits on the scope or duration of U.S. military operations.

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

##### **Experts on the Topic:**

Michael Klare, Hampshire College

- **What is the nature of the coalition the US has formed? Whose in it? What have they committed to? What has US offered them?**

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

##### **Experts on the Topic:**

- **What are present and potential US oil interests in Central Asia? In the Middle East?**

[Steve Kretzman at IPS is writing]

#### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

Missing the Oil Story

Nina Burleigh

<http://www.tompaine.com/news/2001/10/11/index.html>

“Oil and the Middle East: The End of US Hegemony,” Middle East Report 208 (Fall 1998)

Simon Bromley

##### **Experts on the Topic:**

Mamoun Fandy, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University

- **What's the nature of and how convincing is the evidence against the bin Laden network that the US and British have presented?**

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

**Experts on the Topic:**

**III. U.S. military response and international law**

- **How does the US military operation fit into international law and under the UN?**

A country is not permitted to use military force for purposes of retaliation, vengeance, and punishment. In other words, unless a future attack on the United States is imminent, it cannot use military force. This means that even if the United States furnishes evidence as to the authors of the September 11 attack it cannot use military force against them. To this extent the congressional resolution authorizing the President to use force against the perpetrators of the attack on September 11 is a violation of international law. Instead, the U.S. must employ other means including extradition, and resolutions of the Security Council, which could eventually authorize the use of force to effectuate the arrest of suspects.

The United States will argue that the attack on September 11 was an armed attack on the United States and that it has the right to use self-defense (under Article 51) against that attack. Even though the attack is over, it presumably would claim that those who initiated the attack were responsible for prior attacks and are planning such attacks in the future. At the same time, President Bush has stated that the “war” on terrorism would be lengthy, implying that it may go on for years.

In order to rely on this self-defense claim the U.S. would need to present evidence to the Security Council not only as to the perpetrators of the September 11 attack, but evidence that future attacks are planned and imminent. They have not yet done so. Even if the U.S. can put forth a legitimate self-defense claim, it is still to the U.N. Security Council where they ought to turn. Even in cases of self-defense, and particularly when there is sufficient time—two weeks have passed since the attack and President Bush says we are in for a “lengthy” battle—turning to the Security Council may be required. It is certainly better policy and more in keeping with the U.N. Charter to do so.

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

IPS/FPIF publications??

Lawyers Alliance for World Security publications

**Experts on the Topic:**

Merav Datan (PSR)

Michael Ratner (Center for Constitutional Law)

## **IV. Intelligence: Operations and Funding**

- **What are the intelligence operations underway and in the planning? What new authority and funds has the CIA and other agencies gotten/requested?**

**[Steve Aftergood/FAS is doing]**

### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

The CIA: The Need for Reform  
Melvin A. Goodman  
<http://www.fpif.org/papers/cia/index.html>

"Intelligence Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, updated June 4, 2001  
<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB10012.html>

FAS

### **Experts on the Topic:**

Steven Aftergood (FAS)  
Mel Goodman (Natl. War College)

## **V. Nuclear, chemical and/or biological threats and response**

- **What are the possible nuclear, chemical and/or biological threats from the terrorists? What is and should the US do to counter these?**

The US has adopted a doctrine of deterring chemical or biological weapons terrorism through its nuclear forces. This policy was most recently updated in Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD60), which was signed by President Clinton in late 1997. This document, which has likely since been translated into planning guidance for the military, allows for nuclear weapons to be used in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack; against facilities for CBW production or storage; or against an enemy thought to be preparing a CBW attack.

Currently, if the administration declares that the Anthrax outbreaks in Florida and New York, Reno, NV, and Washington, DC, are criminal or terrorist actions, and can then trace them back to the Bin Laden network, this would allow US forces to attack Afghanistan with nuclear weapons. In the current situation, with very few casualties, that is unlikely. If 10,000 die in a smallpox attack, the probability of nuclear retaliation would be extremely high since US action is guided by proportionality.

The problems with this policy are manifold:

First, if the country hosting the WMD terrorists is a non-nuclear weapon state, then the US has promised not to use nuclear weapons against them unless they attack the US in alliance with another nuclear weapon state. In the case of Africa, South America and other nuclear weapon free zones, those promises are legally enshrined in protocols to NWFZ treaties – the US action would therefore be illegal.

Secondly, the human and environmental cost of such action across generations would far exceed any damage done to the US, and there would be no way to ensure that fallout would be contained within the country attacked.

Finally, there is no support for this US policy, even among U.S. allies. NATO has adopted a watered down version of the US nuclear doctrine, but has been unable to agree any guidance for military planners to operationalize the policy. Using nuclear weapons would make the US a pariah state.

Internal Security and U.S. Response:

It is important not to exaggerate the dangers of a WMD attack by terrorists, or its likely effects. Experts generally agree that producing agents, such as a modified flu virus or a chemical agent such as sarin gas is relatively easy. The difficulty lies in weaponizing the agent effectively in order to deliver it in such a way as to kill or injure the maximum number of people. If the current Anthrax outbreaks have a criminal or terrorist origin, they clearly represent a failure to deliver a weapon of mass destruction. The same is true of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks.

In national security terms it is likely that a combined public health/police response would be adequate to such attacks, with no need for military involvement.

A solution to WMD terrorism:

A solution to this problem is much harder in the case of biological or chemical weapons than in the case of nuclear weapons. However, a major part of the problem must be in the development of strict verification regimes for the conventions banning these weapons that already exist. The Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force, and has a reasonably satisfactory verification procedure. It may be that we would want to look at a verification regime that would be able to catch private production of chemical agents.

The Biological Weapons Convention has no verification regime, and the US has recently withdrawn from the negotiations aimed at producing a verification protocol. That protocol had already been greatly weakened by the Clinton administration, acting largely under pressure from Phrma, the pharmaceutical manufacturers association. In short, the US is the bioterrorist's best friend, ensuring that no effective international control regime is likely to be in place for some long time to come. The United States' efforts would be well directed in working to build medical and

public health response to the current threat and, in the long run, supporting the BWC verification protocol.

## **I AM STILL WAITING FOR FAS PIECE TO BE PLUGGED IN HERE.**

### **Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

"Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities," GAO (September 2001)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01915.pdf>

Dr. Bruce Blair, "What if the Terrorists go Nuclear?," Center for Defense Information,

<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.cfm>

Other resources???

### **Experts on the Topic:**

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg (FAS WG on Bio weapons)

Robert Gould, (PSR on chem./bio threats)

Paul Leventhal (NCI on nuclear terrorism)

Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker, Director, CBW Project Center for Nonproliferation Studies

## **VI. War on terrorism and directions for the Military Budget**

- What are the implications of the current war for U.S. budget and military spending?

The events of Sept. 11 could potentially have a profound effect on U.S. military spending. In assessing this impact, it is useful to look at the defense budget in three phases: immediate, near-term, and long-term. In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, the White House sent to Congress a \$20 billion emergency funding request for fiscal year 2001 (FY 01). Viewed widely by both administration officials and congressional leaders as merely a down payment, the amount of the supplemental was quickly doubled. Both the House and Senate approved the package unanimously on Sept. 14. In addition to the amount specified in the Sept. 14<sup>th</sup> supplemental spending package, other Pentagon funds will be used to fund the buildup of U.S. military forces in Central and South Asia, and any combat operations. Funds will be expended from the Defense Department's Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts, as well as for spare parts and replacement of any ordinance - particularly "smart" bombs and cruise missiles.

In the long term, Sept. 11. events will put pressure on members of Congress to approve whatever the administration and the Pentagon needs to respond to the threat of terrorism, even if it meant going back on earlier pledges by both Democrats and Republicans not to tap the Social Security trust fund. Expressing the views of many members of Congress, Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.) said the new security environment "makes the Social Security lockbox seem trivial." It is unclear how much additional Pentagon funding the administration will seek this year and next, but it is likely to be a significant amount. When asked if the Defense Department would fund new anti-terrorism initiatives by shifting funds from current priorities, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said no. "I anticipate, and the indications from the Congress are that my anticipation is well founded, that we will have new additional resources to cover not only the damage that has been inflicted, but to start to begin to build the military capability we need for other options."

**Detail Information Attachments on this Issue:**

Chris Hellman, "The Impact of Sept 11 on Military Spending," Center for Defense Information  
<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/impact.cfm>

**Experts on the Topic:**

Cindy Williams (MIT)  
Chris Hellman (CDI)  
Carl Conetta (PDA)

.

To: ograbc@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Curtis,

Today, Monday, October 22, I would like to finish collecting sign-ons for the letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the war on terrorism. We have 17 signers so far. Will you join them? If so, please reply by e-mail or call me at 301 896-0013.

A copy of the letter is below.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

Sign on letter for representatives of religious organizations.

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The campaign against terrorism is raising new and important questions about the role and future of nuclear weapons in the global security framework of the 21st century. We would like to share with you our thinking on this matter.

First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also believe that nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons.

Second, we note that in January 2001 the Russia Task Force chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops or citizens at home." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States emphasize the importance of this finding. Therefore, we believe that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of the Baker-Cutler report. In terms of relative priority, we suggest that funds be transferred from the missile defense budget to this and other urgent non-proliferation initiatives.

Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the United States and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should be treated as an opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the security of deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear arsenals still in place more than a decade after the Cold War ended.

Specifically we ask you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia to de-alert and stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the security of the United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of accidental launch, it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and use them for terrorist attack on the United States.

We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

Representatives of religious organizations.

To: 76622.637@compuserve.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Lonnie,

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To: thart@dfms.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
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In-Reply-To:  
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Representatives of religious organizations.

To: joe@fcnl.org, kathy@fcnl.org, david@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
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Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

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Representatives of religious organizations.

To: jwinkler@umc-gbcs.org, jhanson@umc0gbcs.org, jhorman@umc-gbcs.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign on letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Jim, Jaydee, and Janet,

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First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also believe that nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons.

Second, we note that in January 2001 the Russia Task Force chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops or citizens at home." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States emphasize the importance of this finding. Therefore, we believe that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of the Baker-Cutler report. In terms of relative priority, we suggest that funds be transferred from the missile defense budget to this and other urgent non-proliferation initiatives.

Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the United States and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should be treated as an opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the security of deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear arsenals still in place more than a decade after the Cold War ended.

Specifically we ask you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia to de-alert and stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the security of the United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of accidental launch, it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and use them for terrorist attack on the United States.

We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

Representatives of religious organizations.

To: info@marylandromancewriters.org  
From: "Carlee L. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: October 27 workshop  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

I would like to register for the workshop scheduled for Saturday, October 27 in Baltimore. I tried your website but received a warning that downloading the registration form was risky for my computer.

If it is all right, I will pay at the door. Please acknowledge my registration.

Carlee L. Hallman  
6508 Wilmet Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817  
301 897-3668  
mupj@igc.org

To: J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mcc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sign-on letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Daryl,

Today, Monday, October 22, I would like to finish collecting sign-ons for the letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the war on terrorism. We have 17 signers so far. Will you join them? If so, please reply by e-mail or call me at 301 896-0013.

A copy of the letter is below.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

Sign on letter for representatives of religious organizations.

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

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First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also believe that nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons.

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We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

Representatives of religious organizations.

User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022  
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 16:18:09 -0400  
Subject: Re: Addition to sign-on letter  
From: Rabia Harris <mpf@forusa.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Hi, I don't remember if we signed on to this one. If not, please sign us on.

Regards,

Rabia

--

(Ms.) Rabia Terri Harris  
Coordinator  
Muslim Peace Fellowship  
www.mpfweb.org

---

la ikraha fid-din - "Let there be no compulsion in religion."

---

on 10/19/01 1:01 PM, Howard W. Hallman at mupj@igc.org wrote:

> Dear Colleagues,

>

> On the sign-on letter to President Bush on nuclear issues, Lisa Wright of  
> the National Council of Churches suggests that we might clarify our intent  
> that nuclear weapons should not be used in a response to biological or  
> chemical weapons. Therefore, I propose adding such a sentence to the  
> appropriate paragraph so that it would read as follows.

>

> "First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government  
> favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states  
> that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in  
> response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would  
> reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as  
> a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of  
> the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any  
> state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time  
> under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral  
> and would constitute a crime against humanity. We believe that nuclear  
> weapons should never be used in response to attacks by chemical and  
> biological weapons."

>

> The last sentence is the new one.

>

> Unless I hear otherwise I will assume that this addition is acceptable to  
> those who have signed so far.

>

> Shalom,

- > Howard
- >
- >
- > Howard W. Hallman, Chair
- > Methodists United for Peace with Justice
- > 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
- > Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org
- >
- > Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of
- > laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

From: "Kimberly Roberts" <kroberts@psr.org>  
To: "Kimberly Roberts" <kroberts@psr.org>  
Subject: PSR Center for Global Security and Health New Service  
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 09:30:16 -0400  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
Importance: Normal  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200

Dear Friend:

Keeping on top of the quickly unfolding events is a big part of planning the right actions for the next few months. Therefore we would like to share with our friends and key activists across the country the news and opinion we gather every day from several major daily newspapers and other sources in the US, in Europe and in South Asia.

This service will include a representative selection of news articles, editorials and op-eds on several major themes: military actions by the United States, the Taliban and other states; the impending humanitarian crisis; the destabilization of the region; the use of chemical and biological weapons by either side; nuclear use policy, and other related topics in the context of the war on terrorism.

This service is a project of PSR's Center for Global Security and Health. For more information check out our website at [www.psr.org](http://www.psr.org) . If you do not wish to continue receiving these news briefings please reply to this email, and we will gladly remove your name.

Thanks,

Kimberly Roberts

Physicians for Social Responsibility

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Below is a compilation of editorials and Op-Eds from around the country. The selections are divided into four categories. Included is a brief summary and web link to the articles. The full texts are enumerated and appear below the summary.

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### **MILITARY ACTION**

#### **1. Coalition of the Unwilling**

The Washington Post, Page A35

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by Robert Kagan,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5574-2001Oct16?language=printer>

**2. Afghan Northern Alliance makes a dangerous friend**

The Baltimore Sun

October 17, 2001, by S. Frederick

Starr <http://www.sunspot.net/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=bal%2Dop%2Ealliance17oct17>

**3. Rumbings from Rumsfeld: Viewing the world and `war' differently**

The Chicago Tribune

Friday, October 19, 2001, by Georgie Anne Geyer

<http://chicagotribune.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=chi%2D0110190069oct19>

**4. If peace wishes were fishes**

The Oregonian

October 19, 2001

[http://www.oregonlive.com/editorials/oregonian/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html\\_standard.xml?base/editorial/10034925112190533.xml](http://www.oregonlive.com/editorials/oregonian/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html_standard.xml?base/editorial/10034925112190533.xml)

**5. Powell's 'winter' message**

The Boston Globe

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Thomas Oliphant

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Powell\\_s\\_winter\\_messageP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Powell_s_winter_messageP.shtml)

**6. Running out of time**

San Francisco Chronicle

Tuesday, October 23, 2001

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/10/23/ED172239.DTL>

## **TERRORIST ACTIONS**

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### **7. Plague on the Potomac**

The New York Times

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by Maureen Dowd

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17DOWD.html?pagewanted=print>

### **8. Coping With Bioterrorism: Beyond Safety**

The New York Times

Thursday, October 18, 2001

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/opinion/18THU1.html?pagewanted=print>

### **9. Control anthrax and fear**

San Francisco Chronicle

Thursday, October 18, 2001

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/10/18/ED204336.DTL>

### **10. Terrorism's impact on WTO**

The Boston Globe,

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Pierre-Henri Laurent and David Dapice

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Terrorism\\_s\\_impact\\_on\\_WTOP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Terrorism_s_impact_on_WTOP.shtml)

### **11. What Happened at Brentwood?**

The Washington Post

Tuesday, October 23, 2001; Page A22

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36498-2001Oct22?language=printer>

## **HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION**

### **12. Common Interests in a Hazardous World**

The New York Times

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by David Shambaugh And Robert S. Litwak

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17SHAM.html?pagewanted=print>

### **13. Keeping Peace in the Subcontinent**

New York Times Editorial

Wednesday, October 17, 2001

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17WED1.html?pagewanted=print>

### **14. The Hunger Factor**

The New York Times

Thursday, October 18, 2001, by Michael O'Hanlon

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/opinion/18OHAN.html?pagewanted=print>

### **15. After the Taliban, What?**

The Los Angeles Times

Sunday, October 21 2001

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000083825oct21>

### **16. China unnerved with war, West so close to its door**

The Baltimore Sun

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Svante E. Cornell and Niklas Swanström

<http://www.sunspot.net/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=bal%2Dop%2Echina23oct23>

**17. Bitter Taste of Charity: Aid Workers Say Airdrops Cause More Problems Than They Solve**

The San Francisco Chronicle

Sunday, October 21, 2001 by Robert James Parsons

<http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1021-04.htm>

**WMD ITEMS**

**18. Editorial Focus: Arms Control and the New 'War'**

Arms Control Today

October 2001, by Daryl G. Kimball

[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001\\_10/focooct01.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/focooct01.asp)

**19. Sept. 11 Verdict: Yes to Missile Defense**

Los Angeles Times

Wednesday, October 17 2001, By Philip H. Gordon And Michael E. O'Hanlon

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000082732oct17>

**20. Are Russian nuclear weapons a terrorist threat?**

The Miami Herald

Thursday, October 18, 2001, by Jon Wolfsthal

<http://www.miami.com/herald/content/opinion/opcol/digdocs/035175.htm>

**21. Security for Nuclear Sites**

The Los Angeles Times

Monday, October 22 2001

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000084249oct22>

**22. Misguided defense**

The Boston Globe  
Tuesday, October 23, 2001

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/editorials/Misguided\\_defenseP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/editorials/Misguided_defenseP.shtml)

## 1. Coalition of the Unwilling

The Washington Post, Page A35

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by Robert Kagan,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5574-2001Oct16?language=printer>

When the refreshingly blunt-spoken deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, was asked for the umpteenth time on

Sunday whether the United States might target any other terrorist-supporting countries besides Afghanistan, he responded with this curious formulation: If "the coalition felt it was necessary to go after terrorist groups in other countries, this would be a matter for the coalition to discuss among themselves." Well, thanks. Maybe when "the coalition" finishes discussing the matter, someone will let us Americans know what they decide.

Bismarck said every alliance has a horse and a rider, and one should endeavor to be the rider. The same goes for international coalitions. You're either leading them or they're leading you. Of course, we're all interested in what "the coalition" feels may be necessary. We'd like to have as many nations on our side as possible. But with many thousands of Americans dead, and who knows how many more at risk, Washington ought to be making its own decisions about the war on terrorism.

This is not the voice of unilateralism speaking. Contrary to fashionable wisdom, the debate today is not between multilateralism and unilateralism. It's between effective multilateralism and paralytic multilateralism.

Everyone agrees the model for effective multilateralism was the assembling of the Gulf War coalition a decade ago. But some seem to have forgotten how that coalition came into being. It was Step Two, not Step One. First, the United States determined on its own the core strategic objective: to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Then and only then did the United

States start assembling a coalition of nations able and willing to help.

It was a policy of multilateralism, but preceded, as effective multilateralism must always be, by a unilateral determination to act. Bush didn't begin by taking a poll of Arab monarchies. If he had, Saddam Hussein would still be in Kuwait. The Saudi royal family's first, quite selfish impulse was to let Saddam keep Kuwait and to draw the line of containment at their own border. Jordan's King Hussein, then our closest friend in the Arab world, sided openly with Iraq.

In the end, Bush had to talk the Saudis into what seemed to them a much riskier strategy. His own steely determination stiffened their spine. But he had to go ahead without Jordan, whose spine was immune to stiffening. Bush succeeded anyway, because he had decided, very publicly, what he wanted to do and then mustered a "coalition of the willing" to help him do it. And guess what. Had he decided to go on to Baghdad, Bush would have succeeded in that mission, too, and today we wouldn't all be wondering whether anthrax spores spreading around the country were developed in one of Saddam's laboratories.

Contrast Bush's success with President Clinton's failed effort to win allied support for a policy of "lift and strike" in Bosnia in 1993 -- the case study in paralytic multilateralism. Instead of leading the alliance, Clinton sent Warren Christopher to Europe to "consult" with the reluctant allies -- before Clinton had staked out a clear position of his own. As David Halberstam writes in "War in a Time of Peace," the Europeans "were accustomed to someone like George Shultz or James Baker telling them in a nice way that brooked little disagreement what the United States of America intended to do." Instead, Christopher's "consultation" signaled that Clinton wasn't serious. And probably he wasn't. In fact, some suspect Clinton counted on European opposition to beat down the more hawkish voices in his own administration. Clinton had assembled, in effect, a coalition of the unwilling.

It's not clear yet which model the Bush administration is following. President Bush said loud and clear on Sept. 24 that the United States would go after other terrorist groups and states that harbor them, beyond Afghanistan and beyond bin Laden and al Qaeda. The letter Ambassador John Negroponte delivered to the U.N. Security Council last week stated that the United States may be compelled in the interest of self-defense to take military actions against other states beyond Afghanistan. But now Armitage says the decision about whether to go after other terrorist groups and other states will be made not by the president but by "the coalition."

That's a scary thought. "The coalition" is an awfully nebulous entity. Great Britain and Canada are part of it, but so are Yemen and Egypt. Lately Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is looking a little unhinged, ranting about the Israeli "dictatorship." Is he really going to be part of the basic decision-making process? Does Armitage mean that, before we contemplate wider military action, we will have to ask the Saudi royal family if it feels wider action is "necessary"? The

Saudis haven't even decided yet that it is "necessary" to cut off all funding to terrorists who fatten on Saudi bank accounts. They're not even sure it's "necessary" to keep fighting in Afghanistan. And if the United States ever discovers Iraq is involved in the latest attacks, will we need to ask the Jordanian king if he feels an invasion of Iraq is necessary? The answer will be the same as it was in

1990: not necessary.

It's important to have partners in this struggle. But a little sober realism is in order, too. At the end of the day, there are a limited number of nations we can trust to look out for our most vital interests, and an even smaller number strong enough and stable enough to be of real help. If we make our goals and strategy plain, those close allies will likely join us, in Afghanistan and beyond, to do what we think is necessary to win the war. But if we let the coalition of the unwilling call the shots, they'll gladly drag us down to defeat, everywhere.

*The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.*

## **2. Rumblyings from Rumsfeld: Viewing the world and 'war' differently**

The Chicago Tribune

Friday, October 19, 2001, by Georgie Anne Geyer

<http://chicagotribune.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=chi%2D0110190069oct19>

WASHINGTON -- It is rare, even in the lives of journalists who have covered many wars, for someone to have the chance to hear firsthand a new military view of America's place being explored by a leader in times of war. Yet Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seemed to be doing just that in an interview here.

Looking not so much tired as thinner and even more resolute, the secretary talked about not what the Bush administration had done, but how and why. In his words we are seeing perhaps the beginnings of a new U.S. outlook toward the world and toward war.

First, he said, in today's world, you have to get it right from the start, because in a world of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, you can't make a mistake and try again.

"It's an amazing process," he said thoughtfully during this interview in his elegant Pentagon office overlooking the Potomac. For the first time publicly, he was reflecting on the past five weeks that have separated America from its past. "There's always so much you need to do that's immediate: your in-box, your phone ringing . . .

"And then there are the other things, like how do you get the case made and set in the beginning so you don't wind up in a cauldron down the line? How do you get [policy] set in the institution? These are very important and require a lot of thought. Assuming the worst, you have to transport yourself three months off when you might be watching TV and see a chemical or biological threat not to hundreds, but to thousands of people. What can you do to see it coming and be prepared to cope with it?

"So while you're dealing with the immediate, you have to force yourself to deal with all of those things." He smiled. "One of Rumsfeld's rules is, 'You don't have to fall into the potholes that others fell into.' You can't start out with a flawed policy.

"So we had to structure it at the outset as a floating coalition with very broad tolerance for what you do or don't do, and how much you want to publicize what countries do. Some countries want to help, but don't want it known."

He delineated coherently and comprehensively how one has to think of "defense" today. In essence, defense in a world of terrorist cells in 60 countries and disintegrating states does not mean defending yourself in any classic defensive manner. It requires an aggressive, but extremely well-planned offensive as well as preventive outreach.

"I remember being in Beirut when they blew up the Marines in the 1980s," he said, leaning back in his chair. "First we put up blockades. They threw bombs over them. Finally, we hung a big wire mesh over the American embassy to protect it—and that didn't work, either. With self-defense today, you have to take the fight to them. Some people think this is something you can start or stop, but the fact is that you don't have a large margin for error when you're talking about nuclear weapons. I don't think you have a choice."

He paused. "But the image is hard for people," he admitted.

The reality was even harder for him on Sept. 11. "I had been at a breakfast here with a bunch of congressmen," he recalled, "and we were talking about the Social Security 'lockbox' and the need for additional defense money for asymmetric warfare."

He noted to the group how, since he had chaired the presidential missile defense commission three years ago, India and

Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons and North Korea had sent off advanced missiles toward Japan. "I said that morning, 'As sure as we sit here, there'll be another.' Then I walked in here and someone said, 'Turn on the TV ...' "

Today, he says of the campaign that he directs as head of the most powerful military the world has ever known, "I think it's working. The pressure is being applied through the financial. A pile of people have been arrested. Out of all of the exchange of information has come more information--and more and more arrests. Anything we can do raises the costs and reduces the recruits [for the terrorists].

"But it isn't very visible. We're watching Afghanistan and seeing scraps from the ground. Some groups are not being as active for the Taliban and some want to come over. Maybe that's not all permanent, no question. But the air war, which in a classic sense has had a limited effect, proportionally has not been trivial.

"At what stage are we? Oh, we're only in the beginning, ... You could put a bubble around Afghanistan, and the networks would still be there. In fact, the extent to which it gets personalized is probably misleading, because the problem of weapons of mass destruction is too immediate and too urgent, and there are too many countries involved in harboring terrorists and tolerating them."

Rumsfeld reiterated that this was a war not against Islam, but against terrorism. He spoke of the need, militarily, to "think globally." The morning of our interview, news came out regarding the

idea of a global military command that would work across regions. And he spoke feelingly of what a terrible shock the events of Sept. 11 were because of our historical experience of "oceans to both sides and friends in Mexico and Canada."

One could almost hear the intellectual and moral gears of rational change shifting in this remarkable man as, drawing on his experience and lifelong study, he explained how he sees America today in a different relationship to the rest of the world.

It's odd. When he was chosen for this position, many thought he was a man of the past. Instead, this leader who is facing the greatest U.S. conflict since World War II is turning out to be a man of the future.

### **3. Rumbblings from Rumsfeld: Viewing the world and `war' differently**

The Chicago Tribune

Friday, October 19, 2001, by Georgie Anne Geyer

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"But it isn't very visible. We're watching Afghanistan and seeing scraps from the ground. Some groups are not being as active for the Taliban and some want to come over. Maybe that's not all permanent, no question. But the air war, which in a classic sense has had a limited effect, proportionally has not been trivial.

"At what stage are we? Oh, we're only in the beginning. . . . You could put a bubble around Afghanistan, and the networks would still be there. In fact, the extent to which it gets personalized is probably misleading, because the problem of weapons of mass destruction is too immediate and too urgent, and there are too many countries involved in harboring terrorists and tolerating them."

Rumsfeld reiterated that this was a war not against Islam, but against terrorism. He spoke of the need, militarily, to "think globally." The morning of our interview, news came out regarding the idea of a global military command that would work across regions. And he spoke feelingly of what a terrible shock the events of Sept. 11 were because of our historical experience of "oceans to both sides and friends in Mexico and Canada."

One could almost hear the intellectual and moral gears of rational change shifting in this remarkable man as, drawing on his experience and lifelong study, he explained how he sees America today in a different relationship to the rest of the world.

It's odd. When he was chosen for this position, many thought he was a man of the past. Instead, this leader who is facing the greatest U.S. conflict since World War II is turning out to be a man of the future.

#### **4. If peace wishes were fishes**

The Oregonian

October 19, 2001

[http://www.oregonlive.com/editorials/oregonian/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html\\_standard.xml?/base/editorial/10034925112190533.xml](http://www.oregonlive.com/editorials/oregonian/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html_standard.xml?/base/editorial/10034925112190533.xml)

Though every poll shows overwhelming support among Americans for U.S. military action in Afghanistan, opponents on the homefront have been anything but hushed. Their objections have become a familiar mantra that goes something like this:

The terrorists did wrong on Sept. 11 and must be punished.

But military force isn't the answer.

They should be apprehended and brought to justice in a court of law.

The exasperating flaw in that reasoning virtually cried out for the world's attention Thursday in a New York courtroom, just a few blocks from the smoking rubble of the World Trade Center.

There, in a federal courthouse in lower Manhattan, four Osama bin Laden disciples were sentenced to life without parole for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

In what seems like a nightmare ago, on Aug. 7, 1998, America's embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously blown to bits, killing 231 people and maiming more than 5,500. Bin Laden and his al-Qaida network were quickly identified as the perpetrators.

And then there was President Bill Clinton's steely response, which sounds hauntingly hollow today:

"We will not yield to this threat," he told the nation. "We will meet it no matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle."

It was tough talk, but only talk. Remember what happened after those grisly 1998 attacks:

The U.S. military lobbed several cruise missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan, destroying some terrorist targets but also a Khartoum building that the Sudanese government claimed was a only a pharmaceutical factory. Civilians apparently were killed, as well.

American peace activists (abetted by anti-Clinton conservatives) raised an outcry, the bombing quickly stopped, and the Clinton administration opted for the activists' justice-through-the-courts alternative.

Through painstaking diplomacy and superb international police work, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Mohamed Rashed Al-'Owhai, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh and Wadih El-Hage were tracked down and apprehended.

After a six-month trial, they were convicted of plotting and executing the embassy bombings, and on Thursday they received the harshest possible punishment short of execution.

Justice done, right?

Thankfully, the vast majority of Americans don't accept that narrow view of what this country faces. The trial in New York represented everything peace activists had demanded, yet it did nothing to protect the nation from the horrors yet to come.

Fight back against al-Qaida without military action? Clearly, we tried that in 1998. Within hours of the embassy bombings, bin Laden and his top henchmen were indicted. What were U.S. officials expected to do? Send over a couple of sheriff's deputies with arrest warrants?

It's not as if the United States just rolled over. In 1995, Clinton froze the U.S. financial assets of bin Laden and his top conspirators. And after the 1998 embassy bombings Clinton reportedly even created a special operations task force to go after bin Laden, but the force never got a solid fix on him in the canyons and caves of Afghanistan.

These terrorists who have declared war on the United States are entrenched, organized and heavily armed. Nothing short of military force -- complementing the criminal justice system that inflicted a mere dent in al-Qaida on Thursday -- will put a lasting end to their heinous attacks.

## **5. Powell's 'winter' message**

The Boston Globe

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Thomas Oliphant

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Powell\\_s\\_winter\\_messageP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Powell_s_winter_messageP.shtml)

Colin Powell didn't say "winter" idly. Moreover, he was saying it to "us" as well as to "them."

The message from the secretary of state over the weekend that the current phase of military operations - eliminating large-unit opposition inside Afghanistan and helping toss the Taliban militia from all major bases - should be a success by the time of the first major snows and bitter temperatures was not irrational exuberance. It was deliberate.

It was also an important benchmark, punctuated by two exclamation points - the beginning of serious air attacks on exposed Taliban forces in the northern part of the country facing an amalgam of opposition groups, and the raid by army Rangers in the south on the edge of Kandahar.

For Americans, the message is that the United States is not merely right but smart, carrying out a strategy that is as worthy of support in detail as it is in overarching purpose. Avoiding the 20-year-old mistake by the former Soviet Union by attacking in support of Afghan allies and not simply invading as a prelude to occupation has been the critical distinction from the beginning. It has been equally important not to unleash the Uzbek and Tajik fighters in the north on Kabul, but to work to assemble Pashtun allies in the south and in Pakistan.

For these ethnic allies the moment to move and to achieve a workable consolidation has basically arrived. President Bush articulated the strategy last week: "We're paving the way for friendly forces on the ground to slowly tighten the net."

For the most important ally in this phase, Pakistan, the US strategy has displayed intelligent sensitivity, both by avoiding favoritism toward the anti-Taliban coalition in northern Afghanistan that it strongly dislikes and by avoiding a protracted, high-visibility, high-civilian casualty, US-only phase of the war.

The US strategy, however, has also displayed intelligent toughness toward Pakistani strongman Pervez Musharraf: no veto power on strategy or tactics.

For "them," the message in Powell's "winter" goal is simple, dramatized by the ease with which scores of American kids dropped out of the skies in the Taliban's southern stronghold: time to think about heading for the hills and caves for the next phase of their gradual demise. Over the next several weeks, the United States hopes to drive them out of every current citadel.

What then remains to be seen, officials say, is how much less than 60,000 turns out to be the core fighting "strength" of the remaining mixture of hard-core Taliban and al Qaeda forces. US officials make no prediction, but the maintenance of an open-arms defection policy for those responsive to the handwriting on the wall suggests an assumption that the eventual number will be much lower.

At this point, the US plan is to turn its military and clandestine attention via commando attacks to whatever is left, a dangerous and dirty task that will require the patience from Americans that it deserves. By then it should be clear to the world that the invaders occupying Afghanistan have been Taliban Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden all along. Any distinctions between them constitute no meaningful difference.

It is also important to avoid comically inaccurate words like "government" to refer to the Taliban-al Qaeda rule. There is force to oppress but not to govern in a society where international relief supplies financed mainly by US dollars have always comprised the essence of subsistence. To the extent the word means anything, there has never been a Taliban government in the sense that Westerners use it.

That is one reason speed in carrying the current phase of military operations to a conclusion is so important.

One key reason for driving Taliban fighters out of population centers is so a US base or two can be quickly established for the delivery by airlift of massive amounts of food and medical supplies so that a humanitarian catastrophe can be eliminated, along with large-size Taliban units, before the worst of the winter begins. Until now, two air transports a day dropping food packets have had infinitely more propaganda than nutritional and life-saving importance.

The difficulty in helping organize a real Afghan government cannot be overstated; neither can the dangers, as witness the strong warning by UN Afghanistan envoy Lakidar Brahimi against premature insertions of any international "peacekeeping" force.

However, anxious and angry Americans can take Colin Powell's "winter" message to mean that their patience and support is for a strategy that is both wise and working.

## 6. Running out of time

San Francisco Chronicle

Tuesday, October 23, 2001

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/10/23/ED172239.DTL>

In the past two days, U.S. forces have finally done what they had previously been unwilling to attempt --hit the Taliban where it hurts.

For the first time since attacks began Oct. 7, U.S. planes bombed and strafed the Taliban's front-line positions, giving the Northern Alliance hope that its forces may be able to overrun the Taliban. This is a welcome change.

Until now, the Bush administration had bombed and re-bombed Taliban sites far from the front lines. This strategy, which seemed to do little but bounce the rubble at previously abandoned bases, was the result of Pakistan's insistence on buying time while it hosted talks to create a broad post-Taliban coalition.

But the Pakistanis seem to be playing a double game -- helping the U.S. offensive while trying to ensure that their old Taliban allies have a prominent role in the postwar government.

Pakistani generals reportedly even want U.S. officials to accept Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Taliban's hard-line army commander, as a leader of the new government.

Such Macchiavellian deception has gone on long enough. Washington will need to suspend bombing during the monthlong Muslim holiday Ramadan, which begins Nov. 18. And after Ramadan, winter snows will make military campaigning difficult. So unless the Taliban and

Osama bin Laden's forces are dramatically weakened in less than a month, they will remain in control of Afghanistan through the winter. This would allow them to claim victory, embarrassing the United States and possibly weakening the international coalition against terrorism.

To be sure, the Northern Alliance must be forced to follow through on its promises to help Afghanistan's former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, call a loya jirga, or meeting of elders, that includes a broad representation of Pashtuns and other ethnic groups.

The Northern Alliance has a major trump card -- it is recognized by the United Nations as Afghanistan's legitimate government. This status would be difficult for Washington and Pakistan to take away after the war.

The Bush administration has legitimate misgivings about putting Afghanistan in the Northern Alliance's hands, but the rebels clearly remain the only short-term hope of toppling the Taliban.

U.S. forces must provide the Northern Alliance with a decisive battlefield advantage.

## **7. Plague on the Potomac**

The New York Times

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by Maureen Dowd

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17DOWD.html?pagewanted=print>

I am typing this wearing long black leather gloves.

It's not so easy to type wearing leather gloves. But I had to stop wearing the latex gloves I got at the drugstore on Monday. They made me feel so forensic.

Amid the plague panic, with what appears to be a terrifyingly sophisticated anthrax strain sent to Tom Daschle; with Senate staffers getting nose swabs as their building's ventilation system was checked for spores; with news organizations getting Cipro and security guards; with The New York Post featuring a cover of Abraham Lincoln seated in his Memorial wearing a gas mask — I felt the need for a more stylish sort of sterility.

Osama bin Laden had already made women in New York and Washington rethink wearing high heels and skirts to the office, in case they have to clamber through wreckage. Now anthrax terrorism is forcing us to wear rubber gloves and surgical masks if we want to open our mail.

Our nemesis in the caves won't be satisfied until we are, as President Bush so memorably called the women of Afghanistan, women of cover.

Whether the epistolary pestilence is the work of bin Laden or a rogue state or, as some in the F.B.I. think, a demented American scientist, journalists are big targets.

"It's brilliant," said Jessica Stern, a terrorism expert at Harvard.

Thanks a lot, Ms. Stern. I don't think it's so brilliant. Has the creep from Al Qaeda been living in the eighth century so long he hasn't heard about not killing the messenger?

We could use a little reassurance on the war front, with The Evil One still on the loose and lining up an interview with CNN. But it is now chillingly clear that, in the matter of bioterrorism, the government is flummoxed.

Tommy Thompson seems so immune to a sense of emergency, I expect him to announce any minute that he has plenty of leeches and hot plasters to go around. And Tom Ridge should be giving regular briefings to help soothe Americans with the yips.

The Bush team keeps acting as though pretending we are ready if our enemies poison our air and food and water will make us ready.

"Somebody needs to take control of this issue," says Dr. Beth Horowitz, a Washington internist who has called for more government guidance for doctors. "You cannot just have a vague statement that the government is prepared when they're clearly not prepared. I'm fielding questions every day from a lot of very worried people. I haven't seen anthrax before. And my only experience with smallpox is reading 'Bleak House.' "

The chatting heads are getting scarier. On CNN Dr. Sanford Kuvin, an infectious-disease expert, insists we have "no ability to respond to" a smallpox epidemic. Senator Evan Bayh notes that only 1 percent of the food coming into this country is inspected. And James Woolsey, the former C.I.A. chief, speculates that the anthrax mailings were "too sophisticated" for bin Laden alone; they may have involved Iran or Iraq.

And the spores are getting scarier. Government investigators said yesterday that the anthrax mailed to Mr. Daschle was the real deal — a pure, potent strain that requires a high degree of technical savvy for its production, slips invisibly through the air and could cause huge casualties if dispersed in the right way.

"This one was of a grade that shows it was not an amateur producing it," Senator Dianne Feinstein told me, speculating that it could heighten suspicions that Saddam Hussein is involved. "It's a very sobering thing for Americans, who tend to be so upfront dealing with everything, to be faced with something so clandestine and unknown."

At The Times, which had an anthrax letter scare on Friday, we had a risk-assessment meeting. The assessment was we are at risk, so we moved on to risk management.

"You are your best safeguard," the security expert told us. "Take ownership of your area." He said we could "develop protocols without creating a moon-suit environment."

A society that indulged in recreational victimology seems to be turning into a society of potential victims.

When things were in our control, we used to love to think that they were out of our control. Taking responsibility for moral failings and bad habits became passé. We were addicted to our addictions.

Now that things are outside our control, they tell us to take control.

I'm trying. I'm trying.

## **8. Coping With Bioterrorism: Beyond Safety**

The New York Times

Thursday, October 18, 2001

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/opinion/18THU1.html?pagewanted=print>

One of the challenges of living in the post-Sept. 11 world is defining acceptable risk. We know now that mail can contain anthrax that tall buildings can be brought down by hijacked airplanes. We have been informed that it's at least conceivable for the subway to be flooded with toxins, Disney World to be crop-dusted with biological weapons and smallpox to be spread through a shopping mall. The question now is what we do with that information.

One answer yesterday came from the House of Representatives, which bowed to security concerns and closed up shop for the week. "We felt that was the most prudent thing to do," said Speaker Dennis Hastert. The other came from the Senate, which decided to continue operating even though some staff members had tested positive for anthrax exposure. "We will not let this stop the work of the Senate," said the majority leader, Tom Daschle, whose office was the target of an anthrax-laden letter.

The Senate had the better idea. As the House leader, Mr. Hastert naturally feels responsible for the members of Congress and staff under his direction and wants to do the best thing for their safety. That's important. But whoever has been mailing letters laden with anthrax scored a coup when he or she got the House to shut down. Public officials who are continually urging the public to go about their normal lives have an obligation to lead the way.

Since World War II, America has had the luxury of constantly ratcheting up the level of safety. We have federal agencies charged with making sure that consumer products are not dangerous even if they're misused. When our homes, schools or neighborhoods are exposed to elements like asbestos, we want the air cleaned until every single particle is gone. The only acceptable risks, to our modern way of thinking, were the ones we deliberately courted ourselves.

Now we're being forced to adjust our thinking. No one can absolutely promise that people will be protected from terrorism when they go to a football game, ride in the subway or take their children shopping in the mall. Zero tolerance for risk of terrorism would mean restricting movement and contacts with other people to a more and more drastic degree. That road ultimately leads to huddling in caves of our own making. People need guidance about where to draw the line, particularly from our elected officials. It is useless to simultaneously tell Americans to get back to normal life, and then warn them that there is an imminent danger of another, unspecified terrorist attack. Officials need to lead, by word and deed, toward the sort of courageous prudence that Mr. Daschle showed when he decided to close Senate office buildings for environmental sweeps but keep the Senate itself open for business.

As we chart our way through this new reality, we have to be careful to avoid falling into government by security experts. The Secret Service and the other men and women who make their living figuring out how to keep their clients safe are important. We need their advice. But their world view is necessarily limited. They can only define the safest possible world. It is up to the rest of us to find the best.

## **9. Control anthrax and fear**

San Francisco Chronicle

Thursday, October 18, 2001

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/10/18/ED204336.DTL>

Anthrax is: a) a health scare that has reached the top ranks of the country's media and politics; b) beyond worrying about for the huge majority of Americans; c) a mystifying scare that needs responsible handling. The answer is: all of the above.

When such figures as newscaster Tom Brokaw, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and New York Gov. George Pataki are sent anthrax-sprinkled letters, it's impossible to dismiss the scare. Investigators now believe the packets sent to Brokaw and Daschle were from the same source. This menace is no longer isolated nor random.

The threats have spread to other news organizations where exhaustive testing is under way. On Capitol Hill, Congress has shut down until Tuesday for sampling and disinfecting of offices. Hundreds of employees will be tested for exposure. These are prudent steps when direct danger exists.

At the same time, it's far from a national health threat. The genuine attacks target high visibility personalities, save for the first incident at a Florida tabloid. In that case, an editor was infected and died, the only death so far. Others exposed or made sick are being treated successfully.

The drumbeat of anthrax reports has made it seem as though a deathly wave is sweeping the country. But it's localized mostly in New York, Washington, D. C., and Florida. Other reports are either unsubstantiated or spurious.

With the events of Sept. 11, there are no safe predictions about the future.

But the alternative shouldn't be panic. The public needs a dose of caution, not Cipro.

The source of the anthrax poisonings must be identified, and the malefactor caught. But the scare so far is no excuse for pill hoarding, jumpy suspicions, or sensationalism. Such jitters produce a frightened public, just the results the perpetrators want.

## 10. Terrorism's impact on WTO

The Boston Globe,

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Pierre-Henri Laurent and David Dapice

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Terrorism\\_s\\_impact\\_on\\_WTOP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/oped/Terrorism_s_impact_on_WTOP.shtml)

With the threat of terrorism and reality of war, the debate over new trade talks has taken a back seat. Those inclined to trade expansion continue to argue for it, while those who see the process as rigged for rich, multinational corporate interests want the entire process overhauled and the outcomes more weighted toward the interest of the poor nations, labor, and the environment. These squabbles seem tame compared to matters of life and death. However, there is a link between the World Trade Organization negotiations at Qatar in November, the sagging global economy and the tragedy of Sept. 11.

The 142 nations that are to meet in the Doha summit include 80 more states than when the Uruguay Round commenced in 1986. They include rich states, which seek more liberalization and therefore trade and investment growth, and poorer ones, which object to further "globalization injustices."

The non-Western states complain that the United States and the European Union have not opened up their markets. For example, they say, America continues to protect its farmers with hidden subsidies, only slowly cuts textile tariffs, and blocks Indian steel exports with illegal antidumping rules. The Europeans and Americans were pressing hard for cuts in tariffs on industrial products and increased free trade in agriculture and services but their opponents in WTO insist that no new round take place until the 1994 Uruguay decisions are fully implemented. Furthermore, many Southerners argue that globalization primarily enlarges the gap between rich and poor.

The smaller economies insist they continue to be marginalized and disadvantaged in WTO with Western trade policies on textiles, farm products and intellectual property discriminating against them. The advocates of another trade round point out that the smaller developing nations need the WTO rules and system more than anyone else, particularly if the wasteful uses of resources and the environment are reversed. The fear that hostile trading blocs would emerge at a time when the world economy is slowing down and entering recession drives the US and EU to accentuate the benefits of trade-barrier removals. The more wary Southerners see more

globalization as more hegemony for the already economically powerful, plus, as one critic has said, "just more pollution."

Mike Moore, the WTO director general, asserts that it is not the diesel fumes that are paramount but the stalled engine of the global economy. He fears stagnation and the possible revival of economic tribalism, which may accompany the fragmentation and division of a no-round decision at the biennial assembly at Qatar.

However, the impact of terrorism may introduce a new factor in favor of beginning a new round. The terrorist threat, for instance, will mean an increase in the cost of shipping many goods. Trucks will face lengthy inspections and delays and ships will not meet schedules or may even be barred from ports. Airplane schedules will be curtailed, and deliveries will take longer and cost more. This will raise the cost of production, as "just-in-time" inventories are replaced by costly "just-in-case" stockpiles. The effect is that of a "negative supply shock," very much like an oil price increase. This tends to cause both inflation in prices and a contraction in real output.

A rapid reduction in tariffs and trade barriers would offset this effect, at least to some extent. This would hasten recovery from global slowdown or recession that is now upon us. Such a recovery, or even the enhanced possibility for one, adds a short-term reason to favor the talks, even if the long-term arguments seem to be finely balanced.

There are those who argue that, for example, the reduction in protection in services is simply a sop to the rich banks and insurance companies, and that past planned tariff cuts on poor-country exports that have been delayed should come first. It might be plausible to suggest a North-South trade-off that links reduction in service protectionism to real implementation of already-negotiated cuts in rich-country tariffs. There are also clear benefits to poor nations that improve the efficiency of their financial systems. Customers would get better service and products and borrowers would find it easier to get loans. Fewer crony companies would get money that they will not repay.

In sum, creating more roadblocks to trade amelioration will not help the poor, even if this kind of trade progress does help the rich. Repeating that 1999 Seattle no-talks decision at this time would deny both rich and poor nations an opportunity to at least start the diplomacy to better our common and shared economic future.

*Pierre-Henri Laurent is professor of history and David Dapice is associate professor of economics at Tufts University.*

## **11. What Happened at Brentwood?**

The Washington Post

Tuesday, October 23, 2001; Page A22

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36498-2001Oct22?language=printer>

At this time last week, a chain of events had been set off on Capitol Hill that would ultimately lead to the unprecedented shutdown of the House of Representatives, the closure of Senate offices and the testing of hundreds of congressional staff members and workers for exposure to anthrax bacteria. But as attention focused on anthrax contamination in Congress, and the connection between the anthrax spores sent to Sen. Tom Daschle's office and similar cases in New York and Florida, the U.S. postal facility on Brentwood Road in Northeast Washington -- where letters for the House and Senate are processed -- was also apparently under assault from the anthrax bacteria, and with serious and potentially deadly consequences.

As of yesterday, two male postal workers at the Brentwood facility have tested positive for the inhaled form of anthrax, and two other male Brentwood postal workers have died -- one under circumstances consistent with the presence of anthrax spores, the other under conditions viewed as "highly suspicious" by D.C. Health Department chief Ivan Walks. An additional nine postal workers are being checked for possible anthrax infection. The attention now directed to Brentwood postal employees stands in sharp relief to the initial reaction of U.S. Postmaster General John E. "Jack" Potter and top postal officials only last week. Following nervous queries from postal workers, Mr. Potter held a press conference at the Brentwood facility itself in which he announced, "There is only a minute chance that anthrax spores escaped from [the Daschle letter] into this facility." Postal officials now say Mr. Potter's optimism was based on the fact that the Daschle letter was well-sealed, and assurances from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention officials that postal workers were more susceptible to contracting the less deadly skin-transmitted form of the disease than the pulmonary, or inhaled, variety that killed Robert Stevens of Florida on Oct. 2.

City officials believe their response was accelerated because the District's Health Department required medical providers to notify public health officials of possible anthrax cases based on symptoms rather than a confirmed diagnosis. That mandated shift from diagnosis to a symptom

protocol alerted city officials to act after learning of the admission of a postal worker to Inova Fairfax Hospital in Virginia. That may be cold comfort to the infected and worried workers, but otherwise an additional 48 hours might have elapsed.

Still, questions raised last week by Brentwood workers following news of anthrax spores in the Senate are relevant and pressing today. It took until Sunday to test and give antibiotics to workers at the facility where Sen. Daschle's letter was processed; the contaminated letter had been found six days earlier. Is broader and quicker testing in order?

These questions are not accusatory; we are all in new terrain, and authorities are feeling their way. But what we have seen over the weekend and yesterday underscores both the gravity of the situation and the need for authorities to be aggressive and expansive on matters of public health, public safety and public information -- especially if a few days can spell the difference between life and death.

## **12. Common Interests in a Hazardous World**

The New York Times

Wednesday, October 17, 2001, by David Shambaugh And Robert S. Litwak

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17SHAM.html?pagewanted=print>

Washington -- President Bush's trip to China tomorrow to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting may mark a qualitatively new and more mature phase in relations between the two countries. The current campaign against global terrorism, in which the two governments have already cooperated extensively, offers the opportunity to improve a relationship that has been plagued by difficulties.

Normally a presidential visit to China would generate strong passions and public controversy in the United States, as China has been a lightning rod in American domestic political debates. Disagreements about China policy inside the government, which have often been heated since 1989, have become muted.

The principal reason for the lack of controversy is that America and the world are preoccupied by the events of Sept. 11 and the unfolding American-led military campaign in Afghanistan. This lack of attention may be just what the relationship between America and China needs, providing an opportunity for President Bush and President Jiang Zemin of China to meet without strong domestic pressures and heightened international expectations. Simply going to Shanghai will also help familiarize President Bush with the realities of a rapidly modernizing China, giving him a concrete sense of a country often reduced to abstractions and stereotypes.

This first meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Jiang provides a chance for the two to stake out mutual interests in the campaign against terrorism as well as to manage other difficult issues, including the spread of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, organized crime and narcotics smuggling, and the future of North Korea.

China's hosting of the APEC conference and imminent entry into the World Trade Organization in early November are also important events in their own right, and tangibly symbolize China's integration into the global economy. In this context, the tensions of recent years between Washington and Beijing may be reduced by multinational management of common problems. Although the two nations will continue to have friction, international coalitions and multilateral mechanisms offer a productive way forward for Sino-American cooperation.

Since President Nixon's opening to China three decades ago, American policy has sought China's integration into the international community. Encouraging Chinese membership in, and compliance with, international institutions has been viewed as important for global stability. Yet China has long suspected multilateral institutions of being stalking horses for American interests.

Interestingly, this view has recently been reversed; China now believes that such institutions may constrain American power or, at the least, keep the United States from acting unilaterally.

Although China is regarded as a full member of the global system, this integration remains more form than substance. China's ambivalence even now about multilateralism and Beijing's selective implementation of international agreements indicate that China is not fully comfortable with the aims, principles and norms that underlie global institutions. China's commitment to the international system needs to be judged by the consistency of its actions.

The international effort to restrict the proliferation of sensitive military technologies is one particularly thorny area that has long roiled Sino-American relations. Last November, Beijing formally committed to Washington that it would curb its exports of missile components and nuclear technology. This important agreement was reciprocated by a Clinton administration decision to make it easier for American companies to launch satellites on Chinese rockets. But last month the State Department slapped sanctions on two Chinese companies accused of circumventing the pledge to curb missile exports by transferring missile parts to Pakistan.

The Chinese government faces a choice. It can either continue selling nuclear technology and missile components, for example, to unstable states like Pakistan or hostile ones like Iran, or it can live up to its commitments and gain international acceptance as a responsible state. In our discussions in Beijing last week with military officials and civilian analysts, it was apparent that Chinese arms control authorities are rethinking China's approach. China cannot be against terrorism one day and selling dangerous technology to states that sponsor terrorism the next. The incentives now clearly cut in favor of Chinese compliance with multilateral nonproliferation norms. Mr. Bush and Mr. Jiang may announce progress on this issue when they meet in Shanghai on Friday.

The mixed, complex character of Sino-American relations resists reduction to any simplistic slogan, whether "strategic partners" or "strategic competitors." America's relationship with China is increasingly enmeshed in a broader global framework. Of course, some Sino-American problems — Taiwan and missile defense, for example — are not amenable to multilateral management. But China's increased participation in global organizations may well improve the way our two nations handle this always fraught relationship.

*David Shambaugh is director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University. Robert S. Litwak is director of international studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.*

### **13. Keeping Peace in the Subcontinent**

New York Times Editorial

Wednesday, October 17, 2001

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/opinion/17WED1.html?pagewanted=print>

The last thing Secretary of State Colin Powell needed as he began a delicate diplomatic mission to Pakistan and India this week was a flare-up of violence in Kashmir. Thanks to an untimely attack by India on Pakistani border posts, that is just what he got. The clash served notice, if any were needed at this volatile time in South Asia, that maintaining some sort of equilibrium in relations between Pakistan and India will be essential to waging a successful international war against terrorism.

In return for Pakistani support for the American bombing campaign in Afghanistan, President Bush has embraced Gen. Pervez Musharraf's regime in Islamabad and offered Pakistan large amounts of economic aid. Not surprisingly, that has alarmed Indian leaders, who before Sept. 11 had every reason to believe that Washington was eager to build stronger ties to New Delhi. Secretary Powell's difficult job has been to reinforce the new relationship with Pakistan while reassuring India that its interests will not be overlooked.

He appears to have accomplished the first part by gaining General Musharraf's agreement to work together to create a new, broad-based government in Afghanistan. To secure Pakistan's cooperation, Mr. Powell in principle endorsed the inclusion of moderate elements of the Taliban leadership. General Musharraf, for his part, did not insist on a fixed deadline for ending American military action. As General Powell completed his visit to Islamabad and began talks in India yesterday, it was clear that the Bush administration has no choice but to get more deeply engaged on a host of regional issues, including Kashmir.

General Musharraf deserves American support for his willingness to help in the campaign against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. That does not mean he should be given a free hand to support Islamic fundamentalist extremists in Kashmir, the northern Indian state where a Muslim uprising has been raging for years. Pakistan needs to stop supporting guerrilla fighters in the conflict. India must understand that it cannot crush Muslim aspirations in Kashmir with the use of force.

Washington should also press the two nations to lower nuclear tensions. The Clinton administration made significant progress in getting India and Pakistan to agree to end nuclear testing, curb the production of weapons material and halt the export of sensitive material. That effort must be continued.

George W. Bush came into office determined to keep his distance from foreign conflicts that did not directly threaten American interests. He probably would have put the strains between India

and Pakistan in that category before Sept. 11. Now, with American forces attacking Afghanistan, Washington will have to be very much involved in maintaining the peace between these two old adversaries.

#### **14. The Hunger Factor**

The New York Times

Thursday, October 18, 2001, by Michael O'Hanlon

<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/opinion/18OHAN.html?pagewanted=print>

Washington -- American and British forces are aiming their bombs carefully to avoid harming civilians, but the war could still cause a catastrophe in Afghanistan. Food supplies, already inadequate, are dwindling further as relief efforts are disrupted by the intensifying war. The Bush administration needs a better plan for averting large-scale famine and starvation in Afghanistan — and quickly.

The United States has been air-dropping an average of 35,000 meals a day into Afghanistan, but six million people there need food aid. To deliver less than 1 percent of what's needed not only is insufficient, but could undermine our efforts to persuade the world that the United States cares about the welfare of Muslims. World Food Program convoys, financed largely by the United States, are still going into Afghanistan, but not regularly enough to meet the need. International aid groups say border closings, truck drivers' fears of going out onto the roads, and confusion inside Afghanistan are making large-scale food delivery extremely difficult.

There is another reason, too, why America can't assume that food deliveries will go on as in the past: The Taliban may not let them. The Taliban have already impeded some relief efforts; yesterday they seized half of the United Nations food supplies in parts of Afghanistan, according to a United Nations official. And resistance fighters can't be expected to defeat the Taliban quickly enough so that food can soon be delivered under a friendlier new government. At last count, the resistance forces were still outnumbered at least two to one by Taliban fighters. Although American air strikes can help, air power generally does not deplete enemy forces by more than 1 to 2 percent a day. At that pace, Kabul may not fall until November. Even when it does, some parts of Afghanistan will almost surely remain in Taliban hands. At the same time, Afghans are also finding it hard to flee to neighboring Pakistan and Iran in hopes of getting food.

Some officials of food aid groups have called for a halt in the bombing while winter food supplies are brought in. But that would delay the real solution to the crisis — a new Afghan government. The Bush administration needs a vigorous plan to provide famine relief even as it continues the bombing.

First, the American military food drops should immediately increase by several times over. There is no reason that daily deliveries should be limited to what fits inside two C-17 military planes.

Second, in the parts of Afghanistan safe for landing planes, the United States and its coalition partners should begin to deliver large quantities of food and other necessities in a Berlin-airlift style operation — and do it now, while the weather is still good. These deliveries could be made in areas controlled by Northern Alliance forces and by tribal leaders in other regions of Afghanistan who agree to join the resistance coalition.

Third, Washington needs to begin preparations for creating safe havens within Afghanistan. Displaced people within the country will need secure areas where they can receive food and shelter. Depending on the course of the civil war, such zones might have to be protected in coming weeks by several thousand ground troops from various countries, including the United States.

These measures may sound extreme. But they are well within our capabilities and pose only modest additional risks to our forces. If the alternative is to risk a winter of humanitarian catastrophe within Afghanistan, we really have no choice.

*Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.*

## **15. After the Taliban, What?**

The Los Angeles Times  
Sunday, October 21 2001

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000083825oct21>

The air war in Afghanistan continues, the ground war has barely begun and the duration of both is uncertain. Yet now is the time to consider the makeup of a future government in the landlocked Asian nation.

Whatever regime succeeds the Taliban must not provide a haven for terrorists like Osama bin Laden, prime suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks. Further, it must meet at least minimum human rights standards, including letting women work and girls attend school.

The key to a new government will be the Pushtuns, the country's biggest ethnic group. One reason the Northern Alliance army, a Taliban foe, should be stopped from entering the capital, Kabul, and proclaiming itself the new government is that it consists of ethnic groups unacceptable to the Pushtuns. If it tries to impose itself it will launch yet another descent into warlord battles of the type that plagued Afghanistan after Soviet troops were driven out more than a decade ago. Internecine fighting, plunder and rape became so intolerable that Taliban soldiers were welcomed because they promised peace. The Northern Alliance is no more a monolith than the Taliban. Both contain elements that several years ago talked informally of ending the fighting but were unable to agree on what role the Northern Alliance might play in a government. A new regime might well include Taliban members; not all are religious fanatics who punish men whose beards are too short or stone women on the streets. Not all support Bin Laden and his fellow Arabs, who are not Afghans.

The Taliban leaders who have sheltered Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network can have no place in a new government, but some members at lower levels may be able to help with the rebuilding. That's a point made by Pakistan, which backed the Taliban takeover and wants a friendly government on its western border to balance its eastern neighbor, India, with which it has fought three wars.

Mohammad Zaher Shah, overthrown as king in 1973, could be a symbolic leader for the next rulers. He is a Pushtun and 87 years old and probably would be acceptable to other ethnic groups such as Tajiks and Hazaras. He ruled for 40 years, a relative period of calm in a nation that for centuries was a pawn in contests between Britain and Czarist Russia. The king was overthrown by a cousin, who later was ousted by a pro-Soviet ruler. In 1979 Soviet troops invaded, beginning a tragic period that made rubble of large swaths of the nation and ended in a humiliating defeat for Moscow.

The United Nations, including peacekeeping troops, will have a key role in rebuilding Afghanistan. Giving food to millions who are malnourished or starving will be the first priority, even before a government is formed. Peacekeeping troops cannot become an occupation army; Afghanistan has an unblemished record of repelling invaders. Nor can any government be perceived as imposed by an outsider, be it the United States, Pakistan or Iran.

Afghan history is rife with battles between tribes and armies that switched sides and cut deals when the time was right. The large amounts of foreign aid that will be needed for economic and social development after 22 years of fighting should go far to persuade members of different ethnic groups to form a government that does not terrorize people inside or outside the nation's borders.

## **16. China unnerved with war, West so close to its door**

The Baltimore Sun

Tuesday, October 23, 2001, by Svante E. Cornell and Niklas Swanström

<http://www.sunspot.net/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=bal%2Dop%2Echina23oct23>

Washington - China's tacit but limited support for the U.S.-announced war on terrorism has earned it widespread respect in the United States.

But China's stance is by no means decidedly pro-American. Beijing shares some of the American objectives, but, on a deeper level, it is increasingly disturbed by what it views as a U.S. military presence in its backyard.

The hunt for Osama bin Laden and the war in Afghanistan has brought a regional conflict to China's neighborhood that it would rather not have. Basically, China has the United States next door again, just as it did during the wars in Vietnam and Korea.

China has been worried for a long time that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, as well as bin Laden's presence there, would inspire Muslim Uighur separatists in its northwestern Xinjiang province to assume a more militant Islamic posture; Uighurs have been trained in bin Laden's

camps. But, at the same time, China also has been able to find a common language with the Taliban.

Though it never recognized the Taliban government, Beijing encouraged Chinese companies to engage in Afghanistan. As a result, there has been increasingly significant economic cooperation between the Taliban and China.

Despite these positive dynamics, China would not mind seeing bin Laden removed or a more moderate government installed in Afghanistan. And though Beijing may seem to share many of the U.S. goals in Afghanistan, it is hindered by economic, political and domestic considerations to engage militarily in the hunt for terrorists. To believe China will actively participate in combating the Taliban government is, therefore, wishful thinking.

The regional consequences of U.S. actions in Afghanistan could affect China directly.

To deal with terrorist issues in Central Asia, China would prefer to use its own brainchild, the recently created Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia and four Central Asian states, notably Uzbekistan, rather than

American troops.

Indeed, China has spent considerable diplomatic efforts to counteract U.S. and Western influence in Central Asia in recent years. Its cooperation with Russia in creating the SCO has largely been based on this joint aim to keep the West, especially the United States, out of Central Asia.

This policy seemed to be successful, until Sept. 11. The equation changed after the terrorist attacks against America because it no longer seemed absurd to imagine U.S. troops in Uzbekistan, a key Central Asian country because of its location, large population and strong military.

China and Russia had until Sept. 11 been successful in bringing Uzbekistan into the fold. Although Uzbekistan had been heavily pro-American, a decrease in U.S. interest in the region during the Clinton administration, coupled with an internal Islamic insurgency, drew Tashkent reluctantly closer to Moscow and Beijing.

The war on terrorism provides an opportunity for Uzbekistan and possibly other Central Asian states to break free of the

Sino-Russian axis and improve political and military ties to the United States. That's why the increased U.S. presence runs counter to Chinese interests in the region.

And this is the chief reason why China has been reluctant to more openly support military action in Afghanistan.

China and the United States generally agree about Islamic radicalism, in particular as regards bin Laden. Hence Beijing will support the struggle against terrorism so long as it is compatible with China's internal and regional security. Ideally, China would like the United States to deal swiftly with bin Laden and leave Central Asia.

Given that this is unlikely, the United States should be prepared for increased Chinese intransigence as its military presence in Central Asia extends over time. China's recent decision to extend military aid to Tajikistan is a sign that Beijing will remain engaged in the region, a factor to be considered in formulating any U.S. strategy for Central Asia.

*Svante E. Cornell is editor of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Niklas Swanström is project director of the East Asian Project in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University, Sweden.*

## **17. Bitter Taste of Charity: Aid Workers Say Airdrops Cause More Problems Than They Solve**

The San Francisco Chronicle

Sunday, October 21, 2001 by Robert James Parsons

<http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1021-04.htm>

Geneva -- From the start, the United States has tried to present the military offensive in Afghanistan as a move not simply to punish the Taliban but to liberate the Afghan people from the Taliban's repressive regime. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly said the United States was parachuting humanitarian aid to the oppressed.

It did not take long for one of the world's most prestigious aid organizations, Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), to level sharp criticism at the U.S. air drops. Jean-Herve Bradol, president of the organization, speaking from Islamabad, deplored what he called "PR," focusing his criticism on three main points.

First, he said, airdrops are a huge waste of money. The packages, containing enough to feed an adult for a day, land all over the place, with no guarantee that any, or even most, will be retrieved.

And 37,500 rations per night are mere drops in the bucket in a country where 7 or 8 million are starving. The money (\$25 million for the duration of the bombing, according to U.S. government sources) would be better spent provisioning the regular aid convoys already in action.

Second, since Afghanistan is one of the most mined countries in the world, haphazard drops like these, if noticed by the local population, could easily lure people into mine fields.

Finally, Bradol's main grievance is that much of the local population will associate -- reasonably -- the planes dropping the food with the planes dropping the bombs. According to Bradol, there is already a strong tendency on the part of many people in the region to lump together all Westerners, regardless of why they are there. From that, it is just one short step to associating all international aid staff with the newly arrived military. "We do not," he stated emphatically, "want to be confused with people conducting a military operation!"

The Swiss-based humanitarian group, Terre des Hommes, has condemned the airdrops point-blank as "dangerous and badly targeted," calling instead for the opening of a humanitarian

corridor to avoid what they denounce as "the deliberate confusion between military operations and humanitarian aid."

Last May, when the various international aid agencies operating in the field under United Nations auspices launched an international appeal for Afghanistan, "a forgotten country and a forgotten people caught up in a forgotten war," nobody was interested. With almost no response to the appeal, aid agencies had to borrow from their own budgets to keep the help coming.

And last November, in a speech before an international symposium, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan touched on this subject. Admitting that military intervention might be undertaken for humanitarian motives, he said, "Such military intervention should not, however, in my view, be confused with humanitarian action."

Annan recounted an experience during the war in Kosovo, when NATO troops had become much engaged in relief activities: Cornelio Sommaruga, then head of the International Red Cross, came to him, furious, saying, "You have to do something. You have to tell NATO to respect the line. They are taking our space, and we cannot create confusion and give the impression that the same people who are bringing the bombs are bringing the bread."

While U.N. aid agencies operating in the region are silent for the time being, there has been much behind-the-scenes discussion about the U.S. airdrops, and one highly placed U.N. agency official decried them as "a publicity stunt." It remains a delicate subject, however. With U.S. military action dominating the scene, an aid agency voicing overt criticism of the United States risks being sidelined and severely handicapped in its efforts.

Nonetheless, the fear that aid agencies could become easy targets for those who see them as part of the war machine is apparently not unfounded. Following the first night's bombing, the headquarters of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Quetta, Pakistan, near the Afghan border, was pelted with stones from outside its surrounding wall, while the office of UNICEF (the U.N. Children's Fund), with no wall around it, was torched.

The Red Cross's Sommaruga, in his remonstrations to Annan, put it this way: "Ours is the bread, let them focus on the fighting or whatever they are there to do."

*Robert James Parsons is a Geneva-based journalist writing on international issues for the Geneva daily Le Courrier.*

## **18. Editorial Focus: Arms Control and the New 'War'**

Arms Control Today

October 2001, by Daryl G. Kimball

[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001\\_10/fococt01.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/fococt01.asp)

As President George W. Bush and congressional leaders have correctly suggested, the response to the devastating attacks on New York and the Pentagon requires unprecedented international cooperation to prevent future outbreaks of terrorism. This new “war” will consume attention and resources, but Washington cannot lose sight of the related and equally severe threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the carnage wrought by the airliner-turned-flying-bombs staggering, the toll from biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons could be even greater. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has acknowledged the importance of “seeing that...weapons of vastly greater power...are not used by the kinds of people that attacked the United States.” Nevertheless, the Bush administration has so far failed to present an effective and comprehensive approach.

National, state, and local emergency response and public health systems to help treat the victims of any future attacks must certainly be fortified. But we must recognize that there is no civil defense plan, however robust, that can adequately protect the public against chemical, biological, and especially nuclear attack. The first line of defense is and must be prevention. Success depends on ensuring that the acquisition and delivery of these weapons remains technically challenging and universally unacceptable. This requires a sustained and coordinated international effort to extend and strengthen the multilateral framework of arms control and non-proliferation.

Unfortunately, Bush and his cadre of advisers have spent their first eight months in office dismissing, dismantling, and disavowing proven and promising arms control measures. At times, the Bush team speaks positively about a few treaties, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, in keeping with its “à la carte” approach, the administration supports only those NPT provisions that constrain the capabilities of others, while it chooses to ignore U.S. non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. To work, this treaty, like so many others, must continue to serve the interests of all treaty partners, not just a few.

If the administration is truly committed to protecting the homeland, it must shed its disdain for multilateral arms control and non-proliferation and build upon the bipartisan mood that has enveloped Capitol Hill.

Among other actions, the president should reconsider his rejection of the draft protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and help achieve, not hinder, agreement on a strengthened text. He should utilize a part of the \$20 billion approved for anti-terrorism activities to broaden and accelerate programs to secure and dispose of weapons-usable nuclear material and demilitarize chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union. The president should redouble U.S. efforts for strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and UN Security Council support for on-site inspections to help prevent Iraq from reconstituting its weapons of mass destruction programs. International support for these steps would be greatly enhanced if Bush moved to fulfill key U.S. NPT commitments. In particular, he should reconsider his refusal to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; initiate genuine negotiations with Russia on verifiable, irreversible nuclear force reductions; and agree to operate within the framework of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The latter objective will require an important adjustment in the pace and direction of national missile defense policy, which now calls for deployment of a rudimentary capability by 2004 and possible unilateral ABM Treaty withdrawal within months. Predictably, U.S. officials have resumed their push for deployment. But the airliner attacks highlight that, however capable they may someday become, strategic missile defenses are useless against cheaper and more available means of weapons delivery. Though U.S. officials have “consulted” with their Russian counterparts, they have flatly rejected inquiries about possible treaty modifications to allow for planned anti-missile testing and have not yet made proposals for nuclear reductions. Taking the time necessary to reach a lasting strategic weapons agreement with Russia would, among other benefits, help preserve the long-term cooperation of Moscow, Beijing, and other governments in the new anti-terrorism campaign.

As he tries to root out global terrorism, the president must not create additional proliferation dangers. He should decisively put to rest speculation that the United States might use nuclear weapons against targets in Afghanistan. Even the implied threat of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states could spur some states to seek their own nuclear weapons capability.

Just as the United States cannot combat global terrorism by itself, it cannot alone curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduce the risks associated with existing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons stockpiles. If the president and the Congress continue to ignore this reality, they do so at our peril.

## **19. Sept. 11 Verdict: Yes to Missile Defense**

Los Angeles Times

Wednesday, October 17 2001, By Philip H. Gordon And Michael E. O'Hanlon

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000082732oct17>

Predictably, both supporters and opponents of ballistic missile defenses claim that the events of Sept. 11 strengthen their case. Proponents claim that the attacks showed that we need to protect ourselves against unexpected but devastating threats, while opponents point out that the terrorists did not need ballistic missiles--merely knives and box cutters--to perpetrate their crimes.

President Bush weighed in on the debate last week, arguing that there is no better example of the new threats we face than the Sept. 11 attacks and that "the case is more strong today than it was on Sept. 10 that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is outmoded." Bush has a point that the attacks reinforce the case for missile defense, but only for a defense limited in size and scale, and deployed in a way that does not threaten other great powers. Bush will need to show that he understands this point when he meets with Russian and Chinese leaders this weekend at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shanghai. Opponents of missile defense are clearly right that a wide range of threats to the United States exists and that addressing such threats requires resources. If missile defense becomes an exclusive obsession, we may devote too few dollars to counter other, more likely threats through means such as airport security, the Coast Guard, immigration and customs agencies and defenses against chemical or biological attack with "suitcase bombs." Leading Democrats already were making these arguments before Sept. 11.

Unconstrained pursuit of missile defense could also worsen relations among the major powers, impeding security cooperation on dangers that may be even more pressing. To deal with the terrorist threat, for example, we need the cooperation of Russia and China, primarily to cut off terrorists' access to financial resources and to track them down through intelligence, customs and law enforcement activities. We also need Russian and Chinese help to put diplomatic pressure on

key regional players such as Pakistan and Iran and to halt proliferation so that the next terrorist attack does not involve a weapon of mass destruction.

These realities do not mean that U.S. foreign policy must be designed to please Beijing and Moscow. But we must avoid making them feel threatened if we want them on our side. Given their own sense of the threat from Islamic fundamentalism, China and Russia are likely to join forces with the United States in this fight if we play our cards right.

As missile defense proponents rightly argue, however, the Sept. 11 attacks remind us that seemingly remote or abstract dangers can become tragically real very quickly. That fact bolsters the case for some type of long-range missile defense.

Currently, among extremist countries only North Korea is believed to be capable of developing a long-range missile within a few years, but countries such as Iraq and Iran might have them within a decade.

It is true that terrorists probably will never use long-range ballistic missiles against the United States. They do not have the resources to acquire them or the territory on which to base them. Moreover, they can seek to accomplish their hateful goals with less advanced means, such as dispersing biological agents at a sporting event or blowing up a cargo ship full of chemicals as it approaches a port.

Yet even if terrorists may not find ballistic missiles useful, an enemy country might. Being able to threaten the United States with a biological or nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile could allow an adversary state to act aggressively against its neighbors in the hopes that, with Americans at risk, Washington would not retaliate. A hostile state armed with ballistic missiles could also harbor terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, with the knowledge that a U.S. with no missile defense would be highly reluctant to threaten enough force to capture him or overthrow the country's ruling regime.

The lesson of the terrorist attacks is not that the U.S. should abandon all missile defense plans. Rather, it should pursue a limited long-range missile defense within a framework that reassures Russia and China and that does not hinder other efforts to defend the U.S. against threats that are even more imminent.

## 20. Are Russian nuclear weapons a terrorist threat?

The Miami Herald

Thursday, October 18, 2001, by Jon Wolfsthal

<http://www.miami.com/herald/content/opinion/opcol/digdocs/035175.htm>

An internal government report, obtained by an outside watchdog group, reveals that America's 10 nuclear-weapons research and production facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have failed about half of recent security drills. In several cases, commando squads were able to capture enough nuclear materials to make nuclear weapons.

If this report scares you, then just imagine how much worse things are in Russia, with its huge and under-funded nuclear-weapons complex.

The former Soviet Union produced more than 1,300 tons of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, most of which is now vulnerable to theft or diversion. Only a few kilograms are needed to produce even a crude nuclear weapon.

Of even greater concern is the fact that Russia itself doesn't even know how much material it produced or where all of it is. After the Sept. 11 attacks, the world has to confront the very real possibility that some of this material already may be missing. We know that terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, have shown interest in getting such material from Russia in the past.

U.S. programs designed to secure Russian nuclear weapons, materials and technology have made significant progress, despite having come under recent funding pressures and skepticism from the Bush administration and Congress. The terrorist attacks appear to have refocused U.S. attention on the need to prevent other countries or terrorist groups from seizing this material.

Obviously, U.S. facilities need to have the best possible security, and additional resources and attention should be applied. But the more-likely scenario -- that Russian material will be seized

and used against U.S. territory or allies -- should be given increased funding and attention as well.

How much of the administration's \$40 billion anti-terror package will be applied to these threats remains to be seen.

*Jon Wolfsthal is an associate in the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.*

## **21. Security for Nuclear Sites**

The Los Angeles Times  
Monday, October 22 2001

<http://www.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D000084249oct22>

As the nation goes about the unpleasant and still unfamiliar task of prioritizing threats, consider this: The country's 103 commercial nuclear plants, including south Orange County's San Onofre, are required only to withstand an assault by several people on foot and one person operating inside. The plants are engineered to prevent meltdowns and withstand earthquakes and other natural forces, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission compels reactor operators to comply with volumes of regulations against accidents and attacks. But those requirements did not anticipate assaults by boats, aircraft or explosives-laden trucks, and it never expected plants to fend off an attack by "an enemy of the United States." Then came Sept. 11.

The NRC has already stepped up on-site patrols with well-armed guards, asked plant operators to check all current and past employees and visitors against an FBI watch list and to search incoming vehicles for explosives. It has also launched a "top-to-bottom" review of plant security. That review, however, should be coordinated with the new Office of Homeland Security, which should simultaneously encourage immediate outside action. Our suggestions:

\* The Federal Aviation Administration should, at any site where it would be possible, impose a no-fly zone. Today. The agency recently asked pilots to avoid the airspace over nuclear reactors, dams, refineries and other facilities "to the extent practicable." That's not good enough. \* The

Coast Guard should install the protection of nuclear plants on navigable waters among its highest priorities. If it lacks the resources to do so, President Bush should place the guard under the auspices of the Navy, as happens in wartime, and add personnel and ships accordingly.

\* Gov. Gray Davis should follow the lead of the governors of New York and New Jersey and request prompt deployment of trained National Guard troops to patrol California's two operating nuclear sites--Diablo Canyon, near San Luis Obispo, and San Onofre--as well as two nonoperating plants that continue to store nuclear waste--Rancho Seco, outside Sacramento, and Humboldt Bay, near Eureka.

San Onofre, like all reactors, is already a "hardened" target, extremely uninviting to most would-be assailants. Which is not to say that a cell of terrorists might not see vulnerability at this plant, which overlooks a popular beach and campground and is just off Interstate 5. If a worst-case attack were to trigger a major release of radioactive material, the immediate impact on Orange and San Diego counties would be devastating. Ultimately it might cause cancers and genetic defects and render a significant swath of the region uninhabitable. It's hard to imagine a threat that merits more attention.

## **22. Misguided defense**

The Boston Globe  
Tuesday, October 23, 2001

[http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/editorials/Misguided\\_defenseP.shtml](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/296/editorials/Misguided_defenseP.shtml)

Standing next to Russian President Vladimir Putin Sunday in Shanghai, President Bush said: "The events of Sept. 11 make it clearer than ever that a Cold War ABM treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated and, I believe, dangerous."

This was Bush's way of saying that he was right all along - that the United States must pursue an expensive, accelerated program to develop defenses against long-range missiles and that he is still determined to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty unilaterally if he and Putin cannot strike a bargain on amending it.

A more lucid conclusion would be that the failure to prevent the use of hijacked planes as terrorist weapons can hardly be blamed on a lack of missile defense. Indeed, the atrocities of Sept. 11 suggest that, for years to come, the nation will be most vulnerable not to intercontinental ballistic missiles but to suicidal fanatics crossing the country's borders unnoticed, hiding in dormant terrorist cells for months or years, and then striking without warning from American soil.

Bush and his advisers may now realize that their vision of ultimate security from a missile defense system is little more than a distant technological possibility. Independent scientists have tried to warn of a fundamental flaw in the system being tested: its inability to discriminate between decoys and live warheads.

It would be unrealistic to expect Bush to admit, overtly, that he had been wrong to make missile defense and the scrapping of the ABM treaty a top priority for defense policy and relations with Russia. There was cause for optimism, however, in the hints Bush and Putin dropped in Shanghai that they were nearing agreements on a new, low number of strategic nuclear missiles for both sides and on a mutually acceptable amending or alteration of the ABM treaty.

Putin desperately needs the revenues to be saved if Russia can reduce its current arsenal of some 6,000 ICBMs to 1,500 or even 2,000. Although he was slow to realize it, Bush needs to avoid the instability he would provoke were he to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty, a crucial foundation for the entire edifice of global nuclear arms control.

A sensible deal is there for the taking when the Russian leader visits the Bush ranch in Texas next month. Bush could offer Putin something close to the cut in ICBMs that Russia needs - and to do it within existing arms-control treaties. Otherwise, there will be no mechanisms for inspections and exchanges of data. In return, Putin could accept an amendment to the ABM treaty, allowing continued American testing of a missile defense system that may offer no protection against current threats but might one day become feasible as a deterrent against a rogue regime with strategic missiles.

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: Abolition USA <abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com>  
Subject: (abolition-usa) Oppose the Kyl amendment to cut nuclear testing monitoring (CTBTO  
 ) on the Foreign Ops. Bill  
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 13:46:05 -0400  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)  
Sender: owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
Reply-To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

On the Senate floor today, Sen. Jon Kyl may offer an amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill, H.R. 2506, to strike funding for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). This international organization was created to monitor compliance with the nuclear testing moratorium.

The U.S. payment for the CTBTO is only \$20 million for FY 2002.

\* The Bush administration requested full funding for the CTBTO in its February budget request.

\* The House Appropriations Committee provided full funding for the CTBTO in its markup of the foreign operations bill.

There are 161 countries (including the United States) that have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 84 countries have ratified the treaty.

These payments are not for diplomats drinking lattes in Geneva. It is to complete the system of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories around the globe. The web site of the CTBTO contains additional information about the organization at <<http://www.ctbt.org>>.

Sen. Kyl opposes a nuclear testing moratorium and believe the U.S. should resume testing. That is why he and other conservative Senators have proposed eliminating funding for the international organization that monitors the test ban.

The Friends Committee on National Legislation (a Quaker lobby) strongly urges the Senate to reject the Kyl amendment to delete funds for the CTBTO.

David Culp, Legislative Representative  
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)  
245 Second Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002-5795  
Tel: (202) 547-6000, ext. 146  
Toll free: (800) 630-1330, ext. 146  
Fax: (202) 547-6019  
E-mail: david@fcnl.org  
Web site: www.fcnl.org

-

To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.

For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send

"help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message.

To: pincusw@washpost.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Religious leaders oppose nukes in Afghanistan  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

News Release from Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
Immediate release      Contact: Howard W. Hallman  
October 24, 2001      Phone: 301 896-0013

## RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPPOSE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Representatives of 20 national religious organizations have written to President George W. Bush to oppose use of nuclear weapons in the campaign against terrorism. Recently two members of Congress, Rep. Steve Buyer (R-IN) and Rep. Peter T. King (R-NY), have recommended such action.

In contrast, the religious leaders register their belief that "the policy of the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance." They also state that "nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons."

The religious leaders note the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material might be stolen from Russia and sold to terrorists. This was a finding of the January 2001 report of the Russia Task Force, chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. Therefore, the religious leaders propose that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of non-proliferation activities recommended in the Baker-Cutler report.

In light of the improved relationship between the United States and Russia, the religious leaders ask President Bush to work with Russia to de-alert and stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. They indicate that this would lower the possibility of accidental launch. It would also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of deployed Russian nuclear weapons and launch them in a terrorist attack on the United States.

-30-

October 23, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The campaign against terrorism is raising new and important questions about the role and future of nuclear weapons in the global security framework of the 21st century. We would like to share with you our thinking on this matter.

First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of the United

States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also believe that nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons.

Second, we note that in January 2001 the Russia Task Force chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops or citizens at home." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States emphasize the importance of this finding. Therefore, we believe that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of the Baker-Cutler report. In terms of relative priority, we suggest that funds be transferred from the missile defense budget to this and other urgent non-proliferation initiatives.

Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the United States and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should be treated as an opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the security of deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear arsenals still in place more than a decade after the Cold War ended. Specifically we ask you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia to de-alert and stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the security of the United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of accidental launch, it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and use them for terrorist attack on the United States.

We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

James Matlack, Director  
Washington Office  
American Friends Service Committee

Ken Sehested, Executive Director  
Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America

Greg Davidson Laszakovits, Coordinator  
Church of the Brethren Washington Office

Tiffany Heath  
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This letter was facilitated by Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC. Phone/fax: 301 896-0013. E-mail: mupj@igc.org

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Letter to President Bush  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Colleagues:

Here is the letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the campaign against terrorism. Thanks to the 20 organizations which signed it.

If you would like to post the letter and signers on you web site, please do so. I am attaching a Word version in case it will be useful to you.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

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Washington, D.C. 20500

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Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations

James Winkler, General Secretary  
General Board of Church and Society United Methodist Church

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From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Religious leaders oppose nukes in Afghanistan  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

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X-Lotus-FromDomain: MCC  
From: J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mail.mcc.org  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 17:17:20 -0400  
Subject: Re: Letter to President Bush

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj @ igc.org>  
From: J. Daryl Byler  
Date: 10/24/2001 5:16:49 PM  
Subj: Re: Letter to President Bush

Hi Howard:

Thanks for your good work on this letter. Sorry I didn't respond in time. It's been an absolutely chaotic schedule. All the best.

Daryl

X-Sender: flick@pop.igc.org  
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 17:53:20 -0500  
To: updates@reachingcriticalwill.org  
From: Felicity Hill <flick@igc.org>  
Subject: MID WEEK REPORT FROM THE FIRST COMMITTEE  
Cc: wilpf-news@igc.topica.com

Dear All,

1. All Resolutions are on line - see full list
2. How to contact your own and other governments
3. Nuclear weapons related and disarmament resolutions - an update
4. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty resolution - an update
5. Outer Space resolutions - an update
6. Depleted Uranium Resolution - an update
7. ICJ Resolution - an update
8. Annotated list of resolutions

Happy United Nations Day,

Merav Datan, IPPNW/PSR  
Dimity Hawkins, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF  
Felicity Hill, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF  
Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF  
Jim Wurst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

## **1. All 51 draft resolutions before the First Committee are on line**

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/2001resindex.html>

Further below you will find the entire list, with short summary and links to the draft texts, which will change as the negotiations continue.

It is now time for NGOs to contribute their opinions. Please examine the key resolutions and put forth your positions and recommendations to your own and other governments.

## **2. How to contact your own and other governments**

For the contact details of your disarmament decision makers, in New York, Geneva and in capitals, please see our updated database:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/govcontacts/govindex.html>

### **3. Nuclear weapons related and disarmament resolutions - an update**

The thematic debate on nuclear disarmament (22 and 23 October) saw the introduction of what are likely to be the most controversial resolutions before the First Committee this year: Japan's draft on "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (L.35) and a new proposal by Mexico on a "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" (L.16).

Like last year's draft, the 2001 version of the Japanese draft follows the decisions made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; but also like last year, it strays just enough from the NPT's consensus language on 13 steps "for the systematic and progressive efforts" leading to nuclear disarmament to cause concern. Most notably, the draft lists the hallmark "unequivocal undertaking" as a step to be taken rather than as an existing commitment; it reintroduces language that had been abandoned at the NPT Conference calling disarmament the "ultimate objective" (a NWS- approved phrase meaning "indefinite future") and linking nuclear to general and complete disarmament (a linkage severed in the 13 steps); it deletes some of the 13 steps, including references to the ABM Treaty and the START negotiations.

As noted last week, Mexico had been consulting on a draft calling for an international conference on eliminating nuclear dangers. The draft introduced this week frames the conference "as a follow-up to the resolve expressed... in the Millennium Declaration." One problem is that it proposes a schedule of prepcoms and a conference in 2006 that conflicts with the already scheduled Small Arms Conference. Many countries, especially in the South, consider the later initiative a priority. Political complications for this draft are that it could be seen as competing with the NPT and the proposed Fourth Special Session on Disarmament. On the positive side, it gives impetus to a project endorsed by the Secretary- General and the Millennium Summit and -- since it would be outside the NPT process -- could draw in the four NPT hold-outs, India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba. It also calls for the "widest possible and effective participation" of NGOs and civil society.

Mexico also raised the issue tactical nuclear weapons in a statement on 24 October. Amb. Gustavo Albin, while acknowledging the progress in reducing the stocks of tactical weapons by the US and Russia, was "deeply concerned" that there were still thousands of these weapons. Making his statement with "the full support" of the other New Agenda countries, Albin said "urgent action" should be taken to further reduce tactical weapons; to pursue "confidence-building and transparency measures;" and "to further reduce the operational status: of these arms. There will not be a draft resolution

introduced on this subject.

Jim Wurst  
LCNP

#### **4. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty resolution - an update**

The first two days of the cluster issue debates were disappointing in their lack of real debate or movement. There were loud and persistent earlier calls for there to be a strong commitment to the issues of disarmament in the face of global changes since September 11, as this is not the time for business as usual. However, with Mondays and Wednesdays sessions sitting for just under one hour and Tuesdays for only a little over two hours, it would seem that these early calls have fallen on deaf ears. It was pointed out by one diplomat after the one hour of the Monday session on nuclear disarmament issues that there is obviously no interest in nuclear disarmament in this committee. We wonder if there isn't more than a little truth to this.

Contrary to some reports coming through media in the US from Shanghai meetings between Presidents Putin and Bush last weekend, the ABM Treaty and the resolution regarding ABM to this session of the General Assembly 1st Committee is still very much a priority to its sponsors, the Russian Federation, China and Belarus.

The Russian Federation (23 October 2001) made a clear statement on their commitment to the ABM treaty, reiterating it as a cornerstone to international security and stability and of crucial importance to the conclusion of START I and II initiatives, while stating that the fate of the current ABM Treaty concerns all countries of the world without exception. They noted that in the resolution from last year they had deleted optional paragraph 6 as it was no longer relevant with the US announcement on 1 September 2000 not to deploy NMD. They also referred to continuing negotiations with the US to reduce their nuclear arsenals down to 1500 by the year 2008.

Belarus and China (23 October, 2001) both followed with a strong statement about the importance of the ABM, and the importance of not undermining the treaty. China noted that missile proliferation, which is the justification of the NMD, can be best addressed by political and diplomatic means and within existing disarmament and arms control treaties.

China went on to say that the security of all countries is interrelated and that "the security of one country cannot be based on the insecurity of others."

The question remains, will the US continue to stand in the way of this resolution and urge its allies to do the same (as they called for in week one of this committee's debate)? Or will they be prepared to walk away from the ABM treaty all together at the end of the year?

Dimitry Hawkins, Reaching Critical Will/ WILPF

## **5. Outer Space resolutions - an update**

China (full text on line, 24 October 2001) addressed the issue of PAROS, noting that with war games in outer space and the development of NMD and space weapons are part of long-term plans for the control of space.

They also noted that, due to inherent limitations, existing legal instruments are "insufficient in preventing the weaponization of, and an arms race in outer space in the 21st Century."

China referred to working papers submitted to the CD in February 2000 and another last June which explain the basic views on the structure and elements of a future legal instrument. They have co-sponsored the draft resolution on PAROS.

Dimitry Hawkins  
Reaching Critical Will

## **6. Iraq's Depleted Uranium Resolution - an update**

This one page resolution requests the Secretary General to seek the views of states and relevant organisations on all aspects of the effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments, and to submit a report to the next GA. The resolution also places this item on the agenda of the next GA.

In presenting their resolution on the effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments, Iraq cited the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, paragraph 77 of which spoke of taking effective measures to avert dangers of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq also cited resolution 54/44 on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq also cited the great concern of international humanitarian organisations on DU weapons, mentioning the Human Rights Commission and the World Health Organisation.

Felicity Hill  
Reaching Critical Will/ WILPF

## 7. International Court of Justice Resolution - an update

On Tuesday, 23 October, Ambassador Hasmy Agam of Malaysia introduced draft resolution A/C.1/56/L.45 entitled "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons." As of the time of its introduction, Malaysia's co-sponsors were Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. (See NGO report from week 2 for background on this resolution.)

This year's resolution has standard updates, such as references to GA sessions and the call for multilateral negotiations in 2002, including an updated reference to lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament. There is an added preambular reference to the 2000 NPT Review Conference in the context of welcoming the "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate nuclear weapons. There is also a new preambular paragraph: "Stressing the importance of strengthening all existing nuclear-related disarmament, arms control and reduction measures." According to Malaysia, this paragraph relates to the failure to realize "peace dividends" in the area of disarmament since the end of the Cold War. In fact, there have been "a number of setbacks, *inter alia*, by the weakening of existing nuclear disarmament treaties and a virtually complete standstill in negotiations on nuclear disarmament in both the bilateral and multilateral tracks." Malaysia stressed that the ICJ Advisory Opinion indicates a legal obligation to pursue and to *bring to an early conclusion* negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Implementation of this unanimous conclusion of the ICJ is "entirely appropriate for the General Assembly, which has a mandate to promote disarmament negotiations." Recognizing that this is not the only conclusion of the ICJ, operative paragraph 3 requests states to inform the Secretary-General of their efforts to implement the ICJ conclusions generally.

On the question of timing, Malaysia stated that "Our final goal must remain the elimination of all of these [nuclear] weapons, within a time-frame that, while distant, is nevertheless foreseeable, realistic and attainable, not at some vague, never-to-be-defined remote time in the future." Malaysia concluded by noting that "We are confident that States which support multilateral negotiations that will eventually lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, as we are all committed to do, will have to reason to oppose this Draft Resolution, which seeks to do exactly that in the long term."

NGOs have heard from various governments that one of the reasons some nuclear disarmament advocates have abstained in the past on this resolution, or even voted against it, is because of doubts about the commitment to nuclear disarmament of some (but not all) of its co-sponsors.

Merav Datan

Physicians for Social Responsibility

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

## 8. Annotated list of resolutions

L.1: initially co-sponsored by Russia, Belarus and China: this draft resolution is similar to the resolution put forward last year with several small changes (optional paragraph 6 was deleted and the last optional paragraph was changed). It is a key resolution, addressing the **ABM treaty** as valid and relevant as well as it being a "cornerstone for maintaining global peace and security and strategic stability".

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L1.pdf>

L.2: initially co-sponsored by 12 African states: this draft resolution explores **regional confidence-building** measures, and the activities of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. One point of note is point 14 welcoming of a call for a subregional conference on the protection of women and children in armed conflicts and asking for the Secretary-General to lend all necessary support for the holding of this conference.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L2.pdf>

L.3: initially sponsored by the Russian Federation: this draft resolution looks at the developments in the field of **information and telecommunication** in the context of international security, including promotion of information security.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/ac56L3.pdf>

L.4: initially co-sponsored by 12 countries: this draft resolution takes note of the report from the **Disarmament Commission**. It also calls for the Disarmament Commission to adopt certain items for consideration at the 2002 conference, including an item on ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L4.pdf>

L.5: initially sponsored by Egypt: this draft resolution has been adopted since 1974 and has been adopted by consensus since 1980. It calls for a **Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction** and for all parties to the resolution to comply with IAEA standards and monitoring systems. It has been on the receiving end of some debate as Israel feels they have been singled out as the only state in the region with these weapons.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L5.html>

L.6: initially sponsored by Iran: this draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of **missiles** in all its aspects and to report back to the 57th Session of the General Assembly. The resolution calls for a provisional agenda item on missiles to be included in the 57th Session also.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L6.html>

L.7: initially co-sponsored by 23 nations: this draft resolution explores the **peaceful uses of outer space** and how to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is a key resolution currently with much discussion over PAROS and the militarisation (and weaponisation) of outer space.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L7.html>

L.8: initially sponsored by Iraq: this draft resolution notes that **depleted uranium** in armaments "releases radioactive particles and chemical dust" into the environment when used and requests the Secretary-General to seek views of the states about the effects of depleted uranium in

armaments.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L8.pdf>

L.9: initially sponsored by Sudan: this draft resolution calls on all African states to sign and ratify the **African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty** (Treaty of Pelindaba) and for the Members to the NPT to comply with the IAEA.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L9.pdf>

L.10: initially sponsored by New Zealand: this is a short draft decision on the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** noting that the forthcoming conference on the Treaty will be held from 11-13 November.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L10.pdf>

L.11: initially sponsored by Hungary: a draft decision on the **Biological and Toxin Weapons convention**, calling for the Secretary-General to continue to offer assistance and services required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the past Review Conference and for the upcoming Review Conference (being held 19 November - 7 December 2001 in Geneva).

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/1Ac156L11.pdf>

L.12: initially sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution calls on the CD to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention **prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons**, under any circumstances.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L12.pdf>

L.13: initially sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution is on the role of **science and technology** in the context of international security and disarmament. In one of the points it encourages the UN bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technologies for peaceful purposes. It also calls for a provisional agenda item on the subject for the 57th session of the GA.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L13.pdf>

L.14: initially sponsored by 11 countries: this draft resolution discusses methods to **reduce nuclear dangers** and calls for a provisional agenda item on reducing nuclear dangers at the 57th Session. This looks at the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to the L12 which is more specifically referring to the intentional use.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L14.pdf>

L.15: sponsored by South Africa: this is a draft decision on the inclusion of an agenda item "**Towards a Nuclear Free World: the Need for a New Agenda**" at the 57th Session of the General Assembly.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L15.pdf>

L.16: initially sponsored by Mexico: this draft resolution calls for a United Nations conference to compliment the efforts of the CD and review processes of the NPT to address reducing nuclear

dangers in the context of **nuclear disarmament**. It calls for the conference to be held no later than 2006 in New York with three preparatory committee meetings. Of note is the strong calls for the input in this meeting from non-government organizations and civil society.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L16.pdf>

L.17: initially co-sponsored by 31 countries, chiefly Latin American and Caribbean states: this draft resolution calls on countries in the region to sign and ratify the **Treaty of Tlatelolco** and decides to include as a provisional agenda item in the 58th Session of the GA an item to consolidate the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L17.pdf>

L.18: initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution is on the UN **regional centers for disarmament**, calling on measures to strengthen and revitalize these centers.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L18.pdf>

L.19: initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution decides, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to hold a **fourth special session** on disarmament. A provisional agenda item on this will be included in the 57th Session also.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L19.pdf>

L.20: initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution calls on the high level Steering Group on **disarmament and development** to strengthen its activities and calls for a provisional agenda item to be included for the 57th Session of the GA.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L20.pdf>

L.21: initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution reaffirms that all disarmament forums should take into account **environmental norms** and that unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures undertaken for international security and disarmament should not harm the environment.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L21.pdf>

L.22: initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution recalls the 1971 Declaration of the **Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace** and takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean while reiterating that the participation of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and major users of the zone would enhance the stability of the region. It also calls for a provisional agenda item at the 58th Session of the GA.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L22.pdf>

L.23: sponsored by South Africa: this draft decision notes the inclusion of a provisional agenda item on the review of the implementation of the declaration on the **strengthening of international security**.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L23.pdf>

L.24: initially co-sponsored by 60 countries: this draft resolution addresses the establishment of a **nuclear weapons free zone in the southern hemisphere** and adjacent areas. This puts a provisional agenda item on the 57th Session on this subject and takes note of the existing treaties

of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba.  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L24.pdf>

L.25: initially sponsored by Egypt: this draft resolution, titled "**the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East**" welcomes conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, calls on Israel to accede to the IAEA safeguards and puts the issue on the provisional agenda for the 57th Session.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L25.pdf>

L.26. initially co-sponsored by 11 countries: this draft resolution notes the importance of the Report of the Disarmament Commission and recommends that this body adopt two items for consideration at its 2001 substantive session: ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L26.html>

L.27: initially co-sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey: this draft resolution on regional disarmament, emphasizes the importance of general and complete disarmament, focusing on the need for regional efforts to coincide with international approaches.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L27.pdf>

L.28: initially co-sponsored by 9 countries: this draft resolution regarding conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels requests a report from the Conference on Disarmament, to seek the views of Member States on the subject, and a report to the General Assembly from the Secretary-General.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L28.pdf>

L.29: initially sponsored by Togo: this draft resolution regarding United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa calls to support and revitalize the centre from international and non-governmental organizations. In addition the resolution requests that the Secretary General support the centre and to form closer ties between the centre and the Organization for African Unity and other regional and sub-regional organizations.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L29.pdf>

L.30: initially co-sponsored by 31 countries: this draft resolution regarding verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, calls for resolutions on the issue to be implemented, and requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly at its 58th session on further view from Member States on the issues.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L30.pdf>

L.31: initially sponsored by Canada: this draft resolution is regarding the Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L31.pdf>

L.32: initially co-sponsored by Canada and Poland: this draft resolution regarding the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction calls for the importance of the close cooperation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L32.pdf>

L.33: initially sponsored by Sudan: this draft resolution regarding the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes focused on the potential hazards of this waste that would constitute radiological warfare. States are called upon to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a convention on this issue, and that various relevant existing resolutions, codes of practice and conventions be observed.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L33.pdf>

L.34: initially co-sponsored by 95 countries: this draft resolution regarding the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction urges States parties to the convention and non-parties to provide the Secretary-General with information to make "global mine action efforts more effective". Relevant international, regional, non-governmental organizations are invited to participate in the programme of intersessional work at the First meeting of States Parties to the Convention.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L34.pdf>

L.35: initially sponsored by Japan: this draft resolution regarding a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons calls for the strengthening of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, especially in light of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT. This resolution encourages the Russian Federation and United States to continue intensive consultations on the offensive and defensive systems. Eight elements strengthening the international non-proliferation regime are listed as of critical importance. Civil society is encouraged to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L35.pdf>

L.36: initially sponsored by Ecuador: this draft resolution is regarding the Report of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on the issue of disarmament. The Secretary General is requested to ensure the CD has all the proper support services and requests the CD to report on its work.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L36.pdf>

L.37: initially co-sponsored by 33 countries: this draft resolution calls for the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, especially in particular areas of tension. States of the region are called to adhere to all of the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments to do so, to strengthen confidence-building measures and to further their cooperation in combating terrorism.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L37.pdf>

L.38: initially sponsored by Algeria: this draft resolution is regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee. The First meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York from 8 to 19 April 2002.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L38.pdf>

L.39: initially co-sponsored by 81 countries: this draft resolution regarding the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures emphasizes the importance of comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures such as collection and responsible disposal of weapons obtained illegally. The Secretary General is also requested to report on the implementation of the present resolution, taking into consideration the activities of the group of interested States in this regard.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L39.pdf>

L.40: initially co-sponsored by 76 countries: this draft resolution regarding transparency in armaments requests the convening of a group of governmental experts in 2003 to report on the Register of Conventional Arms, calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to consider this, for member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional level, and for the Secretary General to report of the implementation of this resolution.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L40.pdf>

L.41: initially co-sponsored by 26 countries, mostly from Europe with the exception of Benin and Canada: this draft resolution is regarding maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe, based on existing resolutions, agreements and instruments. Mines and small arms and light weapons are mentioned as particular issues which must be dealt with.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L41.html>

L.42: initially co-sponsored by 55 countries: this draft resolution is regarding objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures. This is recommended through consultations with relevant international bodies with a view to ascertaining requirements for adjusting the present instruments and expand participation.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L42.pdf>

L.43: initially co-sponsored by 49 countries: this draft resolution is regarding the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Various issues are suggested as needing further exploration, such as compliance procedures and mechanisms, explosive remnants of war, extension of the scope of application of the Convention to non-international armed conflict, landmines other than anti-personnel mines, and small-calibre ammunitions.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L43.pdf>

L.44: initially co-sponsored by 32 countries: this draft resolution regarding nuclear disarmament reaffirms the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and that the time is now opportune to undertake this task. The entry into force of the CTBT as well as strengthening of various treaties, agreements and institution related to this goal are called for.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L44.pdf>

L.45: initially co-sponsored by 27 countries: this draft resolution regarding follow-up to the advisory opinion of the *International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* calls on states to fulfill the obligation to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict effective international control".

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L45.pdf>

L.46: initially sponsored Haiti: this draft resolution regarding the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean welcomes the support these centres have received and calls for more participation from all of the States of the region and international, regional and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L46.pdf>

L.47: initially co-sponsored by 57 countries: this draft resolution regarding the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, decides to convene a conference no later than 2006, to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, with the date and venue to be decided at its 58th session. Member States to implement this plan of action. The Secretary General is encouraged to facilitate and report on the implementation of the plan of action at the 58th session on the implementation of this resolution.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L47.pdf>

L.48: initially sponsored by Uzbekistan: this draft resolution regarding establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia simply takes the decision to include in the provisional agenda of its 57th session this item.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L48.pdf>

L.49: initially sponsored by the Chairman: this draft resolution is regarding global efforts against terrorism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Chairman notes with concern the "lack of sufficient progress in multilateral disarmament diplomacy" and reaffirms the importance of strengthening multilateral negotiations.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L49.pdf>

L.50: initially co-sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution regarding the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific welcomes the support these centres have received and calls for more participation from all of the States of the region and international, regional and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L50.pdf>

L.51: initially sponsored by Mali: this draft resolution regarding assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, welcomes the support and encourages further participation of States, and international, regional and non-governmental organizations to ensure the smooth functioning of the bodies established to facilitate this task. The Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly at the 57th session on the implementation of this resolution.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L51.pdf>

Dimity Hawkins, Reaching Critical Will/ WILPF  
Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will/WILPF

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Felicity Hill  
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Reply-To: <agreenblat@nccusa.org>  
From: "Andrew Greenblatt" <agreenblat@nccusa.org>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Letter to President Bush  
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:48:11 -0400  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0)  
X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400  
Importance: Normal

Howard,

Great work! Thank you so much for doing this.

Andrew Greenblatt

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 3:42 PM  
To: mupj@igc.org  
Subject: Letter to President Bush

Dear Colleagues:

Here is the letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the campaign against terrorism. Thanks to the 20 organizations which signed it.

If you would like to post the letter and signers on you web site, please do so. I am attaching a Word version in case it will be useful to you.

Shalom,  
Howard

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October 23, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The campaign against terrorism is raising new and important questions about the role and future of nuclear weapons in the global security framework of the 21st century. We would like to share with you our thinking on this matter.

First, we note that some of your advisors inside and outside of government favor using nuclear weapons against terrorist enclaves and against states that possess no nuclear weapons. Some advocate use of nuclear weapons in

response to attacks by chemical and biological weapons. This would reverse the long-standing U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons primarily as a tool to deter other nuclear-weapon states. We believe that the policy of the United States should be no first use of nuclear weapons against any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, or against any other adversary at any time under any circumstance. We believe that such first use would be immoral and would constitute a crime against humanity. We also believe that nuclear weapons should never be used in response to an attack by biological and chemical weapons.

Second, we note that in January 2001 the Russia Task Force chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler stated: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops or citizens at home." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States emphasize the importance of this finding. Therefore, we believe that a substantial portion of anti-terrorist funds should go for full implementation of the Baker-Cutler report. In terms of relative priority, we suggest that funds be transferred from the missile defense budget to this and other urgent non-proliferation initiatives.

Third, we believe that the improved relationship between the United States and Russia because of mutual concern over terrorism should be treated as an opportunity to make substantial progress in improving the security of deployed nuclear weapons and dismantling the nuclear arsenals still in place more than a decade after the Cold War ended. Specifically we ask you to implement your campaign promise to work with Russia to de-alert and stand down the respective nuclear arsenals and to achieve deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Not only will this enhance the security of the United States and Russia by lowering the possibility of accidental launch, it will also reduce the danger that a renegade group could gain control of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and use them for terrorist attack on the United States.

We urge you to carry out these recommendations as a means of achieving a safer and more peaceful world in the 21st century.

Sincerely yours,

James Matlack, Director  
Washington Office  
American Friends Service Committee

Ken Sehested, Executive Director  
Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America

Greg Davidson Laszakovits, Coordinator  
Church of the Brethren Washington Office

Tiffany Heath  
Washington, D.C. Legislative Office  
Church Women United

Rev. Joel J. Heim, Ph.D., Moderator Disciples Peace Fellowship

David Culp, Legislative Representative  
Friends Committee on National Legislation

The Rev. Mark B. Brown  
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs  
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Stan De Boe, OSST, Director  
Office of Justice and Peace  
Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Brenda Girton-Mitchell, Associate General Secretary for Public Witness  
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA

Marie Dennis  
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice

(Ms.) Rabia Terri Harris, Coordinator  
Muslim Peace Fellowship

Kathy Thorton, RSM, National Coordinator  
NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

Bishop Walter Sullivan, President  
Bishop Tom Gumbleton, Former President  
Dave Robinson, National Coordinator  
Pax Christi USA

Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory, Director  
Washington Office  
Presbyterian Church (USA)

Mark J. Pelavin, Associate Director  
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism

Andrew Greenblatt, Coordinator  
Religious Leaders for Sensible Priorities

Sr. Ann Rutan, President  
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace

Rev. Meg A. Riley, Director  
Washington Office for Faith in Action  
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations

James Winkler, General Secretary  
General Board of Church and Society United Methodist Church

**X-Sender: flick@pop.igc.org**  
**Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 21:12:14 -0400**  
**To: updates@reachingcriticalwill.org**  
**From: Felicity Hill <flick@igc.org>**  
**Subject: WEEK 3 NGO REPORT FROM 1st COMMITTEE**  
**Cc: wilpf-news@igc.topica.com**

## **WEEK 3 NGO Report from General Assembly First Committee**

1. Introduction
2. Missiles
3. Draft Resolution submitted by the Chairman on Terrorism and Disarmament
4. Small Arms
5. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Entry Into Force Conference
6. DDA symposium on terrorism and disarmament
7. Statement by the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the First Committee on Financial Implications of Draft Resolutions
8. The costs of not funding disarmament adequately

### **1. Introduction**

NGOs have been disappointed at the level of debate and engagement this week in the First Committee. Diplomats have used less than a third the time made available in their agenda to debate the resolutions presented. Of course, as optimists, we presume that many discussions and negotiations are going on behind the scenes, in informal consultations and bilateral negotiations.

**And, because we are optimists,** we also presume that NGOs are indicating their interest to their own and other governments, using the information we are trying to provide.

In an excellent symposium organised by the DDA this week on Disarmament and Terrorism, Mr. V. P Salov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia stated that recent events **simply affirm and confirm the urgency of the traditional disarmament agenda, but add items to this already full agenda.**

Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary asked a provocative question: We all know where the physical ground zero is, but where is moral, legal and political ground zero?

The paralysis and time wasting of the disarmament community over the past years has never been excusable - there has been sufficient basis for a sense of very real danger and urgency for many, many years. As Ambassador Toth of Hungary stated in the forum yesterday, - the question is whether the new situation will help us act more dynamically?

That question remains before the First Committee, the global forum of all 189 member states on Disarmament and International Security.

Felicity Hill, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

## **2. Missiles**

In last year's First Committee, on 20 November 2000, Iran submitted a resolution on Missiles: 55/33 A of 20 November 2000. In this resolution Iran requested that a panel of governmental experts be established in 2001 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution on the issue of missiles in in all its aspects.

This government panel was established and comprised of 23 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Russia, Republic of Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine, UK and US.

The first of these meetings occurred at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the auspices of Department of Disarmament Affairs in mid-August 2001. There will be a total of three meetings, the next being April 1-4 2002 and the third in July 2002.

In this session of the First Committee, Iran submitted draft resolution A/C.1/56/L.6 with the same title as the previous, "Missiles". In this resolution the language is identical to the 55/33 A with the exception of the four points at the end, which note "with satisfaction" that the panel has met will convene twice more. The resolution also requests for the Secretary-General to submit another report to the General Assembly at its 57th session on missiles in all its aspects.

To see last year's resolution from Iran on Missiles:  
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55r033.pdf>

To see this year's draft resolution from Iran on Missiles:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L6.html>

For more general information on the subject of missiles, the governmental expert panel on missiles, and relevant issues:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/missiles/missilesindex.html>

Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

## **3.Global efforts against terrorism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, 19 October 2001. A/C.1/56/L.49.**

This resolution sponsored by the Chairman emphasizes the importance of multilateral negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, in order to contribute towards the global effort against terrorism. The resolution recalls that Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) establishes a "close connection between international terrorism and, inter alia, illegal

arms trafficking and the illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials". A noteworthy absence from this list are legally traded small arms and conventional weapons, which are also of great risk.

To see this resolution:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L49.pdf>

Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

#### **4. Small Arms/Light Weapons (SALW)**

Two draft resolutions relating to small arms and light weapons were introduced. They were both formally presented to 1st Committee on Friday, October 26:

##### **1. The illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (A/C.1/56/L.47)**

Introduced by Colombia, with speeches from Japan, South Africa, Nauru (on behalf of the Pacific Island countries), Belgium (on behalf of the EU), Nepal, and Uruguay (on behalf of Mercosur).

##### **2. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (A/C.1/56/L.51)**

Introduced by Mali (on behalf of ECOWAS), with speeches from Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Guinea, Gabon, and Niger.

The first draft resolution, the principle resolution on SALW, was cosponsored by nearly seventy member states. The delegations of Japan, South Africa, and Columbia were the major contributors in working with other interested delegations in the preparation of the draft resolution.

This draft resolution calls for all Member States to implement the Programme of Action adopted from the July, 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons. As a follow up to the Conference, it calls for a review conference to be convened no later than 2006, and meetings of Member States to be held on a biennial basis beginning in 2003. In addition, the draft resolution encourages the UN, other relevant international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil society, to play active roles in the implementation of the Programme of Action. It calls on the Secretary-General to ensure that resources are made available to the Secretariat in order for the Programme of Action to be implemented.

The financial component of the draft resolution, which speaks about mobilizing resources and expertise in order to implement the Programme of Action, seems to be an impasse for certain member states.

The second draft resolution, sponsored by Mali on behalf of ECOWAS, focuses on the accumulation, proliferation, and widespread use of small arms in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion

in Africa. It calls for greater cooperation on all levels in the struggle to curb the illicit traffic of small arms, including the establishment of national committees in the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion. It welcomes the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Western Africa. This declaration was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Western Africa States in October 1998. Furthermore, the draft resolution calls on the international community to provide technical and financial support to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms.

In statements on the two draft resolutions, most Member States have stressed the need for a multilateral approach to the issue of SALW, with the United Nations playing a key role in facilitating the implementation of the Programme of Action by member states. The danger these weapons pose to innocent civilians, namely women and children, was also stressed; we know already that 80% of those killed by SALW are women and children.

Japan, in a statement to First Committee on Tuesday, 23 October 2001, spoke specifically on the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Japan acknowledged the efforts of various bodies and organizations, for their role in the success of the conference. Japan also highlighted the importance of the resultant Programme of Action, which now must be implemented by Member States. Japan made mention of the fact that in light of the recent terrorist attacks, attention must not be diverted from issues such as small arms and light weapons.

For A/C.1/56/L.47. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, go to:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L47.pdf>

For A/C.1/56/L.51. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, go to:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L51.pdf>

Tariq Remtulla, Quaker UN Office

## **5. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

From November 11 - 13, the Special Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be held at UN Headquarters.

This conference was originally scheduled for September, however after the General Assembly General Debate was postponed due to the events of September 11, Ambassador Olga Pellicer, sent a letter to the Secretary-General, on behalf of the majority of States which have ratified the CTBT asking him to also postpone the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT.

In their communication, the ratifying States expressed the wish to have the new dates for the Conference coincide with the first week of the general debate of the 56th session of the GA, as originally planned. This timing could maximize the possibility of high level attendance, in particular by Ministers who may also be attending the General Debate.

For more information see the website

[http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/ctbt/article\\_iv/index.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/ctbt/article_iv/index.html)

Felicity Hill, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, WILPF

## **6 Symposium on Terrorism and Disarmament, Sponsored by the DDA**

**Mr. Dhanapala, Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs:** Mr. Dhanapala, eloquent as always, reminded the audience of the immediate relevance of linking the two issues of terrorism and disarmament. In his words, "we need a common strategy in the disarmament area to deal with this global challenge while pressing ahead with our agreed objectives of achieving the common security with the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of conventional arms to the lowest possible level for legitimate national defence". He qualified this statement by stating that weapon-based security is not only morally wrong but also goes in the opposite direction of disarmament. As a result, new ideas and legal regimes for cooperation in addressing existing and potential terrorist uses of weapons must be discussed and transformed into concrete action through the mechanism of the United Nations system, before it is too late.

**Professor Paul Wilkinson, University of St. Andrews:** According to Professor Wilkinson, the September 11 events have been a watershed in the evolution of terrorism. Terrorists are adapting traditional strategies of terror. Poor airport security has only increased vulnerability to attack. Wilkinson also noted some positive developments since the September 11 attacks. The new era of global cooperation for the fight against terrorism is one such development, such as the timely disarming of the IRA and the participation of Muslim countries in the coalition against terrorism.

He also noted that terrorism often takes form of a geographically dispersed network, thereby emphasizing the multilateral role of the United Nations in this battle. Conventions and guidelines must be used to define the nature of the threat and achieve a model for response. On the subject of counter-proliferation, Professor Wilkinson believes that a critical measure is to enhance security of materials of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, he noted the importance of entry into force of the Rome Statute for the formation of the International Criminal Court to bring these terrorists to justice.

**Ms. Anita Nilsson, IAEA:** The Illicit Trafficking Database Programme of the IAEA has recorded 596 incidents of attempted trafficking, with 396 confirmed by states. 175 of these incidents involved nuclear material, with 18 cases involving highly enriched uranium or plutonium, 201 with other radioactive material. 75% of these incidents were described as with criminal intent.

**Mr. Mikhail Berdennikov, OPCW:** Mr. Berdennikov presented information about the number of inspections undertaken by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

**Ambassador Tibor Toth, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:** Ambassador Toth said there was a danger in simplifying or underestimating the current security situation vis a vis toxic substances. He anticipated that the same difficulties would face the Review Conference on Biological Weapons that starts November 19, but said that the challenge is to go beyond simply reaffirming but translating the general principles into concrete action. There is sufficient basis to act already - the question is whether the new situation will help us act more dynamically.

**Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, University of St Andrews:**

Four trends in the combination of small arms and terrorism:

1. Increased procurement and employment of rockets, grenades, light artillery, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles and small caliber mortar.
2. Asian and Middle East export international to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material- heightening phenomenon in the post-cold war period. As a result of the Middle East peace process, there has been a move eastward in terrorism centers, from Middle East to South Asia and the Southern belt of former USSR republics.
3. Financial, technological and ideological cooperation among terrorist organizations has increased and broadened its geographical scope.
4. Use of improvised explosive devices- low cost and high impact.

Dr. Gunaratna noted that during the cold war, terrorism was primarily sponsored by states. However, since the cold war, states are less likely to sponsor terrorism for fear of international sanctions, and therefore many terrorist networks have found alternative sources of finance. These include legitimate trade, investment, business, and exploitation of Diaspora communities and migrants. The extensive international network disseminates propaganda, raises money, and provides operational support for their cause.

Democratic states such as England, Australia and Canada are often conducive for the formation of these international networks, taking advantage of freedom of speech values. In addition, procurement of weapons often occurs from governments of states where proper controls are not in place.

Dr. Gunaratna therefore recommends some counter-terrorism measures:

1. The most valuable and irreplaceable measure is that of human intelligence, because terrorists have found ways to evade many other types of intelligence.
2. High quality intelligence should be generated to infiltrate and disrupt these networks.
3. Legislation and judicial measures should be harmonized- beyond monitoring of these networks, but actually disrupting their actions.
4. Financial assets should be confiscated.
5. Harsh punishment should be instituted to deter terrorists in procurement of weapons.

The Professor's conclusion stated that the terrorist threat is driven by intention, capability and opportunity, and therefore a multiple approach to the problem is the only way to eradicate terrorism.

**Mr. V. P. Salov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation:** Mr. Salov affirmed the disarmament agenda, indicating that there were simply more items now to be added. The difficulty in suppressing terrorism lies in the fact that many of these organisations are deeply embedded in society, and are usually an ethnic group. He said that the Russians will ratify the 1999 convention on the suppression of financing of terrorism.

Felicity Hill and Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

## **7. Statement by the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the First Committee on Financial Implications of Draft Resolutions**

Mr. Dhanapala reminded Member States that the draft resolution A/C.1/56/L.47 on "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects" entrusts the Secretariat for several new tasks for which "no provision has been made under section 4, Disarmament, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003". Without doubt, the financial implications are important to consider. Considering the Department for Disarmament Affairs is the smallest department in the Secretariat, it has very limited resources with which to carry out its current mandate, let alone the additional demands. Therefore, additional resources are required. The Secretary-General has appealed for the First Committee to support the DDA's request for a "moderate increase in resources so as to enable the Department to effectively discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by member States in the field of disarmament".

The NGO community is adamant that the DDA's role is of utmost importance in the United Nation's work towards peace and security in the world. No one can deny that the DDA is faced with a demanding mandate which requires adequate resources in order to carry out its task. The NGO community joins the voice of Mr. Dhanapala in urging all Member States to approve the DDA's proposals for additional resources, which will be submitted to the Committee, and are vital for the continuation of its important work.

Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

## **8. What Price Disarmament?**

The overall level of resources assigned to the United Nations **Department for Disarmament** in the year 2000 was **\$7.2 million** [A/56/6 (sec.4), 13 March 01]

UN procurement for "**Cleaning and Waste Disposal Services**" = **\$10.7 million**  
[<http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/pdf/00com.pdf>]

UN procurement for "**Furniture**" = **\$5.3 million**  
[<http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/pdf/00com.pdf>]

one F-16 C/D **jet fighter** = **\$12.8 million**  
[<http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay1996/acs/96-004/hardware/docs/fl16.htm>]

one Mirage 2000 C **jet fighter** = **\$23 million**  
[<http://home.iae.nl/users/wbergmns/info/mir2000.htm>]

one Su-34 **jet fighter** = **\$34 million**  
[<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/su-30.htm>]

Annual budget of 76 **US military bands** = **\$163 million**  
[[http://www.utexas.edu/student/careercenter/career\\_ideas/mil\\_musician.html](http://www.utexas.edu/student/careercenter/career_ideas/mil_musician.html)]

Cost of **third golf course** at Andrews Air Force Base = **\$7 million**  
[<http://wwwcdi.org/adm/948/transcript.html>]

Cost of **fireworks** used at APEC meeting in Shanghai = **\$~2 million**  
[Global News Wire, 20 October 01]

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Felicity Hill  
Director, United Nations Office  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
777 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA  
Ph: 1 212 682 1265 Fax: 1 212 286 8211  
email: flick@igc.org, wilpfun@igc.org  
web: www.wilpf.int.ch www.reachingcriticalwill.org  
\*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*

X-Sender: dan@mail.clw.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1  
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 18:08:07 -0500  
To: dan@clw.org  
From: Dan Koslofsky <dan@clw.org>  
Subject: Coolfont Panels: Please Respond

Monday Lobby Participants:

The Coolfont Committee has narrowed the list of potential panels down to eight with six slots remaining. There are a total of seven time slots but one will be dedicated to a presentation from a pollster. We will also include time for the various working groups in Monday Lobby to report on their plans for the year. The events of Sept. 11 and their influence on our work will provide the overall theme for the conference and the context for all panel discussions.

Please Select TWO of the following panel topics that you DO NOT want to include:

1. Missile defense/weapons in space
2. Nuclear weapons issues: reductions, posture review, de-alerting
3. United Nations issues: role in dealing with terrorism
4. Military spending
5. Arms Transfers
6. Foundations and the Arms Control Community
7. Congressional staff outlook for the coming year
8. Nonproliferation issues: nuclear, chemical, biological

The two issues receiving the most votes WILL NOT be the topic of a panel at the conference.

We have tentatively scheduled it for January 15-17. We are also actively searching for alternate, lower cost sights and negotiating prices with Coolfont.

Please RESPOND BY FRIDAY NOVEMBER 2nd.

Contact me with any questions.

Dan Koslofsky  
Executive Director, PeacePAC  
110 Maryland Ave, NE - Suite 409  
Washington, DC 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x115  
(202) 543-6297

To: Dan Koslofsky <dan@clw.org>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Coolfont Panels: Please Respond  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <4.3.1.0.20011029163136.00b35990@mail.clw.org>  
References:

At 06:08 PM 10/29/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Monday Lobby Participants:

>Please Select TWO of the following panel topics that you DO NOT want to

>include:

>

>

>6. Foundations and the Arms Control Community

>7. Congressional staff outlook for the coming year

Howard Hallman

To: gpowers@nccbuscc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Jerry,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

I invite you to be part of this delegation. If you can participate, I will need your date of birth and social security number to provide them in advance for security purpose. If you can't make it and want to send a representative, let me know who that person will be. I am also invite persons from the National Council of Churches, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, a peace church, and a Muslim.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the attached interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Although you didn't sign this letter, the positions articulated are consistent with policies of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If you can participate, please let me know and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: mweiner@rac.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Mike,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

I would like a top staff person from the Religious Action Center to be part of this delegation. would Rabbi David Saperstein or Mark Pelavin be available? If so, I will need that persons date of birth and social security number to provide them in advance for security purpose. I am also inviting persons from the National Council of Churches, U.S. Catholic Conference, a peace church representative, and a Muslim.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If some one from the Religious Action Center can participate, please let me know who it will be and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: lisaw@nccusa.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Lisa,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

I invite you or Brenda Girton-Mitchell to be part of this delegation. If you can participate, I will need your date of birth and social security number to provide them in advance for security purpose. I am also inviting persons from the U.S. Catholic Conference, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, a peace church, and a Muslim.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If you or another representative of the National Council of Churches can participate, please let me know and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: joe@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Joe,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

I invite you to be part of this delegation. If you can participate, I will need your date of birth and social security number to provide them in advance for security purpose. If you cannot attend, I will seek the Washington office head of another peace church. I am also inviting persons from the National Council of Churches, U.S. Catholic Conference, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, and a Muslim.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If you can participate, please let me know and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: mpf@forusa.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\iclt.173.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Rabia,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

We would like to have a Muslim as part of this delegation. Can you help us find an appropriate Muslim leader, perhaps based in Washington, either from the Muslim Peace Fellowship or from another Muslim organization that shares our views on nuclear issues. For security purposes I will need that person's date of birth and social security number to provide in advance. I am also inviting persons from the National Council of Churches, U.S. Catholic Conference, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, and a peace church.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

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At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: kgdime@hotmail.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Sandwich Sunday announcement  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Kelly,

Here is information about Sandwich Sunday for the Sunday School newsletter.

Thanks for taking care of this.

Howard

###

**SANDWICH SUNDAY.** The first Sunday of each month Bethesda United Methodist Church delivers sandwiches for the homeless to McKenna's Wagon in Washington, D.C. Our members prepare sandwiches from one to four loaves of bread and take them to the church kitchen before the 8:45 or 11:00 service. This is a good project for families.

One loaf of bread will make 11 to 12 sandwiches. For each loaf of bread, you will need a one pound package of sliced lunchmeat, a dozen cheese slices, and a spread, such as salad dressing. Cut the sandwich in half and place it in a plastic sandwich bag. Put the filled sandwich bags in the bread wrapper and seal.

From: Michael Weiner [mweiner@rac.org](mailto:mweiner@rac.org)  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)  
Subject: RE: A meeting with NSC staff  
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 17:42:57 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Howard,

I have made the request. I will let you know as soon as I can.

Mike

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [<mailto:mupj@igc.org>]  
Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 7:27 AM  
To: [mweiner@rac.org](mailto:mweiner@rac.org)  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff

Dear Mike,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

I would like a top staff person from the Religious Action Center to be part of this delegation. Would Rabbi David Saperstein or Mark Pelavin be available? If so, I will need that persons date of birth and social security number to provide them in advance for security purpose. I am also inviting persons from the National Council of Churches, U.S. Catholic Conference, a peace church representative, and a Muslim.

The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If some one from the Religious Action Center can participate, please let me know who it will be and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

From: Joe Volk <joe@fcnl.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: A meeting with NSC staff  
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 07:21:02 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

11/1/01

Howard,

Thanks for this invitation to meet with NSC. I accept. I watch for your followup memos.

Cheers,

Joe

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 7:30 AM  
To: joe@fcnl.org  
Subject: A meeting with NSC staff

Dear Joe,

I am forming a six-person, interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person on the National Security Council staff on nuclear weapons issues. It will take place from 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. The purpose will be to discuss several key nuclear issues and offer the perspective of the faith community.

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The point of departure for our discussion will be the interfaith letter to President Bush, dated October 23. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

We can also inquire about the nuclear posture review, now underway, and articulate the view that a systematic program for nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of the U.S. nuclear posture.

At the meeting we can also present Mr. Miller with a set of statements from the faith community on nuclear weapons issues.

If you can participate, please let me know and provide the required security information.

Shalom,  
Howard

X-Sender: jdi@[63.106.26.66]  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1  
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 10:53:28 -0500  
To: jdi@clw.org  
From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
Subject: Missile defense: an analysis of key decisions ahead

October 31, 2001

Bush, Putin Set for Key Decisions on ABM Treaty and Missile Defense:  
An Analysis from Council for a Livable World

The upcoming meetings between President Bush's and Vladimir Putin in Washington and Texas November 12 - 14 have put the ABM Treaty and national missile defense back on the agenda after nearly two months in which terrorism drowned out all other issues. Decisions are likely to be made soon that will have a major impact on the progress of the missile defense program, the health of arms control efforts and the cohesion of the international coalition against terrorism.

=====  
The U.S.-Russian minuet begins in Genoa  
=====

At their July 22 summit meeting in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin began a slow minuet in which they formally linked missile defenses with reductions in nuclear weapons. There has been background music but little progress since, in part because the U.S. has yet to complete an on-going review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and has not been prepared to propose specific levels of strategic nuclear weapons.

=====  
What happened in Shanghai  
=====

When they came together again in Shanghai in mid-October, Bush and Putin reported progress toward agreement on both missile defense and nuclear reductions. President Bush said at his October 21 press conference with President Putin: "We also see progress in our efforts to build a new strategic framework." President Putin agreed: "I believe we do have an understanding we can reach agreements."

However, the two leaders continued to display major notes of discord. Bush warned: "The events of September 11 make it clearer than ever that a cold war ABM Treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated, and I believe dangerous." By contrast, Putin called the ABM Treaty "an important element for stability in the world," and saw no connection between missile defense and September 11. "It would be difficult for me to agree that some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental ballistic missiles and will be able to use them," Putin said.

The summit was also significant for steps not taken. Some in the administration were pushing President Bush to set a deadline for an agreement and to stipulate that, if none were reached, the U.S. would give

six months notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as provided for in the Treaty. There were hints that a deadline was written into President Bush's talking points for the meeting. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell said at an October 21 press briefing, "We did not give formal or informal notification of an intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty." He added: "The only talking points that count were the ones that came out of the President last night."

There were also reports that the U.S. would propose a new lower limit on strategic nuclear warheads, probably not as low as Russia's suggested level of 1,500, but perhaps closer to 2,500. Instead Bush said at his press conference: "I told Mr. Putin that we are in the process of analyzing our nuclear arsenal," and National Security Adviser Condolizza Rice added that "the President said that he would be getting back to President Putin soon" on a number.

=====  
The next steps  
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Another overture was heard from the Bush side on October 25. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Pentagon was delaying some missile defense tests that would "bump up" against the ABM Treaty. This raised hopes that the two sides were moving closer to a deal. U.S. Ambassador to Russia Sandy Vershbow said on October 26, "I am more confident that we will find a mutually advantageous solution to the problem of missile defense because we now have a stronger commitment to meeting new threats together."

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More to the point, the tests cited by Rumsfeld are not crucial to development of missile defense at this stage. Philip Coyle, a former director of testing and evaluation at the Pentagon, called the tests involving the Aegis radar a "red herring" because they would violate the treaty but are not particularly significant. "That's an example of one of the tests that they'd like to do that would bump up against the ABM treaty. They picked a test that ... doesn't help that much with the overall development of the program," Coyle said at a press briefing last month.

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The Pentagon has begun clearing the Fort Greely site. Administration officials have suggested that if no agreement is reached with Russia in the next months, the administration may be prepared to give six months notice of withdrawal in January 2002. That announcement could clear the way to begin construction — the so-called pouring of concrete — by the summer of 2002.

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While Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin shelved several Senate Armed Services Committee decisions that could have constricted the Administration's missile defense program, he continues to argue against any unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

On October 22, in a speech delivered in Washington, Levin continued to press his case against unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty: "The Bush administration has got to be very careful before they do it, because if we withdraw unilaterally, there will be more nuclear material on Russian soil, not less. That adds to the proliferation threat, which is the greatest threat we face, because there is nothing more threatening than a terrorist or a terrorist state getting their hands on nuclear material. And the more nuclear material there is on Russian soil, the greater the likelihood is that there could be theft or pilferage of some of that material getting into the hands of a terrorist."

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ABM Finale?  
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The Putin-Bush meetings in November will be pivotal for the future of national missile defense and arms control. The most desirable outcome is one that results in significant reductions in both nations' nuclear arsenals and leaves the ABM Treaty intact. The least desirable would be a U.S. decision to give notice that it was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty with none or only modest cuts in nuclear weapons. The best guess is that the results will be somewhere in between — some agreed modifications to the limits set by the ABM Treaty on missile defense testing, accompanied by cuts in offensive weapons.

John Isaacs  
Council for a Livable World  
110 Maryland Avenue, NE - Room 409  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x.131  
www.clw.org

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Missile defense: an analysis of key decisions ahead  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

You may be interested in this analysis.

Howard

>Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 10:53:28 -0500  
>From: John Isaacs <jdi@clw.org>  
>Subject: Missile defense: an analysis of key decisions ahead  
>  
>October 31, 2001  
>  
>Bush, Putin Set for Key Decisions on ABM Treaty and Missile Defense:  
>An Analysis from Council for a Livable World  
>  
>  
>The upcoming meetings between President Bush's and Vladimir Putin in  
>Washington and Texas November 12 - 14 have put the ABM Treaty and national  
>missile defense back on the agenda after nearly two months in which  
>terrorism drowned out all other issues. Decisions are likely to be made  
>soon that will have a major impact on the progress of the missile defense  
>program, the health of arms control efforts and the cohesion of the  
>international coalition against terrorism.  
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>The U.S.-Russian minuet begins in Genoa  
>=====

>At their July 22 summit meeting in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin  
>began a slow minuet in which they formally linked missile defenses with  
>reductions in nuclear weapons. There has been background music but little  
>progress since, in part because the U.S. has yet to complete an on-going  
>review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and has not been prepared to propose  
>specific levels of strategic nuclear weapons.  
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>What happened in Shanghai  
>=====

>When they came together again in Shanghai in mid-October, Bush and Putin  
>reported progress toward agreement on both missile defense and nuclear  
>reductions. President Bush said at his October 21 press conference with  
>President Putin: "We also see progress in our efforts to build a new  
>strategic framework." President Putin agreed: "I believe we do have an  
>understanding we can reach agreements."  
>

>However, the two leaders continued to display major notes of discord. Bush  
>warned: "The events of September 11 make it clearer than ever that a cold  
>war ABM Treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated, and  
>I believe dangerous." By contrast, Putin called the ABM Treaty "an  
>important element for stability in the world," and saw no connection  
>between missile defense and September 11. "It would be difficult for me to  
>agree that some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental  
>ballistic missiles and will be able to use them," Putin said.

>  
>The summit was also significant for steps not taken. Some in the  
>administration were pushing President Bush to set a deadline for an  
>agreement and to stipulate that, if none were reached, the U.S. would give  
>six months notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as provided for in the  
>Treaty. There were hints that a deadline was written into President Bush's  
>talking points for the meeting. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell  
>said at an October 21 press briefing, "We did not give formal or informal  
>notification of an intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty." He added:  
>"The only talking points that count were the ones that came out of the  
>President last night."

>  
>There were also reports that the U.S. would propose a new lower limit on  
>strategic nuclear warheads, probably not as low as Russia's suggested level  
>of 1,500, but perhaps closer to 2,500. Instead Bush said at his press  
>conference: "I told Mr. Putin that we are in the process of analyzing our  
>nuclear arsenal," and National Security Adviser Condolizza Rice added that  
>"the President said that he would be getting back to President Putin soon"  
>on a number.

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>The next steps  
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To: Mcropsey@umpublishing.org  
From: "Carlee L. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Summer 2002 devotions  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments: A:\#1-1001.11.doc; A:\#2-1001.09.doc; A:\#3-1001.08.doc; A:\#4-901.17.doc; A:\#5-1001.11.doc;  
A:\#6-1001.doc; A:\#7-1001.04B.doc; A:\#8-1001.doc; A:\#9-1001.doc; A:\#10-101.doc; A:\#11-101.doc; A:\#12-  
901.29.doc; A:\#13-801.28.doc;  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Marvin,

Please find attached the thirteen columns for Summer 2002, "Maturing in Faith." I look forward to hearing from you.  
Happy Reformation Day.

In faith,  
Carlee

Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 09:19:21 -0800  
Subject: Urge all Governments to Condemn State Terrorism and Violence in the Middle East  
To: "Howard Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
From: "GBCS" <actiongbcs@umc-gbcs.org>  
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:leave-gbcs-5112739D@earth.lyris.net>  
Reply-To: GBCS<actiongbcs@umc-gbcs.org>

October 25, 2001

Contact: Teddy Crum or Janet Horman

Urge all Governments to Condemn State  
Terrorism and Violence in the Middle East

The United Methodist Book of Resolutions states:

There is no significant difference between "state terrorism," as the "overkill" response of a state, and group terrorism, whether in the international arena or on the home front ... therefore, we urge the President of the United States to repudiate violence and the killing and victimizing of innocent people, ... and oppose the use of indiscriminate military force to combat terrorism, especially where the use of such force results in casualties among noncombatant citizens who are not themselves perpetrators of terrorist acts (2000 BOR, p. 787).

Urge governments to stop military assistance and arms exports to the [Middle East] (2000 BOR, p. 758).

The United Methodist Church calls upon the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to accept the authority of Security Council resolutions and abide by Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as all other relevant Security Council resolutions, that provide a framework for bringing [the Israel-Palestine] conflict to a just and permanent end (2000 BOR, p. 761).

Council of Bishops statement, May 2001:

We...call upon the United States government, through Congress, to use all measures possible, including the cutting off of all funding to the Israeli government, to insure that the following conditions are met:

- 1)All human rights violations cease
- 2)Building of roads for the purpose of dividing the Palestinian lands through the West Bank and Gaza cease
- 3)No more Jewish settlements built in occupied territories
- 4)All home demolitions cease.

The Issue: Since Thursday, October 18, 2001, the Israeli army has "re-occupied" or put under siege all major population areas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Dozens of innocent civilians have been

killed, many others injured, and countless numbers severely traumatized, mostly children, women and elderly, by the indiscriminate use of force.

News coming out of the Occupied Palestinian Territories suggests that Israel is showing no sign of ending its siege. Fear that massacres of innocent civilians could happen, and indeed, reports that more than 10 civilians have been killed already in the villages of Beit Rima and Deir Ghassana, remind us that our vigilance is needed at this time to avoid events similar to the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982, when between 1,200 and 2,000 refugees were slaughtered under the direct military control of then Defense Minister and current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

Holy sites and religious institutions, including hospitals, have been fired upon with heavy weaponry by the Israeli Occupation Forces. St. Catherine's Church, adjoining the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, was fired upon while worshippers were inside for the morning mass. A 17-year-old altar boy from the Greek Orthodox Church, located atop the grotto where Jesus is believed to have been born, was killed while on his way home from church on Saturday. At least two hospitals have been hit by Israeli fire including the Holy Family Hospital in Bethlehem, which is a maternity hospital, first hit on October 22nd. Three shells hit the buildings of the hospital, one going into the intensive care unit (ICU), one hitting the laundry room, and another hitting an adjacent building. At the time it was hit, the hospital had 50 residents, all under age five.

The increasing state violence and terrorism by Israel is resulting in greater violence and terrorism by militant nationalist elements among the Palestinians.

The United States Government gives almost \$5 billion annually to the Israeli Government, over half of which is designated as military aid. Israel has killed civilians with U.S. made F-16s, Apache attack helicopters, and other ammunition and weaponry. The Security and Fair Enforcement in Arms Trafficking Act of 2001 encourages "a prohibition against the transfer [of arms] to recipients engaged in gross and consistent violations of internationally recognized human rights and international humanitarian law." The United Nations Commission on Human Rights points out their "[concern] at the widespread, systematic and gross violations of human rights perpetrated by [the] Israeli occupying Power, in particular mass killings and collective punishments, such as demolition of houses and closure of the Palestinian territories, measures which constitute war crimes, flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity" (UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Fifth Special Session, 17-19 October 2000).

#### Action Calls:

We call upon all United Methodists to become educated on the situation in the Middle East, including the 34 year Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, pray for all people of the region, and provide financial support to the Palestinian people, who are victims of the current attacks, through contributions to the General Board of Global Ministries "Advance Special for the Middle East Crisis" advance number 601740-2. (Make Checks

payable to General Board of Global Ministries and include # on check.)

United States Citizens should call the President, Secretary of State, and Members of Congress; all other United Methodists should write or call your elected officials urging them to follow these actions set out by the Book of Resolutions of the United Methodist Church:

- 1) Stop military assistance and arms exports to the Middle East.
- 2) Encourage the state of Israel to cease the confiscation of Palestinian lands; to cease the building of new, or the development of existing, settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; to lift closures of Jerusalem to Palestinians; to cease construction of bypass roads connecting Israeli settlements that isolate Palestinian towns and villages; to cease the demolition of Palestinian homes; to cease the torture of Palestinian prisoners, deportations, and other human rights violations; and to release Palestinian political prisoners
- 3) Urge the President of the United States to repudiate violence and the killing and victimizing of innocent people
- 4) Oppose the use of indiscriminate military force to combat terrorism, especially where the use of such force results in casualties among noncombatants who are not themselves perpetrators of terrorist acts
- 5) Urge the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to accept the authority of Security Council resolutions and abide by Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as all other relevant Security Council resolutions, that provide a framework for bringing this conflict to a just and permanent end

When the angels had left them and gone into heaven, the shepherds said to one another, "Let us go now to Bethlehem and see this thing that has taken place, which the Lord has made known to us." So they went with haste and found Mary and Joseph, and the child lying in the manger. When they saw this, they made known what had been told them about this child; and all who heard it were amazed at what the shepherds had told them. But Mary treasured all these words and pondered them in her heart." (Luke 2:15-19)

As we go into the Advent season, urge your congregation to work and pray for peace in the city, and land of Jesus' birth.

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To unsubscribe send a blank email to [leave-gbcs-5112739D@earth.lyris.net](mailto:leave-gbcs-5112739D@earth.lyris.net)

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"Herb Jasper"  
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"Bill Hansell" <BHANSELL@ICMA.org>, "Jim Svara" <svara@ncsu.edu>,  
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"ScottFosler@aol.com"  
<ScottFosler@aol.com>,  
"Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>,  
"DSkoler@aol.com" <DSkoler@aol.com>  
Cc: "Gloria Register" <gregist@mail.ci.dallas.tx.us>  
Subject: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 16:39:08 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Colleagues:

I know that several of you have had problems opening attachments or receiving e-mail messages that I have been generating from my University work station at home -- and I have been too lazy to go into my office where I could get secretarial instruction in such matters. But we are close to putting our Dallas conference to bed now, so soon things will be back in channels. This communication to all persons thus far identified as either Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons for the Conference

break-out groups attempts to summarize previously garble messages, and clarify a few additional points.

Note that the addressees are listed in the order that they have appeared on previous draft agenda programs. I am happy to report that the current iteration (10-31-01) is on our website <napawash.org/spse>, and you can access it by clicking on "What's New". It is subject to additional changes, but it is pretty much in place. Please note that there will be a strategy session for the addressees at the Magnolia Hotel, Sunday, November 11, 2:00 PM. Please plan to be present so that we might resolve together any remaining confusion about what we hope to accomplish. The Prospectus for the Conference, which some of you could not open, will also be on the website tomorrow (hopefully). The guidance concept piece for break out group leaders is also included at the bottom of this e-mail, instead of in an attachment for your convenience.

Regard the guidance as just that, not something engraved in stone. In general, we have asked the Rapporteurs to take leadership in framing the discussion pieces to be prepared for break out groups. But this is not always the case, and can be negotiated between you. This is made easier by including everyone's e-mail address above. I will include some telephone numbers below as well, as I go down each break-out group. Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons should have some conversation prior to our strategy meeting in Dallas, preferably in the preparation of the discussion piece -- but I know how time pressures are.

1. For the Health group, rapporteur Herb Jasper (301-229-0644) has been asked to prepare a brief discussion paper, not more than two pages, as outlined in the guidance statement. The background pieces will be given to each Conference participant to help in selection of the break-out group to attend.

2. Norm Johnson (404-827-8145) is preparing a brief discussion paper for the Education/diversity break-out group.

3. Charles Washington (954-762-5642) will prepare the discussion piece for the Investing in People breakout group. Charldean Newell will also provide some points.

4. Marshall Taggart (773-838-0642) has been asked to prepare a discussion piece for the Drugs/Correction break out group.

5. Enid Beaumont (202-223-1617) is preparing a discussion piece for the Income support/Social Security break-out group, which will have Horace Dickerson, Regional Social Security commissioner as a Resource Person.

6. Valerie Lemmie (937-333-3609) is preparing a discussion piece for the environment group.

7. Jim Svava (919-515-5069) is preparing a discussion piece for the Benchmark/scorecard group

8. Costis Toregas (202-626-2411) is preparing a discussion piece on the Digital Divide/economic inequalities group.

9. Sy Murray (216-687-2254) is preparing a piece on international social equity issues.

10. Howard Hallman (301-897-3668) is preparing a discussion piece on responsible consumption.

Please e-mail your two page discussion pieces to Gloria Register [gregist@ci.dallas.tx.us](mailto:gregist@ci.dallas.tx.us) as soon as possible for duplicating so they can be put in each program packet. I would also urge each of you to glance again at the Panel's Issue paper and Work Plan, of which the Dallas Conference is the final product for our first year's operation. The Issue paper can be found on the panel's website. An updated version of this "work in progress" will be distributed in Dallas -- but addresses should read the current version in advance of the meeting to better inform our discussions.

And don't forget to read the guidance document which follows below:

#### **GUIDANCE TO DISCUSSION LEADERS, RESOURCE PEOPLE, AND RAPPORTEURS**

To make the most of the limited time in the breakout sessions, several people will facilitate the discussion and reporting of it to the plenary session.

Discussion Leaders will moderate the exchange of ideas among breakout group participants. This individual may want to make a 2-3 minute opening statement, but is not considered a speaker. The primary skill is eliciting input from others. The discussion leader will want to use the brief issue paper for the session as a framework for the discussion, but it is possible the participants will veer from the points in the paper; it is intended only as a starting point. After approximately one hour of the session, the discussion leader will want to guide participants in developing the recommendations they want presented to the plenary.

Rapporteurs need to be comfortable enough with the subject matter to take cogent notes and be prepared to present and defend the group's recommendations to the plenary session. The rapporteur will probably want to interact more with the participants as they develop recommendations, to ensure that the rapporteur understands them well enough to represent the group. It is not necessary that a rapporteur agree with the group's recommendations.

Resource People will be subject-matter experts who will assist discussion leaders or participants if there are questions about the issues being discussed. Some breakout sessions may take more advantage of the resource people than others.

Note takers will take more detailed notes of the discussion, and will be a primary resource to the rapporteurs. Generally, the note takers will be recruited from Dallas area universities, and will take notes on laptops so this information can be used for a conference summary.

#### **SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR SHORT ISSUE PAPERS**

Each of the issues to be discussed in breakout groups is important enough to warrant a week's worth of discussion, if not more. A short issue paper (perhaps two pages) will help focus the discussion in the two hours and fifteen minutes allotted for the breakout groups. All Leadership Conference attendees will likely read all the papers, as they will ultimately be discussing recommendations from each group. It will thus be helpful if the papers are organized in a similar fashion.

The papers are not intended to be significant works of research. They will offer a common base of information for the discussion, and should mention conflicting perspectives, if appropriate. This outline should be sufficiently flexible for each writer to adapt to their issue.

- I. Title of the Breakout Session
- II. Statement of the current problem.
- III. Impact the problem has on society, including references to how it may affect some demographic or ethnic groups differently.
- IV. Current role of the public sector in the area.
- V. Perceived problems with the current public level of effort.

A writer may want to present the information in paragraph or outline form.

To: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <875F4BFEEB4CD21192D300805F65BBC00A533CF2@PENNSYLVANIA>  
References:

At 04:39 PM 10/31/01 -0500, you wrote:

.> 10. Howard Hallman (301-897-3668)is preparing as discussion piece  
>on responsible consumption.

Phil,

This is the first time I have heard about this. I thought I was a rapporteur and would be dealing with material brought to the session by the discussion leader and resource persons. I know enough about this subject to be a decent rapporteur but not enough to write a discussion piece.

If you gave me this precise assignment earlier, I missed it. I would have expressed a reservation. A discussion piece needs to be challenging and offer particular views. The rapporteur's role is more neutral and seeks to identify consensus and disagreements in the the discussion.

Can't somebody else produce the discussion piece?

Shalom,  
Howard

From: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman'" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 17:27:59 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Howard:

I'll have someone else do it. A lot of pieces I sent out apparently got lost in cyber space -- which is why I sent this one in one piece, with no attachments. Did you happen to read what the discussion piece was to consist of in the guidance document? Not much to it really, most of the stuff is in the Issue Paper.

Phil

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Wednesday, October 31, 2001 5:06 PM  
To: Rutledge, Philip  
Subject: Re: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons

At 04:39 PM 10/31/01 -0500, you wrote:

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Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

From: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
To: "ScottFosler@aol.com" <ScottFosler@aol.com>,  
"DSkoler@aol.com"  
<DSkoler@aol.com>,  
"Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Cc: "Gloria Register" <gregist@mail.ci.dallas.tx.us>  
Subject: Group 10 on Intergenerational Equity/Sustainable Development  
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 21:38:33 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Scott, Dan, Howard:

The question has been resolved by making Dan Skoler, Discussion Leader; Scott Fosler, Rapporteur; Howard Hallman, Resource Person. Scott and Dan should confer on two page discussion piece/questions, everyone skim again the Issue paper. See you in Dallas, November 11, 2:00 PM.

Phil

## Break-Out Groups for NAPA Conference

### **Group 1 - Ensuring Adequate Health Care for All**

Discussion Leader: William R. Dodge Jr.\*, Regional Excellence Consulting, Bethesda MD  
Rapporteur: Herbert N. Jasper\*, Senior Consultant, McManis Associates, Inc., Bethesda MD  
Resource Persons: Mary Kay Vaughn, Director of Environmental & Health Services, City of Dallas TX  
Drew Alexander, MD, Associate Dean, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas TX

### **Group 2 - Moving from School Desegregation and Integration to Diversity and Improved Educational Outcomes**

Discussion Leader: Norman J. Johnson\*, The Atlanta School Board, Atlanta GA  
Rapporteur: Michael Brintnall, National Association of Schools of Public Administration, Washington DC  
Resource Person: Louis Lopez, Director, Policy, United Way of Central Indiana, Indianapolis IN

### **Group 3 - Investing in People, Beyond Minimum/Livable Wages to Individual Development**

Discussion Leader: Carl W. Stenberg III\*, Dean, Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts, University of Baltimore MD  
Rapporteur: Charles W. Washington\*, Professor of Public Administration, Florida Atlantic University, Ft. Lauderdale FL  
Resource Persons: John L. Ware\*, President and CEO, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Group, Dallas TX; Chardean Newell, Regents Professor, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas, Denton, TX

### **Group 4 - Shifting from "War" on Drugs and Long Prison Terms to Treatment, Prevention and Restoration**

Discussion Leader: Marshall Taggart Jr., Conference of Minority Public Administrators, Washington DC  
Rapporteur: Larry D. Terry\*, Associate Provost, University of Texas at Dallas  
Resource Person: James Ward, Master of Public Administration Program, Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls TX

### **Group 5 – Securing the Future for Income Support Programs and Social Security**

Discussion Leader: Robert Silvanik, Council of State Governments, State Trends Development Group, Lexington KY  
Rapporteur: Enid Beaumont\*, Institute for Public Administration, Washington DC  
Resource Person: Horace Dickerson\*, Regional Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Dallas, TX

### **Group 6 – Supporting the Legal and Moral Dimension of Environmental Protection and Justice**

Discussion Leader: Edward Ferguson, Deputy Executive Director, National Association of Counties, Washington, DC  
Rapporteur: Valerie Lemmie\*, City Manager, City of Dayton OH  
Resource Person: Richard Hug, Associate professor, Indiana University Northwest, Gary IN

### **Group 7 – It Only Matters If You Measure: Indicators and Scorecards Needed to Track Social Equity Issues**

Discussion Leader: Mitchell Rice\*, Director, Race and Ethnic Studies Institute, Texas A&M University, College Station TX  
Rapporteur: William H. Hansell Jr.\*, Executive, International City/County Management Association, Washington DC  
Resource Person: James Svava\*, Professor, Public Administration Program, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC

### **Group 8 – Bridging the Digital Divide: Creating Equal Access So We Don't Reinforce Economic Inequalities**

Discussion Leader: Naomi B. Lynn\*, Chancellor, University of Illinois at Springfield  
Rapporteur: Costis Toregas\*, President, Public Technology, Inc., Washington DC  
Resource Person: TBA

### **Group 9 – Balancing National and International Economic Interests**

Discussion Leader: Franklin S. Reeder\*, President, The Reeder Group, Arlington VA  
Rapporteur: Sylvester Murray\*, College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University  
Resource Person: Harriet Jenkins\*, Former Director, U.S. Senate Fair Employment Practices Office, Washington, DC

### **Group 10 – Ensuring That Today's Generation Doesn't Consume Tomorrow's Resources**

Discussion Leader: Daniel L. Skoler\*, Former Vice President for Policy and Advocacy, The National Council on Aging  
Rapporteur: R. Scott Fosler\*, University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs, Chevy Chase MD  
Resource Person: Howard Hallman\*, Former Executive Director, Methodists United for Peace and Justice, Bethesda MD

\*NAPA Fellow

To: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <875F4BFEEB4CD21192D300805F65BBC00A533CF5@PENNSYLVANIA>  
References:

At 05:27 PM 10/31/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Howard:

>

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Phil,

I'm really confused. Apparently I didn't receive all of your previous communiations. Certainly I have never seen an issue paper on responsible consumption.

On your first message: What's the difference between the issue paper and the discussion piece? Is somebody writing an issue paper on responsible consumption? Is the discussion piece then basically derived from the issue paper to help focus discussion?

If it's the latter and if there is a longer issue paper available, written by an expert, I could manage a discussion piece. But I would need the issue paper within a few days.

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Also: my title is Chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice.

If e-mail exchange isn't adequate to clarify this, please call me. I will be available this afternoon, Thursday, November 1, at 301 896-0013.

Shalom,  
Howard

From: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
To: "'Howard W. Hallman '" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2001 15:42:05 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Howard:

I think it will work out. There have been a lot of e-mail exchanges sent from different sources that went astray. The confusion is around a couple breakout groups, but the new line up will take care of it. They have your title correct, but there was a computer glitch in shifting places with Dan Skole. It'll be correct on the Program.

Phil

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman  
To: Rutledge, Philip  
Sent: 11/1/2001 7:39 AM  
Subject: RE: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons

At 05:27 PM 10/31/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Howard:

>

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Shalom,  
Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

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To: "Rutledge, Philip" <rutledge@indiana.edu>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Memo To Dallas Conference Discussion Leaders, Rapporteurs, and Resource Persons  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <875F4BFEEB4CD21192D300805F65BBC00A533CFF@PENNSYLVANIA>  
References:

At 03:42 PM 11/1/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Howard:

>

> I think it will work out. There have been a lot of e-mail exchanges  
>sent from different sources that went astray. The confusion is around a  
>couple breakout groups, but the new line up will take care of it. They have  
>your title correct, but there was a computer glitch in shifting places with  
>Dan Skole. It'll be correct on the Program.

>

> Phil

Phil,

Are you saying that Dan Skoler is the resource person? And that I will be rapporteur? I hope so.

I cannot claim to be a subject-matter expert as defined in the attachment you sent in mid-October. But I am "comfortable enough with the subject matter" as rapportuer "to take cogent notes and be prepared to present and defend the group's recommendations to the plenary session." I welcome this role, for I like to synthesize discussion.

So let me know. And thanks for doing all the detailed work to make this conference a success.

Shalom,  
Howard

**X-Sender: flick@pop.igc.org**  
**Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2001 12:17:13 -0500**  
**To: updates@reachingcriticalwill.org**  
**From: Felicity Hill <flick@igc.org>**  
**Subject: WEEK 4 NGO REPORT ON 1st Committee**

## **WEEK 4 NGO Report from General Assembly First Committee**

1. Introduction
2. VOTING SO FAR
3. Nuclear Disarmament/New Agenda/NWFZ
4. ABM Treaty resolution/PAROS
5. Missiles
6. Small Arms
7. Biological Weapons
8. Transparency in Armaments/Register of Conventional Weapons
9. International Court of Justice/Nuclear Weapons Convention
10. IAEA Briefing on Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Power Plant Vulnerability
11. Disarmament and Gender - celebrating SC Resolution 1325
12. 5th Committee
13. CTBT

### **1. Introduction**

Disarmament and international security are the subject matter of the UNGA First Committee, but the most crucial decisions on this matter do not seem to be on the table here in New York. Even taking into account that government representatives to the UN receive their instructions from home, four weeks into this year's First Committee meeting the question surfaces: Is the body formally entrusted to discuss disarmament and international security and make recommendations on behalf of all the nations of the world any more than a side show within the global discourse on security? Do the operational structure and the questions on the table even allow the First Committee to contribute significantly to security, other than as a secondary arena or even a possible sacrifice zone?

Those who follow the debate in the First Committee and read the newspapers have recently experienced moments of disorientation, when the headlines and the resolution titles bump up against each other but don't seem to reflect much of the same content. This has been the case, for example, on the ABM Treaty and its future. What agreements are taking shape between Bush and Putin, we do not know at the moment. It's a bilateral issue according to the US. It's a global issue according to Russia and the rest of the world. The resolution sponsored by Russia, China, and Belarus calling for preservation of the ABM Treaty has been the hot item in this year's the First Committee. (See below.) But the upcoming Bush-Putin Summit is the real show.

Another example of the secondary arena complex relates to an issue dominating the headlines: bio-terrorism. The First Committee is part of a community that has laboured for years to produce a protocol enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention. The guiding principle of the protocol is prevention, and most of the world strongly desires this protocol. The US has rejected the protocol in favour of an approach that relies primarily on response to the use - rather than the development - of biological weapons. Recent US proposals would enhance the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention, and preparation for the event of use is clearly in the public interest as well. But a meaningful response to the threat of bio-terrorism requires strengthening preventive measures and working cooperatively to improve enforcement and verification. With all the attention to bio-terrorism these days, there should be more attention to the protocol across the board, not only among UN insiders. US government and industry need to hear directly from the citizens and the governments of the world. See more on this below.

Merav Datan, Physicians for Social Responsibility/International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Dimity Hawkins, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

Felicity Hill, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

Jim Wurst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

## **2. VOTING SO FAR**

The voting records for each resolution can be found at:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/2001resindex.html>

## **3. Nuclear Disarmament/New Agenda/NWFZ**

When the First Committee began voting on draft resolutions Tuesday afternoon, it began with nuclear disarmament drafts that are either uncontentious or so well-worn that debate is useless. The New Agenda is on Comm I's agenda only as a draft decision to place the item on next year's agenda. The decision was adopted without a vote. Likewise, the draft on the fissile materials cut-off treaty, which simply "urges" the CD to agree to a program of work so that negotiations may begin, was adopted by consensus.

Four drafts on which votes were taken were highly divisive -- as they always are. The draft on a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons was adopted 90 to 42 with eleven abstentions; India's reducing nuclear dangers passed 89:43:11; arrangements for negative security assurances to NNWS passed 94:0:52; and the ICJ resolution was adopted 99:28:19. (See below.) The split is largely on South/North lines.

There was little debate on these drafts, and what comments were made broke no new ground. The United States explained its opposition to the prohibition of use and ICJ resolutions in nearly identical words: these are not "practical" approaches; "step-by-step" is the only process "yielding significant results." It should also be noted that there is essentially no change between the Clinton and Bush administrations on these issues.

On Friday afternoon, Japan issued a revision of its embattled draft on "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons." Delegations have criticized it for straying too far from the consensus language of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, thus undermining that agreement. Japan proposed several changes meant to address those concerns. Language has been added on IAEA safeguards and the CTBT which Japan said would stress the importance of these initiatives. The major concern of some states centered on the wording on the "unequivocal undertaking." The early draft placed this "undertaking" as a step to be taken rather than an existing commitment; some delegates wanted this removed from Operative Paragraph 3 and placed in the preamble. Japan rejected this idea as "not strong enough." Therefore Japan changed the

chapeau on OP 3 to eliminate the word "taking" thus removing the suggestion that the undertaking is yet to occur and added wording that the undertaking was agreed to at the NPT 2000 Conference. However, there is still no mention of preserving the ABM Treaty or of the ICJ advisory opinion. Some delegations say they find the revision more acceptable, but it is too soon to know if it is enough to move many states from the abstention to yes column.

Also on Friday afternoon, Mexico announced it would not press to a vote its draft resolution on a conference on eliminating nuclear dangers -- effectively withdrawing it. Instead, Mexico put forward a draft decision simply asking that this item be placed on next year's GA agenda, saying that "we require more time... to explain the objective of this resolution and to raise the level of support for this initiative."

Besides the Japanese and Mexican revised texts, under the "nuclear disarmament" cluster, this leaves the non-aligned's tradition draft on nuclear disarmament - always opposed by the Northern NWS and their allies - and draft decision on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the depleted uranium draft still to be voted on.

To view the Mexican resolution go to:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L16.pdf>

To view the new Japanese resolution go to:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L35Rev1.pdf>

## NWFZs

All NWFZ drafts were dealt with this week. On Tuesday, the Committee approved without a vote the drafts on the Middle East NWFZ, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Latin American NWFZ), and the draft decision on the Central Asia NWFZ. The more difficult NWFZ drafts were dealt with on Friday. The draft on a southern hemisphere NWFZ was adopted 141 to four (US, UK, France and Monaco) with five abstentions. France, speaking on behalf of itself, the US and UK, said they were worried about "ambiguity" in the text that might threaten the rights of free navigation on the high seas. The draft on "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" -- calling on Israel, as the only Middle East country not a party to the NPT, to join the regime -- was approved 139 to three (Israel, US and Micronesia) with seven abstentions. Israel and the US complained the draft was one-sided, singling out Israel with ignoring Iraq's violations of the NPT. The draft on the African NWFZ was adopted without a vote.

- Jim Wurst, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

#### **4. ABM Treaty resolution/PAROS**

The ABM Resolution initially co-sponsored by the Russian Federation, China and Belarus was revised before coming back to the 1st Committee earlier this week. The revised draft resolution (A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev1) was presented by the Russian Federation during general statements to the 1st Committee on Wednesday 31 October and was voted on during the sessions on Friday 2 November, 2001.

Before going to the vote, the Revised draft attracted additional co-sponsors from Fiji, Haiti and Cote D'Ivoire. Although the Russian Federation announced that there were "no major changes" to the draft, there was a substantial addition which showed the commitment of the sponsors to flexibility in light of the current strategic negotiations between Russia and the US. These negotiations include those held by Presidents Putin and Bush at the Shanghai meeting on October 21 and are scheduled to continue at a Summit of the Presidents later this month.

Optional Paragraph 7 was added to "take into account present realities" and welcomes the ongoing dialogue between Russia and the US. This carefully worded paragraph hopes that the dialogue will "successfully lead to substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces and contribute to the maintenance of international stability". Russia described these revisions as reflective of the vital issues currently under discussion.

The morning following the reintroduced and revised draft resolution L1, a Washington Post article (November 1, 2001) stated that the US and Russia are working on an agreement to be confirmed at this month's Summit between the Presidents. This agreement would reportedly allow for "extensive testing to develop a missile defense system and aim to cut strategic nuclear warhead levels by about two-thirds".

However, the New York Times reported that, "Some former Clinton administration officials said the reductions the Bush administration is considering are less significant than advertised. That is because the Bush administration is adopting a new procedure for counting weapons in which strategic submarines and bombers that are being overhauled will not be included, a break with past arms control treaties.

This change in the counting will reduce the official tabulation of nuclear weapons by about 250 warheads without actually eliminating a single weapon."

Daryl Kimball from Arms Control Today has commented that "Without US nuclear reductions below 2,500 warheads, Bush will lose an important inducement to Russian flexibility on missile defense." He also states that "Bush should direct the Pentagon to drop mass attack nuclear war options and disarming first strike capabilities."

It would seem that the price is getting close to right for both parties to negotiate their way out of the ABM Treaty or to significantly alter this Treaty, repeatedly referred to as a cornerstone of international stability.

The Russian Federation could gain some much needed momentum on disarming some of their

obsolete and outdated nuclear arsenals and progress on the START agreements. It seems they could also gain a possible revocation of one of the last of the Cold War economic sanctions against Russia by the US (New York Times 2 November, 2001). In addition, the New York Times stated that "Mr. Bush wants to announce this month that Russia and a host of former Soviet republics will be "graduated" from the entire process of being reviewed annually to be granted normal trading status. That step would also help pave the way for American approval of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization."

But most importantly, Russia would benefit from the US being "markedly more reserved on the question of Russian use of force in Chechnya" (New York Times, 2 November, 2001).

The US for its part will gain Russia's support (or at least a qualified silence) on their testing program for National Missile Defence. The US will also expect an increase in support and cooperation on the war on terrorism and the US attacks on Afghanistan.

Prior to going to the vote, the US took the floor to emphasize that, despite changes to the draft which acknowledge the ongoing dialogue between themselves and Russia as the parties to the ABM Treaty, it would still vote against the resolution and encouraged others to do the same. This they justified by reiterating old views that it is not the business of the whole of the 1st Committee to be involved in a Treaty to which only two nations are a party. These comments were followed by others before the vote which reflected many of the same views argued in earlier debates on this subject, including that the Treaty is restricted to two parties but remains the concern of the entire international community because of the ABMs place in strategic stability.

After the vote, France took the floor (see their statement in French at <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001state/frefirst021101.pdf>) explaining why they abstained. Germany spoke for many of the European nations and Canada in explaining their reasons for abstaining, which included supporting the US view that the way this issue is dealt with in this Committee should have the support of both parties to the Treaty. Sweden reiterated the view that the support of both parties is necessary to address the issue in this Committee, but added that it is concerned about any unilateral action on national missile defence. Sweden "does not share the overriding preoccupation with strategic stability" expressed in the resolution, as views strategic stability as linked to Cold War deterrence doctrines. In the post- Cold War era, security should be based on principles such as those in the NPT final document.

Regardless of this many of the other nations who took the floor stressed again the vital role that the ABM plays still in international security and stability and expressed their support to the resolution.

Russia and cosponsors struggled to find support for the draft and at the end of the day, the results of the vote on Draft Resolution A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1 were:

80 yes, 3 no and 63 abstained, including the majority of European nations.

The United States did not gain much support for their repeated call to vote against the resolution however, being joined only by Israel and Micronesia in voting no.

Comments before and after the vote were made by:

Syrian Arab Republic, United States, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, , France, India, Iran, Chile, Philippines, Germany, Ukraine, Sweden, Nepal, and Haiti.

View the Revised Draft at:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L1Rev1.pdf>

See also New York Times article "Bush Will Offer Nuclear Cuts to Sway Russia" by Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger: 2 November, 2001: (<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/international/02ARMS.html>)

See also Washington Post article "U.S.-Russia Accord Would Allow Tests, Preserve ABM Pact"; by Walter Pincus and Alan Sipress: November 1, 2001  
Dimity Hawkins, Reaching Critical Will/WILPF

## **PAROS**

The "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" draft resolution (A/C.1/56/L.7) went to the vote today without any further revisions. The results were:

145 yes, 0 no and 3 abstaining. The abstaining parties were the United States, Israel and Micronesia.

Comments were made by Pakistan and El Salvador (who asked to be added as a co-sponsor). Belgium took the floor after the vote on behalf of the EU to clarify their support of the resolution.

View the Draft Resolution at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L7.html>

Dimity Hawkins  
Reaching Critical Will/WILPF

## **5. Missiles**

On 31 October 2001, the Iranian-sponsored resolution A/C.1/56/L.6, entitled "Missiles", passed in the First Committee with 88 in favor and 57 abstentions. There were several statements made before and after the vote. Iran and Pakistan spoke before the vote.

Iran stated four pillars of importance surrounding the missiles issue. First, missiles are finally included in the disarmament agenda; second, there needs to be a balanced approach (non-discriminatory, multilateral and universal) to negotiations; third, missiles must be addressed in ALL its aspects; and fourth, the importance of the initiative of the Secretary-General to prepare a report to consider missiles in all its aspects. Particular concerns from Pakistan included: the danger of missile proliferation from the "suppliers group", concern that negotiations thus far have not been inclusive, and that peaceful uses of the technology involved must be protected.

After the vote, the first to speak was the United States. US expressed concern that this resolution is premature in calling for a report from the Secretary-General before the findings from the Governmental Expert Panel have been completed. They went on to say that perhaps the political intent of the resolution was to take resources away from missile non-proliferation efforts and to hamper progress on the Missile Technology Control Regime Code of Conduct. For information on the MTCR code of conduct, go to: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/missiles/mtr.html>.

Japan noted that the resolution lacked specific reference to missiles as delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. Republic of Korea noted the absence from the resolution of reference to missile tests. Cuba expressed support for the resolution, and noted their support for ridding the world of ballistic missiles.

Belgium, on behalf of the European Union, noted that the resolution takes no political stand against the proliferation of missiles. They agreed with the US that the Code of Conduct of the MTCR is the best way forward at this time, and that it should be universal, so that non-MTCR members will agree to it. Belgium hopes this Code can be in place by 2002, and once adopted would be politically binding, and therefore of clear interest to the United Nations arena.

Australia's statement supported that of Belgium in support of the Code of Conduct.

The statements surrounding this vote demonstrate the divide between those states which feel that the MTCR is the only legitimate negotiating forum on the issue of missiles and those who would like to expand the process, or begin a new path through the United Nations mechanism. The MTCR is not a universal regime, comprising only of 33 members, and focusing only on the supply-side constraints of export control. The establishment of the governmental expert panel on missiles in resolution 55/33 A clearly represented this desire for a new process. MTCR member states are using the UN process to promote the acceptance of the MTCR Code of Conduct, a politically binding set of confidence-building measures which have been negotiated outside of the UN process. Of course, to be truly effective, the Code would have to have wide acceptance from states outside of the MTCR. And yet, several non-MTCR countries have expressed that they have no intention of adhering to yet another discriminatory arms control regime.

It is evident that the only way this process can move forward is for the MTCR states to reach out to those outside of the regime. The process must be more inclusive, for example, moving the process altogether to the UN, and thereby avoiding simultaneous parallel processes, one of which obviously takes precedence over the other for MTCR member states.

Emily Schroeder, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

## **6. Small Arms/ Light Weapons (SALW)**

The revised draft resolution sponsored by Mali on the **Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (A/C.1/56/L.51)** was approved without a vote. Unfortunately, in the process of approval a misunderstanding led to much discussion, but this was eventually resolved. Apparently, certain member states were not aware that Mali was

ready for action to be taken on the draft resolution.

Egypt initially asked for continued consultations on the draft resolution before a vote would be taken. Egypt was concerned about language in the draft, specifically that the language was far from both Bamako and the Programme of Action adopted from the UN Small Arms Conference. Basically, Egypt felt that adopting a draft resolution with language not agreed to before would negatively impact the follow-up process to the UN Small Arms Conference. While Egypt would not ask for a recorded vote, they did want their concerns to be recorded in the official documents of the Committee.

Jordan and Oman also voiced concerns but did not want to block consensus. South Africa then rose on a point of order requesting a deferment of action on the resolution. After a procedural discussion and a brief recess, South Africa took the floor to explain that they did not see a need for linkages to be made between texts and that each text should stand on its own merit. Egypt once again reiterated its concerns about language but did not want to block any vote. Its reservations were noted.

Draft resolutions which relate more loosely to small arms and light weapons are included below (with relevant information on SALW):

**United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (A/C.1/56/L.29)**

Appeals to the Centre and related organizations to take steps to promote the consistent implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

**Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures (A/C.1/56/L.39)**

The availability of cheap and ready-to-use weapons, illicitly traded or manufactured, have added to the intensity and duration of conflicts and make future violence more likely. Existing arms control measures do not cover cases where light weapons are the primary means of combat, a gap that practical disarmament measures seek to fill. The draft resolution (in preambular paragraph seven) lists the Programme of Action as a practical disarmament measure.

**Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development of South-Eastern Europe (A/C.1/56/L.37)**

Urges all States to take effective measures against illicit trade in SALW, to help projects aimed at the destruction of surplus stocks of small arms, and stresses the importance of closer cooperation among States in such areas as crime prevention, illicit trade in people, organized crime, drug trafficking, and money-laundering.

Action on resolution "**The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects**" (A/C.1/56/L.47) has been postponed until Monday due to the late release of document A/C.1/56/L.61 "**Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/56/L.47**". United States expressed that it had not had ample time to review the document due to its lack of required 24 hours of release for consideration, but would be ready for action on Monday.

To view A/C.1/56/L.29 go to: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L29.pdf>.

To view **A/C.1/56/L.39** go to:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L39.pdf>

To view **A/C.1/56/L.37** go to: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L37.pdf>

To view **A/C.1/56/L.47** go to: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L47.pdf>

To view **A/C.1/56/L.61** go to:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L61.pdf>

Tariq Remtulla, Quaker United Nations Office, QUNO

## 7. Biological Weapons Convention

Res. A/C.1/56/L.11, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction" was adopted without a vote on October 31. The resolution calls for the necessary support for the upcoming Review Conference, November 19 to December 2001 in Geneva.) For background and analysis see Jenni Rissanen  
<<http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/index.htm>>

Below are a NY Times article on recent US proposals regarding the BWC, comments on the proposals, and an open letter to the pharmaceutical industry from NGOs.

### **a. BWC: US Proposals and NGO Comments**

NY Times, November 1, 2001

U.S. Seeks Changes in Germ War Pact

By JUDITH MILLER

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 In the wake of anthrax attacks that have killed 4 and sickened some 12 others, the Bush administration is discussing new proposals with its allies that would make it a crime for individuals to buy, build or acquire a biological weapon for terrorist attacks.

The proposals, intended to strengthen the 1972 treaty banning germ weapons, abandon a previous approach favored by many other countries that sought to require treaty members to create a new international organization to conduct mandatory inspections of plants in which germ weapons could be made.

The administration opposed that approach, maintaining that it would have provided a false sense of security. Officials said the previous approach could not have been verified and countries determined to cheat would still have been able to do so.

Instead, the United States wants governments that have signed the treaty to pledge to open their countries to international investigations of suspicious outbreaks, according to a summary of the administration's proposal, the details of which have not been publicly disclosed.

The White House is expected to discuss the measure soon, possibly as early as Thursday.

Administration officials said the recent anthrax terrorism in the United States was helping to convince American allies of the advantages of the administration's approach.

"We strongly believe in the importance of the Biological Weapons Convention and the need to strengthen it," a senior administration official said. "But the anthrax attacks against Americans show that a treaty is not the be-all and end-all to stopping the spread of biological weapons or preventing and dealing with germ attacks."

The official said the attacks showed that "access to enough Cipro also matters, and so do epidemiological investigations and punishing the people who did this."

Donald H. Mahley, the American representative to the protracted international talks in Geneva aimed at strengthening the treaty, and Avis T. Bohlen, assistant secretary of state for arms control, discussed the proposals with key legislators on Capitol Hill last month and with key European allies last week. This week Ambassador Mahley is discussing the package with Japan and Australia.

The administration said that its ideas had been well received by several allies and that Britain had produced a list of suggestions for building on the American approach.

Two veteran European diplomats interviewed today confirmed that their governments were ready to work with the measures proposed by the administration. But both added that they still preferred the more sweeping approach that the administration rejected last summer and hoped that the White House would eventually endorse more of it.

"We are ready and willing to work with the Americans to bridge the gaps," said one of the diplomats. "But we hope this is only a first step and that it opens the door to more sweeping multilateral measures."

Arms control groups voiced similar reservations. "This is a good start," said Daryl Kimball, director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association. "But it doesn't do what the draft agreement that the administration rejected would have done."

Critics at home and abroad argued last summer that the White House's rejection of that proposed agreement, known as a protocol, showed that it was concentrating too much on new military programs and not enough on international treaties and prevention of the spread of weapons.

An interagency review within the administration had unanimously concluded that the protocol would have granted foreign inspectors too much access to American installations and companies.

The 1972 treaty, which 143 nations have ratified, prohibits the development, production and possession of biological weapons. But the treaty has always lacked a means of verifying compliance. The administration's rejection of the draft agreement last summer effectively torpedoed its prospects.

Countries that have signed the treaty are to meet again to discuss ways of strengthening it in Geneva on Nov. 19.

The administration's new package, among other things, would require governments that have signed the accord to pass laws to criminalize violations of the treaty by individuals and to make violators subject to extradition. It would also, according to the summary, require signers to "adopt and implement strict regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms," and report "any releases or adverse events that could impact other countries."

Countries would also have to "sensitize scientists to the risks of genetic engineering" and "explore national oversight of high-risk experiments." Additionally, they would have to adopt a "code of conduct" for scientists working with dangerous germs, and enforce "strict biosafety procedures" for all germ research.

Another provision would require signatories to "accept international expert inspectors" if the United Nations secretary general decided that they should be sent, and create procedures for "international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks" or alleged treaty violations.

The administration would also like to set up a "voluntary" mechanism for "clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent." That would include exchanges of information, visits or other procedures.

Several critics noted that these procedures fall short of the inspections of suspected so-called dual use facilities long favored by many arms control advocates. The lack of mandatory inspections is troubling, one diplomat said.

Seth Brugger, managing editor of the Arms Control Association monthly, also said his group felt that creating a professional group of inspectors would help give the treaty teeth.

The administration has rejected both measures.

Col. David R. Franz, the former commander of the Army biological lab at Fort Detrick, who has inspected suspect installations in Iraq and Russia, said he felt the administration's approach would accomplish more than a mandatory enforcement scheme.

Officials said the Administration had not yet shared its proposals with Russia, a new ally in its war against terrorism.

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**NGO Comments on US proposals:**

States will need time to study them. There are no official reactions as of the time of this writing. The proposals are free standing elements, as opposed to the comprehensive approach of the protocol, but there is some sense they could be useful, and better than nothing. Also they would be instant measures, whereas the protocol, if concluded now, would still take 5 years to enter into force, leaving a vacuum until then. There is potential concern, though, that these proposals could be seen as a substitute rather than an addition to an enforceable protocol.

The NY Times quotes a senior Administration official saying that a treaty is not the "end all, be all". According to one US-based NGO, this and the comments about "having enough Cipro...and epidemiological investigations" make it seem "as if the US Administration is giving a stamp of approval for a bio-terror industry. Where are the preventive measures? Do terrorists who use this stuff really care about being punished?"

It might be important to have the U.S. outline precisely what is meant by "too much access." It also seems to some that the US Administration at this point would like foreign governments to think the American public is behind them on this, and for the American public to think foreign governments are behind them on this. For more information contact Chris Demers at 20/20 Vision, 202-833-2020, [chris@2020vision.org](mailto:chris@2020vision.org).

**b. BWC: Letter to members of PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) in support of enforceable BWC protocol**

The letter below is being sent to the largest members of PhRMA, including Johnson & Johnson, Merck, American Home Products, Bayer, Bristol Myers, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Proctor and Gamble. It is signed by a wide range of NGOs, mainly but not only in the US, and it urges companies to express support for the BWC and for US signature of an enforceable protocol. Letters or statements by governments along these lines could also have a positive influence if such action is taken very soon.

Dear Company CEO:

As groups working to reduce public risk from weapons of mass destruction, we are writing you on a vital policy matter. We are gravely concerned that your trade organization, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), continues to oppose reasonable inspections necessary to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

Rather than blocking progress on this international accord, your company has an opportunity to demonstrate leadership before a meeting scheduled for November 19th to review progress in implementing the Convention. We are sure you will agree that no single issue is of more public concern and more newsworthy than public exposure to biological and toxic agents.

Our hope is to receive your cooperation on this most urgent matter, in advance of a major public education campaign directed at members of PhRMA. Recent acts of terrorism have shown that American citizens are highly susceptible to the use of biological weapons, so we think the general public will share our concerns about your role in PhRMA.

The BWC was established in 1972 as a multinational disarmament treaty to ban the production and use of biological weapons. When the treaty entered into effect in 1975, there was no agreed-upon means to verify compliance. Today, there remains no monitoring for compliance, checking to see that biological agents are accounted for, securely stored and being used only for legitimate purposes.

It is imperative that the BWC be better enforced through inspections. Strengthening the Convention is a rational way to improve the safety of millions of people. We do not think the public will support the pharmaceutical industry's continued opposition to an enforcement protocol for the Convention.

In 1994, after evidence of treaty violations by Iraq and the former Soviet Union, parties to the treaty established an Ad Hoc Group to discuss creation of inspection measures. After 22 meetings over seven years, the Ad Hoc Group's efforts remain stalled. That holding pattern is thanks largely to the U.S., which has resisted the idea of inspections. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America has been the loudest private sector voice lobbying against the U.S. government approving an enforcement protocol. A representative of the industry group recently attempted to justify these lobbying efforts at a congressional hearing. In her words:

"Our concerns with the protocol include the scope of the declarations and on-site activities and the degree to which the burden of the protocol on legitimate activities is balanced by its value for arms control purposes"

Clearly, the value of arms control has not been given adequate weight with respect to whatever burden there may be to pharmaceutical companies. On-site inspections for the protocol can be done without compromising confidential business information. The draft protocol created by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group has been challenged by your trade association as ambiguous, but this should not eliminate efforts to draft and pass an improved protocol.

Intended inspections have been defined as no more invasive than those currently carried out by government agencies like the Food and Drug Administration.

Today, we are asking for a formal response by your company on or before Friday, November 9th. We urge you to issue a public statement acknowledging:

§ Your company's support for the BW

§ The urgent need for an enforcement protocol with inspections

§ Your willingness to support reasonable inspections

§ Your support for the U.S. to sign a protocol

We expect PhRMA to produce the same documentation.

The timing of this is urgent because of the unique opportunity for the U.S. to negotiate and sign a legally binding enforcement protocol at the Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from Nov. 19 to Dec. 7 in Geneva.

An opportunity exists for the pharmaceutical industry to improve the safety of the entire public; a safety all people deserve. Your leadership will be appreciated and well noted to the public and those in government.

Sincerely,

[List of signatories omitted.]

**20/20 Vision Sign On Letter**

Contact Chris Demers at: 202-833-2020, [chris@2020vision.org](mailto:chris@2020vision.org)

Merav Datan, Physicians for Social Responsibility/IPPNW

## **8. Transparency in Armaments/Register of Conventional Weapons**

Resolution A/C.1/56/L.40 on "Transparency in Armaments" passed on October 31 with a vote of 121-0 and 22 abstentions. There were separate votes on two of the paragraphs, and several explanations of vote before and after the voting. In addition to the 76 initial co-sponsors, the resolution attracted about 30 new co-sponsors. The action around this resolution indicates broad support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms in many circles, as well as deep dissatisfaction among some states. Much of the criticism of the resolution was related to the effect of nuclear weapons on regional security concerns in the Middle East.

This resolution follows the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established under GA Res. 46/36 L of 1991 and maintained at UN headquarters in New York. This was intended to be a "universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies. The Register comprises seven agreed categories of major conventional weapons, covering battle tanks, armoured vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missile/missile launchers. It has been in operation with effect from calendar year 1992." (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/register.htm>)

This year's resolution welcomes the most recent Secretary-General's report and responses from Member States, reaffirms support for the operation of the Register, calls for universal participation, and invites additional information. Operative Paragraph 4(b) requests "the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-eighth session." The vote on this paragraph was 123-4 (Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria), with 13 abstentions (Algeria, China, DPRK, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen).

Operative Paragraph 6 "invites the Conference on Disarmament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments." The vote was 123-0, with 17 abstentions (Algeria, China, Cuba, DPRK, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen).

Although none voted against the resolution as a whole, abstainers included the Arab states generally, as well as China, DPRK, Iran, Mauritania, Mexico, Myanmar, and Pakistan. For the Arab states, the main concern related to the Register is that it does not include high tech weapons, specifically nuclear weapons. Libya, speaking on behalf of the Arab group, noted that almost half of UN members refrain from providing information to the Register, and that the Middle East is a special case, with a qualitative lack of balance in armaments. Israel "ignores international appeals" to accept the NPT and to open its nuclear facilities to safeguards, as reiterated at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Egypt, an early proponent of the Register, elaborated on this, explaining that it had changed its vote on this resolution in 1994, when the group of experts was unable to reach consensus on its expansion. According to Egypt, the Register should be universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory, and representative of the security concerns of all states, with the broadest degree of transparency in all fields of armament. The Register currently "does not meet the needs" of Egypt and other states. Reflecting "overall military capability" is the only way to contribute to security, and as such the Register is not consistent with the 1991 agreements on expanding its scope.

Syria commented on Israel's refusal to implement Security Council resolutions, and its sophisticated and destructive weapons capabilities, saying that Israel's alleged transparency is only a small portion of its capability. Oman, Iran, and Algeria spoke along the same lines, calling for transparency in all categories in the interests of balance. Jordan pointed out that it has never refrained from reporting to the Register, but does believe in enlargement to all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

China's explanation of vote (abstention) referred to a Register footnote documenting sales of armaments to Taiwan by one country. This "goes against sovereignty". By registering sales to Taiwan, the US has created a situation of "one China, one Taiwan" in the UN. Myanmar expressed sympathy with the resolution's sponsors, but called for transparency to include weapons of mass destruction. Cuba took the floor to express support for the resolution and point to its participation in the Register as well as the group of experts.

Merav Datan, Physicians for Social Responsibility/IPPNW

## **9. International Court of Justice/Nuclear Weapons Convention**

Resolution A/C.1/56/L.45, "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*" passed on October 30 with a vote of 99-28 and 19 abstentions. There is a cumulative total of about 40 additional co-sponsors since the resolution was introduced.

The First Committee vote in 2000 had been 109-27, with 21 abstentions. The change indicates a decrease in the overall number of states participating in the First Committee vote, although there was one more "no" vote this year. A comparison of the GA vote this year to last year will determine whether there has actually been a decline in support for this resolution. (For background on the resolution, see last week's NGO report.)

As before, there was a separate vote on operative paragraph 1, which "Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the [ICJ] that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." The vote on this paragraph was 139-4 (France, Israel, Russia, and US), with 2 abstentions (UK and Micronesia). Last year's vote on this paragraph was 150-4 (France, Israel, Russia, and US again), with 1 abstention (UK).

Japan took the floor following the vote to express appreciation for Malaysia's commitment to this resolution, Japan's belief that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to basic humanitarianism at the base of international law, and its support for the ICJ conclusion. Japan believes in concrete measures, but also believes it is premature to call for a nuclear weapons convention.

The Netherlands, on behalf of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (BENELUX) and associated states of Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain welcome and support the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ regarding negotiations, so voted in favour of OP1. They share the intent of the resolution but cannot support it as a whole and "regret that only one aspect of the ICJ opinion is represented here." Nuclear disarmament can "only" be reached in a "step-by-step" process, and the international community should focus on the NPT practical measures.

The US voted no on Res. L.45 as well as OP1, expressing support for a step-by-step process that is multi-lateral, bi-lateral, and unilateral, the "only realistic approach." The US opposes attempts to justify the call for negotiations based on the ICJ opinion, stating that the obligation comes from NPT Article VI, not the ICJ opinion. The "progress" so far includes the multi-lateral NPT process, as well as unilateral and bi-lateral progress, non of which uses or was set in motion by the ICJ opinion. The US added that the ICJ advisory opinion is only advisory, not binding. The US perspective overlooks the universal nature of the disarmament obligation implicit in the ICJ opinion, as well as the binding nature of the body of international law on which the ICJ based its opinion. US understanding of progress on nuclear disarmament is also at variance with statements by other states, such as members of the New Agenda Initiative and Non-Aligned Movement (see earlier reports).

Merav Datan, Physicians for Social Responsibility/IPPNW

## **10. IAEA Briefing on Nuclear Terrorism and Independent Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Vulnerability**

### **IAEA Briefing**

The IAEA says the greatest danger of a nuclear terrorism attack would be the detonation of a "dirty" bomb -- a conventional explosive surrounded by non-weapons-grade radioactive material. Such a weapon would spread radiation without a nuclear explosion; in other words, poison rather than fusion. Gustavo Zlauvinen, the IAEA's representative in New York, told a news conference on 1 Nov that "there is no limit to the intent of terrorists... to deliver destruction and death." He called the dirty bomb "the most likely scenario" since there are tens of thousands of source of radioactive materials and much of it is not very secure. (For more information on this issue, see "Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat", available from IPPNW, [www.ippnw.org](http://www.ippnw.org).) He said the popularly cited terrorist threat - terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon, either bought, stolen or produced - is the least likely possibility since it requires the most advanced technology. He downplayed the third scenario - an attack on a nuclear power plant, saying by crashing an airplane into a plant - "we do not know if [such an attack] would produce another Chernobyl." This is a bit odd since various war games played at US nuclear plants end with terrorists succeeding about 50% of the time.

A meeting this week in at IAEA headquarters in Vienna is exploring ways to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. Zlauvinen admitted "it has not been a main concern to cope with nuclear terrorism." To improve the IAEA's capacity for detecting loose nuclear material and other inspection needs, the agency will be seeking a budget increase of \$30 to \$50 million per year for the next five years. The agency's budget has been kept at zero growth for ten years.

Jim Wurst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

### **Nuclear Power Plant Vulnerability to Terrorism**

The assessment by the IAEA of the nuclear power plant risk is somewhat at variance with recent findings reported in an Issue Brief by Physicians for Social Responsibility, which states that in the US, for example:

"Since the September 11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other federal and state offices have received a number of threats or scares concerning U.S. nuclear power plants. The Air National Guard has been scrambled at least a couple of times to keep low-flying aircraft away from nuclear power plants, including the Vermont Yankee plant in Vermont and the Oconee plant in South Carolina. On October 17, according to plant officials, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania was put on the highest alert after receiving, as described by the plant officials, a "credible threat" against the installation. A day earlier, the city of Baltimore, MD, was put on high alert due to a threat received against a nearby nuclear power plant. The NRC, which is the agency responsible for monitoring the safety of U.S. nuclear installations, has acknowledged receiving serious threats against U.S. nuclear power plants even before September 11. In 1999, for example, the NRC admitted to Congress that it had received a credible threat of a terrorist attack against a nuclear power facility...

"Most of the existing NRC security regulations, critics claim, are intended to protect against internal fuel damage from a small group of well-armed intruders aided by one insider; a lone insider; or a 4-wheel-drive land vehicle bomb. Despite the enhanced safety mechanisms imposed by the NRC under the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation program, U.S. nuclear reactors remain vulnerable to terrorist attack or insider sabotage. The NRC's own tests have illustrated that safety firewalls at many U.S. nuclear power plants are penetrable by outside intruders as well as disgruntled employees on the inside. Since 1991, despite months of advanced warning and beefed up security, some 47% of U.S. nuclear power plants failed to repel small mock terrorist attacks conducted by the NRC. "Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the NRC stated that American nuclear power plants could withstand the crash of a commercial jetliner like those used against the WTC and the Pentagon. Within days of this assertion, however, the agency spokesmen found themselves backpedaling and stating that before Sept. 11 the NRC had not considered and prepared for the danger of an aerial attack on U.S. nuclear reactors involving large commercial planes loaded with jet fuel. The agency had no serious contingency plans for such attack because, as the NRC spokesman Victor Dricks stated, 'it was never considered credible that suicidal terrorists would hijack a large commercial airliner and deliberately crash it into a nuclear power plant.'" (See "Vulnerability of the U.S. Nuclear Power Plants to Terrorist Attack and Internal Sabotage", PSR Issue Brief, forthcoming publication, <http://www.psr.org/s11/index.html> or available by request: [mdatan@ippnw.org](mailto:mdatan@ippnw.org).)

Merav Datan

Physicians for Social Responsibility/IPPNW

## **11. Disarmament and Gender - celebrating Security Council Resolution 1325**

On October 31, 2000 the UN Security Council discovered the existence of women and passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which "encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants".

A number of celebratory events were held at UN headquarters to mark the anniversary of this historic resolution, including another Arria Formula Meeting between Security Council Ambassadors and representatives of NGOs - to read the speeches by women from Afghanistan, East Timor and Kosovo, click here <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/2001arria.html>.

The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement read by Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Brian Cowan in his capacity as President of the Council. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7191.doc.htm> This Presidential Statement mentioned "the timely issuance of the publication Gender Perspective in Disarmament, which gives a clear indication of ways in which women can be fully involved and the benefits to the parties concerned."

These excellent materials on Gender and Disarmament can be found here: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/msg3.htm>

Under Secretary-General, Mr. Dhanapala was one of five Under Secretary-Generals that reported at a panel discussion organised by Angela King, Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women. He elaborated on the Gender and Disarmament materials, the joint project between the DDA and the Hague Appeal for Peace called, "Disarming Children and Youth" which will include translating and disseminating Resolution 1325. Mr. Dhanapala also referred to the important contributions of women's groups and networks and looks forward to future work together in addressing critical gender issues in the field of disarmament.

"Among the specific challenges ahead are the need to ensure the equal representation of women and men on all bodies dealing with disarmament, as experts or representatives of civil society....we need to give particular attention to increasing the potential for women's participation in decision-making in all areas of disarmament activities."

Indeed.

Felicity Hill, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

## 12. 5th Committee

NGO efforts toward supporting greater financial commitment by the UN system to the area of disarmament have received very positive feedback from delegations and NGOs.

We know of two NGOs that are sending letters to the attention of 5th Committee delegates to the UN General Assembly devoted to Administrative and Budgetary Questions. **We urge other NGOs to use our Governmental Contact Database to do likewise.**

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/govcontacts/govindex.html>

Felicity Hill, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF

### 13. CTBT

The list of speakers for the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, November 11-13 can be found at:  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ctbt/ctbtindex.html>

\*\*\*\*\*

Felicity Hill  
Director, United Nations Office  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
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web: www.wilpf.int.ch,  
www.peacewomen.org, www.reachingcriticalwill.org  
\*\*\*\*\*

X-Sender: mupj@pop2.igc.org

X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.3 (32)

Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2001 11:51:19 -0500

To: ograbc@aol.com, ken@bpfna.org, tiller64@starpower.net, bpinguel@afsc.org, jmatlack@erols.com, glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org, dradcliff\_gb@brethren.org, washofc@aol.com, tlheath@churchwomen.org, redgar@nccusa.org, lisaw@nccusa.org, agreenblatt@nccusa.org, heathern@nccusa.org, bgrieves@dfms.org, jmskipper@aol.com, thart@dfms.org, gthunt@mdo.net, stuwhis@enter.net, disarm@forusa.org, joe@fcnl.org, kathy@fcnl.org, david@fcnl.org, lydia@fcnl.org, marsusab@aol.com, J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mcc.org, CHouleMM@aol.com, jcoode@maryknoll.org, dave@paxchristiusa.org, slisherness@unidial.com, jow@mindspring.com, cgordon@ctr.pcusa.org, lwyolton@prodigy.net, mweiner@rac.org, uuawo@aol.com, egbertl4pj@yahoo.com, stiefr@ucc.org, conoverp@ucc.org, jhorman@umc-gbcs.org, jhanson@umc-gbcs.org, gpowers@nccbuscc.org, WorldPeaceMakers@compuserve.com, mupj@igc.org, mpf@forusa.org, ccosby@dhm.disciples.org, jheim@cc.edu, amygopp@hotmail.com, blythe-goodman@erols.com, sdeboe@csm.org, Murraylou2@CS.com, dshank@sojourners.com, sroyster@sistersofmercy.org, csjp@igc.org, DickUll@aol.com, oneilsp@netzero.net, kenanddavida@starpower.net, 76622.637@compuserve.com, bbryant@cbfnet.org, ronsider@esa-online.org, guy.quinlan@cliffordchance.com, mupj@igc.org

From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Subject: Current and future activities

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

1. As a follow up to our letter to President Bush on nuclear issues related to the campaign against terrorism, I have made arrangements for a small interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top staff person at the National Security Council on nuclear weapons. It will take place on November 20.

2. At the moment there seems to be no legislative issue in sharp focus related to our area of concern. Because Democrats gave up their attempt to cut back spending for missile defense in the name of national unity, this issue is not now in play. It is possible that in the Senate will consider a separate bill to prohibit missile defense testing that would violate the ABM Treaty, but probably not in the remainder of this session. Expansion of funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program and related nuclear safeguard and non-proliferation measures may be considered as a means of preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons and fissile material. This is within our interest, but I don't see it coming into focus as a legislative issue for which we can mobilize grassroots action.

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Therefore, I am inclined to discontinue serving as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament and to continue my work on nuclear disarmament mainly through Methodists United for Peace with Justice.

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5. I would be interested in your views on this matter. Should the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament continue to function? If so, what role should it play? Who is willing to take leadership? What alternatives do you propose?

I am addressing this e-mail letter directly to all on our list so that you can reply to all if you wish. Depending upon the response, we might schedule a meeting for December to discuss the future of interfaith cooperation on nuclear disarmament issues.

As well as replying by e-mail, please call me at 301 896-0013 if you want to talk about this matter.

Shalom,  
Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

To: Kathy Guthrie <kathy@fcnl.org>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Mary Miller party  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <E9BA445D76C0D21182F30090273DFAF6961D7E@local.fcnl.org>  
References:

At 12:02 PM 11/5/01 -0500, you wrote:

>Howard,  
>I got the information regarding the party for Mary Miller last week. Could  
>you please cut and paste this into a distribution email?  
>Thanks.  
>Kathy

Kathy,

I did as you requested. I'd like to be there, but I'll be out of town.

Howard

Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 14:43:22 -0500 (EST)  
To: nuclearcalendar@lists.his.com  
Subject: Nuclear Calendar  
From: "FCNL Nuclear Calendar" <owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org>  
X-Mailer: Html Mime Mail Class  
Sender: owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org  
Reply-To: nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org

## Friends Committee on National Legislation

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### Nuclear Calendar

- Oct. 31- Nov. 9** [U.N. General Assembly First Committee \(Disarmament and International Security\)](#), voting on disarmament and international security resolutions
- Week of Nov. 5** House-Senate conference committee continues on the defense authorization bill, [H.R. 2586](#) and [S. 1438](#)
- Week of Nov. 5 or 12** Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, markup of the defense appropriations bill
- Nov. 6** 8-10:30 pm, Carnegie Endowment, ["Crawford and Beyond: The Future of the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Relationship."](#) RSVP by Nov. 5 to Marshall Breit, [mbreit@ceip.org](mailto:mbreit@ceip.org), (202) 939-2296.
- Nov. 6** 2 pm, Brookings Institution, ["Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Visit to the U.S."](#) panel discussion and book signing. RSVP to the Brookings Office of Communications, [communications@brookings.edu](mailto:communications@brookings.edu), (202) 797-6105.
- Nov. 6** 2:30 pm, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on the nomination of Charles Pritchard to be Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea, 419 Dirksen. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](http://CapitolHearings.org).
- Nov. 6** 8 pm, PBS's NOVA, ["Russia's Nuclear Warriors"](#)
- Nov. 6** Gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia, and mayoral elections in Boston, New York and

other cities

- Nov. 7** 8:30 am, Carnegie Endowment, "[U.S.-Russian Relations: Born Again Partnership or Marriage of Convenience?](#)" Attendance is by invitation only. Broadcast on the [Carnegie web site](#).
- Nov. 7** 10 am, House Budget Committee, hearing on ensuring domestic security: issues and potential costs with former Rep. Lee Hamilton and GAO Comptroller General David Walker, 210 Cannon. Broadcast on the [Committee web site](#).
- Nov. 7** 10 am, House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, hearing on chemical and biological defense: medical readiness, 2154 Rayburn.
- Nov. 7** 11 am, Cato Institute Policy Forum, "[Should the United States agree to China's nuclear expansion in exchange for National Missile Defense?](#)". RSVP by 11 am, Nov. 6 to Julie Johnson, [jjohnson@cato.org](mailto:jjohnson@cato.org). Broadcast on the [Cato web site](#).
- Nov. 7** 2:30 pm, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security Proliferation and Federal Services, hearing on weapons of mass destruction proliferation threats, 342 Dirksen. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](#).
- Nov. 7** 5:30 pm, Women In International Security, "[U.S.-Russia Relations: The Economic, Political, and Security Dimensions of the Upcoming U.S.-Russia Summit](#)," at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St., N.W. RSVP by Nov. 5 to Maria Markley, [mmarkley@wiis.org](mailto:mmarkley@wiis.org) or fax (202) 687-3233.
- Nov. 7** House floor action on the NATO Expansion Act (Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001), [H.R. 3167](#). Broadcast on [C-SPAN](#).
- Nov. 7 or 8** House floor action on the defense appropriations bill (no bill number). Broadcast on [C-SPAN](#).
- Nov. 8** 9:30 am, Senate Armed Services Committee, hearing on the nomination of Dale Klein to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, 222 Russell. Broadcast on [CapitolHearings.org](#).
- Nov. 9** Noon, Michael Moodie, Chemical and Biological

Arms Control Institute, and Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, "The Chemical and Biological Weapons Challenge: Confronting the New Reality," [Woodrow Wilson Center](#). RSVP by Nov. 7 to Anita Wright, [wrightag@wwic.si.edu](mailto:wrightag@wwic.si.edu).

- Nov. 9** Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visits Washington
- Nov. 9-11** Peace Action [annual national congress](#), Austin, Texas
- Nov. 10** President Bush addresses the U.N. General Assembly
- Nov. 11-13** [Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty](#), United Nations
- Nov. 12** Veterans' Day (federal holiday)
- Nov. 12-14** Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with President Bush in Washington and Crawford, Texas

The *Nuclear Calendar* is published every Monday when Congress is in session. To subscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "subscribe NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body. To unsubscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "unsubscribe NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body.

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From: Janet Horman <JHorman@UMC-GBCS.ORG>

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>, ograbc@aol.com, ken@bpfna.org, tiller64@starpower.net, bpinguel@afsc.org, jmatlack@erols.com, glaszakovits\_gb@brethren.org, dradcliff\_gb@brethren.org, washofc@aol.com, tlheath@churchwomen.org, redgar@nccusa.org, lisaw@nccusa.org, agreenblatt@nccusa.org, heathern@nccusa.org, bgrieves@dfms.org, jmskipper@aol.com, thart@dfms.org, gthunt@mdo.net, stuwhis@enter.net, disarm@forusa.org, joe@fcnl.org, kathy@fcnl.org, david@fcnl.org, lydia@fcnl.org, marsusab@aol.com, J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mcc.org, CHouleMM@aol.com, jcoode@maryknoll.org, dave@paxchristiusa.org, slisherness@unidial.com, jow@mindspring.com, cgordon@ctr.pcusa.org, lwyolton@prodigy.net, mweiner@rac.org, uuawo@aol.com, egbertl4pj@yahoo.com, stiefr@ucc.org, conoverp@ucc.org, Jaydee Hanson <JHanson@UMC-GBCS.ORG>, gpowers@nccbuscc.org, WorldPeaceMakers@compuserve.com, mpf@forusa.org, ccosby@dhm.disciples.org, jheim@cc.edu, amygopp@hotmail.com, blythe-goodman@erols.com, sdeboe@csm.org, Murraylou2@CS.com, dshank@sojourners.com, sroyster@sistersofmercy.org, csjp@igc.org, DickUII@aol.com, oneilsp@netzero.net, kenanddavid@starpower.net, 76622.637@compuserve.com, bbryant@cbfnet.org, ronsider@esa-online.org, guy.quinlan@cliffordchance.com

Subject: RE: Current and future activities

Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 16:04:41 -0500

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Howard:

Thank you for raising the issue of the future of the Interfaith Committee in light of current realities. My preference, I suppose, would be to broaden the committee's focus at this time to include both disarmament and anti-war work. I would like to thank you for your tireless efforts to keep us all together. I think that many of us have so many issues under our umbrella that we find ourselves spread rather thin. Your prompting and sign-ons have allowed me to express our agency's voice on important issues(I am available on November 20th and would like to be a part of the delegation to meet Frank Miller). I also think that it would be a shame to throw away an interreligious structure at this time...unless we are sure that we can pull it together again in a hurry if the issues on the horizon change.

I can certainly understand that you cannot work without additional income..and I'm also certain that you must have pursued the MUPJ board's thoughts in this regard. Work-wise, I am stretched rather thin at the moment, and, although I'd love to have an interreligious group continue to meet(especially if the focus is broadened), I do not think I should offer to chair it at this time. You have been extremely faithful in efforts to pull us together and keep us on task, and I do greatly admire your efforts and deeply appreciate them. I know that these thoughts do not solve the problem, but they do reflect my thoughts at the moment.

I look forward to the input of others.

Janet Horman  
Program Director for Peace with Justice

United Methodist General Board of Church and Society

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]

Sent: Monday, November 05, 2001 11:51 AM

To: ograbc@aol.com; ken@bpfna.org; tiller64@starpower.net;  
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dradcliff\_gb@brethren.org; washofc@aol.com; tlheath@churchwomen.org;  
redgar@nccusa.org; lisaw@nccusa.org; agreenblatt@nccusa.org;  
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76622.637@compuserve.com; bbryant@cbfnet.org; ronsider@esa-online.org;  
guy.quinlan@cliffordchance.com; mupj@igc.org  
Subject: Current and future activities

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

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Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Stacie Robinson" <srobinson@clw.org>  
From: "Stacie Robinson" <srobinson@clw.org>  
To: "Stacie Robinson" <srobinson@clw.org>  
Subject: Follow-up to Friday's Working Group Mtg/Upcoming events  
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 16:52:41 -0500  
Organization: CRND  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600

TO: Coalition Working Group Members  
RE: Events related to next week's Crawford Summit

Here is a brief compilation of upcoming events relating to the Bush-Putin Crawford Summit. Member organizations are working on a few editorial advisories, a press briefing or two, and numerous press releases. If there is anything that the Coalition staff can do to help coordinate these events or contact press outlets, please let us know. (Todd, 202-546-0795 ext. 136 or [tstubbendieck@clw.org](mailto:tstubbendieck@clw.org)).

Please note that WAND has posted sample letters to policy makers and editors on their website. This is a great resource for member organizations and especially for grassroots organizations. Please help to get the word out!  
[www.wand.org/9-11/letters.html](http://www.wand.org/9-11/letters.html)

Finally, please see the attached talking points for the Bush-Putin Summit (available in both Word and Word Perfect). We also hope to send out a short fact sheet on Nunn-Lugar/CTR programs that WAND is compiling, by the end of the week to help people incorporate these issues in their releases.

Contact us with any other questions, ideas, or comments.

Thanks  
-Coalition staff

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-- FAS  
editorial board advisories (this week)  
press briefing on nuclear reductions/NMD, Russian-American cooperation, and tactical nukes; with Garwin, von Hippel, Nelson(Wed. 11/07 - location TBD)

release of FAS/Nobel Laureates letter (Mon. 11/12)  
possible press briefing in New York (Tues. 11/13)

-- Back from the Brink Campaign  
emphasizing de-alerting at Crawford Summit  
placing Op-Eds with the help of Steve Kent (this week)  
email update to members

--WAND

sample letters to policy makers/editors on website. Useful to all member organizations! <http://www.wand.org/9-11/letters.html>

--PSR

possible editorial advisory linking Crawford Summit with EIF conference  
press release (this week?)

--BASIC

possible Editorial in Euro press  
press release to foreign press in US (Fri. 11/09)

--CLW

possible press briefing with ACA regarding ABM issues  
press release on Crawford summit (Fri. 11/09)

--ACA

media advisory with experts list (this week?)  
section on website dealing with Crawford summit  
<http://www.armscontrol.org>

--UCS

press release (Tues. 11/06)  
(no talking points for now)

-LAWS

press briefing in New York on CTBT (Tues. 11/13)

-20/20 Vision

press briefing on BWC issues (Wed. 11/14)

Please see the Coalition Calendar for all other events.

<http://www.clw.org/coalition/calendar.htm>

+ + + + + + + + + +

Stacie Robinson

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

110 Maryland Ave., NE, Suite 505

Washington, DC 20002

Phone: (202) 546-0795

Fax: (202) 546-7970

Email: [srobinson@clw.org](mailto:srobinson@clw.org)

Website: <http://www.crnnd.org>

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Crawford talking points.wpd"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Talking Points 11-05.doc"

Reply-To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
From: "Brink Campaign" <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
To: <prgrm@backfromthebrink.net>  
Subject: NEWS FROM RUSSIA AND URGENT ACTIONS NEEDED!  
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:08:18 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600  
Importance: Normal

Dear Brink Supporter,

#### ACTION ALERT

BUSH AND PUTIN MEET IN NOVEMBER--WRITE LETTERS-TO-THE-EDITOR  
EVENT IN MOSCOW RELEASED RUSSIAN DE-ALERTING BRIEFING PAPER  
NOVEMBER 6--NOVA PROGRAM ON RUSSIAN MISSILIER  
CONFERENCE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NOV 26-27, NY, NY.

WHEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND PUTIN MEET in Washington DC and Crawford, Texas  
November 13-15 they will most likely reach an agreement that will include  
maintaining the ABM treaty and reducing the number of strategic nuclear  
weapons in their respective arsenals. If they do this, the arms control  
community  
can claim a victory--the ABM treaty stays in place, nuclear weapons numbers  
are reduced for the first time in years. SEE OP-ED BY STANSFIELD TURNER IN  
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 31 AT  
[http://chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/oped/chi-0110310149oct31.story?coll=c  
hi%2Dnewsopinioncommentary%2Dhed](http://chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/oped/chi-0110310149oct31.story?coll=c<br/>hi%2Dnewsopinioncommentary%2Dhed)

However, if they reach agreement to reduce the number of strategic missiles  
while leaving missiles on hair-trigger alert, the threat of an accidental  
nuclear exchange will remain.

We have an unique opportunity during this historic summit to pressure  
President Bush and Putin to include de-alerting as part of the new strategic  
framework. If the U.S. and Russia are now partners then preparing for a  
quick-launch of nuclear missiles at each other makes no sense.

THE BEST WAY TO GET OUR MESSAGE ACROSS IS THROUGH THE MEDIA--SPECIFICALLY  
WITH LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

WRITE A LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF YOUR LOCAL NEWSPAPERS

- IF YOU OFTEN GET YOUR LETTERS PRINTED—SEND IN ANOTHER LETTER.
- IF YOU HAVE NEVER BEEN PRINTED—TRY AGAIN.
- IF YOU HAVE NEVER SENT A LETTER—NOW IS THE ABSOLUTELY PERFECT TIME  
TO DO SO.

Attached is a sample letter and up-dated talking points. IMPORTANT NOTE:  
When you write your letter, include President Bush's name so it will be seen  
by the White House clipping service. Please let me know if you send in a  
letter, and send a copy to the Brink office if it is printed.

ADDITIONAL SAMPLE LETTERS FROM OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ARE AVAILABLE ON WAND's  
(Women and New Directions) website at [www.wand.org/9-11/letters.html](http://www.wand.org/9-11/letters.html). This

site will be updated regularly to provide you with additional ideas and letters. WRITE EARLY--AND OFTEN.

LATE BREAKING NEWS FROM RUSSIA: Ira Shorr, Director of Back From the Brink participated in a forum in Moscow on October 30 to release a Russian Briefing Paper on the need to de-alert nuclear weapons. The forum was attended by over 80 Russian military policy experts, including top scientists, military and government officials and journalists. See attached REUTERS NEWS STORY ON THE EVENT and click here for BBC article: <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=011031008586> The briefing paper is being sent to Putin's administration in preparation for his USA visit.

REMINDER TO WATCH NOVA, NOVEMBER 6 AT 8:00 EST. "Russia's Nuclear Warriors." This program promises to be the most in-depth look at the crumbling Russian nuclear infrastructure and the devastating potential for an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. See [www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/missileers](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/missileers). Take this opportunity to distribute Brink public education materials. See attached order form.

CONFERENCE ON THE "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: COLD WAR LEGACIES IN THE POST 9.11 WORLD" November 26 and 17--New York University, NY, NY sponsored by International Center for Advanced Studies and others. Jonathan Schell, Frances Fitzgerald and Andrew Cockburn will be joined by policy experts from, among others, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Defense Information. Questions: 202-234-9382 x or email [juliette@ips-dc.org](mailto:juliette@ips-dc.org). To register go to <http://www.ips-dc.org/wmd>

ON-GOING TOAST CARD CAMPAIGN--We will get a report out soon about the Toast Card Campaign. We have printed and distributed over a quarter million toast cards so far, and heard from thousands of you that you sent in your cards. Thanks! Part of our report will be legislative suggestions for the next session of Congress. Stay tuned.

Thank you for your continuing interest and support.

Esther Pank,

Esther Pank  
Back from the Brink Campaign  
6856 Eastern Avenue, NW, # 322  
Washington DC 20012  
202.545.1001 ph  
202.545.1004 fax  
[prgm@backfromthebrink.net](mailto:prgm@backfromthebrink.net)

GO TO [www.backfromthebrink.org](http://www.backfromthebrink.org) to check out the action!

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Talking Points\_Bush and Putin.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Oct\_Nov Sample Letter.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Reuters October 31 release\_Russia event.doc"

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Toast\_order\_form.doc"

From: Daphne Price [dprice@rac.org](mailto:dprice@rac.org)  
To: "mupj@igc.org" [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)  
Cc: Michael Weiner [mweiner@rac.org](mailto:mweiner@rac.org)  
Subject: Rabbi David Saperstein  
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 10:59:50 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Mr. Hallman,

I'm trying to rearrange an appointment on David's calendar so that he can be at the meeting at the OEOB on the 20th. In the meantime, I'll give you his pertinent information:

Thank you,  
Daphne

***Daphne Lazar-Price  
Assistant to the Director  
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism  
2027 Massachusetts Ave, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(p) 202/387-2800 x 22 (f)202/667-9070***

X-eGroups-Return: sentto-1606632-26-1005066887-  
mupj=igc.apc.org@returns.groups.yahoo.com  
X-eGroups-Return: research@napf.org  
X-eGroups-Approved-By: admin@abolition2000.org via web; 06 Nov 2001 17:14:45 -0000  
X-Sender: research@napf.org  
X-Apparently-To: sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com  
X-Sender: research@napf.org@mail.wagingpeace.org  
To: sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com  
From: Carah Lynn Ong <research@napf.org>  
X-Yahoo-Profile: delfin\_carah  
Mailing-List: list sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com; contact sunflower-napf-  
owner@yahoogroups.com  
Delivered-To: mailing list sunflower-napf@yahoogroups.com  
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:sunflower-napf-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>  
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 18:14:53 -0700  
Subject: [sunflower] Sunflower No. 54, November 2001

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## **The Sunflower**

Online monthly newsletter of the  
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  
November 2001 (No. 54)

The Sunflower is a monthly e-newsletter providing educational information on nuclear weapons  
abolition and other issues relating to global security. Back issues are available at  
<http://www.wagingpeace.org/sf/backissues.html>

## **IN THIS ISSUE**

**PERSPECTIVE**  
**BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**  
**NUCLEAR TERRORISM**  
**NUCLEAR MATTERS**  
**NUCLEAR WASTE**  
**NUCLEAR INSANITY**  
**ACTION ALERT**  
**NAPF HAPPENINGS**  
**RESOURCES**

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**PERSPECTIVE**

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## **Stop the Bombing and Bring in the UN**

By David Krieger

The US military action in Afghanistan is failing. Many innocent Afghans are being killed, and the US is no closer to finding or defeating the terrorists responsible for perpetrating the September 11th crimes against humanity. The United Nations and other relief organizations are warning that millions of Afghans could die of starvation this winter unless the bombing is halted soon. In other words, the bombing of Afghanistan is leading to a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. We, therefore, call on the US and British forces to halt the bombing to allow relief organizations to do their job of getting food to the Afghan people.

Terrorism is a global problem that can only be solved globally. Every country on Earth, every person on the planet, has a stake in ending the threat of terrorism. This matter must go back to the United Nations Security Council and must be handled by the United Nations as a matter of priority. If the US and UK continue their bombing, killing more innocent people, they will simply be adding fuel to the fire of terrorism. Some have suggested that they are providing the spark to ignite a global conflagration.

On the other hand, if the international community joins together in a serious effort to combat terrorism, it could lead to unprecedented cooperation between national police and intelligence services. Such efforts could leave terrorists with no place to hide, and are essential to *preventing* terrorism.

A global action through the United Nations will also demonstrate that this is not simply retaliation or vengeance on the part of the United States. To make a United Nations effort effective will require leadership and support by the United States, but it must be an effort that is truly directed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The United Nations should also set up a special International Tribunal for terrorists until the International Criminal Court is established, which will probably be next year. A trial before an impartial International Tribunal will help educate the world on the need to put an end to all terrorism. Such a trial will also be acceptable to virtually all countries throughout the world, whereas a trial of terrorists in the US would be viewed as biased in many countries.

In sum, step one on the path to ending terrorism is to stop the bombing of Afghanistan now; step two is to turn over to the United Nations Security Council the job of preventing terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice.

Military force is deepening the crisis without producing significant results. The vulnerability of civilization to determined and suicidal terrorists makes prevention the key to victory. Our future security, and that of the rest of the world, will be dependent on multilateral and cooperative efforts under an internationally accepted legal framework.

**For more perspectives on the events of 11 September and the war on Afghanistan, please visit <http://www.wagingpeace.org>**

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## **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

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### **US Postpones NMD Tests**

The Pentagon announced that it will postpone three tracking tests of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, originally scheduled to begin on 24 October, because they may violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the decision to postpone testing demonstrates the Bush administration's concerns about the ABM Treaty, but the test were not on schedule anyway (see paragraph 2-3). He also said the delays would allow more time for President Bush to strike a deal with President Putin to move beyond the ABM Treaty. President Bush has repeatedly stated that unless he can reach an agreement with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty allowing deployment of a NMD system, the US will withdraw from the accord. Presidents Putin and Bush will meet from 13 to 15 November at Bush's Crawford Ranch in Texas to discuss missile defense and deep cuts in the Russian and US nuclear arsenals.

Earlier this year, the Pentagon stated that at some point, testing of the NMD system would "bump up against" the treaty. According to Rumsfeld, "that has now happened." Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, a spokesperson for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), said that the administration's lawyers who study ABM compliance issues determined that the three planned tests could be interpreted as treaty violations.

According to Pentagon officials, two of the three postponed tests involving the use of tracking radars would not have occurred on schedule anyway because they were to be performed in conjunction with a missile intercept test that was rescheduled for unrelated reasons. Lehner said the intercept test, which would have occurred on 24 October, has been rescheduled for late November or early December. During the intercept test, an Aegis radar aboard a Navy ship was to have tracked both the interceptor launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and the target missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. An additional radar at Vandenberg would also have tracked the target missile launched from Vandenberg. According to Rumsfeld, each of these tracking radar activities has been put off indefinitely. (source: AP; 25 October 2001)

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## **NUCLEAR TERRORISM**

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### **Mock Terrorists Breach Security at US Nuclear Weapons Facilities**

A report released in October by a non-governmental watchdog organization, Project on Government Oversight (POGO), found that the ten US nuclear weapons research and production facilities are vulnerable to a terrorist attack and failed about half of recent security drills. In exercises designed to test security, US Army and Navy teams successfully penetrated nuclear

facilities and obtained nuclear materials. US government security regulations require that nuclear facilities defend themselves against the theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or through sabotage. According to Dannielle Brian, POGO Director, the repeated security breaches are serious cause for concern because Department of Energy employees were warned before each security exercise but still failed to stop the would-be terrorists in more than half the drills.

Nine of the ten weapons facilities are within 100 miles of cities with more than 75,000 people. Eight of the ten weapons facilities contain a total of 33.5 metric tons of plutonium. It only takes a few pounds of plutonium to create a nuclear bomb. Regarding security at the nuclear weapons facilities, Brian stated that no one thought it really mattered until 11 September. A spokesperson from the National Nuclear Security Administration declined to comment on the report.

The full report can be accessed online at POGO's website <http://www.pogo.org/>. (source: The Chicago Tribune; 5 October 2001)

### **IAEA Calls for Global Nuclear Security Standards to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism**

Weapons experts told attendees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Vienna, Austria on 2 November that terrorists could use a nuclear device. Speakers at the conference suggested that western countries, in particular the US, should accelerate efforts to protect nuclear materials that could, if they haven't already, fall into the hands of terrorists. Morten Bremer Maerli, a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, stated, "The only strategy is to protect the material where it is, but this kind of implementation strategy doesn't exist."

Maerli and other experts testified to a shocking lack of security and control to prevent the theft or purchase of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities in many countries, especially Russia. Since 1993, the IAEA has reported 175 cases of nuclear materials trafficking, including 18 cases involving small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. In these cases, law enforcement agencies seized the materials, but records at the facilities from which the materials were stolen, most of them Russian, did not show anything missing. According to Matthew Bunn, Assistant Director of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program at Harvard University's Kennedy School, up to 60 percent of nuclear material remains inadequately secured in Russia.

Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, stated "The controls on nuclear material and radioactive sources are uneven. Security is as good as its weakest link and loose nuclear material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world." According to ElBaradei, in the wake of the 11 September events, the IAEA has expanded its concerns about nuclear materials getting into clandestine weapons programs, not only in states that sponsor terrorism, but also into the hands of extremist groups.

ElBaradei called for international unity to create universal minimum security standards for nuclear plants and materials. Currently, standards are largely left to individual countries. The

IAEA also requested \$30 million to \$50 million to step up safety work in securing nuclear materials globally.

(source: The Washington Post; 3 November 2001)

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## **NUCLEAR MATTERS**

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### **Ukraine Destroys Last Nuclear Facility**

On 1 November, the Ukraine destroyed its last nuclear missile silo, fulfilling its pledge to give up the nuclear arsenal it inherited after the dissolution of the USSR. Under the US-Ukrainian Cooperative Threat Reduction, the silo was blown up at a military range in the southern Mykolaiv region near Pervomaisk. The land underneath the silo will now be cleaned up and converted to agricultural use.

In 1991, the Ukraine inherited the world's third largest nuclear stockpile, including 130 SS-19 missiles, 46 SS-24 missiles and dozens of strategic bombers. After renouncing nuclear weapons, the Ukraine transferred all its nuclear missiles and warheads to Russia by 1996. Nuclear materials from the warheads were reprocessed and sent back to the Ukraine for use as fuel in nuclear power plants. In 1997, the Ukraine and the US signed a treaty on US assistance for dismantling 38 Tu-160s and Tu-95s bombers and more than 480 Kh-55 air-launch cruise missiles.

Serhiy Borodenkov, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, stated, "So far, Ukraine confirmed its commitment to secure peace and stability, and made a significant contribution to strengthening the international regime of arms nonproliferation." All work for the disarmament program will be completed by 4 December.

(source: The Moscow Times; 1 November 2001)

### **Expert Russian Scientists Call for Lowering Nuclear Weapons Alert Status**

On 24 October, leading Russian scientists specializing in the field of strategic security released a report entitled, "The lowering of the level of combat readiness of the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States". The report found that the possibility of launching an accidental nuclear war could only be effectively reduced by taking nuclear weapons off their high level of continuous combat readiness. Key points of the report will be discussed at the Russian Academy of Sciences in the near future.

Professor Vladimir Belous of the Academy of Military Sciences contributed to the report. He told ITAR-TASS, a Russian news agency, that the forthcoming meeting of Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush will be an opportunity to discuss and approve measures to lower combat readiness of nuclear weapons parallel to holding consultations on ballistic missile defense and reductions of strategic arms. According to Belous, "Unilateral, step-by-step moves are possible with a subsequent discussion of additional measures to build up confidence."

(source: ITAR-TASS news agency; 24 October 2001)

### **Missing Russian Suitcase Bombs Still a Concern**

In May 1997, then Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed revealed to US Congressmen visiting Moscow that Russia once had between 80 and 100 suitcase-size, one kiloton atomic demolition weapons. He said that the KGB ordered the weapons to be built in the 1970s, and he also told the Congressmen that the weapons were missing. The Russian government at first denied the existence of such weapons, later saying that if the weapons were built, they were accounted for.

In October 1997, Alexey Yablokov, an advisor to then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, testified to members of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Military Research and Development that indeed the weapons did exist and were missing.

Today, the missing suitcase bombs remain a concern. According to Charles Curtis, former Deputy Energy Secretary in the Clinton administration and President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, "We believe we have a full accounting of all of Russia's strategic weapons, but when it comes to tactical weapons--the suitcase variety--we do not know, and I'm not sure they do, either."

(source: Knoxnews.com; 24 October 2001)

### **Former Nuclear Scientist Settles Whistleblower Lawsuit Against Nuclear Lab**

David Lappa, a former nuclear engineer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), who was harassed for refusing to cover up nuclear safety violations, settled his whistleblower lawsuit against the lab for \$250,000 on 4 October. Susan Houghton, a spokesperson for the US Department of Energy (DoE) nuclear weapons labs, said that the lab continues to deny Lappa's allegations made in a 1998 lawsuit. According to Houghton, LLNL, which is run by the University of California, refuses to admit any wrong-doing in the settlement.

Lappa worked at LLNL for 20 years and continued to raise safety concerns to his managers and federal authorities about serious and repeated violations of plutonium safe-handling requirements at the facilities. Lappa claimed that he was forced to resign after harassment became intolerable. Tom Carpenter, Lappa's attorney, stated, "David Lappa was a model employee until he refused to go along with a cover-up of serious safety and health issues involving plutonium handling at the Lab."

The University of California is responsible for oversight and management of three national nuclear weapons laboratories. For more information on the University of California's contractual relationship with the Department of Energy and current efforts to end this relationship, please visit <http://www.ucnuclearfree.org>.

(source: Reuters; 4 October 2001)

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## **NUCLEAR WASTE**

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### **Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approves Yucca Mountain Waste Dump**

On 23 October, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the site suitability study to build an underground dump for radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The US Department of Energy (DoE) submitted the site suitability study to the NRC. The Bush administration must now submit the plan to Congress for approval. If approved, Yucca Mountain would become the recipient of thousands of tons of radioactive waste for an estimated 10,000 years.

(source: Reuters, 23 October 2001)

### **UK MOX Reprocessing Plant Faces Challenges**

Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace filed papers in the UK High Court to stop the opening of a nuclear reprocessing plant at Sellafield on the Cumbrian coast in Ireland. In early October, UK Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett ruled that the manufacture of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel was justified. The two environmental groups have called for a judicial review of the decision, saying it was unlawful and a concern to the environment and public health.

On 26 October, Ireland also took legal action against the British government for giving the go-ahead to open the MOX plant. Ireland claims that the plant will violate international laws on sea pollution. Officials also expressed concern that they received no information about a safety review of the site, especially in light of the 11 September events. Irish Ministers demanded that the British Government voluntarily suspend the authorization of the MOX plant by 9 November or they will ask the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to order an immediate suspension of the authorization of the plant until it can be reviewed by an arbitration panel.

MOX fuel is a blend of plutonium and uranium that has been extracted from spent fuel rods already used in reactors. The nuclear industry argues that "recycling" spent fuel could help reduce the growing stockpile of toxic plutonium worldwide. Environmentalists argue that ships carrying MOX fuel are targets for terrorists to either blow the ship up or steal the material for use in making nuclear bombs. A much safer and secure option would be to leave plutonium in spent fuel storage tanks at their site of origin rather than shipping the highly radioactive waste around the world.

(source: BBC news online; 5 October 2001, 26 October 2001)

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## **NUCLEAR INSANITY**

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## **Nuclear Hawks Push for Mini-Nukes**

Representative Steven Buyer (R-Indiana) called on the Bush administration to deploy mini nuclear weapons against Osama bin Laden. Buyer called for the use of tactical nuclear devices on caves in Afghanistan where bin Laden and other members of the Al Qaeda network are reportedly hiding. In a television interview, Buyer said he doesn't just want to kill bin Laden and his cohorts but also send a message to the rest of the world that the US is willing to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield. He stated, "I just want the [Bush] administration to know that I think the United States needs to send a message to the world that we are prepared to do that."

Representative Peter King (R-New York) also expressed the same view in a radio interview on WABC. King stated during the interview, "I would never rule out tactical nuclear weapons if I thought they could do the job, and if they were needed." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also refused to state in a television interview on ABC whether or not the US was considering use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Among nuclear proponents is Thomas Woodrow, a veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency and advisor to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. He recently wrote in a Washington Times article, "At a bare minimum, tactical nuclear capabilities should be used against the bin Laden camps in the desert of Afghanistan. To do less would be rightly seen by the poisoned minds that orchestrated these attacks as cowardice on the part of the US and the current administration."

Since the mid-1970s, US policy has been to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. However, the policy seems to be shifting as nuclear proponents are increasingly calling for a conversion of the current arsenal to low-yield, earth penetrating nuclear weapons, making their use more likely in the future. Paul Robinson, Director of the Sandia National Laboratory, stated in a September interview with the National Journal, "It just takes far too many aircraft sorties and conventional weapons to give you any confidence that you can take out underground bunkers. By putting a nuclear warhead on one of those weapons instead of high explosives, you would multiply the explosive power by a factor of more than one million." Robinson also said that the "bunker busting" bombs could be deployed without violating the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to Robinson, "We would neither have to conduct testing nor redesign for such a weapon, because we have them already. We could develop these lower-yield weapons without forcing the nuclear testing issue back onto the table, with a richer database of past tests, and at relatively low cost."

(source: <http://www.intesetimes.com/issue/25/26/news2.shtm>; 31 October 2001)

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**ACTION ALERT**

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## **Help Stop A Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan**

### **Millions Face Starvation this Winter**

According to aid workers in Afghanistan, some 7.5 million Afghans may be threatened with

starvation this winter unless the bombing is halted to allow food to reach the Afghan people.

"The United Nations believes that 7.5 million Afghans will need food over the winter, 2.5 million more than on September 11. Relief groups said today that the 275,000 [now over 1,000,000, but still far from sufficient] packets of food dropped in the country so far are at best a minor public relations gesture and at worst a source of mistrust."-- New York Times (10/17/01)

"Aid officials estimate that up to 7.5 million Afghans might be threatened with starvation. Unless the [US air] strikes stop, there will be a huge number of deaths, one UN source said." -- Observer of London, (10/21/01)

### **Facts about Afghan Children**

- One in four Afghan children will not live to their fifth birthday
- One in three Afghan children is an orphan
- Almost 1/2 of Afghan children suffer from malnutrition
- Millions of Afghan children face the threat of starvation

### **Refugees**

Some 30,000 refugees have poured into Pakistan over the last few weeks, joining an estimated 2 million refugees who have fled the country over the last 20 years.

### **What YOU Can Do**

Write to President Bush or your head of state to ask him to stop the bombing so that relief workers can get food through to the Afghan people to prevent millions, including children, from starving this winter.

You can email President Bush at [president@whitehouse.gov](mailto:president@whitehouse.gov). Copies of emails can be sent to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org). You can also write to President George Bush, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC 20509-1600.

You can also send a contribution to UNICEF to support relief efforts for Afghan children: UNICEF, 333 East 38th Street, New York, NY 10016. Visit <http://www.unicef.org> for more information.

### **Gallup Poll Shows World Opposes Military Action**

An international Gallup Poll showed that a majority in 32 out of 35 countries (the US, Israel and India in opposition) favored a criminal justice response, rather than military action response to the 11 September acts of violence.

The numbers were clear: 67%-88% in NATO/Western countries and 83%-94% in Latin America favored a non-military approach.

30% of US respondents also supported this option even though the mainstream US media consistently ignores this.

Of the European countries polled, France had the highest support for military action with 30% in favor. In the UK, 18% favored military action, and in Greece 8%.

All of the European countries were well above 60% in support of extradition of the terrorists to stand trial.

(source: [http://www.gallup-international.com/terrorismpoll\\_figures.htm](http://www.gallup-international.com/terrorismpoll_figures.htm); 23 October 2001)

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## **NAPF HAPPENINGS**

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### **Annual Awards Dinner**

Since 1984 the Foundation has honored some of the great peace leaders of our time with its Distinguished Peace Leadership Award. This year the Foundation will honor **Craig Kielburger** and **Hafsat Abiola**, two courageous young leaders, in order to highlight the extraordinary contributions made by youth in shaping humanity's future. Craig is an 18-year-old young man from Toronto. He is founder of Free the Children and has traveled the world on behalf of children's rights. Hafsat Abiola is a 27-year-old woman from Lagos, Nigeria and founder of Kudirat Initiative for Democracy (KIND). Hafsat has been a tireless advocate for human rights, women and children throughout the African continent.

The awards will be presented at a dinner and ceremony on Friday, November 9th in Santa Barbara, CA. For more information about the recipients or the event, please contact Chris Pizzinat at the Foundation's offices at +1 (805) 965-3443 or by e-mail at [cpizzinat@napf.org](mailto:cpizzinat@napf.org).

### **Swackhamer Peace Essay Contest Winners**

We are pleased to announce "Mahatma Gandhi" by Janina de Jesus as the Foundation's 2001 Swackhamer Peace Essay Contest first place winning essay. The essay is now available on our website. The theme for this year's contest was: **Who is your choice for the most important peace hero of the 20th Century? Write an essay supporting your choice and describing the qualities that make that person a peace hero.**

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Swackhamer Peace Essay Contest was established by Gladys Swackhamer in honor of her parents to encourage young people to think and act for peace. The contest is open to high school students worldwide, and winners receive \$1,500 for first place, \$1,000 for second place, and \$500 for third place.

The contest topic for 2002 is: **"What policies should the US government establish to significantly limit and end the use of weapons of mass destruction?"**

Note: This year the topic coincides with the US High School Debate topic. While the question focuses on US policy, international students are encouraged to contribute their views on US policies.

Please visit the Foundation's website at [www.wagingpeace.org](http://www.wagingpeace.org) to read this year's winning essay and for more details on the 2002 contest.

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## **RESOURCES**

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Visit the ever-evolving website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at [Http://www.wagingpeace.org](http://www.wagingpeace.org)

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has devoted a section of its website to the 11 September events. The section offers alternative responses to the use of military force; background information on US policies in the Middle East, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden; perspectives on the events from staff and advisors; and ideas for citizen action to wage peace instead of war. Please visit our site at: <http://www.wagingpeace.org/terrorism/index.htm>

Take a journey through the Nuclear Age. Visit the Nuclear Files at [Http://www.nuclearfiles.org](http://www.nuclearfiles.org)

*A Maginot Line in the Sky: International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Defense* brings together the views of 18 contributors from around the world on US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. Order your copy today at:  
<http://www.wagingpeace.org/secure/maginotline.html>

For current reports on the UN First Committee on Disarmament, please visit the *Reaching Critical Will* website of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom at <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org>

National Security Archive has produced "The September 11th Source Books" available online at <http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAAEBB/NSAEBB54/>

*Living Without the Labs*, an article by Andreas Toupadakis, a former Los Alamos scientist who quit his job at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on principle, is available online at [http://www.abqtrib.com/archives/opinions01/091901\\_opinions\\_labs.shtml](http://www.abqtrib.com/archives/opinions01/091901_opinions_labs.shtml)

An updated dialogue between nuclear resisters and UK decision makers on the legal status of nuclear weapons entitled, "ENGAGING WITH THE AUTHORITIES," includes commentary on Government responses on the legality of Trident. The dialogue is now available on the World Court Project UK web site, <http://www.gn.apc.org/wcp>

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## **EDITORS**

\*\*\*\*\*

Carah Ong  
David Krieger

--

Carah Lynn Ong  
Director of Research and Publications

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Santa Barbara, California 93108-2794 USA

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[Http://www.wagingpeace.org](http://www.wagingpeace.org)  
[Http://www.nuclearfiles.org](http://www.nuclearfiles.org)  
[Http://www.abolition2000.org](http://www.abolition2000.org)

"He aha te nui mea o te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata." (A Maori Saying)

"What is the most important thing in the world? It is the people, the people, the people."

"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."  
Victor Hugo

To Unsubscribe, send a blank message to: [sunflower-napf-unsubscribe@eGroups.com](mailto:sunflower-napf-unsubscribe@eGroups.com)

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the [Yahoo! Terms of Service](#).

From: "Cropsey, Marvin" <Mcropsey@umpublishing.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Article for Mature Years  
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 14:08:07 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Dear Howard,

Thank you for the reduction in word count. I am exceedingly pleased with this article. It accomplishes a great deal: telling about a vital older adult named Howard Hallman, explaining the fascinating rules and special provisions of older adult softball, addressing potential rewards and difficulties of sports in the mature years, and encouraging older adults to be active. That is a lot to ask-and a lot to deliver. You have done it well.

The two new pictures arrived today. They are great. I now have all I need. Your article will appear in a Spring issue in order to give readers the opportunity to take your advice and get involved.

I am sending more complete information about publication and payment in a posted letter that you will receive in a few days.

Marvin

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [SMTP:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2001 1:34 PM  
To: Mcropsey@umpublishing.org  
Subject: Article for Mature Years

Dear Marvin,

At your suggestion I have cut my story, "You're Never Too Old for Sports",  
to less than 1,600 words. It is attached in Word format.

Under separate cover I am mailing two photos of myself, one batting,  
the other standing with glove and ball. You can add them to the photos  
I sent you previously in selecting illustrations for the article.

Please let me know if the article is now acceptable for Mature  
Years.

Shalom,  
Howard

<< File: Mature Years story.02.doc >> << File: ATT54956.txt >>

To: mark@arcfilms.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Query  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Mark Witherspoon-Cross:

I have a screenplay set mostly in Florida. Would you be interested in seeing a one-page synopsis or receiving the entire script for your consideration?

Called "Spring Chickens", it's the Odd Couple meets the Bad News Bears. A couple of older New Yorkers, who could be played by Clint Eastwood and James Garner, walk out on their wives because they are tired of going to the opera. They wind up in Florida and become managers of rival senior softball teams, the spring chickens who display remarkable skills and antics. Their wives, could be Debbie Reynolds or Shirley MacLaine, maybe Jane Fonda coming out of retirement, borrow an idea from Mozart's "Cosi fan Tutte" and show up in disguise. They spy on their husbands for ten days, take up with a couple of senior softball players, and finally reveal their identity after the championship game. It's a fun piece.

There are lots of senior softball players in Florida to fill out the cast. If you want to see senior players in action, I can send you a video of two local news stories on senior softball in Montgomery County, Maryland where I live. As one of the players, I make a brief appearance catching a fly ball in left field.

My training for film writing includes a course in television production at American University, workshops sponsored by the Maryland Writers' Association and the Writer's Center of Bethesda, Maryland (the most recent one taught by Adam Kulakow, a Hollywood screenwriter), reading books on screenwriting, watching movies analytically, and writing and re-writing this and four other screenplays.

Let me know if you would like to receive the script of "Spring Chickens".

With best regards,  
Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817

Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: mupj@igc.org

To: MorrisCT@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Books for Zimbabwe  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Morris and Ann,

Perhaps you have already sent your container to Zimbabwe, but if not, I want to follow through on my September contact with you.

Your project was mentioned in the e-mail newsletter of the Baltimore-Washington UMC Conference, so I assumed that you are in Maryland. Getting books to Michigan is more difficult. However, the person from our congregation who has up-to-date computer books to donate is going to drive to visit her parents in Ann Arbor for Thanksgiving. She could manage four boxes. The books could be used by the library at Africa University or by the high school you are supporting.

So if Thanksgiving isn't too late and an Ann Arbor delivery would work, please let me know.

Shalom,  
Howard Hallman

To: WILLNORTH@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Re: Your notes re Poverty Forum  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <93.12cde7ac.29195b85@aol.com>  
References:

At 10:28 AM 11/6/01 EST, you wrote:

>Colleagues in outreach

>I am trying to put together a report on the Poverty Forum. I find that I  
>don't have any notes on the comments of the three panelists. Do any of you  
>have notes from which I could select two-three of their observations? When I  
>get a draft completed I will give you a crack at it for improvement.

>Haven

Haven,

Sorry I can't help you. I was taking photos so I didn't take notes of the panelists' presentations.

Howard

From: MorrisCT@aol.com  
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 10:43:59 EST  
Subject: Re: Books for Zimbabwe  
To: mupj@igc.org  
X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535

Howard,

I am not certain whether to say that I am sorry or that I am thankful that it is too late to send your books via our container. Anyway, we loaded it on Saturday and they took it away Monday. Since the offer was open-ended, we had neither control nor estimate of what came to us and we had serious doubts it was all going to fit.

When we finished, there was room for only about a half dozen boxes more than we had. It was stuffed tight! An entire high school library for Hartzell HS at Old Mutare, some computers and books for the primary school, clothes and medicine for Mutambara Mission and the Fairfield orphanage, and a few boxes for AU.

Thank you for thinking of Zimbabwe and Mutare and wanting to help.

Peace,  
Morris Taber

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman " <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Current and future activities  
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2001 09:19:49 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Howard --

We have our annual meeting this weekend. Several hundred Quakers coming to town. It will take us a while to come up with an answer.

David

> To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament  
>  
> Dear Colleagues:  
>  
> 1. As a follow up to our letter to President Bush on nuclear issues  
> related to the campaign against terrorism, I have made  
> arrangements for a  
> small interfaith delegation to meet with Frank Miller, top  
> staff person at  
> the National Security Council on nuclear weapons. It will  
> take place on  
> November 20.  
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> national unity,  
> this issue is not now in play. It is possible that in the Senate will  
> consider a separate bill to prohibit missile defense testing  
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> weapons and fissile material. This is within our interest,  
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> it coming into focus as a legislative issue for which we can mobilize  
> grassroots action.  
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> 3. Because there is no immediate focus for action by the Interfaith  
> Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, I suggest that we do not meet in  
> November. However, I suggest that we meet in the first part  
> of December to  
> assess where we are and what we want to do in the future, if anything.  
>  
> 4. In that regard I am considering stepping down as chair of the  
> Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. As you know, this group

> formed at my initiative, building on our work together for CTBT  
> ratification. I became chair by consensus because I was asserting  
> leadership. Although we don't have formal membership, we  
> have about 35  
> faith groups on our e-mail list, a combination of  
> organizations wanting to  
> be represented at meetings and others wanting only to be kept  
> informed.  
> During the past two years attendance at monthly meetings has  
> consisted of  
> representatives of six to ten organizations. Sign-on  
> letters have gained  
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> been expressed  
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> I was hoping that the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear  
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> However, among  
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> very high for  
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> Personally I am wonder whether it is worth my effort to keep  
> the Interfaith  
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> retirement income, but I need supplemental earnings each year. For  
> several years I was able to obtain grants in the \$10,000 to  
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> source of support.  
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> Therefore, I am inclined to discontinue serving as chair of  
> the Interfaith  
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> 5. I would be interested in your views on this matter. Should the  
> Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament continue to  
> function? If so,  
> what role should it play? Who is willing to take leadership? What  
> alternatives do you propose?

>  
> I am addressing this e-mail letter directly to all on our  
> list so that you  
> can reply to all if you wish. Depending upon the response, we might  
> schedule a meeting for December to discuss the future of interfaith  
> cooperation on nuclear disarmament issues.

>  
> As well as replying by e-mail, please call me at 301 896-0013  
> if you want  
> to talk about this matter.

>  
> Shalom,  
> Howard

>  
>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

>  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership  
> association of  
> laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist  
> denomination.

>

X-Sender: pmeidell@pop.igc.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32)  
Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 11:12:29 -0800  
To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
From: Pamela Meidell <pamela@atomicmirror.org>  
Subject: (abolition-usa) FEED THE WOLF: 2001 Abolition 2000 Report Card Released  
Sender: owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
Reply-To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

Dear Nuclear Abolitionists and Friends,

This year's Abolition 2000 Report Card, attached, was released at the United Nations on October 24, 2001 (UN Day). It was personally handed out to each member of the First Committee, and made available at several meetings, including one on Terrorism and Disarmament. Please distribute widely and make use of it wherever you can. As we say in the report card, "in a dark time, the eye begins to see." We hope that the eyes of the world will begin to see the crucial need to abolish nuclear weapons. We would be pleased to receive any feedback. Thank you.

In peace,  
Janet Bloomfield and Pamela Meidell

P.S. Apologies for any cross postings.

Pamela Meidell  
Director  
The Atomic Mirror  
"Reflecting and Transforming our Nuclear World through the Arts"  
P.O. Box 220  
Port Hueneme, CA 93044  
tel: 805 985 5073  
fax: 805 985 7563  
email: pamela@atomicmirror.org

"Unless we insist that politics is imagination and mind, we will learn that imagination and mind are politics, and of a kind we will not like."  
Lionel Trilling

-

To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.  
For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message.

Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2001 11:38:33 -0800 (PST)  
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Subject: Re: Current and future activities  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Cc: UUAWO@aol.com

Howard,

Thank you for this note. I received it in Washington yesterday and have called David Culp. I cheer your wonderful persistence and thoroughness. You have led us and challenged us and it has been a pleasure to have helped a bit with this incredibly complicated business.

Now, clearly financial support is lousy for no one seems to think a nuclear war is brewing. I saw the headline that W Bush was concerned about nuclear war in Eastern Europe! I respect your need to make a slightly better income especially considering the mountain of work you have taken on. However, there are other ways to solve this. How about dumping some of the tasks on others? David sounded interested in helping. I am willing to do some of the chores of mailing and calling.

This whole project has been a useful stimulant for our Washington Office of the Unitarian Universalist Association and I think we should continue. I regret that the Veatch Foundation did not pour money into our coffers!

Janet Horman sent me a copy of her letter to you. I think David Culp would agree to contribute. David DID say that they are having Quaker Meetings in large scale right now so he will be out of pocket for several weeks.

Do not depart! PEACE! Larry  
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> Shalom,  
> Howard  
>  
>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
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> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org  
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---

Do You Yahoo!?

Find a job, post your resume.

<http://careers.yahoo.com>

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Do not depart! PEACE! Larry

**Ref.: SD.16.E.01**

**Pax Christi International  
Statement on Biological Weapons**

*This statement of the international Catholic peace movement Pax Christi on biological weapons is an expression of concern by its International Council which took place in Mainz, Germany, from 31 October – 4 November 2001, and engaged members on recent developments in international disarmament negotiations.*

*In particular, Pax Christi International is worried about the recent breakdown of the negotiations on a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The statement in part 1 of this document expresses the concerns. A background document explains how the movement has reached the positions adopted.*

**Table of contents:**

- 1) Pax Christi International statement on biological weapons
- 2) Background note
  - 2.1) The Technology
  - 2.2) Status quo of International Law
  - 2.3) Suspects and Potential Victims
  - 2.4) Relevant Catholic Social Ethics
  - 2.5) Relevant earlier Positions of Pax Christi (International)
  - 2.6) Conclusion
- 3) Annexes
  - 3.1) List of contributors
  - 3.2) Bibliography

**1. Pax Christi International Statement on Biological Weapons**

Pax Christi International **rejects** any production, testing, transport, storage, use or possession of biological and toxin weapons for killing humans and for destroying human food, crops and animals. The developments in the USA after 11 September do highlight the dangers of terrorist

resort to weapons of mass destruction. There is an increased urgency to agree a Verification Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

#### International community

Pax Christi International **urges** the international community to strengthen the BTWC by adding the protocol which has been negotiated by the Ad Hoc group of states party to the BTWC convention. We realise that this protocol is not sufficient to respect for the ban on the possession and use of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the protocol, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, are necessary instruments to strengthen the international protection regime against biological weapons. Also, they will contribute to a climate of international collaboration to foster the peaceful development of vaccines and other biotechnologies. The verification protocol should urge the participating states to continue efforts to develop better verification procedures.

#### National authorities

Pax Christi International **calls upon** national governments to protect their own citizens as well as civilians in other countries against the effects of attacks with biological weapons. Also, they should take preventive measures such as dual use export controls, regular inspection of dual use installations, promoting Good Manufacturing and Good Laboratory Practice, the adoption of 'whistleblowers' legislation to protect individual employees if they want to report suspect situations, and legislation (when not already done) to criminalize BW activity of individuals and organisations. This legislation should contain provisions on alternative jobs for the 'whistleblower' in case the relation between the 'whistle blowing' employee and the employer proves to be irreparably damaged. Governments should also grant asylum and protection to nationals of countries who speak out against offensive biological weapons programmes of their own governments.

#### Industries

Pax Christi International **requests** pharmaceutical, chemical, biotechnological and other industries which have biotechnological installations, which could be abused for the production of biological weapons, to develop an internal code of conduct to prevent abuse of their installations for biological weapons. This code of conduct should respect Good Manufacturing Practice and Good Laboratory Practice standards. They should also develop a 'whistleblowers' procedure to enable employees to report suspect situations.

#### Individuals

Pax Christi International **asks** individual researchers and other employees who work with biological agents to watch out for signs of potential abuse. Individuals should warn their

superiors or the relevant authorities if they suspect potential abuse. We see a special responsibility of medical and scientific professions.

### Churches

Pax Christi International **calls upon** the Holy See and the World Council of Churches to speak out against the development, production or stockpiling or use of biological weapons for mass destruction. The various churches should promote the development and acceptance of a verification regime, even if the verification possibilities are not yet sufficient.

Mainz, 5 November 2001

## **2. Background note**

### **2.1. The technology**

Biological weapons contain any pathogenic agents from bacterial, viral or other biological origin that are used intentionally to inflict bodily harm to people, animals or plants. Bacteria are viable micro-organisms belonging to the order of eubacterialis. They multiply inside a living organism or in an inorganic growth medium in a laboratory. Some sorts are pathogenic for man, animals, plants or produce toxins. Viruses are micro organisms that can only replicate in animal or human cells or in bacterial cells. Viruses are pathogenic by nature. A toxin (weapon) is a toxic substance produced by a living creature, e.g. snake poison or botulinum toxin. A toxin is itself a chemical (non-living) substance, and can not multiply itself. Viruses can be spread by air in the form of small aerosols. These are meant to enter the victims through the lungs. A gas mask is an effective protection mechanism. Bacteria can infect water or food supplies, entering the victims through the stomach. In such cases prior vaccination is an effective countermeasure, if you know beforehand which diseases your enemy will use.

### Similarities and dissimilarities between civil biotechnology and biological weapons

In biotechnological production processes, micro-organisms and their enzymes are used to facilitate chemical reactions. As in chemical reactions, concentrations of reactants, catalysts and temperature influence the reaction. Biotechnology is an old technology, e.g. used for cheese and wine making and preparation of sauerkraut. Later, biotechnological processes has also been used to prepare other products such as antibiotics and vaccines. Chemical production technologies have been developed in the 19th century, biotechnologies have really only emerged in the 20th century.

The preparation of biological weapons strongly resembles the first steps of the preparation of a vaccine. For the propagation of a biological weapon using bacteria, a synthetic growth medium should be used. For the propagation of such a weapon using viruses, animal cell cultures must

be grown aseptically. These cell cultures are inoculated with a viral culture extract. The main difference is in the second phase. In the preparation of a vaccine, the bacteria or viruses are weakened by heating or by chemical means. The people who are trying to prepare biological weapons have to take some very dangerous steps. They must store the pathogens or toxins under optimal circumstances, and later spread them in the target area. They may need to take extra protection measures for the pathogens. If they try to aerosolise a (freeze dried) culture, this may weaken its virulence, thereby making it less deadly.

People claim that it is difficult to control possible production sites of biological weapons, because the technology is "dual use". Only production sites for vaccines, recombinant DNA and bio defence research facilities are similar to bio weapon sites. Production installations for food and antibiotics are already protected against escaping micro-organisms. While in the preparation of vaccines active micro-organisms are weakened and prepared for safe injection in human beings, biological weapons must be suitable for large-scale dissemination in a lethal form. The technology used for production, stockpiling or development of biological weapons includes a list of known pathogenic viruses and bacteria. Fermenters and other equipment such as for purification or enrichment are also listed in international dual use export regulations.

Another relevant development is the development of biosensors and laboratories on a chip. Biosensors combine a thin layer of biological materials with a microchip. The biological part works as a receptor for biological molecules or cells, and can be used to detect specific pathogens. The microchip analyses the signal and is used to warn humans if a dangerous microbe is present. Especially in the USA, the Department of Defence and Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA are funding research to develop biosensors for detecting biological weapons. At the moment this research is still 10-15 years from real applications. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) allow such bio-defence research, since its aim is to give early warning when a biological weapon is used. People may then protect themselves with a gas mask or by evacuation.

So far, biological weapons have rarely been used, because it is difficult to protect one's own troops and civilians. The development of effective bio-defence could have the unintended consequence that a country or terrorist group will be able to protect it and use the biological weapon against their enemy, who does not have the countermeasures.

## **2.2. Status quo of international law**

The **use** of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes has been forbidden since 1925 (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Biological Methods of Warfare. Signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925). In 1972, the UN "Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction" (BTWC) expanded this ban to **possessing** biological agents for hostile purposes. It became operational in 1975.

Unfortunately, this is a toothless treaty, since it lacks an international verification regime. Since 1995, an Ad Hoc group of states party to this BTWC convention have been negotiating a new protocol to move some way towards a verification regime and a UN "Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons". Until the beginning of 2001, most interested parties expected this protocol to be agreed upon before the fifth review conference of the BTWC convention, 19 November until 7 December 2001 in Geneva.

The draft protocol should strengthen the existing BTWC by enforcing:

- a) Annual declarations of dual-use facilities, which can be used for peaceful as well as hostile purposes;
- b) Investigation(s) visits, when one state party accuses another of having biological weapons;
- c) Types of visits.

The draft protocol also addresses trade, scientific co-operation and measures to promote compliance. An international Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) should be responsible for the execution of the protocol, once it is operational.

But on 25 July 2001 the US government called the proposed protocol text unacceptable. Their main arguments were twofold. First, they claim verification is impossible. This is the distinction between biological and chemical weapons. US representative Donald A. Mahley said that verification is an illusion, according to Theo Koala, (Volkskrant, 6 August 2001). An aggressor can easily hide ingredients for biological weapons, since only a small tube is enough to stockpile a pathogenic organism. This can be multiplied to large quantities in a relatively short time. But verification remains possible after biological weapons have allegedly been used. Verification can also be used when biological agents have unintentionally been released from laboratories. The latter has happened in Sverdlovsk in 1979, when anthrax escaped from an offensive bioweapons facility and caused an epidemic.

The second US argument is national security and loss of industrial property. The US bio-defence programme is among the largest worldwide. However, the states party to the BTWC convention must only declare very limited information. There are not many sites which are open to visits. Therefore the possible backlash to national security seems limited. The same goes for civil companies which are worried to lose confidential information under the proposed verification regime. Test verifications have demonstrated this.

The US is investigating potential alternatives for verification, including the development of new vaccines to protect against biological weapons, or an attempt to increase the costs for producing biological weapons. The US might present a new proposal during the review conference in November. The other negotiating states decided to freeze the negotiations and wait for an alternative proposal or wait until they can resume the existing negotiations to conclude a Protocol after a delay? According to the mandate of the Ad Hoc group, they must adopt the protocol by consensus. The US has made it clear that they will not agree. If they remain present at the negotiations, they can block any progress unless they can be persuaded to stand aside and be footnoted, so as not to block consensus.

An article published by Michael Moodie (2001) may shed light on the possible contents of the US proposal. He states that the aim of arms control treaties should be a safer world. Moodie doubts that the weakened Verification protocol will contribute to a safer world. He proposes to pick out the best elements from the protocol text, including Investigations, enhanced consultation, export controls to prevent dissemination by the members of the Australia group of countries who possess dual use technologies, confidence building measures, implementing the BWC in national legislation in more countries, linking up with other 'tools of policy'. The non-aligned states which the US suspects of having biological weapons facilities will probably not agree to such a unilateral approach.

### **2.3 Suspects and potential victims**

Several countries are suspected to have biological weapons. Iraq<sup>1</sup>, a well-known example, possessed chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf war. The US accuses Iraqi president Saddam Husein of rebuilding his biological and chemical weapons programme. It is hard to verify since UNSCOM is not allowed to visit suspect sites. The US is accusing 13 countries, mostly in the Middle East, of having offensive BW programmes. The US is especially concerned that terrorist groups may use biological and chemical weapons against civilians. This is a major incentive for their investments in bio-defence. They also refuse to exclude the potential use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent for biological and chemical weapons.

The US government is worried about possible attacks with biological weapons by "rogue states" such as Iraq, or by terrorist groups. Potential victims are both civilians and soldiers. So far, other countries have been more sceptical about the danger of bio-terrorism. But recent outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Europe, as well as some human epidemics have demonstrated the vulnerability of countries with an open economy for both attacks on human beings and on food supplies and economic resources.

The case of "Dr. Death" Wouter Basson, who was responsible for a biological weapons programme under the South African Apartheid regime, shows that ethnic groups in non-democratic countries can also become victims of biological weapons used by their own government. In most sub-Saharan African countries, current natural epidemics including AIDS, malaria and other diseases such as cholera and Ebola probably render the threat of biological weapons less pressing.

During the cold war, several countries ran offensive national programmes to develop biological weapons. In the US, this programme was terminated by president Nixon in 1969. In Russia, a massive programme to develop new biological weapons in quantities large enough to fill

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<sup>1</sup> Iraq's last use of CW was at Halabja, March 1988; at the end of the 1980-88 war against Iran; but it never used BW in the Iran/Iraq war.

intercontinental warheads ran until the beginning of the 1990s. One of the leaders of this programme, Ken Alibek, published a detailed description of this programme in 1999. There are several ongoing conversion programmes in which former weapons researchers are now working on civil biotechnology Research and Development. Some analysts are also concerned about an erosion of the definition of biological weapons. The genetic revolution could render pathogens less lethal, making them safer and easier to handle as a conventional weapon, not only as a weapon of mass destruction.

#### Terrorism with biological weapons: a case study of *Aum Shinrikyo*

The world witnessed a terrorist attack with a chemical agent *sarin*, conducted by a religious cult group *Aum Shinrikyo*, on March 20, 1995, in a busy subway station in Tokyo, causing 12 deaths and injuring over 5.000 people. However, it is not so known that this same group had conducted at least four (some suggest nine) terrorist attacks in Tokyo with biological weapons in 1990 and 1993. The *Aum* group effectively recruited a number of young intelligent scientists, including chemists, biologists, bacteriologists, and genetic engineers, to prepare for the apocalyptic coup d'état.

In 1990, the *Aum* members attempt to attack the US Navy base in Yokosuka, Japan, with botulinum toxin. Later they conducted similar attacks with anthrax spores in 1993 in an attempt of a coup d'état in Tokyo. In addition to botulinum and anthrax, the *Aum* members are believed to have studied other infectious agents such as Q fever virus. Although these two attacks resulted in a failure, a risk study of anthrax attack shows that estimated 20,000 to 30,000 persons could be exposed to the cloud of spores, possibly causing indiscriminate mass infections and deaths (SIPRI Yearbook 2000). Although their attacks with biological weapons proved to be too difficult due to the lack of sufficient technology and instruments, many experts agree that further studies on virus, use of other types of virus (e.g. those that are easier to handle), and improvements of equipment could nevertheless lead to a successful massive biological catastrophe.

The experiences from the *Aum* attacks show that there is a huge potentiality that any intelligent, non-state, civilian group could wage successful terrorist attacks with biological weapons that could cause massive bacterial calamity in any populated areas. Under the present fragile international framework for banning biological weapons, preventive measures for bio-terrorism are in a serious doubt. Without more solid preventive measures, we will only repeat the same history in Japan in 1990 and 1993; and next time, as many predict, we will not be as lucky.

#### **2.4. Relevant Catholic Social Ethics**

The Catholic Church recognises the legitimate defence of sovereign states. The Catholic Church supports the long-term objective of disarmament as a road to peace. It strongly opposes

all types of arms races, and especially arms races with mass destruction weapons. The Catholic Church has regularly spoken out against such weapons and against the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Pax Christi urges a reconsideration of biological weapons against the background of these teachings of the Church.

In coming to a judgement about biological weapons it is necessary to make a distinction between different kinds of biotechnologies, depending on their use, and judged by their effects.

Judged according to principles of the just war theory, biological weapons are inherently evil. They are essentially weapons of attack and aggression, not defense. They are indiscriminate and escape control. They are intended to sow terror and to demoralize entire populations.

## **2.5. Relevant earlier positions of Pax Christi International**

In the April 2001 statement on Nuclear Disarmament, Pax Christi International warned against: *"The failure of the USA to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to rule out the extension of the role of nuclear weapons to deter attacks by other weapons of mass-destruction and attacks by terrorist groups and so-called 'rogue states,' or 'states of concern'," and "The fact that the deployment of nuclear weapons provides a strong rationale for the development and proliferation of all kinds of weaponry, especially biological and chemical weapons, often thought of as the mass-destruction weapons 'of the poor and the weak'."*

Pax Christi sections have been involved in projects to develop codes of conduct for multinationals how to deal with human rights in countries where human rights violations occur. Some of the principles and arguments apply also to corporate responsibility to protect against biological weapons. Of course, companies cannot replace governments in protecting citizens against bio-warfare or bio-terrorism. But international and national enforcement of the BTWC convention is impossible without the loyal collaboration of industries with inspectors and export controls.

In the case of human rights, Pax Christi sections plead for the adoption of a corporate policy including auditable standards, based on the principles of international human rights law. Pax Christi sections distinguish three levels of responsibility for a company:

- a) "Where a company has control, it has full responsibility to uphold [international legal] standards ..." In the case of biological weapons, this means a company must ensure nobody abuses their installations to use, develop, produce or stockpile biological weapons. International ISO norms should be used as a guide, as in the other two cases.
- b) "Where a company does not control a situation, but is capable of exercising influence, it has a responsibility to develop and use this influence with the purpose of contributing to the realisation of [international law] by or in conjunction with others ..." A company must respect dual use export directives, and collaborate loyally with the authorities to prevent "international shopping", or reselling instruments or consumables which can be abused for

biological weapons to suspect companies or countries. A company should therefore continuously update its list of suspect parties.

- c) "In cases where a company has no means of directly influencing a situation, there still exists a responsibility towards the wider community to contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for the realisation of [international law] by all ..." A company must steer clear of situations where they can not guarantee that their installations or goods will not be abused for biological weapons.

## **2.6. Conclusion**

Pax Christi International is traditionally in favour of multilateral arms control and disarmament in the framework of the United Nations. This is applicable on biological weapons as much as on nuclear and chemical weapons. The specific aspects which distinguish biotechnology from nuclear or chemical weapons technology do not convince us to take another stance in this case. National authorities still need to collaborate and take their own responsibility to protect their own citizens against bio-warfare and bio-terrorism.

Pax Christi International has also called upon multinational companies to contribute as much as possible to the realisation of international law. In the 1990s, we focused on human rights, now we want to expand our position to include international disarmament law as well. As in the case of chemical weapons, biotechnology industries have a clear responsibility to control the safe use of their installations.

In accordance with other developments in personal responsibility of scientists and employees, we also call upon individuals to take their responsibility and "blow the whistle" if necessary. The Catholic Social Ethics present a clear framework to judge the use of biological weapons. If used as a weapon of mass destruction, it is always disproportionate, and must be rejected.

### 3. Annexes

#### 3.1 Contributors to this statement

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## **WEEK 5 NGO Report from General Assembly First Committee**

1. Introduction
2. Nuclear Disarmament/ New Agenda
- 3. Voting and short summary of each Resolution**
4. Sixth Committee Update: Draft Conventions on Terrorism

### **1. Introduction**

Although the 56th Session of the First Committee completed its business in an efficient and routine manner, evolution has been deferred in the disarmament and international security community.

One would be forgiven for presuming that the September 11 attacks on the USA would have highlighted the urgent need to strengthen arms control regimes, and to quickly rid the world of weapons. Instead, initial statements from the Member States that reflected this urgency were not translated into any significant recommendations towards disarmament, nor did much fruitful debate develop on the issues at hand. Early on there were lyrical remarks on how the world has changed, though by the end it seemed that nothing much had.

Further, most major discussions on relevant disarmament or arms control treaties, bodies and regimes are not taking place in the UN; rather they seem somewhat detached from the whole UN process and are a sort of "another reality". This is highlighted in the cases of the Biological Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiations between US and Russia.

In addition, the Chairperson's urgency in rushing the agenda of the First Committee meetings was seen by many as not demonstrating the imperative that nations have on these issues, but rather as further evidence that States feel time is not worth spending on disarmament issues in this fora. Incredibly, the three-phase process (general statements, introducing the resolutions by cluster, and voting) was jammed into just over four weeks, of which the full time was not utilized productively.

To be fair, the First Committee attempted to conduct its work in a climate of international uncertainty and scrutiny. However, it is perhaps unwise to look to a body such as the First Committee to be more than what it is - a rubber stamping mechanism for states towards the distant goal of disarmament. Ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction and their deadly and prevalent cousins - small arms, landmines and light weapons - is a big job and has never

been (and should never be) left solely in the hands of this body. Disarmament, conflict prevention and arms control is in the hands of governments who depend (whether by design, compulsion or necessity) on NGOs to push the agenda. The international NGO community engaging in disarmament work has a responsibility to interact more athletically with the United Nations and their own governments if they expect real results from this yearly forum.

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## **2. Nuclear Disarmament/ New Agenda**

While there was little cause for optimism in the First Committee debate on most disarmament issues, in the case of nuclear disarmament this year's session was even regressive. Lacking a New Agenda resolution that appealed across the North/South and nuclear/non-nuclear divides, that which was old stayed divisive and what little that was new (a conference on eliminating nuclear dangers, depleted uranium) was dropped into the same box. There was even the unprecedented case of having two procedural draft decisions provoking enough opposition to make votes necessary.

The Japanese draft on "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" - the draft reflecting (but not always faithfully) the 13 steps in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document - was revised again before being considered on Monday, Nov 5. In the paragraph on technology transfers (OP 9), a phrase was added saying constraints on transfers should be consistent with NPT obligations. On background, some states complained this new language was not a simple wording change but rather an assault on control regimes. However, it did not appear to change any votes - those who disliked the draft still were not won over. The vote was 123 (including France and the UK) to two (the US and India), with 20 abstentions (including the New Agenda, China, Israel, Pakistan and Russia). South Africa, speaking for the NA, criticized the placement of the "unequivocal undertaking" as a step to be taken and the placement of nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. Some countries that voted for the draft - including Germany, Italy and Chile - also expressed concern about how the "unequivocal undertaking" was handled. On the other hand, France (the P5 state most resistant to accepting the undertaking language at the NPT Conference) praised the text for "reflect[ing] the delicate balance" in the NPT language. India said it was flawed because it was based on the NPT.

The biggest surprise was the US "no" vote - the Japanese draft, unlike

nuclear disarmament drafts written by some non-aligned states, was very sensitive to NWS concerns. The US said it opposed the CTBT paragraph (the language is close, but not exactly the same, as the NPT consensus) because it does not support the CTBT, and would have preferred language "used elsewhere" - without explaining what that language was. Somewhat contradictory, the US argued that this position was "not a repudiation" of the NPT principles.

The non-aligned draft on nuclear disarmament ("non-aligned" in lower case because it is not an official draft of the Non-Aligned Movement) was adopted 90 to 35 with 19 abstentions, a typical vote for this annual draft. It was criticized from both sides: India said it "diluted" NAM and G-77 positions (and, of course, speaks favorably of the NPT); Japan said it strayed too far from the NPT agreements, notably the reference to a time frame for disarmament.

### **CTBT**

Hoping to achieve consensus, supporters of the CTBT draft decision eliminated all political content from the document and simply asked that the CTBT be placed on next year's GA agenda. It didn't work. The United States was the only country to vote against the decision. (Draft decisions are routinely approved without a vote, as was the case with the New Agenda this year.) The vote was 140 to one.

While Bush administration hostility to the CTBT is nothing new, to reject even placing the issue on the UN's agenda is a pretty stark sign that it has no interest in discussing the treaty at all; it's another sign of the contempt the US harbors for multilateral disarmament. The US representative said the US "does not support the CTBT" and does not intend to re-submit it to the Senate. However, he went on to say the moratorium will be maintained (he did not add that the US is still paying its share of the costs of maintaining the CTBT Organization) and that the US "understands its special responsibility under Article Six" of the NPT. How the US can support the NPT yet reject the decisions of the Review Conferences was left unexplained.

Minutes after this decision was put to a vote, a second draft decision was also voted on. The Mexican draft decision on the conference on eliminating nuclear dangers was adopted 101 to seven with 34 abstentions. This is more understandable since, while a procedural issue - placing the item on the agenda - this is the first time nations have had a chance to comment on it. Normally a new item is merely placed on the agenda by a state before the GA begins. Therefore this procedural question became a political question.

### **Depleted Uranium**

Iraq's draft on depleted uranium (DU), a new item, looks straight-forward. It simply asks the Secretary-General to solicit views of states "and relevant

organizations" on the effects of the use of DU and report to the next GA. However, the question is framed as one of "new types of weapons of mass destruction," which gave opponents two avenues of criticism: that DU is not a mass destruction weapons and that it does not pose a danger to humans and the environment. The draft passed on the narrowest of margins - 49 to 45, with 39 abstentions. The US, the EU, Pakistan and New Zealand all argued that DU is not a WMD, but only Pakistan said it should be considered as a conventional weapons (many NGOs working in the field argue that the banning - or at least the control - of DU munitions be considered under the Certain Conventional Weapons Conference as a weapon that has indiscriminate effects). The US and EU said studies have already cleared DU of harmful after-effects; New Zealand agreed but added it "has an open mind about further studies."  
- Jim Wurst, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

### **3. Voting and short summary of each Resolution**

#### **L.1: Preservation of and Compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems**

Initially co-sponsored by Russia, Belarus and China: this draft resolution is similar to the resolution put forward last year with several small changes (optional paragraph 6 was deleted and the last optional paragraph was changed). It is a key resolution, addressing the ABM treaty as valid and relevant as well as it being a "cornerstone for maintaining global peace and security and strategic stability".

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L1.pdf>  
Voting results for L.1/Rev.1 (November 2): Yes: 80; No: 3; Abstain:63

Comment: This issue attracted some of the greatest attention both within the 1st Committee and outside in the world of media and international politics with much publicized meetings between Presidents Putin and Bush taking place and planned for this next month. With an early call from the USA to their friends and allies to vote no on the draft resolution, the results could have been far worse than we saw here, but careful negotiation on behalf of the co-sponsors of the resolution may well have saved the day. As it was the US was only joined by Micronesia and Israel in voting against this resolution.

#### **L.2: Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa**

Initially co-sponsored by 12 African states: this draft resolution explores regional confidence-building measures, and the activities of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security

Questions in Central Africa. One point of note is point 14 welcoming of a call for a subregional conference on the protection of women and children in armed conflicts and asking for the Secretary-General to lend all necessary support for the holding of this conference.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L2.pdf>

Voting Result: L.2: Adopted Without a Vote (5 November)

Comment: This resolution had an oral amendment at the last minute with optional paragraph 8 being deleted. As a consequence, Mr Dhanapala announced that the L59 paper on budgetary implications for this optional paragraph was being withdrawn also. No clean text was issued. It was adopted with this amendment without a vote or further comment.

### **L.3: Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security**

Initially sponsored by the Russian Federation: this draft resolution looks at the developments in the field of information and telecommunication in the context of international security, including promotion of information security.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/ac56L3.pdf>

Voting Result: L.3/Rev.1 as a whole Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

Comment: While the Secretary of the First Committee reminded member states of the financial implications implied by operative paragraph 4, which calls for a group of governmental experts to be set up on the subject for 2004, L.3 was adopted without a vote.

### **L.4: Report of the Disarmament Commission**

Initially co-sponsored by 12 countries: this draft resolution takes note of the report from the Disarmament Commission. It also calls for the Disarmament Commission to adopt certain items for consideration at the 2002 conference, including an item on ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L4.pdf>

Voting Result: L.4 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.5: Establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the region of the Middle East**

Initially sponsored by Egypt: this draft resolution has been adopted since 1974 and has been adopted by consensus since 1980. It calls for a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction and for all parties to the resolution to comply with IAEA standards and monitoring systems. It been on the receiving end of some debate as Israel feels they have been singled out as the only state in the region with these weapons.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L5.html>

Voting Result: L.5 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: This traditional draft calling on all states in the region to consider "the practical and urgent steps" needed to establish a zone enjoys consensus because it avoids hot-button issues such as naming Israel as the only state in the region with an unsafeguarded nuclear program.

### **L.6: Missiles**

Initially sponsored by Iran: this draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to report back to the 57th Session of the General Assembly. The resolution calls for a provisional agenda item on missiles to be included in the 57th Session.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L6.html>  
Voting Result for L.6 (October 31): Yes- 88; No-0; Abstain-57

Comment: In statements surrounding the vote, Iran and Pakistan noted the importance of the inclusion of the missiles issue on the disarmament agenda and the need for a balanced approach (non-discriminatory and comprehensive). US expressed that the Code of Conduct of the MTCR is the best way forward at this time, and that this resolution may hamper that effort. Belgium and Australia agreed with the US in support of the MTCR.

### **L.7: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space**

Initially co-sponsored by 23 nations: this draft resolution explores the peaceful uses of outer space and how to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is a key resolution currently with much discussion over PAROS and the militarisation (and weaponisation) of outer space.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L7.html>  
Voting Result for L7 (November 2): Yes: 145; No: 0; Abstain: 3

Comment: The issue of the use of space attracted considerable attention during the debates. However at the end of the day there was overwhelming support for the resolution, only going to the vote so that the US, Micronesia and Israel could register an abstained vote.

### **L.8: Sub-item on the effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments**

Initially sponsored by Iraq: this draft resolution notes that depleted uranium in armaments "releases radioactive particles and chemical dust" into the environment when used and requests the Secretary-General to seek views of the states about the effects of depleted uranium in armaments.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L8.pdf>  
Voting Result for L8 (November 2): Yes 49; No: 44; Abstain 39

Comment: This resolution was introduced this year for the first time. The diplomatic community is in a state of denial about the deadly effects of depleted uranium weapons, which has not been helped by efforts that have become over-zealous and over-stated in an attempt to overcome this denial. Depleted Uranium is deadly, it is pyrogenic and ignites on impact, it is a radiologically and chemically toxic weapon that is primarily an alpha emitter with beta and gamma decay products with a half life of 4.5 billion years. After detonation, DU weapons produce very small, volatile and "ceramic" particles of uranium oxide which release long term, low level radiation in the human organism and system, in which they remain for many years. DU could only have radically exacerbated the health effects of the already toxic situations into which it has been dropped. Even the extremely conservative International Commission on Radiological Protection agrees that there is no safe level of radiation - yet there are credible and intelligent people who have said during this First Committee that depleted uranium is harmless, which just has no basis in fact. Depleted uranium is a chemical and radiological weapon, not a nuclear weapon. Much of the objection and discussion around this resolution was about the fact that Iraq had placed it under the Weapons of Mass Destruction cluster rather than the Conventional Weapons cluster. This is typical of the procedural preoccupations of UN meetings wherein deadly weapons split open lives and livers while diplomats split hairs. Nonetheless, this issue and resolution will remain on the agenda, and we can only hope that it will given the time and debate that it deserves next year. We look forward to the Secretary General's report on this and encourage contribution and input from experts in this field. . Felicity Hill, WILPF

### **L.9: African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty**

Initially sponsored by Sudan: this draft resolution calls on all African states to sign and ratify the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and for the Members to the NPT to comply with the IAEA.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L9.pdf>  
Voting Result: L9: Adopted without a vote (November 2)

Comment: Calls for all African states to ratify the 1996 treaty and for all states to whom the protocols apply (the NWS and Spain) to ratify the protocols.

### **L.10: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

Initially sponsored by New Zealand: this is a short draft decision on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty noting that the forthcoming conference on the Treaty will be held from 11-13 November.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L10.pdf>  
Voting Result for L.10/Rev.1 (November 5): Yes-140;No-1; Abstain-0

Comment: This draft decision to place the CTBT on next year's agenda had to be voted on, with only the US opposing.

### **L.11: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

Initially sponsored by Hungary: a draft decision on the Biological and Toxin Weapons convention, calling for the Secretary-General to continue to offer assistance and services required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the past Review Conference and for the upcoming Review Conference (being held 19 November - 7 December 2001 in Geneva).

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/1Ac156L11.pdf>

Voting Result: L.11 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

Comment: The US has rejected the proposed enforcement protocol for the BWC and has put forward proposals, which address possible use more than prevention of use, and it plans to discuss these at the upcoming Review Conference. Support for the protocol is still strong among most other states.

### **L.12: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons**

Initially sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution calls on the CD to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L12.pdf>

Voting Result: View Voting Results for L.12 (October 30): Yes-90; No-42; Abstain-11

Comment: Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons  
This draft calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a convention, a course the Western nuclear powers and its allies oppose.

### **L.13: Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament**

Initially sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution is on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament. In one of the points it encourages the UN bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technologies for peaceful purposes. It also calls for a provisional agenda item on the subject for the 57th session of the GA.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L13.pdf>

Voting Result: View Voting Results for L.13 (October 31): Yes-86; No-42; Abstain-16

Comment: This resolution calls for disarmament related technologies and resolves to promote science for peaceful purposes.

Someone, somewhere, all of you, everywhere, be on notice that all resolutions that talk about mankind are illegitimate. Mankind does not exist. Humankind does. Felicity Hill, WILPF

#### **L.14: Reducing nuclear danger**

Initially sponsored by 11 countries: this draft resolution discusses methods to reduce nuclear dangers and calls for a provisional agenda item on reducing nuclear dangers at the 57th Session. This looks at the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to the L12 which is more specifically referring to the intentional use.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L14.pdf>

Voting Result: View Voting Results for L.14 (October 30): Yes-89; No-43; Abstain-13

Comment: This Indian draft calls for a "review of nuclear doctrines... and take urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons." This means de-alerting of nuclear weapons, which is opposed by the US, UK, France and Russia.

#### **L.15: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda**

Sponsored by South Africa: this is a draft decision on the inclusion of an agenda item "Towards a Nuclear Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" at the 57th Session of the General Assembly.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L15.pdf>

Voting Result: L.15 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: This draft decision, approved without a vote, simply places the New Agenda on next year's First Committee agenda.

#### **L.16: United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament**

Initially sponsored by Mexico: this draft resolution calls for a United Nations conference to compliment the efforts of the CD and review processes of the NPT to address reducing nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament. It calls for the conference to be held no later than 2006 in New York with three preparatory committee meetings. Of note is the strong calls for the input in this meeting from non-government organizations and civil society.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L16.pdf>

Voting Result: L.16 **Withdrawn**

**REPLACED BY A DECISION**

**L.60: United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament**

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L60.pdf>  
Voting Result for L.60 (November 5): Yes-101; No-7; Abstain-34

Comment: Mexico began with a draft resolution (L.16) that would have the UN decide to convene a "conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament" in 2006. But after much opposition (the date interfered with the Small Arms Conference, it competed with the NPT), Mexico ended up replacing the resolution with a draft decision asking for the idea to be considered next year.

**L.17: Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

Initially co-sponsored by 31 countries, chiefly Latin American and Caribbean states: this draft resolution calls on countries in the region to sign and ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco and decides to include as a provisional agenda item in the 58th Session of the GA an item to consolidate the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L17.pdf>  
Voting Result: L.17 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: The traditional resolution calls for full implementation of the Latin American NWFZ - world's oldest and most comprehensive.

**L.18: United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament**

Initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution is on the UN regional centers for disarmament, calling on measures to strengthen and revitalize these centers.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L18.pdf>  
Voting Result: L18 Adopted Without a Vote (November 2)

**L.19: Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament**

Initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution decides, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to hold a fourth special session on disarmament. A provisional agenda item on this will be included in the 57th Session also.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L19.pdf>  
Voting Result: L.19 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

Comment: this resolution puts the Fourth Special Session on the provisional agenda for next year. There were no comments during the vote.

## **L.20: Relationship between disarmament and development**

Initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution calls on the high level Steering Group on disarmament and development to strengthen its activities and calls for a provisional agenda item to be included for the 57th Session of the GA.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L20.pdf>

Voting Result: L.20 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

Comment: after the vote the USA stated that although they didn't block consensus they also didn't participate in this vote as in their view disarmament and development are not linked.

## **L.21: Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

Initially sponsored by South Africa on behalf of NAM: this draft resolution reaffirms that all disarmament forums should take into account environmental norms and that unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures undertaken for international security and disarmament should not harm the environment.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L21.pdf>

Voting Result for L.21 (October 31): Yes-141; No-0; Abstain-4

Comment: The US stated that they remain uncertain of the purpose and objective of the resolution and don't see the relevance to the First Committee. France, US, UK and Israel abstained, but all other states voted for this resolution because the effects of nuclear weapons, and the need to protect the environment with responsible disarmament of toxic weaponry is obvious to the rest of the world.

## **L.22: Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace**

Initially sponsored by South Africa: this draft resolution recalls the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean while reiterating that the participation of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and major users of the zone would enhance the stability of the region. It also calls for a provisional agenda item at the 58th Session of the GA.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L22.pdf>

Voting Result for L.22 (October 31): Yes-105; No-3; Abstain-37

Comment: This resolution was requested to be adopted without a vote, but the United States asked for it to go to a vote.

## **L.23: Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security**

Sponsored by South Africa: this draft decision notes the inclusion of a provisional agenda item on the review of the implementation of the declaration on the strengthening of international security.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L23.pdf>

Voting Result: L.23 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

#### **L.24: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas**

Initially co-sponsored by 60 countries: this draft resolution addresses the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. This puts a provisional agenda item on the 57th Session on this subject and takes note of the existing treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L24.pdf>

Voting Results:

Results L24 op para 3; 3 last words (November 2): Yes- 132; No-3; Abstain- 8

Results L24 op para 3 as a whole (November 2): Yes-136; No- 2; Abstain-8

Results L24 as a whole (November 2): Yes- 149; No- 4; Abstain- 5

Comment: This annual draft calling talks to expand all the NWFZ in the South (where most of them are in any case) into a single seamless NWFZ is still opposed by the nuclear powers with a global reach - the US, UK and France - who say they are worried the zone would interfere with the freedom of the high seas.

#### **L.25: The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East**

Initially sponsored by Egypt: this draft resolution, titled "the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" welcomes conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, calls on Israel to accede to the IAEA safeguards and puts the issue on the provisional agenda for the 57th Session.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L25.pdf>

Voting Results:

Results for L25pp6 (November 2): Yes: 139; No:2; Abstain: 6

Results for L25 as a whole (November 2): Yes 139; No: 3; Abstain:7

Comment: This resolution singles out Israel as the only state in the Middle East not party to the NPT and calls on it to ratify the treaty. Israel and the US oppose the draft because it focus only on Israel and not on other causes of tensions in the region, such as Iraq's weapons programs.

#### **L.26. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: report of the Disarmament Commission**

Initially co-sponsored by 11 countries: this draft resolution notes the importance of the Report of the Disarmament Commission and recommends that this body adopt two items for consideration at its 2001 substantive session: ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L26.html>

Voting Result for L.26 (October 30): Yes-94; No-0; Abstain-52

Comment: Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

This draft notes that the CD "in principle" has no objection to negotiating an international convention on negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states and calls on the CD to actively work on the issue.

### **L.27: Regional Disarmament**

Initially co-sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey: this draft resolution on regional disarmament, emphasizes the importance of general and complete disarmament, focusing on the need for regional efforts to coincide with international approaches.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L27.pdf>

Voting Result: L.27 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.28: Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels**

Initially co-sponsored by 9 countries: this draft resolution regarding conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels requests a report from the Conference on Disarmament, to seek the views of Member States on the subject, and a report to the General Assembly from the Secretary-General.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L28.pdf>

Voting Result for L.28 (October 31): Yes-138; No-1; Abstain-1

Comment: India asked for a recorded vote on this resolution, stating that it had no productive value.

### **L.29: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

Initially sponsored by Togo: this draft resolution regarding United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa calls to support and revitalize the centre from international and non-governmental organizations. In addition the resolution requests that the Secretary General support the centre and to form closer ties between the centre and the Organization for African Unity and other regional and sub-regional organizations.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L29.pdf>

Voting Result: L.29 Adopted Without a Vote (November 5)

### **L.30: Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification**

Initially co-sponsored by 31 countries: this draft resolution regarding verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, calls for resolutions on the issue to be implemented, and requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly at its 58th session on further view from Member States on the issues.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L30.pdf>

Voting Result: L.30 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.31: The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

Initially sponsored by Canada: this draft resolution is regarding the Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L31.pdf>

Voting Result: L.31 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: Pakistan noted that while it fully supported this resolution, it emphasized that any negotiation on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material would have to be negotiated according to the principles of universality, non-discrimination and comprehensiveness.

Reflecting the deadlock in the CD on the issue of negotiating a FMCT, the resolution repeats previous years' draft and "urges" the CD to "agree on a program of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty."

### **L.32: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction**

Initially co-sponsored by Canada and Poland: this draft resolution regarding the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of

Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction calls for the importance of the close cooperation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L32.pdf>

Voting Result: L.32 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: While this resolution was adopted without a vote, Egypt was very clear that it would like to disassociate itself with the consensus because it has no intention of signing the CWC until Israel adheres to the NPT. Pakistan also noted concern that several countries party to the CWC have not begun to dismantle these weapons. After the vote, Israel stated that while it has signed the CWC, it will not ratify the treaty until its Middle East neighbors do as well, due to its "unique geopolitical position".

### **L.33: Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes**

Initially sponsored by Sudan: this draft resolution regarding the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes focused on the potential hazards of this waste that would constitute radiological warfare. States are called upon to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a convention on this issue, and that various relevant existing resolutions, codes of practice and conventions be observed.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L33.pdf>

Voting Result: L.33/Rev.1 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: India and Pakistan both noted their support for this resolution, and India even went as far to say that radiological weapons should be further recognized as a weapons category. Dominican Republic, while it joined the consensus, wanted to be put on the record to note their fear of becoming a victim of dumping of radiological waste.

### **L.34: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction**

Initially co-sponsored by 95 countries: this draft resolution regarding the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction urges States parties to the convention and non-parties to provide the Secretary-General with information to make "global mine action efforts more effective". Relevant international, regional, non-governmental organizations are invited to participate in the programme of intersessional work at the First meeting of States Parties to the Convention.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L34.pdf>

Voting Result for L.34 (October 31): Yes-121; No-0; Abstain-19

Comment: There was considerable discussion on this resolution both before and following the vote from countries including Republic of Korea, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Libya, Nepal, Iran, Myanmar, India, Cuba, Israel and Singapore. Many stated that although there are

enormous humanitarian impacts of landmines, the resolution did not take into account the right of states to self defence, some saying that landmines are still a legitimate minimum level defence. There were a number of calls for a strengthened Treaty on this issue as the Ottawa Convention was inadequate.

### **L.35: A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

Initially sponsored by Japan: this draft resolution regarding a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons calls for the strengthening of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, especially in light of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT. This resolution encourages the Russian Federation and United States to continue intensive consultations on the offensive and defensive systems. Eight elements strengthening the international non-proliferation regime are listed as of critical importance. Civil society is encouraged to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L35.pdf>

Voting Result for L35Rev1\*: Yes 123; No 2; Abstain 20

Comment: This draft, sponsored by Japan, is meant to frame elimination in the language of the 2000 NPT Review Conference consensus decision. Critics said the draft weakens that consensus by deleting some of the agreed language (no references to the ABM treaty) and misrepresenting other parts (grouping the "unequivocal undertaking" as a step to be taken rather than as an existing commitment). The NWS party to the treaty show up in each column: France and the UK voted yes, the US voted no and China and Russia abstained. Jim Wurst, LCNP

### **L.36: Report of the Conference on Disarmament**

Initially sponsored by Ecuador: this draft resolution is regarding the Report of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on the issue of disarmament. The Secretary General is requested to ensure the CD has all the proper support services and requests the CD to report on its work.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L36.pdf>

Voting Result: L.36 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.37: Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region**

Initially co-sponsored by 33 countries: this draft resolution calls for the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, especially in particular areas of tension. States of the region are called to adhere to all of the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments to do so, to strengthen confidence-building measures and to further their cooperation in combating terrorism.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L37.pdf>

Voting Result: L.37 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.38: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee**

Initially sponsored by Algeria: this draft resolution is regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee. The First meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York from 8 to 19 April 2002 with Henrik Salander of Sweden in the Chair.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L38.pdf>

Voting Result for L.38 (October 30): Yes-141; No-1; Abstain-3

Comment:

The resolution simply notes the decision of the parties to the treaty to begin the preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference in April 2002. There are no political issues involved; it merely recalls the Final Document of 2000. The draft was opposed only by the four states not party to the NPT. Jim Wurst, LCNP

Overwhelmingly the results of the NPT 2000 Review Conference were held as one of the few positive achievements of the disarmament community at this years First Committee. In its contempt for the NPT as a "discriminatory, inadequate and ineffective treaty due to lack of movement on Article 6 after 30 years", but simultaneous desire to be considered a Nuclear Weapon State, India pressed for a vote and then voted no to this very short procedural resolution. Pakistan, Cuba and Israel, the other non-signatories, abstained. Before the vote, Pakistan said that it disagreed with the statements indicating that the 2000 Review Conference was a success, and therefore abstained. India protested the unwarranted and unacceptable references to India in the final document and indicated that the optimism regarding the "unequivocal undertaking" was short lived and unfulfilled. Felicity Hill, WILPF

### **L.39: Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures**

Initially co-sponsored by 81 countries: this draft resolution regarding the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures emphasizes the importance of comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures such as collection and responsible disposal of weapons obtained illegally. The Secretary General is also requested to report on the implementation of the present resolution, taking into consideration the activities of the group of interested States in this regard.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L39.pdf>

Voting Result: L.39 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.40: Transparency in armaments**

Initially co-sponsored by 76 countries: this draft resolution regarding transparency in armaments requests the convening of a group of governmental experts in 2003 to report on the Register of Conventional Arms, calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to consider this, for member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional level, and for the Secretary General to report of the implementation of this resolution.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L40.pdf>

Voting Results:

Results for L.40 Operative Paragraph 4b (October 31): Yes-123; No-4 Abstain-13

Results for L.40 Operative Paragraph 6 (October 31): Yes-123; No-0; Abstain-17

Results for L.40 as a whole (October 31): Yes-121; No-0; Abstain-22

Comment: Most of the abstentions were from Arab states who object to the "imbalanced" picture of security conveyed by not including nuclear weapons or other high tech weapons, particularly in the context of the Middle East, where they say that Israel's capabilities are not accurately reflected in the Register.

#### **L.41: Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe**

Initially co-sponsored by 26 countries, mostly from Europe with the exception of Benin and Canada: this draft resolution is regarding maintenance neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe, based on existing resolutions, agreements and instruments. Mines and small arms and light weapons are mentioned as particular issues which must be dealt with.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L41.html>

Voting Result: L.41/Rev.1 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

#### **L.42: Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures**

Initially co-sponsored by 55 countries: this draft resolution is regarding objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures. This is recommended through consultations with relevant international bodies with a view to ascertaining requirements for adjusting the present instruments and expand participation.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L42.pdf>

Voting Result: L.42 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

#### **L.43: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

Initially co-sponsored by 49 countries: this draft resolution is regarding the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention Weapons Which May Be Deemed

to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Various issues are suggested as needing further exploration, such as compliance procedures and mechanisms, explosive remnants of war, extension of the scope of application of the Convention to non-international armed conflict, landmines other than anti-personnel mines, and small-calibre ammunitions.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L43.pdf>

Voting Result: L43: Adopted without a vote

#### **L.44: Nuclear disarmament**

Initially co-sponsored by 32 countries: this draft resolution regarding nuclear disarmament reaffirms the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and that the time is now opportune to undertake this task. The entry into force of the CTBT as well as strengthening of various treaties, agreements and institution related to this goal are called for.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L44.pdf>

Voting Results:

Results for L.44/Rev.1 Operative Paragraph 9 (November 5): Yes-132; No-3; Abstain-6

Results for L.44/Rev.1 as a whole (November 5): Yes-90; No-35; Abstain-19

Comment: Pakistan noted that while committed to nuclear disarmament they could not support this resolution because of issues in pp6, the final pp and optional paragraphs 6 and 9. India also stated that they couldn't support because of their well known views on the NPT. China made comments in support of the resolution but also noted that the ABM is still the cornerstone of international stability, that countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should take a lead in disarmament and transparency measures can only be implemented in an atmosphere of trust and security. In contrast, Japan stated that they support the assertion of the resolution that the NPT is the cornerstone to security while noting that there is no specified timeframe for nuclear disarmament.

Myanmar takes the lead in sponsoring this non-aligned draft that calls on the nuclear weapons states to take steps towards disarmament that they do not want to take, such as "plurilateral" negotiations and ending qualitative improvements in their arsenals.

#### **L.45: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons**

Initially co-sponsored by 27 countries, with about 40 joining later: this draft resolution regarding follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons calls on states to fulfill the obligation to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict effective international control" in OP1. The resolution also calls for negotiations to begin in 2002 leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. The separate vote on OP1 had 4 no votes (France, Israel, Russia, and US) and 2 abstentions (UK and Micronesia).

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L45.pdf>

Voting Results:

Result for L.45 Operative Paragraph 1 (October 30): Yes-139; No-4; Abstain-2

Results for L.45 as a whole (October 30): Yes-99; No-28; Abstain-19

Comment: Most of the abstentions were from Arab states who object to the "imbalanced" picture of security conveyed by not including nuclear weapons or other high tech weapons, particularly in the context of the Middle East, where they say that Israel's capabilities are not accurately reflected in the Register.

#### **L.46: United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Initially sponsored Haiti: this draft resolution regarding the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean welcomes the support these centres have received and calls for more participation from all of the States of the region and international, regional and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/AC156L46.pdf>

Voting Result: L.46 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

#### **L.47: The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects**

Initially co-sponsored by 57 countries: this draft resolution regarding the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, decides to convene a conference no later than 2006, to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, with the date and venue to be decided at its 58th session. Member States to implement this plan of action. The Secretary General is encouraged to facilitate and report on the implementation of the plan of action at the 58th session on the implementation of this resolution.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L47.pdf>

Voting Result: L47 Adopted without a Vote (5 November)

Comment: The draft resolution was accompanied by Programme Budget Implications document: A/C.1/56/L.60. Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/56/L.47 Draft resolution L.47 would have the assembly decide to convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at the UN small arms conference, the date and venue to be decided at its fifty-eighth session. The GA would also decide to convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis, commencing in 2003, to consider national, regional, and global implementation of the Programme of Action. It would call upon all States to implement it and encourage the UN and other appropriate international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Action Programme. The United States, while it decided to join consensus on the resolution, believed that

the Programme Budget Implications (PBI) document required further discussion. They noted that further discussion would be taken up in Fifth Committee.

#### **L.48: Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia**

Initially sponsored by Uzbekistan: this draft resolution regarding establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia simply takes the decision to include in the provisional agenda of its 57th session this item.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L48.pdf>

Voting Result: L.48 Adopted Without a Vote (October 30)

Comment: This draft decision simply places the issue on next year's agenda.

#### **L.49: Global efforts against terrorism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation**

Initially sponsored by the Chairman: this draft resolution is regarding global efforts against terrorism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Chairman notes with concern the "lack of sufficient progress in multilateral disarmament diplomacy" and reaffirms the importance of strengthening multilateral negotiations.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L49.pdf>

Voting Result: Adopted Without a Vote (November 6)

Comment: This resolution was held over until the last day of the voting. As one of three "new" resolutions (the others being L16 and L8), it attracted considerable debate and attention. It was undoubtedly the most successful of the three.

The Chair was eager to have it dealt with on Monday to bring the Committees work to a close early but the African and Arab groups stated that they needed more time for consultations to strengthen the consensus towards the resolution. However, the Chairperson stated that he had negotiated the text extensively and he would be seeking only a consensus or a complete withdrawal of the resolution, and would not make any further changes to the text. The African and Arab states insisted on their right to take the time to consult further however and the Committee adjourned until the following day.

Therefore on the final day, this came before the Committee as the final resolution to be put to the vote. Comments were made by Sudan on behalf of the African group who thanked the Chairperson for the initiative while noting that the rush of having this resolution accepted without further negotiations on the text at the insistence of the Chair was not usual and that no resolution before the committee is set in rock. The Arab states also stated that no resolution should be presented to the Committee on a "take it or leave it" basis and that although they join consensus they had reservations on the 1st optional paragraph. Cuba and Belgium on behalf of the European Union also made comments. The Chairperson was pleased to see this resolution come through as he viewed it as an important contribution to the work of the Committee in the current international climate. And as the African states concluded in their final comments on the resolution, "All's well that ends well."

### **L.50: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

Initially co-sponsored by 22 countries: this draft resolution regarding the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific welcomes the support these centres have received and calls for more participation from all of the States of the region and international, regional and non-governmental organizations. In addition, the Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L50.pdf>

Voting Result: L.50 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

### **L.51: Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them**

Initially sponsored by Mali: this draft resolution regarding assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, welcomes the support and encourages further participation of States, and international, regional and non-governmental organizations to ensure the smooth functioning of the bodies established to facilitate this task. The Secretary General is requested to report to the General Assembly at the 57th session on the implementation of this resolution.

Text: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/1com/2001res/Ac156L51.pdf>

Voting Result: L.51/Rev.1 Adopted Without a Vote (October 31)

Comment: Draft resolution L.51 would encourage the establishment in the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion of national commissions to combat the proliferation of small arms, and invite the international community to lend its support wherever possible to ensure the smooth functioning of those committees. It would welcome the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of SALW in West Africa, and encourage the international community to support its implementation.

A few member states, including Egypt, chose not to block consensus, but made it aware that they were less than pleased by some of the language in the revised draft resolution. Egypt felt that the revised draft was far away from both Bamako and the UN small arms conference language, which was the cornerstone of efforts to deal with the problem. It was felt by Egypt that referring to language not agreed to at Bamako or the small arms conference could have negative impacts on the follow-up process. Some delegations were equally upset that action on the resolution was taken prematurely - apparently, some member states felt further consultations were necessary before the resolution was acted on.

## **4. Sixth Committee Update: Draft Conventions on Terrorism**

The UNGA Sixth Committee agenda item "Measures to eliminate international terrorism" was the focus of a Working Group that met between 15 and 26 of October. Its report is now available at <http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/english/ac65619e.pdf>.

The Working Group continued the "elaboration of a draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism," and "consideration of outstanding issues relating to the elaboration of a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism." (This working group continues the work of an Ad Hoc Committee established in 1996, which has since met during the early part of each calendar year and again during the Sixth Committee as a working group. For background see NGO Reports from weeks 1 and 2, and the website of the Ad Hoc Committee: [www.un.org/law/terrorism/](http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/).)

Most of the attention during this recent session has been on the draft comprehensive convention proposed by India. Most of the outstanding issues relate to articles 2 and 18 addressing, respectively the definition of offences under the draft convention and the relation to acts of state. The Working Group concluded with a new draft by the Friends of the Chair for articles 3 to 17 bis and 20 to 27, as well as informal texts for articles 2 and 2 bis. Discussions are to continue on the preamble and articles 1 and 18, with articles 2, 2bis and 18 seen as interrelated, according to the chair.

The Working Group recommended that work should continue "as a matter of urgency" on the elaboration of a draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

On the nuclear terrorism draft convention originally proposed by Russia, the text has been substantially completed, with one outstanding issue - though a significant one - relating to scope. The single proposed amendment, from Mexico, relates to this issue and reads:

"The Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by states."

This proposed amendment would be a new paragraph in Article 4, the latest public version of which reads:

"1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law.

"2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.

"3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of the present article shall not be interpreted as condoning or making lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or precluding prosecution under other laws."

Among the foremost concerns related to this Article is a perception among some non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states might regard the draft convention as legitimising their possible use of nuclear weapons. The wording of draft Article 4 and the Mexican proposal above seem to reflect these concerns.

This issue is still outstanding and, according to the Working Group report, the Chair has "stressed that the finalization of the work on the draft convention depended primarily on the political will to reach a compromise on the outstanding issues and he urged delegations to demonstrate the necessary flexibility in order to bring the negotiation of the instrument to a successful conclusion at the current session of the Working Group. A new coordinator for the draft nuclear terrorism convention was appointed, Mr. Richard Rowe from Australia. The Working Group recommended that the coordinator should continue consultations on the draft convention and report on these to the Sixth Committee.

The Sixth Committee will again consider the item "Measures to eliminate international terrorism" during its current session, scheduled to conclude on Nov. 23.

Merav Datan  
Physicians for Social Responsibility  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

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\*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*       \*\*\*\*\*

X-Sender: flick@pop.igc.org  
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2001 15:48:04 -0500  
To: updates@reachingcriticalwill.org  
From: Felicity Hill <flick@igc.org>  
Subject: CTBT EIF Conference  
Cc: wilpf-news@igc.topica.com

Dear All,

The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began today with speeches from the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers of: Austria, Belgium, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Peru, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Mexico, Lesotho, Iceland, Australia, Indonesia, Germany, Republic of Korea, Egypt, UK, Netherlands, New Zealand, Iran, Belarus, Greece, Argentina, Morocco, Norway, Poland, Bulgaria, Thailand, Nauru, Slovakia, Malaysia, Israel, Holy See.

All statements made to the Conference are being placed on line here  
<http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/index.html>

A draft of the Final Declaration is online at  
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ctbt/ctbtfinaldoc.pdf>

Analysis of the event will be available at

Reaching Critical Will <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ctbt/ctbtindex.html>

The Acronym Institute <http://www.acronym.org.uk/ctbt>

The Arms Control Association  
<http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/ctbt/default.asp>

best wishes

Felicity

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\*\*\*\*\*

To: president@warnersisters.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Query  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Cass Warner:

I share with you the conviction that we need "more affirmative, more insightful and uplifting pictures suitable for their entire families." This feeling has drawn me into writing screenplays. I have four that offer different slices of Americana along these lines, as summarized below. If you are interested in any of them, I can send you the complete script.

**SUNDAY BOX.** With help from their womenfolk three generations of stubborn men (grandfather, son, grandson) offer mutual forgiveness for long-standing grievances and achieve reconciliation. This is of the genre of the Hallmark Hall of Fame and the CBS Sunday Night Movie, but it could also be a feature film.

**SUPER WEDNESDAY.** A widower supermarket manager clashes with a female police detective called in to investigate an anonymous threat, but before the day is over an unexpected romance blossoms. This occurs as the daily life of the supermarket unfolds with drama and comedy and on this day, unexpected happenings. **SUPER WEDNESDAY** could bring Tom Hanks and Helen Hunt together again, or the roles could be played by a comparable pair.

**SPRING CHICKENS.** The Odd Couple meets the Bad News Bears. Two older guys in New York walk out on their wives at the opera, which they detest, and head for Florida. They become managers of rival senior softball teams (the spring chickens). Their wives, borrowing an idea from Mozart's "Cosi fan Tutte", show up in disguise and spy on them until reconciliation occurs after the championship game. The husbands could be Clint Eastwood and James Garner, the wives could be Debbie Reynolds and Shirley MacLane, or other pairs of older actors and actresses

**LEAD, KINDLY LIGHT.** A querulous band of travelers stranded by a blizzard in a little country church become the reluctant cast for the Christmas pageant with life-change consequences. It is essentially an ensemble piece, though the pastor has the central role. Unlike many of today's Christmas film offerings that deal with a secular version of the Christmas spirit, **LEAD, KINDLY LIGHT** returns to the original, multiple versions as told in the gospels of Matthew, Luke, and John.

My training for film writing includes a course in television production at American University, workshops sponsored by the Maryland Writers' Association and the Writer's Center of Bethesda, Maryland (the most recent one taught by Adam Kulakow, a Hollywood screenwriter), reading books on screenwriting, watching movies analytically, and writing and re-writing these four screenplays. . A stage version of **LEAD, KINDLY LIGHT** was performed at a downtown church in Washington, D.C. I also have in the works a screenplay about a Washington whistle blower.

Please let me know if you would like me to e-mail you a synopsis of any of these screenplays or to send you any of the completed scripts.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmet Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817

Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)

To: phil  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: billing  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Phil,

The invoice you sent has one line that says, "TAB, ADDRESS, SORT/TIE/TRAY AND TAKE TO PO - 50.00" and a second line that says, "POSTAGE - \$127.85". So it's all right.

Howard

To: lisaw@nccusa  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: November 20 meeting  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Lisa,

For the meeting with Frank Miller at NSC at 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, November 20, it seems likely that Rabbi Saperstein, Jerry Powers, and Joe Volk will participate. We hope that there can be somebody from NCC. If not, I'll get a Protestant.

I'll be out of town until Wednesday, November 14. I'll get in touch with you then unless you reply by e-mail.

Shalom,  
Howard

# Pax Christi International

International Secretariat  
Secrétariat International

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## **New Challenges on Nuclear Disarmament Agenda**

### **A Call and Statement on Nuclear Disarmament**

#### **I. Background Briefing**

Pax Christi International stresses the need of the International Community and the Churches to insist once again on the continuing threat of nuclear weapons. We are at a very critical moment of new challenges to the international disarmament agenda. Statements alone will not be enough. Pax Christi International appeals to public opinion to raise its voice in the debate.

Like Pax Christi International, numerous religious bodies have a long history of addressing nuclear weapons issues. Many have condemned nuclear weapons and called for their abolition. In their joint statement to the NPT Review PrepCom of April 1998, Cardinal Danneels, President of Pax Christi International, and Dr. Konrad Raiser, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, stated: “Nuclear weapons, whether used or threatened, are grossly evil and therefore morally wrong. As an instrument of mass destruction, nuclear weapons slaughter the innocent and ravage the environment.”

In May 2000 at the conclusion of the Review Conference of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the major nuclear powers made an important new commitment. They promised to make “an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” True, a commitment to nuclear abolition was and is one of the obligations of the NPT itself (Art. VI); but the nuclear weapons states never took it seriously. Time and again the Holy See asked for an “unequivocal commitment” during interventions in the United Nations.

Today, the window of opportunity for moves towards the elimination of nuclear weapons seems to be open again. However, there is still no concrete timeframe for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. The need for abolition exists because of a real possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in anger for the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with disastrous results for the whole of humanity. In recent years, we have witnessed policies by several states to extend the role for nuclear weapons in their security policies. India and Pakistan are the most prominent examples. The USA and the Russian Federation too are modernizing and extending the role of nuclear weapons.

Public opinion takes little notice of the problem. This is due in part to the mistaken belief

that with the end of the cold war nuclear weapons no longer pose serious dangers. However, the window of opportunity may be closed again if political leaders are not pressed by public opinion “to accomplish the total elimination” soon. Notwithstanding their proclaimed commitment to the nuclear disarmament required of them by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Weapons States still insist that their own security depends on retaining nuclear weapons while at the same time insisting that the security of other states depends on their renunciation of exactly the same weapons. The incoherence of this position is obvious and must be rectified before it is too late.

### Some Special Dangers

The Churches and other religious organisations can play an important role in informing public opinion of some of the dangers that confront our common security:

1. The likely further proliferation of nuclear weapons following the example of India and Pakistan, where there is a danger of nuclear weapons being used inadvertently or by miscalculation over (for example) the Kashmir dispute.
2. The danger of a nuclear strike elsewhere in the world by chance, accident or inadvertence.
3. The refusal of Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT and to place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, or to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
4. The refusal of North Korea to preserve and make available to the IAEA all information on its nuclear material, as it is obliged to do as a party to the NPT and its safeguard agreement with IAEA.
5. The presence, especially in Europe, of many tactical nuclear weapons.
6. The failure of the USA to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to rule out the extension of the role of nuclear weapons deter attacks by other weapons of mass-destruction and attacks by terrorist groups and so-called “rogue states,” or “states of concern.”
7. The announcement by Russia of its intention to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons in response to its conventional military weakness and its sense of encirclement due to the expansion of NATO; and by China because of the alleged threat of Theatre Missile Defences in South East Asia.
8. The fact that the deployment of nuclear weapons provides a strong rationale for the development and proliferation of all kinds of weaponry, especially biological and chemical weapons, often thought of as the mass-destruction weapons “of the poor and the weak.”
9. US plans for “National Missile Defence,” a provocative and destabilising concept which threatens very serious damage to the arms control and disarmament efforts of other states.

## **II. The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons - A Statement by Pax Christi International**

We call upon all states to put urgent negotiation of a nuclear disarmament convention at the top of the international agenda. We welcome the overwhelming support given to the “New Agenda Resolution” in the United Nations General Assembly in November 2000, including that of most (though regrettably not all) of the states which possess nuclear weapons.

We see nuclear weapons abolition as a major component in the process of re-examining our traditional ideas about security and war. Our ultimate vision is of a peace built on common security based on justice and reconciliation. It is for all of us to work for the elimination of war, the priority of non-violence and the establishment of a global culture of peace.

The Holy See has summarised the measures that need to be pursued at the present time; measures largely agreed by the expert opinion-makers:

”It should be an immediate objective of the international community to eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons, de-alert weapons by removing warheads from delivery vehicles, establish a legally binding negative security assurance regime, and secure from the Nuclear Weapons States a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.”

Negotiations do not have to start from scratch. A detailed scheme for nuclear abolition has been prepared and is lodged with the United Nations. We welcome the recent vote at the United Nations affirming the need of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world, although we are disappointed that the New Agenda Resolution’s adopted text has weakened the sense of urgency present in the earlier drafts.

Certain immediate steps should be taken which would move us closer to abolition. We urge:

1. Russia and the USA to make rapid progress towards Start III with lower limits than those envisaged at Helsinki.
2. The smaller Nuclear Weapons states to promote multilateral disarmament negotiations for the purpose of reducing nuclear arsenals in order to make progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The UK and France should take a lead here, by abandoning talk of relying on nuclear weapons for national security, promoting a no first use treaty among the Nuclear Weapons States, and announcing their intention not to replace their current arsenals at any time in the future.
3. All states to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to promote its early entry into force.
4. The removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of all non-nuclear European states.
5. Nuclear weapons everywhere to be taken off alert, including removing warheads from all land-based missiles and placing them in secure internationally monitored storage.
6. A no first use pledge to be given by all nuclear weapon states, as a confidence building measure.
7. The establishment of nuclear weapon free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Reply-To: From: "Paul Lansu" To: Subject: Call and Statement on Nuclear Disarmament Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 11:30:41 +0100 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook CWS, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 Importance: Normal X-MDRemoteIP: 192.168.0.4 X-Return-Path: paul@paxchristi.net X-MDAemon-Deliver-To: mupj@igc.org

**Press Release**

**International Council Pax Christi International 2001**

**Pax Christi Reinigorates the Nuclear Disarmament Debate  
Call and Statement on Nuclear Disarmament  
Signed by Cardinals, Bishops and Presidents of Pax Christi International**

The second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CNTB) takes place in New York, USA, November 2001.

Pax Christi International issued a position paper and is calling on the International Community and the Churches to renew their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Concern on this issue must continue to be voiced through strong public opinion raised against nuclear weapons.

This initiative has been re-initiated at the International Council of Pax Christi International which took place in Mainz, Germany, 1 – 4 November 2001. More than 165 delegates from more than 50 countries participated in the Council.

The Call and Statement stresses the urgent need for an international nuclear disarmament convention, and other immediate actions to move closer to abolition. Certain immediate steps should be taken. The statement urges:

- \* Russia and the USA to make rapid progress towards Start III with lower limits than those envisaged at Helsinki.
- \* The UK and France should take a lead here, by abandoning talk of relying on nuclear weapons for national security, promoting a “no first use” treaty among the Nuclear Weapons States, and announcing their intention not to replace their current arsenals at any time in the future.
- \* The removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of all non-nuclear European states.
- \* The establishment of nuclear weapon free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia.

Among the signatories are Msgr. Michel Sabbah, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and current President of Pax Christi International; and all former International Pax Christi Presidents: Franz Cardinal König, Former Archbishop of Vienna, Godfried Cardinal Danneels, Archbishop of Malines – Brussels, Bishop Luigi Bettazzi, Former Bishop of Ivrea, Laurent Monsengwo, Archbishop of Kisangani and member of the Executive Committee of Pax Christi International, signing the statement in his capacity as the President of the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM). Among the signatories is also Amédée Grab OSB, the recent elected new President of the Council of European Bishops’ Conferences (CCEE). All bishop presidents of national sections also signed the statement, including (several bishops of) the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Ireland and the Netherlands. Bishops of Japan have signed the statement as well. In Australia, ecumenical leaders also signed the Statement. See list in attached document.

The Church and other religious organisations have an important role to play in informing and mobilising public opinion on the issues confronting our common security. This statement of Pax Christi International explicitly supports the Call of the Holy See on nuclear disarmament. It is a follow up of the statement of more than 100 Pax Christi USA bishops questioning the morality of nuclear deterrence in their letter of 1998 as well as on the recent appeals for nuclear disarmament of the World Council of Churches and the international coalitions acting in favour of the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

The position paper of Pax Christi International contains two sections: a background briefing, and a statement. It is the

second part, the statement, which has been signed by Cardinals, Bishops and Presidents of our movement.

*The Call and Statement is available in English, French, German, Dutch and Portuguese (see ref.: SD.04.EFGDP.00 in attached documents). More info: paul@paxchristi.net*

November 2001

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\image001.png" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\SD04E00.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\SD04F00.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\SD04G00.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\SD04N00.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\SD04P00.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Signatories.doc" Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Press Nuclear Weapons.doc"

**Call and Statement on Nuclear Disarmament**  
**List of Signatories**  
**November, 2001**

H.B. Michel Sabbah  
Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem  
President of Pax Christi International

Franz Cardinal König  
Emeritus Archbishop of Vienna  
Former International Pax Christi President

Godfried Cardinal Danneels  
Archbishop of Malines – Brussels  
Former International Pax Christi President

Rt Rev Luigi Bettazzi  
Emeritus Bishop of Ivrea  
Former International Pax Christi President

Rt. Rev H. Ernst  
Emeritus Bishop of Breda  
Former Vice President of Pax Christi International

Most Rev. Laurent Monsengwo  
Archbishop of Kisangani  
Member of the Executive Committee of Pax Christi International  
President of the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM)

Rt. Rev Vaclav Maly  
Auxiliary Bishop of Prague  
Member of the Executive Committee of Pax Christi International

Rt. Rev Bishop Walter Sullivan  
Bishop of Richmond  
President Pax Christi USA

Rt. Rev Henri Derouet

Emeritus Bishop of Sées and of d'Arras  
President Pax Christi France

Rt. Rev Dr Hermann Josef Spital  
Emeritus Bishop of Trier  
President Pax Christi Germany

Rt. Rev Ad van Luyn SDB  
Bishop of Rotterdam  
President of Pax Christi Netherlands

Rt. Rev Diego Bona  
Bishop of Saluzzo  
President Pax Christi Italia

Rt. Rev Victor Guazzelli  
National President of Pax Christi UK

Rt. Rev Heinrich Fasching  
Auxiliary Bishop of St Pölten  
President of Pax Christi Austria

Dom Manuel Martins,  
Emeritus Bishop of Setúbal, Portugal  
Former Bishop President Pax Christi Portugal

Dom Januário Torgal Ferreira,  
Auxiliary Bishop of Lisbon  
President of Pax Christi Portugal

Rt. Rev Amédée Grab OSB  
President of the Swiss Bishops' Conference  
Cardinal Henri Schwery, évêque émérite de Sion  
Pax Christi Switzerland

Rt. Rev Raymond Field  
Bishop of Dublin  
President Pax Christi Ireland

Rt. Rev. Czeslaw Kozon  
Bishop of Copenhagen

Pax Christi Denmark

Rt. Rev Roger Vangheluwe  
Bishop of Brugge  
Pax Christi Flanders

Rt. Rev Paul Lanneau  
Auxiliary Bishop of Brussels  
Pax Christi Wallonie - Bruxelles

Most Rev. Fernand Franck  
Archbishop of Luxembourg  
Pax Christi Luxembourg

Professor Joseph A. Camilleri  
School of Sociology, Politics & Anthropology La Trobe University of Melbourne  
President Pax Christi Australia

Dr. Michel Van Zeebroeck  
President Pax Christi Wallonie-Bruxelles

Dr Karel Vanspringel  
President Pax Christi Flanders

Justice and Peace Commission of Thailand, Affiliated with Pax Christi International  
Rt. Rev Michael Bunluen Mansap, is a chairperson of the commission

United Kingdom

Most Rev Patrick Kelly / Archbishop of Liverpool  
Rt. Rev Rawsthorne / Bishop of Hallam  
Rt. Rev Griffiths OSB / Bishop of Hexham and Newcastle  
Rt. Rev Alexander / Bishop of Clifton  
Rt. Rev Pargeter / Auxiliary Bishop of Birmingham  
Rt. Rev O'Donaghue / Bishop of West London  
Rt. Rev McMahon / Bishop of Brentwood  
Rt. Rev Brain / Bishop of Salford  
Rt. Rev Malone / Auxiliary Bishop of Liverpool  
Rt. Rev Noble / Bishop of Shrewsbury  
Rt. Rev Crowley / Bishop of Middlesborough  
Rt. Rev. Mc Mahon OP / Bishop of Nottingham

Rt. Rev Smith / Bishop of East Anglia  
Rt. Rev Henderson / Area Bishop of Southwark

Japan

Rt. Rev Nomura	Bishop of Nagoya
Most Rev Shimamoto	Archbishop of Nagasaki
Rt. Rev Michel Matsunaga	Bishop of Osaka
Rt. Rev Tani	Bishop of Urawa
Most Rev Peter Okada	Archbishop of Tokyo
Rt. Rev Paul Yoshinao Otsuka	Bishop of Kyoto
Rt. Rev Leo Jun Ikenaga	Bishop of Osaka

New Zealand

Thomas Cardinal Williams	Archbishop of Wellington
Rt Rev Peter Cullinane	Bishop of Palmerston North
	President of Conference
Rt. Rev Patrick Dunn	Bishop of Auckland
Rt. Rev Denis Browne	Bishop of Hamilton
Rt. Rev John Cunneen	Bishop of Christchurch
Rt. Rev Leonard Boyle	Bishop of Dunedin
Rt. Rev Owen Dolan	Coadjutor Bishop of Palmerston North
Rt. Rev Max Takuiria Mariu	Auxiliary Bishop of Hamilton
Rt. Rev Robin Leamy	Emeritus Bishop of Rarotonga
Rt. Rev John Dew	Auxiliary Bishop of Wellington
	Secretary of Conference

Ireland

Cahal Cardinal B. Daly	Archbishop Emeritus of Armagh
Rt. Rev Donal McKeown	Auxiliary Bishop of Belfast
Rt. Rev John Kirby	Bishop of Clonfert
Rt. Rev Brendan Commiskey	Bishop of Ferns
Rt. Rev Larry Ryan	Bishop of Kildare & Leighlin
Rt. Rev William Walsh	Bishop of Killaloe
Most Rev Sean Brady	Archbishop of Armagh
Rt. Rev Joseph Duffy	Bishop of Clogher
Christopher Dillon, OSB	Mitred Abbot, Glenstal Abbey

Netherlands

Adrianus Cardinal Simonis                      Archbishop of Utrecht  
Rt. Rev. Dr. M.P.M. Muskens                      Bishop of Breda

Australia

The Most Revd Dr Peter Carnley AO, Primate of the Anglican Church of Australia  
The Right Revd Roger Herft, Anglican Bishop of Newcastle  
The Right Revd David Farrer, Anglican Bishop of Wangaratta  
The Revd Professor James Haire, President, Uniting church in Australia  
The Revd David Gill, General Secretary, National Council of Churches in  
Australia  
The Most Rev P. P. Power, Auxiliary Bishop, Catholic Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn

X-Lotus-FromDomain: MCC  
From: J.\_Daryl\_Byler@mail.mcc.org  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 14:15:08 -0500  
Subject: Re: Current and future activities

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj @ igc.org>  
From: J. Daryl Byler  
Date: 11/13/2001 2:00:29 PM  
Subj: Re: Current and future activities

Hi Howard:

I agree that there doesn't seem to be a strong legislative focus just now and that a meeting in November is not necessary. It wasn't clear to me, though, the connection between taking a short breather, and your stepping down as chair.

In my judgment, this group continues to serve a significant purpose. Perhaps in the present season, we only need to meet every other month or once a quarter.

Unfortunately, if there is a meeting in December, I will miss it. I'm planning on being out on a 6 week study leave.

Warm regards,  
Daryl Byler

To: mupj@igc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Talking points on Bush-Putin agreement  
Cc:  
Bcc: icnd  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

For your information I am sending some talking points on the Bush-Putin agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They come from the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

I agree that this is a victory, but it is only a beginning. Apparently there is no intent to de-alert or stand down the remaining nuclear arsenal. It continues the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), a cold war relic. We should praise Bush but ask for considerably more, especially the total elimination of nuclear weapons with de-alerting in the immediate future.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

From Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

#### Bush-Putin Summit Outcome Nuclear Reductions Talking Points

After their initial Summit meeting, Presidents Bush and Putin announced an agreement on reducing the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles. This announcement is very good news and is due in large measure to the work of the arms control community over the last decade. However, the announcement also highlights how much work remains to be done if we are to create a safer, post-Cold War world. Below are some initial talking points as groups begin to develop their response to the Summit.

As other agreements (on the ABM Treaty and proliferation) are announced, the Coalition will provide further information.

#### Nuclear Reductions

##### Good News

- President Bush announced the United States would reduce its nuclear arsenal to around 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. This truly is good news. It represents a two-thirds cut in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.
- President Putin indicated that Russia would "try to respond in kind." Most experts agree that, for budgetary reasons, Russia will be forced to reduce its stockpile to at least these levels.
- These reductions will take place over the next ten years and will be verifiable under the on-site inspection provisions of the START I treaty.
- These reductions are a significant step forward and a huge victory for the arms control community.

##### Bad News

- Although this is a victory, the agreement with Russia does not go far enough in several very important ways.
- At this point, there doesn't seem to be any agreement regarding de-alerting U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. Instead of taking ten years to reduce to the 1,700 to 2,200 level, the United States and Russia should agree to immediately de-alert all weapons in excess of these levels. This would be an important step in reducing the chance of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.
- President Bush has once again demonstrated his disdain for formal arms control agreements. The current deal is little more than a verbal agreement between Presidents Bush and Putin. While this allows both sides to act relatively quickly, the lack of a legally binding framework makes it possible for either side to change its mind at some point in the future.
- President Bush may be surprised to find current law forbids him from making any of the nuclear reductions agreed upon during the Summit. Several years ago, Congress passed a law forbidding the President from reducing U.S. strategic nuclear force levels below START I levels until START II enters into force. Several attempts in previous years to repeal this law have been blocked by Congressional Republicans. The Senate version of the Defense Authorization Bill would remove the restriction from President Bush. This bill is currently in conference with the House, but the provision is still opposed by House Republicans.
- While the 1,700 to 2,200 levels is good news, there are indications the actual numbers could be higher. For example, the Bush Administration is adopting new counting rules in which strategic submarines and bombers that are being overhauled will not be counted. This accounting change will reduce the number of warheads counted by about 250 without actually destroying any weapons. In addition, the United States is likely to continue to maintain a fairly sizable reserve of warheads to hedge against a future threat.

From: Joe Volk <joe@fcnl.org>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: Talking points on Bush-Putin agreement  
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 20:42:15 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

11-15-01

Howard,

Thanks for forwarding these talking points.

RE De-alerting: I would think that we not only want "weapons in excess of these levels" put on de-alert status but we especially would want all the remaining arsenal put on de-alert. What's the point of having the remaining weapons on hair-triggers? Also, what's the shortest timeline for de-alerting the nuclear weapons that will be decommissioned? A year or two years?

Shouldn't we still push for immediate de-alerting the 50 MX missiles? Success there would create a precedent and show it is possible as well as desirable.

Joe

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2001 11:36 AM  
To: mupj@igc.org  
Subject: Talking points on Bush-Putin agreement

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

For your information I am sending some talking points on the Bush-Putin agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They come from the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

I agree that this is a victory, but it is only a beginning. Apparently there is no intent to de-alert or stand down the remaining nuclear arsenal.

It continues the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), a cold war relic. We should praise Bush but ask for considerably more, especially the total elimination of nuclear weapons with de-alerting in the immediate future.

Shalom,  
Howard

###

From Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Bush-Putin Summit Outcome

## Nuclear Reductions Talking Points

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actual numbers could be higher. For example, the Bush Administration is adopting new counting rules in which strategic submarines and bombers that are being overhauled will not be counted. This accounting change will reduce the number of warheads counted by about 250 without actually destroying any weapons. In addition, the United States is likely to continue to maintain a fairly sizable reserve of warheads to hedge against a future threat.

To: Joe Volk <joe@fcnl.org>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Miller meeting; CRND talking points  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To: <E9BA445D76C0D21182F30090273DFAF6735F3F@local.fcnl.org>  
References:

Joe,

First, I need your date of birth and social security number for the meeting with Frank Miller.

At 08:42 PM 11/15/01 -0500, you wrote:

>11-15-01

>

>Thanks for forwarding these talking points.

Joe,

I sent this material not necessarily as endorsement of all the points but as background for people in the faith community who don't follow this issue day to day.

You wrote:

>RE De-alerting: I would think that we not only want "weapons in excess of  
>these levels" put on de-alert status but we especially would want all the  
>remaining arsenal put on de-alert. What's the point of having the remaining  
>weapons on hair-triggers? Also, what's the shortest timeline for  
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>years?

>

>Shouldn't we still push for immediate de-alerting the 50 MX missiles?  
>Success there would create a precedent and show it is possible as well as  
>desirable.

Joe,

I agree that we should be pushing for de-alerting the entire arsenal. Bruce Blair says that it could be accomplished in a year or so. It could be done in phases: the 50 MX missiles, other weapons that will be eliminated under the Bush plan, and then the remaining missiles.

We need to insist that having any nuclear weapons is an outmoded cold war approach. De-alerting can be seen as an interim step toward abolition (or complete elimination, which seems to be a more acceptable term).

Howard

Reply-To: <lisaw@nccusa.org>  
From: "Lisa Wright" <nccwsdc@bellatlantic.net>  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: RE: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller  
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 14:35:49 -0500  
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal  
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)  
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4  
Importance: Normal

Dear Howard:

I did find the original invite yesterday after we spoke. Apologies - I was out of the office for several days for the CWS Board meeting, and am only just managing to clear through everything.

Anyhow, I've managed to reschedule a couple of things, so can join you on the 20th. The info you need is as follows:

NAME (important - Lisa is a nickname!): Eleanor L. Wright  
DOB: Dec. 7, 1960  
SS#: 214-88-4382.

Best,

Lisa

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]  
Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2001 8:41 AM  
To: dprice@rac.org; gpowers@nccbuscc.org; lisaw@nccusa.org;  
joe@fcn.org  
Subject: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller

Dear Colleagues,

We have a half-hour meeting scheduled with Frank Miller of the National Security Council staff for 2:00 p.m., on Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. We will use the entrance at 17th & G Streets. I suggest that we arrive at 1:45 so that we can review what we want to talk about.

Tentatively participants will include Rabbi David Saperstein, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism; Jerry Powers, U.S. Catholic Conference; Lisa Wright or some other representative of the National Council of Churches; Joe Volk, Friends Committee on National Legislation; and myself as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. If you haven't provided me with your social security number and date of birth, please give me this information immediately so that I can provide it for security clearance.

The purpose of the meeting is to offer views of the faith community on

issues related to nuclear weapons and to gain a better understanding of the Bush Administration's perspective. The point of departure is an interfaith letter sent to President Bush on October 23 on nuclear issues related to the campaign against terrorism. This letter makes three points: (1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. I've sent a copy of this letter previously. If you don't have a copy handy, let me know, and I'll sent another one.

Although it may seem remote that the United States would use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, there are advocates of that position, including Rep. Steve Buyer of Indiana and Rep. Peter King of New York. A report issued in January 2001 by the National Institute for Public Policy favored the use of nuclear weapons to deter regional powers from using weapons of mass destruction (including biological and chemical) and for targeting buried and biological weapons targets. The authors included Stephen Hadley, now deputy national security advisor, and Robert G. Joseph, head of non-proliferation strategy at that National Security Council. I am faxing you a Washington Post article on this matter.

We can oppose any expansion of the proposed use of nuclear weapons, whether against terrorist or in response to biological and chemical weapons. We can go beyond that and offer our support for a no-first use policy and for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Each of you can speak from your organization's perspective. You might want to bring copies of your policy statements to give to Mr. Miller.

He will probably speak of the Bush-Putin agreement to cut back on strategic nuclear weapons. I suggest that we praise this agreement as a significant step in the right direction. However, we might suggest the desirability of a written agreement with verification procedures. We might also express our concern that nothing has been done to de-alert the nuclear arsenals and that the cold war doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is retained. We can urge that further steps of nuclear disarmament be incorporated into the nuclear posture of the United States, leading to the goal of total elimination.

If you want to comment on my suggestions or offer further ideas, please reply to all.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: dprice@rac.org, gpowers@nccbuscc.org, lisaw@nccusa.org, joe@fcnl.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
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If you want to comment on my suggestions or offer further ideas, please reply to all.

Shalom,  
Howard



## Nuclear Threat is Real, Experts Warn

David Willman And Alan C. Miller  
Los Angeles Times  
November 11, 2001  
(for personal use only)

WASHINGTON -- The guards who oversee the vast, remaining nuclear stockpile of the former Soviet Union have gone months at a time without pay. Highly enriched uranium--usable for a nuclear bomb--has disappeared. Among the buyers-in-waiting is the world's most wanted man, Osama bin Laden.

President Bush last week underscored the threat, noting that Bin Laden has vowed to seek weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear bombs.

Before the Sept. 11 suicide hijackings, many government officials assumed that terrorists would refrain from using radioactive materials because of the grave risk to themselves. This assumption now appears outdated, raising dire questions about the possibility of terrorist attacks that could kill tens of thousands or more civilians.

"Absent a major new initiative, we have every reason to expect there will be an act of nuclear terrorism in the next decade, maybe sooner," said Graham T. Allison, an assistant secretary of Defense under President Clinton.

Interviews and documents show that U.S. and Russian leaders over the last decade have taken incomplete steps to safeguard a potentially large nuclear shopping mart in which scientists or officials motivated by cash meet terrorists seeking the ultimate weapon.

Although Bush said his administration "will do everything we can" to thwart Bin Laden's nuclear ambitions, past promises have fallen short: As a candidate, Bush vowed to increase spending for securing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and to press for "an accurate inventory of all this material." As president, he has done the opposite--proposing spending cuts in his first budget. And Bush has not sought to use any of the \$40 billion provided for anti-terrorism spending after Sept. 11 to better secure the coveted stockpile.

With new urgency, experts are examining the widespread opportunities for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials and know-how from the former Soviet Union.

A report prepared for the U.S. secretary of Energy early this year warned of "dozens" of worrisome incidents. Other government consultants have verified the disappearance of highly enriched uranium from an

unguarded plant on the Black Sea, interviews and records show. A prominent U.S. physicist told The Times of being presented with an offer to buy neutron "guns," devices that can be used to detonate a nuclear bomb.

And according to U.S. experts, neither the Russians nor the Americans have a complete inventory of all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium, another ingredient for a nuclear bomb.

"I am concerned that weapons-usable nuclear material may have gone astray," said Rose Gottemoeller, who served as assistant secretary of Energy for nonproliferation and national security during the Clinton administration.

### Bin Laden Claims He Has Weapons

For now, American officials say they do not know whether Bin Laden's international terror network, Al Qaeda, possesses either intact nuclear weapons or the materials to make them.

But Bin Laden, in interviews in December 1998 with U.S. television and magazine reporters, said it was a "religious duty" to possess nuclear materials and chemical weapons. When Bin Laden and others were indicted in November 1998 for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, federal prosecutors alleged that "from at least as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others known and unknown made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons."

On Friday, a leading Pakistani newspaper quoted Bin Laden as saying in an interview Wednesday that he has both nuclear and chemical weapons. "I wish to declare that if America used nuclear or chemical weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent," Bin Laden said, according to the account in the English-language newspaper, Dawn. Bin Laden declined to say where he might have acquired the weapons.

Al Qaeda would not be the only terrorist group to pursue nuclear materials. Aum Shinrikyo, a wealthy doomsday cult based in Japan, recruited nuclear physicists from Moscow. Investigators determined that the group also tried to mine its own uranium in Australia and to buy Russian nuclear warheads.

Some analysts speculate that Bin Laden or others also could seek nuclear materials from "rogue" states such as Iran and Iraq, suspected of fomenting attacks against the U.S. The shared border and Islamic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan have helped spur conjecture that Bin Laden has gained assistance from two or more Pakistani nuclear scientists, who were recently detained for questioning and released. The

government of Pakistan insists that its nuclear weapons have remained secure.

For U.S. officials, the nature of the nuclear threat has evolved since December 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved into Russia and 14 other independent states, with thousands of assembled nuclear weapons still aimed at North America.

Properly securing and destroying many of those weapons remains an imperative. But what looms even larger for many security specialists are the separate and portable materials necessary to make a nuclear bomb--highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Also of great concern are other radioactive materials that could be used, with a conventional explosive, to construct a relatively simple "dirty" bomb. Such an explosive could inflict casualties on the scale of the Oklahoma City bombing, and the radioactive material could contaminate a large urban area.

#### Ingredients for Disaster

With just a few kilograms of radioactive material--which can be obtained from nonmilitary sources--a terrorist could make the crude device. Weapons specialists say it could be delivered with such low-tech means as a passenger van or boat.

For a nuclear device, as little as 12 kilograms, or about 26.4 pounds, of highly enriched uranium, or four kilograms--less than a soda can full--of plutonium would be needed, along with other components that are available commercially. Building and detonating a nuclear device would take far greater scientific training than needed for the "dirty" bomb, and experts differ on how readily terrorists could execute such a mission. But the precision that the terrorists demonstrated Sept. 11 has challenged such assumptions.

"We are now in a new arms race," Charles B. Curtis, deputy secretary of Energy under Clinton, said in an Oct. 29 speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. "Terrorists and certain rogue states are racing to get weapons of mass destruction, and we are racing to stop them."

Viewed from the vantage point of the Cold War, progress has been made in cooperatively identifying and reducing the former Soviet arsenal. Thousands of nuclear weapons have been dismantled. Hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material have been placed under improved security. The U.S. has spent billions of dollars to assist the former Soviet republics in securing or eliminating nuclear weapons and material. And new efforts are expected to be discussed when Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin begin talks Tuesday in Washington.

Still, the U.S. has fallen short of the actions needed to avert the calamity invited by loose nuclear materials, more than a dozen leading experts said. They voiced dismay that the government is not ramping up its efforts in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

"These materials pose a clear and present danger to the U.S. national security," said John P. Holdren, a Harvard University specialist who in 1995 headed a secret study for Clinton of the security of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium within the former Soviet Union. "We haven't done enough."

### Nuclear Material Found Missing

Just a decade ago, the city of Sukhumi was known for its comforts. Located in the Abkhazia region of the former Soviet republic of Georgia on the eastern reach of the Black Sea, it was a "how-much-wine-can-you-drink place," in the fond memory of one visitor. Then came a rebellion by ethnic separatists.

The disruption affected more than the resort atmosphere. Sukhumi, it turns out, also was home to a nuclear research facility. Amid the fighting and ensuing chaos, about two kilograms of highly enriched uranium disappeared, according to a team of researchers led by William C. Potter at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, an independent graduate school in California.

A Russian-speaking researcher who assisted Potter, Emily Daughtry, said she confirmed the prior existence of the highly enriched uranium with both the former director of the Sukhumi nuclear research center and with Georgian Foreign Ministry officials whom she visited.

She said the director told her that, in September 1993, as the city was being taken over by the Abkhazian separatists, "the scientists asked Georgian security forces for help in moving what [the director] characterized as radioactive materials out of the institute and out of the city."

Daughtry, now a law student at UCLA, said the security forces were fighting the rebels and could not assist the scientists. "And so the scientists surrounded the material storage areas with concrete blocks, and then they left," she said. "They fled the city; they couldn't take it with them."

When a team of Russian inspectors finally gained access to the Sukhumi facility, about 880 miles southeast of Moscow, in December 1997, they found it deserted, according to Potter. He said the inspectors found none of the highly enriched uranium, although other radioactive material

was present.

"This is an instance in which weapons-grade material is known to have disappeared," said Potter, who also is a consultant to the Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He said he shared his findings with U.S. officials.

The Times was unable to reach the former director of the Sukhumi nuclear center. In Moscow, a spokesman for the Russian nuclear energy ministry, Yuri Bespalko, said he was unaware of weapons material missing from Sukhumi or any other location.

"There is definitely a full inventory of all nuclear materials in Russia, and it is simply impossible that something could go missing," Bespalko said. "Today, nothing threatens Russia's nuclear installations. As for former Soviet republics . . . there may have been separate cases in the past, but today, according to our information, all nuclear materials are under a reliable protection."

Current and former U.S. officials say the record suggests otherwise.

The Monterey Institute has documented 11 cases of diversion and recovery of uranium and plutonium from 1992 to 1997. More recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency described six arrests or seizures of weapons-grade nuclear material linked to the former Soviet Union from 1999 through last January.

The January report of a task force led by Republican Howard H. Baker Jr., a former U.S. senator and White House chief of staff, and Democrat Lloyd N. Cutler, a former White House counsel, referred to "dozens" of incidents of attempted theft.

### Culture of Deal-Making

In 1998, the report said, employees of a Russian nuclear facility in Chelyabinsk were caught "attempting to steal fissile material of a quantity just short of that needed for one nuclear device." Also in 1998, a Russian employee at a lab in Arzamas was charged with "attempting to sell documents on nuclear weapons designs to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan for \$3 million," according to the task force report. In January 2000, Russian agents arrested four sailors at a base on the Kamchatka Peninsula with a stash that included radioactive materials they were suspected of having stolen from their submarine.

The regional head of Russia's Federal Security Service, or FSB, the main successor agency to the KGB, attributed the Arzamas case and others to the "very difficult financial position" of workers at the nuclear defense facilities, the report said.

Indeed, specialists who commute to Russia say that a culture of deal-making persists. "People are trying to sell all various things," said Thomas L. Neff, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology physicist who pioneered a program that buys the Russians' highly enriched uranium and recycles it for nonmilitary purposes.

Neff described an incident several years ago in which a Russian engineer he met outside a nuclear weapons facility in the town of Lesnoy offered to sell him 700 neutron guns, devices that can be used both for detonating a nuclear bomb and for oil drilling. Neff said he reported the overture to U.S. authorities.

"That's just the tip of the iceberg," Neff said. "I had a number of experiences like that. . . . Engineers have come out and talked to me, brought me out samples of their stuff, which is pretty scary. . . . I mean, I could have been anybody."

Just last month, Igor Volynkin, head of the defense agency responsible for protecting Russia's nuclear arsenal, told reporters that on two occasions in the last year, terrorists had staked out nuclear facilities. Security was beefed up in response, Volynkin said.

Potter, who participated in two National Academy of Sciences studies of the security of the former Soviet nuclear facilities, said "the Russians maintain that they have accounted for everything. In fact, anybody who's ever been to one of these Russian facilities knows that that is a joke."

Based on the volume of known theft attempts, Potter said, it is "likely that Western observers of the nuclear trafficking scene have missed significant instances of diversion and/or export."

Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union have a total of about 1,100 metric tons of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium and 160 metric tons of plutonium at 123 sites, according to specialists and U.S. government reports. This includes 603 metric tons of weapons-grade material stored separately from nuclear weapons at 53 facilities.

But neither Russia nor the U.S. has a complete inventory of the amount and location of all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium, U.S. experts say.

"There's a great deal of anxiety in our community about that, probably in theirs too," said Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), co-sponsor of the most prominent U.S. program to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. "We haven't accounted for everything. So that if something was taken, someone might not know it."

Officials also have been unable to confirm the status of the former Soviet Union's portable nuclear explosives, called backpack bombs or suitcase bombs.

"There were such bombs, absolutely," said Nikolai Sokov, who was a Russian negotiator for the START II arms control pact signed in 1993. "They should have been dismantled. We do not know for sure if they have been dismantled."

Volynkin, the nuclear security chief, told reporters in October that Russia had 84 nuclear devices weighing 30 kilograms or less and that all had been destroyed or put under tight control.

Gottemoeller, the former assistant Energy secretary, said the attempted theft of 1.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a facility in Podolsk in 1992 "was a major wake-up call" for Russian officials.

U.S. officials assigned to assist the Russians in the early 1990s "had a problem establishing working relationships," Gottemoeller said, until the Russians "got the fear of God put into them because some of their work force started walking out with pellets of uranium in their pockets."

Glasnost, the opening of Soviet society, posed its own challenge. The old security regime was developed with closed borders and nuclear workers who were relatively well paid. This eroded quickly with the superpower's breakup into independent states with open borders and rampant corruption.

#### Quick Fixes For Lax Security

The Americans found stunningly lax security at the nuclear facilities they visited: Perimeter fences with holes or gaps. Hinges rusted off doors. Nuclear material stored in lockers with flimsy padlocks.

Working with the Russians, they made quick fixes--bricking up windows, installing blast-proof doors, placing radiation detectors at the exits.

More comprehensive improvements have been made at a smaller number of facilities--electronic sensors on fences, internal alarms, closed-circuit television monitors and electronic systems to screen visitors.

But many of Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites remain off-limits to U.S. officials. The General Accounting Office reported in May that U.S. officials had yet to gain access to 104 of 252 nuclear-site buildings "requiring improved security systems."

The Russians' reticence stems in part from nationalist sentiment.

"Some people find it humiliating," said Igor Khripunov, who for 21 years was an official with the former Soviet Union's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now is associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia in Athens, Ga. "You shouldn't underestimate this sense of national pride. We were this great superpower, and now we have to get money and assistance from the country we considered our adversary."

Retired Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Kuenning Jr., who directs the Pentagon's program for reducing threats from the former Soviet Union's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, said in an interview that "Russia's security paranoia" is an impediment.

#### Security Concerns at Civilian Facilities

For the Americans, access is required to ensure that U.S. tax dollars are being spent appropriately, Kuenning said. The Russians, in turn, want reciprocal access to sensitive U.S. nuclear facilities. "But we're paying the bill," he said. In his view, reciprocity "is not an issue."

Despite "steady, consistent progress," Kuenning said, "there are [security] vulnerabilities that we realize and the Russians realize. And we're working very hard to try to fix" them.

John C. Reppert, a former defense attache to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, said his greatest worry is vulnerabilities at the civilian Ministry of Atomic Energy test facilities and academic institutions. He said he suspected that security was "at best a padlock and a barbed-wire fence," with fewer guards who are less well trained than those at military locations.

(Russia signed an agreement with the U.S. Energy Department in September to provide access to some sensitive Ministry of Atomic Energy facilities that had been closed to the Americans.)

Even at the ostensibly premier military facilities, the reliability of the security guards is a constant concern. Some endured months-long gaps in pay in the mid-1990s.

Kuenning said pay has improved--it's higher than salaries for ordinary soldiers--and the guard force has a high percentage of officers. But, he added, the tough economic conditions in the remote places where many guards live "add to the challenge" of securing the stockpile.

A bipartisan congressional commission headed by former CIA Director John M. Deutch and Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) detailed some of those

challenges in a July 1999 report:

"Russia has no reliable inventory of its fissile material, and Russian vulnerability to an 'insider' threat is increased by power outages at Russian nuclear installations, by the need for unpaid guards and technicians to forage for food."

The General Accounting Office reported in February that "hundreds of metric tons of [Russian] nuclear material remain unprotected." The report added: "We also observed instances where systems were not operated properly. For example, at one nuclear facility that we visited, an entrance gate to a building containing nuclear material was left open and unattended by guards."

When members of the Baker-Cutler task force visited seven of the nuclear facilities in July 2000, they, too, found severe shortcomings. The task force concluded that the republics of the former Soviet Union remained "the most likely place" for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

"Many of the Russian nuclear sites remain vulnerable to insiders determined to steal enough existing material to make several nuclear weapons and to transport these materials to Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan," the task force's report said. ". . . With the expertise required to make at least a crude nuclear bomb now widely available, it is critical that these materials be secured, neutralized, or eliminated."

The U.S. government's capacity to detect diversions of nuclear material also has been undermined by policy shifts within the CIA, several recently retired agents said in interviews. They described specific directives to disband spy missions within the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, Germany and other nations where Islamic terrorists are now suspected to have operated.

The directives came as the CIA shifted to a post-Cold War posture of spying less on presumed friends and of relying more on high-tech eavesdropping than on informants.

"It's had a devastating effect," said one of the ex-agents, who worked inside the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Europe. "We're out of the game. It terrifies me."

#### Presidential Promises

A succession of U.S. presidents and members of Congress has agreed upon the need to help the former Soviet Union better safeguard its nuclear materials--and strides have been made.

The Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, known as

Nunn-Lugar after its two original Senate sponsors, has helped deactivate 5,708 nuclear warheads, destroy 435 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 483 air-to-surface missiles, and eliminate hundreds of bombers, submarines and missile launchers. Cost: \$4 billion.

The Energy Department has spent nearly \$6 billion to improve overall security of the nuclear materials, reduce the amount of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium, and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

And a State Department program has provided grant money to about 34,000 weapons scientists and other workers to help steer them into civilian research. The U.S. has contributed about \$134 million to this international effort.

Without viable commercial opportunities, officials fear that some of the 50,000 scientists and engineers who worked to develop the Soviet nuclear arsenal would be tempted by offers from "rogue" states or terrorists.

"There still is an environment out there where, despite some improvement in the economy, there are extremely limited choices for many of these people," said a senior State Department official. "Which means that if we can provide them an alternative to a bad guy walking through the door with a suitcase full of money, then this continues to be important."

Yet the need to contain the resulting nuclear dangers remains unfulfilled, as highlighted in January by the Baker-Cutler task force report.

The task force called for the U.S. to spend up to \$30 billion over the next eight to 10 years to prevent the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists against American troops or citizens.

Based on his statements as a candidate, Bush recognized the need to act.

Appearing on Nov. 19, 1999, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Bush said: "Under the Nunn-Lugar program, security at many Russian nuclear facilities has been improved and warheads have been destroyed. Even so, the Energy Department warns us that our estimates of Russian nuclear stockpiles could be off by as much as 30%. In other words, a great deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next president must press for an accurate inventory of all this material. And we must do more.

"I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our insistence to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible."

On Nov. 21, 1999, Bush explicitly called for higher funding for the Nunn-Lugar program. "We not only ought to spend that money, we ought to increase that amount of money in the budget to make the world safer," Bush said on NBC's "Meet the Press."

Yet last Feb. 28, when Bush submitted his first budget as president, he proposed spending 9% less on the Nunn-Lugar program, reducing the total from \$443.4 million to \$403 million. And despite candidate Bush's vow to "press for an accurate inventory" of all the nuclear material, the new president's budget proposed significant reductions in related programs that are administered by the Energy Department.

Bush proposed reducing by about 11%--from \$872.4 million to \$773.7 million--the department's overall nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union. (Congress last month approved more money than Bush requested but less than the current funding level.)

And Bush included no money in his budget for a U.S.-Russia inventory of all plutonium produced in Russia. The current budget, the last under Clinton, included \$500,000 to launch the plutonium program.

The administration also is using none of an initial \$20-billion emergency package to better secure the Russian nuclear materials. The package is aimed at countering terrorism and assisting in the recovery from the Sept. 11 attacks. And Bush has not asked Congress for any funds for this purpose from an additional \$20-billion spending request that is pending on Capitol Hill.

Several nuclear security experts criticized Bush's approach.

"This is a scandal," said Holdren, the Harvard specialist who chairs an arms control panel of the National Academy of Sciences. "It is far cheaper and more efficient to protect both the knowledge and the material at their source than to try to figure out how to intercept them once they've been manufactured into a nuclear bomb somewhere."

### Bush, Putin to Talk About Nuclear Threat

An administration official said Bush is committed to reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and expects to discuss the issue with Russia's Putin at this week's summit.

"We are actively examining new and expanded efforts in these areas," the official said.

The official did not directly address questions submitted by The Times about the contrast between Bush's campaign statements and his spending decisions.

Pentagon officials defended Bush's approach to the Nunn-Lugar program. They say he sought the full amount they requested.

Clinton raised spending for safeguarding the former Soviet nuclear stockpile throughout his presidency, but he, too, pledged more than he delivered. In his State of the Union address Jan. 19, 1999, Clinton said:

"We must expand our work with Russia, Ukraine and the other former Soviet nations to safeguard nuclear materials and technology so they never fall into the wrong hands. Our balanced budget will increase funding for these critical efforts by almost two-thirds over the next five years."

Clinton included spending increases in his two subsequent budget requests--but substantially less than two-thirds, with much of the money going toward programs that were not aimed at securing the nuclear materials.

Some former aides say Clinton should have moved more boldly.

Matthew Bunn, a leading authority on the Soviet nuclear arsenal who served as an advisor to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in the mid-1990s, wrote last year: "President Clinton has said a few words about the high priority of these issues, and then has failed to follow through with the sustained commitments of money, personnel and political attention to get the job done."

And Clinton's predecessor, George H.W. Bush, was hesitant to support the Nunn-Lugar initiative in 1991 and 1992.

Lugar said that when he and then-Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) approached the administration to use U.S. funds to secure and dismantle nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, Bush was preoccupied with other priorities as the nation emerged from the Persian Gulf War and the president confronted both a recession and his reelection bid.

"It was not immediately adopted by the Bush administration as a plan of action," Lugar recalled. "They may not have seen rapidly the efficacy, or even the need, to do this."

Cutler, the co-chairman of the task force report issued in January, said the country's leaders and the public remained complacent for a decade.

"Before the 11th of September, you couldn't get anybody's attention on nuclear risks, especially the nonproliferation risks," Cutler said. "They thought that if the Cold War was over, it was over. They didn't

realize how serious the risks are that the Russian material can either be stolen or sold, how primitive the security is."

From: Sdwpjip@aol.com  
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 00:21:57 EST  
Subject: Re: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller -Forwarded  
To: GPowers@usccb.org, mupj@igc.org  
X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10536

Howard:

I think I can make it. I assume Saperstein is confirmed. If not, let me know. His participation is important to me.

My coordinates: Gerard Francis Powers, March 6, 1958, 278-50-7468.

Thanks for organizing this.

Jerry

X-Sender: johnburroughs@mail.lcnp.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.0.1  
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 09:50:05 -0500  
To: abolition-caucus@yahoogroups.com,abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
From: John Burroughs <johnburroughs@lcnp.org>  
Subject: (abolition-usa) Acronym CTBT conference summary  
Sender: owner-abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com  
Reply-To: abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com

High Level CTBT Meeting "Successful" despite US Boycott.

Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT closed on Tuesday November 13, 2001 after unanimously adopting its final declaration. The declaration, which had been negotiated over many months in Vienna, highlighted the importance of the CTBT for non-proliferation and international security, stressing that the conduct of nuclear explosions "constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation". The Declaration called on all states that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. Pending entry into force, all were enjoined to maintain the current moratoria on nuclear testing.

The Conference (known also as the Article XIV Conference, after the entry-into-force provision in the CTBT), was postponed from September 25. It was opened on November 11 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who said "If anyone thinks that [the CTBT and the Conference] have been overshadowed or marginalised by the events of 11 September and their aftermath... those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons." Annan concluded, telling the meeting "we have a fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons. We must not let it pass."

Ambassador Olga Pellicer, speaking on behalf of the Conference President, Miguel Marín Bosch, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico, told an end-of-conference press briefing that the meeting had been "a success, because of high level attendance, with more than 50 Foreign Ministers, all of whom reiterated their support for the CTBT... and its verification system."

The CTBT Conference, which ran for two and a half days, was attended by 108 states which have signed the Treaty and a small number of observers and non-governmental organisations. Of the 80 national or group statements made in support of the test ban treaty, 52 were made by Foreign Ministers or equivalent senior government officials. The United States, however, was conspicuously absent. During the three months prior to the meeting, some 13 additional states had ratified the CTBT, bringing the total number of ratifiers to 87. On the last day of the conference, Libya, which refused to vote in favour of the Treaty in 1996 and therefore attended the Article XIV Conference as an observer, announced that it had decided to accede and would be signing the Treaty forthwith.

Press coverage on Monday hooked stories about the CTBT Conference, held in

the shadow of the high level UN General Assembly debate among state presidents and foreign ministers, the war against terrorism, and a further plane crash in New York, on the US boycott. Ironic, therefore, that the test ban meeting was given unexpected (but much-needed) visibility through the actions of the United States, whose boycott had been intended to convey its view that the CTBT is irrelevant.

Just a week earlier, the United States had shocked the UN First Committee (Security and Disarmament) by forcing a vote on a simple procedural decision to retain the CTBT on the UN General Assembly agenda next year. Such decisions are usually treated as formalities and sent forward on the basis of consensus, regardless of whether a government is for or against the subject. After forcing the vote, the United States was the sole country to oppose. A US representative explained that he asked for the vote because his country "did not support the CTBT", a treaty that Eisenhower advocated but failed to deliver in the 1950s, and President Clinton signed with John F. Kennedy's pen on September 24 1996. All others voted in favour, including India, which had previously voted against the CTBT in the UN General Assembly when it was adopted in September 1996.

The United States failed to inform the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs or the CTBT Organisation Preparatory Commission in Vienna of its decision to boycott the Entry-into Force Conference until the last possible moment, despite the presence of Secretary of State Colin Powell and numerous senior officials at other meetings in the UN over the same time period. After the CTBT Conference opened on Sunday November 11, Rick Grenell, a US State Department Official, confirmed "We're just not going to engage".

In keeping with diplomatic tradition, few statements criticised the United States directly, though some expressed 'regret' at its deliberate absence; privately many - most notably from the US' own allies in Europe and Asia - were furious at this latest example of US contempt for multilateral treaties and arms control. An earlier announcement (August 21, 2001) by Washington that it would withhold support for, and not to participate in, some of the activities by the CTBTO not related to the International Monitoring System (IMS), was likewise derided as petty and unbecoming of a major power.

In general, the statements emphasised the importance of the CTBT to international security, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and supported the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its Executive Secretary, Wolfgang Hoffmann in establishing an effective verification system. Many related the CTBT to commitments in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly the NPT agreements of May 2000, where the United States had joined consensus. Almost all underlined the necessity of maintaining the moratorium against nuclear tests, currently observed by all five nuclear weapon states and, after they each conducted a series of nuclear explosions in May 1998, by India and Pakistan, though neither has yet signed the CTBT. Among the weapon states, Britain, France and Russia have ratified, while the United States and China have signed but not ratified.

Amongst all the positive statements about the CTBT, there appeared to be

few new or concrete proposals for facilitating entry into force. Few even wanted to name the 13 states whose failure to sign and/or ratify now impedes the CTBT's entry into force. The NGOs, however, in their statement to the Conference, explicitly called on India, Pakistan and North Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT, and urged Algeria, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the United States to ratify without further delay. Like the governments, the NGOs stressed the vital importance of preventing any future testing, for fear of destroying the test ban norm and setting off a "dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation". The NGOs proposed that the Conference "should commit its participants to condemn any future testing and call upon governments, businesses and people from around the world to respond to any future test by withholding military sales, trade and other business support from the testing countries." To ensure that the testing moratorium is maintained, it would be necessary for potential violators to realise that the penalties and costs would be significant.

In addition to the US Boycott, two developments were particularly noteworthy:

\* Russia proposed additional confidence-building measures with the United States after entry into force, referring to "the possibility to develop additional verification measures for nuclear test ranges going far beyond the Treaty provisions... [which] could include the exchange of geological data and results of certain experiments, installation of additional sensors, and other measures."

\* On the negative side, possibly responding to the US lack of commitment and announced withholding of funds, a few states, notably Brazil and Argentina, raised questions about their financial contributions to the CTBTO, particularly the "burden" of verification costs on the non-nuclear weapon states while the treaty remained in limbo.

This brief, preliminary report, written as the Conference ended, will be expanded with further analysis and published on our website and in Disarmament Diplomacy over the next couple of weeks. See the website for the final declaration and NGO statement. Other documents can be found at <[www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org)>

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## 1. EXPERT SERIES: Secrets of Blockbusters II by John Truby

If you are interested in writing for mainstream Hollywood, you must begin with its fundamental requirement: Hollywood must have scripts with blockbuster potential.

Don't be fooled by the notion that no one knows anything. Buyers may not know if a particular script will make over \$100 million, but they have a pretty good idea of certain major story characteristics found in most blockbuster scripts.

The top professional screenwriters -- the ones who get all the jobs - - know what they are, too.

While the vast majority of screenwriters are off pounding out their simple three-act scripts, top screenwriters are using fundamentally different techniques.

Three-act structure is designed to give you the same script everyone else is writing. Plus it tells you nothing about what Hollywood wants to buy. So using the old three-act structure paradigm virtually guarantees failure.

Blockbuster techniques are story structure elements that Hollywood wants to see. That doesn't mean you are writing 'bad' or pre-fab scripts when you use these techniques. Many blockbuster scripts are extremely 'well-written' in the classic sense of the term.

Blockbuster techniques simply allow you to be more attuned to the popular audience you must serve if you want to sell your material.

One of the most important blockbuster elements is what I call the 'double track line.' Hit films always have a character line and an action line, or, to put it another way, a personal story and a case to be solved.

The character line, or personal story, refers to some kind of struggle the hero must go through to make a character change and grow as a human being.

The action line, or case, involves the trouble the hero must deal with to save the day.

The audience wants to see both of these lines play out over the course of the story. Having only the personal line gives you a

'character study.' Having only the action line gives you a 'plot piece.' Neither will be a popular success.

Caution: some writers try to write a hit film by going strictly for the action line. They figure they'll cut out the slow personal stuff up front where the hero's weaknesses are expressed and go right to the non-stop action. They've just made a pact with the devil. While they may gain some speed up front, they have just blown the payoff of the movie.

The audience doesn't care that much about a hero temporarily saving the day unless it is accompanied by permanent personal change. The personal line is what makes the action matter. If you strip the guts out of your story, the best action scenes in the world won't make any difference.

Let's look a little more closely at character.

In blockbuster movies, the hero is almost always a rogue, charmer or trickster character. I cannot overstate the importance of this element in smash hit films.

There are hundreds, even thousands, of possible heroes in a story. Yet in the vast majority of blockbusters, the hero is some kind of trickster.

This blockbuster element originated long before film. The trickster is found in cultures all over the world going back to the oldest stories on record. American movies have been especially adept at showing this character in many guises.

What makes a rogue/charmer/trickster character? First, and foremost, he is someone with great confidence. The 'con-man' comes from this quality. Audiences the world over love seeing someone brimming with confidence. A confident person goes through life walking on air.

The trickster also has a way with words. He is the most verbal of all characters. In the mouth of a movie star, the glib words of the trickster are especially sweet.

Invariably, the trickster uses his ability with words to accomplish a scam. A scam is a plan that involves deception. The plan is one of the seven major story structure steps found in every story. The more the hero's plan uses deception, the better the audience likes it.

Eddie Murphy and Bill Murray almost always play a rogue/charmer/trickster. Han Solo is one. So is Indiana Jones. So

is the kid in 'Home Alone.'

Most screenwriters know the importance Hollywood places on a 'high concept' premise as the basis for a blockbuster film. What most writers don't know is the fallacy of the high concept.

A high concept premise is a story idea with a fun (and marketable) twist. The problem with high concept is that it gives you only two or three great scenes when the twist occurs. The rest of the movie is often a complete bore. Which is why most high concept scripts are dismal failures at the box office.

Blockbuster films are usually based on a high concept, but they also extend the high concept through theme and opposition.

Theme is your view of the proper way to act in the world, as expressed through your characters. Blockbuster writers find the moral problem at the heart of the high concept and then play out the various possibilities of the problem in the body of the story.

The way they play out those possibilities is through the opposition. The opponent is another of the seven major structural steps in any good story. A blockbuster writer looks for the deepest conflict inherent to the high concept and fashions a group of opponents who can force the hero to deal with this conflict.

A perfect example of this blockbuster technique is 'Tootsie.' There have been scores of 'switch' comedies in Hollywood history where someone switches places with someone else. They're all 'high concept,' and they almost all fail.

'Tootsie' was a switch comedy that was a huge popular hit. Why? Sure, it was fun seeing Dustin Hoffman walk down the street the first time dressed as a woman. But the reason the movie was a smash hit was that the writers found the key moral theme -- how a man treats a woman -- inherent in the fun twist of a man dressing as a woman. They then created a number of opponents who could highlight the different ways a man treats a woman by the way each attacks the hero.

One of the simplest blockbuster elements has to do with the stakes, or consequences, of the hero's action. The audience must care whether the hero succeeds or fails to reach his goal. That is true for any piece of writing.

A simple rule of thumb for blockbusters is: the bigger the stakes, the bigger the hit. If you are going to get a vast number of people out of the house to come see a movie, you must make it an event. National or international consequences to the story do just that.

For example, what's at stake in 'Raiders of the Lost Ark' is nothing less than Nazi takeover of the world. In 'The Lion King,' it's the kingdom. In the 'Star Wars' movies, it's control of the universe and the future of the Republic. 'Forrest Gump' appears to be just a small personal tale, but it also tracks American history of the last half century.

You can't understand what makes a blockbuster movie without looking closely at genre. I have long believed that the first rule of Hollywood is: it doesn't buy and sell writers, directors or even stars; it buys and sells genres.

Genres are the lifeblood of Hollywood. Bad writers don't bother to study the genre they are working in. Average writers study their genre and hit every beat, just like the other writers working in that genre.

Blockbuster writers hit all the beats of their genre, but they twist each one so that the story seems original. The reader gets the pleasure of the genre beats, but also the pleasure of surprise and creativity.

I'll talk about more blockbuster elements in future articles. You don't have to consider these elements if you only want to write a good script. But if you also want the best chance of selling your work in today's Hollywood, these techniques are crucial.

\* \* \* \* \*

JOHN TRUBY is considered by many to be the best story consultant in Hollywood. He coaches top writers for the screen and television, has created software for the working writer and has served as story consultant for major studios and production companies and as script doctor on more than 1,000 movies, sit-coms and dramas for television. He founded Truby's Writers Studio where he teaches writing techniques and has created a number of books, audiotapes and other essential tools for the writer, all of which are available through The Writers Store. See below for a complete list of Truby's products.

From: Daphne Price [dprice@rac.org](mailto:dprice@rac.org)  
To: "Howard W. Hallman" [mupj@igc.org](mailto:mupj@igc.org)  
Subject: RE: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller  
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2001 00:55:05 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Dear Mr. Hallman,

I apologize for not getting back to you sooner -- it has been a little hectic in the office.

I am writing with some sad news -- David Saperstein's father, Rabbi Harold Saperstein, passed away on Friday night.

Unfortunately, this obviously means that David cannot join the meeting on Tuesday. However, if it is possible, Mark Pelavin, our Associate Director, can fill in for him.

Please be in touch with our office -- I will in all likelihood be out on Monday, attending the funeral in NY, but will be checking my voice mail at various points during the day. Alternatively, you can be in touch with Jonetta, Mark's assistant. He is aware of the meeting, and is available.

Thank you,  
Daphne

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman  
To: [dprice@rac.org](mailto:dprice@rac.org); [gpowers@nccbuscc.org](mailto:gpowers@nccbuscc.org); [lisaw@nccusa.org](mailto:lisaw@nccusa.org); [joe@fcn1.org](mailto:joe@fcn1.org)  
Sent: 11/15/01 8:40 AM  
Subject: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller

Dear Colleagues,

We have a half-hour meeting scheduled with Frank Miller of the National Security Council staff for 2:00 p.m., on Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. We will use the entrance at 17th & G

Streets. I suggest that we arrive at 1:45 so that we can review what we want to talk about.

Tentatively participants will include Rabbi David Saperstein, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism; Jerry Powers, U.S. Catholic Conference; Lisa Wright or some other representative of the National Council of Churches; Joe Volk, Friends Committee on National Legislation; and myself as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. If you haven't provided me with your social security number and date of birth, please give me this information immediately so that I can provide it for security clearance.

The purpose of the meeting is to offer views of the faith community on issues related to nuclear weapons and to gain a better understanding of the Bush Administration's perspective. The point of departure is an interfaith letter sent to President Bush on October 23 on nuclear issues related to the campaign against terrorism. This letter makes three points:

(1) do not use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, (2) step up efforts on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including transfer of funds from missile defense, and (3) work with Russia to de-alert and stand down nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. I've sent a copy of this letter previously. If you don't have a copy handy, let me know, and I'll send another one.

Although it may seem remote that the United States would use nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism, there are advocates of that position, including Rep. Steve Buyer of Indiana and Rep. Peter King of New York. A report issued in January 2001 by the National Institute for Public Policy favored the use of nuclear weapons to deter regional powers from using weapons of mass destruction (including biological and chemical) and for targeting buried and biological weapons targets. The authors included Stephen Hadley, now deputy national security advisor, and Robert G. Joseph, head of non-proliferation strategy at that National Security Council. I am faxing you a Washington Post article on this matter.

We can oppose any expansion of the proposed use of nuclear weapons, whether against terrorist or in response to biological and chemical weapons. We can go beyond that and offer our support for a no-first use policy and for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Each of you can speak from your organization's perspective. You might want to bring copies of your policy statements to give to Mr. Miller.

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If you want to comment on my suggestions or offer further ideas, please reply to all.

Shalom,  
Howard

User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022  
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2001 18:35:10 -0800  
Subject: material  
From: Info <info@jumpropeprods.com>  
To: <mupj@igc.org>

Thank you for the opportunity to review your work. Unfortunately, we are not going to pursue the material at this time.

We appreciate your interest and wish you the best of luck finding a home for your material.

--

JRP

Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 09:20:42 -0500 (EST)  
To: nuclearcalendar@lists.his.com  
Subject: Nuclear Calendar  
From: "FCNL Nuclear Calendar" <owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org>  
X-Mailer: Html Mime Mail Class  
Sender: owner-nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org  
Reply-To: [nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org](mailto:nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org)

## Friends Committee on National Legislation

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### Nuclear Calendar

- Nov. 17-26** Congressional Thanksgiving recess
- Nov. 19-** [Biological Weapons Convention](#) review  
**Dec. 7** conference, Geneva
- Nov. 20** Special election to replace the retired Rep. Asa Hutchinson (Ark.-3)
- Nov. 26-27** ["Weapons of Mass Destruction: Cold War Legacies in the Post-9.11 World,"](#) sponsored by the International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University; Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies; Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Center for War, Peace and the News Media, New York University; The Nation Institute; and Ploughshares Fund; held at New York University, New York
- Nov. 27** House and Senate reconvene from Thanksgiving recess
- Week of** House-Senate conference committee completes the  
**Nov. 27** defense authorization bill, [H.R. 2586](#) and [S. 1438](#)
- Nov. 28** House floor action on the defense appropriations  
**or 29** bill (no bill number). Broadcast on [C-SPAN](#) (estimate).
- Nov. 29** 9:30 am, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, hearing on nonproliferation issues, 216 Hart. Broadcast on the [Committee web site](#) and on [CapitolHearings.org](#).
- Nov. 29** [International Atomic Energy Agency](#), Board of Governors meeting, Vienna, Austria
- Nov. 29-30** Lawrence Livermore National

- Laboratory, ["Whither Deterrence? Stability Strategies for the Future Implications for Nuclear Weapons,"](#) Livermore, Calif.
- Nov. 29 or 30** Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, markup of the defense appropriations bill (possible)
- Nov. or Dec.** House floor action on the Export Administration Act of 2001, [H.R. 2581](#) (estimate)
- Nov. or Dec.** House floor action (suspension calendar) on the Price-Anderson Reauthorization Act of 2001, [H.R. 2983](#) (estimate)
- Nov. or Dec.** Senate Armed Services Committee, vote on the nomination of Everet Beckner to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration
- Nov. or Dec.** Senate floor action on the State Department authorization bill, [S. 1401](#) (estimate)
- Nov. or Dec.** Senate floor action on the Security Assistance Act (no bill number)(estimate)
- Nov. or Dec.** U.S. Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile submits its annual report to Congress ([42 USC Sec. 2121 note](#)) (was due Oct. 1; estimated release date)
- Late Nov.-early Dec.** Defense Department conducts the fifth flight intercept test (Integrated Flight Test 7) for the [missile defense system](#), Vandenberg AFB, Calif. and Kwajalein Missile Range, Marshall Islands
- Dec. 1** Defense Department submits the Nuclear Posture Review to Congress ([Public Law 106-398, Sec. 1041](#))
- Dec. 1** Defense Department reports to Congress on "mini-nukes" ([Public Law 106-398, Sec. 1044](#)) (was due July 1, 2001; may be released with the Nuclear Posture Review)
- Dec. 3-4** [OSCE foreign ministers meeting](#), Bucharest, Romania

The *Nuclear Calendar* is published every Monday when Congress is in session. To subscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "subscribe NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body. To unsubscribe [click here](#), or send an e-mail to [majordomo@fcnl.org](mailto:majordomo@fcnl.org) with "unsubscribe

NuclearCalendar" (without the quotation marks) in the message body.

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Editor is [David Culp](#). Publication is made possible by contributions from the Ploughshares Fund, W. Alton Jones Foundation Fund of the Rockefeller Family Fund, Town Creek Foundation, and the contributors and supporters of the [Friends Committee on National Legislation](#) and the [FCNL Education Fund](#).

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X-Sender: dan@mail.clw.org  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1  
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 10:25:49 -0500  
To: dan@clw.org  
From: Dan Koslofsky <dan@clw.org>  
Subject: Coolfont Registration: CHECKS NEEDED BY DEC. 5

Monday Lobby Participants:

The annual arms control community retreat will be held at the Coolfont Resort in Berkeley Springs, WV beginning the evening of Tuesday, Jan. 15, 2002 and ending midday on Thursday, Jan. 17.

I need your reservation and CHECKS by WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5<sup>th</sup>.

Your reservation should include:

1. Who will be attending Coolfont.
2. If you plan to stay only one night please tell me if it will be Tuesday or Wednesday.
3. Check payable to "Council for a Livable World Education Fund"

Remember, the MAIL IS SLOW AND UNRELIABLE. It is best to bring your checks to Monday Lobby or drop them off at our office (110 Maryland, Ave, NE #409). If that is not possible I recommend using Fedex or UPS.

=====  
Lodging Costs (including meals)  
=====

Double Room: \$115.38 per night  
Single Room: \$152.38 per night

These rates are PER NIGHT so if you intend to stay for the whole conference, double the amount before writing your check.

=====  
Panels  
=====

1. Missile defense
2. Nuclear weapons issues: reductions, posture review, de-alerting
3. United Nations issues
4. Polling
5. Arms Transfers
6. Congressional staff outlook for the coming year
7. Nonproliferation issues: nuclear, chemical, biological

If you have any suggestions for congressional staff invitees please send me names and offices.

Dan Koslofsky  
Executive Director, PeacePAC  
110 Maryland Ave, NE - Suite 409  
Washington, DC 20002  
(202) 543-4100 x115  
(202) 543-6297

To: gpowers@nccbuscc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: November 20 meeting with Frank Miller  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Jerry,

Rabbi Saperstein was scheduled to be at the meeting with Frank Miller, but his father died on Friday. Mark Pelavin, associate director of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, will come in his place. I hope this acceptable to you because we need your presence.

If you have some policy statements to give Mr. Miller, please bring them along. I'm trying to find out if there will be anybody else present from NSC, who should also receive copies of statements. If there is, I'll let you know.

I'll see you at the 17th and G entrance to the Old Executive Office Building tomorrow at 1:45 p.m.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: jcopeland@rac.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Meeting with Frank Miller, November 20  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Here is a copy of the e-mail I sent to participants for the meeting with Frank Miller at the National Security Council at 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, November 20. It is amended to substitute Mr. Pelavin for Rabbi Saperstein. Please give it to him.

Thanks,  
Howard Hallman

###

Dear Colleagues,

We have a half-hour meeting scheduled with Frank Miller of the National Security Council staff for 2:00 p.m., on Tuesday, November 20 at the Old Executive Office Building. We will use the entrance at 17th & G Streets. I suggest that we arrive at 1:45 so that we can review what we want to talk about.

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of total elimination.

If you want to comment on my suggestions or offer further ideas, please reply to all.

Shalom,  
Howard

To: "Larisa Wain" <producedby@eddiekritzer.com>  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Query  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Larisa Wain:

I would like to inquire whether Eddie Kritzer Productions would be interested in a screenplay I have written entitled **SPRING CHICKENS**. If so, I will send you a one-page synopsis or the entire script.

In **SPRING CHICKENS** the Odd Couple meets the Bad News Bears. A couple of old guys in New York walk out on their wives because they are tired of going to the opera. They wind up in Florida and become managers of rival senior softball teams, the spring chickens who display remarkable skills and antics. Their wives borrow an idea from Mozart's "Cosi fan Tutte" and show up in disguise. They spy on their husbands for ten days, take up with a couple of senior softball players, and finally reveal their identity after the championship game. **SPRING CHICKENS** could pair Clint Eastwood and James Garner or another pair of septuagenarian actors. The wives could be played by Debbie Reynolds and Shirley MacLaine, or perhaps one by Jane Fonda. There are also cameo roles for Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa.

My training for film writing includes a course in television production at American University, workshops sponsored by the Maryland Writers' Association and the Writer's Center of Bethesda, Maryland (the most recent one taught by Adam Kulakow, a Hollywood screenwriter), reading books on screenwriting, watching movies analytically, and writing and re-writing four screenplays. The other three are **SUPER WEDNESDAY**, a romance comedy; **SUNDAY BOX**, a family drama; and **Lead, Kindly Light**, a Christmas story. I have in the works a screenplay about a Washington whistle blower.

If you would like to receive the synopsis or full script of **SPRING CHICKENS**, or more information about my other screen plays, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,  
Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817

Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: mupj@igc.org

To: SoniaAH@aol.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Query  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Sonia Apodaca-Harms:

I would like to inquire whether the Braun Entertainment Group would be interested in considering a couple of screenplays I have written, one entitled SUPER WEDNESDAY, the other called SUNDAY BOX. If so, I can send you a one-page synopsis or the full script for either or both.

SUPER WEDNESDAY is a romance comedy with a touch of mystery that takes place just before Halloween. It provides roles that could bring Tom Hanks and Helen Hunt together again, he as a supermarket manager, she as a police detective called in because of an anonymous threat. Or the roles could be played by a comparable pair. They clash initially over who is in charge, but during the day they gradually reveal themselves to one another. There is a spark of romance by the evening as she figures out "who done it". In between the daily life of the supermarket unfolds with drama and comedy: raucous teenagers, a runaway cart pushed by a young boy with his little sister in it, seniors fumbling around, a bomb threat, witches and motorcyclists in disguise, a homeless man who builds a temporary cardboard shelter, a tremendous thunder storm, and other incidents.

SUNDAY BOX is a family drama about conflict among three generations of headstrong men with a fourth added by the grandfather's memory of his own father. Old grudges emerge as they come together on the grandfather's 75th birthday. Through creative and loving reconciliation the women of the family -- mothers, wives, an ex-wife, a housemate, an aunt -- succeed by day's end in achieving forgiveness and reconciliation. It shows that macho males can say, "I'm sorry." SUNDAY BOX is of the genre often shown on the Hallmark Hall of Fame and the CBS Sunday Night Movie. It would also work as a feature film at the movies.

My training for film writing includes a course in television production at American University, workshops sponsored by the Maryland Writers' Association and the Writer's Center of Bethesda, Maryland (the most recent one taught by Adam Kulakow, a Hollywood screenwriter), reading books on screenwriting, watching movies analytically, and writing and re-writing four screenplays. The other two are SPRING CHICKENS, a comedy in which the Odd Couple (two old guys) meet the Bad News Bears (senior softball teams), and Lead, Kindly Light, a Christmas story. I have in the works a screenplay about a Washington whistle blower.

Sincerely yours,  
Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817

Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: mupj@igc.org

To: mgg@scriptstar.com  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Query  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Mr. Grace:

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Please let me know if you are interested in receiving the script of SUPER WEDNESDAY or SUNDAY BOX, or more about my other screenplays.

Sincerely yours,  
Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmett Road  
Bethesda, MD 20817

Phone: 301 897-3668  
Fax: 301 896-0013  
E-mail: mupj@igc.org

"Let's move beyond Cold War thinking"

Boston Globe - November 18, 2001 - Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright OpEd

PRESIDENT BUSH is right - it is time for the United States and Russia to move beyond Cold War thinking and restructure their nuclear relationship. But as he himself said in June, it is important that we not only talk differently but act differently.

Despite the rhetoric surrounding this week's summit, there is little evidence that Bush is prepared to match his words with deeds. In fact, there is a fundamental inconsistency in the administration's thinking about nuclear weapons and missile defense.

Bush is eager to convince Russian President Putin that the end of the Cold War means that US missile defenses should not worry Russia. But Russia cares about US missile defenses because the United States targets thousands of nuclear weapons on Russia. Why? Because the United States is stuck in old ways of thinking and continues to rely on its Cold War strategy.

Bush argues that US-Russian arms-control agreements on missiles and missile defenses are no longer needed because the United States does not negotiate arms-control agreements with friends, and Russia is now a friend. Yet he neglects the more fundamental issue. The United States does not target its friends with nuclear weapons.

On Tuesday Bush announced that the United States will reduce its deployed nuclear weapons to around 2,000 over the next 10 years. While that is a substantial step in the right direction, it represents only a quantitative change, not the fundamental rethinking that Bush is quick to tell Putin is required on missile defenses. Only a few hundred nuclear weapons are needed to destroy a country the size of Russia. No current or conceivable future threat requires the United States to maintain more than a few hundred survivable warheads. Large nuclear arsenals are not relevant to current security threats such as proliferation and terrorism.

During the presidential campaign, Bush said that the premise of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal. Yet the only reason the United States would retain 2,000 warheads is to target Russian nuclear weapons. Cold War thinking remains institutionalized in US nuclear targeting plans, which require the United States to have enough highly accurate weapons to target and destroy Russian missiles in their silos.

Actions speak louder than words. Bush should demonstrate that the United States no longer considers Russia an enemy by cutting US arsenals to the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, as he has promised. The administration should announce that the United States will cut to 1,000 warheads immediately and then to a few hundred in concert with Russia. The administration should make these cuts

irreversible by committing to dismantle the remaining 10,000 US strategic and tactical nuclear weapons - including those in storage - in a manner transparent to Russia and the international community and to place the resulting nuclear material under international safeguards.

These steps would also provide an opportunity to seek better controls on Russian nuclear materials, which present a real danger of proliferation.

Bush should announce that the United States will no longer maintain its dangerous ability to launch nuclear weapons in a matter of minutes. He can thereby induce Russia to de-alert its nuclear weapons, too. Taking nuclear weapons off alert is the best way to reduce the very real risk of accidental or mistaken launch.

Bush cannot fundamentally change the US-Russian nuclear relationship by building missile defenses and abandoning arms control agreements while keeping thousands of nuclear weapons targeted at Russia. He can do so only by getting rid of Cold War targeting plans, making much deeper cuts in US nuclear arsenals, and removing nuclear weapons from high alert levels. And he should - and could - start doing that today.

Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright are senior staff scientists at the Union of Concerned Scientists and Research Fellows at the MIT Security Studies Program.

## "Still Overkill"

San Jose Mercury News - November 18, 2001 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay OpEd

Suppose a terrorist buys radioactive material from the Russian mafia, smuggles it into the United States, packs it around explosives, and sets it off in a major city, leaving a smoking, radiating ruin. Such a scenario no longer seems farfetched in the wake of Sept. 11.

But while the possible diversion of weapons of mass destruction into terrorist hands should have topped the agenda at last week's U.S.-Russia summit, the issue was barely raised in a meeting that was long on down-home hospitality and short on substance.

This was supposed to be a different kind of summit. Drawn together as new allies in the war on terrorism, presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin were supposed to meet in Crawford, Texas, and close the book on the Cold War. They would conclude a deal that would trade deep cuts in offensive nuclear weapons for greatly relaxed restrictions on missile-defense testing, and thereby usher in a new era of the nuclear age.

In fact, the Crawford summit failed to achieve even its most modest goals. Bush and Putin continued to disagree over missile-defense testing and the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. And while both presidents said they would slash their still-massive strategic nuclear arsenals, there is much less to those commitments than meets the eye.

In the end, Putin returns to Moscow with mostly empty hands, making future cooperation on securing weapons stockpiles less likely.

In failing to meet Putin at least halfway on the ABM treaty, Bush may have secured his ability to go his own way in the short term -- allowing him to build a missile defense he says will protect the United States against "rogue" nations with nuclear bombs. But he did so at a cost -- possibly increasing the long-term risk to a United States targeted by terrorists.

As Bush and Putin admitted in their joshing before high school students in Texas, their disagreement on missile defense centered on the ABM treaty. That treaty bars the deployment of nationwide defenses and restricts anti-missile testing. Those restrictions were meant to keep both countries vulnerable to attack, so neither would launch a first strike. Given his desire to build a "shield" against missile attacks, Bush considers the treaty outdated, even dangerous. Putin, on the other hand, views the agreement as a cornerstone of international stability and believes that steep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons are possible only if future defenses remain strictly limited.

At a meeting in China three weeks ago, Bush and Putin signaled that a deal

reconciling these views was in the offing. U.S. officials hinted that they could live with the ABM treaty for a time if Moscow allowed the Pentagon to proceed with a robust missile-defense testing program. Putin, in turn, hinted that Russia could live with some testing as long as the treaty remained in effect.

Only one stumbling block remained. Putin insisted that any deal be codified in a formal agreement, while Bush wanted it to be an informal understanding. By Tuesday, when the presidents met at the White House, it became clear that this question of how to record their agreement was a deal-breaker.

This setback makes it all but certain that the United States will soon unilaterally abandon the ABM treaty. The Pentagon has warned for months that its ongoing testing program is bumping up against the treaty. Withdrawing from the treaty will come as no surprise -- Bush has signaled his intent to do so since taking office. But that decision will nonetheless evoke an outcry in Moscow, at home and among America's friends.

#### Still overkill

The only real news to emerge from the three days of meetings was Bush's pledge to reduce U.S. offensive nuclear weapons to 1,700-2,200 over the next decade -- down from the 7,000 weapons currently deployed. Putin indicated that Russia, too, would reduce its strategic weapons to a level equal to or possibly below that of the United States.

The numbers themselves were not a major breakthrough. In 1997, former presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a treaty to reduce U.S. and Russian forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. That negotiation was never concluded, because of the missile-defense issue.

Bush's unilateral commitment is a welcome effort to restart this stalled arms-control process. Still, some perspective is in order. Bush proposes to phase in the cuts over 10 years, leaving plenty of time to reverse course if, as a senior administration official suggested, there were "changes in the world that might necessitate a change in our thinking." What's more, the administration is pledging only to retire warheads. It is not saying it will destroy them, which leaves open the possibility that some or all will be put in storage and thus available for deployment if the need arises.

Nevertheless, even if the United States goes down to 1,700 operational warheads by 2011, it will mean that -- more than two decades after the Cold War ended -- the U.S. nuclear arsenal will still be larger than the Soviet Union's during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Moscow wants to cut its nuclear arsenal to save money. Still, Putin spoke about weapons cuts only in broad terms. He did not say how long it would

take Moscow to dismantle its weapons or which weapons it would retire. And, like Bush, he said nothing about whether he would destroy warheads or just store them.

These discussions of details and numbers obscure the important reality that we have far more weapons than we need today. As President Kennedy adviser McGeorge Bundy said more than 30 years ago ``A decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; 10 bombs on 10 cities would be disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities unthinkable."

In other words, even if Russia became our enemy again, we would still have more than enough weapons to deter a nuclear attack.

Treaties and trust

There is an additional problem with the announced weapons cuts. The relatively small reductions are not going to be enshrined in a treaty. Without that legally binding agreement, promised cuts may not be made or could be easily reversed.

Putin is all for formalizing promises. At a press conference with Bush on Tuesday, he said Russia prefers to ``present all our agreements in a treaty form." He argued that a nation's security cannot be based solely on trust.

But Bush rejects this trust-but-codify approach. Although he somewhat testily offered to write last week's commitments ``down on a piece of paper," he clearly regards arms-control negotiations and treaties as relics of the Cold War.

For him, treaties hark back to the days when the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was one in which the only thing the two countries could agree on was not to annihilate each other. He sees reciprocal unilateralism as a better approach for the beginning of what he called ``a new relationship based upon trust and cooperation."

Bush's view has some appeal. A world without formal constraints on weapons would give the United States tremendous flexibility to respond to unanticipated threats -- including by increasing the size of its arsenal.

But the president's approach runs two great risks. One is that flexibility is a two-way street. By failing to codify the unilateral cuts, Russia, too, gains the ability to change its mind.

And even if the Bush administration is right that Russia has become a country like Britain or France, in which mutual trust is indeed a defining characteristic of our relations, failing to codify the force-reduction

commitments has the potential to derail the cuts.

Ambiguity about the nature, pace and extent of the unilateral commitments is sure to arise. That could easily draw Congress and the Russian parliament, the Duma, into the fray. Will the Duma accept Russian reductions if the United States walks away from the ABM treaty? And if Russia drags its feet on reducing its arsenal, will Congress still buy into the idea that unilateral cuts are a good deal? We could find ourselves in a new stalemate.

A greater danger

The failure to get the deal done in Crawford is bad enough. Having too many missiles around would make the catastrophe all the greater should they one day be used. Worse still, continuing friction makes it more difficult to take joint action to tackle a more pressing threat the vulnerability of Russian nuclear, chemical and biological weapons materials to terrorist theft.

Sept. 11 leaves no doubt that terrorists like Osama bin Laden will use weapons of mass destruction if they get their hands on them. The most ready source is Russia's vast stock of weapons and materials -- often secured in only the most primitive ways. Just this month, Russian government sources acknowledged a nuclear-security violation in Russia within the past two years of the "highest possible consequence." While the details are vague -- and it doesn't appear that weapons were lost this time -- the report alarmed many security experts.

The Bush administration has, all along, been slow to tackle this threat -- even cutting funding for highly effective programs to assist Moscow in securing and dismantling this most dangerous of Soviet legacies. Over the past decade, the United States has spent several billion dollars to dismantle Soviet missiles, increase security at storage facilities and pay weapons scientists to conduct research for peaceful purposes.

But the issue of protecting Russia's weapons stockpiles was reportedly barely mentioned in Crawford.

By focusing their discussions on the old, Cold War agenda of arms reductions and missile defense -- and failing to reach agreement -- Bush and Putin missed a major opportunity. The real promise of Crawford was that it might allow our two countries to move beyond the issues of yesterday so that we could, together, meet the threats of tomorrow.

IVO H. DAALDER and JAMES M. LINDSAY are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution and former members of the Clinton administration's National Security Council staff. They wrote this article for Perspective.

From: Joe Volk <joe@fcnl.org>  
To: 'howard hallman' <mupj@igc.org>  
Cc: 'lisa wright' <Lisaw@nccusa.org>, 'jerry powers'  
<gpowers@nccbuscc.org>  
Subject: Notes: NSC Meeting  
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 16:49:30 -0500  
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: <E9BA445D76C0D21182F30090273DFAF6A29492@local.fcnl.org>  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

11/20/01

Howard,

As you write up your notes for Monday Lobby, please feel welcome to use (and correct) my rough notes which I have pasted in below:

Joe

NSC011120 2 to 3:15

Meeting with: Franklin C. Miller  
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for  
Defense Policy and Arms Control  
National Security Council  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20504  
Phone: 202-456-9191  
202-456-9190

RE: Nuclear Weapons Policy

Present: lisa wright, howard hallman, jerry powers, joe volk

FM says that POTUS is more knowledgeable on nuclear weapons policy than any previous President; POTUS policy approach based on three things:

1. DIFFERENT VIEW OF NUCLEAR WPNS
2. NEW RELATIONSHIP W RUSSIA...END ANY NOTION US & ROSSIA AT SWORDS POINT
3. ABM RELIC OF COLD WAR; NOT HELPFUL...SEE POTUS SPEECH 5/1 @Nat'l War College...he knows morz re nuclear war college than anyPres

deep cuts announced takh plc nxt  
10 ys...unilateral action & not agreement

Russians invited to reciprocate; asked US to codify

- o JV: smith prohibition?  
(not up to speed on leg...I tell him..then he says)

FM:  
support Sen versjon; biggest chunk of cuts 4 Tridents...then Mjnote  
Man & MX...

O nukes in past 50 yrs has prevented 100s of mlls of deaths, not only  
deter nuke war but also conventional wars...need continue...question # now  
needed is under discussion...another question is tactical or non-strategic

o 1700 US Strategic wpns after Bush cuts ... & then cld talk about nxt  
cuts...

o JP: if ABMs permitted, will Russians feel safer or more vulnerable?  
FM:

o hair-trigger alert issue here....  
o ABM issue  
...NATO EXP ok w/Putin  
o Joint Warning Sta...-poss but Russians not taking down the  
obstacles...suggests they don't feel threatened by US

o LW: PAKI & INDIA sanctjns...we oppose prolif but sanctions not  
useful approach...Nunn-Lugar now up to \$2 b spent working  
w/russians...failed in Clinton Admn to get them to shut down reactors tht  
prdc fissile material...Rumsfeld now opposes

o HH: nukes to counter terror?

FM: US policy has always bn to deter major threat of wmd or  
conventional...rogue states wrkg on bio, so US is not going to say no 1st  
use....deterrence is an ugly thing...

New roles for nuclear wpns...no

targetting: changes but will not go to civilians...

hair trigger not helpful aro

Joe Volk  
Executive Secretary  
Friends Committee on National Legislation  
245 Second Street NE  
Washington, DC 20002-5795  
Phone: 202-547-6000  
Fax: 202-547-6019  
Web: [www.fcnl.org](http://www.fcnl.org)

We seek a world free of war and the threat of war.  
We seek a society with equity and justice for all.  
We seek a community where every person's potential may be fulfilled.  
We seek an earth restored.

-- FCNL Statement of Purpose

Attachment Converted: "C:\Program Files\Internet\download\Notes NSC Meeting"

To: gpowers@nccbuscc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: CTBT conference  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Jerry,

Here is background on the recent CTBT conference.

Howard

###

From: John Burroughs <johnburroughs@lcnp.org>  
Subject: Acronym CTBT conference summary

High Level CTBT Meeting "Successful" despite US Boycott.

Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT closed on Tuesday November 13, 2001 after unanimously adopting its final declaration. The declaration, which had been negotiated over many months in Vienna, highlighted the importance of the CTBT for non-proliferation and international security, stressing that the conduct of nuclear explosions "constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation". The Declaration called on all states that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. Pending entry into force, all were enjoined to maintain the current moratoria on nuclear testing.

The Conference (known also as the Article XIV Conference, after the entry-into-force provision in the CTBT), was postponed from September 25. It was opened on November 11 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who said "If anyone thinks that [the CTBT and the Conference] have been overshadowed or marginalised by the events of 11 September and their aftermath... those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons." Annan concluded, telling the meeting "we have a fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons. We must not let it pass."

Ambassador Olga Pellicer, speaking on behalf of the Conference President, Miguel Marín Bosch, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico, told an end-of-conference press briefing that the meeting had been "a success, because of high level attendance, with more than 50 Foreign Ministers, all of whom reiterated their support for the CTBT... and its verification system."

The CTBT Conference, which ran for two and a half days, was attended by 108

states which have signed the Treaty and a small number of observers and non-governmental organisations. Of the 80 national or group statements made in support of the test ban treaty, 52 were made by Foreign Ministers or equivalent senior government officials. The United States, however, was conspicuously absent. During the three months prior to the meeting, some 13 additional states had ratified the CTBT, bringing the total number of ratifiers to 87. On the last day of the conference, Libya, which refused to vote in favour of the Treaty in 1996 and therefore attended the Article XIV Conference as an observer, announced that it had decided to accede and would be signing the Treaty forthwith.

Press coverage on Monday hooked stories about the CTBT Conference, held in the shadow of the high level UN General Assembly debate among state presidents and foreign ministers, the war against terrorism, and a further plane crash in New York, on the US boycott. Ironic, therefore, that the test ban meeting was given unexpected (but much-needed) visibility through the actions of the United States, whose boycott had been intended to convey its view that the CTBT is irrelevant.

Just a week earlier, the United States had shocked the UN First Committee (Security and Disarmament) by forcing a vote on a simple procedural decision to retain the CTBT on the UN General Assembly agenda next year. Such decisions are usually treated as formalities and sent forward on the basis of consensus, regardless of whether a government is for or against the subject. After forcing the vote, the United States was the sole country to oppose. A US representative explained that he asked for the vote because his country "did not support the CTBT", a treaty that Eisenhower advocated but failed to deliver in the 1950s, and President Clinton signed with John F. Kennedy's pen on September 24 1996. All others voted in favour, including India, which had previously voted against the CTBT in the UN General Assembly when it was adopted in September 1996.

The United States failed to inform the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs or the CTBT Organisation Preparatory Commission in Vienna of its decision to boycott the Entry-into Force Conference until the last possible moment, despite the presence of Secretary of State Colin Powell and numerous senior officials at other meetings in the UN over the same time period. After the CTBT Conference opened on Sunday November 11, Rick Grenell, a US State Department Official, confirmed "We're just not going to engage".

In keeping with diplomatic tradition, few statements criticised the United States directly, though some expressed 'regret' at its deliberate absence; privately many - most notably from the US' own allies in Europe and Asia - were furious at this latest example of US contempt for multilateral treaties and arms control. An earlier announcement (August 21, 2001) by Washington that it would withhold support for, and not to participate in, some of the activities by the CTBTO not related to the International Monitoring System (IMS), was likewise derided as petty and unbecoming of a major power.

In general, the statements emphasised the importance of the CTBT to international security, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and supported the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its Executive

Secretary, Wolfgang Hoffmann in establishing an effective verification system. Many related the CTBT to commitments in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly the NPT agreements of May 2000, where the United States had joined consensus. Almost all underlined the necessity of maintaining the moratorium against nuclear tests, currently observed by all five nuclear weapon states and, after they each conducted a series of nuclear explosions in May 1998, by India and Pakistan, though neither has yet signed the CTBT. Among the weapon states, Britain, France and Russia have ratified, while the United States and China have signed but not ratified.

Amongst all the positive statements about the CTBT, there appeared to be few new or concrete proposals for facilitating entry into force. Few even wanted to name the 13 states whose failure to sign and/or ratify now impedes the CTBT's entry into force. The NGOs, however, in their statement to the Conference, explicitly called on India, Pakistan and North Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT, and urged Algeria, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the United States to ratify without further delay. Like the governments, the NGOs stressed the vital importance of preventing any future testing, for fear of destroying the test ban norm and setting off a "dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation". The NGOs proposed that the Conference "should commit its participants to condemn any future testing and call upon governments, businesses and people from around the world to respond to any future test by withholding military sales, trade and other business support from the testing countries." To ensure that the testing moratorium is maintained, it would be necessary for potential violators to realise that the penalties and costs would be significant.

In addition to the US Boycott, two developments were particularly noteworthy:

- \* Russia proposed additional confidence-building measures with the United States after entry into force, referring to "the possibility to develop additional verification measures for nuclear test ranges going far beyond the Treaty provisions... [which] could include the exchange of geological data and results of certain experiments, installation of additional sensors, and other measures."

- \* On the negative side, possibly responding to the US lack of commitment and announced withholding of funds, a few states, notably Brazil and Argentina, raised questions about their financial contributions to the CTBTO, particularly the "burden" of verification costs on the non-nuclear weapon states while the treaty remained in limbo.

This brief, preliminary report, written as the Conference ended, will be expanded with further analysis and published on our website and in Disarmament Diplomacy over the next couple of weeks. See the website for the final declaration and NGO statement. Other documents can be found at <[www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org)>

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To: joe@fcnl.org, lisaw@nccusa.org, gpowers@nccbuscc.org  
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>  
Subject: Meeting with Frank Miller  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:  
In-Reply-To:  
References:

Dear Joe, Lisa, Jerry,

I feel that we had a useful meeting with Frank Miller yesterday. Thanks for your participation.

Here is a draft of my notes from the meeting. Please offer your suggestions for changes and additions. Then I'll circulate them to the participants in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament.

Shalom,  
Howard

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Draft.

Notes on a meeting with Franklin C. Miller, special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council. Attendees: Jerry Powers, U.S. Catholic Conference; Joe Volk, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Lisa Wright, National Council of Churches; and Howard Hallman, Methodists United for Peace with Justice. November 20, 2001.

These notes are for background only and not for publication.

Mr. Miller started by stating the view of President Bush that the Cold War is over. The president's response has three components: (1) end the notion that the United States and Russia are military rivals and draw Russia closer to the West; (2) reduce the level of nuclear weapons; (they will still play a role in security, for the world is not ready for nuclear disarmament); (3) get out of the ABM Treaty, an underpinning for mutual annihilation. Bush's War College speech of May 1 is the best statement of his current views.

The reductions of U.S. strategic weapons to 1,700 to 2,200 that Bush announced while meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin will take place over ten years. This is a unilateral declaration that reflects U.S. interests and needs. They don't want a traditional arms control treaty with its long delays. The arms control bureaucracy is an impediment to progress. Putin will subsequently announce a reduction to 1,500. He wants codification of the mutual reductions, so there will be more discussion. Likely the verification and transparency provision of START I will be used.

Joe asked about the Smith provision in defense authorization that prohibits U.S. reductions. Miller wasn't well informed on the status on Capitol Hill, but he said they support the Senate provision for outright repeal.

Jerry asked about what kind of targeting guidance goes with the 1,700 figure. Miller said that the number is a presidential decision to get out of the cold war vestige, for there is no military confrontation with Russia anywhere. The Pentagon will have several months to come up with a targeting plan that reflects this number. Reductions will include the 50 MX missiles and four Trident submarines. However, warheads will be retained. Tactical nuclear weapons are not covered.

Howard asked why stop at 1,700. Miller gave a long exposition about how nuclear deterrence prevented war in Europe and is still a necessity of U.S. policy. Getting under 2,000 is a significant improvement.

Regarding de-alerting, Miller stated that the idea is cosmetically attractive but impractical. If you de-alert only part of the arsenal, the remaining weapons become more vulnerable. Total de-alerting can't be verified. However, not all of the 1,700 U.S. will not be on operational alert. Bombers will take several hours to reload their nuclear weapons. Only some of the submarine fleet will be at sea at any one time. Likewise Russian subs are not at sea and mobile missiles are in their home bases. They are working with Russia on a joint warning system and are not worried about launching by mistake. The commitment to de-alerting expressed in Bush's May 2000 campaign speech does not reflect current presidential policy.

Regarding the ABM Treaty, it is based upon mutual fear. They'll work it out with Russia, for Putin is pragmatic.

Lisa asked about nonproliferation policies, including the lifting of sanctions on India and Pakistan. Miller said they were counterproductive because denying Pakistan assistance on conventional weapons has made them rely more on nuclear weapons. There is a need to rethink sanctions.

They continue to be concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons and are worried about the deal between Russia and Iran. The key is to keep fissile material safe. The money spent on Nunn-Lugar and other measures in the past ten years has been a good investment. The Clinton administration tried but failed to help Russia shut down three nuclear power reactors that produce plutonium as a by-product. Now Rumsfeld opposes this initiative.

Howard asked about the possible expanding role for nuclear weapons, such as in response to biological and chemical weapons and for use against bunkers and caves. Miller reaffirmed the traditional policy of nuclear deterrence to prevent aggression against the United States by any means, including conventional and all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. They don't want any nation to think it can use biological or chemical weapons against U.S. without a strong response. (He emphasized "state actor".) Therefore, they will not say "no first use".

Joe asked whether deep cuts will lead to developing new kinds of nuclear weapons. Miller said, "absolutely not". He dismissed the need for a mini-nuke because it meets no military requirement.

Returning to targeting, Miller said that in his previous role in the Pentagon in 1995 he helped bring about a change away from targeting urban populations. He referred to just war theory and international law. However, he didn't get into the situation where command and control headquarters and military installations, which are targeted, are found in urban areas.

Comment by Hallman: The reduction to 1,700 warheads is a positive move if carried out. It is something that President Clinton did not achieve in his two terms. However, the lengthy period of ten years and the lack of any codification that binds future presidents and Russia are major concerns. In spite of Bush's talk that the Cold War is over and that cold war approaches, such as the ABM Treaty, are obsolete, the basic cold war doctrine of mutually assured destruction remains unchanged. Likewise the willingness of first use of nuclear weapons in response to attack by conventional, biological, and chemical weapons. The Bush policy retains nuclear weapons forever. (In effect the Clinton administration had the same policy in spite of lip service to nuclear disarmament.)

The backing away from Bush's campaign commitment to de-alerting is also troublesome, especially the apparent lack of concern for accidental launch by Russia or use of active missiles by rogue commanders or terrorists. Although Miller expressed support for Nunn-Lugar, the administration has not allocated any of the anti-terrorism funds to expanding nonproliferation measures.

Those of us who favor the total elimination of nuclear weapons and de-alerting as an interim measure have a tremendous challenge. Our nibbling on relative minor legislative issues is insufficient to achieve our goal. Whether we have the time, energy, and resources to mount a much larger campaign to achieve nuclear disarmament should be explored.

To: Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Dear Colleagues:

Here are some notes on a meeting held November 20, 2001 with Franklin C. Miller, special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council. Attendees from the faith community consisted of Jerry Powers, U.S. Catholic Conference; Joe Volk, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Lisa Wright, National Council of Churches; and Howard Hallman, Methodists United for Peace with Justice.

Mr. Miller started by stating the view of President Bush that the Cold War is over. The president's response has three components: (1) end the notion that the United States and Russia are military rivals and draw Russia closer to the West; (2) reduce the level of nuclear weapons; (they will still play a role in security, for the world is not ready for nuclear disarmament); (3) get out of the ABM Treaty, an underpinning for mutual annihilation. Bush's War College speech of May 1 is the best statement of his current views.

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X-Sender: vhallman@pop-server  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1  
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 09:28:30 -0600  
To: (Recipient list suppressed)  
From: Jeanette Hallman <vhallman@kscable.com>  
Subject: My e-mail has changed

Hey everybody,

My e-mail has changed. It is still vhall110 but my domain has changed to kscable.com. So my address is

[vhall110@kscable.com](mailto:vhall110@kscable.com)  
vhall are letters and 110 are numbers.

I look forward to hearing from everyone.

Jeanette  
Jeanette Hallman  
110 Downing Rd.  
Hutchinson, KS 67502  
620-663-4355