

From int@fme.knooppunt.be Mon Mar 17 17:58:28 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:47:26  
From: Pol D'Huyvetter <int@fme.knooppunt.be>  
To: a-days@knooppunt.be, abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org,  
fme@knooppunt.be  
Subject: News-release # 1 : Int'l Campaign/ICJ/NVDA

Please publish and network following release.  
Photographs available on request

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Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days (NWAD) 1997

An International Campaign to uphold International Law  
with Non-Violent Direct Actions of Civil Defence

July 8th - NATO Summit Madrid  
August 6th - NATO HQ Brussels  
August 9th at 'sites of crime'

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Activists launch new campaign of civil disobedience to uphold  
international law at NATO Summit in Madrid

Gent (Belgium), March 17th 1997 - European peace and  
environmental  
activists who met on March 8 -9 in Gent (Belgium) decided on a  
new  
international campaign of civil disobedience to uphold  
international  
law to abolish nuclear weapons.

Next July 8 is the first anniversary of the historic decision by  
the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) on how international  
law  
applies to nuclear weapons. The ICJ, asked for an advisory  
opinion by  
the United Nations General Assembly, decided that 'the threat  
with  
or use of nuclear weapons is generally contrary to the rules of  
international law and could find no circumstance in which they

could  
lawfully be used'.

On this first anniversary of the ICJ-decision all of the NATO leaders, meeting in Madrid for the NATO Summit, will be startled to receive a visit from a Spanish bailiff with a summons. They will be told that unless they carry out radical legal surgery on NATO's nuclear weapons policy in accordance with international law, they will be confronted with a new campaign of non-violent direct action to remind them of their obligations under international law.

The activists are preparing a international peacecamp with non-violent direct action training from August 1 to 11 in Belgium.

They will make the last preparations for a news conference and a non-violent direct action at NATO HQ in Brussels next August 6th, with the 52nd anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

On Saturday August 9th, the anniversary of Nagasaki, activist-groups are organising non-violent direct actions at different 'sites of crime' around the globe, i.e. nuclear weapon laboratories and depots.

The activists are cooperating with members of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and members of Abolition

2000, a global network of NGO's which is working towards a Nuclear

Weapons Convention to prohibit testing, manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, an aim supported by most governments, the public and the International Court of Justice which stated on July 8th 1996 that " there exists an obligation to

pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading

to nuclear disarmament", referring to Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Next month Abolition 2000 will present a draft of the Nuclear Weapons Convention to UN delegates, NGO's and disarmament policy makers during the NPT Review PrepCom at the United Nations in New York.

>From April 7- 18, governments will meet at the UN for the first in a series of meetings of the 185 states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, signed in 1970, is

an agreement between non-nuclear states, which pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapon states, which agree under Article VI of the Treaty to negotiate for nuclear disarmament . The April meeting provides an opportunity to press the nuclear weapon states to implement their Article VI obligation

by beginning work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, as well as push

for a review of Article IV which guarantees all countries the use of 'the peaceful atom'. We learned how states can acquire nuclear weapon technology through the civilian atomic energy programs, while nuclear energy is not only expensive, there are also problems

with reactor safety and nuclear waste..

'With this new campaign to uphold international law to abolish nuclear weapons we want to put further pressure on the politicians

of NATO members to start immediate multilateral negotiations for a

Nuclear Weapons Convention' states Pol D'Huyvetter, campaigner at For Mother Earth International in Belgium, and initiator of this campaign. 'After all the vain promises and treaty violations by nuclear weapon states, I have the moral obligation to call for civil disobedience. The politicians have to take international law

serious and comply with it, otherwise we don't need to bother making it'.

'The upcoming non-violent direct actions are not only a means, they

are also an aim. They are an example of active non-violence, of civilian defence, which we put forward as an alternative to military

defence and doctrine. The latest example was practised successfully

in Gorleben last week when thousands of citizens blocked a rad-waste

transport to protest the nuclear policy of the German government. We

have to remind the politicians that we want to free the world of the

madness of wars and money which dominates everything. Let the

people  
work together towards more democracy and solidarity, and move  
into  
the new millenium with a convention to free the world of nuclear  
weapons' states D'Huyvetter. Info/contact/donations :

For more information/donations/registrations :  
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Contact : Pol D'Huyvetter

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\* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 -  
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\* a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons,  
\*

\* the International Peace Bureau (IPB)  
\*

\* the International Network for Sustainable Energy (Inforse)  
\*

\* and World Information Service on Energy (WISE)  
\*

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\* For Mother Earth has offices  
\*  
\* in Belarus, Belgium, Romania, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, USA,  
\*  
\* aswell as active members/groups  
\*  
\* in Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Ukraine  
\*

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From nfznsc@gn.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:28 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:49:23 GMT  
From: Stewart Kemp <nfznsc@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Nuclear Waste

Dear Friends

I apologise if anyone considers the following news an 'abuse' of the list server but I know it will interest many. Today the UK Department of the Environment rejected the appeal by the nuclear waste agency NIREX to excavate a 'Rock Laboratory' in Cumbria. This is a huge victory for the many environmental campaigners who lobbied against it. National media are unlikely to cover the story because of the announcement of the UK General Election on May 1st.

Good wishes

Stewart Kemp

Stewart Kemp (nfznsc@gn.apc.org)  
From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:28 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 06:37:40 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org

To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group

forwarded

>Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 11:40:52 +0100 (MET)  
>To: aslater@igc.apc.org, Kurt.Hanevik@ikb.uib.no  
>From: fredpax@sn.no (Fredrik S. Heffermehl)  
>Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group  
>Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, ipb@gn.apc.org,  
stale.eskeland@jus.uio.no

>

>\*\*\*\*\*

>\* Fredrik S. HEFFERMEHL \*  
>\* President, Norwegian Peace Alliance \*  
>\* Vice President, International Peace Bureau \*  
>\* Board/Directors, IA Lawyers Ag. Nuclar Arms \*  
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>\*\*\*\*\*

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>

Oslo, March 14, 1997

>Re: "European" - "American"??

>

>MINUTES OF THE ABOLITION 2000 STEERING  
>COMMITTEE FOR THE NPT PREPCOM - March 6, 1997:

>

>Thanks to Alice for keeping us posted on the progress.  
>I shall be in NY from Sunday 6 to Fri 18th.

>

>Please forgive me for questioning a little point  
>on very common usage, sparked by the text

>

>"EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: Alyn has just returned from Europe,  
>and reports that the European Parliament will vote next  
>thursday .... Alyn asked us to contact Europeans so they  
>could urge their EPPs to vote for this urgency resolution."

>

>Such language supports the imperialistic wish of unions formed  
by some

>states to appear as the whole continent, as with  
America/Americans - or

>Europe/Europeans.

>

>

>When people speak of an "American", I ask at times: "from Ecuador"?  
>  
>Many European states are not in the EU. Even inside the EU states large parts  
>of the populations - even solid majorities - are opposed to the Union and  
>its projects. They oppose transfer of power away from the people and over  
>to governments and corporations ... and a.o. important ambitions to be a  
>strong military - and nuclear weapons - power. Therefore, it is \*in the  
>interest of  
>our cause\* not to follow the language of establishment and power, not to  
>make "the other Europe" invisible.  
>  
>So, though it may feel a bit strange at first, I urge everyone to try to  
>speak of "the US/A", not America, of "US Americans", of "EU", not Europe, of  
>"the EU parliament" and "EU Europeans", instead of commonly used language.  
>It immediately signals \*and produces\* a lot of political consciousness.

>  
>  
>Fredrik  
>  
>  
>

From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:28 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:56:38 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Primakov - Summit Preparation

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U.S., Primakov Begin Arms Talks

By Thomas W. Lippman  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Sunday, March 16  
Page A24 The Washington Post

Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov began three days of top-level meetings with U.S. officials yesterday, in a last-minute effort to resolve thorny arms control and security issues that have cast a cloud of uncertainty over this week's scheduled summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Seldom in recent years have so many complicated and interlocking issues been on the table at one time, senior U.S. officials said, and it is by no means clear that all or any of them will be resolved by July, when, over Russian objections, a NATO summit in Madrid is to offer alliance members help to former Warsaw Pact states in Central Europe.

In an effort to forge an agreement with Russia on future relations with NATO and to win Russian parliamentary ratification of the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty, the Clinton administration is prepared to begin discussions -- "not negotiations," a senior official stressed -- about a possible "START III" accord.

But even the prospect of a START III sweetener to ease Russian concerns about the perceived bad deal Moscow accepted in START II would probably not persuade the Russian legislature to ratify it unless an accord is also reached on the separate, more complex issue of missile defenses, U.S. officials and independent experts said.

Primakov's talks with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright yesterday and scheduled meetings with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen today and Clinton on Monday are unlikely to resolve these issues, but they could result in new proposals for the two leaders to consider at Helsinki on Thursday, officials said.

The Russians' failure to implement several smaller-scale arms agreements reached in previous U.S.-Russian summits complicates the talks, senior officials said.

For example, the Russians are still operating two plutonium-producing reactors they agreed to shut down, and have balked at an agreement to share secret information about the disposition of materials from disassembled warheads.

While these agreements are theoretically unrelated to NATO expansion or START II ratification, officials here said they fear all will be held hostage to Russian resentment over NATO's move eastward if they are not resolved soon.

"Let's get this stuff tied down at Helsinki or it will be in trouble after Madrid," one senior official said.

Complicating the discussions further, senior U.S. officials said, is Yeltsin's recent move to dismiss his entire cabinet, which has left Washington unsure of who is in charge of key issues. While Primakov is still foreign minister, for example, senior U.S. officials said that as of Friday they did not know the fate of nuclear energy minister Viktor Mikhailov, who controls Russia's nuclear materials.

According to senior U.S. officials and independent arms control specialists, both Washington and Moscow have retreated in recent months from hard positions on the two biggest issues: Russia has softened the terms on which it would assent to NATO expansion and the United States has agreed to discuss a possible START III before Russian ratification of START II. As summarized by a senior U.S. negotiator, Russia's original position on NATO was, "no expansion. Then they went to a fallback, saying O.K., NATO can expand but new members should be political members only, not military. We said no, sorry, guys, all members are going to be full members. So then they moved and said, we understand the new members will be full members but no [military] or stationed forces on their territory. And we had to say no. . . . NATO has to maintain its flexibility."

Now Russia and the United States are negotiating the language of a "charter," or working agreement on NATO-Russian relations, first offered to the Russians by Secretary of State Warren Christopher last fall.

The Russians want binding language barring NATO from positioning nuclear weapons or large military bases in such former Warsaw Pact countries as Poland and Hungary. The United States is resisting that demand, arguing that the issue of what troops can be stationed where should be negotiated in a revision of the existing Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, or CFE.

As a result, "It is really wrong to suggest we are on the brink of a deal" for a NATO-Russian charter, a senior official said. "I know exactly where we are on every single outstanding issue, and we've got a long way to go."

The United States is offering Russia creation of a "consultative mechanism" for joint NATO-Russian discussions about European security issues, a senior official said.

The theory behind this offer is that it would please Moscow by creating a new, permanent organization in which Russia would be on an equal footing with members of NATO, while not giving Russia a veto over NATO decisions. In principle, NATO expansion and START II ratification are unrelated, but U.S. officials said in briefings last week that they have accepted that they are politically linked in Russian eyes. Members of the Russian parliament who don't like the terms of START II are likely to harden their position further after NATO expansion becomes a fact at Madrid.

The U.S. response to this conundrum is to signal a willingness to talk about a possible START III that would respond to Russian reservations about START II, while insisting that START II be ratified before formal negotiations begin.

The Pentagon's Strategic Command "can support efforts to consider prudent reductions beyond START II to lower levels of strategic forces," Air Force Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services committee in a statement last week.

START II was signed by Yeltsin and President George Bush in January 1993 and ratified 87-4 by the Senate last year. If ratified by the Russian Duma, it will require both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear forces to no more than 3,500 deployed warheads by 2003, well below the current limit of 6,000. Russia would be required to destroy its SS-18 heavy missiles and multiple-warhead missiles would be banned.

Because of the composition of Russia's nuclear forces, the new limits would require Russia to spend billions of dollars it does not have to build single-warhead missiles if it wanted to retain nuclear parity with the United States. To alleviate that concern, U.S. officials said they are prepared to discuss "guidelines" for a START III that would bring both sides down to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads, which is about where the Russians would be if they did not build new weapons.

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APO 03/17 0949 Clinton To Hold Pre-Summit Talks

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- His knee surgery forced President Clinton to delay by a day his summit with Russia's Boris Yeltsin, but he is wasting no opportunity to lay the groundwork for what could be a difficult two days of talks.

Clinton was meeting at the White House today with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov for a pre-summit discussion of such ticklish issues as Russian objections to NATO expansion and a U.S.-Russian impasse in arms control negotiations.

Primakov went over those topics Saturday with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and again Sunday with Defense Secretary William Cohen at a meeting held at Primakov's request in the "tank," the Pentagon's secure briefing room. It was unclear what, if any, progress had been made.

At Clinton's request, Yeltsin agreed Sunday to delay their summit in Helsinki, Finland, by one day -- to Thursday and Friday from Wednesday and Thursday -- to give Clinton extra time to recuperate from his knee surgery.

Just a few weeks ago, many in Washington doubted that Yeltsin was healthy enough to meet with Clinton. Yeltsin was so weakened by pneumonia in January, after heart surgery in November, that the summit was changed from Washington to Helsinki to save him a long trip. His recuperation has since accelerated.

Thus, it may have given Yeltsin puckish delight to tell Clinton in a get-well telegram that he was ready to meet him "as soon as your health allows."

Clinton's state visit to Denmark, originally scheduled for Friday, has been postponed until July. Clinton told reporters he hopes to fit in that visit while in Europe to attend a NATO summit.

In Moscow, the Kremlin press service announced the summit was pushed back a day "by mutual agreement" and said the delay was made necessary by Clinton's recovery from surgery to repair the tendon he tore Friday in Florida.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the decision to delay the summit's start by 24 hours was made Saturday night by Erskine Bowles, the president's chief of staff, and the National Security Council staff.

"It gives the president an additional day to convalesce and an additional day to learn to be mobile," McCurry said. The trip begins Wednesday night.

Asked whether the summit's schedule of meetings had been shortened, McCurry made a veiled reference to the earlier worries over Yeltsin's health.

"Remember," he said, "the schedule had been designed to accommodate everyone's health needs."

Doctors said Clinton will be in a wheelchair for several days and on crutches for about eight weeks as he recuperates from Friday's knee surgery. In addition to the regular three-person medical team that normally travels with him, an orthopedist and a

physical therapist will accompany him to Helsinki.

Even before going into surgery, Clinton pledged not to let his injury stop him from attending the Helsinki summit, where an unusual mix of tough and sensitive topics will be discussed, including NATO's plans to expand eastward.

Clinton considers NATO expansion his top foreign policy priority -- linked to other festering security issues such as overcoming the Russian parliament's reluctance to ratify the START II nuclear weapons treaty.

Yeltsin said in an interview published Sunday in Finland's leading newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, that Finland should not think of joining NATO. The Russians already have made a fuss over the Western alliance's intention to invite some former Soviet-bloc nations -- probably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- to join.

"To us, bringing the alliance's military infrastructure closer to Russian territory is absolutely unacceptable," Yeltsin said in the Finnish interview.

McCurry said Clinton was aware of Yeltsin's remarks and viewed them as a reflection of Russia's well-known objections to NATO expanding eastward.

In the past week, McCurry and other Clinton aides have voiced optimism that the summit will bring the two sides closer on that thorny issue.

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RTw 03/17 0906 Defence minister says Russian nukes are reliable

MOSCOW, March 17 (Reuter) - Defence Minister Igor Rodionov assured President Boris Yeltsin on Monday that the command and control system governing Russia's nuclear missiles was reliable, the presidential press service said.

Rodionov's comments at a one-hour meeting in the Kremlin appeared to reverse earlier remarks in which he expressed concern that underfunding of the armed forces raised doubts about the reliability of Russia's nuclear weapons.

"As the defence minister underlined in his report, the system controlling the country's strategic nuclear forces answers all demands, is reliable and stable, which excludes the possibility of unusual situations," a presidential press service statement said.

The statement followed a weekend newspaper article suggesting Russia could accidentally launch a nuclear missile attack because its systems were unreliable.

The written statement said Yeltsin and Rodionov also discussed plans for Russia's nuclear arms, including prospects

for negotiating a START-3 treaty to follow the unratified START-2 treaty with the United States cutting strategic nuclear missiles.

Yeltsin is due to discuss arms control with President Bill Clinton at a summit in Helsinki later this week.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:28 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:23:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: URGENT ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

forwarded

>Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 15:09:23 +0200

>To: disarmament@igc.apc.org

>From: laural@kaapeli.fi (Peace Station)

>Subject: URGENT ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

>Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

>X-Mailer: <PC Eudora Version 1.4>

>

>HELP PEACE - MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3!

>

>We are going to do media work on peace movements' ideas about Clintons and

>Jeltsins negotiations; about START III, about disarmament of conventional

>weapons, about NATO enlargement etc. etc... We have made some texts based

>on abolition 2000 points made in Tahiti , and some presentation of peace

>organisations and views... but if You have something else (more)You would

>want us to do, please contact us ! (There is going to be over 1500

>journalists here in Helsinki).

>

>other happenings in Helsinki: Peace Union has made a fact leaflet to

>activists & groups: What the summit is all about. Various groups arrange

>demonstrations: today in Helsinki against the Finnish membership i NATO and

>NATO enlargement, and on Thursday against World military spending - in

>favour of disarmament.  
>  
>Today, on Monday, The Finnish government gave a security and  
defence  
>political program to the parliament (we are not applying for  
Nato membership  
>.. for the moment..) and there is a hot security political  
debate going on  
>this week...

>  
>Contacts are:  
>Laura Lodenius, Peace Union of Finland, tel.358-9-142915  
>Malla Kantola, Committee of 100, tel: +358-9-141336  
>Peace Station, Helsinki, Finland  
>fax: 358-9-147297  
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>  
>  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:23:32 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: CTBT update

forwarded

>Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 20:56:01 GMT  
>From: acronym@gn.apc.org (Rebecca Johnson)  
>Subject: CTBT update

>  
>To: DisInt receivers,  
>16 March, 1997  
>DisInt Report # 2: CTBT Update

>  
>So, Geneva at last waves goodbye to the CTBT!  
>This is a short summary of the CTBT resumed PrepCom, which  
finally took the  
>decision to set up the implementing organisation in Vienna.

>  
>The resumed Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban  
Treaty  
>Organisation (CTBTO), chaired by Ambassador Jacob Selebi of  
South Africa,  
>concluded its meeting in Geneva, March 3-11, by agreeing the  
budget and  
>establishment of the CTBTO, to be headed by Wolfgang Hoffmann.  
After the  
>difficulties and disappointments of New York in November 1996,

Hoffmann was

>clearly relieved that the PrepCom passed off so successfully this time.

>Preparing to leave Geneva, where he has been the Disarmament Ambassador

>since 1993, Hoffmann said that the PrepCom had 'done everything it should

>do, with nothing left open.'

>

>The successful decisions followed weeks of intensive behind-the-scenes

>consultations to resolve the problems over structure, staffing and budget

>that had prevented agreement four months earlier. In New York the decisions

>on how the CTBTO should be structured became tangled with different states'

>bids for their personnel to be appointed to key positions in the new

>hierarchy. Some countries, including Iran and France, retained serious

>reservations about the way in which the CTBTO was to be constituted, but in

>the end Selebi managed to forge agreement, enabling work to begin. After

>much debate, a budget of \$28 million was agreed for the first nine months.

>This will enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to be

>established at the Vienna International Centre (VIC). The budget is also

>intended to cover the initial setting up costs for the international

>monitoring system (IMS) and the international data centre (IDC).

However,

>some of the scientists most closely involved with the verification regime

>have expressed concern that cuts in investment earmarked for the seismic

>network could have an adverse effect on the ability of the verification

>regime to be fully operational by September 1998, as planned.

>

>Hoffmann, who also chaired the Nuclear Test Ban Committee's working group on

>Verification during the CTBT negotiations in 1994, was appointed Executive

>Secretary of the PTS. He will sign the Host Country Agreement with Austria

>on March 18 and take up his new post in Vienna immediately. The directors

>of the five divisions were agreed as follows:

>Administration: William B Davitte (USA),

>Legal and External Relations: Masabumi Sato (Japan),

>On-site Inspections: Vladimir Kryuchenkov (Russian Federation),

>Verification - International Monitoring System: Gerardo Suarez (Mexico),

>Verification - International Data Centre: Rashad M Kebeasy (Egypt).

>

>The Administration Division will cover general services, finance, personnel,

>conference services and procurement. In addition to legal services and

>external relations, the Legal and External Relations Division will cover

>will cover public information and international cooperation. The OSI

>Division will have to be responsible for developing the procedures and

>equipment for geophysical and radionuclide inspections, drilling, transport,

>overflights and training. The IDC Division will cover monitoring,

>scientific methods and data fusion, communications and infrastructure, and

>training in IDC-related technology and interpretation. The IMS Division

>will also cover training and the setting up of seismic, hydroacoustic,

>radionuclide and infrasound monitoring stations as specified in the treaty.

>In addition to the office of the Executive Secretary, monitoring of progress

>towards establishing the CTBTO will be overseen by teams responsible for

>internal auditing and evaluation of the verification regime.

>

>Two working groups were also convened, comprising representatives from

>countries which have signed the treaty. As of March 1, 142 countries

>including the P-5 nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and

>the United States) and Israel. Of the 44 countries whose ratification is  
>required by article XIV before the Treaty can enter into force, only three  
>have not signed: India, Pakistan and North Korea. In view of India's stated  
>objections to the CTBT, which it had blocked in the CD, a large number of  
>delegates in November queried the urgency of setting up the verification  
>regime, reflecting doubt that the entry into force conditions would be met  
>any time soon. This sentiment was less in evidence in Geneva in March (or  
>at least further below the surface), as CTBT signatories looked forward to  
>moving the test ban treaty out of Geneva and setting up the new organisation  
>in Vienna.

>

>The two working groups are Working Group A on Budgetary and Administrative  
>Matters, chaired by Tibor Toth of Hungary and Working Group B on  
>Verification, chaired by Ola Dahlman of Sweden. Dr Dahlman was formerly the  
>Chair of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which studied seismic  
>verification under the auspices of the CD's NTB Committee, culminating in  
>the third technical test of a provisional worldwide seismic network, known  
>as GSETT-3. According to preliminary assessments, the IMS primary seismic  
>network, some of which is based on GSETT-3, is 64 percent complete, with the  
>auxiliary seismic network covering 32 percent of the stations identified in  
>the CTBT verification protocol. However, there is still a long way to go on  
>the other three technologies which comprise the IMS: the hydroacoustic  
>network is estimated to be 27 percent in place; the radionuclide network  
>about 15 percent complete; but only 2 percent of the proposed infrasound  
>network is set up. Fourteen countries earmarked to host stations in the IMS

>have not yet signed the treaty. In June 1996, at the height of the battle  
>over the CTBT's entry into force, India withdrew its three stations, which  
>appeared as 'to be determined' in the adopted treaty text. It is understood  
>that there have not yet been any discussion of the implications of this and  
>other gaps due to any country's failure to sign.  
>  
>It will be the task of Working Group B during 1997 to develop technical  
>specifications, requirements, policies, guidelines, procedures and  
>documentation (including manuals and training) relating to inspections, as  
>well as the IMS, IDC and communications. Working Group A, chaired by Tibor  
>Toth, focused on a programme of work for the rest of 1997, according to  
>which it will prioritise the development of staffing and financial  
>regulations, rules of procedure for the CTBTO and the 1998 draft budget.  
>Smaller expert groups may also be convened to work out details on particular  
>issues.  
>  
>With these historic decisions, Geneva has now waved farewell to the 'the  
>longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history'. The CTBT  
>goes to Vienna, with the hope that all the work and resources put into  
>setting up the verification regime will be justified by its timely  
>implementation and entry into force. However, with India adamantly opposed,  
>and Pakistan waiting on India's decision, the prospect does not look very  
>optimistic. Resolving their altercation over the intended meaning of the  
>term 'anniversary' in the text, signatories have agreed that the  
>entry-into-force conference described in article XIV may be held after  
>September 1999. However, with understandings in the negotiating record that

>this conference will not be empowered to waive the entry into  
>force  
>conditions nor impose sanctions on any hold-outs, there is  
>considerable  
>cynicism that this 'handwringing conference' will be able to  
>bring the  
>treaty into effect if the political will remains lacking. All  
>in all, the  
>best hope for the CTBT's entry into force is irreversible  
>nuclear arms  
>reduction, further progress on nuclear disarmament, and greater  
>regional  
>security and confidence building in South Asia.

>

>ends

>

>

>

>=====

>email: acronym@gn.apc.org

>Disarmament Intelligence Review

>24, Colvestone Crescent

>London E8 2LH

>England

>Tel/fax until April 1: +44 171 241 4691

>Please note: from April 1, 1997 the telephone and fax numbers  
>will be

>changed, as follows: telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857

>fax (0) 171 503 9153

>The address and email remain the same.

>=====

>

>

From IPPNW@OLN.comlink.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997

Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 00:00:00 +0000

From: IPPNW Int Aerzte gg Atomkrieg <IPPNW@OLN.comlink.apc.org>

To: ippnw.campaign@conf.igc.apc.org, abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Subject: Conference, Burg Schlaining

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]

[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]

[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

ADVANCE NOTICE

"Nuclear Weapons Free Europe.

Visions for non-nuclear European Security"

A European NGO-Conference.

---

June 13th -15th 1997  
Peace Center Burg Schlaining, Austria

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Host Organisations:

International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms  
(IALANA),  
International Network of Engineers and Scientists (INES),  
International Peace  
Bureau (IPB), International Physicians for the Prevention of  
Nuclear War  
(IPPNW), Peace Center Burg Schlaining, Project for European  
Nuclear Non-  
Proliferation (PENN) , Women's International League for Peace and  
Freedom (WILPF)

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Friday 13th June, afternoon  
Arrival and check-in  
Friday 13th June, 6.00 - 7.00 pm  
Dinner

Friday evening: 7.00 -9.30 pm

Mai-Britt Theorin, MEP, S (IPB President)  
"Alternative Security Structures for the 21st Century in Europe  
- the role of nuclear weapons"

Alla Yaroshinskaya, RUS (Advisor to President Yeltsin)  
"Russian Nuclear Deterrence in the Light of NATO Expansion"

Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK (WCP):  
"Why nuclear weapons are obsolete"

Saturday 14th June, 9.00 - 11.30 am

Plenary background lectures:

Stephen Young, USA (BASIC) (invited)  
"Nuclear arsenals and doctrines in Europe Including their  
"virtual" character"

Alexander Nikitin, RUS (Pugwash, invited)  
"The Russian nuclear posture - between dismantling and new emphasis for nuclear weapons"

Saturday 14th June, 11.30 am - 1.30 pm  
Lunch break

Saturday 14th June, 1.30 pm - 3.30 pm

Working Groups, session 1  
"Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

I.1. "Further Delegitimation of Nuclear Weapons"  
Evaluation of the legal and political implications of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons. Evaluation of the status of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear weapons states (nuclear participation and NPT, war reservation). Evaluation of the legal problems of the "Eurobomb", i.e. the nuclear status of the European Union. Evaluation of the legal problems of the NATO expansion, especially concerning the nuclear status of new NATO member states. Proposals for a programme of action: implementation of a real non-nuclear status of the non-nuclear weapons states by legal and political means.  
Facilitators: Renate Reupke, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both IALANA)  
Expert participants: Phon van den Biesen, NL (IALANA), Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK (WCP) and Solange Fernex, F (WILPF, Greens, IPB, France).

I.2. "Nuclear non-proliferation. Can Europe take the next step?"  
Evaluation of the opportunity for European states to take the next non-proliferation step by improving the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear technology. Identifying possibilities for reducing the availability of all kinds of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Other discussion points: nuclear dual

use materials and technologies; a Cut-Off Convention; an international plutonium register; research reactor conversion from HEU to LEU fuel; etc.

Facilitator: Martin Kalinowski, D (IANUS/INESAP)  
Expert participants: Frans Berkhout, UK (SPRU), Christian Kueppers, D and Michael Sailer, D (both Eco-Institute), Mycle Schneider D/F (WISE-Paris)

### I.3. "A European nuclear option."

Discussion of a future European nuclear option, either within the context of so-called "concerted deterrence" or based upon the European security and defence identity (ESDI). Clarification of the role of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear states, especially in the case of NATO enlargement and under possible future concepts, like concerted deterrence. Look at the legal incompatibility of the participation of European non-nuclear weapon states in NATO's nuclear planning with obligations under the NPT.

Facilitator: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg Schlaining)

### I.4. "Russian and NATO nuclear planning"

Examination of the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapon states, and their future role in crisis-management and crisis-prevention. Evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in new East-West and North-South conflict scenarios. The role of nuclear weapons in case of NATO-enlargement. Is there an obligation of NATO member states to accept nuclear weapons on their territory?

Facilitator: Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW)  
Expert participants: Otfried Nassauer, D (BITS)

### I.5. "Denuclearise Europe"

Examination of the prospects of Russian ratification of START II

and initiation  
of START III negotiations. How can France and the UK be drawn  
into a  
substantial and irreversible nuclear disarmament process?  
Evaluation of  
reactions to proposals for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.  
Identification of  
reasonable strategies for achieving a nuclear weapons free zone  
(NWFZ) in  
Europe, and especially the unilateral return of nuclear weapons  
deployed on  
foreign territory to their countries of origin.

Facilitator: Tobias Damjanov, D (INES)  
Expert participants: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix),  
Janet  
Bloomfield, UK (CND)

Saturday 14th June, 3.30 - 4.00 pm  
Coffee Break

Saturday 14th June, 4.00 - 6.00 pm

Working Groups, session 2  
"Security Architecture in Europe"

II.1. "Further Delegitimation of Nuclear Weapons - New Trends"  
European nuclear option and the NPT; NATO expansion and nuclear  
weapons: legal and political obstacles? Visions for non-nuclear  
European  
security; legal and political means of implementation; proposals  
for a NGO  
programme of action.

Facilitator: Peter Becker, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both  
IALANA)  
Expert participants: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg  
Schlaining),  
Dieter Deiseroth, D (IALANA)

II.2. "Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament"  
Discussion of the prospects for, and content of, a Nuclear  
Weapons  
Convention. Creation of an agenda towards the global elimination  
of nuclear  
weapons, including steps like no first-use treaty, START III,  
fissile material

cut-off, P5 and P5+3 negotiations.

Facilitator: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix)

Expert participant: Juergen Scheffran, D (IANUS/INESAP)

### II.3. "Collective Security Revisited"

Discussion of systems of collective security versus systems of collective defence. What kind of influence do nuclear weapons present and what problems do they pose on both types of architecture? Should the OSCE as formerly successful international organization in the time of East West dtente have a more prominent political value? Discussion of the role of the different interlocking and interblocking institutions in the European Security agenda, including the European Union's CSFP. Other topics: disinventing war in Europe; abandoning the military; demilitarised zones.

Facilitator: Solange Fernex, F (WILPF, Greens, IPB, France)

Expert participants: Jarmila Marsalkova, CZ (IPPNW)

### II.4. "NATO: From Old Dogmas to New Realities"

The changing face of security in Europe. What is the role of NATO in the security policy of the EU? European integration and NATO enlargement: Examination of the involved parties and their interests. Evaluation of the role of Partnership for Peace. What is the likelihood of nuclear deployment in new NATO member states? NATO and Russia: New conflict constellation or partnership for a more secure Europe?

Facilitator: Miklos Barabas, H (Hungarian Peace Association)

Expert Participant: Jiri Matousek, CZ (Pugwash)

### II.5. "Campaigning for Nuclear Free Zones in Europe"

Lobbying decision makers, media work, nuclear free local authorities.

Facilitator: Liz Waterston, UK (MEDACT)

Expert Participant: Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW)

Saturday 14th June, : 6.00 - 7.30 pm

Break

The results of the working groups will be displayed on wall charts

Saturday 14th June, evening

Social event with dinner

Sunday 15th June, 10.00 am - 1.00 pm

Plenary session

"Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

1. Reports of the facilitators/rapporteurs on the following:  
Proposals for a joint resolution addressed to military and political

leaders, developed by the working groups with special emphasis on:

- Concepts for a nuclear weapons free Europe and alternative security

structures

- strengthened future role of OSCE, new role for NATO and WEU

2. Improvement of NGO work on OSCE level and formation of/Contribution to a European Abolition 2000 Network

- Adoption of a joint resolution

- Agreement on a list of common NGO strategies and campaign activities

Co-Chairs: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Center Burg Schlaining) & Reiner

Braun, D (INES)

Wallchart record: Xanthe Hall (IPPNW)

Sunday 15th June, 1.00 pm

Lunch and Departure

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Goals of the Conference:

1. To present and discuss topical information central to peace and security

in the OSCE region (and surrounding area), especially:

a. the future role of nuclear weapons;

b. enlargement of NATO and WEU and their relation to CIS;

c. the future role of the OSCE;

d. alternative concepts and strategies for peace and security.

2. To establish the foundations for a NGO Network by the end of

the  
conference, active in the OSCE region and linked to the global NGO  
Network "Abolition 2000", by:  
a. discussing and drafting a common platform for goals,  
strategies and  
campaign proposals;  
b. establishing an informal working structure for further  
communication  
and joint action.  
3. To undertake first steps to attract media attention to such an  
NGO  
Network

---

If you wish to register for this conference, please contact:

Georg Schoefbaenker  
Peace Center Burg Schlaining  
A-7461 Schlaining/Burg  
Tel: +43-3355-2498  
Fax: +43-3355-2381  
E-Mail: georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at

## CrossPoint v3.1 ##  
From int@fme.knooppunt.be Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:49:33  
From: Pol D'Huyvetter <int@fme.knooppunt.be>  
To: comof100@kaapeli.fi  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Re: HELSINKI SUMMIT - Brussels action

>>HELP PEACE - MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3!

We are planning a vigil next Thursday from 12 to 1 pm in front of  
US-embassy in Brussels to protest NATO expansion to the East,  
denuclearization of NATO and an NWFZ in Europe, starting in  
Central Europe. The vigil will be joined by members of (so far)  
Forum voor Vredesaktie (WRI), European Nuclear Test Ban  
Coalition,  
Green Party, Vrede (Peace) and For Mother Earth. We have asked  
delegation to be received by ambassador. A letter will be sent to  
Russian embassy.

Please keep us updated, so we update press in Brussels

Good luck,

Pol D'Huyvetter

\*\*\*\*\*

\* For Mother Earth International office  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium  
\*

\* Phone/fax +32-9-233 84 39  
\*

\* E-mail: int@fme.knooppunt.be  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* WWW:http://www.knooppunt.be/~fme  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* Postal account : 000-1618561-19  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global  
\*

\*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International  
Peace\*

\* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE)  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Sri  
Lanka,\*

\* USA,aswell as active members/groups in Belarus, Finland,  
\*

\* Germany, Netherlands, Rumania and Ukraine  
\*

\*\*\*\*\*

From disarmament@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:07:49 -0800 (PST)  
From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Senate & House Letter

\*\*SENATORS & REPRESENTATIVES  
CALL ON PRESIDENT CLINTON  
TO START TALKING AT THE SUMMIT\*\*

Here are letters from the Senate and Congress to President Clinton urging a START III agreement at the upcoming Clinton-Yeltsin Summit.

Thank you to many of you who wrote letters, and called Senate offices to help generate these letters.

Please concentrate on media work and send letters-to-the-editor this week calling for a START III Framework Agreement and bold cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st-century, as the Summit actually gets under way (starting on Thursday.)

Please contact Kathy Crandall at the Disarmament Clearinghouse for more information or assistance:

Kathy Crandall, Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

(The Disarmament Clearinghouse is a project of: Greenpeace, Peace Action, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Plutonium Challenge, and Women's Action for New Directions)

\*\*\*\*\*

United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We applaud the significant and historic progress to reduce the dangers of weapons of mass destruction achieved over the last four years of your Presidency: the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty; ratification of the START II by the Senate; the nuclear free zone treaties, Pelindaba and Rarotonga, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; and the extension of the U.S. nuclear test moratorium and signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

On the eve of your important meeting with President Yeltsin in Helsinki and Senate debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and CTBT, we write to underscore our view that in the next four years, your Administration, can - and must - achieve further progress toward the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons threats.

In addition to the vital task of securing early Senate ratification of the CWC and the CTBT this year, we recommend that conclusion of the next round of bilateral U.S.- Russian nuclear arms reductions be a top Administration priority.

We are very encouraged that further nuclear arsenal reduction through possible START III "framework" agreement appears to be under active consideration for the upcoming Helsinki Summit. We are encouraged by the growing level of public and expert support for deeper nuclear arms cuts and phased elimination of these weapons, which has been underscored by the December statement of the 61 former military leaders.

We are hopeful that a START III framework agreement might establish the basis for further, significant reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals as well as the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In addition, we hope that START III might provide greater security against the growing risk of nuclear exchange due to accidental or unauthorized launch by removing all nuclear forces off alert status. Just as it was the case during the height of the Cold War, our nation's security against inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear attack depends upon the integrity of Russia's command and control system as much as our own.

In addition to setting the stage for further reductions below the still massive START II nuclear force levels, we believe

that conclusion of a START III framework agreement can help overcome the disturbing reluctance of the Russian Duma to ratify START II. Without a new approach to this problem and to Russian fears about the impact of NATO expansion on the conventional and nuclear military balance in Europe, we are concerned that START II -- and other important post-Cold War arms control milestones -- may be seriously imperiled.

We urge you to seize the opportunity presented by the upcoming Helsinki Summit meeting with President Yeltsin to conclude a START III framework agreement. We look forward to the results of the Helsinki Summit and to working with you on these vital matters in the coming months.

Sincerely,

Patty Murray (D-WA)  
Tom Daschle (D-SD)  
Tim Johnson (D-SD)  
Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)  
John Glenn (D-OH)  
Tom Harkin (D-IA)  
Richard Durbin (D-IL)  
Carol Mosely-Braun (D-IL)  
Paul Wellstone (D-MN)  
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)  
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)  
John Kerry (D-MA)  
Ted Kennedy (D-MA)  
Russ Feingold (D-WI)  
Diane Feinstein (D-CA)  
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)  
Robert Torricelli (D-NJ)  
Jack Reed (D-RI)  
Patrick Leahy (D-VT)  
Robert Kerrey (D-NE)

Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Dale Bumpers (D-AR) sent their own separate letters. Contact the Disarmament Clearinghouse if you'd like copies faxed to you.

\*\*\*\*\*

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

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President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. President:

We appreciate the sentiment expressed in your inaugural address when you spoke of a future in which, "Our children will sleep free from the threat of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons." Your upcoming summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin presents a good opportunity to move toward that goal.

We are writing to encourage you and President Yeltsin to discuss how to achieve a START III agreement to attain deeper cuts in our strategic nuclear weapons arsenals that would enhance the strategic stability of the remaining forces. Russian ratification of START II would be better ensured by beginning discussions of a framework agreement for START III.

Additional measures toward nuclear weapons reductions enjoy increasingly broad support among the American public as well as national security experts and are vital to diminishing the threat that these weapons pose. We urge you to put this vital issue high on the summit agenda.

Allen  
Tom Barrett  
Blumenauer  
Berman  
Boehlert  
Bonior  
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Capps  
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Danny Davis  
DeFazio  
DeLauro  
Dellums  
Doggett  
Doyle

Engel  
Evans  
Farr  
Fazio  
Filner  
Frank  
Furse  
Gejedenson  
Hamilton  
Hinchey  
Hooley  
Kind  
Leach  
John Lewis  
McGovern  
McDermott  
McKinney  
Maloney  
Minge  
Morella  
Nadler  
Norton  
Oberstar  
Olver  
Pelosi  
Roybal-Allard  
Rush  
Sabo  
Shays  
Skaggs  
Stark  
Stupak  
Underwood  
Vento  
Watt

\*Many thanks to Elizabeth Furse (D-OR) for initiating and working on signatures for this letter.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:00:52 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
To: Recipients of conference  
<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>  
Subject: SENATE/HOUSE LETTERS senators/ reps.

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Doyle  
Engel

Evans  
Farr  
Fazio  
Filner  
Frank  
Furse  
Gejedenson  
Hamilton  
Hinchey  
Hooley  
Kind  
Leach  
John Lewis  
McGovern  
McDermott  
McKinney  
Maloney  
Minge  
Morella  
Nadler  
Norton  
Oberstar  
Olver  
Pelosi  
Roybal-Allard  
Rush  
Sabo  
Shays  
Skaggs  
Stark  
Stupak  
Underwood  
Vento  
Watt

\*Many thanks to Elizabeth Furse (D-OR) for initiating and working on signatures for this letter.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From nfzns@gn.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 14:49:23 GMT  
From: Stewart Kemp <nfzns@gn.apc.org>

To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Nuclear Waste

Dear Friends

I apologise if anyone considers the following news an 'abuse' of the list server but I know it will interest many.

Today the UK Department of the Environment rejected the appeal by the nuclear waste agency NIREX to excavate a 'Rock Laboratory' in Cumbria. This is a huge victory for the many environmental campaigners who lobbied against it. National media are unlikely to cover the story because of the announcement of the UK General Election on May 1st.

Good wishes

Stewart Kemp

Stewart Kemp (nfznscc@gn.apc.org)  
From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 06:37:40 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group

forwarded

>Date: Fri, 14 Mar 1997 11:40:52 +0100 (MET)  
>To: aslater@igc.apc.org, Kurt.Hanevik@ikb.uib.no  
>From: fredpax@sn.no (Fredrik S. Heffermehl)  
>Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group  
>Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, ipb@gn.apc.org, stale.eskeland@jus.uio.no

>

>\*\*\*\*\*

>\* Fredrik S. HEFFERMEHL \*  
>\* President, Norwegian Peace Alliance \*  
>\* Vice President, International Peace Bureau \*  
>\* Board/Directors, IA Lawyers Ag. Nuclar Arms \*  
>\* International Free Vanunu Committee \*  
>\* \*  
>\* N. Juels g. 28 A, N-0272 Oslo, Norway \*

>\* Phone +47-2244 8003 (fax: +47-2244 7616) \*  
>\* E-mail: fredpax@sn.no \*  
>\*\*\*\*\*

>

>

Oslo, March 14, 1997

>Re: "European" - "American"??

>

>MINUTES OF THE ABOLITION 2000 STEERING

>COMMITTEE FOR THE NPT PREPCOM - March 6, 1997:

>

>Thanks to Alice for keeping us posted on the progress.

>I shall be in NY from Sunday 6 to Fri 18th.

>

>Please forgive me for questioning a little point

>on very common usage, sparked by the text

>

>"EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: Alyn has just returned from Europe,  
>and reports that the European Parliament will vote next  
>thursday .... Alyn asked us to contact Europeans so they  
>could urge their EPPs to vote for this urgency resolution."

>

>Such language supports the imperialistic wish of unions formed  
by some

>states to appear as the whole continent, as with  
America/Americans - or

>Europe/Europeans.

>

>

>When people speak of an "American", I ask at times: "from  
Ecuador"?

>

>Many European states are not in the EU. Even inside the EU  
states large parts

>of the populations - even solid majorities - are opposed to the  
Union and

>its projects. They oppose transfer of power away from the people  
and over

>to governments and corporations ... and a.o. important ambitions  
to be a

>strong military - and nuclear weapons - power. Therefore, it is  
\*in the

>interest of

>our cause\* not to follow the language of establishment and  
power, not to

>make "the other Europe" invisible.

>

>So, though it may feel a bit strange at first, I urge everyone

to try to  
> speak of "the US/A", not America, of "US Americans", of "EU",  
not Europe, of  
> "the EU parliament" and "EU Europeans", instead of commonly used  
language.  
> It immediately signals \*and produces\* a lot of political  
consciousness.

>  
>  
> Fredrik

>  
>  
>

From: disarmament@igc.org  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:56:38 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Primakov - Summit Preparation

\*\*\*\*\*  
U.S., Primakov Begin Arms Talks

By Thomas W. Lippman  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Sunday, March 16  
Page A24 The Washington Post

Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov began three days of top-level meetings with U.S. officials yesterday, in a last-minute effort to resolve thorny arms control and security issues that have cast a cloud of uncertainty over this week's scheduled summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Seldom in recent years have so many complicated and interlocking issues been on the table at one time, senior U.S. officials said, and it is by no means clear that all or any of them will be resolved by July, when, over Russian objections, a NATO summit in Madrid is to offer alliance members help to former Warsaw Pact states in Central Europe.

In an effort to forge an agreement with Russia on future relations with NATO and to win Russian parliamentary ratification of the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty, the Clinton administration is prepared to begin discussions -- "not negotiations," a senior official stressed -- about a possible

"START III" accord.

But even the prospect of a START III sweetener to ease Russian concerns about the perceived bad deal Moscow accepted in START II would probably not persuade the Russian legislature to ratify it unless an accord is also reached on the separate, more complex issue of missile defenses, U.S. officials and independent experts said.

Primakov's talks with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright yesterday and scheduled meetings with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen today and Clinton on Monday are unlikely to resolve these issues, but they could result in new proposals for the two leaders to consider at Helsinki on Thursday, officials said.

The Russians' failure to implement several smaller-scale arms agreements reached in previous U.S.-Russian summits complicates the talks, senior officials said.

For example, the Russians are still operating two plutonium-producing reactors they agreed to shut down, and have balked at an agreement to share secret information about the disposition of materials from disassembled warheads.

While these agreements are theoretically unrelated to NATO expansion or START II ratification, officials here said they fear all will be held hostage to Russian resentment over NATO's move eastward if they are not resolved soon.

"Let's get this stuff tied down at Helsinki or it will be in trouble after Madrid," one senior official said.

Complicating the discussions further, senior U.S. officials said, is Yeltsin's recent move to dismiss his entire cabinet, which has left Washington unsure of who is in charge of key issues. While Primakov is still foreign minister, for example, senior U.S. officials said that as of Friday they did not know the fate of nuclear energy minister Viktor Mikhailov, who controls Russia's nuclear materials.

According to senior U.S. officials and independent arms control specialists, both Washington and Moscow have retreated in recent months from hard positions on the two biggest issues: Russia has softened the terms on which it would assent to NATO expansion and the United States has agreed to discuss a possible START III before Russian ratification of START II. As summarized by a senior U.S. negotiator, Russia's original position on NATO was,

"no expansion. Then they went to a fallback, saying O.K., NATO can expand but new members should be political members only, not military We said no, sorry, guys, all members are going to be full members. So then they moved and said, we understand the new members will be full members but no [military] or stationed forces on their territory. And we had to say no. . . . NATO has to maintain its flexibility."

Now Russia and the United States are negotiating the language of a "charter," or working agreement on NATO-Russian relations, first offered to the Russians by Secretary of State Warren Christopher last fall.

The Russians want binding language barring NATO from positioning nuclear weapons or large military bases in such former Warsaw Pact countries as Poland and Hungary. The United States is resisting that demand, arguing that the issue of what troops can be stationed where should be negotiated in a revision of the existing Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, or CFE.

As a result, "It is really wrong to suggest we are on the brink of a deal" for a NATO-Russia charter, a senior official said. "I know exactly where we are on every single outstanding issues, and we've got a long way to go."

The United States is offering Russia creation of a "consultative mechanism" for joint NATO-Russian discussions about European security issues, a senior official said.

The theory behind this offer is that it would please Moscow by creating a new, permanent organization in which Russia would be on an equal footing with members of NATO, while not giving Russia a veto over NATO decisions. In principle, NATO expansion and START II ratification are unrelated, but U.S. officials said in briefings last week that they have accepted that they are politically linked in Russian eyes. Members of the Russian parliament who don't like the terms of START II are likely to harden their position further after NATO expansion becomes a fact at Madrid.

The U.S. response to this conundrum is to signal a willingness to talk about a possible START III that would respond to Russian reservations about START II, while insisting that START II be ratified before formal negotiations begin.

The Pentagon's Strategic Command "can support efforts to consider prudent reductions beyond START II to lower levels of strategic

forces," Air Force Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services committee in a statement last week.

START II was signed by Yeltsin and President George Bush in January 1993 and ratified 87-4 by the Senate last year. If ratified by the Russian Duma, it will require both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear forces to no more than 3,500 deployed warheads by 2003, well below the current limit of 6,000. Russia would be required to destroy its SS-18 heavy missiles and multiple-warhead missiles would be banned.

Because of the composition of Russia's nuclear forces, the new limits would require Russia to spend billions of dollars it does not have to build single-warhead missiles if it wanted to retain nuclear parity with the United States. To alleviate that concern, U.S. officials said they are prepared to discuss "guidelines" for a START III that would bring both sides down to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads, which is about where the Russians would be if they did not build new weapons.

\*\*\*\*\*

APO 03/17 0949 Clinton To Hold Pre-Summit Talks

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- His knee surgery forced President Clinton to delay by a day his summit with Russia's Boris Yeltsin, but he is wasting no opportunity to lay the groundwork for what could be a difficult two days of talks.

Clinton was meeting at the White House today with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov for a pre-summit discussion of such ticklish issues as Russian objections to NATO expansion and a U.S.-Russian impasse in arms control negotiations.

Primakov went over those topics Saturday with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and again Sunday with Defense Secretary William Cohen at a meeting held at Primakov's request in the "tank," the Pentagon's secure briefing room. It was unclear what, if any, progress had been made.

At Clinton's request, Yeltsin agreed Sunday to delay their summit in Helsinki, Finland, by one day -- to Thursday and Friday from Wednesday and Thursday -- to give Clinton extra time to recuperate from his knee surgery.

Just a few weeks ago, many in Washington doubted that Yeltsin was healthy enough to meet with Clinton. Yeltsin was so weakened by pneumonia in January, after heart surgery in November, that the summit was changed from Washington to Helsinki to save him a long trip. His recuperation has since accelerated.

Thus, it may have given Yeltsin puckish delight to tell Clinton in a get-well telegram that he was ready to meet him "as soon as your health allows."

Clinton's state visit to Denmark, originally scheduled for Friday, has been postponed until July. Clinton told reporters he hopes to fit in that visit while in Europe to attend a NATO summit.

In Moscow, the Kremlin press service announced the summit was pushed back a day "by mutual agreement" and said the delay was made necessary by Clinton's recovery from surgery to repair the tendon he tore Friday in Florida.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the decision to delay the summit's start by 24 hours was made Saturday night by Erskine Bowles, the president's chief of staff, and the National Security Council staff.

"It gives the president an additional day to convalesce and an additional day to learn to be mobile," McCurry said. The trip begins Wednesday night.

Asked whether the summit's schedule of meetings had been shortened, McCurry made a veiled reference to the earlier worries over Yeltsin's health.

"Remember," he said, "the schedule had been designed to accommodate everyone's health needs."

Doctors said Clinton will be in a wheelchair for several days and on crutches for about eight weeks as he recuperates from Friday's knee surgery. In addition to the regular three-person medical team that normally travels with him, an orthopedist and a physical therapist will accompany him to Helsinki.

Even before going into surgery, Clinton pledged not to let his injury stop him from attending the Helsinki summit, where an unusual mix of tough and sensitive topics will be discussed, including NATO's plans to expand eastward.

Clinton considers NATO expansion his top foreign policy priority -- linked to other festering security issues such as overcoming the Russian parliament's reluctance to ratify the START II nuclear weapons treaty.

Yeltsin said in an interview published Sunday in Finland's leading newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, that Finland should not think of joining NATO. The Russians already have made a fuss over the Western alliance's intention to invite some former Soviet-bloc nations -- probably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- to join.

"To us, bringing the alliance's military infrastructure closer to Russian territory is absolutely unacceptable," Yeltsin said in the Finnish interview.

McCurry said Clinton was aware of Yeltsin's remarks and viewed them as a reflection of Russia's well-known objections to NATO expanding eastward.

In the past week, McCurry and other Clinton aides have voiced optimism that the summit will bring the two sides closer on that thorny issue.

\*\*\*\*\*  
RTw 03/17 0906 Defence minister says Russian nukes are reliable

MOSCOW, March 17 (Reuter) - Defence Minister Igor Rodionov assured President Boris Yeltsin on Monday that the command and control system governing Russia's nuclear missiles was reliable, the presidential press service said.

Rodionov's comments at a one-hour meeting in the Kremlin appeared to reverse earlier remarks in which he expressed concern that underfunding of the armed forces raised doubts about the reliability of Russia's nuclear weapons.

"As the defence minister underlined in his report, the system controlling the country's strategic nuclear forces answers all demands, is reliable and stable, which excludes the possibility of unusual situations," a presidential press service statement said.

The statement followed a weekend newspaper article suggesting Russia could accidentally launch a nuclear missile attack because its systems were unreliable.

The written statement said Yeltsin and Rodionov also discussed plans for Russia's nuclear arms, including prospects for negotiating a START-3 treaty to follow the unratified START-2 treaty with the United States cutting strategic nuclear missiles.

Yeltsin is due to discuss arms control with President Bill Clinton at a summit in Helsinki later this week.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:23:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: URGENT ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

forwarded  
>Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 15:09:23 +0200  
>To: disarmament@igc.apc.org  
>From: laural@kaapeli.fi (Peace Station)

>Subject: URGENT ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT  
>Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>X-Mailer: <PC Eudora Version 1.4>  
>  
>HELP PEACE - MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3!  
>  
>We are going to do media work on peace movements' ideas about  
Clintons and  
>Jeltsins negotiations; about START III, about disarmament of  
conventional  
>weapons, about NATO enlargement etc. etc... We have made some  
texts based  
>on abolition 2000 points made in Tahiti , and some presentation  
of peace  
>organisations and views... but if You have something else  
(more)You would  
>want us to do, please contact us ! (There is going to be over  
1500  
>journalists here in Helsinki).  
>  
>other happenings in Helsinki: Peace Union has made a fact  
leaflet to  
>activists & groups: What the summit is all about. Various  
groups arrange  
>demonstrations: today in Helsinki against the Finnish  
membership i NATO and  
>NATO enlargement, and on Thursday against World military  
spending - in  
>favour of disarmament.  
>  
>Today, on Monday, The Finnish government gave a security and  
defence  
>political program to the parliament (we are not applying for  
Nato membership  
>.. for the moment..) and there is a hot security political  
debate going on  
>this week...  
>  
>Contacts are:  
>Laura Lodenius, Peace Union of Finland, tel.358-9-142915  
>Malla Kantola, Committee of 100, tel: +358-9-141336  
>Peace Station, Helsinki, Finland  
>fax: 358-9-147297  
>email: comof100@kaapeli.fi  
>  
>  
From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997

Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 07:23:32 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: CTBT update

forwarded

>Date: Sun, 16 Mar 1997 20:56:01 GMT  
>From: acronym@gn.apc.org (Rebecca Johnson)  
>Subject: CTBT update

>

>To DisInt receivers,  
>16 March, 1997  
>DisInt Report # 2: CTBT Update

>

>So, Geneva at last waves goodbye to the CTBT!  
>This is a short summary of the CTBT resumed PrepCom, which  
finally took the  
>decision to set up the implementing organisation in Vienna.

>

>The resumed Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban  
Treaty

>Organisation (CTBTO), chaired by Ambassador Jacob Selebi of  
South Africa,

>concluded its meeting in Geneva, March 3-11, by agreeing the  
budget and

>establishment of the CTBTO, to be headed by Wolfgang Hoffmann.  
After the

>difficulties and disappointments of New York in November 1996,  
Hoffmann was

>clearly relieved that the PrepCom passed off so successfully  
this time.

>Preparing to leave Geneva, where he has been the Disarmament  
Ambassador

>since 1993, Hoffmann said that the PrepCom had 'done everything  
it should

>do, with nothing left open.'

>

>The successful decisions followed weeks of intensive behind-the-  
scenes

>consultations to resolve the problems over structure, staffing  
and budget

>that had prevented agreement four months earlier. In New York  
the decisions

>on how the CTBTO should be structured became tangled with  
different states'

>bids for their personnel to be appointed to key positions in the  
new

>hierarchy. Some countries, including Iran and France, retained serious  
>reservations about the way in which the CTBTO was to be constituted, but in  
>the end Selebi managed to forge agreement, enabling work to begin. After  
>much debate, a budget of \$28 million was agreed for the first nine months.  
>This will enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to be  
>established at the Vienna International Centre (VIC). The budget is also  
>intended to cover the initial setting up costs for the international  
>monitoring system (IMS) and the international data centre (IDC). However,  
>some of the scientists most closely involved with the verification regime  
>have expressed concern that cuts in investment earmarked for the seismic  
>network could have an adverse effect on the ability of the verification  
>regime to be fully operational by September 1998, as planned.  
>  
>Hoffmann, who also chaired the Nuclear Test Ban Committee's working group on  
>Verification during the CTBT negotiations in 1994, was appointed Executive  
>Secretary of the PTS. He will sign the Host Country Agreement with Austria  
>on March 18 and take up his new post in Vienna immediately. The directors  
>of the five divisions were agreed as follows:  
>Administration: William B Davitte (USA),  
>Legal and External Relations: Masabumi Sato (Japan),  
>On-site Inspections: Vladimir Kryuchonkov (Russian Federation),  
>Verification - International Monitoring System: Gerardo Suarez (Mexico),  
>Verification - International Data Centre: Rashad M Kebeasy (Egypt).  
>  
>The Administration Division will cover general services, finance, personnel,  
>conference services and procurement. In addition to legal services and  
>external relations, the Legal and External Relations Division will cover

>will cover public information and international cooperation.  
The OSI  
>Division will have to be responsible for developing the  
procedures and  
>equipment for geophysical and radionuclide inspections,  
drilling, transport,  
>overflights and training. The IDC Division will cover  
monitoring,  
>scientific methods and data fusion, communications and  
infrastructure, and  
>training in IDC-related technology and interpretation. The IMS  
Division  
>will also cover training and the setting up of seismic,  
hydroacoustic,  
>radionuclide and infrasound monitoring stations as specified in  
the treaty.  
>In addition to the office of the Executive Secretary, monitoring  
of progress  
>towards establishing the CTBTO will be overseen by teams  
responsible for  
>internal auditing and evaluation of the verification regime.  
>  
>Two working groups were also convened, comprising  
representatives from  
>countries which have signed the treaty. As of March 1, 142  
countries  
>including the P-5 nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France,  
Russia and  
>the United States) and Israel. Of the 44 countries whose  
ratification is  
>required by article XIV before the Treaty can enter into force,  
only three  
>have not signed: India, Pakistan and North Korea. In view of  
India's stated  
>objections to the CTBT, which it had blocked in the CD, a large  
number of  
>delegates in November queried the urgency of setting up the  
verification  
>regime, reflecting doubt that the entry into force conditions  
would be met  
>any time soon. This sentiment was less in evidence in Geneva in  
March (or  
>at least further below the surface), as CTBT signatories looked  
forward to  
>moving the test ban treaty out of Geneva and setting up the new  
organisation  
>in Vienna.

>

>The two working groups are Working Group A on Budgetary and Administrative  
>Matters, chaired by Tibor Toth of Hungary and Working Group B on  
>Verification, chaired by Ola Dahlman of Sweden. Dr Dahlman was  
formerly the  
>Chair of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which studied  
seismic  
>verification under the auspices of the CD's NTB Committee,  
culminating in  
>the third technical test of a provisional worldwide seismic  
network, known  
>as GSETT-3. According to preliminary assessments, the IMS  
primary seismic  
>network, some of which is based on GSETT-3, is 64 percent  
complete, with the  
>auxiliary seismic network covering 32 percent of the stations  
identified in  
>the CTBT verification protocol. However, there is still a long  
way to go on  
>the other three technologies which comprise the IMS: the  
hydroacoustic  
>network is estimated to be 27 percent in place; the radionuclide  
network  
>about 15 percent complete; but only 2 percent of the proposed  
infrasound  
>network is set up. Fourteen countries earmarked to host  
stations in the IMS  
>have not yet signed the treaty. In June 1996, at the height of  
the battle  
>over the CTBT's entry into force, India withdrew its three  
stations, which  
>appeared as 'to be determined' in the adopted treaty text. It  
is understood  
>that there have not yet been any discussion of the implications  
of this and  
>other gaps due to any country's failure to sign.

>

>It will be the task of Working Group B during 1997 to develop  
technical  
>specifications, requirements, policies, guidelines, procedures  
and  
>documentation (including manuals and training) relating to  
inspections, as  
>well as the IMS, IDC and communications. Working Group A,  
chaired by Tibor  
>Toth, focused on a programme of work for the rest of 1997,

according to  
>which it will prioritise the development of staffing and  
financial  
>regulations, rules of procedure for the CTBTO and the 1998 draft  
budget.  
>Smaller expert groups may also be convened to work out details  
on particular  
>issues.  
>  
>With these historic decisions, Geneva has now waved farewell to  
the 'the  
>longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history'.  
The CTBT  
>goes to Vienna, with the hope that all the work and resources  
put into  
>setting up the verification regime will be justified by its  
timely  
>implementation and entry into force. However, with India  
adamantly opposed,  
>and Pakistan waiting on India's decision, the prospect does not  
look very  
>optimistic. Resolving their altercation over the intended  
meaning of the  
>term 'anniversary' in the text, signatories have agreed that the  
>entry-into-force conference described in article XIV may be held  
after  
>September 1999. However, with understandings in the negotiating  
record that  
>this conference will not be empowered to waive the entry into  
force  
>conditions nor impose sanctions on any hold-outs, there is  
considerable  
>cynicism that this 'handwringing conference' will be able to  
bring the  
>treaty into effect if the political will remains lacking. All  
in all, the  
>best hope for the CTBT's entry into force is irreversible  
nuclear arms  
>reduction, further progress on nuclear disarmament, and greater  
regional  
>security and confidence building in South Asia.  
>  
>ends  
>  
>  
>  
>=====

>email: acronym@gn.apc.org  
>Disarmament Intelligence Review  
>24, Colvestone Crescent  
>London E8 2LH  
>England  
>Tel/fax until April 1: +44 171 241 4691  
>Please note: from April 1, 1997 the telephone and fax numbers  
will be  
>changed, as follows: telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857  
>fax (0) 171 503 9153  
>The address and email remain the same.

>=====

>  
>  
From IPPNW@OLN.comlink.apc.org Mon Mar 17 17:58:29 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 00:00:00 +0000  
From: IPPNW Int Aerzte gg Atomkrieg <IPPNW@OLN.comlink.apc.org>  
To: ippnw.campaign@conf.igc.apc.org, abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Conference, Burg Schlaining

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]  
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]  
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

ADVANCE NOTICE

"Nuclear Weapons Free Europe.  
Visions for non-nuclear European Security"

A European NGO-Conference.

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June 13th -15th 1997  
Peace Center Burg Schlaining, Austria

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Host Organisations:  
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms  
(IALANA),  
International Network of Engineers and Scientists (INES),  
International Peace  
Bureau (IPB), International Physicians for the Prevention of  
Nuclear War  
(IPPNW), Peace Center Burg Schlaining, Project for European  
Nuclear Non-  
Proliferation (PENN) , Women's International League for Peace and

Freedom (WILPF)

---

Friday 13th June, afternoon  
Arrival and check-in

Friday 13th June, 6.00 - 7.00 pm  
Dinner

Friday evening: 7.00 - 9.30 pm

Mai-Britt Theorin, MEP, S (IPB President)  
"Alternative Security Structures for the 21st Century in Europe  
- the role of nuclear weapons"

Alla Yaroshinskaya, RUS (Advisor to President Yeltsin)  
"Russian Nuclear Deterrence in the Light of NATO Expansion"

Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK (WCP):  
"Why nuclear weapons are obsolete"

Saturday 14th June, 9.00 - 11.30 am

Plenary background lectures:

Stephen Young, USA (BASIC) (invited)  
"Nuclear arsenals and doctrines in Europe Including their  
"virtual" character"

Alexander Nikitin, RUS (Pugwash, invited)  
"The Russian nuclear posture - between dismantling and new  
emphasis for  
nuclear weapons"

Saturday 14th June, 11.30 am - 1.30 pm  
Lunch break  
Saturday 14th June, 1.30 pm - 3.30 pm

Working Groups, session 1  
"Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

I.1. "Further Delegitimation of Nuclear Weapons"  
Evaluation of the legal and political implications of the  
advisory opinion of  
the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons.  
Evaluation of the

status of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear weapons states (nuclear participation and NPT, war reservation). Evaluation of the legal problems of the "Eurobomb", i.e. the nuclear status of the European Union. Evaluation of the legal problems of the NATO expansion, especially concerning the nuclear status of new NATO member states. Proposals for a programme of action: implementation of a real non-nuclear status of the non-nuclear weapons states by legal and political means.

Facilitators: Renate Reupke, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both IALANA)  
Expert participants: Phon van den Biesen, NL (IALANA), Commander (ret.)  
Rob Green, UK (WCP) and Solange Fernex, F (WILPF, Greens, IPB, France).

I.2. "Nuclear non-proliferation. Can Europe take the next step?"  
Evaluation of the opportunity for European states to take the next non-proliferation step by improving the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear technology. Identifying possibilities for reducing the availability of all kinds of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Other discussion points: nuclear dual use materials and technologies; a Cut-Off Convention; an international plutonium register; research reactor conversion from HEU to LEU fuel; etc.

Facilitator: Martin Kalinowski, D (IANUS/INESAP)  
Expert participants: Frans Berkhout, UK (SPRU), Christian Kueppers, D and Michael Sailer, D (both Eco-Institute), Mycle Schneider D/F (WISE-Paris)

I.3. "A European nuclear option."  
Discussion of a future European nuclear option, either within the context of so-called "concerted deterrence" or based upon the European security and defence identity (ESDI). Clarification of the role of nuclear

weapons in non-nuclear states, especially in the case of NATO enlargement and under possible future concepts, like concerted deterrence. Look at the legal incompatibility of the participation of European non-nuclear weapon states in NATO's nuclear planning with obligations under the NPT.

Facilitator: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg Schlaining)

#### I.4. "Russian and NATO nuclear planning"

Examination of the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapon states, and their future role in crisis-management and crisis-prevention. Evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in new East-West and North-South conflict scenarios. The role of nuclear weapons in case of NATO-enlargement. Is there an obligation of NATO member states to accept nuclear weapons on their territory?

Facilitator: Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW)

Expert participants: Otfried Nassauer, D (BITS)

#### I.5. "Denuclearise Europe"

Examination of the prospects of Russian ratification of START II and initiation of START III negotiations. How can France and the UK be drawn into a substantial and irreversible nuclear disarmament process? Evaluation of reactions to proposals for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Identification of reasonable strategies for achieving a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in Europe, and especially the unilateral return of nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory to their countries of origin.

Facilitator: Tobias Damjanov, D (INES)

Expert participants: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix), Janet Bloomfield, UK (CND)

Saturday 14th June, 3.30 - 4.00 pm  
Coffee Break

Saturday 14th June, 4.00 - 6.00 pm

Working Groups, session 2  
"Security Architecture in Europe"

II.1. "Further Delegitimation of Nuclear Weapons - New Trends"  
European nuclear option and the NPT; NATO expansion and nuclear  
weapons: legal and political obstacles? Visions for non-nuclear  
European  
security; legal and political means of implementation; proposals  
for a NGO  
programme of action.

Facilitator: Peter Becker, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both  
IALANA)  
Expert participants: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg  
Schlaining),  
Dieter Deiseroth, D (IALANA)

II.2. "Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament"  
Discussion of the prospects for, and content of, a Nuclear  
Weapons  
Convention. Creation of an agenda towards the global elimination  
of nuclear  
weapons, including steps like no first-use treaty, START III,  
fissile material  
cut-off, P5 and P5+3 negotiations.

Facilitator: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix)  
Expert participant: Juergen Scheffran, D (IANUS/INESAP)

II.3. "Collective Security Revisited"  
Discussion of systems of collective security versus systems of  
collective  
defence. What kind of influence do nuclear weapons present and  
what  
problems do they pose on both types of architecture? Should the  
OSCE as  
formerly successful international organization in the time of  
East West  
d

From int@fme.knooppunt.be Mon Mar 17 18:18:08 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 22:49:33  
From: Pol D'Huyvetter <int@fme.knooppunt.be>  
To: comof100@kaapeli.fi  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Re: HELSINKI SUMMIT - Brussels action

>>HELP PEACE - MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3!

We are planning a vigil next Thursday from 12 to 1 pm in front of US-embassy in Brussels to protest NATO expansion to the East, denuclearization of NATO and an NWFZ in Europe, starting in Central Europe. The vigil will be joined by members of (so far) Forum voor Vredesaktie (WRI), European Nuclear Test Ban Coalition, Green Party, Vrede (Peace) and For Mother Earth. We have asked delegation to be received by ambassador. A letter will be sent to Russian embassy.

Please keep us updated, so we update press in Brussels

Good luck,

Pol D'Huyvetter

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*****
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* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace*
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *
*****
*For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Sri Lanka,*
* USA,aswell as active members/groups in Belarus, Finland, *
* Germany, Netherlands, Rumania and Ukraine          *
*****
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From rwilcock@execulink.com Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 19:52:11 -0500  
From: Ross Wilcock <rwilcock@execulink.com>  
To: "Abolition Caucus List (E-mail)" <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Don't Allow Moscow To Dictate Nato Enlargement

Don't Allow Moscow To Dictate NATO Enlargement,' Helsinki Commission Warns Clinton  
March 17, 1997 01:45pm EST From: PR Newswire  
WASHINGTON, March 17 /PRNewswire/ -- Today the Commission on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, released the text of a letter sent  
to President Clinton last week regarding the Commission's concerns over the upcoming Summit  
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Specifically the letter:

- 1) cautioned President Clinton not to allow Russia to dictate the terms for the expansion of NATO, either formally or by implication;
- 2) urged the President to get reaffirmation from President Yeltsin of Russia's rejection of developing any sphere of influence, specifically regarding Ukrainian sovereignty and her control of the port city of Sevastopol; and
- 3) reminded the President of U.S. support for the full withdrawal of all Russian troops from Moldova under the Russia-Moldova agreement of 1994.

The letter was signed by Commission Chairman Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-C-NY) and Co-Chairman Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-N-T).

The full text of the letter follows:

"In anticipation of your upcoming summit meeting with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin we urge you to consider several issues as you prepare for these important discussions. Your travels to the Finnish capital are a reminder of the monumental changes that have occurred in Europe since the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act as well as the continuing challenges in building a truly united and democratic Europe.

"While we strongly support the timely enlargement of NATO as part of this process, we remain concerned that reason and realism be exercised in efforts undertaken by the administration to forge ahead with some form of formal partnership between Russia and NATO. The killing fields of Chechnya should serve as a stark reminder of the limits on democracy and human rights in Russia. President Yeltsin is ultimately responsible for the Russian military operations that laid waste to Grozny, leveled scores of towns and villages, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Chechen and Russian civilians, and resulted in tens of thousands of deaths.

"The single greatest contribution Russia can make to the construction of an integrated and democratic Europe would be to consolidate democracy, human rights and rule of law at home.

"We cannot ignore the historical relationship between Russia and her neighbors, many of whom have understandable concerns for their sovereignty and independence, given decades of brutal domination and suppression by Moscow. Such apprehension can only be heightened by the current leadership crisis in the Kremlin and neo-imperialist statements made by certain prominent Russian political figures. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, a key interlocutor on NATO issues, has been one of the chief proponents of the re-establishment of a Russian sphere of influence in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

"Mr. President, while we cannot ignore legitimate Russian security concerns as NATO proceeds with the admission of new states, neither can we allow Moscow to dictate the terms of

enlargement or which states might be admitted. While the United States should continue to encourage cooperation among countries in the Baltic region, it is important to keep in mind that such cooperation cannot preclude NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Talks on a possible formal charter between NATO and Russia should clearly address the following points. First, the Russian Federation must not be given a veto, or implied veto, over the timing or conditions for the admission of new members into the Alliance. Second, such an accord must firmly oppose any moves by Moscow to establish "spheres of influence" in East Central Europe. Third, the charter must in no way impede the development of enhanced relations between NATO and non-members, such as Ukraine.

"With Ukraine in mind, we wish to express our growing concern over a series of disturbing Russian actions relating to the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. Challenges to Ukrainian sovereignty over Sevastopol continue despite the 1995 agreement signed by the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia on the principles for dividing the Black Sea Fleet headquartered on the Crimean peninsula. In December, the Federation Council of the Russian Parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution claiming the port as part of Russian territory, and condemning Ukraine's refusal to recognize Sevastopol's 'Russian status.' A similar measure was adopted by the State Duma in October. More recently, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov traveled to Sevastopol, where he declared that 'Sevastopol was and is a Russian city and we must defend Sevastopol's right to be a Russian city.'

"In the five years since independence, Kiev has endeavored to pursue improved relations with the Russian Federation based on sovereign equality. Threats to Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, such as those described above, can only undermine this process with potentially destabilizing consequences.

"During your talks with President Yeltsin, we urge you to underscore unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders, and to stress the importance of resolving all outstanding issues relating to the Black Sea Fleet and the port of Sevastopol in a manner consistent with OSCE principles, including respect for territorial integrity.

"Regarding this principle, we note that there has been some indication that Russia intends to withdraw at least part of its military forces from Moldova. Your administration has consistently and properly insisted that the October 21, 1994 withdrawal agreement between Moldova and Russia be observed. We hope you will continue to encourage President Yeltsin to this end.

"In closing, Mr. President, we wish you every success in Helsinki and may your work be guided by those principles so closely identified with that city."

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is made up of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. For more information about the Commission, please call 202-225-1901.

SOURCE Helsinki Commission

3/17/97

/CONTACT: Chadwick R. Gore of the Helsinki Commission, 202-225-1901, or e-mail, CGORE@HR.HOUSE.GOV/

From worldpeace@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:51:43 GMT  
From: Housmans Peace Resource Project <worldpeace@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
Cc: fredpax@sn.no  
Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group

FROM: Albert Beale, 5 Caledonian Road, Kings Cross, London N1, UK  
(tel +44-171-278 4474; fax +44-171-278 0444; e-mail  
worldpeace@gn.apc.org).

17 March 1997

Dear Fredrik Heffermehl & friends

I was pleased to see Fredrik's response to one of the Abolition 2000 items circulated on the e-mail list-server ... language and precision are important. This is, as he says, so as to not make political assumptions, or even political insults; but also simply because accuracy is essential if we are not to give hostages to fortune to our opponents, and not to give an excuse to opponents to ignore us because of our sloppy thinking. Let's show that peace campaigners can make our case with precision and with accurate terminology!

Fredrik gives the examples of the use of "American" when only the US is being referred to; and the use of "European" when referring only to the EU.

Can I add related examples: the problem of people using "England" when they mean "Britain", or "Britain" when they mean the UK, and so on... . And similarly, the confusion between Holland and the Netherlands, which I presume is as significant there as the Britain/etc errors are here. (At least we no longer get the confusion between Russia and the USSR!)

And also on the topic of accuracy ... I'm all in favour of setting disarmament targets (and deciding to have a party!) for when we reach the year 2000. But since that's still a year before the turn of the century/millennium, let's avoid the quite common howler of referring to the beginning of the year 2000 as the new millennium, when it's the beginning of the last year of this one, of course.

Best wishes

Albert Beale

From ipb@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 16:58:17 -0100  
From: International Peace Bureau <ipb@gn.apc.org>  
To: "Heffermehl, Fredrik" <fredpax@sn.no>,  
"Weiss, Cora" <srfnyusa@IGC.APC.ORG>  
Cc: 'Committee of 100 in Finland' <comof100@kaapeli.fi>,  
"Lodenius, Laura" <laural@kaapeli.fi>  
Subject: FW: HELSINKI SUMMIT: PEACE AND MEDIA

-----  
From: Peace Station[SMTP:laural@kaapeli.fi]  
Sent: lundi, 17. mars 1997 14:13  
To: ipb@gn.apc.org  
Cc: caat@gn.apc.org  
Subject: HELSINKI SUMMIT AND PEACE AND MEDIA

MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3.97!

Important information from Finnish peace organisations

We are going to do some media work on peace movements' ideas about Clinton and Yeltsin's negotiations about START III, about disarmament of conventional weapons, about NATO enlargement etc. etc... We have made some texts based on abolition 2000 points made in Tahiti, and some presentation of peace organisations and views... but if You have something else You would want us to do, please contact us! (\*\*There are going to be over 1500 journalists here in Helsinki\*\*).

Other happenings in Helsinki: Peace Union (member organisation of IPB, signed abolition 2000..) has made a fact leaflet to activists & groups: What the summit is all about. Various groups arrange demonstrations: today in Helsinki against the Finnish membership of NATO and NATO enlargement, and on Thursday against World military spending - in favour of disarmament.

Today, on Monday, The Finnish government gave a security and defence political program to the parliament (we are not applying for Nato membership .. for the moment..) and there is a hot security political debate going on this week...

Contacts are:

Laura Lodenius, Peace Union of Finland, tel.358-9-142915  
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Both at:  
Peace Station, Helsinki, Finland  
fax: +358-9-147297  
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From nfnzsc@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 12:39:09 GMT  
From: Stewart Kemp <nfnzsc@gn.apc.org>  
To: nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: UK Nuclear News 15-16 March 1997

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 15:51:32 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 15-16 Mar  
>To: nfnzsc@gn.apc.org  
>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY  
>  
>Sun 16 Mar 1997  
>  
>97-8314 Outrage as military research security, including Porton Down,  
> is sold to private firm. Obs  
>  
>Sat 15 Mar 1997  
>  
>97-8311 Global stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium now  
> more than 2,000 tonnes, often with lax controls, says new book.  
> Ind  
>97-8312 Nato promises not to deploy troops in substantial numbers on  
> the soil of new members 'for foreseeable future': Russia  
> demands that membership is not extended to former Soviet  
> states. FT,G  
>  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
>  
>

Stewart Kemp (nfnzsc@gn.apc.org)

From disarmament@igc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 07:35:50 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: White House Press Briefing - Summit Prep.

Here are excerpts from the White House Press Briefing yesterday following President Clinton's discussions with Russian Defense Minister Primakov in preparation for the Summit.

March 17, 1997  
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY  
4:34 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

March 17, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY  
MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

MR. MCCURRY: Uh-oh, this is not going to work. I can tell already. I got my old gang out here. You are all going to go away mightily disappointed because you just got more from Foreign Minister Primakov than you're going to get from me.

Let me do a couple -- the President just had in the Yellow Room of the White House, the second floor of the President's residence, a very textured and detailed conversation with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. They met for approximately an hour and really went through in a very detailed way those issues that are on the agenda for the two Presidents when they meet in Helsinki. That was, by the way, roughly twice as long as the meeting had been expected to go.

It started with a lot of pleasantries because the President had to explain half the jokes that were said at the

Gridiron to the Foreign Minister -- (laughter) -- no. The President --

Q That took up 45 minutes. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. The President teased the Foreign Minister a little bit about being Madeleine's date at the Gridiron Dinner, and said he hoped they had had fun. Foreign Minister Primakov said that he was pleased and that President Yeltsin is pleased that President Clinton is going ahead with the summit later in the week.

And then they just reviewed those areas -- I mean, those continuing issues in the three large areas I told you about last week, in the area of European security; second, the future of arms control; third, the economic engagement that the West has with the Russian Federation. They reviewed some of the issues that are still outstanding that the two Presidents will have to address.

I'd really say it was an effort to take those differences that are on the agenda as we head to Helsinki and really bring them under the magnifying glass, look at them in greater detail. I'm sure the Foreign Minister will report back to President Yeltsin on President Clinton's strong thinking on some of the issues that we've presented. And we'll see what arises in Helsinki.

Q Did the Russian Foreign Minister link the dispute over NATO expansion to the lagging effort to get the START Treaty resolved or to other arms control measures? Did he suggest that this was having a negative impact on arms control generally?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think it's known that they have some views about how issues intersect and relate, but our thinking is quite clear: we consider ratification of START II important. It is vital to the future of arms reduction and continuing arms control efforts, and we certainly have made that clear in our discussions.

Q Mike, I know you're probably sick of this, but the issue of legally binding character of the final charter, did that come up again with Primakov? Primakov suggested on the lawn just here that if the United States would change its

position, he would be happy, implying that we hadn't. But have they changed their position on the necessary character of a legally binding charter?

MR. MCCURRY: They really, on that issue, did not spend time because that's an issue that has been well-rehearsed now by the discussions that have occurred prior to the meeting here today, and our view is pretty well-known on that.

Q Well, what did you mean then when you said earlier -- I think you said it would be politically binding? You mean just a statement of promises?

MR. MCCURRY: Politically binding means it's a commitment that the United States is going to carry out along with its ally partners.

Q Mike, is there any progress on any issue?

MR. MCCURRY: By the way, for those of you in the White House Press Corps, the State Department Press Corps is treating me with the deference deserved a White House Press Secretary because --

Q We knew you then.

MR. MCCURRY: -- they would not have let me get away with this in my place of prior employment.

Q Yeltsin's comments earlier today were rather tough in tone. Did Primakov have similar tone, or was he more conciliatory?

MR. MCCURRY: No, this is a working meeting and the Foreign Minister properly was grateful for the opportunity to see the President of the United States. They had a good review of the areas in which they'll have discussion in Helsinki, to be sure, and talked about that. They really talked about those issues that the two Presidents will need to address in addition to reviewing the work that's been done by the delegations at various levels to prepare for the summit.

Q Mike, have you heard anything new in Russian position today?

MR. MCCURRY: We've heard a lot of good commitment to

addressing those issues that are clearly outstanding and clearly where there's some disagreements. There will likely continue to be disagreements after the summit in Helsinki. I can't imagine that we will resolve all the issues that are pending, but there will be a relationship here that is productive, that is moving forward, and that will aim this relationship to the 21st century, which is what the President's objective is in the first place.

Q Would you consider the issue of military infrastructure and how both sides define that as one of those issues on which you spent a lot of time over the weekend?

MR. MCCURRY: Not today, but my understanding is a substantial portion of time was spent on that issue as the Foreign Minister met with Secretary Cohen. I believe they might have even spent some time on issues like that in some of the sessions with Secretary Albright.

Q Are the two sides any closer together on this one issue?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to speculate whether they're closer together or farther together, but I think there is still work to be done.

Q When the two Presidents meet, will they discuss the lag time between the first set of admissions to an expanded NATO any subsequent ones?

MR. MCCURRY: I suspect that timing sequences and issues like that will be something that will be discussed right up through the summit.

Q What was discussed on that today?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that there was any detailed discussion of that point today, but I think that there will probably be a future discussion.

Q Are you saying that Russia had some kind of say over the timing sequence?

MR. MCCURRY: No, I'm just saying that's an issue that I think the Presidents will have to address.

Q Last week you characterized the meeting as perhaps more ordinary than extraordinary. Is that what you're going with still, now?

MR. MCCURRY: Even less extraordinary than might otherwise have indicated. I think they've got work to do and there will continue to be work to do. And the President, at the end of the meeting today, really made the point that I think is fundamental, that will certainly be a part of our presentation -- that the United States and Russia are in this relationship for the long haul. They have the capacity together to do extraordinary things as we think about the 21st century and think about Europe and the 21st century and an undivided democratic Europe in the 21st century, but there is a substantial amount of work that needs to be done to clear away the residue of the Cold War period. And that's a large part of the work that this summit will be about that and that type of work will likely continue for coming years.

Q You've got another day now before Helsinki. Is this the end of Primakov meetings here?

MR. MCCURRY: The Foreign Minister, my understanding is, was flying back and planned to meet almost immediately upon his return with President Yeltsin.

Q Mike, did you make any progress or was there any progress either on CFE or any discussion at all about the outlines of a START III?

MR. MCCURRY: The President mentioned the conventional forces in Europe discussions that have occurred in Geneva and elsewhere and the position advanced by the U.S. side, and talked about the importance of that and said that he hoped the Foreign Minister would relay that to President Yeltsin. And of course, a large part of these discussions over the last several days have been about the ratification of START II and the future of strategic arms reductions beyond that.

Q But did the President talk in broad outlines about what the United States would like to see or could imagine inside a START III agreement?

MR. MCCURRY: He didn't talk in detail about that, but he referenced some of the detailed discussions that have occurred

over the weekend about that.

Q Mike, is it the administration's position that the NATO summit and expansion will proceed regardless of whether there is any agreement on any of these other issues, such as -- demarcation or any of these other issues?

MR. MCCURRY: The North Atlantic Alliance is committed to a course of action on expansion that is well-known and that is proceeding and will proceed. But we do think it's fundamentally important to address some of these other issues and resolve some of these issues as well, and importantly, to address in a very specific way the relationship the United States would like to see evolve between NATO and the Russian Federation, which is a large part of this summit is about helping to guide those discussions, very important discussions, that are occurring between Secretary General Solana on behalf of the Alliance and the Russian Federation.

Q Is it necessary to have this charter worked out before NATO expands?

MR. MCCURRY: Necessary is kind of a fungible concept. I mean, it's important to move that forward, and it has to move forward consistent with the unanimous view of 16 members of the Alliance and the agreements and commitment of the Russian Federation. We obviously are trying to advance those discussions, and that will be a purpose in the talks between the two Presidents.

Q What is our position now on the 10-year moratorium for the second -- of countries to join NATO?

MR. MCCURRY: We haven't changed our view that this is not -- the members that will be considered for entry into NATO in Madrid will certainly not be the last of members that will be considered, that this will be an inclusive process that will continue. And we would address only in the context of agreement at 16 what we would say about timing and sequencing of additional membership.

Q Is it still the Russian position of 10 years?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to attempt to explain the nuances of their position.

Q Continuing a theme from the previous briefing, this is the first meeting that the President's had since he injured his knee. Did it make any difference? Was it a factor at all?

MR. MCCURRY: No. He's actually moving around a little more than I think the doctors wanted him to, because I saw Dr. Mariano frowning at one point as she paced around in the hallway.

Q Moving around in a chair?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. He did his briefing with his foreign policy advisors in one room and received Foreign Minister Primakov in the Yellow Room, and he's been dragging up and down the hall on the crutches, and the doctor probably would like him to take it a little easier.

Q Did he just sit -- was he in a wheelchair? I mean, could you --

MR. MCCURRY: Have we released the pictures? I think we are going to release the picture -- they sat in two chairs, side by side. The President had his leg slightly elevated on a little footstool that was available for him. The Vice President held the crutches for him. (Laughter.)

Q Did he pull them at any point? (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: And the President was able to lift his leg, cross his leg a couple of times. So he's starting to move it around a little bit.

Q First, can you rule out the other side used any knee-jerk position?

MR. MCCURRY: No, they were -- (laughter) --

Q On ABM, TMD, the Russians care a lot about --

MR. MCCURRY: And we do, too. Resolving those demarkation issues are critical to us.

Q Do you have any sense they're sort of willing to think more about the world as it is now as opposed to the world

as it may be 20 years from now?

MR. MCCURRY: I think there is a great deal of thinking. That's about all I can say at this point -- a great deal of thinking going into their position, and I think the Foreign Minister presented their thinking quite well. But it's clearly an issue that will require further exchanges even perhaps between the two Presidents.

Q So lots of work still to do on this issue, too?

MR. MCCURRY: Right. When I hinted last week that we were not anticipating major breakthroughs or resolving some of these outstanding efforts, I was not simply lowering expectations.

Q But is there any area where they reached agreement today? Primakov said out on the lawn that in some cases we have success. I'm not quite sure --

MR. MCCURRY: They've made very productive progress in their discussions. And remember, there are three areas here -- the are a basket of economic issues are those that I think are in some ways most compelling to the President when he thinks about the future of this relationship. How we engage economically with Russia and how Russia really begins to seize the economic opportunities that it has and how that begins to affect the equation is really in the long-term I think what the President thinks is far more important to the future of this relationship. So they have made some progress related to those issues; hopefully we'll have some more to say about that. But they at the same time have got a number of pieces of work left on the security and arms control portions of the dialogue, and we'll have to see where we end up.

...

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:31 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 08:08:22 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Get ready for the SUMMIT

NEW YORK TIMES, March 18, 1997

"Yeltsin's Envoy Describes Helsinki Summit as Crucial"

By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- After meeting President Clinton on Monday, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, emphasized Moscow's openness to a new relationship with NATO but maintained a tough public stance against the alliance's expansion.

Primakov met Clinton, who is recovering from leg surgery, for an hour in the family quarters of the White House. He emerged to stress the "extreme importance" of the summit meeting this week in Helsinki, Finland, for Russia's overall relations with the United States.

American officials hope for agreement on the principles of a charter between the two presidents, with orders to their subordinates to keep working on the contentious issues. One official called the document two-thirds complete, but with the most difficult military issues unresolved "and a lot of work left to do."

The Americans mean the charter to be a general statement of goals and principles; it is expected to include NATO's well-publicized pledges that the alliance has "no need, no intention and no plan" to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, and that, "in the current and foreseeable security environment," it would not station foreign NATO troops in new member states. But NATO is not prepared to promise "never," and will not accept Russia's insistence that it do so, American officials say.

In meetings this weekend with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Defense Secretary William Cohen, Primakov negotiated firmly on specific issues of NATO-Russian military relations and Russian-American disagreements over missile defenses and strategic arms, American officials said.

But officials also said that the Russians had moved significantly toward negotiating the charter. Russia is seeking the best deal it can get before deciding whether or not to take it. American officials said they hoped that decision would come before the NATO meeting in July to invite new members to join.

President Boris Yeltsin said in Moscow on Monday that it was time for American concessions. "Our diplomats have made enough concessions to the United States," he said. "We can't move any

further."

But the Russians have privately dropped some demands that NATO found unacceptable. They no longer request that NATO not expand, or that new memberships be political only. They no longer insist that the charter be "legally binding" and ratified by the legislatures of all NATO states. Still, American officials caution that Moscow could revive this demand.

NATO has also offered a joint proposal to alter the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty to mollify Russian military concerns. The alliance offered deep cuts in its ceilings for conventional weapons in Western Europe, while freezing weapons ceilings in Central Europe, which would include new member nations.

But NATO is refusing a Russian demand to promise not to modernize military installations and equipment in new member nations. NATO does not want to have "second-class" members. More important, in times of threat, it insists on being able to reinforce new members with alliance troops. NATO's military plans depend on the ability to send reinforcements when necessary, the officials say, and it will not promise Moscow otherwise.

There are two important issues the Russians have associated with NATO enlargement, and the Americans hope for progress in these areas at Helsinki.

The Russian Parliament has not ratified the second strategic arms reduction treaty, Start 2, which bans multiple-warhead land-based missiles. The Americans have offered -- and are negotiating -- binding guidelines on a Start 3 treaty to slash limits on both sides, to perhaps 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. That would allow the Russians to skip building up to Start 2 limits of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads. But Washington insists that Start 2 be ratified first.

The second problem is a new generation of anti-missile defenses. The Americans are working on "theater missile defenses" that do not violate existing treaties. Although the two sides largely agree on how to limit currently possible missiles, the Russians want to foreclose developments far into the future.

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RTna 03/18 0430 Arms control issues at the Helsinki summit

HELSINKI, March 18 (Reuter) - From nuclear missiles to the new threats of the post-Cold War era, arms control issues are a key feature of the summit between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday and Friday.

Some of them represent unfinished business from the time when the United States and the Soviet Union were trapped in

confrontation, others are linked to Western efforts to reassure Russia over NATO enlargement.

Following are details of the arms control issues for Helsinki:

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Although the two superpowers made major cuts in their arsenals immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the pace of nuclear arms reductions has now slowed and there is a deadlock over an important U.S.-Russian treaty.

The United States is pushing for a new round of deeper nuclear cuts with Russia, but first wants the Russian parliament (Duma) to ratify the long-delayed START-2 treaty which was signed in 1993.

Communist and nationalist opponents of that treaty, which would cut the number of long-range missile warheads on each side to about one-third of the level they were a decade ago, say it leaves Russia at a severe disadvantage.

Russia is particularly concerned by the U.S. superiority in submarine-launched nuclear missiles.

Clinton is expected to outline some ways of reassuring the Russians on nuclear issues, in an attempt to get START-2 ratified before moving on to further cuts in a new treaty.

START stands for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

#### CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

The two presidents will discuss changes to a 1990 treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe.

As part of its attempts to ease Russian concerns over NATO enlargement, the alliance recently proposed major reforms of the Cold War-era agreement to reflect Moscow's demands for changes. Russia says it is outnumbered and outgunned now that the Warsaw Pact has disappeared.

By adapting limits on how much military hardware can be held by countries that have signed the treaty, NATO hopes to convince Russia that fears of a military buildup on its borders following the alliance's enlargement are unfounded.

The changes have to be formally agreed at 30-nation talks in Vienna and it is not yet clear whether they go far enough to satisfy the Russians.

#### MISSILE DEFENCES, OTHER ISSUES

The United States is also hoping to lay to rest a long-running dispute with Russia over a 1972 treaty on missile defences. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty is another Cold

War agreement that now has different implications.

Washington wants to cooperate with Moscow on the potential missile threat from other countries labelled as "rogue nations," one of the new security problems.

But Russia is suspicious of what it sees as U.S. efforts to circumvent the terms of the treaty as Washington presses on with developing new anti-missile defences.

The two presidents may also discuss international efforts to ban anti-personnel land mines and to negotiate an end to the production of fissile material, the highly-enriched uranium or plutonium which is used to make nuclear weapons

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RTw 03/18 0645 Russia, U.K. boost military ties, differ on NATO

By Gareth Jones

MOSCOW, March 18 (Reuter) - The defence ministers of Russia and Britain agreed on Tuesday to expand bilateral military ties but remained divided on the thorny issue of NATO expansion.

Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov and his British counterpart Michael Portillo signed a memorandum paving the way for increased contacts between their ministries and between the armed forces of the former Cold War foes.

"The documents we have signed cover a very wide range of issues, including arms reduction, joint exercises, exchanges of delegations and consultations," Rodionov told reporters after the signing ceremony in the Russian Defence Ministry.

Portillo, on a two-day visit to Moscow, said the bilateral agreement was part of wider efforts to bring Russia into closer contact with the Western military establishment but acknowledged that NATO's expansion plans still overshadowed relations.

"Of course we know that Russia has very strongly felt views on this issue but there is also a very strong commitment in NATO to sign a new charter with Russia...as equal partners," he said.

Moscow is fiercely opposed to the Atlantic alliance's plans to admit former members of the Warsaw Pact, saying they pose a threat to its own security. NATO is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join at a summit in July.

Russia, unable to halt the expansion, wants a legally binding charter with NATO, including guarantees that allied troops and nuclear arms will not be deployed in new member states.

"We don't just want a declaration or promise, any charter must be binding," Rodionov said.

The alliance prefers a more flexible document and also

rejects Moscow's demand that former Soviet republics, particularly the Baltic states, should be permanently barred from NATO membership.

Rodionov and Portillo both said they hoped U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin would reach a compromise agreement at their summit in Helsinki this week.

NATO enlargement is expected to top the summit's agenda, which will also focus on arms control and economic issues.

Rodionov said he would not be going to Helsinki but the decision appeared unrelated to recent speculation that he might lose his job after Yeltsin criticised him for "whining" about the parlous state of Russia's cash-strapped armed forces.

The reserve general was unaffected by government changes announced on Monday and looks likely to stay in his post for now, despite his calls for more money to fund vital reforms in the armed forces.

Rodionov told reporters that he had discussed with Yeltsin on Monday the sacking of several generals for being involved in "matters incompatible with their official activities."

Portillo said that, under the terms of the joint memorandum, Britain was keen to help Russia in its military reforms, which will involve big cuts in the number of officers and soldiers.

Ironically it was Portillo, not Rodionov, who had to field questions about his political future following British Prime Minister John Major's decision on Monday to set a general election for May 1.

Portillo said he was confident that his Conservatives would win a fifth term in office despite the opposition Labour Party's big lead in the opinion polls.

"Everything is to play for...Labour's instincts are all wrong. It will put at risk the Conservatives' achievements over the past 18 years," Portillo said.

Asked about the top-selling Sun newspaper's decision to desert the Conservatives and back Labour in the election Portillo said: "The editor of the Sun has just one vote."

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RTw 03/18 0511 U.S.-Moscow summits since Cold War's end

HELSINKI, March 18 (Reuter) - This week's U.S.-Russian summit is the latest in a tradition of meetings which were once aimed at reducing superpower tensions during the Cold War but now focus on cooperation.

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev started the ball rolling in 1959.

Since then, U.S. and Soviet leaders have met in cities

around the world, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 turned them into U.S.-Russian summits.

The Helsinki summit -- the first in the Finnish capital since 1990 -- will be the 11th time Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton have met.

Following is a chronology of summits since the end of the Cold War:

December 1989

-- Less than a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meet on a ship off Malta, dubbed the "seasick summit" because of gales and high seas. They agree to accelerate negotiations on cutting long-range nuclear missiles and conventional forces in Europe.

May-June 1990

-- Gorbachev visits Washington for follow-up summit that is hailed as a proof of growing superpower rapport.

September 1990

-- Bush hastily arranges one-day meeting in Helsinki, primarily to show U.S.-Soviet unity in midst of Gulf crisis after Iraq invades Kuwait. Now seen as a brief "golden age" of superpower cooperation which would not last.

November 1990

-- Bush and Gorbachev meet at European security conference summit in Paris, hold further talks on Gulf.

July 1991

-- Bush and Gorbachev meet after Group of Seven economic summit in London, announce deal on strategic arms reduction treaty (START) to cut their long-range nuclear missile arsenals.

February 1992

-- Bush and Russian President Yeltsin hold first meeting since dissolution of Soviet Union in December 1991. Focus on arms control and Western aid for Russia during talks at Camp David, which result in declaration that two countries no longer "regard each other as potential adversaries."

June 1992

-- At formal summit in Washington, Bush, Yeltsin agree in principle to slash strategic weapons arsenals by about two-thirds by 2003, to be formalised later as START-2 pact. Yeltsin appeals for aid to bolster Russian economic reforms.

January 1993

-- Yeltsin, Bush sign START-2 Pact in Kremlin during 24-hour Bush visit to Moscow on his final foreign trip before leaving office. Bush says pact offers "a future free from fear"; Yeltsin

calls it "a treaty of hope."

April 1993

-- Yeltsin and the newly elected Bill Clinton hold introductory summit in Vancouver, Canada, to discuss emergency aid for Yeltsin's embattled economic and democratic reforms. Clinton announces immediate U.S. aid package worth \$1.6 billion and plans to press for more, long-term Western multilateral aid.

July 1993

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold talks in connection with summit of seven industrial nations in Tokyo, with continued Russian bid for economic assistance the main issue. G-7 endorses \$3 billion package to promote privatisation of economies in former Soviet Union.

January 1994

-- Clinton visits Moscow on first European tour to show support for Yeltsin and reformers, shaken by strong showing of ultranationalists and Communists in December parliamentary elections. Tells Yeltsin United States, Russia must work together on global security.

July 1994

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold bilateral meeting during annual G-7 summit in Naples, Italy. Yeltsin makes spirited pitch for United States and allies to dismantle remaining Cold War trade barriers to do more business with Moscow.

September 1994

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold their third formal summit, signing a "partnership for economic progress" and a joint statement pledging to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also agree to accelerate the timetable for scrapping nuclear warheads covered by arms treaties.

May 1995

-- The two meet in Moscow after celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the World War Two victory over Nazi Germany. Differences over Russia's planned sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, but Russia agrees to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme of cooperation.

June 1995

-- The leaders meet in Halifax, Canada, again on the sidelines of a G7 summit. Yeltsin asks for Russian membership of exclusive rich nations' club.

October 1995

-- After good-humoured summit at Hyde Park, north of New York, Clinton and Yeltsin announce agreement to cooperate in policing Bosnian peace accord.

March 1996

-- They meet in the Egyptian resort of Sharm El-Sheikh at an international conference to combat terrorism, following killings that threaten to disrupt Middle East peace process.

April 1996

-- At an eight-nation summit on nuclear safety in Moscow, Clinton and Yeltsin both have their eyes on their respective re-election campaigns. Yeltsin wins in July, very much against the odds. Clinton wins easy victory in November.

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Subject: CD update

To DisInt receivers

DisInt 1997 report 2.2: Geneva Update

17 March, 1997

AGENDA BUT NO WORK AT CD

Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed on February 13 to adopt an eight point agenda, but is still deadlocked on its work programme. It has therefore been impossible to convene any ad hoc committees or appoint special coordinators on anything. Proposals have been made to negotiate on three issues: a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban); anti-personnel landmines (AP mines); and nuclear disarmament. These were therefore the focus of formal and informal consultations and discussions, with the President, in groups and in plenary. A few delegations also called for the CD to undertake negotiations (or at least further discussions) on negative security assurances (NSA), prevention

of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and regional conventional disarmament.

The European countries are deeply divided over the issues of landmines and nuclear disarmament. On AP mines, France and Britain are backing a joint initiative for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on exports and transfers. However, Belgium, Austria and Ireland are among the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa fast-track, aiming for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all AP mines by the end of this year. In an attempt to paper over the cracks, diplomats in Brussels cobbled together a draft mandate that put a phased approach in the context of the objective of a full ban. This has been discussed, but not yet agreed, by the western group members. The formal position of most western group members is that they would not oppose negotiations in the CD providing that they complemented and reinforced the Ottawa Process. Similarly, Russia, China and several non-aligned and eastern European states are saying little, although they want to retain the option to use AP mines as long as possible. This has left Mexico carrying the burden of out-front opposition to putting landmines negotiations into the CD, although its formal position is that it remains to be convinced that the CD is the appropriate forum. It now looks unlikely that the CD will have taken a decision on this issue before the next meeting of the Ottawa Process, in Brussels, June 24-27. It is hoped that the prospects for success of the fast track approach will be much clearer by then, which could simplify the options before the CD.

The chances for achieving a fissile materials ban in the CD look less and less promising. Despite repeated calls from many countries for negotiations to commence immediately, and despite the view reiterated by both western and non-aligned delegations that the Shannon mandate is broad enough to enable the issue of stocks to be addressed within the context of negotiations, incentive is lacking. The reasons include linkage with a timetable for nuclear disarmament and a growing lack of enthusiasm from some of the nuclear weapon states, who are no longer confident that multilateral negotiations will deliver adherence by the threshold states, and from some of the non-aligned, who consider that the 'value added' to the moratoria is not sufficient to warrant the time and resources of multilateral negotiations unless the fissban has a stronger disarmament component, especially with respect to existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority for many states. Since the western nuclear powers, Britain, France and the United States, continue to oppose an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the deadlock on this conditions the overall paralysis in the CD. With Jesse Helms sitting on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States, it seems unlikely that the Clinton Administration would

risk any positive moves on any other area of arms control that the hard-line Republicans might portray as 'weakness' on defence until that important treaty is through. It is also unlikely that Britain would show flexibility before its general election, called for May 1. While few now anticipate any dramatic change of policy on nuclear matters if the Labour Party wins, a more constructive attitude towards negotiations might well be forthcoming, which could result in withdrawal of Britain's adamant opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee.

Since so little is happening in the CD, Geneva's disarmament delegations have devoted the majority of their time over the past two months to other issues, including strengthening the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), where progress is slow and painstaking, and getting agreement on the CTBT Organisation.

#### Agenda Agreed

The CD requires both an agenda and a programme of work. The generalised agenda, based on the 10 point decalogue adopted at the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, is a form of ritual. Therefore, adoption of the following agenda by the 755th CD plenary, chaired by Ambassador Joun Yung Sun of the Republic of Korea, did not get the CD working, but only took the small step of resolving a theological (and, some would say, diversionary) procedural debate.

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
7. Transparency in armaments
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In an oblique reference regarding the debate over whether a ban on landmines should be negotiated at the CD, the President read into the record the following understanding: 'If there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues they could be dealt with within this agenda.'

As acknowledged by the President, the 1997 agenda is the same as the 1996 agenda minus the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In joining consensus, Germany stated a formal reservation over repeating an annual

formula. Germany would have preferred the agenda to have explicitly included the concrete issues under discussion, such as the fissban and landmines, rather than vague and generalised categories.

No agreement on work

With the agenda agreed, the substantive and more difficult question remains: what issues should the CD negotiate or prepare to negotiate? The programme of work has to be much more specific, bearing only a loose relationship with the agenda, as evidenced by the President's on-the-record understanding.

Proposals have been made for ad hoc committees on three issues:

- \* fissile ban convention
- \* nuclear disarmament
- \* anti-personnel landmines

Attempts by Sun to focus informal discussions on these three topics caused a furious exchange in the 754th plenary on February 6. The Mexican Ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, said categorically that 'Mines have no role to play here' and that his delegation would not participate in discussions aimed at putting landmines into the CD's programme of work. In Mexico's view, priority should be accorded first to nuclear disarmament, then to negative security assurances (NSA), and thirdly to regional conventional disarmament. Ambassador Mounir Zahran said that Egypt would not oppose any new item but had reservations over separating the fissban item from nuclear disarmament: 'the 'fissban' or 'cut-off'...could be discussed as a sub-item of nuclear disarmament.' He would also consider security assurances, the prevention of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race as sub-items of nuclear disarmament. India's Ambassador Arundhati Ghose underlined the 'paramount importance' of the issue of nuclear disarmament.

For the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar responded to de Icaza's objections to discussing landmines, by pointing out that 'there is no consensus in this Conference on what is called "nuclear disarmament"'. He said that the US was opposed 'to the concept of the Conference on Disarmament doing "nuclear disarmament"'. China did not want the discussions to be limited to only three topics, arguing that the CD should establish ad hoc committees on NSA as well as on outer space. France, the Netherlands and Britain commended the President on his initiative and put in a plea for trying to 'get this show on the road'. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram suggested getting the agenda agreed first, followed by discussions on negotiating mechanisms and work programme. However, he warned against preordaining the items for consultation.

The debate which spilled into the February 6 plenary was just the tip of an iceberg of bilateral and group consultations with successive presidents,

first Sun, and then Pavel Greco of Romania. Handing on his presidency to Russia, Greco told the 760th plenary on March 13 that the consultations had been useful. He emphasised that the purpose of addressing the three issues separately was for each to be approached on its own merits, without the 'destructive linkage' that bedevilled the Conference. However, though he thanked everyone for their cooperation, he had to admit defeat.

Notwithstanding the objections to the Presidential identification of the three items for priority consideration, and alternative suggestions for work put forward by China, Mexico and others, the fissban, nuclear disarmament and landmines are in fact the three areas under serious consideration. It therefore makes sense to consider each of these in turn.

### Fissban

In March 1995 the 38-member CD accepted a report from the Canadian Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon, with a mandate to negotiate a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. The CD has since been unable to convene a committee to do this. During discussions over a mandate in 1994 and 1995, the major difficulty was over stockpiles, the product of past production. The five nuclear weapon states, India and Israel (though not yet a CD member) were prepared only to negotiate a cut-off of future production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria were most prominent among the countries which argued for past production also to be taken into account, arguing that a cut-off would leave stockpiles untouched, thereby merely reinforcing the inequalities of the nuclear status quo. However, since 1995, the major point of contention is the relationship between the fissban and nuclear disarmament.

When the G21 group of non-aligned states were working on their programme of action for nuclear disarmament in August 1996, India insisted that four measures identified for immediate negotiations should be addressed concurrently. These were:

- a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
- a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The 'concurrent' addition was unsuccessfully opposed by some G-21 delegations. South Africa's Ambassador Selebi called it a recipe 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although a number of G-21 delegations privately agreed, only South Africa and Chile refused to co-sponsor the programme,

which now forms the basis for G-21 discussions over a mandate for the proposed nuclear disarmament committee. The fact that the fissban came fourth in the list was also not lost on the rest of the CD, although the G-21 claimed the order was unimportant since the measures were to be addressed concurrently.

Since then, alliances have shifted slightly, but no real progress has been made. During 1997, numerous western and European countries called on the CD to convene the committee immediately and get on with fissban negotiations. Many referred to the priority accorded the fissban in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by NPT parties in May 1995. Spain's Ambassador Amador Martinez Morcillo called it the 'next, complementary step'. New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Don McKinnon, said that a fissban would 'constitute a prerequisite step...towards a nuclear weapon free world'. He emphasised that a fissban should cap the fissile materials available not only to the declared nuclear weapon states but also to those with unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plants, and would 'contribute to ensuring the conditions under which the process of nuclear disarmament can broaden, constrain the opportunities for vertical proliferation and help prevent any future resumption of the nuclear arms race.'

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Eugeniusz Wyzner, echoed this view, saying that a fissban represented 'a significant supplement to the NPT and CTBT'. Sweden's Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, agreed, saying the fissban treaty was 'of the highest significance both for continued nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation'. Hungary's Ambassador Peter Naray said that the fissban was 'ripe for serious negotiations' and that the mandate in the March 1995 Shannon report 'accommodates the different shades of opinion' with respect to existing stocks. Slovakia's Ambassador Maria Krasnohorska concurred: 'Special Coordinator Ambassador Shannon's mandate can serve as the basis of the ad hoc committee's work [and] is broad enough to meet all legitimate concerns.' Switzerland also encouraged the CD to get on with it, while Ireland's Ambassador Anne Anderson called for an immediate start to fissban negotiations 'on the basis of the Shannon mandate'. Austria's Ambassador Harald Kreid shared the view of non-aligned nations that nuclear disarmament was of utmost importance, but urged the CD to start work on a fissban, for 'if we are not able to solve the daunting issue of nuclear disarmament in one great stroke now, let us attend to what is feasible'. Kreid refused to dodge the sensitive issue of stocks, voicing the concerns of many western delegations (as well as the non-aligned) when he commented that negotiations 'would inevitably have to touch upon the question of stockpiles, even if they would remain outside of the treaty, because it is hard to see how [a]

cut-off could be verified without transparency with regard to existing stockpiles.' Clearly referring to South Asia and the Middle East, Kreid added that improvising transparency and confidence could be important regionally.

Notwithstanding these exhortations, there is a growing view that (with the possible exception of the United States), the nuclear weapon states are less than enthusiastic, while the non-aligned want much more. Prior to the consensus UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L in 1993, from which the CD mandate derived, the US and Russia, awash with plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads, brokered agreement among the P-5 to agree multilateral negotiations on a basic cut-off. This was accompanied by declared moratoria on production from Britain, France, Russia and the United States, and a widespread (but unconfirmed) belief that China has also now halted its fissile materials production programme. The moratoria, while intended to encourage negotiations, have paradoxically led to diminished commitment to make the halt legally binding. For the smaller nuclear weapon states, a voluntary moratorium earns them brownie points while leaving open an escape hatch if they should want to restart production in the future. They have made it clear that they are only interested in a multilateral cut-off that brings the threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan, on board but does not touch stockpiles. For many non-nuclear-weapon countries, the moratoria remove the pressure for speedy action. This makes them reconsider the cost of negotiating a treaty in the CD, which could take considerable time and resources, while also encouraging them to hold out for a more substantial measure, including stockpiles.

Most non-aligned statements incorporated their remarks on a fissban or cut-off in their positions on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Syria made no specific mention of a fissban in its intervention on February 6, although it endorsed the G-28 programme of action. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer suggested establishing a nuclear disarmament committee 'under which separate working groups would take up issues such as the fissile materials convention and nuclear disarmament measures.' Furthermore, he stated that if the Shannon mandate were to be the basis for fissban negotiations, 'it is our expectation that the question of stocks will be dealt with within committee discussions on the scope of the future treaty.' He gave two reasons for this: i) adequate verification of a ban on production would require knowledge and accountability with regard to fissile materials already in existence; and  
ii) the moratoria.

He stated that 'if the future treaty is to have real impact beyond non-proliferation, and we hope it will, it would therefore also have to go beyond the narrow scope that some currently envisage for it.' Reiterating one of its concerns regarding the CTBT implementing organisation, Brazil

also required that the costs of verification for a fissban should not 'unduly burden' countries which already accept safeguards, such as members of the NPT or regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

De Icaza argued that the 'implicit mandate' in Shannon's report 'should allow that, within the ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes as well as the problem of past production and management of existing stocks be examined, so as to make sure that any production of nuclear weapons will cease.' Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi said that Indonesia considered the fissban would 'significantly contribute' to non-proliferation, but emphasised that it should 'encompass not only the future production but also the past production', in order to fulfil a disarmament commitment as well. If stockpiles were brushed aside, the cut-off would be 'a mere non-proliferation measure' with 'no added value to date ... [and] therefore unappealing'. However, Indonesia would be ready to 'revisit the question' of a fissban, with the understanding that the Shannon mandate 'acknowledged that this issue [stocks] to which many delegations attach great importance cannot be isolated...'

## Landmines

There has been considerable manoeuvring on the question of negotiating a ban on landmines in the CD since US President Clinton called for this on January 17. Both the UK and France gave strong and early backing, with Britain putting forward a draft mandate for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on the export, import or transfer of all AP mines. There is little public expression of outright opposition to negotiating on landmines in the CD, but considerable reluctance, coming from two corners: those who want a 'fast track' total ban, such as Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and others who would prefer to back the Ottawa process, initiated by Canada in October 1996; and those who want to hold open the option of producing and using landmines, such as Russia, China, Cuba, Syria, North and South Korea. These countries would prefer negotiations to remain within the purview of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The second meeting under the Ottawa Process took place in Vienna from February 12-14. Kreid reported that 111 states participated and that proposals for revising Austria's tentative draft treaty were now being considered. The next meeting will be held in Brussels on June 24-27. Mixed reports of progress are emerging from the Vienna meeting. It is pointed out that of the 111 participants, around 50 are strong supporters of a total ban on AP mines, the others participating as critics, or with the hope of influencing or slowing down the process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ottawa Process intends to move ahead. Since few now expect the CD to have

come to agreement on its agenda before June, the tough decision point is likely to come after the Brussels meeting, when the prospects and products of the Ottawa Process have become clearer. Pointing out that the landmines, which he called 'hidden killers' take a toll of 25,000 victims a year, Kreid said that 'the CD cannot simply ponder the matter in its customary slow motion fashion'. Nor would the CD process guarantee participation by all the relevant countries, Kreid warned that 'we are not willing to submit to a strategy of long-term persuasion complete with trade-offs and linkages and subject to an unpredictable stop and go process.' In his view, establishing a universal norm by means of a lawmaking treaty would bring adherents 'in due course'.

Canada spoke on February 6, the week following Britain's proposal for a CD mandate on landmines. Ambassador Mark Moher reiterated that 'use is the problem' and said that Canada had set itself 'a straightforward objective: a legally binding agreement in 1997 to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and, particularly, the use of AP mines.' To this end, the Ottawa Process would 'proceed without interruption until a successful conclusion later this year.' He cast doubt on the 'lengthy step by step approach' but said that Canada would 'not object' if members of the CD wanted to negotiate a ban on exports. However, he said that Canada had 'major difficulty' with the concept underlying the UK proposal. Moher 'acknowledged' those who wanted the CD to deal with the issue, but rejected the view that the Conference was the 'only acceptable mechanism' for this. If the CD wanted to negotiate on landmines, Canada would 'not oppose', but he underlined that Canada set one criterion: that any CD approach 'be complementary to and mutually reinforcing of, the Ottawa Process'. If not, he warned that Canada would oppose.

Ireland spoke in a similar vein two weeks later, underlining that any negotiations on landmines in the CD 'must reinforce and complement other efforts, such as the Ottawa Process, which have already begun, which are working well, and which have attracted a high level of international support'. After analysing the benefits and drawbacks of the CD and Ottawa approaches, Anderson argued that if the CD took on the issue it would have to 'build on what has already been achieved in terms of international consensus on the way forward'; that negotiations must be comprehensive from the outset and 'must cover the central question of use'; and that the CD must move rapidly. 'If the Conference spends months talking around a mandate, further months discussing the modalities of the negotiations and yet more time on the scope of the convention, then the Conference will not respond to the humanitarian urgency implicit in the words "as soon as possible"'.

While saying that he did not reject the CD out of hand, Ambassador Erwin

Hofer made clear that Switzerland prefers the Ottawa process to the CD, since the 'time factor is decisive'. Hofer emphasised that the planned rules should cover 'first, a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, possession, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines, and secondly, an obligation to destroy existing stockpiles.'

Of the non-aligned who made plenary statements, only Mexico expressed a strong opinion on the issue of landmines. De Icaza made two telling arguments against the CD taking on landmines negotiations: i) that it would divert attention from what should be the CD's 'highest priority' -- nuclear disarmament; and ii) that the CD will have the disadvantage of slowness without being able to guarantee universality or the participation of key states. Commenting memorably that 'swiftness is not this Conference's main virtue', de Icaza raised doubts that the CD was 'capable of pursuing and bringing to conclusion more than one negotiation at a time'. In that case, he continued, 'it is necessary not to waste our limited capabilities by undertaking tasks which are not of the highest priority or which would duplicate efforts undertaken in other multilateral fora.' Indonesia seemed largely to share this perspective. Although saying he would not stand in the way if the CD reached agreement on landmines, Tarmidzi reiterated that 'this Conference should not be side-tracked from negotiating the highest priority item in our agenda, namely nuclear disarmament.'

Intending to bolster his argument that the CD was the inappropriate forum, de Icaza argued that the principles for a landmines ban were based on humanitarian and not disarmament considerations. Others, arguing from the opposite side (and advocating the CCW as the appropriate mechanism to deal with AP mines) have made the same distinction. However, as pointed out by Kreid, 'banning a defensive weapon carries with it a strong disarmament dimension as well.' The Ottawa Process recognises this. Although with the objective of outlawing the use of anti-personnel mines, Ottawa is aiming for a treaty which will give teeth to such an objective by banning the production, stockpiling, export and transfer as well. Recognising the disarmament dimension does not necessarily mean that the CD is the only forum for negotiations. As Kreid pointed out, there are precedents in disarmament law, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, where a small number of states signed the original treaty, opening it for accession by others. By 1974 this treaty was a sufficient international norm that the prospect of a case taken in the ICJ by South Pacific countries over atmospheric testing was decisive in making France halt its atmospheric testing programme, despite having never acceded to the PTBT itself.

Mexico's concern that the US-UK-French initiative to prioritise landmines on the CD's negotiating agenda was in part designed to divert attention from demands for the CD to negotiate further nuclear disarmament measures is

shared by many non-aligned delegations. However, several, including Cuba, DPRK, Pakistan and Syria, are less enthusiastic than Mexico for the fast track Ottawa Process as an alternative. Syria referred to the 'pain' it felt at the human suffering caused by AP mines 'in some parts of the world where those mines have been misused'. Its representative, Iyad Orfi, went on to argue that for some states, mines 'are still a legitimate weapon to defend their security and their borders in the face of more lethal weapons.'

While the attitude of several non-aligned states seems to be unenthusiastic either way, Brazil stated its backing for the CD as 'the proper forum for the attainment of a universal and effective ban.' Lafer said that the proposed phased approach could 'yield early results', but said that Brazil would also continue to participate in the Ottawa Process, which could play 'an important role in building political momentum for attaining the goal of a universal ban.'

The western and European states are deeply divided. Although France and Britain have taken the lead in pushing for the CD as the venue for negotiating on landmines, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Ireland have been determined to press ahead with the fast track Ottawa approach. Other western countries are positioned along a continuum between these two strongly held positions, with some leaning closer to Ottawa and others towards the CD. New Zealand's Foreign Minister said that it supported the Ottawa process but could also accept a 'potential role' for the CD, providing it proceeded in parallel with Ottawa and agreed a 'strong mandate supportive of an early and comprehensive outcome.' Sweden's Foreign Minister said that 'the only effective solution to the landmine crisis is a total ban on APLs. No more, no less.' However, she went on to say that Sweden participated in the Ottawa Process and was also ready to do so in the CD. Swedish ratification of the amended Protocol II of the CCW was foreseen for June.

Poland endorsed the Anglo-French proposal for a phased approach within the context of the CD, saying only that it 'noted with interest' the Canadian initiative to conclude a ban by the end of 1997. However, Poland considered that the Ottawa Process and the CD could complement each other and have a 'potentially synergistic effect'. Hungary was a stronger supporter and participant in the Ottawa Process, but Naray said that the 'CD's role in the concert of efforts aimed at a total ban should be considered from the point of view of the universality and efficiency of the future convention.' Hungary could be flexible towards the Anglo-French approach, but 'would have serious difficulties with a mandate not stipulating a total ban on use and production as the ultimate goal of the negotiating process in the CD.'

Nuclear Disarmament

Both Indonesia and Mexico identified nuclear disarmament as the 'highest priority' for the CD, underlined by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. They both wanted the CD to establish a nuclear disarmament committee, but stopped short of insisting that it be convened with a negotiating mandate from the beginning. Within the G-21 there are attempts to get agreement on a negotiating mandate, but those who opposed the 'concurrent' linkage in the programme of action put forward by 28 of the 30 members of the G-21 in August 1996 are also resisting any mandate which commits the CD to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which they consider impractical at present. They are joined by others, including Egypt and Morocco, who are concerned that if the G-21 demands a negotiating mandate they could frighten away the moderates in the nuclear weapon states.

Three countries continue to oppose a nuclear disarmament committee: Britain, France and the United States. But the positions are not solid. There is an internal debate in all three capitals, with a growing number of pragmatists willing to accept such a committee, under certain conditions (which do not include a mandate to negotiate a treaty or timetable at this point). However, it is clear that unless and until the Clinton Administration can get ratification of the CWC past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Jesse Helms, it is not going to risk showing flexibility on nuclear disarmament, while there is no prospect of Britain moving until after the elections in May, if then.

In their statements, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and also Sweden referred to important new developments, such as the Canberra Commission, the ICJ advisory opinion and the December 5 statement by 61 retired Generals and Admirals calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Indonesia deeply regretted 'the recalcitrant attitude adopted by some of the nuclear weapon states towards the need to immediately negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.' Tarmidzi criticised them for narrowly interpreting their multilateral legal commitments, particularly article VI of the NPT, by insisting that nuclear disarmament is a 'bilateral exercise and therefore the sole domain of the nuclear weapon states.' He said that article VI and the NPT required prompt action and warned the nuclear weapon states that their prevarication 'may lead to the unravelling' of the NPT.

Brazil referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons as 'the paramount task' for the CD, proposing that a fissban and other measures could be negotiated under the overall umbrella of a nuclear disarmament committee. Lafer argued that making further progress on nuclear disarmament 'contingent on the prior attainment' of the fissban and even entry into force of the CTBT was just linkage of another sort. Syria addressed the nuclear disarmament by focusing on Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Among the western group, several delegations, including Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Japan made a strong plea for a more constructive attitude towards nuclear disarmament, while warning against linkage and the 'blueprint approach', as Anderson called it. Ireland's ambassador went on to ask why some delegations need reassurance about the direction of incremental nuclear disarmament. Like Austria and Sweden, she enumerated progress in the NPT, CTBT, START I and II (if ratified by Russia), expansion of nuclear weapon free zones adherence, and so on. But she also called on the P-5 to 'set out their perspective, and imbue the words 'systematic and progressive' with meaning...Such a perspective need not be time-bound, but ... a broad elaboration of the next steps they themselves propose to take.' Sweden's Foreign Minister also called for the concept of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament to be given a 'concrete content'. She said that 'the steps must be identified and fully translated into action.' New Zealand's Foreign Minister declared that though the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament had begun in a bilateral framework, 'we are also convinced that sustainable progress is not a matter which can be left solely to the nuclear-weapon states...'

McKinnon went further, calling for a nuclear disarmament committee 'with an overarching mandate...[which] could begin immediately with the cut-off negotiations, while also considering longer term issues.' In effect, it would have 'an active negotiating track and a preparatory track.' This would not be a talk shop, he argued, but one 'which prepared the ground carefully and effectively for eventual negotiations.'

Others sought ways to bridge the gap between those who wanted a committee on nuclear disarmament and those who wanted nothing. Ambassador Hisami Kurokuchi of Japan proposed that a special coordinator be appointed 'to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.' This might have proved acceptable last year, but with many members of the G-21 focusing now on a negotiating mandate, a special coordinator could be perceived as a defeat rather than a compromise.

## Conclusion

This is a dismal time for the CD. More than one delegate has likened it to post-natal depression (after the difficult birth of the CTBT). Some hold out hopes that a constructive NPT PrepCom in April could help shift the logjam. Others look forward to a more constructive government in Westminster or a less timid approach in Washington after Senate ratification of the CWC and Russian ratification of START II. Certainly not even the optimists expect any decisions on the CD's programme of work before the end

of June. Pointing to the strong reservations (read objections) by significant groups of states on each of the three major issues under discussion, the pessimists doubt that there is sufficient incentive for any movement on anything this year.

#### 1997 CD Session

The CD's 1997 session runs from January 20 to March 27; from May 12 to June 27; and from July 28 to September 10.

ends

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Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 17:42:34 GMT

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Subject: CD update

To DisInt receivers

DisInt 1997 report 2.2: Geneva Update

17 March, 1997

#### AGENDA BUT NO WORK AT CD

##### Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed on February 13 to adopt an eight point agenda, but is still deadlocked on its work programme. It has therefore been impossible to convene any ad hoc committees or appoint special coordinators on anything. Proposals have been made to negotiate on three issues: a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban); anti-personnel landmines (AP mines); and nuclear disarmament. These were therefore the focus of formal and informal consultations and discussions, with the President, in groups and in plenary. A few delegations also called for the CD to undertake negotiations (or at least further discussions) on negative security assurances (NSA), prevention

of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and regional conventional disarmament.

The European countries are deeply divided over the issues of landmines and nuclear disarmament. On AP mines, France and Britain are backing a joint initiative for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on exports and transfers. However, Belgium, Austria and Ireland are among the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa fast-track, aiming for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all AP mines by the end of this year. In an attempt to paper over the cracks, diplomats in Brussels cobbled together a draft mandate that put a phased approach in the context of the objective of a full ban. This has been discussed, but not yet agreed, by the western group members. The formal position of most western group members is that they would not oppose negotiations in the CD providing that they complemented and reinforced the Ottawa Process. Similarly, Russia, China and several non-aligned and eastern European states are saying little, although they want to retain the option to use AP mines as long as possible. This has left Mexico carrying the burden of out-front opposition to putting landmines negotiations into the CD, although its formal position is that it remains to be convinced that the CD is the appropriate forum. It now looks unlikely that the CD will have taken a decision on this issue before the next meeting of the Ottawa Process, in Brussels, June 24-27. It is hoped that the prospects for success of the fast track approach will be much clearer by then, which could simplify the options before the CD.

The chances for achieving a fissile materials ban in the CD look less and less promising. Despite repeated calls from many countries for negotiations to commence immediately, and despite the view reiterated by both western and non-aligned delegations that the Shannon mandate is broad enough to enable the issue of stocks to be addressed within the context of negotiations, incentive is lacking. The reasons include linkage with a timetable for nuclear disarmament and a growing lack of enthusiasm from some of the nuclear weapon states, who are no longer confident that multilateral negotiations will deliver adherence by the threshold states, and from some of the non-aligned, who consider that the 'value added' to the moratoria is not sufficient to warrant the time and resources of multilateral negotiations unless the fissban has a stronger disarmament component, especially with respect to existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority for many states. Since the western nuclear powers, Britain, France and the United States, continue to oppose an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the deadlock on this conditions the overall paralysis in the CD. With Jesse Helms sitting on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States, it seems unlikely that the Clinton Administration would

risk any positive moves on any other area of arms control that the hard-line Republicans might portray as 'weakness' on defence until that important treaty is through. It is also unlikely that Britain would show flexibility before its general election, called for May 1. While few now anticipate any dramatic change of policy on nuclear matters if the Labour Party wins, a more constructive attitude towards negotiations might well be forthcoming, which could result in withdrawal of Britain's adamant opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee.

Since so little is happening in the CD, Geneva's disarmament delegations have devoted the majority of their time over the past two months to other issues, including strengthening the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), where progress is slow and painstaking, and getting agreement on the CTBT Organisation.

#### Agenda Agreed

The CD requires both an agenda and a programme of work. The generalised agenda, based on the 10 point decalogue adopted at the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, is a form of ritual. Therefore, adoption of the following agenda by the 755th CD plenary, chaired by Ambassador Joun Yung Sun of the Republic of Korea, did not get the CD working, but only took the small step of resolving a theological (and, some would say, diversionary) procedural debate.

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
7. Transparency in armaments
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In an oblique reference regarding the debate over whether a ban on landmines should be negotiated at the CD, the President read into the record the following understanding: 'If there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues they could be dealt with within this agenda.'

As acknowledged by the President, the 1997 agenda is the same as the 1996 agenda minus the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In joining consensus, Germany stated a formal reservation over repeating an annual

formula. Germany would have preferred the agenda to have explicitly included the concrete issues under discussion, such as the fissban and landmines, rather than vague and generalised categories.

No agreement on work

With the agenda agreed, the substantive and more difficult question remains: what issues should the CD negotiate or prepare to negotiate? The programme of work has to be much more specific, bearing only a loose relationship with the agenda, as evidenced by the President's on-the-record understanding.

Proposals have been made for ad hoc committees on three issues:

- \* fissile ban convention
- \* nuclear disarmament
- \* anti-personnel landmines

Attempts by Sun to focus informal discussions on these three topics caused a furious exchange in the 754th plenary on February 6. The Mexican Ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, said categorically that 'Mines have no role to play here' and that his delegation would not participate in discussions aimed at putting landmines into the CD's programme of work. In Mexico's view, priority should be accorded first to nuclear disarmament, then to negative security assurances (NSA), and thirdly to regional conventional disarmament. Ambassador Mounir Zahran said that Egypt would not oppose any new item but had reservations over separating the fissban item from nuclear disarmament: 'the 'fissban' or 'cut-off'...could be discussed as a sub-item of nuclear disarmament.' He would also consider security assurances, the prevention of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race as sub-items of nuclear disarmament. India's Ambassador Arundhati Ghose underlined the 'paramount importance' of the issue of nuclear disarmament.

For the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar responded to de Icaza's objections to discussing landmines, by pointing out that 'there is no consensus in this Conference on what is called "nuclear disarmament"'. He said that the US was opposed 'to the concept of the Conference on Disarmament doing "nuclear disarmament"'. China did not want the discussions to be limited to only three topics, arguing that the CD should establish ad hoc committees on NSA as well as on outer space. France, the Netherlands and Britain commended the President on his initiative and put in a plea for trying to 'get this show on the road'. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram suggested getting the agenda agreed first, followed by discussions on negotiating mechanisms and work programme. However, he warned against preordaining the items for consultation.

The debate which spilled into the February 6 plenary was just the tip of an iceberg of bilateral and group consultations with successive presidents,

first Sun, and then Pavel Greco of Romania. Handing on his presidency to Russia, Greco told the 760th plenary on March 13 that the consultations had been useful. He emphasised that the purpose of addressing the three issues separately was for each to be approached on its own merits, without the 'destructive linkage' that bedevilled the Conference. However, though he thanked everyone for their cooperation, he had to admit defeat.

Notwithstanding the objections to the Presidential identification of the three items for priority consideration, and alternative suggestions for work put forward by China, Mexico and others, the fissban, nuclear disarmament and landmines are in fact the three areas under serious consideration. It therefore makes sense to consider each of these in turn.

### Fissban

In March 1995 the 38-member CD accepted a report from the Canadian Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon, with a mandate to negotiate a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. The CD has since been unable to convene a committee to do this. During discussions over a mandate in 1994 and 1995, the major difficulty was over stockpiles, the product of past production. The five nuclear weapon states, India and Israel (though not yet a CD member) were prepared only to negotiate a cut-off of future production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria were most prominent among the countries which argued for past production also to be taken into account, arguing that a cut-off would leave stockpiles untouched, thereby merely reinforcing the inequalities of the nuclear status quo. However, since 1995, the major point of contention is the relationship between the fissban and nuclear disarmament.

When the G21 group of non-aligned states were working on their programme of action for nuclear disarmament in August 1996, India insisted that four measures identified for immediate negotiations should be addressed concurrently. These were:

- a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
- a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The 'concurrent' addition was unsuccessfully opposed by some G-21 delegations. South Africa's Ambassador Selebi called it a recipe 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although a number of G-21 delegations privately agreed, only South Africa and Chile refused to co-sponsor the programme,

which now forms the basis for G-21 discussions over a mandate for the proposed nuclear disarmament committee. The fact that the fissban came fourth in the list was also not lost on the rest of the CD, although the G-21 claimed the order was unimportant since the measures were to be addressed concurrently.

Since then, alliances have shifted slightly, but no real progress has been made. During 1997, numerous western and European countries called on the CD to convene the committee immediately and get on with fissban negotiations. Many referred to the priority accorded the fissban in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by NPT parties in May 1995. Spain's Ambassador Amador Martinez Morcillo called it the 'next, complementary step'. New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Don McKinnon, said that a fissban would 'constitute a prerequisite step...towards a nuclear weapon free world'. He emphasised that a fissban should cap the fissile materials available not only to the declared nuclear weapon states but also to those with unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plants, and would 'contribute to ensuring the conditions under which the process of nuclear disarmament can broaden, constrain the opportunities for vertical proliferation and help prevent any future resumption of the nuclear arms race.'

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Eugeniusz Wyzner, echoed this view, saying that a fissban represented 'a significant supplement to the NPT and CTBT'. Sweden's Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, agreed, saying the fissban treaty was 'of the highest significance both for continued nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation'. Hungary's Ambassador Peter Naray said that the fissban was 'ripe for serious negotiations' and that the mandate in the March 1995 Shannon report 'accommodates the different shades of opinion' with respect to existing stocks. Slovakia's Ambassador Maria Krasnohorska concurred: 'Special Coordinator Ambassador Shannon's mandate can serve as the basis of the ad hoc committee's work [and] is broad enough to meet all legitimate concerns.' Switzerland also encouraged the CD to get on with it, while Ireland's Ambassador Anne Anderson called for an immediate start to fissban negotiations 'on the basis of the Shannon mandate'. Austria's Ambassador Harald Kreid shared the view of non-aligned nations that nuclear disarmament was of utmost importance, but urged the CD to start work on a fissban, for 'if we are not able to solve the daunting issue of nuclear disarmament in one great stroke now, let us attend to what is feasible'. Kreid refused to dodge the sensitive issue of stocks, voicing the concerns of many western delegations (as well as the non-aligned) when he commented that negotiations 'would inevitably have to touch upon the question of stockpiles, even if they would remain outside of the treaty, because it is hard to see how [a]

cut-off could be verified without transparency with regard to existing stockpiles.' Clearly referring to South Asia and the Middle East, Kreid added that improvising transparency and confidence could be important regionally.

Notwithstanding these exhortations, there is a growing view that (with the possible exception of the United States), the nuclear weapon states are less than enthusiastic, while the non-aligned want much more. Prior to the consensus UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L in 1993, from which the CD mandate derived, the US and Russia, awash with plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads, brokered agreement among the P-5 to agree multilateral negotiations on a basic cut-off. This was accompanied by declared moratoria on production from Britain, France, Russia and the United States, and a widespread (but unconfirmed) belief that China has also now halted its fissile materials production programme. The moratoria, while intended to encourage negotiations, have paradoxically led to diminished commitment to make the halt legally binding. For the smaller nuclear weapon states, a voluntary moratorium earns them brownie points while leaving open an escape hatch if they should want to restart production in the future. They have made it clear that they are only interested in a multilateral cut-off that brings the threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan, on board but does not touch stockpiles. For many non-nuclear-weapon countries, the moratoria remove the pressure for speedy action. This makes them reconsider the cost of negotiating a treaty in the CD, which could take considerable time and resources, while also encouraging them to hold out for a more substantial measure, including stockpiles.

Most non-aligned statements incorporated their remarks on a fissban or cut-off in their positions on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Syria made no specific mention of a fissban in its intervention on February 6, although it endorsed the G-28 programme of action. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer suggested establishing a nuclear disarmament committee 'under which separate working groups would take up issues such as the fissile materials convention and nuclear disarmament measures.' Furthermore, he stated that if the Shannon mandate were to be the basis for fissban negotiations, 'it is our expectation that the question of stocks will be dealt with within committee discussions on the scope of the future treaty.' He gave two reasons for this: i) adequate verification of a ban on production would require knowledge and accountability with regard to fissile materials already in existence; and  
ii) the moratoria.

He stated that 'if the future treaty is to have real impact beyond non-proliferation, and we hope it will, it would therefore also have to go beyond the narrow scope that some currently envisage for it.' Reiterating one of its concerns regarding the CTBT implementing organisation, Brazil

also required that the costs of verification for a fissban should not 'unduly burden' countries which already accept safeguards, such as members of the NPT or regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

De Icaza argued that the 'implicit mandate' in Shannon's report 'should allow that, within the ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes as well as the problem of past production and management of existing stocks be examined, so as to make sure that any production of nuclear weapons will cease.' Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi said that Indonesia considered the fissban would 'significantly contribute' to non-proliferation, but emphasised that it should 'encompass not only the future production but also the past production', in order to fulfil a disarmament commitment as well. If stockpiles were brushed aside, the cut-off would be 'a mere non-proliferation measure' with 'no added value to date ... [and] therefore unappealing'. However, Indonesia would be ready to 'revisit the question' of a fissban, with the understanding that the Shannon mandate 'acknowledged that this issue [stocks] to which many delegations attach great importance cannot be isolated...'

## Landmines

There has been considerable manoeuvring on the question of negotiating a ban on landmines in the CD since US President Clinton called for this on January 17. Both the UK and France gave strong and early backing, with Britain putting forward a draft mandate for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on the export, import or transfer of all AP mines. There is little public expression of outright opposition to negotiating on landmines in the CD, but considerable reluctance, coming from two corners: those who want a 'fast track' total ban, such as Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and others who would prefer to back the Ottawa process, initiated by Canada in October 1996; and those who want to hold open the option of producing and using landmines, such as Russia, China, Cuba, Syria, North and South Korea. These countries would prefer negotiations to remain within the purview of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The second meeting under the Ottawa Process took place in Vienna from February 12-14. Kreid reported that 111 states participated and that proposals for revising Austria's tentative draft treaty were now being considered. The next meeting will be held in Brussels on June 24-27. Mixed reports of progress are emerging from the Vienna meeting. It is pointed out that of the 111 participants, around 50 are strong supporters of a total ban on AP mines, the others participating as critics, or with the hope of influencing or slowing down the process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ottawa Process intends to move ahead. Since few now expect the CD to have

come to agreement on its agenda before June, the tough decision point is likely to come after the Brussels meeting, when the prospects and products of the Ottawa Process have become clearer. Pointing out that the landmines, which he called 'hidden killers' take a toll of 25,000 victims a year, Kreid said that 'the CD cannot simply ponder the matter in its customary slow motion fashion'. Nor would the CD process guarantee participation by all the relevant countries, Kreid warned that 'we are not willing to submit to a strategy of long-term persuasion complete with trade-offs and linkages and subject to an unpredictable stop and go process.' In his view, establishing a universal norm by means of a lawmaking treaty would bring adherents 'in due course'.

Canada spoke on February 6, the week following Britain's proposal for a CD mandate on landmines. Ambassador Mark Moher reiterated that 'use is the problem' and said that Canada had set itself 'a straightforward objective: a legally binding agreement in 1997 to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and, particularly, the use of AP mines.' To this end, the Ottawa Process would 'proceed without interruption until a successful conclusion later this year.' He cast doubt on the 'lengthy step by step approach' but said that Canada would 'not object' if members of the CD wanted to negotiate a ban on exports. However, he said that Canada had 'major difficulty' with the concept underlying the UK proposal. Moher 'acknowledged' those who wanted the CD to deal with the issue, but rejected the view that the Conference was the 'only acceptable mechanism' for this. If the CD wanted to negotiate on landmines, Canada would 'not oppose', but he underlined that Canada set one criterion: that any CD approach 'be complementary to and mutually reinforcing of, the Ottawa Process'. If not, he warned that Canada would oppose.

Ireland spoke in a similar vein two weeks later, underlining that any negotiations on landmines in the CD 'must reinforce and complement other efforts, such as the Ottawa Process, which have already begun, which are working well, and which have attracted a high level of international support'. After analysing the benefits and drawbacks of the CD and Ottawa approaches, Anderson argued that if the CD took on the issue it would have to 'build on what has already been achieved in terms of international consensus on the way forward'; that negotiations must be comprehensive from the outset and 'must cover the central question of use'; and that the CD must move rapidly. 'If the Conference spends months talking around a mandate, further months discussing the modalities of the negotiations and yet more time on the scope of the convention, then the Conference will not respond to the humanitarian urgency implicit in the words "as soon as possible"'.

While saying that he did not reject the CD out of hand, Ambassador Erwin

Hofer made clear that Switzerland prefers the Ottawa process to the CD, since the 'time factor is decisive'. Hofer emphasised that the planned rules should cover 'first, a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, possession, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines, and secondly, an obligation to destroy existing stockpiles.'

Of the non-aligned who made plenary statements, only Mexico expressed a strong opinion on the issue of landmines. De Icaza made two telling arguments against the CD taking on landmines negotiations: i) that it would divert attention from what should be the CD's 'highest priority' -- nuclear disarmament; and ii) that the CD will have the disadvantage of slowness without being able to guarantee universality or the participation of key states. Commenting memorably that 'swiftness is not this Conference's main virtue', de Icaza raised doubts that the CD was 'capable of pursuing and bringing to conclusion more than one negotiation at a time'. In that case, he continued, 'it is necessary not to waste our limited capabilities by undertaking tasks which are not of the highest priority or which would duplicate efforts undertaken in other multilateral fora.' Indonesia seemed largely to share this perspective. Although saying he would not stand in the way if the CD reached agreement on landmines, Tarmidzi reiterated that 'this Conference should not be side-tracked from negotiating the highest priority item in our agenda, namely nuclear disarmament.'

Intending to bolster his argument that the CD was the inappropriate forum, de Icaza argued that the principles for a landmines ban were based on humanitarian and not disarmament considerations. Others, arguing from the opposite side (and advocating the CCW as the appropriate mechanism to deal with AP mines) have made the same distinction. However, as pointed out by Kreid, 'banning a defensive weapon carries with it a strong disarmament dimension as well.' The Ottawa Process recognises this. Although with the objective of outlawing the use of anti-personnel mines, Ottawa is aiming for a treaty which will give teeth to such an objective by banning the production, stockpiling, export and transfer as well. Recognising the disarmament dimension does not necessarily mean that the CD is the only forum for negotiations. As Kreid pointed out, there are precedents in disarmament law, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, where a small number of states signed the original treaty, opening it for accession by others. By 1974 this treaty was a sufficient international norm that the prospect of a case taken in the ICJ by South Pacific countries over atmospheric testing was decisive in making France halt its atmospheric testing programme, despite having never acceded to the PTBT itself.

Mexico's concern that the US-UK-French initiative to prioritise landmines on the CD's negotiating agenda was in part designed to divert attention from demands for the CD to negotiate further nuclear disarmament measures is

shared by many non-aligned delegations. However, several, including Cuba, DPRK, Pakistan and Syria, are less enthusiastic than Mexico for the fast track Ottawa Process as an alternative. Syria referred to the 'pain' it felt at the human suffering caused by AP mines 'in some parts of the world where those mines have been misused'. Its representative, Iyad Orfi, went on to argue that for some states, mines 'are still a legitimate weapon to defend their security and their borders in the face of more lethal weapons.'

While the attitude of several non-aligned states seems to be unenthusiastic either way, Brazil stated its backing for the CD as 'the proper forum for the attainment of a universal and effective ban.' Lafer said that the proposed phased approach could 'yield early results', but said that Brazil would also continue to participate in the Ottawa Process, which could play 'an important role in building political momentum for attaining the goal of a universal ban.'

The western and European states are deeply divided. Although France and Britain have taken the lead in pushing for the CD as the venue for negotiating on landmines, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Ireland have been determined to press ahead with the fast track Ottawa approach. Other western countries are positioned along a continuum between these two strongly held positions, with some leaning closer to Ottawa and others towards the CD. New Zealand's Foreign Minister said that it supported the Ottawa process but could also accept a 'potential role' for the CD, providing it proceeded in parallel with Ottawa and agreed a 'strong mandate supportive of an early and comprehensive outcome.' Sweden's Foreign Minister said that 'the only effective solution to the landmine crisis is a total ban on APLs. No more, no less.' However, she went on to say that Sweden participated in the Ottawa Process and was also ready to do so in the CD. Swedish ratification of the amended Protocol II of the CCW was foreseen for June.

Poland endorsed the Anglo-French proposal for a phased approach within the context of the CD, saying only that it 'noted with interest' the Canadian initiative to conclude a ban by the end of 1997. However, Poland considered that the Ottawa Process and the CD could complement each other and have a 'potentially synergistic effect'. Hungary was a stronger supporter and participant in the Ottawa Process, but Naray said that the 'CD's role in the concert of efforts aimed at a total ban should be considered from the point of view of the universality and efficiency of the future convention.' Hungary could be flexible towards the Anglo-French approach, but 'would have serious difficulties with a mandate not stipulating a total ban on use and production as the ultimate goal of the negotiating process in the CD.'

Nuclear Disarmament

Both Indonesia and Mexico identified nuclear disarmament as the 'highest priority' for the CD, underlined by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. They both wanted the CD to establish a nuclear disarmament committee, but stopped short of insisting that it be convened with a negotiating mandate from the beginning. Within the G-21 there are attempts to get agreement on a negotiating mandate, but those who opposed the 'concurrent' linkage in the programme of action put forward by 28 of the 30 members of the G-21 in August 1996 are also resisting any mandate which commits the CD to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which they consider impractical at present. They are joined by others, including Egypt and Morocco, who are concerned that if the G-21 demands a negotiating mandate they could frighten away the moderates in the nuclear weapon states.

Three countries continue to oppose a nuclear disarmament committee: Britain, France and the United States. But the positions are not solid. There is an internal debate in all three capitals, with a growing number of pragmatists willing to accept such a committee, under certain conditions (which do not include a mandate to negotiate a treaty or timetable at this point). However, it is clear that unless and until the Clinton Administration can get ratification of the CWC past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Jesse Helms, it is not going to risk showing flexibility on nuclear disarmament, while there is no prospect of Britain moving until after the elections in May, if then.

In their statements, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and also Sweden referred to important new developments, such as the Canberra Commission, the ICJ advisory opinion and the December 5 statement by 61 retired Generals and Admirals calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Indonesia deeply regretted 'the recalcitrant attitude adopted by some of the nuclear weapon states towards the need to immediately negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.' Tarmidzi criticised them for narrowly interpreting their multilateral legal commitments, particularly article VI of the NPT, by insisting that nuclear disarmament is a 'bilateral exercise and therefore the sole domain of the nuclear weapon states.' He said that article VI and the NPT required prompt action and warned the nuclear weapon states that their prevarication 'may lead to the unravelling' of the NPT.

Brazil referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons as 'the paramount task' for the CD, proposing that a fissban and other measures could be negotiated under the overall umbrella of a nuclear disarmament committee. Lafer argued that making further progress on nuclear disarmament 'contingent on the prior attainment' of the fissban and even entry into force of the CTBT was just linkage of another sort. Syria addressed the nuclear disarmament by focusing on Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Among the western group, several delegations, including Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Japan made a strong plea for a more constructive attitude towards nuclear disarmament, while warning against linkage and the 'blueprint approach', as Anderson called it. Ireland's ambassador went on to ask why some delegations need reassurance about the direction of incremental nuclear disarmament. Like Austria and Sweden, she enumerated progress in the NPT, CTBT, START I and II (if ratified by Russia), expansion of nuclear weapon free zones adherence, and so on. But she also called on the P-5 to 'set out their perspective, and imbue the words 'systematic and progressive' with meaning...Such a perspective need not be time-bound, but ... a broad elaboration of the next steps they themselves propose to take.' Sweden's Foreign Minister also called for the concept of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament to be given a 'concrete content'. She said that 'the steps must be identified and fully translated into action.' New Zealand's Foreign Minister declared that though the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament had begun in a bilateral framework, 'we are also convinced that sustainable progress is not a matter which can be left solely to the nuclear-weapon states...'

McKinnon went further, calling for a nuclear disarmament committee 'with an overarching mandate...[which] could begin immediately with the cut-off negotiations, while also considering longer term issues.' In effect, it would have 'an active negotiating track and a preparatory track.' This would not be a talk shop, he argued, but one 'which prepared the ground carefully and effectively for eventual negotiations.'

Others sought ways to bridge the gap between those who wanted a committee on nuclear disarmament and those who wanted nothing. Ambassador Hisami Kurokuchi of Japan proposed that a special coordinator be appointed 'to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.' This might have proved acceptable last year, but with many members of the G-21 focusing now on a negotiating mandate, a special coordinator could be perceived as a defeat rather than a compromise.

## Conclusion

This is a dismal time for the CD. More than one delegate has likened it to post-natal depression (after the difficult birth of the CTBT). Some hold out hopes that a constructive NPT PrepCom in April could help shift the logjam. Others look forward to a more constructive government in Westminster or a less timid approach in Washington after Senate ratification of the CWC and Russian ratification of START II. Certainly not even the optimists expect any decisions on the CD's programme of work before the end

of June. Pointing to the strong reservations (read objections) by significant groups of states on each of the three major issues under discussion, the pessimists doubt that there is sufficient incentive for any movement on anything this year.

1997 CD Session

The CD's 1997 session runs from January 20 to March 27; from May 12 to June 27; and from July 28 to September 10.

ends

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Please note: from April 1, 1997 the telephone and fax numbers will be changed, as follows: telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857

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The address and email remain the same.

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From nfnzsc@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 19:55:39 GMT

From: National Steering Cttee Nuclear Free Local Authorities

<nfnzsc@gn.apc.org>

To: nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org

Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Subject: UK Nuclear News 18 March 1997

>From GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk Tue Mar 18 15:35:38 1997

Received: from MCR1.poptel.org.uk by gnew.gn.apc.org (8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)

id PAA15253; Tue, 18 Mar 1997 15:35:21 GMT

From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 15:35:01 GMT

Subject: NPU Bulletin 17-18 Mar

To: nfnzsc@gn.apc.org

Message-Id: <397235830MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>

Status: R

DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Tues 18 Mar 1997

97-8318 Gummer refuses #2bn plan for underground dumping of n/waste at Sellafield: n/industry in turmoil. All  
97-8319 Ch-Ex of UKAEA admits misjudgments in 1995 sale of the authority's facilities services division. FT  
97-8320 Construction has started on a pioneering plant for treating intermediate level n/waste at Sellafield. MEN 17  
97-8321 UK to spend #2bn on three new n/subs, to be built at VSEL yard at Barrow. Ind,FT,DT 18 Mar  
97-8323 Tim Radford on the forthcoming Saturn launch, which will carry 72.3 pounds of plutonium-238, and which has, experts say, a 1-in-10 to 1-in-20 chance of failure at launch. G

Mon 17 Mar 1997

97-8315 Iraq could use stolen fissile material to reconstitute its n/weapon programme quickly, international team warns. G

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.

Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.

Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

From disarmament@igc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 14:51:54 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: Press Briefing -Albright & Berger

Here are excerpts from a press briefing held this morning, with both Nat'l Security Advisor, Sandy Berger and Sec'y of State Madeleine Albright discussing expectations for the Summit - I've taken out everything not related to the Summit, but it's still rather lengthy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

March 18, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT  
AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER

## The Briefing Room

10:49 A.M. EST

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good morning, everybody. As you know, on Wednesday, the President leaves for Helsinki for his summit with President Yeltsin. This will be the 11th meeting between the two Presidents. Their leadership and personal engagement over the last four years has transformed the relationship between the United States and Russia. As a result, we now have a mature friendship based on common interests and characterized by honesty on matters where we disagree.

As you also know, Foreign Minister Primakov was here yesterday and over the weekend. I met with him on each of the last three days. On Sunday, he was briefed by the Joint Chiefs and he met with Secretary Cohen at the Defense Department. He met with President Clinton yesterday.

The issues we're dealing with are serious and of utmost importance to both our countries and that many must still be resolved. But our talks were thorough and cooperative. We had a comprehensive discussion of all the issues on the agenda of the summit, particularly European security and the NATO-Russia relationship. The President is looking forward to a positive meeting with President Yeltsin. He's approaching the summit in that spirit, and that is what he told Foreign Minister Primakov yesterday.

The summit will help us advance three shared aspirations: to create a safer world through further reductions in our nuclear arsenals, to expand trade and investment in a way that benefits Americans and Russians alike, and to build a secure and undivided Europe of sovereign, independent democracies. Sandy Berger is going to speak about the first two of these goals. And I want to just say a few words about Europe.

What President Clinton will stress in Helsinki is this:

We are facing an entirely new historical situation in Europe. NATO faces no enemy to its east; Russia faces no enemy to its

west. The quest for security on the continent is no longer a zero sum game in which we must choose between protecting the interests of Central Europe or the interests of Russia, but not both at the same time. We do not face a choice between diminishing NATO and diminishing Russia. It is not 1949 or even 1989; today we are all on the same side.

The United States and Western Europe now have a chance to gain new allies and partners who can and will contribute to our common security. The people of Central Europe now have a chance to overcome a Cold War dividing line that has cut them off from the European mainstream. The people of Russia now have a chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine integration with the West that their nation has ever enjoyed.

Let me be clear: We believe that Europe will not be whole and free until a democratic Russia is wholly a party of Europe. That is why we have supported Russia's membership in the WTO and its deepening participation in the P-8. It is why we worked hard to ensure Russia's participation in our mission in Bosnia and in NATO's partnership for peace.

In each of these cases, we made a decision not to isolate Russia and Russia made a decision not to isolate itself. It is in that spirit that NATO and Russia have been talking about the outlines of a charter that will launch a true partnership between them. NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov are taking the lead in negotiating an agreement. While that job is not finished, they both deserve credit for the progress they have made.

In Helsinki, the President will outline the possibilities of such a partnership for Russia and for NATO. He will reaffirm NATO's commitment that it has no intention, no plan and no reason to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. He will discuss NATO's proposals to adapt and modernize the CFE Treaty which will ensure that there are no destabilizing troop concentrations anywhere in Europe.

At the same time, he will be clear about the lines we will not cross and the barriers we will not build. NATO enlargement will remain on track. New allies will enjoy the full benefits and assume the full responsibilities of membership. The first new members will not be the last, and we will exclude no

European democracy from future consideration. NATO will continue to evolve, but the qualities that have made it the most successful alliance in history will be preserved.

Let me also stress that the point of the NATO-Russia charter is not to convince Russia's leaders to agree to NATO enlargement. That is unnecessary, and it certainly will not happen in Helsinki. We know it will take time for the progress of trust to catch up with the process of change.

The point of the charter is to advance an enduring interest; NATO and Russia will continue to share our interest in acting together to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The only steps we will propose to Russia are those we would want to take whether NATO was enlarging or not, because they are worthwhile in their own right.

For this reason, while we would welcome agreement in the next few months, there is no deadline -- not in Helsinki or in Madrid. The door will stay open. And at this point, Sandy Berger will say a few words about the other elements on the agenda, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

MR. BERGER: Thank you. As Secretary Albright has noted, this is the 11th meeting between the two Presidents. In a sense, meetings between American and Russian Presidents now have become routine, and that in and of itself is remarkable if you look at the sweep of the last 25 or 40 years. The high drama of summit diplomacy has given way to a real working partnership -- less drama, but perhaps more progress towards common goals.

Secretary Albright has talked about the European security dimension of the meeting in Helsinki. But I think it's also important to emphasize this is a very important meeting in terms of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. And there are two principal elements that the Presidents will be discussing. One is in the realm of the danger of weapons of mass destruction and arms control, and the second is in the area of economic cooperation.

We've already taken remarkable strides together -- the United States and Russia -- over the preceding few years. We've agreed to a comprehensive test ban, indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the elimination of nuclear weapons from

the three former states of the Soviet Union. We've worked together on improving nuclear safety and ratifying START I. Now, we are waiting the Duma ratification of START II. And together with START I, that will cut both our arsenals -- both our nuclear arsenals by two-thirds from the Cold War levels.

We have been discussing with the Russians guidelines for START III negotiations which could begin immediately after START II is ratified and enters into force. We need to be realistic about the prospects of progress in this area. There remain disagreements between us and the Russians, particularly in the area of the distinction between antiballistic missile defenses, which were restricted by the treaty of 1972, and our desire to move forward with theater missile defenses.

Both sides agree on the need to preserve the ABM Treaty. Both agree on the need to defend against the growing threat of short-range missiles with theater missile defenses, and we agree with the issue of how you distinguish between ballistic missiles and theater missiles is a difficult one which must be resolved. But we have emphasized repeatedly to the Russians that we are developing theater missile defenses to protect our troops. When Foreign Minister Primakov was here this past weekend, he had a very, I think, compelling briefing at the Pentagon and heard a very forceful statement that our intention with the development of these systems is not directed at Russia, but rather directed at protecting our troops and those of our allies against short-range missiles. So we will need to see whether we can make some more progress in this area.

In any case, we believe that the Russians should proceed with START II ratification, which would then let us move into START III. And I hope that we can make some further progress in Helsinki, but these negotiations will continue thereafter if we don't.

In the economic area, the two Presidents will discuss Russia's effort to build a stable, prosperous market economy. What Russia has achieved in a short time, with our help and other Western nations is remarkable. . . .

At Helsinki and beyond, both Presidents will be focusing on this central U.S.-Russian relationship, particularly over the next four years as a cornerstone to the kind of world

that we will build for the 21st century. Thank you.

Q Madam Secretary, Boris Yeltsin said yesterday the ball in Helsinki is in Bill Clinton's court, that if Russia has made concessions that there's an uneven situation now and it's the United States' turn. How would you respond to that?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me say that this summit, as Sandy has said, is one of a series of summits where we are now down to kind of regular business. We used to think of summits as either coming at really fabulous times when there was something to celebrate, or really dreadful times when relationships had to be mended. And we now have a mature relationship in which we agree on some subjects and disagree on others.

We expect that this will be a summit where a number of questions will be asked, and many resolved, and a very large agenda. I think it's very important not to look at this summit, as I said, as far as the European security issues are concerned as a zero sum game. It is not us versus them or them versus us; we are all on the same side.

The word "concessions" is an inappropriate word. This is a discussion about how to have the Russians cooperate in a new European atmosphere, and at the same time to make clear that the countries that are in a grey zone in Central Europe are no longer there. And I can assure you that the President nor I are going to bargain away the rights of the Central Europeans. Neither justice nor history will allow that. And it is a discussion that will go forward in order to make clear that NATO enlargement will go forward and that Russia, in fact, does have a seat at the table in discussions on Europe, but not a veto over the decisions.

Q Madam Secretary, all through this town in think-tanks and elsewhere, people who are really not philosophically very different from the people who work with this administration are very anxious about NATO's expansion's impact on arms control. I mean, they're not talking about Yeltsin, they're talking about the communists, the military, the nationalists, et cetera, who are holding back the START treaty and who will see NATO expansion as, rightly or wrongly, as a threat. Now, if you folks care about arms control, isn't there anything you might do to soften this impact, or is there anything where you can work

around START, perhaps extend for four or five years, as has been proposed by some think-tankers, the compliance with the 2003 deadline?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me say that it is very important to see these issues in their own separate baskets while they clearly have an impact on each other. We need to understand NATO enlargement as an issue that is important for a new Europe.

Obviously, as Sandy has said, we are interested in moving the START II process forward and making sure that those limits are lived up to. But I think the important part is to make sure that people understand why we're doing these separate issues.

And Sandy, you might want to --

MR. BERGER: I hesitate to comment on anything coming out of the think-tanks, but let me -- (laughter.)

Q They could be your twins, they're not the people that brought down Tony Lake.

MR. BERGER: Let me say this -- let me put it this way: NATO enlargement will proceed. I think that it is important that NATO enlargement proceed in the right way. I have spoken about the Scylla and Charybdis in a sense of NATO enlargement. On the one hand, NATO enlargement proceeds -- needs to proceed in a way that does not undercut the security of the Central Europeans, that does not create a second class of members of NATO, that does not give the Russians a veto.

At the same time -- and the President has been very clear about this over the last two years -- it's been an open, transparent process which he has discussed at every meeting with President Yeltsin that NATO enlargement can proceed in a way which also strengthens the NATO-Russian relationship. And by creating a NATO-Russian charter, by creating some sort of a consultative mechanism with Russia, this does not have, in any way, to undercut the democracy of Russia or those who are proponents of it.

There is a new Russia. We say that to the American people. And what President Yeltsin must say equally vigorously to the Russian people is, there's a new NATO, there's a new day,

and we're designing new institutions to deal with that fact.

Q Sandy, do you believe -- and Ms. Albright, too, if you care to answer it -- that the Russians fully believe there is a new Russia? I mean, are the Russians fully aware of their changed circumstance in the world?

MR. BERGER: I think Russia is undergoing a profound transition -- a transition that is political, economic, social and geostrategic. And I think that there are -- as it defines itself as the President has said many times, the question is whether it will define its future greatness in terms of enhancement of the life of its people and a normal relationship with its neighbors, or whether it will define its greatness in old, classic terms, which I think are increasingly irrelevant.

So I do think that there is a new and emerging Russia. It is in our interest to reinforce that. It is our interest to promote that. But the Russians also have to understand that there is -- that NATO no longer is directed towards Russia. There's a new NATO. It's changed in its force structure. It's adapted dramatically. It's changed in its mission in many respects. And it's no longer the NATO that is a threat to Russia that existed during the Cold War.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me just say, I fully believe -- those of us that have studied, first, the Soviet Union and now Russia very intensively I think understand that the process is a complex one that takes place in a variety of arenas at different times. I think it's most encouraging, for instance, that President Yeltsin has now chosen what seems to be a team that is focused on economic reform -- a clear understanding of the necessity that he sees a prime necessity to move his country.

When I met with President Yeltsin recently in Moscow, we talked about the difference. He kept saying, you know, you have to see a new Russia. And I said to him, you need to see a new NATO. What I find very interesting is the discussions that I had with Foreign Minister Primakov in the last three days where we very clearly, both of us, avidly defended our countries' national interests, but both of us also understood that a great part of our national interests are satisfied when we cooperate. And in that spirit, even though we saw Foreign Minister Primakov at 4:00 p.m. here yesterday, I was already on the phone with him

this morning at 8:00 a.m., working the process of some of the questions we have to resolve at Helsinki.

So I think here, we have to understand we are not dealing with a static Russia, we are dealing with a Russia that is adjusting to the many points that Sandy raised.

Q Secretary Albright, if we take the very firm line that you have articulated today on the basic issues of NATO expansion, and then what President Yeltsin said yesterday, should we not conclude that what's essentially going on here is sort of staking out rhetorical positions in advance of a meeting that's going to include real bargaining because you both know your stands are not tenable?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We are not taking any rhetorical positions. We have made very clear what our position is, and we are not -- as I said, we are not bargaining away the rights of the Central Europeans, who were, to a great extent the victims of the Cold War. And what President Clinton has said is what he is trying to do is to eliminate the dividing line down the center of Europe.

So we have made our points very clear. I think that what you're going to see is, as President Yeltsin made clear in Moscow and other places, they are not -- they do not like NATO enlargement; they have made that very clear. But that is not the point. NATO enlargement is going forward, and what we are doing is developing helping NATO, of which we are a part, and Secretary General Solana is in the lead, developing a new relationship between NATO and Russia, which would reflect this new relationship.

Let me just make one historical point. Everybody thinks that last year was the 50th anniversary of everything; but the truth is that we have some other anniversaries to celebrate -- what happened at the end of World War II was the creation of a set of institutions that basically created structure for the post-World War II scene in Europe.

We are now in the process of creating new institutions for the post-Cold War, and they have a lot to do with how Europe sees itself, a lot of institutions that are thoroughly Western Europe directed, some that are economic, some that have to do with a variety of integrative processes, and NATO enlargement is

one of them and NATO-Russia is another. And what we are all doing here together is looking at an historical process and creating institutions that will serve us into the 21st century.

Q I wonder if you could respond to those critics who charge the President has put too many of his eggs in the Yeltsin basket and is not doing enough to work with alternative voices in Russia, beyond Boris Yeltsin.

MR. BERGER: They're wrong. (Laughter.) I mean, the fact of the matter is that this is an extraordinarily broad relationship. Number one, I would point out that Boris Yeltsin is the democratically-elected President of Russia. And Presidents generally deal with Presidents, particularly those who are democratically elected. So I think it's normal and quite rational for the President to be dealing with the leader that Russia has chosen.

But this relationship is far broader than Clinton-Yeltsin. This is a relationship -- the relationship between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, which is really more than a personal relationship, is an institutional infrastructure that has been developed to manage the relationship on energy and on economic development and on nuclear waste and a whole range of issues is now quite an extraordinary relationship. The relationship that the Secretary of State already has developed with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Primakov is, I think, going to be a lively and very productive relationship, and so -- and when the President goes to Russia, he meets not only with President Yeltsin, the last trip he met with opposition leaders and certainly our embassy does as well. So I think this is as extensive a relationship as probably we have.

Q A question on ABM, please. START II is hostage not only to NATO enlargement, but also to this demarkation dispute in the ABM Treaty, at least in the Russian point of view. Are the two Presidents personally going to discuss ABM demarkation in Helsinki, and is President Clinton going to offer new proposals or compromises on higher capability theater missile systems?

MR. BERGER: We believe that START II ought to proceed to ratification in the Duma without regard to any lingering disputes with respect to ABM-TMD demarkation, and that's our

position and the position the President will reiterate to President Yeltsin. To the extent that they believe it is important for there to be a clarification of the demarkation issue, the Presidents may discuss that, but we've made it very clear that we believe that the theater missile systems that we are developing are consistent with the ABM treaty, and that we intend to proceed with those systems, and that we don't believe that they do violate the ABM treaty.

So there conceivably could be some discussion of it, but our view is that in any case it would be good for the Russians to proceed with ratification of START II.

Q Do you expect Bosnia or Albania or the Middle East or any other issues -- other areas to come up, or just these three described?

MR. BERGER: No, I'm sure that there will -- this is a -- let me just quickly outline the schedule for you as it's currently contemplated. We'll leave tomorrow night. We'll arrive Thursday afternoon Helsinki time. There is a dinner being hosted by Prime Minister Ahtisaari Thursday night. And then Friday, there will be at least two sessions between the two Presidents, one in the morning and one in the afternoon -- a lunch and a planned press conference. There may be a dinner that evening before we leave, a smaller dinner between the two Presidents.

It would not surprise me that they talk about other issues of common interest, including, Rita, many of the ones that you raised. . .

Q Secretary Albright, are there any specific issues that you think will actually be resolved in Helsinki, or is this just part of a process of ongoing --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that there clearly will be some, but I think the issue that one needs to keep in mind here, that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have not seen each other in almost a year; they have many things to talk about and that it's important to understand the process of these summits. We all can talk at various levels, and as Sandy has explained, we have a vibrant and robust process going on on a variety of levels. But ultimately, it's important for the

Presidents to talk to each other about all these subjects and what -- we will see. I think that it's important to know that having the summits in itself is something that we value. . .

Q A broad question, please, on foreign policy. I come from Russia and I had some thoughts on what has been said here. Do you think the U.S. needs a foreign policy in the new post-Cold War period? (Laughter.) I should explain that I mean, in Russia, with very many people, very many reformers, whom you referred to, are against NATO, are against some of the policies and they resent something that they regard as some sort of a high-handed approach on the part of the U.S.

I know from my contacts with my colleagues in other countries that this view is something shared by some others. So you reach out to the American people, explaining the foreign policy to them. Do you plan to explain your foreign policy to the world? Do you think it needs correction, or do you believe that, as President Clinton said, you are the only indispensable country in the world and can basically do whatever you want?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's kind of loaded. Let me say that, first of all, it is not as much our statement that we are the indispensable nation in the world, it is how others also behave that is clear that we are the indispensable nation. It doesn't mean we do everything alone, however, which is why a major component of what we're talking about now is the NATO-Russia relationship, in which we are one of 16, and it is the Secretary General of NATO that is leading that discussion.

But let me go to your larger point. I think that the United States, more than any other country, is understanding the post-Cold War environment, where we are trying to direct the attention of other countries to the new threats, not the old threats. And the new threats come from a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; they come from issues to do with the environment, terrorism, drugs. And we need to look forward and not backward.

When I was in Russia I tried to explain on Russian television that we required, all of us, some new thinking. And the new thinking had to do with the fact that we were not involved in a zero-sum game anymore. We are not -- and NATO is not -- poised against Russia. It is an alliance of democracies that have common values that is open to all democratic governments in Europe. We have made that clear. The first will

not be the last.

And it is important for all of us, whether we are explaining policy here or in Europe or in other countries, to get people thinking forward and not backward. The Cold War is over. Russia is not our enemy. Russia is our friend. And we want to work with Russia cooperatively to create a new structure.

MR. BERGER: Let me add one thought to what Madeleine has said very eloquently. I think President Clinton has made very clear to President Yeltsin, to the Russia people, again to Foreign Minister Primakov yesterday that the United States wants a strong Russia. We don't seek a weak Russia. We seek a strong Russia. We seek a Russia that is growing. We seek a Russia in which democracy is strengthening, in which the economy is strengthening, in which the Russian people are gaining confidence and gaining a brighter future, and that we have a very strong American interest in seeing that happen and being of help to the extent that the Russian government and the Russian people want us to be of help.

So, just to kind of amplify the zero-sum proposition that Madeleine has indicated, it is very much in the interests of the United States, in the interests of the world, for the greatness of the Russian people and for Russian strength to be recognized, to be enhanced, and to be part of the overall European undivided peaceful security structure that we're trying to build. . .

\*\*\*\*\*

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From ipb@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 22:33:47 -0100  
From: International Peace Bureau <ipb@gn.apc.org>  
To: "Heffermehl, Fredrik" <fredpax@sn.no>,  
"Weiss, Cora" <srfnyusa@IGC.APC.ORG>  
Subject: FW: Helsinki Summit

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]  
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]  
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

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From: Peace Station[SMTP:mkantola@kaapeli.fi]  
Sent: mardi, 18. mars 1997 18:18  
To: ipb@gn.apc.org  
Cc: disarmament@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Helsinki Summit

Dear Friends,

We, Committee of 100 and Peace Union of Finland, have planned to deliver the text following to the international press coming here to Helsinki this week (1500 accredited journalists according to the Ministry of Foreign affairs). We unfortunately have no accredited journalists among us but the Ministry of Foreign affairs has promised that our material has access to the press centre. We will send this also to the international news agencies located in Helsinki, and naturally material in Finnish to the Finnish media.

On Friday the 21st of March there will be a demonstration focused on disarmament. The organisers of this demonstration are young activists who call themselves "defenders of the earth". They are young people involved in peace movement, human rights movements, animal rights' mov. etc. and people who prefer not be members of any organisations. We have made a leaflet about the agenda of the Summit (START III, enlargement of the Nato etc.) to be delivered both to the demonstrators and to people passing by.

I'm sure there will be all kind of events at the end of the week here in Helsinki. We will inform you about all the demonstrations, events etc. we know about.

Yours in peace,

Malla Kantola, Committee of 100

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Committee of 100  
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Email:: comof100@kaapeli.fi

START Talking SUMMIT! START Talking SUMMIT! START

Peace movement to presidents Clinton and Yeltsin :  
Total elimination of Nuclear weapon has to be the ultimate goal !

At a Press Conference March 7, 1997 U.S. President Clinton stated, " ...This meeting that we're going to have in Helsinki, President Yeltsin and I, it will be very important. . . It will be a meeting that will be extremely candid, extremely straight forward, and I hope it will help to deal with not only the question of Russia's relationship to Europe but also what we can do with the Russians to continue to reduce the nuclear threat ..."

The world wants progress toward nuclear disarmament. This is a historic opportunity to achieve bold cuts toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century. President Clinton and President Yeltsin should seize this Summit opportunity to achieve further deep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by negotiating a new "START III" framework agreement as the next step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

\* Lack of progress in START negotiations will leave START II, signed 4 years ago by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, and ratified by the U.S. Senate last year, unratified by the Russian Duma.

\* Lack of progress will leave the world stuck with over 20,000 nuclear weapons, over 95% in the possession of the United States and Russia.

\* Lack of progress will seriously imperil other arms control efforts. For example, the U.S. Senate may be even less likely to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without Russian ratification first, and multilateral arm reductions, including the Nuclear Weapons Convention, will be less likely to progress with such large U.S. and Russian stockpiles.

Four years ago, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arsenal Reduction Treaty (START II) and last year the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty that would reduce the number of deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 3500 each.

Unfortunately START II ratification has stalled in the Russian Duma. Without bold action from the presidents to break the START II logjam and achieve further reductions, the world will head toward the 21st century stuck with over 20,000 nuclear warheads - 95 percent in the possession of Russia and the United States.

In December of 1996, sixty international retired Generals and Admirals called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prominent among them is U.S. Retired Four-Star General Lee Butler. The December statement from retired world military leaders has stirred the debate about nuclear weapons elimination, and marked the

culmination of tremendous progress for nuclear disarmament in 1996, including milestones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signing, the World Court Ruling on nuclear weapons, the Canberra Commission Report, and the United Nations Resolution calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention abolishing nuclear weapons.

There exists the "potential political will" in the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations to achieve a framework agreement on a START III treaty mandating deeper cuts in U.S and Russian arsenals. It would be important that a START III treaty would not be only playing a "numbers game", debating with the U.S. and Russian administrations whether strategic weapons be reduced to 2,500 or 2000 or 1000, but raising the recommendations of the Canberra Commission - as echoed by General Butler - that a START III is the chance for taking U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons off alert, for separating warheads from delivery systems, and for disarming tactical weapons, too. Such an agreement would truly open up the way for p-5 disarmament talks, and build momentum for a nuclear weapons convention.

In April, 1997 at the NPT (nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) Review Conference, the United States and Russia both need to show progress toward nuclear disarmament, in accordance with their obligation under Article VI of the NPT. Without START III Multi-lateral negotiations to abolish nuclear weapons will be more difficult. It is unlikely that China, France, or the UK. will enter into multilateral negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons while the United States and Russia maintain these enormous arsenals. Even after START II, Russia and the U.S. will have many more weapons than any of the other nuclear weapons states.

Maintaining these enormous arsenals costs also enormous amounts of money. The Cost Study Project's "Atomic Audit" estimates that U.S. taxpayers have spent at least \$4 trillion on nuclear weapons programs since 1942 (in adjusted 1995 dollars). Without Russian ratification and implementation of START II, the Pentagon estimates it will spend \$5 billion over the next seven years on the nuclear weapons that would have been eliminated under START II.

Without START reductions, the Department of Energy (U.S.) is seeking a new tritium production source. Tritium, a radioactive isotope used to boost the destructive power of nuclear weapons, will cost taxpayers even more money to produce, and add to the radioactive waste legacy of nuclear weapons production. With further deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, tritium production now would not be necessary. In addition to tritium production, increased plutonium pit production will be sought, while dismantling of nuclear weapons will be slowed and eventually halted.

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Nato Expansion:

Many in the Peace movement fears that Nato's proposed expansion into Eastern Europe threatens present chances of U.S.-Russian co-operation on further nuclear weapons reductions, and would remilitarize Europe at a time when NATO and Europe face no credible military threat.

The Russian Duma is reluctant to ratify START II and consider further arms reductions negotiations in large part because of security fears relating to NATO expansion. Duma International Committee Chairman, Vladimir Lukin has stated, "Russians are disappointed with the tendencies emerging in America, and it would be difficult to convince the Russian public that the United States is friendly and has peaceful intentions towards Russia." START II (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty II), which would limit U.S. and Russian Strategic arsenals to 3,500 each, requires significant changes to the Russian nuclear weapons infrastructure. Russia would have to destroy many more weapons than the United States. In order to achieve parity with the United States, Russia would then build single warhead missiles. Further reducing U.S. and Russian arsenals with a "START III" agreement could adjust this sc.. "imbalance".

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ABOLITION 2000 - A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

The time has come to rid the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons. The Cold War era is behind us. A new millennium is near at hand. If not now, then when?

These radioactive devices are terrifyingly dangerous, politically destabilising, environmentally contaminating, economically wasteful and contrary to international law. They are weapons of genocide and therefore can have no place in human civilisation.

Over the past 50 years people all over the world have joined together to protest and to organise to ban the bomb. While some progress has been made in reducing the arsenals of the two superpowers, there is a long way to go on the road to elimination. For this reason a new network has been brought into being, whose purpose is to help coordinate on a global basis efforts to promote an agreement between governments by the year 2000 on a time-bound framework for total abolition.

ABOLITION 2000 network was formally established on November 5th, 1995 at an international meeting in the Hague. It grew out of a number of pre-existing groupings and in a sense supersedes them: The World Court Project, of which IPB was a co-founder; The International Coalition for Nuclear

non-proliferation and Disarmament for which the IPB acted as coordinating secretariat; The World Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; and The NGO Abolition Caucus, which met daily during the NPT Extension Conference in New York, April-May 1995, and which drew up the statement which constitutes the political foundation of Abolition 2000.

Peace Union of Finland and Committee of 100 have signed the Abolition 2000 statement.

For more information contact: International Peace Bureau.

International Peace Bureau

International Peace Bureau, IPB is the world's oldest and most comprehensive international peace network. With 19 international and 141 national/local member organisations (and 120 individuals) in over 40 countries, it brings together people working for peace in many different sectors: not only pacifists but also women's, youth, labour, religious, political and professional bodies. IPB was founded in 1892 and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1910 for its efforts in promoting the establishment of the League of Nations and for spreading the message of peace to the general public. Among its many distinguished leaders over the years was the Irish Nobel laureate Sean MacBride. Nowadays its role is that of supporting peace and disarmament initiatives taken by the UN, launching collective projects and informing and servicing grassroots peace campaigns.

IPB has had UN Consultative Status as an NGO since 1977, and has been active in the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament since 1972.

Current program areas of the IPB are nuclear disarmament; conventional and inhumane weapons; conflicts; and women and peace.

Peace Union of Finland and Committee of 100 in Finland are members of the IPB.

secretary general: Colin Archer (UK), Program Officer: Tracy Moavero (USA)

Contact information:

International Peace Bureau

41, Rue de Zurich, CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland

Tel: + 41 22 731 6429, Fax: + 41 22 738 9419

E-mail: [ipb@gn.apc.org](mailto:ipb@gn.apc.org), Web: <http://www.itu.ch/ipb>

The Finnish Peace Movement

The Finnish peace movement works for disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, for a nuclear and block free Europe and world.

The Peace Union of Finland and the Committee of 100 will inform about the views of the international and the Finnish Peace movement and about the NGO

actions taking place in Helsinki during the Summit.

Contact:

Laura Lodenius	Malla Kantola
press secretary	secretary general
Peace Union	Committee of 100
tel: +358-(0)9-142915	+358-(0)9-141336
email: laural@kaapeli.fim	kantola@kaapeli.fi

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Existing nuclear arsenal

Under the ratified Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) now being implemented, nearly 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons belong to the United States or Russia. Even after START II, which has not been ratified by Russia or implemented by either country, the United States and Russia will have the vast majority of nuclear weapons with France, China and the UK each maintaining total nuclear arsenals of less than 500.

START II limits only "strategic" (longer range intercontinental) nuclear weapons, not "tactical" (shorter range, battlefield) weapons. Almost a quarter of the world's nuclear stockpile consists of non-strategic nuclear weapons. After START II the U.S. will keep 950 warheads for non-strategic forces, and Russia may keep as many as 3,000 non-strategic warheads.

START II limits only deployed strategic nuclear weapons to approximately 3,500 each for Russia and the United States. Both the United States and Russia are planning to maintain several thousand "reserve" warheads.

"The size and composition of the total U.S. stockpile has now stabilised, and it will not decrease below the current level of nearly 10,000 warheads. If START II is implemented, the only change will be in the ratio of deployed warheads to those in a less-ready status." - "Nuclear Notebook," Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January-February 1997.

Under START II all land based missiles will be limited to carrying only one missile; but Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) will continue to carry multiple warheads. The United States and Russia both plan to put about half of their future deployable strategic warheads at sea. (Britain plans to deploy its entire arsenal on submarines and France nearly 90 percent of its arsenal.)

From 70761.2655@CompuServe.COM Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997  
Date: 19 Mar 97 09:24:11 EST  
From: James Hipkins <70761.2655@CompuServe.COM>  
To: Howard Hallman <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Peace Leaf Article

Howard:

When you talked you mentioned that you would write an article for the PEACE LEAF. We have everything but your article. Could you fax it to us as soon as ready? Got the address material o.k. last week.  
Spring is here. See you!

Jim Hipkins

From worldpeace@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 06:51:43 GMT  
From: Housmans Peace Resource Project <worldpeace@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
Cc: fredpax@sn.no  
Subject: Re: Ab2000: Minutes of NPT PrepComm Working Group

FROM: Albert Beale, 5 Caledonian Road, Kings Cross, London N1, UK  
(tel +44-171-278 4474; fax +44-171-278 0444; e-mail  
worldpeace@gn.apc.org).

17 March 1997

Dear Fredrik Heffermehl & friends

I was pleased to see Fredrik's response to one of the Abolition 2000 items circulated on the e-mail list-server ... language and precision are important. This is, as he says, so as to not make political assumptions, or even political insults; but also simply because accuracy is essential if we are not to give hostages to fortune to our opponents, and not to give an excuse to opponents to ignore us because of our sloppy thinking. Let's show that peace campaigners can make our case with precision and with accurate terminology!

Fredrik gives the examples of the use of "American" when only the US is being referred to; and the use of "European" when referring only to the EU.

Can I add related examples: the problem of people using "England"

when they mean "Britain", or "Britain" when they mean the UK, and so on... . And similarly, the confusion between Holland and the Netherlands, which I presume is as significant there as the Britain/etc errors are here. (At least we no longer get the confusion between Russia and the USSR!)

And also on the topic of accuracy ... I'm all in favour of setting disarmament targets (and deciding to have a party!) for when we reach the year 2000. But since that's still a year before the turn of the century/millennium, let's avoid the quite common howler of referring to the beginning of the year 2000 as the new millennium, when it's the beginning of the last year of this one, of course.

Best wishes

Albert Beale

From ipb@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997  
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 16:58:17 -0100  
From: International Peace Bureau <ipb@gn.apc.org>  
To: "Heffermehl, Fredrik" <fredpax@sn.no>,  
"Weiss, Cora" <srfnyusa@IGC.APC.ORG>  
Cc: 'Committee of 100 in Finland' <comof100@kaapeli.fi>,  
"Lodenius, Laura" <laural@kaapeli.fi>  
Subject: FW: HELSINKI SUMMIT: PEACE AND MEDIA

-----  
From: Peace Station[SMTP:laural@kaapeli.fi]  
Sent: lundi, 17. mars 1997 14:13  
To: ipb@gn.apc.org  
Cc: caat@gn.apc.org  
Subject: HELSINKI SUMMIT AND PEACE AND MEDIA

MEDIA WORK WITH HELSINKI SUMMIT 20.3.97!

Important information from Finnish peace organisations

We are going to do some media work on peace movements' ideas about Clinton and Yeltsin's negotiations about START III, about disarmament of conventional weapons, about NATO enlargement etc. etc... We have made some texts based on abolition 2000 points made in Tahiti, and some presentation of peace organisations and views... but if You have something else You would want us to do, please contact us ! (\*\*There are going to be over 1500 journalists here in Helsinki\*\*).

Other happenings in Helsinki: Peace Union (member organisation of IPB, signed abolition 2000..) has made a fact leaflet to activists & groups: What the summit is all about. Various groups arrange demonstrations: today in Helsinki against the Finnish membership of NATO and NATO enlargement, and on Thursday against World military spending - in favour of disarmament.

Today, on Monday, The Finnish government gave a security and defence political program to the parliament (we are not applying for Nato membership .. for the moment..) and there is a hot security political debate going on this week...

Contacts are:

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From nfnzsc@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 12:39:09 GMT

From: Stewart Kemp <nfnzsc@gn.apc.org>

To: nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org

Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Subject: UK Nuclear News 15-16 March 1997

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk

>Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 15:51:32 GMT

>Subject: NPU Bulletin 15-16 Mar

>To: nfnzsc@gn.apc.org

>

>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

>

>Sun 16 Mar 1997

>

>97-8314 Outrage as military research security, including Porton Down,

> is sold to private firm. Obs

>

>

>Sat 15 Mar 1997

>

>97-8311 Global stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium now

> more than 2,000 tonnes, often with lax controls, says new book.

> Ind

>97-8312 Nato promises not to deploy troops in substantial numbers on  
> the soil of new members 'for foreseeable future': Russia  
> demands that membership is not extended to former Soviet  
> states. FT,G  
>  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
>  
>

Stewart Kemp (nfznc@gn.apc.org)  
From disarmament@igc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:32 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 07:35:50 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: White House Press Briefing - Summit Prep.

Here are excerpts from the White House Press Briefing yesterday following President Clinton's discussions with Russian Defense Minister Primakov in preparation for the Summit.

March 17, 1997  
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY  
4:34 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

March 17, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY  
MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

MR. MCCURRY: Uh-oh, this is not going to work. I can tell already. I got my old gang out here. You are all going to

go away mightily disappointed because you just got more from Foreign Minister Primakov than you're going to get from me.

Let me do a couple -- the President just had in the Yellow Room of the White House, the second floor of the President's residence, a very textured and detailed conversation with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. They met for approximately an hour and really went through in a very detailed way those issues that are on the agenda for the two Presidents when they meet in Helsinki. That was, by the way, roughly twice as long as the meeting had been expected to go.

It started with a lot of pleasantries because the President had to explain half the jokes that were said at the Gridiron to the Foreign Minister -- (laughter) -- no. The President --

Q That took up 45 minutes. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. The President teased the Foreign Minister a little bit about being Madeleine's date at the Gridiron Dinner, and said he hoped they had had fun. Foreign Minister Primakov said that he was pleased and that President Yeltsin is pleased that President Clinton is going ahead with the summit later in the week.

And then they just reviewed those areas -- I mean, those continuing issues in the three large areas I told you about last week, in the area of European security; second, the future of arms control; third, the economic engagement that the West has with the Russian Federation. They reviewed some of the issues that are still outstanding that the two Presidents will have to address.

I'd really say it was an effort to take those differences that are on the agenda as we head to Helsinki and really bring them under the magnifying glass, look at them in greater detail. I'm sure the Foreign Minister will report back to President Yeltsin on President Clinton's strong thinking on some of the issues that we've presented. And we'll see what arises in Helsinki.

Q Did the Russian Foreign Minister link the dispute over NATO expansion to the lagging effort to get the START Treaty resolved or to other arms control measures? Did he

suggest that this was having a negative impact on arms control generally?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think it's known that they have some views about how issues intersect and relate, but our thinking is quite clear: we consider ratification of START II important. It is vital to the future of arms reduction and continuing arms control efforts, and we certainly have made that clear in our discussions.

Q Mike, I know you're probably sick of this, but the issue of legally binding character of the final charter, did that come up again with Primakov? Primakov suggested on the lawn just here that if the United States would change its position, he would be happy, implying that we hadn't. But have they changed their position on the necessary character of a legally binding charter?

MR. MCCURRY: They really, on that issue, did not spend time because that's an issue that has been well-rehearsed now by the discussions that have occurred prior to the meeting here today, and our view is pretty well-known on that.

Q Well, what did you mean then when you said earlier -- I think you said it would be politically binding? You mean just a statement of promises?

MR. MCCURRY: Politically binding means it's a commitment that the United States is going to carry out along with its ally partners.

Q Mike, is there any progress on any issue?

MR. MCCURRY: By the way, for those of you in the White House Press Corps, the State Department Press Corps is treating me with the deference deserved a White House Press Secretary because --

Q We knew you then.

MR. MCCURRY: -- they would not have let me get away with this in my place of prior employment.

Q Yeltsin's comments earlier today were rather tough in tone. Did Primakov have similar tone, or was he more conciliatory?

MR. MCCURRY: No, this is a working meeting and the Foreign Minister properly was grateful for the opportunity to see the President of the United States. They had a good review of the areas in which they'll have discussion in Helsinki, to be sure, and talked about that. They really talked about those issues that the two Presidents will need to address in addition to reviewing the work that's been done by the delegations at various levels to prepare for the summit.

Q Mike, have you heard anything new in Russian position today?

MR. MCCURRY: We've heard a lot of good commitment to addressing those issues that are clearly outstanding and clearly where there's some disagreements. There will likely continue to be disagreements after the summit in Helsinki. I can't imagine that we will resolve all the issues that are pending, but there will be a relationship here that is productive, that is moving forward, and that will aim this relationship to the 21st century, which is what the President's objective is in the first place.

Q Would you consider the issue of military infrastructure and how both sides define that as one of those issues on which you spent a lot of time over the weekend?

MR. MCCURRY: Not today, but my understanding is a substantial portion of time was spent on that issue as the Foreign Minister met with Secretary Cohen. I believe they might have even spent some time on issues like that in some of the sessions with Secretary Albright.

Q Are the two sides any closer together on this one issue?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to speculate whether they're closer together or farther together, but I think there is still work to be done.

Q When the two Presidents meet, will they discuss the lag time between the first set of admissions to an expanded NATO any subsequent ones?

MR. MCCURRY: I suspect that timing sequences and issues like that will be something that will be discussed right

up through the summit.

Q What was discussed on that today?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that there was any detailed discussion of that point today, but I think that there will probably be a future discussion.

Q Are you saying that Russia had some kind of say over the timing sequence?

MR. MCCURRY: No, I'm just saying that's an issue that I think the Presidents will have to address.

Q Last week you characterized the meeting as perhaps more ordinary than extraordinary. Is that what you're going with still, now?

MR. MCCURRY: Even less extraordinary than might otherwise have indicated. I think they've got work to do and there will continue to be work to do. And the President, at the end of the meeting today, really made the point that I think is fundamental, that will certainly be a part of our presentation -- that the United States and Russia are in this relationship for the long haul. They have the capacity together to do extraordinary things as we think about the 21st century and think about Europe and the 21st century and an undivided democratic Europe in the 21st century, but there is a substantial amount of work that needs to be done to clear away the residue of the Cold War period. And that's a large part of the work that this summit will be about that and that type of work will likely continue for coming years.

Q You've got another day now before Helsinki. Is this the end of Primakov meetings here?

MR. MCCURRY: The Foreign Minister, my understanding is, was flying back and planned to meet almost immediately upon his return with President Yeltsin.

Q Mike, did you make any progress or was there any progress either on CFE or any discussion at all about the outlines of a START III?

MR. MCCURRY: The President mentioned the conventional

forces in Europe discussions that have occurred in Geneva and elsewhere and the position advanced by the U.S. side, and talked about the importance of that and said that he hoped the Foreign Minister would relay that to President Yeltsin. And of course, a large part of these discussions over the last several days have been about the ratification of START II and the future of strategic arms reductions beyond that.

Q But did the President talk in broad outlines about what the United States would like to see or could imagine inside a START III agreement?

MR. MCCURRY: He didn't talk in detail about that, but he referenced some of the detailed discussions that have occurred over the weekend about that.

Q Mike, is it the administration's position that the NATO summit and expansion will proceed regardless of whether there is any agreement on any of these other issues, such as -- demarcation or any of these other issues?

MR. MCCURRY: The North Atlantic Alliance is committed to a course of action on expansion that is well-known and that is proceeding and will proceed. But we do think it's fundamentally important to address some of these other issues and resolve some of these issues as well, and importantly, to address in a very specific way the relationship the United States would like to see evolve between NATO and the Russian Federation, which is a large part of this summit is about helping to guide those discussions, very important discussions, that are occurring between Secretary General Solana on behalf of the Alliance and the Russian Federation.

Q Is it necessary to have this charter worked out before NATO expands?

MR. MCCURRY: Necessary is kind of a fungible concept. I mean, it's important to move that forward, and it has to move forward consistent with the unanimous view of 16 members of the Alliance and the agreements and commitment of the Russian Federation. We obviously are trying to advance those discussions, and that will be a purpose in the talks between the two Presidents.

Q What is our position now on the 10-year

moratorium for the second -- of countries to join NATO?

MR. MCCURRY: We haven't changed our view that this is not -- the members that will be considered for entry into NATO in Madrid will certainly not be the last of members that will be considered, that this will be an inclusive process that will continue. And we would address only in the context of agreement at 16 what we would say about timing and sequencing of additional membership.

Q Is it still the Russian position of 10 years?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to attempt to explain the nuances of their position.

Q Continuing a theme from the previous briefing, this is the first meeting that the President's had since he injured his knee. Did it make any difference? Was it a factor at all?

MR. MCCURRY: No. He's actually moving around a little more than I think the doctors wanted him to, because I saw Dr. Mariano frowning at one point as she paced around in the hallway.

Q Moving around in a chair?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes. He did his briefing with his foreign policy advisors in one room and received Foreign Minister Primakov in the Yellow Room, and he's been dragging up and down the hall on the crutches, and the doctor probably would like him to take it a little easier.

Q Did he just sit -- was he in a wheelchair? I mean, could you --

MR. MCCURRY: Have we released the pictures? I think we are going to release the picture -- they sat in two chairs, side by side. The President had his leg slightly elevated on a little footstool that was available for him. The Vice President held the crutches for him. (Laughter.)

Q Did he pull them at any point? (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: And the President was able to lift his leg, cross his leg a couple of times. So he's starting to move

it around a little bit.

Q First, can you rule out the other side used any knee-jerk position?

MR. MCCURRY: No, they were -- (laughter) --

Q On ABM, TMD, the Russians care a lot about --

MR. MCCURRY: And we do, too. Resolving those demarkation issues are critical to us.

Q Do you have any sense they're sort of willing to think more about the world as it is now as opposed to the world as it may be 20 years from now?

MR. MCCURRY: I think there is a great deal of thinking. That's about all I can say at this point -- a great deal of thinking going into their position, and I think the Foreign Minister presented their thinking quite well. But it's clearly an issue that will require further exchanges even perhaps between the two Presidents.

Q So lots of work still to do on this issue, too?

MR. MCCURRY: Right. When I hinted last week that we were not anticipating major breakthroughs or resolving some of these outstanding efforts, I was not simply lowering expectations.

Q But is there any area where they reached agreement today? Primakov said out on the lawn that in some cases we have success. I'm not quite sure --

MR. MCCURRY: They've made very productive progress in their discussions. And remember, there are three areas here -- the are a basket of economic issues are those that I think are in some ways most compelling to the President when he thinks about the future of this relationship. How we engage economically with Russia and how Russia really begins to seize the economic opportunities that it has and how that begins to affect the equation is really in the long-term I think what the President thinks is far more important to the future of this relationship. So they have made some progress related to those issues; hopefully we'll have some more to say about that. But

they at the same time have got a number of pieces of work left on the security and arms control portions of the dialogue, and we'll have to see where we end up.

...

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Subject: Get ready for the SUMMIT

NEW YORK TIMES, March 18, 1997

"Yeltsin's Envoy Describes Helsinki Summit as Crucial"

By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- After meeting President Clinton on Monday, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, emphasized Moscow's openness to a new relationship with NATO but maintained a tough public stance against the alliance's expansion.

Primakov met Clinton, who is recovering from leg surgery, for an hour in the family quarters of the White House. He emerged to stress the "extreme importance" of the summit meeting this week in Helsinki, Finland, for Russia's overall relations with the United States.

American officials hope for agreement on the principles of a charter between the two presidents, with orders to their subordinates to keep working on the contentious issues. One official called the document two-thirds complete, but with the most difficult military issues unresolved "and a lot of work left to do."

The Americans mean the charter to be a general statement of goals and principles; it is expected to include NATO's well-publicized pledges that the alliance has "no need, no intention and no plan" to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, and that, "in the current and foreseeable security environment," it would not station foreign NATO troops in new member states. But NATO is not prepared to promise "never," and will not accept Russia's insistence that it

do so, American officials say.

In meetings this weekend with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Defense Secretary William Cohen, Primakov negotiated firmly on specific issues of NATO-Russian military relations and Russian-American disagreements over missile defenses and strategic arms, American officials said.

But officials also said that the Russians had moved significantly toward negotiating the charter. Russia is seeking the best deal it can get before deciding whether or not to take it. American officials said they hoped that decision would come before the NATO meeting in July to invite new members to join.

President Boris Yeltsin said in Moscow on Monday that it was time for American concessions. "Our diplomats have made enough concessions to the United States," he said. "We can't move any further."

But the Russians have privately dropped some demands that NATO found unacceptable. They no longer request that NATO not expand, or that new memberships be political only. They no longer insist that the charter be "legally binding" and ratified by the legislatures of all NATO states. Still, American officials caution that Moscow could revive this demand.

NATO has also offered a joint proposal to alter the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty to mollify Russian military concerns. The alliance offered deep cuts in its ceilings for conventional weapons in Western Europe, while freezing weapons ceilings in Central Europe, which would include new member nations.

But NATO is refusing a Russian demand to promise not to modernize military installations and equipment in new member nations. NATO does not want to have "second-class" members. More important, in times of threat, it insists on being able to reinforce new members with alliance troops. NATO's military plans depend on the ability to send reinforcements when necessary, the officials say, and it will not promise Moscow otherwise.

There are two important issues the Russians have associated with NATO enlargement, and the Americans hope for progress in these areas at Helsinki.

The Russian Parliament has not ratified the second strategic arms reduction treaty, Start 2, which bans multiple-warhead land-based missiles. The Americans have offered -- and are negotiating -- binding guidelines on a Start 3 treaty to slash limits on both sides, to perhaps 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. That would allow the Russians to skip building up to Start 2 limits of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads. But Washington insists that Start 2 be ratified first.

The second problem is a new generation of anti-missile defenses. The Americans are working on "theater missile defenses" that do not violate existing treaties. Although the two sides largely agree on how to limit currently possible missiles, the Russians want to foreclose developments far into the future.

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RTna 03/18 0430 Arms control issues at the Helsinki summit

HELSINKI, March 18 (Reuter) - From nuclear missiles to the new threats of the post-Cold War era, arms control issues are a key feature of the summit between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday and Friday.

Some of them represent unfinished business from the time when the United States and the Soviet Union were trapped in confrontation, others are linked to Western efforts to reassure Russia over NATO enlargement.

Following are details of the arms control issues for Helsinki:

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Although the two superpowers made major cuts in their arsenals immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the pace of nuclear arms reductions has now slowed and there is a deadlock over an important U.S.-Russian treaty.

The United States is pushing for a new round of deeper nuclear cuts with Russia, but first wants the Russian parliament (Duma) to ratify the long-delayed START-2 treaty which was signed in 1993.

Communist and nationalist opponents of that treaty, which would cut the number of long-range missile warheads on each side to about one-third of the level they were a decade ago, say it leaves Russia at a severe disadvantage.

Russia is particularly concerned by the U.S. superiority in submarine-launched nuclear missiles.

Clinton is expected to outline some ways of reassuring the Russians on nuclear issues, in an attempt to get START-2 ratified before moving on to further cuts in a new treaty.

START stands for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

#### CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

The two presidents will discuss changes to a 1990 treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe.

As part of its attempts to ease Russian concerns over NATO enlargement, the alliance recently proposed major reforms of the Cold War-era agreement to reflect Moscow's demands for changes.

Russia says it is outnumbered and outgunned now that the Warsaw Pact has disappeared.

By adapting limits on how much military hardware can be held by countries that have signed the treaty, NATO hopes to convince Russia that fears of a military buildup on its borders following the alliance's enlargement are unfounded.

The changes have to be formally agreed at 30-nation talks in Vienna and it is not yet clear whether they go far enough to satisfy the Russians.

#### MISSILE DEFENCES, OTHER ISSUES

The United States is also hoping to lay to rest a long-running dispute with Russia over a 1972 treaty on missile defences. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty is another Cold War agreement that now has different implications.

Washington wants to cooperate with Moscow on the potential missile threat from other countries labelled as "rogue nations," one of the new security problems.

But Russia is suspicious of what it sees as U.S. efforts to circumvent the terms of the treaty as Washington presses on with developing new anti-missile defences.

The two presidents may also discuss international efforts to ban anti-personnel land mines and to negotiate an end to the production of fissile material, the highly-enriched uranium or plutonium which is used to make nuclear weapons

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RTw 03/18 0645 Russia, U.K. boost military ties, differ on NATO

By Gareth Jones

MOSCOW, March 18 (Reuter) - The defence ministers of Russia and Britain agreed on Tuesday to expand bilateral military ties but remained divided on the thorny issue of NATO expansion.

Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov and his British counterpart Michael Portillo signed a memorandum paving the way for increased contacts between their ministries and between the armed forces of the former Cold War foes.

"The documents we have signed cover a very wide range of issues, including arms reduction, joint exercises, exchanges of delegations and consultations," Rodionov told reporters after the signing ceremony in the Russian Defence Ministry.

Portillo, on a two-day visit to Moscow, said the bilateral agreement was part of wider efforts to bring Russia into closer contact with the Western military establishment but acknowledged that NATO's expansion plans still overshadowed relations.

"Of course we know that Russia has very strongly felt views on this issue but there is also a very strong commitment in NATO to sign a new charter with Russia...as equal partners," he said.

Moscow is fiercely opposed to the Atlantic alliance's plans to admit former members of the Warsaw Pact, saying they pose a threat to its own security. NATO is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join at a summit in July.

Russia, unable to halt the expansion, wants a legally binding charter with NATO, including guarantees that allied troops and nuclear arms will not be deployed in new member states.

"We don't just want a declaration or promise, any charter must be binding," Rodionov said.

The alliance prefers a more flexible document and also rejects Moscow's demand that former Soviet republics, particularly the Baltic states, should be permanently barred from NATO membership.

Rodionov and Portillo both said they hoped U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin would reach a compromise agreement at their summit in Helsinki this week.

NATO enlargement is expected to top the summit's agenda, which will also focus on arms control and economic issues.

Rodionov said he would not be going to Helsinki but the decision appeared unrelated to recent speculation that he might lose his job after Yeltsin criticised him for "whining" about the parlous state of Russia's cash-strapped armed forces.

The reserve general was unaffected by government changes announced on Monday and looks likely to stay in his post for now, despite his calls for more money to fund vital reforms in the armed forces.

Rodionov told reporters that he had discussed with Yeltsin on Monday the sacking of several generals for being involved in "matters incompatible with their official activities."

Portillo said that, under the terms of the joint memorandum, Britain was keen to help Russia in its military reforms, which will involve big cuts in the number of officers and soldiers.

Ironically it was Portillo, not Rodionov, who had to field questions about his political future following British Prime Minister John Major's decision on Monday to set a general election for May 1.

Portillo said he was confident that his Conservatives would win a fifth term in office despite the opposition Labour Party's big lead in the opinion polls.

"Everything is to play for...Labour's instincts are all wrong. It will put at risk the Conservatives' achievements over the past

18 years," Portillo said.

Asked about the top-selling Sun newspaper's decision to desert the Conservatives and back Labour in the election Portillo said: "The editor of the Sun has just one vote."

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RTw 03/18 0511 U.S.-Moscow summits since Cold War's end

HELSINKI, March 18 (Reuter) - This week's U.S.-Russian summit is the latest in a tradition of meetings which were once aimed at reducing superpower tensions during the Cold War but now focus on cooperation.

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev started the ball rolling in 1959.

Since then, U.S. and Soviet leaders have met in cities around the world, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 turned them into U.S.-Russian summits.

The Helsinki summit -- the first in the Finnish capital since 1990 -- will be the 11th time Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton have met.

Following is a chronology of summits since the end of the Cold War:

December 1989

-- Less than a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meet on a ship off Malta, dubbed the "seasick summit" because of gales and high seas. They agree to accelerate negotiations on cutting long-range nuclear missiles and conventional forces in Europe.

May-June 1990

-- Gorbachev visits Washington for follow-up summit that is hailed as a proof of growing superpower rapport.

September 1990

-- Bush hastily arranges one-day meeting in Helsinki, primarily to show U.S.-Soviet unity in midst of Gulf crisis after Iraq invades Kuwait. Now seen as a brief "golden age" of superpower cooperation which would not last.

November 1990

-- Bush and Gorbachev meet at European security conference summit in Paris, hold further talks on Gulf.

July 1991

-- Bush and Gorbachev meet after Group of Seven economic summit in London, announce deal on strategic arms reduction treaty (START) to cut their long-range nuclear missile arsenals.

February 1992

-- Bush and Russian President Yeltsin hold first meeting since dissolution of Soviet Union in December 1991. Focus on arms control and Western aid for Russia during talks at Camp David, which result in declaration that two countries no longer "regard each other as potential adversaries."

June 1992

-- At formal summit in Washington, Bush, Yeltsin agree in principle to slash strategic weapons arsenals by about two-thirds by 2003, to be formalised later as START-2 pact. Yeltsin appeals for aid to bolster Russian economic reforms.

January 1993

-- Yeltsin, Bush sign START-2 Pact in Kremlin during 24-hour Bush visit to Moscow on his final foreign trip before leaving office. Bush says pact offers "a future free from fear"; Yeltsin calls it "a treaty of hope."

April 1993

-- Yeltsin and the newly elected Bill Clinton hold introductory summit in Vancouver, Canada, to discuss emergency aid for Yeltsin's embattled economic and democratic reforms. Clinton announces immediate U.S. aid package worth \$1.6 billion and plans to press for more, long-term Western multilateral aid.

July 1993

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold talks in connection with summit of seven industrial nations in Tokyo, with continued Russian bid for economic assistance the main issue. G-7 endorses \$3 billion package to promote privatisation of economies in former Soviet Union.

January 1994

-- Clinton visits Moscow on first European tour to show support for Yeltsin and reformers, shaken by strong showing of ultranationalists and Communists in December parliamentary elections. Tells Yeltsin United States, Russia must work together on global security.

July 1994

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold bilateral meeting during annual G-7 summit in Naples, Italy. Yeltsin makes spirited pitch for United States and allies to dismantle remaining Cold War trade barriers to do more business with Moscow.

September 1994

-- Yeltsin, Clinton hold their third formal summit, signing a "partnership for economic progress" and a joint statement pledging to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also agree to accelerate the timetable for scrapping nuclear warheads covered by arms treaties.

May 1995

-- The two meet in Moscow after celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the World War Two victory over Nazi Germany. Differences over Russia's planned sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, but Russia agrees to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme of cooperation.

June 1995

-- The leaders meet in Halifax, Canada, again on the sidelines of a G7 summit. Yeltsin asks for Russian membership of exclusive rich nations' club.

October 1995

-- After good-humoured summit at Hyde Park, north of New York, Clinton and Yeltsin announce agreement to cooperate in policing Bosnian peace accord.

March 1996

-- They meet in the Egyptian resort of Sharm El-Sheikh at an international conference to combat terrorism, following killings that threaten to disrupt Middle East peace process.

April 1996

-- At an eight-nation summit on nuclear safety in Moscow, Clinton and Yeltsin both have their eyes on their respective re-election campaigns. Yeltsin wins in July, very much against the odds. Clinton wins easy victory in November.

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Subject: CD update

To DisInt receivers

DisInt 1997 report 2.2: Geneva Update

17 March, 1997

## AGENDA BUT NO WORK AT CD

### Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed on February 13 to adopt an eight point agenda, but is still deadlocked on its work programme. It has therefore been impossible to convene any ad hoc committees or appoint special coordinators on anything. Proposals have been made to negotiate on three issues: a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban); anti-personnel landmines (AP mines); and nuclear disarmament. These were therefore the focus of formal and informal consultations and discussions, with the President, in groups and in plenary. A few delegations also called for the CD to undertake negotiations (or at least further discussions) on negative security assurances (NSA), prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and regional conventional disarmament.

The European countries are deeply divided over the issues of landmines and nuclear disarmament. On AP mines, France and Britain are backing a joint initiative for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on exports and transfers. However, Belgium, Austria and Ireland are among the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa fast-track, aiming for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all AP mines by the end of this year. In an attempt to paper over the cracks, diplomats in Brussels cobbled together a draft mandate that put a phased approach in the context of the objective of a full ban. This has been discussed, but not yet agreed, by the western group members. The formal position of most western group members is that they would not oppose negotiations in the CD providing that they complemented and reinforced the Ottawa Process. Similarly, Russia, China and several non-aligned and eastern European states are saying little, although they want to retain the option to use AP mines as long as possible. This has left Mexico carrying the burden of out-front opposition to putting landmines negotiations into the CD, although its formal position is that it remains to be convinced that the CD is the appropriate forum. It now looks unlikely that the CD will have taken a decision on this issue before the next meeting of the Ottawa Process, in Brussels, June 24-27. It is hoped that the prospects for success of the fast track approach will be much clearer by then, which could simplify the options before the CD.

The chances for achieving a fissile materials ban in the CD look less and less promising. Despite repeated calls from many countries for negotiations to commence immediately, and despite the view reiterated by both western and non-aligned delegations that the Shannon mandate is broad enough to enable the issue of stocks to be addressed within the context of negotiations, incentive is lacking. The reasons include linkage with a timetable for nuclear disarmament and a growing lack of enthusiasm from some of the nuclear weapon states, who are no longer confident that multilateral

negotiations will deliver adherence by the threshold states, and from some of the non-aligned, who consider that the 'value added' to the moratoria is not sufficient to warrant the time and resources of multilateral negotiations unless the fissban has a stronger disarmament component, especially with respect to existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority for many states. Since the western nuclear powers, Britain, France and the United States, continue to oppose an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the deadlock on this conditions the overall paralysis in the CD. With Jesse Helms sitting on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States, it seems unlikely that the Clinton Administration would risk any positive moves on any other area of arms control that the hard-line Republicans might portray as 'weakness' on defence until that important treaty is through. It is also unlikely that Britain would show flexibility before its general election, called for May 1. While few now anticipate any dramatic change of policy on nuclear matters if the Labour Party wins, a more constructive attitude towards negotiations might well be forthcoming, which could result in withdrawal of Britain's adamant opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee.

Since so little is happening in the CD, Geneva's disarmament delegations have devoted the majority of their time over the past two months to other issues, including strengthening the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), where progress is slow and painstaking, and getting agreement on the CTBT Organisation.

#### Agenda Agreed

The CD requires both an agenda and a programme of work. The generalised agenda, based on the 10 point decalogue adopted at the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, is a form of ritual. Therefore, adoption of the following agenda by the 755th CD plenary, chaired by Ambassador Joun Yung Sun of the Republic of Korea, did not get the CD working, but only took the small step of resolving a theological (and, some would say, diversionary) procedural debate.

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
7. Transparency in armaments
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In an oblique reference regarding the debate over whether a ban on landmines should be negotiated at the CD, the President read into the record the following understanding: 'If there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues they could be dealt with within this agenda.'

As acknowledged by the President, the 1997 agenda is the same as the 1996 agenda minus the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In joining consensus, Germany stated a formal reservation over repeating an annual formula. Germany would have preferred the agenda to have explicitly included the concrete issues under discussion, such as the fissban and landmines, rather than vague and generalised categories.

No agreement on work

With the agenda agreed, the substantive and more difficult question remains: what issues should the CD negotiate or prepare to negotiate? The programme of work has to be much more specific, bearing only a loose relationship with the agenda, as evidenced by the President's on-the-record understanding.

Proposals have been made for ad hoc committees on three issues:

- \* fissile ban convention
- \* nuclear disarmament
- \* anti-personnel landmines

Attempts by Sun to focus informal discussions on these three topics caused a furious exchange in the 754th plenary on February 6. The Mexican Ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, said categorically that 'Mines have no role to play here' and that his delegation would not participate in discussions aimed at putting landmines into the CD's programme of work. In Mexico's view, priority should be accorded first to nuclear disarmament, then to negative security assurances (NSA), and thirdly to regional conventional disarmament. Ambassador Mounir Zahran said that Egypt would not oppose any new item but had reservations over separating the fissban item from nuclear disarmament: 'the 'fissban' or 'cut-off'...could be discussed as a sub-item of nuclear disarmament.' He would also consider security assurances, the prevention of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race as sub-items of nuclear disarmament. India's Ambassador Arundhati Ghose underlined the 'paramount importance' of the issue of nuclear disarmament.

For the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar responded to de Icaza's objections to discussing landmines, by pointing out that 'there is no

consensus in this Conference on what is called "nuclear disarmament". He said that the US was opposed 'to the concept of the Conference on Disarmament doing "nuclear disarmament"'. China did not want the discussions to be limited to only three topics, arguing that the CD should establish ad hoc committees on NSA as well as on outer space. France, the Netherlands and Britain commended the President on his initiative and put in a plea for trying to 'get this show on the road'. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram suggested getting the agenda agreed first, followed by discussions on negotiating mechanisms and work programme. However, he warned against preordaining the items for consultation.

The debate which spilled into the February 6 plenary was just the tip of an iceberg of bilateral and group consultations with successive presidents, first Sun, and then Pavel Greco of Romania. Handing on his presidency to Russia, Greco told the 760th plenary on March 13 that the consultations had been useful. He emphasised that the purpose of addressing the three issues separately was for each to be approached on its own merits, without the 'destructive linkage' that bedevilled the Conference. However, though he thanked everyone for their cooperation, he had to admit defeat.

Notwithstanding the objections to the Presidential identification of the three items for priority consideration, and alternative suggestions for work put forward by China, Mexico and others, the fissban, nuclear disarmament and landmines are in fact the three areas under serious consideration. It therefore makes sense to consider each of these in turn.

#### Fissban

In March 1995 the 38-member CD accepted a report from the Canadian Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon, with a mandate to negotiate a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. The CD has since been unable to convene a committee to do this. During discussions over a mandate in 1994 and 1995, the major difficulty was over stockpiles, the product of past production. The five nuclear weapon states, India and Israel (though not yet a CD member) were prepared only to negotiate a cut-off of future production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria were most prominent among the countries which argued for past production also to be taken into account, arguing that a cut-off would leave stockpiles untouched, thereby merely reinforcing the inequalities of the nuclear status quo. However, since 1995, the major point of contention is the relationship between the fissban and nuclear disarmament.

When the G21 group of non-aligned states were working on their programme of

action for nuclear disarmament in August 1996, India insisted that four measures identified for immediate negotiations should be addressed concurrently. These were:

- a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
- a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The 'concurrent' addition was unsuccessfully opposed by some G-21 delegations. South Africa's Ambassador Selebi called it a recipe 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although a number of G-21 delegations privately agreed, only South Africa and Chile refused to co-sponsor the programme, which now forms the basis for G-21 discussions over a mandate for the proposed nuclear disarmament committee. The fact that the fissban came fourth in the list was also not lost on the rest of the CD, although the G-21 claimed the order was unimportant since the measures were to be addressed concurrently.

Since then, alliances have shifted slightly, but no real progress has been made. During 1997, numerous western and European countries called on the CD to convene the committee immediately and get on with fissban negotiations. Many referred to the priority accorded the fissban in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by NPT parties in May 1995. Spain's Ambassador Amador Martinez Morcillo called it the 'next, complementary step'. New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Don McKinnon, said that a fissban would 'constitute a prerequisite step...towards a nuclear weapon free world'. He emphasised that a fissban should cap the fissile materials available not only to the declared nuclear weapon states but also to those with unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plants, and would 'contribute to ensuring the conditions under which the process of nuclear disarmament can broaden, constrain the opportunities for vertical proliferation and help prevent any future resumption of the nuclear arms race.'

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Eugeniusz Wyzner, echoed this view, saying that a fissban represented 'a significant supplement to the NPT and CTBT'. Sweden's Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, agreed, saying the fissban treaty was 'of the highest significance both for continued nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation'. Hungary's Ambassador Peter Naray said that the fissban was 'ripe for serious negotiations' and that the mandate in the March 1995 Shannon report 'accommodates the different shades of opinion' with respect to existing stocks. Slovakia's Ambassador Maria Krasnohorska concurred:

'Special Coordinator Ambassador Shannon's mandate can serve as the basis of the ad hoc committee's work [and] is broad enough to meet all legitimate concerns.' Switzerland also encouraged the CD to get on with it, while Ireland's Ambassador Anne Anderson called for an immediate start to fissban negotiations 'on the basis of the Shannon mandate'. Austria's Ambassador Harald Kreid shared the view of non-aligned nations that nuclear disarmament was of utmost importance, but urged the CD to start work on a fissban, for 'if we are not able to solve the daunting issue of nuclear disarmament in one great stroke now, let us attend to what is feasible'. Kreid refused to dodge the sensitive issue of stocks, voicing the concerns of many western delegations (as well as the non-aligned) when he commented that negotiations 'would inevitably have to touch upon the question of stockpiles, even if they would remain outside of the treaty, because it is hard to see how [a] cut-off could be verified without transparency with regard to existing stockpiles.' Clearly referring to South Asia and the Middle East, Kreid added that improvising transparency and confidence could be important regionally.

Notwithstanding these exhortations, there is a growing view that (with the possible exception of the United States), the nuclear weapon states are less than enthusiastic, while the non-aligned want much more. Prior to the consensus UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L in 1993, from which the CD mandate derived, the US and Russia, awash with plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads, brokered agreement among the P-5 to agree multilateral negotiations on a basic cut-off. This was accompanied by declared moratoria on production from Britain, France, Russia and the United States, and a widespread (but unconfirmed) belief that China has also now halted its fissile materials production programme. The moratoria, while intended to encourage negotiations, have paradoxically led to diminished commitment to make the halt legally binding. For the smaller nuclear weapon states, a voluntary moratorium earns them brownie points while leaving open an escape hatch if they should want to restart production in the future. They have made it clear that they are only interested in a multilateral cut-off that brings the threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan, on board but does not touch stockpiles. For many non-nuclear-weapon countries, the moratoria remove the pressure for speedy action. This makes them reconsider the cost of negotiating a treaty in the CD, which could take considerable time and resources, while also encouraging them to hold out for a more substantial measure, including stockpiles.

Most non-aligned statements incorporated their remarks on a fissban or cut-off in their positions on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Syria made no specific mention of a fissban in its intervention on February 6, although it endorsed the G-28 programme of action. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer suggested establishing a nuclear disarmament committee 'under which separate

working groups would take up issues such as the fissile materials convention and nuclear disarmament measures.' Furthermore, he stated that if the Shannon mandate were to be the basis for fissban negotiations, 'it is our expectation that the question of stocks will be dealt with within committee discussions on the scope of the future treaty.' He gave two reasons for this: i) adequate verification of a ban on production would require knowledge and accountability with regard to fissile materials already in existence; and ii) the moratoria.

He stated that 'if the future treaty is to have real impact beyond non-proliferation, and we hope it will, it would therefore also have to go beyond the narrow scope that some currently envisage for it.' Reiterating one of its concerns regarding the CTBT implementing organisation, Brazil also required that the costs of verification for a fissban should not 'unduly burden' countries which already accept safeguards, such as members of the NPT or regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

De Icaza argued that the 'implicit mandate' in Shannon's report 'should allow that, within the ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes as well as the problem of past production and management of existing stocks be examined, so as to make sure that any production of nuclear weapons will cease.' Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi said that Indonesia considered the fissban would 'significantly contribute' to non-proliferation, but emphasised that it should 'encompass not only the future production but also the past production', in order to fulfil a disarmament commitment as well. If stockpiles were brushed aside, the cut-off would be 'a mere non-proliferation measure' with 'no added value to date ... [and] therefore unappealing'. However, Indonesia would be ready to 'revisit the question' of a fissban, with the understanding that the Shannon mandate 'acknowledged that this issue [stocks] to which many delegations attach great importance cannot be isolated...'

## Landmines

There has been considerable manoeuvring on the question of negotiating a ban on landmines in the CD since US President Clinton called for this on January 17. Both the UK and France gave strong and early backing, with Britain putting forward a draft mandate for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on the export, import or transfer of all AP mines. There is little public expression of outright opposition to negotiating on landmines in the CD, but considerable reluctance, coming from two corners: those who want a 'fast track' total ban, such as Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and others who would prefer to back the Ottawa process, initiated by Canada in October 1996; and those who want to hold open the option of producing and

using landmines, such as Russia, China, Cuba, Syria, North and South Korea. These countries would prefer negotiations to remain within the purview of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The second meeting under the Ottawa Process took place in Vienna from February 12-14. Kreid reported that 111 states participated and that proposals for revising Austria's tentative draft treaty were now being considered. The next meeting will be held in Brussels on June 24-27. Mixed reports of progress are emerging from the Vienna meeting. It is pointed out that of the 111 participants, around 50 are strong supporters of a total ban on AP mines, the others participating as critics, or with the hope of influencing or slowing down the process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ottawa Process intends to move ahead. Since few now expect the CD to have come to agreement on its agenda before June, the tough decision point is likely to come after the Brussels meeting, when the prospects and products of the Ottawa Process have become clearer. Pointing out that the landmines, which he called 'hidden killers' take a toll of 25,000 victims a year, Kreid said that 'the CD cannot simply ponder the matter in its customary slow motion fashion'. Nor would the CD process guarantee participation by all the relevant countries, Kreid warned that 'we are not willing to submit to a strategy of long-term persuasion complete with trade-offs and linkages and subject to an unpredictable stop and go process.' In his view, establishing a universal norm by means of a lawmaking treaty would bring adherents 'in due course'.

Canada spoke on February 6, the week following Britain's proposal for a CD mandate on landmines. Ambassador Mark Moher reiterated that 'use is the problem' and said that Canada had set itself 'a straightforward objective: a legally binding agreement in 1997 to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and, particularly, the use of AP mines.' To this end, the Ottawa Process would 'proceed without interruption until a successful conclusion later this year.' He cast doubt on the 'lengthy step by step approach' but said that Canada would 'not object' if members of the CD wanted to negotiate a ban on exports. However, he said that Canada had 'major difficulty' with the concept underlying the UK proposal. Moher 'acknowledged' those who wanted the CD to deal with the issue, but rejected the view that the Conference was the 'only acceptable mechanism' for this. If the CD wanted to negotiate on landmines, Canada would 'not oppose', but he underlined that Canada set one criterion: that any CD approach 'be complementary to and mutually reinforcing of, the Ottawa Process'. If not, he warned that Canada would oppose.

Ireland spoke in a similar vein two weeks later, underlining that any negotiations on landmines in the CD 'must reinforce and complement other efforts, such as the Ottawa Process, which have already begun, which are

working well, and which have attracted a high level of international support'. After analysing the benefits and drawbacks of the CD and Ottawa approaches, Anderson argued that if the CD took on the issue it would have to 'build on what has already been achieved in terms of international consensus on the way forward'; that negotiations must be comprehensive from the outset and 'must cover the central question of use'; and that the CD must move rapidly. 'If the Conference spends months talking around a mandate, further months discussing the modalities of the negotiations and yet more time on the scope of the convention, then the Conference will not respond to the humanitarian urgency implicit in the words "as soon as possible"'.

While saying that he did not reject the CD out of hand, Ambassador Erwin Hofer made clear that Switzerland prefers the Ottawa process to the CD, since the 'time factor is decisive'. Hofer emphasised that the planned rules should cover 'first, a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, possession, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines, and secondly, an obligation to destroy existing stockpiles.'

Of the non-aligned who made plenary statements, only Mexico expressed a strong opinion on the issue of landmines. De Icaza made two telling arguments against the CD taking on landmines negotiations: i) that it would divert attention from what should be the CD's 'highest priority' -- nuclear disarmament; and ii) that the CD will have the disadvantage of slowness without being able to guarantee universality or the participation of key states. Commenting memorably that 'swiftness is not this Conference's main virtue', de Icaza raised doubts that the CD was 'capable of pursuing and bringing to conclusion more than one negotiation at a time'. In that case, he continued, 'it is necessary not to waste our limited capabilities by undertaking tasks which are not of the highest priority or which would duplicate efforts undertaken in other multilateral fora.' Indonesia seemed largely to share this perspective. Although saying he would not stand in the way if the CD reached agreement on landmines, Tarmidzi reiterated that 'this Conference should not be side-tracked from negotiating the highest priority item in our agenda, namely nuclear disarmament.'

Intending to bolster his argument that the CD was the inappropriate forum, de Icaza argued that the principles for a landmines ban were based on humanitarian and not disarmament considerations. Others, arguing from the opposite side (and advocating the CCW as the appropriate mechanism to deal with AP mines) have made the same distinction. However, as pointed out by Kreid, 'banning a defensive weapon carries with it a strong disarmament dimension as well.' The Ottawa Process recognises this. Although with the objective of outlawing the use of anti-personnel mines, Ottawa is aiming for a treaty which will give teeth to such an objective by banning the

production, stockpiling, export and transfer as well. Recognising the disarmament dimension does not necessarily mean that the CD is the only forum for negotiations. As Kreid pointed out, there are precedents in disarmament law, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, where a small number of states signed the original treaty, opening it for accession by others. By 1974 this treaty was a sufficient international norm that the prospect of a case taken in the ICJ by South Pacific countries over atmospheric testing was decisive in making France halt its atmospheric testing programme, despite having never acceded to the PTBT itself.

Mexico's concern that the US-UK-French initiative to prioritise landmines on the CD's negotiating agenda was in part designed to divert attention from demands for the CD to negotiate further nuclear disarmament measures is shared by many non-aligned delegations. However, several, including Cuba, DPRK, Pakistan and Syria, are less enthusiastic than Mexico for the fast track Ottawa Process as an alternative. Syria referred to the 'pain' it felt at the human suffering caused by AP mines 'in some parts of the world where those mines have been misused'. Its representative, Iyad Orfi, went on to argue that for some states, mines 'are still a legitimate weapon to defend their security and their borders in the face of more lethal weapons.'

While the attitude of several non-aligned states seems to be unenthusiastic either way, Brazil stated its backing for the CD as 'the proper forum for the attainment of a universal and effective ban.' Lafer said that the proposed phased approach could 'yield early results', but said that Brazil would also continue to participate in the Ottawa Process, which could play 'an important role in building political momentum for attaining the goal of a universal ban.'

The western and European states are deeply divided. Although France and Britain have taken the lead in pushing for the CD as the venue for negotiating on landmines, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Ireland have been determined to press ahead with the fast track Ottawa approach. Other western countries are positioned along a continuum between these two strongly held positions, with some leaning closer to Ottawa and others towards the CD. New Zealand's Foreign Minister said that it supported the Ottawa process but could also accept a 'potential role' for the CD, providing it proceeded in parallel with Ottawa and agreed a 'strong mandate supportive of an early and comprehensive outcome.' Sweden's Foreign Minister said that 'the only effective solution to the landmine crisis is a total ban on APLs. No more, no less.' However, she went on to say that Sweden participated in the Ottawa Process and was also ready to do so in the CD. Swedish ratification of the amended Protocol II of the CCW was foreseen for June.

Poland endorsed the Anglo-French proposal for a phased approach within the context of the CD, saying only that it 'noted with interest' the Canadian initiative to conclude a ban by the end of 1997. However, Poland considered that the Ottawa Process and the CD could complement each other and have a 'potentially synergistic effect'. Hungary was a stronger supporter and participant in the Ottawa Process, but Naray said that the 'CD's role in the concert of efforts aimed at a total ban should be considered from the point of view of the universality and efficiency of the future convention.' Hungary could be flexible towards the Anglo-French approach, but 'would have serious difficulties with a mandate not stipulating a total ban on use and production as the ultimate goal of the negotiating process in the CD.'

### Nuclear Disarmament

Both Indonesia and Mexico identified nuclear disarmament as the 'highest priority' for the CD, underlined by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. They both wanted the CD to establish a nuclear disarmament committee, but stopped short of insisting that it be convened with a negotiating mandate from the beginning. Within the G-21 there are attempts to get agreement on a negotiating mandate, but those who opposed the 'concurrent' linkage in the programme of action put forward by 28 of the 30 members of the G-21 in August 1996 are also resisting any mandate which commits the CD to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which they consider impractical at present. They are joined by others, including Egypt and Morocco, who are concerned that if the G-21 demands a negotiating mandate they could frighten away the moderates in the nuclear weapon states.

Three countries continue to oppose a nuclear disarmament committee: Britain, France and the United States. But the positions are not solid. There is an internal debate in all three capitals, with a growing number of pragmatists willing to accept such a committee, under certain conditions (which do not include a mandate to negotiate a treaty or timetable at this point). However, it is clear that unless and until the Clinton Administration can get ratification of the CWC past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Jesse Helms, it is not going to risk showing flexibility on nuclear disarmament, while there is no prospect of Britain moving until after the elections in May, if then.

In their statements, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and also Sweden referred to important new developments, such as the Canberra Commission, the ICJ advisory opinion and the December 5 statement by 61 retired Generals and Admirals calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Indonesia deeply regretted 'the recalcitrant attitude adopted by some of the nuclear weapon states towards the need to immediately negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.' Tarmidzi criticised them for narrowly interpreting their

multilateral legal commitments, particularly article VI of the NPT, by insisting that nuclear disarmament is a 'bilateral exercise and therefore the sole domain of the nuclear weapon states.' He said that article VI and the NPT required prompt action and warned the nuclear weapon states that their prevarication 'may lead to the unravelling' of the NPT.

Brazil referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons as 'the paramount task' for the CD, proposing that a fissban and other measures could be negotiated under the overall umbrella of a nuclear disarmament committee. Lafer argued that making further progress on nuclear disarmament 'contingent on the prior attainment' of the fissban and even entry into force of the CTBT was just linkage of another sort. Syria addressed the nuclear disarmament by focusing on Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Among the western group, several delegations, including Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Japan made a strong plea for a more constructive attitude towards nuclear disarmament, while warning against linkage and the 'blueprint approach', as Anderson called it. Ireland's ambassador went on to ask why some delegations need reassurance about the direction of incremental nuclear disarmament. Like Austria and Sweden, she enumerated progress in the NPT, CTBT, START I and II (if ratified by Russia), expansion of nuclear weapon free zones adherence, and so on. But she also called on the P-5 to 'set out their perspective, and imbue the words 'systematic and progressive' with meaning...Such a perspective need not be time-bound, but ... a broad elaboration of the next steps they themselves propose to take.' Sweden's Foreign Minister also called for the concept of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament to be given a 'concrete content'. She said that 'the steps must be identified and fully translated into action.' New Zealand's Foreign Minister declared that though the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament had begun in a bilateral framework, 'we are also convinced that sustainable progress is not a matter which can be left solely to the nuclear-weapon states...'

McKinnon went further, calling for a nuclear disarmament committee 'with an overarching mandate...[which] could begin immediately with the cut-off negotiations, while also considering longer term issues.' In effect, it would have 'an active negotiating track and a preparatory track.' This would not be a talk shop, he argued, but one 'which prepared the ground carefully and effectively for eventual negotiations.'

Others sought ways to bridge the gap between those who wanted a committee on nuclear disarmament and those who wanted nothing. Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan proposed that a special coordinator be appointed 'to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result

of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.' This might have proved acceptable last year, but with many members of the G-21 focusing now on a negotiating mandate, a special coordinator could be perceived as a defeat rather than a compromise.

## Conclusion

This is a dismal time for the CD. More than one delegate has likened it to post-natal depression (after the difficult birth of the CTBT). Some hold out hopes that a constructive NPT PrepCom in April could help shift the logjam. Others look forward to a more constructive government in Westminster or a less timid approach in Washington after Senate ratification of the CWC and Russian ratification of START II. Certainly not even the optimists expect any decisions on the CD's programme of work before the end of June. Pointing to the strong reservations (read objections) by significant groups of states on each of the three major issues under discussion, the pessimists doubt that there is sufficient incentive for any movement on anything this year.

## 1997 CD Session

The CD's 1997 session runs from January 20 to March 27; from May 12 to June 27; and from July 28 to September 10.

ends

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From acronym@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:35 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 17:42:34 GMT

From: Rebecca Johnson <acronym@gn.apc.org>

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Subject: CD update

To DisInt receivers

DisInt 1997 report 2.2: Geneva Update

17 March, 1997

## AGENDA BUT NO WORK AT CD

### Summary

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed on February 13 to adopt an eight point agenda, but is still deadlocked on its work programme. It has therefore been impossible to convene any ad hoc committees or appoint special coordinators on anything. Proposals have been made to negotiate on three issues: a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban); anti-personnel landmines (AP mines); and nuclear disarmament. These were therefore the focus of formal and informal consultations and discussions, with the President, in groups and in plenary. A few delegations also called for the CD to undertake negotiations (or at least further discussions) on negative security assurances (NSA), prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and regional conventional disarmament.

The European countries are deeply divided over the issues of landmines and nuclear disarmament. On AP mines, France and Britain are backing a joint initiative for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on exports and transfers. However, Belgium, Austria and Ireland are among the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa fast-track, aiming for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all AP mines by the end of this year. In an attempt to paper over the cracks, diplomats in Brussels cobbled together a draft mandate that put a phased approach in the context of the objective of a full ban. This has been discussed, but not yet agreed, by the western group members. The formal position of most western group members is that they would not oppose negotiations in the CD providing that they complemented and reinforced the Ottawa Process. Similarly, Russia, China and several non-aligned and eastern European states are saying little, although they want to retain the option to use AP mines as long as possible. This has left Mexico carrying the burden of out-front opposition to putting landmines negotiations into the CD, although its formal position is that it remains to be convinced that the CD is the appropriate forum. It now looks unlikely that the CD will have taken a decision on this issue before the next meeting of the Ottawa Process, in Brussels, June 24-27. It is hoped that the prospects for success of the fast track approach will be much clearer by then, which could simplify the options before the CD.

The chances for achieving a fissile materials ban in the CD look less and less promising. Despite repeated calls from many countries for negotiations to commence immediately, and despite the view reiterated by both western and non-aligned delegations that the Shannon mandate is broad enough to enable the issue of stocks to be addressed within the context of negotiations, incentive is lacking. The reasons include linkage with a timetable for nuclear disarmament and a growing lack of enthusiasm from some of the nuclear weapon states, who are no longer confident that multilateral

negotiations will deliver adherence by the threshold states, and from some of the non-aligned, who consider that the 'value added' to the moratoria is not sufficient to warrant the time and resources of multilateral negotiations unless the fissban has a stronger disarmament component, especially with respect to existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority for many states. Since the western nuclear powers, Britain, France and the United States, continue to oppose an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the deadlock on this conditions the overall paralysis in the CD. With Jesse Helms sitting on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States, it seems unlikely that the Clinton Administration would risk any positive moves on any other area of arms control that the hard-line Republicans might portray as 'weakness' on defence until that important treaty is through. It is also unlikely that Britain would show flexibility before its general election, called for May 1. While few now anticipate any dramatic change of policy on nuclear matters if the Labour Party wins, a more constructive attitude towards negotiations might well be forthcoming, which could result in withdrawal of Britain's adamant opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee.

Since so little is happening in the CD, Geneva's disarmament delegations have devoted the majority of their time over the past two months to other issues, including strengthening the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), where progress is slow and painstaking, and getting agreement on the CTBT Organisation.

#### Agenda Agreed

The CD requires both an agenda and a programme of work. The generalised agenda, based on the 10 point decalogue adopted at the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, is a form of ritual. Therefore, adoption of the following agenda by the 755th CD plenary, chaired by Ambassador Joun Yung Sun of the Republic of Korea, did not get the CD working, but only took the small step of resolving a theological (and, some would say, diversionary) procedural debate.

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
7. Transparency in armaments
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In an oblique reference regarding the debate over whether a ban on landmines should be negotiated at the CD, the President read into the record the following understanding: 'If there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues they could be dealt with within this agenda.'

As acknowledged by the President, the 1997 agenda is the same as the 1996 agenda minus the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In joining consensus, Germany stated a formal reservation over repeating an annual formula. Germany would have preferred the agenda to have explicitly included the concrete issues under discussion, such as the fissban and landmines, rather than vague and generalised categories.

No agreement on work

With the agenda agreed, the substantive and more difficult question remains: what issues should the CD negotiate or prepare to negotiate? The programme of work has to be much more specific, bearing only a loose relationship with the agenda, as evidenced by the President's on-the-record understanding.

Proposals have been made for ad hoc committees on three issues:

- \* fissile ban convention
- \* nuclear disarmament
- \* anti-personnel landmines

Attempts by Sun to focus informal discussions on these three topics caused a furious exchange in the 754th plenary on February 6. The Mexican Ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, said categorically that 'Mines have no role to play here' and that his delegation would not participate in discussions aimed at putting landmines into the CD's programme of work. In Mexico's view, priority should be accorded first to nuclear disarmament, then to negative security assurances (NSA), and thirdly to regional conventional disarmament. Ambassador Mounir Zahran said that Egypt would not oppose any new item but had reservations over separating the fissban item from nuclear disarmament: 'the 'fissban' or 'cut-off'...could be discussed as a sub-item of nuclear disarmament.' He would also consider security assurances, the prevention of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race as sub-items of nuclear disarmament. India's Ambassador Arundhati Ghose underlined the 'paramount importance' of the issue of nuclear disarmament.

For the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar responded to de Icaza's objections to discussing landmines, by pointing out that 'there is no

consensus in this Conference on what is called "nuclear disarmament". He said that the US was opposed 'to the concept of the Conference on Disarmament doing "nuclear disarmament"'. China did not want the discussions to be limited to only three topics, arguing that the CD should establish ad hoc committees on NSA as well as on outer space. France, the Netherlands and Britain commended the President on his initiative and put in a plea for trying to 'get this show on the road'. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram suggested getting the agenda agreed first, followed by discussions on negotiating mechanisms and work programme. However, he warned against preordaining the items for consultation.

The debate which spilled into the February 6 plenary was just the tip of an iceberg of bilateral and group consultations with successive presidents, first Sun, and then Pavel Greco of Romania. Handing on his presidency to Russia, Greco told the 760th plenary on March 13 that the consultations had been useful. He emphasised that the purpose of addressing the three issues separately was for each to be approached on its own merits, without the 'destructive linkage' that bedevilled the Conference. However, though he thanked everyone for their cooperation, he had to admit defeat.

Notwithstanding the objections to the Presidential identification of the three items for priority consideration, and alternative suggestions for work put forward by China, Mexico and others, the fissban, nuclear disarmament and landmines are in fact the three areas under serious consideration. It therefore makes sense to consider each of these in turn.

#### Fissban

In March 1995 the 38-member CD accepted a report from the Canadian Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon, with a mandate to negotiate a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. The CD has since been unable to convene a committee to do this. During discussions over a mandate in 1994 and 1995, the major difficulty was over stockpiles, the product of past production. The five nuclear weapon states, India and Israel (though not yet a CD member) were prepared only to negotiate a cut-off of future production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and Algeria were most prominent among the countries which argued for past production also to be taken into account, arguing that a cut-off would leave stockpiles untouched, thereby merely reinforcing the inequalities of the nuclear status quo. However, since 1995, the major point of contention is the relationship between the fissban and nuclear disarmament.

When the G21 group of non-aligned states were working on their programme of

action for nuclear disarmament in August 1996, India insisted that four measures identified for immediate negotiations should be addressed concurrently. These were:

- a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
- a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The 'concurrent' addition was unsuccessfully opposed by some G-21 delegations. South Africa's Ambassador Selebi called it a recipe 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although a number of G-21 delegations privately agreed, only South Africa and Chile refused to co-sponsor the programme, which now forms the basis for G-21 discussions over a mandate for the proposed nuclear disarmament committee. The fact that the fissban came fourth in the list was also not lost on the rest of the CD, although the G-21 claimed the order was unimportant since the measures were to be addressed concurrently.

Since then, alliances have shifted slightly, but no real progress has been made. During 1997, numerous western and European countries called on the CD to convene the committee immediately and get on with fissban negotiations. Many referred to the priority accorded the fissban in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by NPT parties in May 1995. Spain's Ambassador Amador Martinez Morcillo called it the 'next, complementary step'. New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Don McKinnon, said that a fissban would 'constitute a prerequisite step...towards a nuclear weapon free world'. He emphasised that a fissban should cap the fissile materials available not only to the declared nuclear weapon states but also to those with unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plants, and would 'contribute to ensuring the conditions under which the process of nuclear disarmament can broaden, constrain the opportunities for vertical proliferation and help prevent any future resumption of the nuclear arms race.'

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Eugeniusz Wyzner, echoed this view, saying that a fissban represented 'a significant supplement to the NPT and CTBT'. Sweden's Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, agreed, saying the fissban treaty was 'of the highest significance both for continued nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation'. Hungary's Ambassador Peter Naray said that the fissban was 'ripe for serious negotiations' and that the mandate in the March 1995 Shannon report 'accommodates the different shades of opinion' with respect to existing stocks. Slovakia's Ambassador Maria Krasnohorska concurred:

'Special Coordinator Ambassador Shannon's mandate can serve as the basis of the ad hoc committee's work [and] is broad enough to meet all legitimate concerns.' Switzerland also encouraged the CD to get on with it, while Ireland's Ambassador Anne Anderson called for an immediate start to fissban negotiations 'on the basis of the Shannon mandate'. Austria's Ambassador Harald Kreid shared the view of non-aligned nations that nuclear disarmament was of utmost importance, but urged the CD to start work on a fissban, for 'if we are not able to solve the daunting issue of nuclear disarmament in one great stroke now, let us attend to what is feasible'. Kreid refused to dodge the sensitive issue of stocks, voicing the concerns of many western delegations (as well as the non-aligned) when he commented that negotiations 'would inevitably have to touch upon the question of stockpiles, even if they would remain outside of the treaty, because it is hard to see how [a] cut-off could be verified without transparency with regard to existing stockpiles.' Clearly referring to South Asia and the Middle East, Kreid added that improvising transparency and confidence could be important regionally.

Notwithstanding these exhortations, there is a growing view that (with the possible exception of the United States), the nuclear weapon states are less than enthusiastic, while the non-aligned want much more. Prior to the consensus UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L in 1993, from which the CD mandate derived, the US and Russia, awash with plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads, brokered agreement among the P-5 to agree multilateral negotiations on a basic cut-off. This was accompanied by declared moratoria on production from Britain, France, Russia and the United States, and a widespread (but unconfirmed) belief that China has also now halted its fissile materials production programme. The moratoria, while intended to encourage negotiations, have paradoxically led to diminished commitment to make the halt legally binding. For the smaller nuclear weapon states, a voluntary moratorium earns them brownie points while leaving open an escape hatch if they should want to restart production in the future. They have made it clear that they are only interested in a multilateral cut-off that brings the threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan, on board but does not touch stockpiles. For many non-nuclear-weapon countries, the moratoria remove the pressure for speedy action. This makes them reconsider the cost of negotiating a treaty in the CD, which could take considerable time and resources, while also encouraging them to hold out for a more substantial measure, including stockpiles.

Most non-aligned statements incorporated their remarks on a fissban or cut-off in their positions on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Syria made no specific mention of a fissban in its intervention on February 6, although it endorsed the G-28 programme of action. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer suggested establishing a nuclear disarmament committee 'under which separate

working groups would take up issues such as the fissile materials convention and nuclear disarmament measures.' Furthermore, he stated that if the Shannon mandate were to be the basis for fissban negotiations, 'it is our expectation that the question of stocks will be dealt with within committee discussions on the scope of the future treaty.' He gave two reasons for this: i) adequate verification of a ban on production would require knowledge and accountability with regard to fissile materials already in existence; and ii) the moratoria.

He stated that 'if the future treaty is to have real impact beyond non-proliferation, and we hope it will, it would therefore also have to go beyond the narrow scope that some currently envisage for it.' Reiterating one of its concerns regarding the CTBT implementing organisation, Brazil also required that the costs of verification for a fissban should not 'unduly burden' countries which already accept safeguards, such as members of the NPT or regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

De Icaza argued that the 'implicit mandate' in Shannon's report 'should allow that, within the ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes as well as the problem of past production and management of existing stocks be examined, so as to make sure that any production of nuclear weapons will cease.' Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi said that Indonesia considered the fissban would 'significantly contribute' to non-proliferation, but emphasised that it should 'encompass not only the future production but also the past production', in order to fulfil a disarmament commitment as well. If stockpiles were brushed aside, the cut-off would be 'a mere non-proliferation measure' with 'no added value to date ... [and] therefore unappealing'. However, Indonesia would be ready to 'revisit the question' of a fissban, with the understanding that the Shannon mandate 'acknowledged that this issue [stocks] to which many delegations attach great importance cannot be isolated...'

## Landmines

There has been considerable manoeuvring on the question of negotiating a ban on landmines in the CD since US President Clinton called for this on January 17. Both the UK and France gave strong and early backing, with Britain putting forward a draft mandate for a phased approach, beginning with a ban on the export, import or transfer of all AP mines. There is little public expression of outright opposition to negotiating on landmines in the CD, but considerable reluctance, coming from two corners: those who want a 'fast track' total ban, such as Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and others who would prefer to back the Ottawa process, initiated by Canada in October 1996; and those who want to hold open the option of producing and

using landmines, such as Russia, China, Cuba, Syria, North and South Korea. These countries would prefer negotiations to remain within the purview of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The second meeting under the Ottawa Process took place in Vienna from February 12-14. Kreid reported that 111 states participated and that proposals for revising Austria's tentative draft treaty were now being considered. The next meeting will be held in Brussels on June 24-27. Mixed reports of progress are emerging from the Vienna meeting. It is pointed out that of the 111 participants, around 50 are strong supporters of a total ban on AP mines, the others participating as critics, or with the hope of influencing or slowing down the process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ottawa Process intends to move ahead. Since few now expect the CD to have come to agreement on its agenda before June, the tough decision point is likely to come after the Brussels meeting, when the prospects and products of the Ottawa Process have become clearer. Pointing out that the landmines, which he called 'hidden killers' take a toll of 25,000 victims a year, Kreid said that 'the CD cannot simply ponder the matter in its customary slow motion fashion'. Nor would the CD process guarantee participation by all the relevant countries, Kreid warned that 'we are not willing to submit to a strategy of long-term persuasion complete with trade-offs and linkages and subject to an unpredictable stop and go process.' In his view, establishing a universal norm by means of a lawmaking treaty would bring adherents 'in due course'.

Canada spoke on February 6, the week following Britain's proposal for a CD mandate on landmines. Ambassador Mark Moher reiterated that 'use is the problem' and said that Canada had set itself 'a straightforward objective: a legally binding agreement in 1997 to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and, particularly, the use of AP mines.' To this end, the Ottawa Process would 'proceed without interruption until a successful conclusion later this year.' He cast doubt on the 'lengthy step by step approach' but said that Canada would 'not object' if members of the CD wanted to negotiate a ban on exports. However, he said that Canada had 'major difficulty' with the concept underlying the UK proposal. Moher 'acknowledged' those who wanted the CD to deal with the issue, but rejected the view that the Conference was the 'only acceptable mechanism' for this. If the CD wanted to negotiate on landmines, Canada would 'not oppose', but he underlined that Canada set one criterion: that any CD approach 'be complementary to and mutually reinforcing of, the Ottawa Process'. If not, he warned that Canada would oppose.

Ireland spoke in a similar vein two weeks later, underlining that any negotiations on landmines in the CD 'must reinforce and complement other efforts, such as the Ottawa Process, which have already begun, which are

working well, and which have attracted a high level of international support'. After analysing the benefits and drawbacks of the CD and Ottawa approaches, Anderson argued that if the CD took on the issue it would have to 'build on what has already been achieved in terms of international consensus on the way forward'; that negotiations must be comprehensive from the outset and 'must cover the central question of use'; and that the CD must move rapidly. 'If the Conference spends months talking around a mandate, further months discussing the modalities of the negotiations and yet more time on the scope of the convention, then the Conference will not respond to the humanitarian urgency implicit in the words "as soon as possible"'.

While saying that he did not reject the CD out of hand, Ambassador Erwin Hofer made clear that Switzerland prefers the Ottawa process to the CD, since the 'time factor is decisive'. Hofer emphasised that the planned rules should cover 'first, a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, possession, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines, and secondly, an obligation to destroy existing stockpiles.'

Of the non-aligned who made plenary statements, only Mexico expressed a strong opinion on the issue of landmines. De Icaza made two telling arguments against the CD taking on landmines negotiations: i) that it would divert attention from what should be the CD's 'highest priority' -- nuclear disarmament; and ii) that the CD will have the disadvantage of slowness without being able to guarantee universality or the participation of key states. Commenting memorably that 'swiftness is not this Conference's main virtue', de Icaza raised doubts that the CD was 'capable of pursuing and bringing to conclusion more than one negotiation at a time'. In that case, he continued, 'it is necessary not to waste our limited capabilities by undertaking tasks which are not of the highest priority or which would duplicate efforts undertaken in other multilateral fora.' Indonesia seemed largely to share this perspective. Although saying he would not stand in the way if the CD reached agreement on landmines, Tarmidzi reiterated that 'this Conference should not be side-tracked from negotiating the highest priority item in our agenda, namely nuclear disarmament.'

Intending to bolster his argument that the CD was the inappropriate forum, de Icaza argued that the principles for a landmines ban were based on humanitarian and not disarmament considerations. Others, arguing from the opposite side (and advocating the CCW as the appropriate mechanism to deal with AP mines) have made the same distinction. However, as pointed out by Kreid, 'banning a defensive weapon carries with it a strong disarmament dimension as well.' The Ottawa Process recognises this. Although with the objective of outlawing the use of anti-personnel mines, Ottawa is aiming for a treaty which will give teeth to such an objective by banning the

production, stockpiling, export and transfer as well. Recognising the disarmament dimension does not necessarily mean that the CD is the only forum for negotiations. As Kreid pointed out, there are precedents in disarmament law, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, where a small number of states signed the original treaty, opening it for accession by others. By 1974 this treaty was a sufficient international norm that the prospect of a case taken in the ICJ by South Pacific countries over atmospheric testing was decisive in making France halt its atmospheric testing programme, despite having never acceded to the PTBT itself.

Mexico's concern that the US-UK-French initiative to prioritise landmines on the CD's negotiating agenda was in part designed to divert attention from demands for the CD to negotiate further nuclear disarmament measures is shared by many non-aligned delegations. However, several, including Cuba, DPRK, Pakistan and Syria, are less enthusiastic than Mexico for the fast track Ottawa Process as an alternative. Syria referred to the 'pain' it felt at the human suffering caused by AP mines 'in some parts of the world where those mines have been misused'. Its representative, Iyad Orfi, went on to argue that for some states, mines 'are still a legitimate weapon to defend their security and their borders in the face of more lethal weapons.'

While the attitude of several non-aligned states seems to be unenthusiastic either way, Brazil stated its backing for the CD as 'the proper forum for the attainment of a universal and effective ban.' Lafer said that the proposed phased approach could 'yield early results', but said that Brazil would also continue to participate in the Ottawa Process, which could play 'an important role in building political momentum for attaining the goal of a universal ban.'

The western and European states are deeply divided. Although France and Britain have taken the lead in pushing for the CD as the venue for negotiating on landmines, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Ireland have been determined to press ahead with the fast track Ottawa approach. Other western countries are positioned along a continuum between these two strongly held positions, with some leaning closer to Ottawa and others towards the CD. New Zealand's Foreign Minister said that it supported the Ottawa process but could also accept a 'potential role' for the CD, providing it proceeded in parallel with Ottawa and agreed a 'strong mandate supportive of an early and comprehensive outcome.' Sweden's Foreign Minister said that 'the only effective solution to the landmine crisis is a total ban on APLs. No more, no less.' However, she went on to say that Sweden participated in the Ottawa Process and was also ready to do so in the CD. Swedish ratification of the amended Protocol II of the CCW was foreseen for June.

Poland endorsed the Anglo-French proposal for a phased approach within the context of the CD, saying only that it 'noted with interest' the Canadian initiative to conclude a ban by the end of 1997. However, Poland considered that the Ottawa Process and the CD could complement each other and have a 'potentially synergistic effect'. Hungary was a stronger supporter and participant in the Ottawa Process, but Naray said that the 'CD's role in the concert of efforts aimed at a total ban should be considered from the point of view of the universality and efficiency of the future convention.' Hungary could be flexible towards the Anglo-French approach, but 'would have serious difficulties with a mandate not stipulating a total ban on use and production as the ultimate goal of the negotiating process in the CD.'

### Nuclear Disarmament

Both Indonesia and Mexico identified nuclear disarmament as the 'highest priority' for the CD, underlined by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. They both wanted the CD to establish a nuclear disarmament committee, but stopped short of insisting that it be convened with a negotiating mandate from the beginning. Within the G-21 there are attempts to get agreement on a negotiating mandate, but those who opposed the 'concurrent' linkage in the programme of action put forward by 28 of the 30 members of the G-21 in August 1996 are also resisting any mandate which commits the CD to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which they consider impractical at present. They are joined by others, including Egypt and Morocco, who are concerned that if the G-21 demands a negotiating mandate they could frighten away the moderates in the nuclear weapon states.

Three countries continue to oppose a nuclear disarmament committee: Britain, France and the United States. But the positions are not solid. There is an internal debate in all three capitals, with a growing number of pragmatists willing to accept such a committee, under certain conditions (which do not include a mandate to negotiate a treaty or timetable at this point). However, it is clear that unless and until the Clinton Administration can get ratification of the CWC past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Jesse Helms, it is not going to risk showing flexibility on nuclear disarmament, while there is no prospect of Britain moving until after the elections in May, if then.

In their statements, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and also Sweden referred to important new developments, such as the Canberra Commission, the ICJ advisory opinion and the December 5 statement by 61 retired Generals and Admirals calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Indonesia deeply regretted 'the recalcitrant attitude adopted by some of the nuclear weapon states towards the need to immediately negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.' Tarmidzi criticised them for narrowly interpreting their

multilateral legal commitments, particularly article VI of the NPT, by insisting that nuclear disarmament is a 'bilateral exercise and therefore the sole domain of the nuclear weapon states.' He said that article VI and the NPT required prompt action and warned the nuclear weapon states that their prevarication 'may lead to the unravelling' of the NPT.

Brazil referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons as 'the paramount task' for the CD, proposing that a fissban and other measures could be negotiated under the overall umbrella of a nuclear disarmament committee. Lafer argued that making further progress on nuclear disarmament 'contingent on the prior attainment' of the fissban and even entry into force of the CTBT was just linkage of another sort. Syria addressed the nuclear disarmament by focusing on Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Among the western group, several delegations, including Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Japan made a strong plea for a more constructive attitude towards nuclear disarmament, while warning against linkage and the 'blueprint approach', as Anderson called it. Ireland's ambassador went on to ask why some delegations need reassurance about the direction of incremental nuclear disarmament. Like Austria and Sweden, she enumerated progress in the NPT, CTBT, START I and II (if ratified by Russia), expansion of nuclear weapon free zones adherence, and so on. But she also called on the P-5 to 'set out their perspective, and imbue the words 'systematic and progressive' with meaning...Such a perspective need not be time-bound, but ... a broad elaboration of the next steps they themselves propose to take.' Sweden's Foreign Minister also called for the concept of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament to be given a 'concrete content'. She said that 'the steps must be identified and fully translated into action.' New Zealand's Foreign Minister declared that though the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament had begun in a bilateral framework, 'we are also convinced that sustainable progress is not a matter which can be left solely to the nuclear-weapon states...'

McKinnon went further, calling for a nuclear disarmament committee 'with an overarching mandate...[which] could begin immediately with the cut-off negotiations, while also considering longer term issues.' In effect, it would have 'an active negotiating track and a preparatory track.' This would not be a talk shop, he argued, but one 'which prepared the ground carefully and effectively for eventual negotiations.'

Others sought ways to bridge the gap between those who wanted a committee on nuclear disarmament and those who wanted nothing. Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan proposed that a special coordinator be appointed 'to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result

of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.' This might have proved acceptable last year, but with many members of the G-21 focusing now on a negotiating mandate, a special coordinator could be perceived as a defeat rather than a compromise.

## Conclusion

This is a dismal time for the CD. More than one delegate has likened it to post-natal depression (after the difficult birth of the CTBT). Some hold out hopes that a constructive NPT PrepCom in April could help shift the logjam. Others look forward to a more constructive government in Westminster or a less timid approach in Washington after Senate ratification of the CWC and Russian ratification of START II. Certainly not even the optimists expect any decisions on the CD's programme of work before the end of June. Pointing to the strong reservations (read objections) by significant groups of states on each of the three major issues under discussion, the pessimists doubt that there is sufficient incentive for any movement on anything this year.

## 1997 CD Session

The CD's 1997 session runs from January 20 to March 27; from May 12 to June 27; and from July 28 to September 10.

ends

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The address and email remain the same.

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From nfnzsc@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:35 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 19:55:39 GMT

From: National Steering Ctte Nuclear Free Local Authorities  
<nfnzsc@gn.apc.org>

To: nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org

Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Subject: UK Nuclear News 18 March 1997

>From GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk Tue Mar 18 15:35:38 1997  
Received: from MCR1.poptel.org.uk by gnew.gn.apc.org (8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)

id PAA15253; Tue, 18 Mar 1997 15:35:21 GMT  
From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 15:35:01 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 17-18 Mar  
To: nfznc@gn.apc.org  
Message-Id: <397235830MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
Status: R

## DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Tues 18 Mar 1997

- 97-8318 Gummer refuses #2bn plan for underground dumping of n/waste at Sellafield: n/industry in turmoil. All
- 97-8319 Ch-Ex of UKAEA admits misjudgments in 1995 sale of the authority's facilities services division. FT
- 97-8320 Construction has started on a pioneering plant for treating intermediate level n/waste at Sellafield. MEN 17
- 97-8321 UK to spend #2bn on three new n/subs, to be built at VSEL yard at Barrow. Ind,FT,DT 18 Mar
- 97-8323 Tim Radford on the forthcoming Saturn launch, which will carry 72.3 pounds of plutonium-238, and which has, experts say, a 1-in-10 to 1-in-20 chance of failure at launch. G

Mon 17 Mar 1997

- 97-8315 Iraq could use stolen fissile material to reconstitute its n/weapon programme quickly, international team warns. G

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
From disarmament@igc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:35 1997  
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 14:51:54 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Press Briefing -Albright & Berger

Here are excerpts from a press briefing held this morning, with both Nat'l Security Advisor, Sandy Berger and Sec'y of State Madeleine Albright discussing expectations for the Summit - I've

taken out everything not related to the Summit, but it's still rather lengthy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

March 18, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY SECRETARY ALBRIGHT  
AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER

The Briefing Room

10:49 A.M. EST

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good morning, everybody. As you know, on Wednesday, the President leaves for Helsinki for his summit with President Yeltsin. This will be the 11th meeting between the two Presidents. Their leadership and personal engagement over the last four years has transformed the relationship between the United States and Russia. As a result, we now have a mature friendship based on common interests and characterized by honesty on matters where we disagree.

As you also know, Foreign Minister Primakov was here yesterday and over the weekend. I met with him on each of the last three days. On Sunday, he was briefed by the Joint Chiefs and he met with Secretary Cohen at the Defense Department. He met with President Clinton yesterday.

The issues we're dealing with are serious and of utmost importance to both our countries and that many must still be resolved. But our talks were thorough and cooperative. We had a comprehensive discussion of all the issues on the agenda of the summit, particularly European security and the NATO-Russia relationship. The President is looking forward to a positive meeting with President Yeltsin. He's approaching the summit in

that spirit, and that is what he told Foreign Minister Primakov yesterday.

The summit will help us advance three shared aspirations: to create a safer world through further reductions in our nuclear arsenals, to expand trade and investment in a way that benefits Americans and Russians alike, and to build a secure and undivided Europe of sovereign, independent democracies. Sandy Berger is going to speak about the first two of these goals. And I want to just say a few words about Europe.

What President Clinton will stress in Helsinki is this:

We are facing an entirely new historical situation in Europe. NATO faces no enemy to its east; Russia faces no enemy to its west. The quest for security on the continent is no longer a zero sum game in which we must choose between protecting the interests of Central Europe or the interests of Russia, but not both at the same time. We do not face a choice between diminishing NATO and diminishing Russia. It is not 1949 or even 1989; today we are all on the same side.

The United States and Western Europe now have a chance to gain new allies and partners who can and will contribute to our common security. The people of Central Europe now have a chance to overcome a Cold War dividing line that has cut them off from the European mainstream. The people of Russia now have a chance to achieve the deepest and most genuine integration with the West that their nation has ever enjoyed.

Let me be clear: We believe that Europe will not be whole and free until a democratic Russia is wholly a party of Europe. That is why we have supported Russia's membership in the WTO and its deepening participation in the P-8. It is why we worked hard to ensure Russia's participation in our mission in Bosnia and in NATO's partnership for peace.

In each of these cases, we made a decision not to isolate Russia and Russia made a decision not to isolate itself. It is in that spirit that NATO and Russia have been talking about the outlines of a charter that will launch a true partnership between them. NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov are taking the lead in negotiating an agreement. While that job is not finished, they both deserve

credit for the progress they have made.

In Helsinki, the President will outline the possibilities of such a partnership for Russia and for NATO. He will reaffirm NATO's commitment that it has no intention, no plan and no reason to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. He will discuss NATO's proposals to adapt and modernize the CFE Treaty which will ensure that there are no destabilizing troop concentrations anywhere in Europe.

At the same time, he will be clear about the lines we will not cross and the barriers we will not build. NATO enlargement will remain on track. New allies will enjoy the full benefits and assume the full responsibilities of membership. The first new members will not be the last, and we will exclude no European democracy from future consideration. NATO will continue to evolve, but the qualities that have made it the most successful alliance in history will be preserved.

Let me also stress that the point of the NATO-Russia charter is not to convince Russia's leaders to agree to NATO enlargement. That is unnecessary, and it certainly will not happen in Helsinki. We know it will take time for the progress of trust to catch up with the process of change.

The point of the charter is to advance an enduring interest; NATO and Russia will continue to share our interest in acting together to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The only steps we will propose to Russia are those we would want to take whether NATO was enlarging or not, because they are worthwhile in their own right.

For this reason, while we would welcome agreement in the next few months, there is no deadline -- not in Helsinki or in Madrid. The door will stay open. And at this point, Sandy Berger will say a few words about the other elements on the agenda, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

MR. BERGER: Thank you. As Secretary Albright has noted, this is the 11th meeting between the two Presidents. In a sense, meetings between American and Russian Presidents now have become routine, and that in and of itself is remarkable if you look at the sweep of the last 25 or 40 years. The high drama of summit diplomacy has given way to a real working partnership -- less drama, but perhaps more progress towards common goals.

Secretary Albright has talked about the European security dimension of the meeting in Helsinki. But I think it's also important to emphasize this is a very important meeting in terms of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. And there are two principal elements that the Presidents will be discussing. One is in the realm of the danger of weapons of mass destruction and arms control, and the second is in the area of economic cooperation.

We've already taken remarkable strides together -- the United States and Russia -- over the preceding few years. We've agreed to a comprehensive test ban, indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the elimination of nuclear weapons from the three former states of the Soviet Union. We've worked together on improving nuclear safety and ratifying START I. Now, we are waiting the Duma ratification of START II. And together with START I, that will cut both our arsenals -- both our nuclear arsenals by two-thirds from the Cold War levels.

We have been discussing with the Russians guidelines for START III negotiations which could begin immediately after START II is ratified and enters into force. We need to be realistic about the prospects of progress in this area. There remain disagreements between us and the Russians, particularly in the area of the distinction between antiballistic missile defenses, which were restricted by the treaty of 1972, and our desire to move forward with theater missile defenses.

Both sides agree on the need to preserve the ABM Treaty. Both agree on the need to defend against the growing threat of short-range missiles with theater missile defenses, and we agree with the issue of how you distinguish between ballistic missiles and theater missiles is a difficult one which must be resolved. But we have emphasized repeatedly to the Russians that we are developing theater missile defenses to protect our troops. When Foreign Minister Primakov was here this past weekend, he had a very, I think, compelling briefing at the Pentagon and heard a very forceful statement that our intention with the development of these systems is not directed at Russia, but rather directed at protecting our troops and those of our allies against short-range missiles. So we will need to see whether we can make some more progress in this area.

In any case, we believe that the Russians should proceed with START II ratification, which would then let us move into START III. And I hope that we can make some further progress in Helsinki, but these negotiations will continue thereafter if we don't.

In the economic area, the two Presidents will discuss Russia's effort to build a stable, prosperous market economy. What Russia has achieved in a short time, with our help and other Western nations is remarkable. . . .

At Helsinki and beyond, both Presidents will be focusing on this central U.S.-Russian relationship, particularly over the next four years as a cornerstone to the kind of world that we will build for the 21st century. Thank you.

Q Madam Secretary, Boris Yeltsin said yesterday the ball in Helsinki is in Bill Clinton's court, that if Russia has made concessions that there's an uneven situation now and it's the United States' turn. How would you respond to that?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me say that this summit, as Sandy has said, is one of a series of summits where we are now down to kind of regular business. We used to think of summits as either coming at really fabulous times when there was something to celebrate, or really dreadful times when relationships had to be mended. And we now have a mature relationship in which we agree on some subjects and disagree on others.

We expect that this will be a summit where a number of questions will be asked, and many resolved, and a very large agenda. I think it's very important not to look at this summit, as I said, as far as the European security issues are concerned as a zero sum game. It is not us versus them or them versus us; we are all on the same side.

The word "concessions" is an inappropriate word. This is a discussion about how to have the Russians cooperate in a new European atmosphere, and at the same time to make clear that the countries that are in a grey zone in Central Europe are no longer there. And I can assure you that the President nor I are going to bargain away the rights of the Central Europeans. Neither justice nor history will allow that. And it is a discussion that

will go forward in order to make clear that NATO enlargement will go forward and that Russia, in fact, does have a seat at the table in discussions on Europe, but not a veto over the decisions.

Q Madam Secretary, all through this town in think-tanks and elsewhere, people who are really not philosophically very different from the people who work with this administration are very anxious about NATO's expansions impact on arms control. I mean, they're not talking about Yeltsin, they're talking about the communists, the military, the nationalists, et cetera, who are holding back the START treaty and who will see NATO expansion as, rightly or wrongly, as a threat. Now, if you folks care about arms control, isn't there anything you might do to soften this impact, or is there anything where you can work around START, perhaps extend for four or five years, as has been proposed by some think-tankers, the compliance with the 2003 deadline?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me say that it is very important to see these issues in their own separate baskets while they clearly have an impact on each other. We need to understand NATO enlargement as an issue that is important for a new Europe.

Obviously, as Sandy has said, we are interested in moving the START II process forward and making sure that those limits are lived up to. But I think the important part is to make sure that people understand why we're doing these separate issues.

And Sandy, you might want to --

MR. BERGER: I hesitate to comment on anything coming out of the think-tanks, but let me -- (laughter.)

Q They could be your twins, they're not the people that brought down Tony Lake.

MR. BERGER: Let me say this -- let me put it this way: NATO enlargement will proceed. I think that it is important that NATO enlargement proceed in the right way. I have spoken about the Scylla and Charybdis in a sense of NATO enlargement. On the one hand, NATO enlargement proceeds -- needs to proceed in a way that does not undercut the security of the Central Europeans, that does not create a second class of members of NATO, that does

not give the Russians a veto.

At the same time -- and the President has been very clear about this over the last two years -- it's been an open, transparent process which he has discussed at every meeting with President Yeltsin that NATO enlargement can proceed in a way which also strengthens the NATO-Russian relationship. And by creating a NATO-Russian charter, by creating some sort of a consultative mechanism with Russia, this does not have, in any way, to undercut the democracy of Russia or those who are proponents of it.

There is a new Russia. We say that to the American people. And what President Yeltsin must say equally vigorously to the Russian people is, there's a new NATO, there's a new day, and we're designing new institutions to deal with that fact.

Q Sandy, do you believe -- and Ms. Albright, too, if you care to answer it -- that the Russians fully believe there is a new Russia? I mean, are the Russians fully aware of their changed circumstance in the world?

MR. BERGER: I think Russia is undergoing a profound transition -- a transition that is political, economic, social and geostrategic. And I think that there are -- as it defines itself as the President has said many times, the question is whether it will define its future greatness in terms of enhancement of the life of its people and a normal relationship with its neighbors, or whether it will define its greatness in old, classic terms, which I think are increasingly irrelevant.

So I do think that there is a new and emerging Russia. It is in our interest to reinforce that. It is our interest to promote that. But the Russians also have to understand that there is -- that NATO no longer is directed towards Russia. There's a new NATO. It's changed in its force structure. It's adapted dramatically. It's changed in its mission in many respects. And it's no longer the NATO that is a threat to Russia that existed during the Cold War.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me just say, I fully believe -- those of us that have studied, first, the Soviet Union and now Russia very intensively I think understand that the process is a complex one that takes place in a variety of arenas at

different times. I think it's most encouraging, for instance, that President Yeltsin has now chosen what seems to be a team that is focused on economic reform --a clear understanding of the necessity that he sees a prime necessity to move his country.

When I met with President Yeltsin recently in Moscow, we talked about the difference. He kept saying, you know, you have to see a new Russia. And I said to him, you need to see a new NATO. What I find very interesting is the discussions that I had with Foreign Minister Primakov in the last three days where we very clearly, both of us, avidly defended our countries' national interests, but both of us also understood that a great part of our national interests are satisfied when we cooperate. And in that spirit, even though we saw Foreign Minister Primakov at 4:00 p.m. here yesterday, I was already on the phone with him this morning at 8:00 a.m., working the process of some of the questions we have to resolve at Helsinki.

So I think here, we have to understand we are not dealing with a static Russia, we are dealing with a Russia that is adjusting to the many points that Sandy raised.

Q Secretary Albright, if we take the very firm line that you have articulated today on the basic issues of NATO expansion, and then what President Yeltsin said yesterday, should we not conclude that what's essentially going on here is sort of staking out rhetorical positions in advance of a meeting that's going to include real bargaining because you both know your stands are not tenable?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We are not taking any rhetorical positions. We have made very clear what our position is, and we are not -- as I said, we are not bargaining away the rights of the Central Europeans, who were, to a great extent the victims of the Cold War. And what President Clinton has said is what he is trying to do is to eliminate the dividing line down the center of Europe.

So we have made our points very clear. I think that what you're going to see is, as President Yeltsin made clear in Moscow and other places, they are not -- they do not like NATO enlargement; they have made that very clear. But that is not the point. NATO enlargement is going forward, and what we are doing is developing helping NATO, of which we are a part, and Secretary General Solana is in the lead, developing a new relationship

between NATO and Russia, which would reflect this new relationship.

Let me just make one historical point. Everybody thinks that last year was the 50th anniversary of everything; but the truth is that we have some other anniversaries to celebrate -- what happened at the end of World War II was the creation of a set of institutions that basically created structure for the post-World War II scene in Europe.

We are now in the process of creating new institutions for the post-Cold War, and they have a lot to do with how Europe sees itself, a lot of institutions that are thoroughly Western Europe directed, some that are economic, some that have to do with a variety of integrative processes, and NATO enlargement is one of them and NATO-Russia is another. And what we are all doing here together is looking at an historical process and creating institutions that will serve us into the 21st century.

Q I wonder if you could respond to those critics who charge the President has put too many of his eggs in the Yeltsin basket and is not doing enough to work with alternative voices in Russia, beyond Boris Yeltsin.

MR. BERGER: They're wrong. (Laughter.) I mean, the fact of the matter is that this is an extraordinarily broad relationship. Number one, I would point out that Boris Yeltsin is the democratically-elected President of Russia. And Presidents generally deal with Presidents, particularly those who are democratically elected. So I think it's normal and quite rational for the President to be dealing with the leader that Russia has chosen.

But this relationship is far broader than Clinton-Yeltsin. This is a relationship -- the relationship between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, which is really more than a personal relationship, is an institutional infrastructure that has been developed to manage the relationship on energy and on economic development and on nuclear waste and a whole range of issues is now quite an extraordinary relationship. The relationship that the Secretary of State already has developed with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Primakov is, I think, going to be a lively and very productive relationship, and so -- and when the President goes to Russia, he meets not only with President Yeltsin, the last trip he

met with opposition leaders and certainly our embassy does as well. So I think this is as extensive a relationship as probably we have.

Q A question on ABM, please. START II is hostage not only to NATO enlargement, but also to this demarkation dispute in the ABM Treaty, at least in the Russian point of view. Are the two Presidents personally going to discussion ABM demarkation in Helsinki, and is President Clinton going to offer new proposals or compromises on higher capability theater missile systems?

MR. BERGER: We believe that START II ought to proceed to ratification in the Duma without regard to any lingering disputes with respect to ABM-TMD demarkation, and that's our position and the position the President will reiterate to President Yeltsin. To the extent that they believe it is important for there to be a clarification of the demarkation issue, the Presidents may discuss that, but we've made it very clear that we believe that the theater missile systems that we are developing are consistent with the ABM treaty, and that we intend to proceed with those systems, and that we don't believe that they do violate the ABM treaty.

So there conceivably could be some discussion of it, but our view is that in any case it would be good for the Russians to proceed with ratification of START II.

Q Do you expect Bosnia or Albania or the Middle East or any other issues -- other areas to come up, or just these three described?

MR. BERGER: No, I'm sure that there will -- this is a -- let me just quickly outline the schedule for you as it's currently contemplated. We'll leave tomorrow night. We'll arrive Thursday afternoon Helsinki time. There is a dinner being hosted by Prime Minister Ahtisaari Thursday night. And then Friday, there will be at least two sessions between the two Presidents, one in the morning and one in the afternoon -- a lunch and a planned press conference. There may be a dinner that evening before we leave, a smaller dinner between the two Presidents.

It would not surprise me that they talk about other issues of common interest, including, Rita, many of the ones that

you raised. . .

Q Secretary Albright, are there any specific issues that you think will actually be resolved in Helsinki, or is this just part of a process of ongoing --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that there clearly will be some, but I think the issue that one needs to keep in mind here, that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have not seen each other in almost a year; they have many things to talk about and that it's important to understand the process of these summits. We all can talk at various levels, and as Sandy has explained, we have a vibrant and robust process going on on a variety of levels. But ultimately, it's important for the Presidents to talk to each other about all these subjects and what -- we will see. I think that it's important to know that having the summits in itself is something that we value. . .

Q A broad question, please, on foreign policy. I come from Russia and I had some thoughts on what has been said here. Do you think the U.S. needs a foreign policy in the new post-Cold War period? (Laughter.) I should explain that I mean, in Russia, with very many people, very many reformers, whom you referred to, are against NATO, are against some of the policies and they resent something that they regard as some sort of a high-handed approach on the part of the U.S.

I know from my contacts with my colleagues in other countries that this view is something shared by some others. So you reach out to the American people, explaining the foreign policy to them. Do you plan to explain your foreign policy to the world? Do you think it needs correction, or do you believe that, as President Clinton said, you are the only indispensable country in the world and can basically do whatever you want?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's kind of loaded. Let me say that, first of all, it is not as much our statement that we are the indispensable nation in the world, it is how others also behave that is clear that we are the indispensable nation. It doesn't mean we do everything alone, however, which is why a major component of what we're talking about now is the NATO-Russia relationship, in which we are one of 16, and it is the Secretary General of NATO that is leading that discussion.

But let me go to your larger point. I think that the

United States, more than any other country, is understanding the post-Cold War environment, where we are trying to direct the attention of other countries to the new threats, not the old threats. And the new threats come from a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; they come from issues to do with the environment, terrorism, drugs. And we need to look forward and not backward.

When I was in Russia I tried to explain on Russian television that we required, all of us, some new thinking. And the new thinking had to do with the fact that we were not involved in a zero-sum game anymore. We are not -- and NATO is not -- poised against Russia. It is an alliance of democracies that have common values that is open to all democratic governments in Europe. We have made that clear. The first will not be the last.

And it is important for all of us, whether we are explaining policy here or in Europe or in other countries, to get people thinking forward and not backward. The Cold War is over. Russia is not our enemy. Russia is our friend. And we want to work with Russia cooperatively to create a new structure.

MR. BERGER: Let me add one thought to what Madeleine has said very eloquently. I think President Clinton has made very clear to President Yeltsin, to the Russia people, again to Foreign Minister Primakov yesterday that the United States wants a strong Russia. We don't seek a weak Russia. We seek a strong Russia. We seek a Russia that is growing. We seek a Russia in which democracy is strengthening, in which the economy is strengthening, in which the Russian people are gaining confidence and gaining a brighter future, and that we have a very strong American interest in seeing that happen and being of help to the extent that the Russian government and the Russian people want us to be of help.

So, just to kind of amplify the zero-sum proposition that Madeleine has indicated, it is very much in the interests of the United States, in the interests of the world, for the greatness of the Russian people and for Russian strength to be recognized, to be enhanced, and to be part of the overall European undivided peaceful security structure that we're trying to build. . .

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From ipb@gn.apc.org Wed Mar 19 08:29:35 1997

Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 22:33:47 -0100

From: International Peace Bureau <ipb@gn.apc.org>

To: "Heffermehl, Fredrik" <fredpax@sn.no>,

"Weiss, Cora" <srfnyusa@IGC.APC.ORG>

Subject: FW: Helsinki Summit

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]

[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]

[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

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From: Peace Station[SMTP:mkantola@kaapeli.fi]

Sent: mardi, 18. mars 1997 18:18

To: ipb@gn.apc.org

Cc: disarmament@igc.apc.org

Subject: Helsinki Summit

Dear Friends,

We, Committee of 100 and Peace Union of Finland, have planned to deliver the text following to the international press coming here to Helsinki this week (1500 accredited journalists according to the Ministry of Foreign affairs).

We unfortunately have no accredited journalists among us but the Ministry of Foreign affairs has promised that our material has access to the press centre. We will send this also to the international news agencies located in Helsinki, and naturally material in Finnish to the Finnish media.

On Friday the 21st of March there will be a demonstration focused on disarmament. The organisers of this demonstration are young activists who call themselves "defenders of the earth". They are young people involved in peace movement, human rights movements, animal rights' mov. etc. and people who prefer not be members of any organisations. We have made a leaflet about the agenda of the Summit (START III, enlargement of the Nato etc.) to be delivered both to the demonstrators and to people passing by.

I'm sure there will be all kind of events at the end of the week here in Helsinki. We will inform you about all the demonstrations, events etc. we know about.

Yours in peace,

Malla Kantola, Committee of 100

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Peace Union of Finland  
Committee of 100  
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START Talking SUMMIT! START Talking SUMMIT! START

Peace movement to presidents Clinton and Yeltsin :  
Total elimination of Nuclear weapon has to be the ultimate goal !

At a Press Conference March 7, 1997 U.S. President Clinton stated, " ...This meeting that we're going to have in Helsinki, President Yeltsin and I, it will be very important. . . It will be a meeting that will be extremely candid, extremely straight forward, and I hope it will help to deal with not only the question of Russia's relationship to Europe but also what we can do with the Russians to continue to reduce the nuclear threat ..."

The world wants progress toward nuclear disarmament. This is a historic opportunity to achieve bold cuts toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century. President Clinton and President Yeltsin should seize this Summit opportunity to achieve further deep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by negotiating a new "START III" framework agreement as the next step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

\* Lack of progress in START negotiations will leave START II, signed 4 years ago by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, and ratified by the U.S. Senate last year, unratified by the Russian Duma.

\* Lack of progress will leave the world stuck with over 20,000 nuclear weapons, over 95% in the possession of the United States and Russia.

\* Lack of progress will seriously imperil other arms control efforts. For example, the U.S. Senate may be even less likely to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without Russian ratification first, and multilateral arm reductions, including the Nuclear Weapons Convention, will be less likely to progress with such large U.S. and Russian stockpiles.

Four years ago, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arsenal Reduction Treaty (START II) and last year the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty that would reduce the number of deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 3500 each.

Unfortunately START II ratification has stalled in the Russian Duma. Without bold action from the presidents to break the START II logjam and achieve further reductions, the world will head toward the 21st century stuck with over 20,000 nuclear warheads - 95 percent in the possession of Russia and the United States.

In December of 1996, sixty international retired Generals and Admirals called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prominent among them is U.S. Retired Four-Star General Lee Butler. The December statement from retired world military leaders has stirred the debate about nuclear weapons elimination, and marked the culmination of tremendous progress for nuclear disarmament in 1996, including milestones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signing, the World Court Ruling on nuclear weapons, the Canberra Commission Report, and the United Nations Resolution calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention abolishing nuclear weapons.

There exists the "potential political will" in the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations to achieve a framework agreement on a START III treaty mandating deeper cuts in U.S and Russian arsenals. It would be important that a START III treaty would not be only playing a "numbers game", debating with the U.S. and Russian administrations whether strategic weapons be reduced to 2,500 or 2000 or 1000, but raising the recommendations of the Canberra Commission - as echoed by General Butler - that a START III is the chance for taking U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons off alert, for separating warheads from delivery systems, and for disarming tactical weapons, too. Such an agreement would truly open up the way for p-5 disarmament talks, and build momentum for a nuclear weapons convention.

In April, 1997 at the NPT (nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) Review Conference, the United States and Russia both need to show progress toward nuclear disarmament, in accordance with their obligation under Article VI of the NPT. Without START III Multi-lateral negotiations to abolish nuclear weapons will be more difficult. It is unlikely that China, France, or the UK. will enter into multilateral negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons while the United States and Russia maintain these enormous arsenals. Even after START II, Russia and the U.S. will have many more weapons than any of the other nuclear weapons states.

Maintaining these enormous arsenals costs also enormous amounts of money. The Cost Study Project's "Atomic Audit" estimates that U.S. taxpayers have

spent at least \$4 trillion on nuclear weapons programs since 1942 (in adjusted 1995 dollars). Without Russian ratification and implementation of START II, the Pentagon estimates it will spend \$5 billion over the next seven years on the nuclear weapons that would have been eliminated under START II.

Without START reductions, the Department of Energy (U.S.) is seeking a new tritium production source. Tritium, a radioactive isotope used to boost the destructive power of nuclear weapons, will cost taxpayers even more money to produce, and add to the radioactive waste legacy of nuclear weapons production. With further deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, tritium production now would not be necessary. In addition to tritium production, increased plutonium pit production will be sought, while dismantling of nuclear weapons will be slowed and eventually halted.

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Nato Expansion:

Many in the Peace movement fears that Nato's proposed expansion into Eastern Europe threatens present chances of U.S.-Russian co-operation on further nuclear weapons reductions, and would remilitarize Europe at a time when NATO and Europe face no credible military threat.

The Russian Duma is reluctant to ratify START II and consider further arms reductions negotiations in large part because of security fears relating to NATO expansion. Duma International Committee Chairman, Vladimir Lukin has stated, "Russians are disappointed with the tendencies emerging in America, and it would be difficult to convince the Russian public that the United States is friendly and has peaceful intentions towards Russia." START II (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty II), which would limit U.S. and Russian Strategic arsenals to 3,500 each, requires significant changes to the Russian nuclear weapons infrastructure. Russia would have to destroy many more weapons than the United States. In order to achieve parity with the United States, Russia would then build single warhead missiles. Further reducing U.S. and Russian arsenals with a "START III" agreement could adjust this sc.. "imbalance".

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ABOLITION 2000 - A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

The time has come to rid the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons. The Cold War era is behind us. A new millennium is near at hand. If not now, then when?

These radioactive devices are terrifyingly dangerous, politically

destabilising, environmentally contaminating, economically wasteful and contrary to international law. They are weapons of genocide and therefore can have no place in human civilisation.

Over the past 50 years people all over the world have joined together to protest and to organise to ban the bomb. While some progress has been made in reducing the arsenals of the two superpowers, there is a long way to go on the road to elimination. For this reason a new network has been brought into being, whose purpose is to help coordinate on a global basis efforts to promote an agreement between governments by the year 2000 on a time-bound framework for total abolition.

ABOLITION 2000 network was formally established on November 5th, 1995 at an international meeting in the Hague. It grew out of a number of pre-existing groupings and in a sense supersedes them: The World Court Project, of which IPB was a co-founder; The International Coalition for Nuclear non-proliferation and Disarmament for which the IPB acted as coordinating secretariat; The World Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; and The NGO Abolition Caucus, which met daily during the NPT Extension Conference in New York, April-May 1995, and which drew up the statement which constitutes the political foundation of Abolition 2000.

Peace Union of Finland and Committee of 100 have signed the Abolition 2000 statement.

For more information contact: International Peace Bureau.

International Peace Bureau

International Peace Bureau, IPB is the world's oldest and most comprehensive international peace network. With 19 internationals and 141 national/local member organisations (and 120 individuals) in over 40 countries, it brings together people working for peace in many different sectors: not only pacifists but also women's, youth, labour, religious, political and professional bodies. IPB was founded in 1892 and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1910 for its efforts in promoting the establishment of the League of Nations and for spreading the message of peace to the general public. Among its many distinguished leaders over the years was the Irish Nobel laureate Sean MacBride. Nowadays its role is that of supporting peace and disarmament initiatives taken by the UN, launching collective projects and informing and servicing grassroots peace campaigns.

IPB has had UN Consultative Status as an NGO since 1977, and has been active in the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament since 1972.

Current program areas of the IPB are nuclear disarmament; conventional and inhumane weapons; conflicts; and women and peace.

Peace Union of Finland and Committee of 100 in Finland are members of the IPB.

secretary general: Colin Archer (UK), Program Officer: Tracy Moavero (USA)

Contact information:

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The Finnish Peace Movement

The Finnish peace movement works for disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, for a nuclear and block free Europe and world.

The Peace Union of Finland and the Committee of 100 will inform about the views of the international and the Finnish Peace movement and about the NGO actions taking place in Helsinki during the Summit.

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Existing nuclear arsenal

Under the ratified Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) now being implemented, nearly 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons belong to the United States or Russia. Even after START II, which has not been ratified by Russia or implemented by either country, the United States and Russia will have the vast majority of nuclear weapons with France, China and the UK each maintaining total nuclear arsenals of less than 500.

START II limits only "strategic" (longer range intercontinental) nuclear weapons, not "tactical" (shorter range, battlefield) weapons. Almost a quarter of the world's nuclear stockpile consists of non-strategic nuclear weapons. After START II the U.S. will keep 950 warheads for non-strategic forces, and Russia may keep as many as 3,000 non-strategic warheads.

START II limits only deployed strategic nuclear weapons to approximately 3,500 each for Russia and the United States. Both the United States and Russia are planning to maintain several thousand "reserve" warheads.

"The size and composition of the total U.S. stockpile has now stabilised, and it will not decrease below the current level of nearly 10,000 warheads. If START II is implemented, the only change will be in the ratio of deployed warheads to those in a less-ready status." - "Nuclear Notebook," Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January-February 1997.

Under START II all land based missiles will be limited to carrying only one missile; but Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) will continue to carry multiple warheads. The United States and Russia both plan to put about half of their future deployable strategic warheads at sea. (Britain plans to deploy its entire arsenal on submarines and France nearly 90 percent of its arsenal.)

From 70761.2655@CompuServe.COM Wed Mar 19 08:29:35 1997  
Date: 19 Mar 97 09:24:11 EST  
From: James Hipkins <70761.2655@CompuServe.COM>  
To: Howard Hallman <mupj@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Peace Leaf Article

Howard:

When you talked you mentioned that you would write an article for the PEACE LEAF. We have everything but your article. Could you fax it to us as soon as ready? Got the address material o.k. last week.  
Spring is here. See you!

Jim Hipkins

From diarmament@igc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:18:21 -0800 (PST)  
From: diarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: CWC

AP Online Washington  
Chemical Weapons Treaty Pushed (03-18-97 1902EST)">

By DAVID BRISCOE Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Democrats hope to force a vote on a long-delayed chemical weapons treaty before Congress goes home in two weeks.

Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., assistant floor leader, told the Senate that Democrats would ``have to take very aggressive action to wedge (the treaty) to the floor of the Senate and have a vote.''

Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., threatened to use minority powers to hold up a two-week spring recess, scheduled to start after Friday, if Republicans don't come up with a plan to take the four-year-old treaty to the Senate floor.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., who fears the treaty will lull Americans into a false sense of security and increase the risk of terrorism, has vowed to keep the ratification bill from leaving his committee until he gets action on several other international issues.

Helms has called the Chemical Weapons Convention ``dumb and dangerous.''

Kerry told reporters he and other senators plan to take ``very aggressive action'' to schedule a vote on the convention, a worldwide effort to dispose of chemical warfare agents and destroy existing arsenals.

Kerry threatened extended debate that could keep the Senate in session after Friday if neither side backs down. If Democrats are united, Republicans don't have a big enough majority to stop a filibuster.

``We're not going to allow the debate just to slide by,''  
Kerry said. ``Our intention is to use every tool available to us in the minority. ... We're going to be very militant.''

Meanwhile, about 100 demonstrators staged a ratification rally on the Capitol steps Tuesday, chanting, ``Free the treaty.''  
Several wore gas masks and carried signs decrying the dangers of poison gas.

In a commentary published in The Christian Science Monitor on

Tuesday, Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., said the administration still doesn't have enough support in the Senate to ratify the treaty.

He said the treaty would cost up to \$300 million per year to administer, would hurt legitimate U.S. chemical businesses by subjecting them to international regulations and would do nothing to reduce dangers facing U.S. troops from rogue countries such as North Korea and Libya.

``The Senate has a solemn obligation to give its advice and consent to treaties only when certain they are in the best interests of the U.S.,' ' Kyl wrote. ``The U.S. has much more to lose in embracing this treaty than in rejecting it.' '

More than 160 nations have signed the treaty and 70 have completed ratification. It takes effect April 29 even without U.S. ratification. President Clinton has asked for ratification before then to ensure a leading U.S. role in its implementation.

Supporters say the treaty will provide better tools to deal with countries that have active chemical weapons programs.

Helms has refused to put it to a committee vote until he gets the administration to act on restructuring the State Department and reforming the United Nations.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:37:17 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Wyoming on Summit

The New York Times

In Wyoming: Counting Missiles, Dreaming of Disarmament

March 19, 1997

By JAMES BROOKE

ALBIN, Wyo. -- If some Wyoming ranchers had their way, the small chain-link enclosures that dot dry grasslands around here would be the focus of Thursday's summit meeting between President Clinton and President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia in Helsinki, Finland.

The unmarked enclosures, a testimony to the banality of nuclear stockpiles, protect a sizable portion of the nation's missile silos, each containing a Minuteman III rocket tipped with three nuclear warheads.

"Cutting the missiles back as fast as possible would be the best thing to do," Mae Kirkbride, an Albin rancher, said when

asked her advice for the presidents. "I've heard all the rationales from the Air Force officers, but it just doesn't seem reasonable to me."

Across the United States, debate over nuclear disarmament fell out of fashion with the end of the cold war. Indeed, at the Helsinki meeting, plans to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may overshadow an American proposal for the United States and Russia to cut their numbers of operational warheads to one-third of today's levels.

But here in Wyoming, home to the Air Force base that controls the nation's 575 land-based missiles, people are less apt to forget the power that sleeps beneath the prairies. If Wyoming, the nation's least populous state, were an independent country, it would be one of the world's most powerful nuclear nations.

Near Missile Drive in Cheyenne, three decommissioned rockets stand sentinel at the main gate of the F.E. Warren Air Force Base, home of 20th Air Force. Half a century ago, this unit dropped atomic bombs on Japan. Today, it maintains the nation's land-based nuclear force -- missiles in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming.

"We have a 99.6 percent alert rate -- that's up and running, manned and fully operational," Maj. Gen. Donald G. Cook, the base commander, said on Friday. "Of course we are not targeting cities anymore, just broad ocean areas."

Openness is the order of the day on a base where the commander prints his home address and telephone number on his business card. Last fall, Cook escorted a counterpart group from the Russian Strategic Rocket Force on a tour of American missile bases.

Despite the detente between Russia and the United States, many Wyomingites fear the momentum for disarmament is being frittered away.

"We have to make people aware that the missiles are still in the ground and are still dangerous," Margaret Laybourn, a veteran of the campaign against nuclear weapons, said last Friday over coffee.

Considered the Rosa Parks of Cheyenne's anti-bomb movement, Mrs. Laybourn was the lone voice of protest over the arrival of Atlas missiles at Warren's nuclear command in 1958. Pushing two of her children in a baby carriage, she carried a sign, written with black shoe polish, that quoted Pope John XXIII: "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind."

Almost four decades later, photographs of her 10 children and 14 grandchildren cover her kitchen refrigerator -- and southeastern Wyoming's rangeland is still laced with nuclear warheads.

"I'm getting discouraged," said Mrs. Laybourn, 73.

To her, nuclear bombs are not an abstraction.

"Bob was with the first marines who went into Nagasaki," she said, just before her husband, a carpenter, came home for lunch.

"He told me of the people streaming up the hills, with flesh coming off their arms," she said, making a peeling motion over her upraised right arm for emphasis. "When you have a new baby, and another on the way, you know you never want that to happen

again."

Forty years of prayer vigils and wreath layings at silos may not have changed big power politics. But it may have helped to change public opinion, Mrs. Laybourn said.

In the early 1960s, local attitudes were symbolized by a neon cowboy who rode a rocket sign advertising the Atlas Motel.

But in the mid-1980s, local opposition was credited with keeping the number of MX missiles assigned to the base at 50, below planned levels.

But nuclear weapons still represent a powerful economic force, pumping an estimated \$1 billion a year into the five states with land-based missiles. Employing 11,000 people, the 20th Air Force has the impact of a Fortune 500 company in a region where low rainfall and few natural resources traditionally mean few jobs.

With Air Force vehicles traveling 25 million miles annually to check on silos and rotate crews, the federal government makes sure that local roads are patched in the summer and cleared of snow in the winter.

"It's a mighty cheap insurance policy," said Cook, who will watch the Helsinki talks from afar. Questioning the Russians' ability to destroy weapons under an accelerated timetable, he added, "What you don't want to do with the Russians is to get ahead of your headlights."

Under the administration's proposal, operational strategic warheads on both sides would be reduced to levels of 2,000 to 2,500. Currently, Russia has about 7,500 of these bombs, and the United States has about 7,150, according to the Center for Defense Information, a study group in Washington.

Almost all the missile silos in Missouri and South Dakota have have been destroyed in the last three years. The reductions have been matched, step by step, by Russia, but Cook remains cautious.

"For Russia, nuclear weapons give them world-power status, a seat at the table," Cook warned. "Despite what is going on in the economy of Russia, they still have crews on alert. While they are not targeted at us, they can change the cross hairs in seconds."

\*\*\*\*\*

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From ledwidge@psr.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:50:07 -0800

From: Lisa Ledwidge <ledwidge@psr.org>

To: wandwill@clark.net, BBanks40@aol.com, tperry@ucsusa.org,

melinda@stimson.org, barbara\_green@pcusa.org,

panukes@igc.org,

papro@igc.org, dculp@nrdc.org, wjnsns@aol.com, mupj@igc.org,

bruce.hall@green2.greenpeace.org, fas@fas.org,

bridget@fcnl.org,

joe@fcnl.org, jdi@clw.org, skerr@clw.org, cdavis@clw.org,

vision@igc.org

Subject: [Fwd: CWC]

[ Part 1: "Included Message" ]

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:18:21 -0800 (PST)  
From: diarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: CWC

AP Online Washington  
Chemical Weapons Treaty Pushed (03-18-97 1902EST)">

By DAVID BRISCOE Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Democrats hope to force a vote on a long-delayed chemical weapons treaty before Congress goes home in two weeks.

Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., assistant floor leader, told the Senate that Democrats would ``have to take very aggressive action to wedge (the treaty) to the floor of the Senate and have a vote.''

Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., threatened to use minority powers to hold up a two-week spring recess, scheduled to start after Friday, if Republicans don't come up with a plan to take the four-year-old treaty to the Senate floor.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., who fears the treaty will lull Americans into a false sense of security and increase the risk of terrorism, has vowed to keep the ratification bill from leaving his committee until he gets action on several other international issues.

Helms has called the Chemical Weapons Convention ``dumb and dangerous.''

Kerry told reporters he and other senators plan to take ``very aggressive action'' to schedule a vote on the convention, a worldwide effort to dispose of chemical warfare agents and destroy existing arsenals.

Kerry threatened extended debate that could keep the Senate in session after Friday if neither side backs down. If Democrats are united, Republicans don't have a big enough majority to stop a filibuster.

``We're not going to allow the debate just to slide by,''  
Kerry said. ``Our intention is to use every tool available to us in the minority. ... We're going to be very militant.''

Meanwhile, about 100 demonstrators staged a ratification rally on the Capitol steps Tuesday, chanting, ``Free the treaty.''  
Several wore gas masks and carried signs decrying the dangers of poison gas.

In a commentary published in The Christian Science Monitor on Tuesday, Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., said the administration still doesn't have enough support in the Senate to ratify the treaty.

He said the treaty would cost up to \$300 million per year to administer, would hurt legitimate U.S. chemical businesses by subjecting them to international regulations and would do nothing to reduce dangers facing U.S. troops from rogue countries such as North Korea and Libya.

``The Senate has a solemn obligation to give its advice and consent to treaties only when certain they are in the best interests of the U.S.,' ' Kyl wrote. ``The U.S. has much more to lose in embracing this treaty than in rejecting it.''

More than 160 nations have signed the treaty and 70 have completed ratification. It takes effect April 29 even without U.S. ratification. President Clinton has asked for ratification before then to ensure a leading U.S. role in its implementation.

Supporters say the treaty will provide better tools to deal with countries that have active chemical weapons programs.

Helms has refused to put it to a committee vote until he gets the administration to act on restructuring the State Department and reforming the United Nations.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From disarmament@igc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 10:13:11 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Expectations, Libya

Russia: NATO Agreement Unlikely  
By SERGEI SHARGORODSKY  
Associated Press Writer  
The Associated Press Wednesday, March 19, 1997 6:42 am EST

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- Talking tough on the eve of the U.S.-Russian summit, Boris Yeltsin's spokesman said today no firm deal on the thorny question of NATO expansion was expected to come out of the meeting.

``Until the last moment, we shall defend our right to a negative attitude toward the expansion of NATO. Despite summits and meetings, Russia's view of NATO expansion shall remain

negative," the spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, told reporters.

His comments reflected the Russian line of emphasizing Moscow's opposition to NATO's planned enlargement -- considered by Russians a possible security threat.

Both Yeltsin and his spokesman have said they expect probably the most difficult summit since the end of the Cold War when Yeltsin meets with President Clinton on Thursday and Friday.

"I don't think there will be a dead end," Yastrzhembsky said. "But one should hardly expect the final compromise decision to be taken here."

Clinton, for his part, was a bit more upbeat Tuesday than Yeltsin or his own senior aides, saying he expected "constructive progress" on a shared desire for a free and democratic Europe.

"I just wouldn't overreact to any particular thing that's said and done between now and then," the president said.

Clinton and Yeltsin plan to take up a U.S.-proposed charter on the special relationship between NATO and Russia. Designed to give Russia a say in NATO affairs, it still falls short of Russian expectations.

NATO is preparing to invite former Soviet allies from Eastern Europe this summer to join the alliance in 1998. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are the leading candidates.

While Clinton will not be his familiar self, arriving in a wheelchair or on crutches after a knee injury, Yeltsin will make an extra effort to look healthy and in charge. In a television interview earlier this week, he stressed that contrary to widespread expectations, the Finnish capital will be host to a healthy Yeltsin and an ailing Clinton.

For Yeltsin, that would be a success in itself. He goes to the summit after months of absence for health problems, and he is besieged by economic and social problems at home.

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RTos 03/19 1206 Clinton Prepares for Summit With Yeltsin

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - President Clinton Wednesday studied the implications of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's current Kremlin overhaul in preparation for a two-day summit that starts Thursday in Helsinki.

Clinton "is very, very engaged on this," White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said of presidential preparations for the summit.

Calling Yeltsin's recent re-shuffle of his government "fascinating," McCurry said Clinton was using the time before his Wednesday night departure from Washington to examine the implications of the changes -- which generally brought economic

reformers to power.

"Clinton is very interested in that ... and what the implications are for our bi-lateral relationship, and how we assess the progress of reform in Russia," McCurry said.

"We may be in a period of real internal dynamic change in Russia," McCurry said.

It was announced in Moscow this week that the newly installed first deputy prime minister, Anatoly Chubais, a reformer, also will be finance minister in the new Russian government and is expected to take overall charge of economic reforms.

The overall reorganization of the Russian government was expected to be completed sometime next week.

Clinton, still recovering from emergency surgery to reattach a tendon on his right knee, was preparing for his first face-to-face talks with Yeltsin since an April summit in Moscow.

The Helsinki venue was chosen to make the trip less arduous for Yeltsin, who had heart bi-pass surgery late last year and this year struggled with double pneumonia. While the Russia leader has been appearing more robust in his appearances, Clinton has been moving gingerly because of pain.

Clinton, who was released from the hospital on Sunday, was forced to delay the scheduled start of the summit by one day and cancel plans to visit Denmark.

Senior administration officials have been stressing that they expect no dramatic breakthroughs at the summit. Instead, they hope for progress in smoothing over divisive issues -- like Moscow's concern about the expansion of the NATO alliance, something Washington advocates.

Washington hopes to begin a new round of talks on nuclear missile reductions with Russia, but first wants the Russian parliament to ratify the long-delayed START-2 treaty, which was signed in 1993.

Administration officials said they expected that during the summit Clinton would formally announce some U.S. financial assistance for Russia to help it fight corruption and strengthen its financial markets.

REUTER

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RTw 03/19 1053 U.S., Russia head for tough summit in Helsinki

(Adds Kinkel comments, Duma resolution, other details)

By Nicholas Doughty, Diplomatic Correspondent

HELSINKI, March 19 (Reuter) - The United States and Russia prepared for their chilliest summit since the end of the Cold War on Wednesday, with hopes fading of a breakthrough in the row over NATO enlargement as both sides stuck to a tough line.

A senior Russian official said Moscow would not drop its bitter opposition to NATO's enlargement plans, after U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright vowed the alliance would not be deterred from taking in former Soviet bloc states.

Seen as the most difficult challenge for European security in the 21st century, NATO enlargement tops the agenda for the

meeting on Thursday and Friday between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki.

The Finnish capital, which hosted several superpower summits during the decades of East-West confrontation, was dusted by a fresh fall of snow on Wednesday as temperatures plunged.

Even though an agreement on NATO enlargement seems unlikely in Helsinki, Russian and U.S. officials suggest there could be progress in other areas, including arms control and economic issues that are of profound concern to Moscow.

Yeltsin's decisive shift towards young reformers in this week's cabinet reshuffle, well-timed for the summit, has won lavish praise from Washington and could open the way for more Western help. Financial markets expected little major news.

Both sides have staked out their positions on NATO, in a sometimes confusing game of diplomatic poker which mixes the usual tough bargaining with hints of possible compromise.

Moscow says enlargement will isolate Russia, although Yeltsin does not want a return to Cold War-style tensions.

At a Madrid summit in July, the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will invite some former Soviet bloc states to start membership talks, probably Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The aim is that they will join in 1999. "Russia's approach to NATO expansion will not change regardless of any summits, bilateral meetings and negotiations," Yeltsin's spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, told reporters in the Finnish capital on Wednesday.

But he also expressed cautious optimism about the summit, saying it offered the chance to "lay down an outline for Russian-American partnership in the 21st century."

In Washington, Albright took an equally firm line on Tuesday, pledging that NATO enlargement would go ahead.

Russia would be a partner but would be told in Helsinki that it could not have a veto over alliance decisions, nor bar any countries from future prospects of NATO membership.

Clinton said there was a "tough agenda" but that he was optimistic. The leaders, meeting for the 11th time, have a good working relationship although they have not met for a year.

Yeltsin, now on fighting form after months of illness and his heart surgery, has made fun of the fact that Clinton will be the obvious invalid in Helsinki, either in a wheelchair or on crutches following surgery for a knee injury last week.

Yeltsin must be careful not to appear weak in front of his communist and nationalist critics who dominate Russia's parliament, the Duma. Increasing the pressure on Yeltsin, they prepared to debate an anti-NATO resolution in Moscow.

Russia wants legally binding commitments in the NATO relationship, including guarantees that allied troops and nuclear arms will not be deployed in new member states.

NATO is offering Russia a new relationship through a special charter, which would give Moscow the right to consultation on security issues but no power of veto over the alliance's plans.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said on Wednesday that progress had been made on this and that he expected more from

Helsinki, although there would be no major breakthrough.

There are also problems on arms control, particularly with Russia's failure to ratify a 1993 deal with the United States cutting long-range nuclear missiles.

REUTE

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UPn 03/19 1154 Libya halts chemical arms plant

WASHINGTON, March 19 (UPI) -- American intelligence agencies have detected no resumption of construction at a suspected chemical weapons plant in Libya, a facility the United States threatened to destroy with a nuclear attack if necessary.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum says U.S. intelligence agencies, which primarily rely on satellite reconnaissance and close scrutiny of shipping records for items that might contribute to a chemical arms program, have found nothing indicating renewed activity at the site.

Holum tells reporters, "Our latest reports are that construction has halted at that plant."

The Clinton administration began a campaign more than a year ago to expose the Libyan chemical arms plant, which was under construction deep inside a hill in the town of Tarhuna, near Tripoli. The campaign aimed to force Col. Moammar Gadhafi to halt development of what then-CIA Director John Deutch said would be the largest chemical weapons facility in the world.

Former Defense Secretary William Perry told Congress last year the United States would not allow Libya to complete the Tarhuna plant, and said "the whole range of American weapons" would be considered to stop it.

An envoy from Egypt, which maintains relations with Libya despite its support for international terrorism and weapons development, inspected the site last year and said he found no evidence to refute Libyan claims they were building a fertilizer factory.

Holum says the United States has kept a close eye on Tarhuna since then, and intelligence analysts believe construction has not resumed.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington, DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From panukes@igc.apc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:53:48 -0800 (PST)

From: Peace Action - National Office <panukes@igc.apc.org>

To: abolition-caucus@igc.org, jdi@clw.org

Cc: palist@igc.org

Subject: NATO & nukes list server

Greetings activists:

I just want to remind you all that there is now a majordomo listserver set up for activists to discuss and devise strategies to counter NATO expansion, and achieve deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, and a European nuclear weapon free zone.

The Clinton-Yeltsin Summit begins tomorrow in Helsinki, and the NATO leaders Summit is only a few months away in July, so it is important that we develop our dialogue across the Atlantic on NATO and nukes issues.

If you wish to subscribe, send a message to <Majordomo@igc.org> with no subject line, and in the body text of your message write subscribe start3-europenwfz@igc.org <your email address>

Please allow a few days processing time.

If you are an IGC subscriber, you can follow the discussion on the majordomo list server on the accompanying conference at <start3.nato>.

I encourage those of you who subscribe to post any documents and articles expressing your/your organization's position on NATO expansion and/or the way forward with weapons reductions and a European NWFZ. Please share letters you have sent to your government, to NATO, to the press on these issues. Post reports of demonstrations, public meetings, lobby visits, press conferences, interviews, etc. so that activists in North America and Europe can share knowledge of each others' activities and become better informed.

I look forward to our dialogue and joint planning.

Karina Wood  
Peace Action Education Fund, USA.  
From disarmament@igc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 12:42:44 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Boston Globe on Summit

This story ran on page a18 of the Boston Globe on 03/19/97.

"Next step toward disarmament"

By Globe Staff

When President Clinton encounters Boris Yeltsin tomorrow in

Helsinki for their summit meeting, most of the issues on the agenda will be markedly different from those that defined the Cold War. There remains, however, one crucial vestige of the superpower conflict: a need to reduce further the levels of strategic nuclear missiles.

The nub of the problem Clinton will try to resolve is that the Russian Duma is refusing to ratify the START II treaty with its reductions to between 3,000 and 3,500 long-range warheads per side by 2003. The US Senate has ratified START II, and if Russia's legislators considered their country's interests rationally, they would, too.

But Russian discontent with START II is not merely a matter of prideful nationalism. The treaty eliminates the destabilizing category of multiple-warhead missiles, which constituted a large fraction of Russia's strategic nuclear weaponry. If Moscow now agrees to be rid of its multiple-warhead missiles, it faces an intolerable choice: Either accept a smaller number of strategic missiles than the United States possesses or spend money it cannot afford to build single-warhead missiles.

Sagely, Clinton and his advisers have prepared for the summit a flexible offer that would permit the Russians to come away with nuclear parity, affordable strategic security, and national pride. At the heart of this offer is the prospect of opening negotiations on a START III treaty without waiting for the Duma to ratify START II. In this manner the two sides could lower the level of strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 per side, thereby making it unnecessary for Russia to finance the building of single-warhead missiles.

Clinton is prepared to be flexible in establishing time lines for the reduction process and in removing warheads for currently deployed missiles while waiting for the destruction of silos. Resolving this security problem inherited from the Cold War will depend on Yeltsin's readiness to keep it separate from other issues such as NATO expansion and on his willingness to use his presidential powers to bring the Duma along.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From nfnzsc@gn.apc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 20:58:41 GMT  
From: National Steering Cttee Nuclear Free Local Authorities  
<nfnzsc@gn.apc.org>  
To: nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: UK Nuclear News 19 March 1997

>From GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk Wed Mar 19 15:52:29 1997  
Received: from MCR1.poptel.org.uk by gnew.gn.apc.org  
(8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)  
id PAA03215; Wed, 19 Mar 1997 15:52:15 GMT  
From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 15:51:57 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 19 Mar  
To: nfznsnc@gn.apc.org  
Message-Id: <397257865MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
Status: R

DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Weds 19 Mar 1997

97-8325 Nirex faces new search for n/waste dump: some scientists  
say  
disposal is 35 to 40 years off. FT  
97-8326 Japanese protesters give British n/waste ship Pacific  
Teal  
angry reception. Ind

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
From ippnwbos@igc.apc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 14:02:37 -0800 (PST)  
From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: PENN seminar

forwarded

>From: uucp@amok.antenna.nl  
>Date: Wed, 19 Mar 97 10:33:24 +0200  
>Message-Id: <gate.D3kT4D1w165w@amok.antenna.nl>  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

>

>

>

>PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT

>

>A PENN seminar on non-proliferation and nuclear weapons in  
Europe

>will be held on Sunday 15 June, one day before the European

>summit in Amsterdam.

>

>Karel Koster

>(coordinator working group Eurobomb)

>

>NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

>

>ORGANISATION:

>PENN (Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation)  
>which includes the following organisations:  
>BITS (Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security)  
>BASIC (British American Security Information Council)  
>CESD (Centre for Eeuropean Security and Disarmament)  
>Working Group Eurobomb (Netherlands)  
> and individuals from other European countries.  
>  
>LOCATION:  
>Amsterdam: the meeting place will have room for 200 people  
>Amsterdam is easily accessible by air, road and rail.  
>  
>DATE: Sunday 15.06.1997  
> (one day before Amsterdam summit conference  
> marking the end of the Dutch chairmanship of the European  
> Union and the review of the Maastricht Treaty)  
>  
>TIME: 14.00 - 17.00  
>  
>PROGRAMME:  
>Opening statement  
>Dutch politician  
>  
>Keynote speaker  
>- Michel Rocard (invited)  
>  
>Theme 1  
>Politics and nuclear bombs: time for a change?  
>  
>Panel  
>- MEP Bertens (Liberal caucus European Parliament)  
>- Heidemarie Wieceorez-Zeul (SPD MP) (invited)  
>- Dutch MP (invited)  
>- Swedish MP (invited)  
>  
>BREAK  
>  
>Theme 2  
>The NPT and European nuclear bombs  
>  
>Panel  
>- PENN research into the NPT (Otfried N.)  
>- IALANA expert  
>- PENN representative: present politics and NPT  
>  
>Closing statement  
>-----  
>  
>The aim is to sensitise public opinion in Holland as well as the  
>international community to the issue of nuclear weapons in  
>Europe. Most of the recent debate on European security has  
>focused on the expansion of NATO and to a limited extent on  
>European Union foreign policy issues. The question of what will  
>happen to the nuclear weapons still present in large numbers on

>European territory has all but disappeared from the public  
>agenda.  
>Discussion on this issue have only taken place in the limited  
>circles of the policy makers of the major European powers. We  
>intend to bring the debate on a future European nuclear  
deterrent  
>into the open. Furthermore, we will also focus attention on the  
>non-proliferation and disarmament aspects of these developments.  
>  
>  
>For further information contact:  
>Dirk Jan Dullemond tel +31-317-423481  
>Karel Koster tel +31-30-2442122  
> fax +31-30-2441783  
>  
>  
>c/o AMOK  
>Esdoornstraat 14  
>3551 AJ Utrecht  
>Netherlands  
>>From amok@amok.antenna.nl Wed, 19 Mar 97 10:32:00 +0200  
>From: amok@amok.antenna.nl (STICHTING AMOK)  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>Subject: Amsterdam seminar NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN EUROPE  
>Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 10:32:00 +0200  
>Message-Id: <031997103243Rnf0.79b5@amok.antenna.nl>  
>Organization: Stichting AMOK Utrecht  
>Reply-To: amok@amok.antenna.nl  
>X-Mailer: Rnf 0.79b5  
>  
>  
>

-----  
Michael Christ Program Director  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St. Cambridge, MA 02142 USA  
tel. (617)868-5050 fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate  
Nuclear Weapons  
From acronym@gn.apc.org Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 22:50:29 GMT  
From: Rebecca Johnson <acronym@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: resend on NPT

Dear abolitioners,  
I sent this a week ago, together with a 5000 word opinion piece  
on how the  
NPT PrepCom process could address substance as a file attachment,  
but I  
think you haven't received it. Therefore I'm resending without  
the file

attachment, although some of this may be old news now. If you want the opinion piece, let me know.

To DisInt Receivers  
DisInt Report # 2.1

16 March, 1997

Re: NPT PrepCom

With just three weeks to go before the start of the NPT PrepCom in New York on April 7, 1997, it is not definite that Pasi Patokallio of Finland will be the Chair. The uncertainty further disrupts consideration of how to organise and run the first PrepCom of the new enhanced review process, agreed in May 1995.

Below is a brief summary of the situation as Geneva ambassadors see it, plus a sketch of the Finnish approach to the PrepCom, should they be confirmed as chair.

Despite indications in November 1996 that the Western Group's nominee for chair of the 1997 PrepCom, Pasi Patokallio, was acceptable to members of all groups, a recent challenge has emerged. Delegations from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), meeting in New York in January, have put in a bid to chair the 1997 PrepCom, as well as the 1999 PrepCom, a fourth PrepCom if one is held, and the Review Conference in the year 2000. While there is support for the argument that the number of countries in the NAM warrants more generous allocation of Chairs (over 100 NAM members, compared with about 25 in the Western group and 20 in the virtually moribund Group of former Eastern bloc countries), there is considerable frustration among many disarmament delegations in Geneva -- not least among the G-21 group of non-aligned states -- that this procedural challenge is dangerously late and will play into the hands of those who want to prevent the enhanced review process from effectively addressing issues of substance. It is understood

that the Western group has already signalled that it is not pushing to chair the 2000 Review. The Eastern European group would also have to agree not to press for their candidates to chair these meetings, which might be more difficult as nominating posts seems to be the only remaining *raison d'etre* for the group. Nevertheless, this procedural question must be clarified without delay, with both the Western and Eastern groups accepting the principle that because the NAM is more numerous, its candidates should chair the 2000 Review Conference, third and (if held) fourth PrepComs.

There are strong indications that the majority of NAM would then be happy to drop their challenge for 1997 and allow Patokallio to go forwards as Chair of the first PrepCom. The sooner this happens the better, as much preparation still needs to be undertaken prior to April 7. However, there is a danger that a few states with different agendas will use this issue to continue the procedural challenge into the first week of the PrepCom. This would divert attention away from developing the approaches, rules and precedents on which the new review process will depend. Most recognise that tying the 1997 PrepCom up in procedural knots will benefit no-one but those who want a weakened non-proliferation regime or business as usual. However, it is not clear whether they will be able to persuade their colleagues to resolve the issue in good time.

Agreeing to Patokallio's nomination as chair of the 1997 PrepCom does not necessarily mean accepting his view of how the PrepCom should run! The Finns have been having series of meetings with various think tanks like PPNN and Monterey, as well as Patokallio attending meetings in Kyoto, Geneva, Kathmandu and all kinds of places. The draft structure emerging from their talks is for a PrepCom rather like a shortened Review Conference. At the very beginning basic procedural decisions would be taken, including adoption

of rules of procedure, documentation etc. Patokallio wants to dispose of this segment as quickly as possible, preferably the first couple of days, but acknowledges that it might take 3-4 days. To deal with it this quickly would presuppose adopting rules as used in the past for most aspects of the PrepComs.

Some time is intended for general debate, with national statements from any parties. To comply with the view that at least 51 percent of time should be devoted to substance, the PrepCom would then debate clusters of issues, divided roughly along the lines of the three main committees: disarmament, safeguards and peaceful uses. These clusters would correspond to the relevant articles of the treaty and agenda items of past Review Conferences, to which related sections of the 1995 Principles and Objectives would be added. There is also a fourth cluster of issues in the P&O, such as universality, which don't correspond directly with treaty articles, but have become very important for states parties. Rather than hold parallel committees (which are deemed difficult for smaller delegations), the idea is for issues to be addressed in turn in formal or informal plenaries, presided over by the PrepCom Chair. There is considerable debate over what kind of report should emerge from the PrepComs, with a growing preference for a Chair's report, summarising the major debates.

In a response to a letter on NGO participation sent by Jonathan Dean, Ann Lakhdar of the NY NGO Committee on Disarmament and me, Patokallio also indicated the likelihood of providing a half day for NGOs to put their views forward, suggesting that if this is offered we try to structure it so as to convey the most representative arguments as coherently as possible (ie not 40 three minute cliché ridden 'statements'). He would also be prepared to speak to us, probably some time in the first week and again when the PrepCom

is over (or at least near the end).

I am worried that the format for the new PrepComs will be rushed through, and have made representations to several key delegations, including Patokallio, for more thought to be given to the type of outcome desired from the PrepCom debates on substance. In order to address substance coherently and effectively in the review process as a whole, it is necessary to determine what states parties aim to achieve. Deciding on how substance will be addressed is as important as determining what the priorities for discussion should be. This is vital in order to avoid the PrepComs turning into an impotent talk shop.

I have finally got round to writing my own thoughts down on how substance could be addressed to strengthen accountability in the review process. As the piece is 7,000 words and may not be of interest to all DisInt receivers, I have provided it as an attachment rather than uploading direct to you. It will be published in Disarmament Diplomacy (No 13) over the next 2 weeks.

All the best,  
rebecca

=====  
email: acronym@gn.apc.org  
Disarmament Intelligence Review  
24, Colvestone Crescent  
London E8 2LH  
England  
Tel/fax until April 1: +44 171 241 4691  
Please note: from April 1, 1997 the telephone and fax numbers  
will be  
changed, as follows: telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857  
fax (0) 171 503 9153  
The address and email remain the same.  
=====

From gdaniell@wt.com.au Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 07:11:33 +0800 (WST)  
From: Graham Daniell <gdaniell@wt.com.au>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: April 6th letter

Hi,

I have written a letter (below) to be sent to local newspapers to mark 1000 days before the year 2000. I would appreciate it if members of this email list would check it for accuracy, as I am not 100% sure on a couple of facts - in particular the year in which Mr. Gorbachev made his call for elimination nuclear weapons.

I also welcome any suggestions regarding how the letter might be improved. However time is short, so please reply quickly.

Please feel free to modify it and to send to your own local papers if you wish.

Thanking you all for the wealth of information and views that I receive via the Abolition server.

Graham Daniell

-----  
(letter begins)

April 6th 1997 will mark 1000 days remaining before the dawn of the year 2000. It is time to begin considering what sort of a world we are bequeathing to our children, and to the inhabitants of the third millennium.

At the turn of every century, people expect great change. Such events are a natural time to look to our past, celebrate our achievements, reflect on our failings, and make resolutions for the future.

In Australia the Republican debate is an example, and no doubt there will be movement for change in many countries as the end of the century approaches.

We can also expect that the peoples the "global village" which our world has become will also desire change for the better, and rightly so. In this century man's inhumanity to man has found it's ultimate incarnation in the nuclear threat which hung over us, suspended on a thread like the sword of Damocles for the greater part of the last fifty years, and which still has not been fully sheathed.

In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. At the time his call was seen as being as unrealistic as his quest for glasnost and perestroika in the USSR. The demise of the Soviet Union since then has been a dramatic lesson in how even the most intractable realities can be changed, almost overnight. In the years since, many world leaders and public figures have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

World outrage In 1995 over French nuclear testing in the Pacific forced France to fall into line with the rest of the world in an effective moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

In July 1996 the International Court of Justice at The Hague ruled that nuclear weapons are contrary to the laws of war in almost any imaginable circumstance, and insisted that all States must now take serious steps to eliminate them.

The report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of nuclear weapons delivered in August 1996, called upon the major powers to commit unequivocally to this goal.

In December last, retired U.S. Generals Goodpaster and Butler (the latter a former commander in chief of all U.S. Strategic nuclear forces) issued a statement condemning nuclear weapons and again calling for their complete elimination. A few days later they were supported by a joint statement of 61 retired Generals and Admirals from 17 countries.

About 2 years ago a group of non-governmental organisations joined forces to form Abolition 2000, calling on all nations to conclude by the year 2000 a treaty and timetable to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. They point out that as chemical and biological weapons have already been banned under international law, so too must these weapons be banned, for they are even more devastating and indiscriminate in their effects.

Already many cities have declared their support for this goal,  
(such as  
Seattle, Oakland, and Pittsburgh in the US) adopting resolutions  
supporting  
the Abolition 2000 ideal.

A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and  
all future  
generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear  
weapons. It is  
to be hoped that the Australian government and people will take  
up this  
cause and promote it at home and in international forums such as  
the U.N.,  
as our gift to the future.

(letter ends)

-----  
Towards a nuclear-free millennium,  
Graham Daniell  
Perth, Western Australia  
gdaniell@wt.com.au

From scott@aloha.net Thu Mar 20 07:46:06 1997  
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 16:32:13 -1000 (HST)  
From: Scott Crawford <scott@aloha.net>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: Military in Hawaii today

--- begin forwarded text

Date: Wed, 19 Mar 1997 09:27:12 -1000  
Reply-To: kanakamaoliallies-l@hawaii.edu  
Sender: owner-kanakamaoliallies-l@hawaii.edu  
From: KEBOI@aol.com  
To: kanakamaoliallies-l@hawaii.edu  
Subject: Military in Hawaii today

Kyle Kajihiro,  
AFSC Hawai'i Area Program, Demilitarization Sub-Committee  
2426 O'ahu Avenue, Honolulu, HI 96822  
Phone: 808-988-6266; Fax: 808-988-4876; email: afsc@pixi.com

Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) will Resume Missile  
Launches at Nohili  
and Seeks to Expand into the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands!  
Recent news articles reported that the PMRF, located in Nohili,  
Kaua'i, will  
resume missile launches as part of a Theater Missile Defense  
testing program.

The sand dunes at Nohili are a traditional Kanaka Maoli burial

site, and have been classified as a "highly sensitive historical/cultural area" in the military's own studies, which were obtained by the Hawai'i Ecumenical Coalition. Although Kanaka Maoli have protested the desecration of these sacred sites for many years, the military refuses to cease its acts of cultural genocide.

The military's arrogance towards the Hawaiian community is emboldened by the strong support they receive from U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye. In a news release, Inouye brags about securing \$230,000,000 for the PMRF facility, "above and beyond the Department of Defense requests for the [PMRF]" over the last four years.

It seems that one missile launch facility is not enough. The PMRF is now seeking to install a missile launch pad on Tern Island, one of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands currently designated as a U.S. Wildlife Refuge. The island is the home to the endangered Hawaiian Monk Seal, the endangered Green Sea Turtle, numerous oceanic plant species, and dozens of seabirds.

A confidential source recently sent us military documents and plans for a missile launch facility on Tern Island. Officials from PMRF have sought permission from U.S. Fish and Wildlife service for several years to build a facility. Until recently, U.S. Fish and Wildlife service has soundly refused to consider the proposal because it was completely incompatible with the wildlife designation. However, it seems that superiors in the federal government pressured the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service into accepting the military's proposal "for consideration".

Desecration of Kanaka Maoli Sacred Sites at Mokuapu

The U.S. Military has begun construction of a \$42,000,000 housing project on the slopes of Heiau Pu'u Hawai'i Loa on the Mokuapu peninsula at Kane'ohe Marine Corps Air Station. Heiau Pu'u Hawai'i Loa is one of the most significant sacred sites in Hawai'i. Kamakau and others have

written about  
the historical and cultural significance of this site.  
Apparently there are  
4 sites where constuction is slated. Eric says that he has  
already begun to  
see iwi (bones) unearthed.  
Contact Eric at 808-261-1814 or Tony at 808-262-8022 for more  
information.

Homeporting of Nuclear War Ships and Planes.

The Navy is drafting an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for  
the

homeporting of three Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft  
carriers (CVN).

They are considering four sites: San Diego, Bremerton and  
Everett in the  
Puget Sound area, and Pearl Harbor. These are the largest  
warships in the  
U.S. arsenal, with each capable of holding a crew of 6000. The  
Navy has  
completed its scoping process which involved gathering public  
comments or  
issues to be considered in their EIS. The Draft EIS will be  
completed around  
the fall of 1997, at which time the public may submit comments  
during the 45  
day comment period. A final EIS is expected around spring of  
1998 and will  
also have a public comment period.

A San Diego coalition which included the Peace Resource Center  
and the  
Environmental Health Coalition, successfully stalled an earlier  
bid by the  
Navy to homeport one CVN there. An EIS already exists for that  
proposed  
project, but the Navy has refused to send copies of this report  
to anyone in  
Hawai'i who has requested it. We have some information that was  
produced by  
the San Diego coalition. We can send those to anyone who is  
interested for  
the cost of copying and postage.

Although the public comment period is over for the scoping  
process, they  
still need to know that people in Hawai'i oppose the nuclear  
warships and are  
watching. Add your name to the notification list and request a  
copy of the

San Diego EIS by contacting:

Dan Muslin (Code 03PL)

Southwest Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command

1220 Pacific Highway, San Diego, CA 92132-5190

619-532-3403

Re: the Environmental Impact Statement for Developing Homeport

## Facilities for Three Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carriers

Some reasons why the nuclear warships are bad for Hawaiyi include:

1. Nuclear warships pose a serious danger to the public. Defueling of spent nuclear fuel is dangerous. An accident or mishap during defueling could result in an explosion which would contaminate a 50 to 100 mile area as it did in Russia several years ago. We do not know the safety record of these ships or of the nuclear submarines already based at Pearl Harbor.
2. Expansion of U.S. fleet in Hawaiyi violates Hawaiian sovereignty and the decolonization process. From what I know, one of the firsts steps in decolonization is the removal of the occupier's military.
3. The Navy's occupation of Pearl Harbor prevents Kanaka Maoli from exercising their traditional and customary rights in the area, such as the cultivation of fish and shellfish and religious practices. The Kohanaiki (PASH) decision upheld Kanaka Maoli traditional and customary practices on private and undeveloped lands as outlined in pre-overthrow kingdom law. Why not on government lands? Pearl Harbor was once the center of a thriving Hawaiian society which included 13 ahupuaya and 36 fishponds. The harbor was also sacred to the shark aumakua.
4. The massive influx of military personnel and their families would affect the job and housing markets. Dependents would compete with locals for jobs and affordable housing.
5. Dredging of the channels would cause severe environmental damage to the harbor habitat. Toxics disturbed in the process would pose a danger to marine life and humans. Pearl Harbor was once the spawning ground for the yanae (big mullet). With the destruction of habitat the large 'anae mullet runs have disappeared.
6. Hawaiyi is inadequately equipped to service these large CVNs. There is not enough housing or trained personnel to service the CVNs.
7. Homeporting of CVNs in Pearl Harbor would interfere with clean up and restoration of the harbor, which is listed as an EPA Superfund

site requiring  
massive clean up.

8. Military spending does not translate directly into economic benefit for Hawaiyi. Many contractors are from out of state. Much of the military personnel payroll circulates within the military commerce system which is not taxed by the state. Military personnel do not pay taxes for public education.

Senator Inouye is primarily responsible for the increased number of naval vessels homeported in Hawai'i. Additional vessels assigned to Hawai'i include: USS Hopper (DDG-70), USS Columbia (SSN-771), USS Tucson (SSN-770), USS Topeka (SSN-754), USS Pasadena (SSN-752), and USS Frederick (LST). Inouye also retained three P-3 Orion aircraft squadrons by transferring them from Barbers Point, which is being decommissioned, to the Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Base.

--- end forwarded text

From rwilcock@execulink.com Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 10:02:20 -0500  
From: Ross Wilcock <rwilcock@execulink.com>  
To: "Abolition Caucus List (E-mail)"  
<abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Comments by an American Investment Banker

forwarded by  
Ross Wilcock  
rwilcock@web.net  
<http://web.net.pgsg/~pgsg/>

I believe these considerations are most relevant to the Abolition 2000 community since real progress in my view depends especially upon Russia. Russia still has more nuclear weapons than anyone else. Confidence in Russia as a reliable partner in Abolition 2000 is critical to progress for the world wide movement.

This is quite long but important. It is copied from the NIS-Health List which is about practical efforts and cooperation in Health matters with the NIS. The author Dr Van de Waal Palms is particularly well informed as an American Investment Banker based in Seattle who has been very active for a long time with many such efforts in Ukraine and Russia. He has both high level and grass roots practical knowledge.

\*\*\*\*\*

From: Dr. Pyotr Johannevich van de Waal-Palms  
[palbank@eskimo.com]  
Sent: 19 March, 1997 14:05  
To: nis-health@igc.org  
Subject: Even more interesting statement on the hill...

On 3 xxx -1, Joanne Neuber wrote:  
> U.S. ADMINISTRATION WANTS TO INCREASE AID TO FORMER SOVIET UNION. In testimony to Congress on 11 March, Ambassador Richard Morningstar called for a 44% increase in U.S. aid to the Newly Independent States next year.

Palms on Statements of Mr. Dine USAID in Hill  
Dear Mr. Dine

I have read your:

> Statement for the Record by Thomas A. Dine, Assistant

Administrator for  
Europe and the New Independent States United States Agency for  
International Development Committee on International Relations  
United  
States House of Representatives March 11, 1997

in which you report that the FREEDOM Support Act has produced  
tangible  
results.

Your remark

> Reformers in Russia, Ukraine and most of the other Soviet  
successor  
states are redefining entire economic and social systems and  
bringing them  
into the wider world.

ignores the reality that prime Minister Chernomyrdin has just  
renewed the  
limitation upon freedom of Russians to travel within their  
country and that the  
redefining of the economy has consisted solely of allocating  
ownership of the  
country to the former rulers of the Soviet Union thereby  
disenfranchising the  
Russian population. Social systems are in chaos and neglected.  
Billions of

wages are in arrears and sums exceeding 5 times the total  
economic assistance  
provided by other nations, have been looted and transferred as  
"flight capital" to the private bank accounts of the policy  
makers abroad.

Western private industry is witnessing nothing to correspond to  
your  
representations that:

> broad and unmistakable signs that reform is starting to achieve  
demonstrable results. It is creating a viable middle class based  
upon the  
empowerment of the individual.

We cannot say as you do that:

> we can say that its roots have taken strong hold of people's  
outlooks and  
expectations. Reform has given oxygen to the life blood of civil  
society and  
private enterprise. And it has produced some remarkable results.

Everywhere we are still smothered by corruption and demands for  
tribute and  
bribes from an unreformed exploitative oligarchy. People are  
being publicly  
executed without trial. Prisons still hold women, children and  
teenagers convicted  
of commercial or religious acts which are no longer crimes and  
this has been

widely reported on Canadian television with documentaries. Except for isolated cases of carefully orchestrated public relations "events" involving the most powerful international companies, things are not changing as you suggest, and I find your assertions misleading to the mid-size American firms.

By in large the majority of private companies in Russia continue to conduct their affairs by strictly Russian "lack of rules". They have not made profits, but rather they have conducted 'reverse income redistribution' by looting existing property from the disenfranchised. How else could a country with 50% decline in GDP and unemployment in excess of 10% have created 1 million millionaires and billionaires, from a previously equally and communally owned country. American companies are growing more apprehensive rather than comfortable, particularly with the official opinions of American government officials which ignore the reality of what is happening, in order to convince Congress to finance the continuation of a policy which has lost the ethical and moral superiority that sustained us through 70 years of philosophical differences. This is a great disillusionment to the Russian population as well, who thought we stood for something and had principles. I can assure you that the general population finds your characterization of "Legal reform is being woven into the fabric of commercial life In Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan" as perplexing, astonishing and tragically comical. I didn't think you yourself believed it. I cannot comprehend how you reconcile your statement: > the legal system and emerging marketplace are beginning to reinforce each other in many of the ways we would take for granted in the West.

with the fact that 50% of the economy is now black-market and less than 40% of income taxes are being collected, or with the fact that a government official by decree, in one day, can issue a discriminatory exemption to a single company of \$1 billion dollars in taxes.

With respect to your reference to:

> A basic element of capitalist economies is competition.

I would add that it is as well for the criminal cartels of the world.

Regulation is not by itself of any use unless what is being regulated is moral and ethical.

The manner in which current ownership has evolved has been one of looting

through "privatization" without regard for social justice What the countries are

being dissolved into, is far more significant than that they are being dissolved.

The extent to which USAID has failed to provide moral leadership is evidenced

by the fact that there is not a single Russian bank that can obtain "confirmation"

of their letters of credit by any major western bank. There simple is nothing to

trust. What is being accomplished is to teach thieves how to use ethical systems

to maintain unethical turf.

The individual today remains powerless, with no control over his or her personal

destiny-much less over the destiny of his community or nation.

The 55% private sector is now criminal under Russian law.

Compliance with all

laws would bankrupt them. Taxes are imposed on revenues not earnings.

If conducted in the United States, the elections, which used the arithmetic

component of numerical votes by the population, would have resulted in

impeachment of the officials. Democracy requires more than vote casting. It is

hardly remarkable that the losing candidates accepted the results, since the

vote casting was evidence of the financial and political power of the candidate

to direct the vote. Failure to win the vote meant you didn't have the military

power to over turn the results. This is the Russian form of "democracy".

Stabilization of the exchange rate, within the present context of regulations is

not evidence of economic stability but simply evidence of regulations which

successfully continue the "reverse income redistribution" policies.

I have carefully followed the media through the very helpful list-server

FSUMEDIA media at Article Request FSUMedia

<library@amhouse.kiev.ua>

and do not share your conclusions about the condition of the media in Georgia of

anywhere else in the FSU.

The ability to dispose of money by donation or "loan" is not the standard by which success in economic development is measured. It is by profitability of the enterprise and repayment. on that point the jury is still out. To the private sector in America it appears that U.S. government preoccupation with justifying its expenditures with "milestones" and "success stories" is self-serving and not objective and a conflict of interest. The fact that Politicians in the FSU were "elected" does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that officials consider themselves accountable to the electorate. Neither does the electorates consider that at present a realistic expectation and they do not have such expectations. While broadly viewed on a global scale, markets determine prices in Russia, regulations imposed by the policy-makers still allocate the components of prices such as 'cost of goods sold" "wages" and "profit margins" so as to exclude 99% of the population from participation in the pie. To determine if stock exchanges are a reality try to sell Russian stocks short. Would I claim that change of a more moral and ethical nature would have occurred if the United States had been a proponent of them? Yes. The old system would not have been replaced by crime, corruption, lawlessness, immoral behavior, if the United States had not expressed an opinion that this was to be expected. I can state with confidence that most of U.S. financial assistance has gone down a black-hole and has delayed the beginning of reform rather than aided it. Russia has wound up with authoritarian, nationalist approaches, something you claim U.S. policies have prevented. The wrong kind of change has happened and while it has not re-ignited the Cold War, it has left a population more oppressed economically than it ever was under Soviet rule. This is a blot on U.S. moral character. Modern free enterprise simply cannot happen without rights, privileges and opportunities for the individual and we have not defended them. There is nothing to build on and from what has been learned a change of direction is

called for.

What the U.S. does now is vital to our own moral, spiritual and ethical survival and the validity of our claim to democratic leadership in the world.

I do not accept the conclusion that you are achieving results and therefore think it unreasonable for you to ask Congress for more resources. There are

things that ought to be done for Russia, but I don't think you know what they are. I am not comfortable with USAID making its own performance assessments.

Rebirth and rebuilding of the economy of Russia will eventually be achieved by the Russian people, not from books written for them by USAID, but from support

they receive to eliminate oligarchy and oppression and unjust exploitation. The

knowledge, means, will, and tools already exist. What is needed is "enablement"

through the elimination of oppression from the policy-makers who are

unresponsive to their electorate.

A good start towards fairness and integrity would be:

1. The establishment of a currency board systems regulated from outside their borders by trustees. A currency board system cannot earn extra revenue from

printing money or by creating credit or inflation as a reverse income

redistribution scheme. Fiscal authorities and state owned enterprises cannot

obtain credit from monetary authorities in counties which have currency boards.

2. The elimination of compulsory registration of Russian citizens recently made

stricter. One of the conditions for Russia's admission to the Council of Europe

was the abolition by the Russian authorities of restrictions on freedom of

movement within the country. The main document, that is the basis of the

operation of "registration," is a resolution of the Russian government of 17 July

1995 #713, with the long title "On the confirmation of the rules of registration and

the recording citizens of the Russian Federation on the registration record for

place of stay and for place of residence within the boundaries of the Russian

Federation and the list of officials responsible for registration."

The essence of this voluminous document is that any citizen in

Russia traveling  
to a new place for a period of more than 10 days, must within 3-7  
days register  
with the organs of the Interior Ministry or with institutions  
accountable to it.  
Above all the preservation of the propiska system (though under a  
different  
name) justifies the preservation of the enormous  
police-bureaucratic apparatus  
engaged solely in the registration of citizens and the collection  
of the duties  
and taxes required by law. What does the Council of Europe want  
and what does  
it hope for? For the gradual abolition of norms that flout human  
rights?

This is the response of the chairman of the Russian Federation  
government,  
V.Chernomyrdin - resolution #172 of 14 February 1997 "On the  
introduction of  
amendments to rules of registration..." One must admit that  
nothing sensational  
happened. There is fine-tuning of the text, and formulations are  
made more  
specific. Instead of "might be refused," it now runs "is  
refused." The words "as  
a rule" are now omitted from the text. The rules have become a  
little more  
rigid, but not so much as to produce anxiety from these  
amendments alone. The  
point is, however, that the rules of registration are not being  
abolished, but  
perfected! The government is blatantly scorning the  
recommendations of the  
Council of Europe.

It is not embarrassed about sharpening a mechanism for violating  
human rights.

This petty, unnoticed resolution demonstrates to all the world  
how the Russian  
government regards its own obligations, how it intends to  
continue violating  
human rights, and just whose interests are given priority by the  
policy-makers  
in Russia.

Please reply to [russia@aa.net](mailto:russia@aa.net)

S uvajheniem i nailuchshimi pozhelaniyami,  
Dr. Pyotr Joannevich van de Waal-palms  
President, Palms & Company, Inc., Investment Bankers  
United States of America  
[russia@aa.net](mailto:russia@aa.net)

WWW home page: <http://ww.aa.net/~russia>

Russian Ministry of Education: Palms Electronic Russian Public  
Library

Home page: <http://www.informika.ru/windows/books/gutenb/list.html>

From ledwidge@psr.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 11:55:59 -0800  
From: Lisa Ledwidge <ledwidge@psr.org>  
To: paxchristi@igc.org, Aaronlk@goshen.edu, spsr@aecom.yu.edu,  
inpeace@bsuvc.bsu.edu, Eddarnold@aol.com, scole01@ibm.net,  
pame@igc.org,  
psrnyc@igc.org, psrpgh@igc.org, psrwase@igc.org,  
bvera@igc.org,  
tunnew@rpi.edu, ncoultter@igc.org, delgree@aol.com  
Cc: bens@access.digex.net, melinda@stimson.org, dculp@nrdc.org,  
barbara\_green@pcusa.org, tperry@ucusa.org,  
wandwill@clark.net,  
panukes@igc.org, paprog@igc.org, wjnsns@aol.com,  
mupj@igc.org,  
susangordon@igc.org, meldredge@igc.org, cmalecka@igc.org,  
bruce.hall@green2.greenpeace.org, fas@fas.org,  
bridget@fcnl.org,  
joe@fcnl.org, disarmament@igc.org, jdi@clw.org,  
cdavis@clw.org,  
vision@igc.org, thayden@igc.org, bmusil@igc.org,  
dkimball@igc.org  
Subject: ACTION ALERT: You Can Help to Ban Poison Gas

\*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\*

#### The CWC Needs Your Help -- Now

The U.S. Senate is on the verge of having-- or not having-- a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty that would ban the manufacture and possession of poison gas weapons worldwide.

NOW is a particularly important time to make a phone call or fax a note (legibly handwritten is best) to the D.C. office of your Senator, whose support is key to the success of the treaty.

Tell your Senator three things:

- 1) Do not allow Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) to prevent Senate action on the CWC.
- 2) See that a vote on the CWC is scheduled before the Senate's spring recess (scheduled to start TOMORROW, March 21).
- 3) Vote YES on the CWC.

Call the Capitol Switchboard (202-224-3121) and ask to be contacted to your Senator's office.

Key Senators on CWC:

AK	Murkowski
CO	Allard
	Campbell

FL Mack  
GA Coverdell  
IN Coats  
MI Abraham  
MN Grams  
MS Lott  
NH Gregg  
NM Domenici  
NY D'Amato  
NC Faircloth  
OR Smith  
PA Santorum  
SC Thurmond  
TN Frist  
Thompson  
TX Hutchison  
Gramm  
UT Bennett  
Hatch  
WA Gorton

...and virtually all other Republican Senators

We WILL get a CWC vote scheduled with enough calls and faxes from constituents. Thank you for your help.

For more information reply to this message or contact Lisa Ledwidge at Physicians for Social Responsibility, 202-898-0150 x222.

3/20/97

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 08:04:38 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: NY Times on Summit

The New York Times  
March 20, 1997  
Editorial

Play It Again, Boris

After comparing surgical histories in Helsinki, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin will slip some coins into the diplomatic jukebox and play a few top hits from the cold war. Among the old favorites will be nuclear arms reductions, the balance of power in Europe and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The agenda of the convalescing Presidents reflects both the enduring importance of the nuclear weapons issue and the misplaced emphasis the Clinton Administration has given to NATO expansion.

The most threatening legacy of the cold war is the nuclear arsenals still maintained by the United States and Russia. Though the number of nuclear warheads is falling, and the two countries no longer target their missiles at one another, the remaining firepower exceeds any reasonable limit. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin need to devote much time to renewing the efforts of both countries to retire and dismantle nuclear warheads and missiles.

To that end, Mr. Clinton has sensibly offered to explore the outlines of a future arms reduction treaty to encourage the Russian Parliament to ratify the last accord, which was signed during the Bush Administration. Mr. Yeltsin ought to welcome this offer and work with Mr. Clinton to cut warhead levels in each country to the 3,000-to-3,500 range specified in the last treaty and to set lower limits in a future agreement.

But these vital matters may not get sufficient attention in Helsinki. The reason is that Mr. Clinton has loaded the agenda with European security questions revolving around his determination to expand NATO eastward into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic by 1999. At a time when American and Russian officials should be talking about ways to consolidate democracy and free markets in Russia, they have been arguing over the number of tanks that can be stationed in Poland.

Under pressure from Washington, Moscow has at least temporarily given up hopes of stopping this expansion into Central Europe and is instead trying to negotiate the best terms it can before NATO officially issues invitations for new memberships this summer. Washington, in turn, has offered a variety of inducements to Moscow, including a pledge not to place nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and a proposal to cut the number of conventional weapons in Western Europe while freezing the number in Central Europe.

Washington has also promised a modest increase in financial assistance to Russia and an enhanced role for Moscow in international economic institutions.

Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin will no doubt spend considerable time haggling over the terms of a proposed charter that would spell out a new relationship between Russia and NATO. The idea is to make Russia a partner in many NATO activities, including peacekeeping missions like the current one in Bosnia where Russian soldiers are participating. But Russia, at least for now, would not be invited to become a full NATO member.

The rush to enlarge NATO is not justified by any Russian military threat today. Russian conventional forces are weak, and even a government with imperial ambitions would require years of draining expense before it could threaten Europe again. Nor will NATO growth do anything to bolster the economies of Central European countries, which face a substantial cost to modernize and integrate their military forces into the alliance.

The future stability of Europe depends more than anything on stability in Russia. Rather than taking actions that may isolate Russia and encourage a resurgence of Russian nationalism, the United States ought to concentrate on trying to help Russia rebuild its faltering economy, establish a fair and effective tax system and make democracy irreversible. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin cannot advance those interests by debating the balance of power in Europe.

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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 08:36:20 -0800 (PST)  
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Subject: Summit, Ledogar to CD

APn 03/20 1058 Summit-Nuclear

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- President Clinton today brought a package of arms control concessions to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, hoping the gesture would end a long impasse on the START II missile-reduction treaty.

Clinton wants something in return: A clear commitment by Yeltsin that the treaty will be ratified by the Russian parliament this spring. START II would cut U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals in half by the year 2003.

A senior U.S. official, briefing reporters aboard Air Force One on Clinton's summit gameplan, said the president was confident Yeltsin could get the treaty ratified.

But White House press secretary Mike McCurry said later that differences on strategic arms cuts would be "difficult to bridge." The administration's aim, he said, was "to make the world a safer place."

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov touched on the proposals during a 45-minute meeting today, but U.S. officials said the outcome depended on the Clinton-Yeltsin talks Friday.

Among the concessions Yeltsin will be offered is delaying for several years the deadline for Russia to blow up silos in which banned missiles are deployed and for scrapping banned bombers and submarines.

However, the long-range warheads on the missiles would have to be removed under the treaty's schedule, the official said.

Also, the two sides have been working on guidelines for a START III treaty that would set new and lower ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 long-range warheads on each side.

The United States has some 10,000 warheads and the Russians, 8,000 to 9,000. The START II treaty sets the ceilings at 3,000 to 3,500 warheads.

The START II treaty was concluded in 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996. The Russian Duma has declined to approve it partly because Russia would have to dismantle its most powerful missiles and could not afford to replace them with single-warhead weapons permitted under the agreement.

The planned expansion of the NATO military alliance to Russia's western border has heightened resistance in Moscow to a nuclear weapons cutback. Trying to ease Yeltsin's concerns, the administration is offering a charter that would give Russia a voice in NATO but not a veto over military actions.

American and Russian arms experts have been working for six weeks on the package of arms control concessions. Now it will be up to Yeltsin to seal the deal or reject it.

"It can go either way," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But this reflects the outer limits of our flexibility. We've pushed the outer limits as far as we can."

Clinton brought Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, with him to the summit to oversee the arms control negotiations with the Russians.

The general's toughest job will be to sell the deal to the Senate, which would have to ratify the changes in START II, if Yeltsin agrees to the terms.

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RTos 03/20 1104 Yeltsin: Tough Summit Ahead in Helsinki

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - Russia promised a tough fight Thursday over NATO enlargement but the United States said it would not be deterred by Moscow's objections as the countries' two leaders arrived in the Finnish capital for their summit.

"President Bill Clinton and I face difficult, serious talks," Russian President Boris Yeltsin said at the airport.

But the Kremlin chief, looking in good health after his recent long illness, said it was important to find compromises and maintain the U.S.-Russian partnership that had been forged after the Cold War, despite their differences.

Yeltsin arrived three hours after the wheelchair-bound Clinton, who had to be lifted from the presidential jumbo jet in a catering truck. Clinton injured his leg in an accident last week.

Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky said Yeltsin would defend Moscow's interests "like never before" at his two-day

meeting with Clinton.

The U.S. insistence on taking former Soviet-bloc countries into the Western alliance could force Moscow to review its foreign policy and strengthen links with countries like China, India and Iran, he said.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, arriving with Clinton, said NATO enlargement would happen on schedule even though Washington wanted a good relationship with Moscow. She dismissed Yastrzhembsky's remarks as unimportant "rhetoric."

"I think they have to understand that we have a schedule that is going to go forward and that is the track that we are going to pursue," Albright told reporters.

A dispute over NATO could signal the chilliest summit between the two powers since the end of the Cold War, although Yeltsin's comments suggested he wanted to avoid serious damage to the relationship with Washington.

Russia says NATO's expansion plans will threaten its security, undermine Yeltsin, create new divisions in Europe and represent a breach of trust.

An alliance summit in July is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start membership talks. The new members would not join until 1999.

Clinton is seeking to reassure Moscow NATO enlargement presents no threat, while U.S. officials are hoping to shift the summit focus on to less contentious issues where progress is more likely, such as Russia's economic reforms.

U.S. officials said they would also press Russia at the summit to ratify within the next few weeks a long-delayed 1993 arms agreement cutting long-range nuclear missiles.

Both sides say there is no intention of reaching a formal agreement on NATO at the Helsinki summit, the first time Clinton and Yeltsin have met in almost a year.

Yeltsin, now on fighting form after last year's heart surgery, is keeping a wary eye on his Communist and nationalist critics at home and must be seen to battle for Russia's interests.

His opponents planned a strident anti-Western debate on NATO for Thursday in Russia's parliament, which is where the START-2 nuclear arms treaty has languished unratified.

The two leaders will have dinner Thursday but the main talks take place Friday in a modern, airy villa overlooking the Baltic, the residence of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

Temperatures were below freezing in the Finnish capital and there was a light dusting of snow across the city.

Clinton had agreed to move the summit from Washington to Helsinki because of Yeltsin's health problems, but now finds himself the invalid and on the defensive over NATO.

While that issue tops the summit agenda, the two leaders may also discuss the latest crisis in the Middle East peace process co-sponsored by Moscow and Washington.

They will also discuss Russia's troubled transition to a market economy. There is likely to be more Western help on offer to support Russia as it tackles organized crime and economic reforms, particularly since Yeltsin has pleased Washington by

bringing young reformers into a new-look cabinet this week.

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RTw 03/20 0744 U.S. seeks quick Russian clearance for arms  
treaty

By Arshad Mohammed

HELSINKI, March 20 (Reuter) - The United States will press Russia to ratify a long-delayed treaty cutting nuclear weapons within the next few weeks and sees this as a key aim of the Helsinki summit, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday.

The official was briefing reporters travelling with U.S. President Bill Clinton to Helsinki for a two-day summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin that is expected to concentrate on arms control, NATO expansion and Russian economic reform.

The START-2 treaty, signed in 1993, has not come into force because the Russian parliament has refused to ratify it, saying it puts Moscow at a disadvantage.

The treaty, a landmark in arms control, would sharply reduce U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear arsenals to a maximum of 3,500 warheads on each side. The United States says it has to be ratified by Russia before further cuts are made.

"The central objective on the strategic side at this summit is to get a clear, unequivocal commitment to go ahead and move START-2 through the Duma (Russian parliament) this spring and not string it out any longer," said the official, who asked not to be identified.

He suggested the United States could offer Russia certain reassurances which would help the Duma pass the agreement, including giving Moscow more time to destroy missile silos covered by the deal.

"We're confident that the whole complex of agreements, the proposals that are on offer in Helsinki in their entirety, provide them with the basis to get this through the Duma." the official added.

"If this works right, we will have addressed their concerns on NATO expansion and agreed on the European security side to a package that allows them to say that although they don't agree, their concerns have been met," he said.

START-2, the second agreement under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in January 1993 and called for the cuts in nuclear arsenals to be implemented by the year 2003. The U.S. Senate has already ratified the treaty.

As part of its proposals, the United States was willing to give Russia more time to destroy missile silos provided it met the treaty's deadlines on dismantling nuclear warheads.

U.S. and Russian negotiators have been discussing such a proposal intensively for several weeks, the official said, but added that differences remained and that Clinton and Yeltsin would discuss these during the summit.

"But what is key to us is whatever amount of flexibility they get in terms of actually destroying the silos, that we hold to the original START schedule at least in terms of taking the warheads off," he added. "It's the warheads that kill people and represent the danger."

The United States also hopes to make progress in Helsinki summit on proposals for cuts under a START-3 treaty, which could cut warhead numbers on each side to just 2,000 -- a fraction of the Cold War level.

The effort to ratify START-2 in Russia has been delayed in part by communists and nationalists in the Duma who argue the treaty took advantage of Russia at a time of weakness.

The treaty obliges Russia to eliminate entirely its huge advantage in land-based, multi-warhead strategic nuclear missiles, seen as the most powerful and potentially destabilising arms.

Several factors have made Russia think twice about the wisdom of START-2. One is NATO expansion, another is pressure from the U.S. Congress for the United States to deploy a national ballistic missile defence system and U.S. plans to deploy theatre missile defences with allies.

REUTER

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RTna 03/20 0717 US arms envoy retires with appeal to non-aligned

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA, March 20 (Reuter) - Retiring U.S. ambassador Stephen Ledogar urged the non-aligned countries on Thursday to drop their demand in the Conference on Disarmament for the nuclear powers to negotiate total disarmament.

In a farewell speech Ledogar expressed "growing frustration" that the 61-member body has so far been unable to launch full negotiations to halt production of nuclear bomb-making fissile material and to ban anti-personnel landmines.

The world's only multilateral disarmament forum is on course to end its first two-month session on March 27 without even having agreed its 1997 agenda, according to diplomats.

India and Pakistan have led the non-aligned movement in demanding that the five declared nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) agree to set up a committee to negotiate total nuclear disarmament by 2020.

In their view, only then could negotiations on fissile material and mines start.

The nuclear powers argue that initial cuts in huge strategic arsenals have been negotiated by the United States and Russia, who aim to reduce their stocks to the level of those of Britain, France and China before widening the disarmament process.

Ledogar, who is retiring after serving as U.S. disarmament ambassador since January 1990, expressed pride in having taken part in successful negotiations in Geneva for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning underground nuclear explosions.

"My sense of pride in these accomplishments is tempered, however, by growing frustration with what I can only describe as a doomed effort to force the nuclear powers to negotiate now in this forum the elements of a disarmament process that they are conducting elsewhere," the U.S. envoy said.

"The implacable hefters of this linkage crowbar have blocked all work in this body for the foreseeable future, even work which is in the best interests of this body's members. Theirs is a self-defeating effort -- one which works to the disadvantage of the entire world community.

Ledogar said: "I can only hope, as I take leave of you, that a sense of realism will once again assert itself in the CD (Conference on Disarmament), and that the members of this body will not allow it to be paralysed by unrealistic and impolitic demands... The CD should not try to insist on the undoable."

President Clinton, in a message to the opening session in January, urged member states to push ahead with global negotiations to ban landmines and halt production of fissile material (plutonium and highly-enriched uranium).

Landmines are blamed for killing 25,000 civilians a year.

"We are stuck and will be stuck for a long time," a U.S. source told Reuters.

Another Western diplomat said: "The Group of 21 (non-aligned countries) are blocking and blocking. There will be nothing out of this session and we will come back to nothing in May."

Siri Bjerke, state secretary at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, said the forum's priority should be negotiations to ban production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

In a speech, she said: "The credibility of the CD depends on its ability to deliver concrete agreements.

"This credibility is damaged if the CD is used as a vehicle to block achievable progress, by making negotiations on one issue hostage to simultaneous movement on others."

Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, who had been scheduled to speak at Thursday's session, did not take the floor.

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Subject: More Summit Opinions

The Washington Post

By Susan Eisenhower

Russia and the Cold-War Warhorses

With the Helsinki summit at hand, it is vital that we rethink the motives behind many of the influential voices who say we should stand tough against the Russians.

Henry Kissinger, never one to beat around the bush, has come

forth this week on NATO expansion. Supporting the alliance's eastward expansion -- despite what he terms "dangerous conditions" -- he said: "Whoever heard of a military alliance begging with a weakened adversary? NATO should not be turned into an instrument to conciliate Russia, or Russia will undermine it."

Perhaps Kissinger hasn't got the word that the Cold War is over. "Adversary" is hardly a contemporary way to characterize a country that has moved forward with market-oriented reforms, held free and fair democratic elections, withdrawn from a bloody civil war and worked closely and productively with the United States under U.S. command in Bosnia. This week Boris Yeltsin appointed a new Council of Ministers, giving greatest power to two prominent Westernizers, former privatization czar Anatoly Chubais and regional radical reformer Boris Nemtsov.

Kissinger's comments and similar rhetoric used by Zbigniew Brzezinski are outdated. But at least they are honest about how they view Russia. Others have been less direct. In fact, the one part of the NATO expansion debate that has not been openly analyzed is the extent to which the expansion advocates have been driven by unreconstructed Cold War attitudes. There is much more of that than Americans living outside the Beltway might imagine. Many of the arguments used in Washington to debate this issue have an old-fashioned ring to them: "Don't appease Russia" and "No new Yalta."

Behind the old-fashioned labels is the view that says all relationships Russia has with the former Soviet republics or its former allies are open to suspicion and that only America should be allowed to dominate the post-Soviet world. "Is Russia really seeking a residual sphere of influence and to dilute the U.S. presence in Europe?" Brzezinski has asked rhetorically. Many who believe this will be happy only when Russia is isolated and excluded from Europe altogether.

Even if Russia had not changed an iota, the country has a legitimate right to be concerned about European security; it is, after all, a European country as well as an Asian one. But with the Soviet Union's agreement to the unification of Germany and acquiescence to Germany's desire to remain in NATO -- as well as the Soviet and then Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Baltic Republics -- the Russians have earned the right to be part of European decision-making. Instead of being part of the new security architecture for Europe, however, Russia has had to swallow the bitter pill of NATO enlargement.

The spirit of the Two Plus Four Treaty, which unified Germany, implied that eastward expansion of the Western alliance would stop there. As the Warsaw Pact was still in place at that time, the Soviets did not think to seek further assurances. The Russians now know, to their chagrin, that agreements with the West are worth nothing unless every contingency is spelled out in writing.

Many in Washington believe that we can call the shots on NATO without compromise because the United States won the Cold War and remains the world's only superpower. Regrettably, those who hold such chauvinistic ideas miss a crucial point: The Russians don't feel that they were defeated in the Cold War; they believe that the Cold War ended because they changed. Anyone who observed the elections results last year would have to agree. Despite horrendous living conditions among a significant portion of the population, the electorate resolutely refused to return to the past, thus defeating Yeltsin's communist rival.

The failure to see the end of the Cold War in the Russian context -- as a victory over senseless military expenditures and unnatural domination -- will prompt us to make perhaps the biggest mistake of the post-Cold War period: rushing to expand NATO without satisfactorily resolving our relationship with Russia first.

In this new era, Russia is needed to serve as a full partner in reducing weapons of mass destruction, tracking and apprehending terrorists, curbing organized crime and drug trafficking, and working with the rest of the world on issues related to energy security.

President Clinton will be right if he seeks accommodation with Moscow. As for the Russians as "adversaries," we must take such labels for what they are: anti-Russian rhetoric whose time, thankfully, has come and gone.

The writer is chairman of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

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The Washington Times - Opinion

EDITORIAL  
March 20, 1997

The Helsinki summit

The meeting that begins today between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the Finnish capital of Helsinki brings back memories of another crucial meeting between Soviet and American leaders in a Scandinavian capital -- the Reykjavik summit of 1986. In fact, there are lessons from Reykjavik that Mr. Clinton would do well to keep in mind today and tomorrow.

Back then, it was Ronald Reagan's absolute, unwavering refusal to sell out the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that convinced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union had lost

the Cold War. No matter what nuclear arms deals the Soviets dangled, Mr. Reagan declared SDI non-negotiable. Here at home, SDI was much ridiculed -- so much "Star Wars." In Moscow, however, it was taken as proof positive that the Soviet Union was hopelessly outclassed in the competition with the economic powerhouse of the United States, even with more than one quarter of the Soviet gross national product devoted to military spending. The world shook its head in despair at the time of the Iceland summit, but the most important word Mr. Reagan said at Reykjavik was "No."

Times, thankfully, have changed, and the stakes at the Helsinki Summit are not quite as dramatic. That does not mean, however, that the subject under discussion is unimportant: it is nothing less than the future of the NATO alliance itself. A number of countries belonging to the former Warsaw Pact -- in fact the vast majority -- want very much to join their old enemy, NATO. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are likely to be named first in line by July, when the heads of NATO convene in Madrid. Can this be accomplished without antagonizing Russia? The Clinton administration is trying its best to steer a course between what National Security Adviser Sandy Berger calls the Scylla and Charybdis of NATO enlargement -- Russian antagonism on one hand and Eastern European fears of being left in limbo on the other. In an article in Monday's Washington Post, Mr. Berger even went so far as to remind Russians how twice this century Russia "has been pulled into war" in Eastern and Central Europe by regional "instability." Miss Manners could not have put it more delicately.

The danger of Helsinki is that Mr. Clinton, who has rightly made NATO enlargement a priority, will be tempted to give in to Russian conditions, which predictably have been escalating as the date of the Helsinki Summit has drawn closer. Russia wants assurances that NATO will not engage in subsequent rounds of expansion to include more of its former satellites; it wants a legally binding charter agreement of cooperation with NATO; and it wants guarantees that no nuclear weapons will be stationed on the soil of new members, nor any forward positioned NATO troops, nor any NATO hardware and military installations.

It is clear that Mr. Clinton cannot give in to these unreasonable Russian demands, which would turn NATO membership into a useless piece of paper for the new candidates. Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati has articulated these concerns, stating, "We fully understand the sensitivity of the West not to humiliate a wounded and defeated Russia. But what we don't understand is this curious willingness to accommodate unjustified desires on the Russian side.

The task before Mr. Clinton will be twofold: To remind Mr. Yeltsin how much he and his country stand to benefit from peaceful and democratic coexistence and cooperation with the West -- and we with them. At the same time, he must stand firm on the

principle that free and sovereign countries, countries which represent no threat to Russia and never have, have every right to arrange for their own defenses and join whatever alliances they please.

Once in this century, an American president bargained away Eastern and Central Europe's right to self-determination at Yalta. Mr. Clinton, who seems to be mindful of the judgment of posterity, will find here a historic opportunity to right that wrong. Furthermore, as Mr. Reagan discovered at Reykjavik, the Russians really do understand a "No" when they get one.

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From wandwill@clark.net Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:38:43 -0500 (EST)  
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To: DDudley718@Juno.com  
Subject: Can you send this out?

>Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 09:02:17 -0500

>>From: jdi@clw.org (John Isaacs)

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>Washington, DC 20002

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Women's Action for New Directions (WAND)

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Women Legislators' Lobby (WiLL)

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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 10:03:40 -0800 (PST)  
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To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org,  
"Recipients of list cpro.military" <careerpro@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS SUPPORT CWC

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## Major Environmental Groups Urge Senate to Ratify Chemical Weapons Treaty

Pressure Builds on Senate to Schedule Vote Before April Deadline

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Thursday, March 20, 1997

Contact: Dr. Paul Walker, Global Green USA, 202-879-3181  
Gawain Kripke, Friends of the Earth,  
202-783-7400x212

[Washington]--Environmental organizations representing over one million members urged the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) today, the second anniversary of the 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas attack. In a letter (attached) sent today to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the groups urged fast action on the treaty which will enter into force on April 29th, 1997 regardless of whether the U.S. ratifies it by that date.

The groups cited the public health and environmental risk posed by chemical weapons as a major incentive for U.S. support of the treaty. The sooner the Senate acts to abolish these dangerous arsenals the better off all Americans will be, said Paul Walker, director of the Global Green USA Legacy Program.

The organizations supporting the treaty include the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, Global Green USA, the League of Conservation Voters, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Zero Population Growth, and Population Action International. The environmental community is proud to

join  
veterans groups, religious organizations, the peace and arms  
control  
communities and others to support this vital treaty, said Carl  
Pope,  
executive director of the Sierra Club.

In the spring of 1995 the Tokyo and Yokohama gas attacks  
killed scores and  
injured thousands. The nerve gas attacks in Japan proved to the  
world that  
we need to take urgent action to ensure public safety and  
environmental  
security. The Senate should approve the chemical weapons treaty  
now,  
proclaimed Brent Blackwelder, president of Friends of the Earth.

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Environmental Defense Fund Friends of the Earth Global Green  
USA  
League of Conservation Voters Natural Resources Defense Council  
Physicians for Social Responsibility Population Action  
International  
Sierra Club Zero Population Growth

20 March 1997

The Honorable Trent Lott  
Majority Leader, United States Senate  
487 Russell Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Majority Leader Lott:

We are writing you as the leaders of national environmental  
organizations to  
urge your support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons  
Convention (CWC).  
This treaty, signed by President George Bush over four years ago,  
warrants  
your vote and active support before it enters into force on April  
29, 1997.

The United States has long recognized the public health and  
environmental  
risk posed by our chemical weapons arsenal. Because this arsenal  
lacks  
military utility, the U.S. Congress has already approved a

program to  
unilaterally eliminate our entire 31,000-ton unitary stockpile.  
U.S.  
ratification of the CWC, already signed by some 160 nations and  
ratified by  
70 signatories, will afford us the opportunity to participate in  
the  
international effort to ban these weapons of mass destruction  
across the  
globe and to encourage other nations, especially Russia, to  
undertake the  
destruction of existing stockpiles.

In the U.S., stockpiles of these weapons are located in eight  
states:  
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon,  
and Utah.  
Public health and safety are at risk in the communities where  
these weapons  
are located and they will continue to be compromised until the  
weapons are  
destroyed. Congress has provided significant leadership in  
recent years in  
promoting the use of safe and effective methods of chemical  
weapons  
destruction. Ratification of the CWC is the vital next step.

We urge that you and the Senate act quickly to ratify the CWC and  
ensure the  
public health and environmental security for all Americans.  
Thank you.

Sincerely,

John Adams  
Executive Director  
Natural Resources Defense Council

Brent Blackwelder  
President  
Friends of the Earth

Deb Callahan  
President  
League of Conservation Voters

Hugo Hoogenboom  
President  
Population Action International

Peter Kostmayer  
Executive Director  
Zero Population Growth

Fred Krupp  
Executive Director  
Environmental Defense Fund

Robert Musil  
Executive Director  
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Mathew Petersen  
Executive Director  
Global Green USA

Carl Pope  
Executive Director  
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From: disarmament@igc.org  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 13:41:46 -0800 (PST)  
Subject: Clinton's Nuclear Summit Offer

APn 03/20 1602 Summit-Nuclear-Box

By The Associated Press

A look at how proposed concessions brought by President Clinton to his summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin could pave the way to reductions in U.S. and Russian long-range missile arsenals.

GOAL: To end an impasse in the Russian Duma over the 1993 START II treaty, which would have required the United States, by 2003, to reduce its arsenal of strategic warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers to 3,500. Russia would get down to 3,101.

The treaty would also ban land-based multiple warhead missiles and the heavy bombers that are the centerpiece of Russia's nuclear array.

CLINTON'S NEW OFFER -- In exchange for Yeltsin's promise of ratification this spring, the United States would:

--Take another whack at the totals, driving them down to

between 2,000 and 2,500, depending on the outcome of negotiations.

--Still require START II's 2003 deadline for destroying warheads.

--Give Russia several years more to destroy the silos where banned missiles are deployed.

--Delay the required Russian breakdown of banned bombers and submarines.

LONG-RANGE WARHEAD ARSENALS:

Now, U.S. -- 8,402; Russia -- 6,669.

In 1990, U.S. -- 12,718; Russia -- 10,779.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From: rwilcock@execulink.com Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 15:07:36 -0500  
From: Ross Wilcock <rwilcock@execulink.com>  
To: "Abolition Caucus List (E-mail)"  
<abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Recommendations to the Government of Canada

Recommendations to the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Canada made by Physicians for Global Survival, Canada have been posted via WWW - Abolition 2000 and World Court Project sections at the WWW address below.

Ross Wilcock  
rwilcock@web.net  
<http://web.net.pgsg/~pgs/>

From: disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 15:36:01 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: White House Summit Brief

March 20, 1997  
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY  
4:43 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)

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For Immediate Release  
20, 1997

March

PRESS BRIEFING BY  
MIKE MCCURRY

Hotel Inter-Continental  
Helsinki, Finland

4:43 P.M. (L)

MR. MCCURRY: Good evening, everybody. Good afternoon, good morning -- what is it? One or the other. President Clinton is upstairs here at our headquarters getting a last briefing from his -- members of his foreign policy team. He met a short while ago with Secretary Madeleine Albright, who is at the moment meeting with her counterpart Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They are clearly working through the substantive issues that we expect to arise on the agenda at the President's working sessions tomorrow.

This evening President Clinton has an opportunity to renew an old acquaintance with Boris Yeltsin. He has not seen him for quite some time. They, no doubt, will compare their respective personal situations -- President Yeltsin clearly vigorously recovering from heart surgery, and President Clinton clearly struggling to recover from knee surgery. But President Clinton continues to enjoy the realities of adjusting to summitry in a wheelchair.

. . .  
The President also is very interested in his bilateral meeting -- this has not been the focus of some of you -- but the President spent a good deal of time with Ambassador Shearer and talking about his upcoming meeting with the Prime Minister and with someone who, I think it's fair to say, the President has been enormously impressed with in his previous meetings. President Ahtisaari has a very keen grasp of issues ranging from the United Nations and reform of the United Nations to all the issues that are important to European integration, European security. And so the President did spend a fair amount of time preparing for that meeting with President Ahtisaari and also with Prime Minister Lipponen.

So there will be some discussions, and of course, the President intends to express the gratitude of the United States to the people of Finland for their willingness to host this summit. This is obviously an historic occasion; it wouldn't be possible if we didn't have the gracious hospitality of the Finnish people and the Finnish leadership.

So tonight, more of a social start to work on the agenda, start to review some of the important issues. The foreign ministers of the United States and the Russian Federation working through some of the issues on the agenda, and then moving tomorrow into the working session and things that we will, hopefully, report to you at the press conference tomorrow. That's where we stand.

. . .

Q What's your reaction to the seemingly conciliatory statements made by Yeltsin as he arrived and spoke of hopes for a compromise, said he wanted to leave here as friends? Do you sense a change in tone?

MR. MCCURRY: There are always prior to a meeting different degrees of public statements made. I think ours have been focused on exactly the working agenda the President brings here to Helsinki -- European security, the future of arms control, the importance of economic growth in Russia for the Russian Federation and for the people of Russia, and charting this relationship as we think of the 21st century where we want the United States and the Russian Federation to be as we think about the future of Europe, indeed, think about cleaning away all the last residues of the Cold War era.

And we have been guarded in what we've said on those subjects because there are disagreements that exist. You've heard me say that there will no doubt continue to be disagreements after the meetings tomorrow. But we remain confident that this is a partnership in which two nations can continue to work through the issues that divide them, led by two Presidents that clearly have a personal relationship sufficient to address those differences in an amicable style.

A lot of hard work, in other words. We'll see whether we can bridge some of these differences, but I don't want to speculate on whether we will or not at this point.

Q I'm sorry, but my question was do you detect a change in tone in what Mr. Yeltsin said when he arrived here, in contrast to what he's been saying the last few days?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, his concerns that he has expressed about the future of NATO our well known to us. And I think that all of those statements reflect some of the anxieties concerned, but also some of the opportunities that the Russian Federation foresees. We think about these issues in very much the same way. There are difficult issues there, but we remain confident that the expansion of NATO is the right formula for preserving an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe as we look ahead to the 21st century.

Q Mike, in that same quote, you know, he was

saying that President Bill Clinton and his team seem to be prepared to find constructive approaches and compromises. It sounds like he's predicting that the compromising is going to from you.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, he's perhaps making more difficult my effort to lower expectations at the moment. And I think, based on what I've heard from our team -- from Secretary Albright, from Deputy Secretary Talbott, from some of the members of the President's National Security team, from Sandy Berger and others -- there's a lot of very difficult work that lies ahead and some differences that are going to be difficult to bridge -- whether we're talking about arms control, whether we're talking about issues related to strategic arms reduction, whether we're talking about the vital question of the future of NATO's relationship with Russia.

There are still many issues to be addressed and not clear that all of them will be resolved. But there will be a good work done on all of those in the spirit of partnership that I think defines this relationship.

Q Do you think President Yeltsin will be disappointed in his hope or expectation --

MR. MCCURRY: I think he will find in his friend Bill Clinton a President, a leader willing to work through these issues and to see if we can't come to common understanding on some of the questions related to the agenda the two Presidents have defined. I think we certainly will be meeting with him in a spirit that is open and candid and realistic in dealing with some of the differences that exist. But I don't want to predict that that will lead to success or lead to more work ahead in the future.

Q Mike, are we likely to see any movement on the Russian request to extend the 2003 deadline? And if we did agree to anything along those lines, is it your understanding that that would require reratification by the Senate?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, there will be a lot of discussion about where we are with START II, what the status of ratification is in the Duma, what the implications are as we look beyond START II and what the timing will be for, perhaps, a third round of strategic arms reductions. I don't want to preview that now because we clearly will be doing a lot of work on that tomorrow.

Q As far back as 1945 the United States has occasionally raised the possibility of the Russians joining NATO or becoming associate members of NATO. Do the Russians now have this option?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we have always described the

expansion of NATO as an inclusive, nondiscriminatory process. And we established clear criteria. We've talked about the why and the how and we're moving now into the question of the who. And we've always said that that is a process that is open and transparent and available to all. I think in reality the Russian Federation itself has chosen to define its relationship with NATO in a different fashion; thus, the concentrated effort to talk about some charter or some way in which we could find a political commitment on the part of NATO and the Russian Federation to structure a relationship in the future that is something other than membership.

But it was, no doubt, just as important to define that relationship, and we've already seen the advantages that come from cooperation. The Russians' participation in the stabilization force in Bosnia has been a hallmark of the cooperation that we foresee as we look ahead and think about the relationship that Russia will have to NATO, and that's the type of discussion that's underway. But by no means is anyone excluded. That has been the policy of the Alliance since it took the decisions necessary to open the question of expansion.

Q The Russians have been very tough and pessimistic in their statements. Do you think they really mean it, or is there some kind of -- part of the game?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to predict how their public statements affected their negotiating strategy or how they thought about the preview of this meeting. Again I'd say we've tried to be very correct in laying out what we think the agenda is, what we think the conceivable goals are for discussion, and then stick to that. And there are always different views of how the dialogue will go and sometimes expressed differently by different people in governments. But I think we've looked across the whole range of things that have been said walking up to this summit and we believe that President Yeltsin arrives here determined to work with President Bill Clinton to address all of these issues that the two governments have defined, and we think it will be done in a spirit of partnership.

Q Mike, in terms of the dynamic that you're talking about, the expansion of NATO, is the President just going to sit down and just say to Mr. Yeltsin, look, the idea that we're going to abandon this expansion is just not there, or do they do it in most of the diplomatic terms? How direct will it get?

MR. MCCURRY: By now the Russian Federation, based on the presentation the President made to Foreign Minister Primakov and what they have heard repeatedly -- not only from the United States government, but from Secretary General Solana and from other NATO governments -- the realities are quite clear. The schedule going to July in Madrid is quite clear.

What is not clear is how we do the very important work of defining Russia's role in questions related to the future of NATO, the adaptation of NATO and eventually the expansion of NATO. And that's probably the work that will be done here. And let me remind, too, this is not conclusive in and of itself here, although the United States obviously has a leadership role in the Alliance, this is a decision that is defined by 16 governments making their decisions. The expansion of NATO is, for our government and for many of our Alliance partners, a treaty amendment, so it does require action by other branches of, indeed, our government and in some cases, other parliaments. So it's a very significant decision and it's one that cannot be taken lightly and cannot be taken unilaterally.

Q I guess -- I was trying to get to the kind of level of discussions you think they are. If you think that they're going -- do you have some concern that this could get a little testy since certainly Mr. Yeltsin wants some reservations on what can be included in NATO and what the NATO expansion will mean the President, at least White House officials are saying, is not prepared to give.

MR. MCCURRY: It has not been a feature of the discussions of these two Presidents that they are testy. They have certainly had disagreements and have been very candid in dealing with issues in the past. But I think they know how to resolve those differences in an amicable way. And the tone of the conversation is most often friendly, although it's sometimes firm and determined as well.

Q How does the White House -- Russian worries about NATO -- how much are they seen for real?

MR. MCCURRY: The public pronouncements that are made? I think that we take them in the context that they're delivered. We understand that there is a vibrant political dynamic in Russia that has to be addressed sometime by the leadership of the Russian Federation. So we account for that as we measure out what various figures in the government say, and then we listen very carefully to what they say as we meet with them face to face, where we do our direct diplomacy.

Q How much do you think they differ from each other?

MR. MCCURRY: They don't differ greatly, there are just differences of tone and nuances sometimes. There's a difference between doing work side by side and then articulating publicly in a way that advances your diplomatic objectives, and perhaps maybe your domestic objectives as well. So there is a difference in tone sometimes. But there are very clear, strong feelings about some of the questions that these two Presidents have addressed, particularly on the side of the Russian Federation, and we acknowledge that and we respect that and will

try to work through that.

Q Has the U.S. government assessed whether this will affect Yeltsin and other -- whether NATO expansion will affect Yeltsin and other democratic politicians in Russia if it does expand, and is the U.S. concerned about that?

MR. MCCURRY: We try to think in a sophisticated way about those who pursue reform and the agendas that they have and the difficulties they face as they advance their objectives and how external factors might impact them. We try to think about that in a serious, sophisticated way, sure.

Q But will it? Is the assessment that it will?

MR. MCCURRY: They are learned experts on that subject, many of them here to comment for many of your news organizations, and I'm sure many of them will help you on that question.

Q Mike, in conversations up until now and today and tomorrow, does the U.S. side communicate to the Russians that they take seriously their concerns and understand the basis of their concerns, while also saying that there's not a whole lot the U.S. is going to do about --

MR. MCCURRY: We do. We understand the historic context in which many average Russian citizens think of NATO because it's defined by the period of the Cold War and it's clear for many people in the Russian Federation that NATO was defined for years and years as the enemy. And making an adjustment to see the possibility of cooperation, partnership and how an expanded NATO becomes a tool that preserves the security of the Russian people is a difficult concept, perhaps, but it is one that we understand we have to articulate, articulate clearly, and we try in our public pronouncements, especially as we communicate in a way that we know will reach the Russian people to talk about the advantages, the opportunities, the importance of plotting a future for Europe that includes NATO as part of the architecture of peace and democracy.

Q The President has taken pains to acknowledge Yeltsin's contribution, the contribution of the Russian people. Does he feel that it's as important to give Yeltsin, if you will, some political cover at home as it is to get some kind of signal here that Yeltsin at least accepts the inevitability of NATO expansion?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think I just described to you how we try to think in a sophisticated way about the political dynamic that our counterpart faces and I think you can incorporate that answer as an answer to your question.

Q Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia all want to be

in this first round of expansion. Is this something that's going to come up in your talks with Yeltsin or do you think you're going to limit it to the other three countries?

MR. MCCURRY: I would be -- it may tangentially arise, but that's really a discussion more for the Alliance itself, the question of who and how we think about membership as we look ahead to Madrid. That could conceivably arise here, but the focus of that work, of course, is more properly in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Q The U.S. takes the position it has for months that Russia doesn't have a realistic picture of NATO. Does the U.S. have a realistic picture of the political problems NATO expansion poses to Yeltsin?

MR. MCCURRY: I think we, as I say, try to be sophisticated in our thinking about the internal dynamic in Russia. We know that that places constraints just as it does everywhere, Barry. You know, you and I have talked over the years about the Middle East and we know how the realities of politics on the street impact the ability of leaders to make decisions. That's, by the way, true for President Bill Clinton, too, as you all know. So I think we do take that into account and we understand the realities that exist and we are, of course, encouraged by some of the steps that have just recently been taken by President Yeltsin with respect to forming a government that appears to be infused with new figures that are committed to reform. We think that's significant, and we acknowledge that and I'm sure that will be something that President Clinton takes into account as he meets with President Yeltsin.

Q You mentioned trying to get this point across to the Russian people the meaning of a new NATO, but that assumes that the opinion of the Russian people counts in that system now. -- the Russian people at this point aren't terribly politically engaged. Can you address that point that your audience -- if your audience is the Russian people for this sort of education, does it really matter?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I suspect, as with maybe even the American people, there are more immediate concerns sometimes in the lives of the average Russian -- the status of the economy, the status of reform, what types of opportunities are existing as you build a better future. Those are the realities that define the day-to-day lives of most people in this world, and they are impacted by things that happen in the realm of foreign policy, but they are sometimes not as immediate.

I imagine there are a lot of things that we're going to be doing here related to promoting economic development and growth and investment in Russia that in the long run are going to be far more important to the Russian people than the question of how we structure the security architecture of Europe for the 21st

century. And I think that's a valuable part of the message that gets communicated from a summit like this as well.

....

Q Mike, after all the talk -- and the talks in Washington last week, could you delineate where the United States, NATO and Russia agree on a charter, if you want to call it that, and where they disagree at this point?

MR. MCCURRY: I probably could, but I won't right now because that's the work that they're going to do tomorrow, and I don't want to preview that. There are areas in which I think they've had good discussions in which they've got a good concept of what that charter should be, but there, inevitably, are some areas that they're still thinking about and that's the work that Secretary Albright and the Foreign Minister are devoted to probably right now. And it's, I imagine, going to be part of the agenda tomorrow. But some understandings of how that works and what that charter is an important part of the discussion tomorrow.

Q That very same thing. Last night the Russian Press Secretary was saying that they won't be happy with oral agreements, that they want something in writing and very concrete and very specific. Is NATO prepared to do that?

MR. MCCURRY: I think from our view it's important to have a good understanding of how that relationship will be structured. There are perhaps many different ways you can establish that understanding, but the concept of a charter that really makes clear for all the members of the North Atlantic Council and for the Russian Federation what the obligations are is a useful approach in our view.

Q Mike, how do you make the case to the Russians that the new NATO is not about turning against Russia when the majority of the contenders for new membership cite as their -- high on their list of rationales for wanting to do it is they're scared of Russia? And only yesterday the Lithuanian foreign minister made this --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the best way to answer that question is to point to what we are doing already with the Russian Federation and NATO together, and that's to address the situation of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, specifically trying to stabilize Bosnia as it recovers from the aftermath of a horrible war.

We're doing very good work together with them and we see in that moment of cooperation the utility of an institution like NATO as we think of a Europe that we want to preserve in peace, even though it has historically been a continent that is rife with ethnic conflicts. So the ability to use some of the

security architecture in the arrangements of NATO as we think about the identity of European security and think about the way you preserve European security is very, very important and shows what the opportunities and possibilities are for Russia.

Q Mike, what does the United States hope to accomplish in holding out the prospect of arms control concessions coming into these talks? What do you gain by dangling that possibility?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we are hoping, of course, to point ahead to the future of strategic arms reductions as we alert the Duma to the possibilities that exist beyond the ratification of START II. And obviously we think about how we can make the world a safer place as we delimit the size of the strategic arsenals on both sides and how we look ahead to the future. We are, in short, taking advantage of the enormous change in history that is represented by the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tensions from both sides, and codifying that or looking to codify that in how we approach the question of structuring the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

Q So, if I could follow up, the U.S. is essentially trying to say to the Russian Parliament, look, there's a lot to be gained from going forward with this and we will offer some good faith here if you're willing to act?

MR. MCCURRY: We certainly are trying to show what the possibilities are beyond START II, but we also want to address questions that are important to us, too -- how do we -- as we think about reducing the threat of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, we need to also address what the dangers are in regional theater-type ballistic missiles and we need to think about what the implications are for treaties that we've reached in the past, specifically the ABM. So how you fit those things together in the arms control equation will be a large part of the discussion tomorrow, and there are some outstanding issues there. There are some things, in short, that we want and expect, too, in exchange for looking ahead out on the horizon with respect to arms control.

. . .

Q Mike, if NATO is so important to European security, what role, if any, should NATO play with the Albania crisis? And a second question: Is Albright's meeting with Primakov specifically focused on the charter, or is she talking about the whole range of issues?

MR. MCCURRY: She is I think focused on some of those issues that were still on the table as the Foreign Minister left the White House and went to talk to President Yeltsin over the weekend, the last several days.

Q What are they specifically?

MR. MCCURRY: They are specifically the things that we'll be probably addressing and talking to you about tomorrow.

. . .Q Mike, back to the summit for a minute. You talked about changes that NATO has made to reassure the Russians that it's not a threat. Most of those changes occurred since Yeltsin's cold peace speech in Budapest about two and a half years ago. And as near as we can tell, Yeltsin hasn't changed his public posture on this subject a bit. Are you coming to a point where you're going to say, okay, we just are not going to be able to agree on that; let's see if we can go on to other things?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, that's a good way maybe of having a defining question that we can have on the table as we work ahead tomorrow. I've gotten through saying about as little as I can possibly say about tomorrow, and that's obviously the kind of question that is relevant after we meet with him tomorrow and see where we are.

. . . Q Tonight's event being primarily social, what business will get done, and besides business what will get accomplished?

MR. MCCURRY: On the President's agenda tonight is a bilateral meeting with President Ahtisaari and some other discussions with the Finnish government that he has taken seriously. That's substantively, they will -- we'll work through all of our bilateral issues with the Finnish government at that session, and then move into the dinner in which I think they'll probably talk about what kind of work are we going to do tomorrow and try to take some sense of what the overall tone and nature of the dialogue will be tomorrow.

Q Here in Finland, there is concerns, as you very well know, of a new deal, divided Europe. Now, even if you are not here to bargain, perhaps you want to tell the Finnish audience how are you going to avoid one -- to another?

MR. MCCURRY: We would hope that the people of Finland would understand that the United States approaches the question of the future of Europe and the future of NATO with one overriding objective: to make the 21st century a century of peace for a continent that is undivided from the United Kingdom to the Urals, living with some sense of security about the future of all of the countries that define Europe. It is a moment of enormous hope for Europe as it integrates, as it begins to think about how the institutions of commerce and economics and security can become more interoperable within Europe.

And we want to play a leadership role in helping to make that happen in a nonexclusive manner. We understand and respect the thinking that the people of Finland have always had about NATO itself. We would hope that, as expansion occurs and as the environment changes and as NATO's utility is shown as we think about the 21st century in peace, that the people of Finland

might begin to see in NATO a very useful element of advancing its own security interests.

And we deeply appreciate, by the way, the contributions that the people of Finland have made in things like stabilizing Bosnia, the contributions to providing police monitors for the SFOR mission there, and some -- the American press may not know this, but the Finnish people have also participated in a very significant way in the Balkans by providing monitors to help stabilize the security of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. That's a very significant contribution. And without that contribution from the partners that we have in Europe, the very tensions that we've been talking about that exist in the Balkans may have been a great deal more troublesome.

So, again, our view of the future of Europe is one of peace, and we think that the Finnish people will want to be a part of it.

Q All this we have heard. But, again, it seems that the worries and concerns stem from the fact that, at least in public, it seems that no matter how hard you are convincing the Russians that there is nothing to worry about, that the concerns and the worries still seem to be there.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we would have to acknowledge that history is a powerful -- sets off powerful emotions and sets off memories that linger. But extraordinary things have happened in the last decade. And I think that we need to think more optimistically about what the future will hold if we can bridge these differences and set aside some of the tensions and cleavages that have existed in the past.

You can well understand the concerns that nations have around the perimeter of the Russian Federation. But you can also understand the possibilities that exist if we can invigorate the transition to democracy and market capitalism in Russia so they become a part of the community of nations that really do define a new history for Europe.

And we just -- part of this is the work of what we call sometimes "public diplomacy," and that's part of the work that we're going to be doing this weekend, but it's also as people see the reality change around them -- perhaps new attitudes will set in.

. . . Q Mike, if the cost to the United States proceeding with NATO expansion is further intransigence by the Russians on arms control, is that in the U.S. national interest to proceed for the good of Central Europe and NATO at the expense of the nuclear arms reduction?

MR. MCCURRY: Oh, I think that the reverse of that is the case -- that proceeding with adaptation of NATO to address

the needs of the post-Cold War era and to prepare for the 21st century, while simultaneously advancing the objectives we have in reducing the size of the nuclear arsenals in the Russian Federation and the United States, is manifestly in the interests of all the people in Europe, and indeed all the people on the planet.

So that's what we're trying to make happen. And we believe we've got some opportunity to make that happen.

Okay, thank you.

END

5:38 P.M. (L)

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
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From: aslater@igc.apc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:51:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: ALICE SLATER <aslater@igc.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org, tomatompn+@igc.org,  
peace-caucus@igc.org  
Subject: Help is on the way!!

Dear Friends,  
It looks like some serious resources are being planned to support the UN.  
Please post and distribute. Alice Slater

Return-Path: <jdi@clw.org>  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 09:02:17 -0500  
X-Sender: jdi@[204.245.159.2]  
To: epages@bens.org (Eric Pages), mpage@macfdn.org (Mary Page),  
cpaine@nrdc.org (Chris Paine), jparachini@stimson.org  
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Pike),  
splatz@macfdn.org  
From: jdi@clw.org (John Isaacs)  
Subject: Can you send this out?

IMMEDIATE JOB OPENING -- Washington, DC

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

EMERGENCY COALITION FOR U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

### Job Description

A broad-based coalition of individuals and non-governmental organizations is seeking an experienced person to work for a dynamic new organization founded to win payment of U.S. dues and arrears to the United Nations. The organization is designed as a one year project. Experience with U.N. or foreign policy issues is desirable. Previous work on Capitol Hill, issue campaigns or in U.S. policy issues is especially useful.

The research associate will assist in supporting the activities of the bipartisan Emergency Coalition for U.S. Financial Support of the United Nations, which will educate the public on the need to pay U.S. legal obligations to the U.N., seek the Clinton Administration's commitment to this goal, and win Congressional support for funding.

The research associate will work with the executive director, as well as the Emergency Coalition's bipartisan senior Leadership Council (composed of high ranking former government officials), its Board of Directors, and supportive non-governmental organizations, to implement its program. This job requires candidates with a number of abilities and skills. The research associate will research political and substantive issues, draft factsheets and prepare materials, liaison with grassroots and national organizations, track legislation and committee activities on Capitol Hill, assist Coalition members in their efforts, follow news and media coverage of key issues, and work with the executive director in coordinating the Coalition. Responsibilities will include responding to informational requests; writing reports on Board actions; helping organize briefings, meetings and events; attending and reporting on various coalition activities; organizing mailings and educational work; updating and maintaining the website, media and contact databases; and covering Congressional hearings.

Desired Skills & Qualifications      Strong organizational skills;

excellent  
writing ability; familiarity with political and foreign policy  
issues;  
knowledge of Congress and the U.S. government process; ability to  
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substantive, policy and political information; ability to work  
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Salary and Benefits High-\$20s to mid-\$30s, based on experience  
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Application Process Applicants should apply by the close of  
business by  
March 27, 1997. Applicants should send a short letter stating  
their  
qualifications for the job, with a resume, short writing sample,  
and the  
names and phone numbers of three references. Please send  
applications to:  
Victoria Holt, 110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 409, Washington,  
D.C. 20002.  
Note: This is a one year position.

The Coalition is an equal opportunity employer.  
March 13, 1997

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From: Rebecca Johnson <acronym@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: part 2 of NPT opinion

part 2 of NPT opinion piece

Category 3: monitoring compliance and implementation

One of the important functions of the NPT's Review Conferences, which was emphasised in the decisions on strengthening the review process, is 'to evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the states parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future...' (Decision 1, paragraph 7). This can be approached in several ways. One proposal is for each state party to submit a report, perhaps on a standardised form, detailing what it has done in the period under review to comply with its treaty obligations. Another option would be for each of the nuclear weapon states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to report on their activities and efforts to ensure effective implementation of the treaty.

Although the NSG has no formal role under the NPT, its members have long argued the necessity of export controls as part of their compliance with their obligations under articles I and II, while states which are not members of the NSG have objected that it operates in a discriminatory and ad hoc manner. The IAEA implements the nuclear safeguards regime, also overseeing challenges of non-compliance in relation to particular states (most recently, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). It is also responsible for the '93+2' programme for strengthening the effectiveness and the credibility of safeguards and thus NPT verification. In the interests of transparency and accountability, it would be useful to

have reports from these bodies, whether formally or informally established. Some time should be provided for open discussion at the PrepComs and the Review Conference, although agreement would not necessarily be an appropriate requirement.

Apart from the obligations of the Treaty itself, the NPT review process has no mandatory power over the nuclear weapon states. However, concern that the indefinite extension of the NPT would be treated as a *carte blanche* by the nuclear weapon states to conduct their nuclear policies so as to reinforce the nuclear status quo rather than move towards full non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, was for many states the primary motivation for accepting the package of decisions in May 1995. As clearly reflected in the debates and negotiating record, one reason for linking the strengthened review process and principles and objectives with the indefinite extension of the Treaty was to retain some form of systemic pressure for full compliance with article VI. If individual national reports from each state party might prove too cumbersome, at the very least the declared nuclear weapon states should submit individual reports on their efforts at compliance. Bearing in mind the injunction to 'look forward as well as back', these reports should not only cover reductions in arsenals or measures undertaken in the period under review. Each nuclear weapon state should also be encouraged to identify what further steps they envisage, whether unilateral, bilateral, with the P-5 or through multilateral negotiations.

This would go some way to realising the objective of a nuclear weapons register, which Germany called for in 1994. Ideally the report could cover current nuclear weapon holdings (active and inactive stockpiles), identify targets for further reductions, and the disposition of fissile materials from dismantled warheads (including progress towards putting this material

under safeguards, thereby ensuring that nuclear arms reduction becomes an irreversible process). Problems which may have contributed to a slowing down of the process or to non-achievement of previously identified targets could also be included. These might, for example, cover technical or financial difficulties in dismantling, disposal or storage of weapons materials, the dismantlement of nuclear weapon facilities, attempts to get ratification of particular agreements (such as START II) through the national democratic procedures, and so on. There would undoubtedly be strong resistance from the nuclear weapon states to providing such detail on their nuclear capabilities. Even if P-5 opposition makes this aspect of monitoring compliance difficult to establish at this point (as is likely), an initial requirement of annual reports and greater transparency could go some way to fulfilling the envisaged role of the enhanced review process in evaluating compliance and implementation, looking forward as well as back.

#### Decision-making and Reporting

As is clear from the foregoing discussion, categorising the substantive issues by type as well as subject enables consideration of different procedures for decision-making and reporting, which may facilitate a more effective approach to recommendations and agreements. Traditionally, the five yearly review conferences have taken decisions by consensus. Each main committee has sought to provide a consensus report for incorporation in a final declaration, which the Conference is supposed to adopt by consensus. In fact, this has failed more often than it has succeeded. It has only been possible to adopt a consensus final declaration in 1975 and 1985. In other years, including 1995, no final consensus was forthcoming, diminishing the authority of any decisions made in the committees during the Review Conferences.

It is not obvious from the decisions taken in May 1995 whether states parties intended the Review Conferences to operate according to past practice. Some argue that this is implied. Certainly no alternative procedural approaches were canvassed, although Decision 1 on strengthening the review stated that the Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and should 'address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.' The PrepCom meetings were to 'consider principles, objectives and ways' to promote full implementation of the treaty, but no decisions were taken on how the PrepComs were to transmit their recommendations to subsequent PrepComs and to the Review Conferences.

Concerning the reporting products from the PrepComs, two contrasting proposals for a 'rolling report' have emerged. One envisages a form of a draft final declaration that is worked on at each PrepCom and then finalised and adopted by the Review Conference. I think this would be counterproductive, more likely to skew discussions at the PrepComs and encourage the taking of intransigent and bargaining positions on issues which need to be openly analysed and discussed among states parties.

A different concept of rolling progress report has also been put forward, whereby some decisions, once taken, could be rolled over to the next Review Conference for full endorsement. Such a provision could avoid duplication of work, allowing the PrepComs to build on foregoing deliberations rather than reinventing them. However, the rules of procedure need to determine whether decisions on subsidiary bodies and recommendations taken by one PrepCom must be retaken in each subsequent PrepCom or if some decisions be rolled over to the Review Conference.

It would be advisable for the PrepComs to steer clear of trying to get a

consensus declaration. Instead they should aim for some kind of progress report, either from the PrepCom meeting or in the name of the Chair of the PrepCom. Decisions on action, which may require consensus, should be documented. On discussions of substance falling into categories 2 and 3, the Chair's should note the range of views, concerns, common approaches and principal divisions, including, if possible, some suggestions for how the issue could be addressed further. Such a progress report would be more useful than if a consensus document from each PrepCom were required which, even if successful, would be likely merely to enshrine a lowest common denominator of innocuous sentiment and bland language.

The status and authority of the Principles and Objectives beyond 1995 will have to be determined, together with agreement on whether and how they can be updated. Are the PrepComs empowered to update particular provisions, such as the programme of action, or can this be done only by the quinquennial Review Conferences? Should a decision on updating parts of the P&O require consensus, general agreement (with which consensus is often conflated in international bodies) or majority decision?

#### Themes and Venues

The Principles and Objectives covered seven issues in 20 paragraphs: universality, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon free zones, safeguards and 'peaceful uses' of nuclear energy. During early consideration of how best to focus substantive discussion in the PrepComs, the idea of a theme based approach (with a rotating venue) was canvassed. According to this idea, one PrepCom would deal principally with disarmament, and be held in Geneva, where many delegations have expertise and resources on nuclear weapons issues, because of the CD. Another PrepCom would be held in Vienna, the seat of the IAEA, prioritising safeguards issues. New York would host the PrepCom designated for a focus on nuclear energy

and article

IV. If convened, the fourth PrepCom would be primarily for the purposes of preparing for the Review Conference and could be held in the same venue as that (Geneva according to past practice, although there may be pressure for Review Conferences to be held in New York from now on). The benefits of this rotating venue concept would be clear focus and the availability of specific expertise. Drawbacks might include lack of continuity, marginalisation of states parties lacking diplomatic resources in Geneva and Vienna, a higher cost to the NPT parties concerned. Although it attracted some interest, the theme based approach now looks unlikely to win enough adherents. While it would be desirable to prioritise certain issues for discussion at each particular PrepCom, the structure would need to be flexible enough to respond to priorities that emerge on the international political agenda from one year to another. Therefore, if the rotating venue concept were adopted, states parties would want assurance that the focus would not be tied too rigidly to one particular theme.

#### Conclusion

The first PrepCom, from April 7-18 has the opportunity to lay the groundwork for the enhanced review process to become an effective tool for implementation and accountability or, alternatively, to degenerate into another talk shop. Although it must start as it means to continue, by giving significant time and resources to substantive issues, there is a need to invest serious consideration in how it wants substance to be addressed, what it wants the PrepComs to achieve and how this relates to the Review Conferences and overall context of the non-proliferation regime. Although states parties should participate with determination to make this enhanced review process work from the very beginning, the difficulties of getting agreement among the diverse interests expressed by nuclear weapon states, northern states in military alliances with nuclear powers, and

southern,  
mostly non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states should not be underestimated.  
Therefore hopes must not be dashed if little is actually achieved at this  
PrepCom. It will be particularly important to identify useful ways forward,  
recognising that considerable work will be needed to put the new thinking  
and appropriate procedures in place over the next 2-3 years.

Already there are worrying indications that some governments lost interest  
after achieving indefinite extension of the NPT, while others want to use  
the PrepComs for positioning themselves in relation to other agendas, and  
may risk tying the review process up in procedural knots. Such attitudes  
are disastrously short sighted. If the new review process is diverted away  
from strengthening implementation of the Treaty into power plays and  
wrangles over procedure, the authority of non-proliferation endeavours could  
be fatally undermined. It is important to view 1997 as laying the first  
foundation stones for building a more secure and accountable non-proliferation regime, strengthening the treaty's fundamental injunctions: non acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

The intent of the NPT parties in 1995 can only be fulfilled if the enhanced  
review process addresses substance more coherently and pragmatically than in  
the past. Issues will undoubtedly be clustered according to subject:  
nuclear disarmament; safeguards; and nuclear energy; with decisions required  
on how to resolve questions of overlap. Substance can also be addressed in  
different ways, depending on their function and desired outcome: whether  
goal oriented, non goal oriented or for monitoring compliance. Issues need  
to be differentiated not only by subject but according to whether concrete  
decisions on action are required or whether discussion is for troubleshooting or monitoring compliance. Actions may include recommendations, updating the Principles and Objectives or setting up  
subsidiary bodies. Issues such as safety, transport, security, disposal of

fissile materials, legal and illegal trade in plutonium may at some stage require action, but at present they need wider consideration and debate.

To ensure better accountability, the states parties should consider instituting progress reports from each of the nuclear weapon states, the IAEA, the NSG and any other key player (for example a state against whom there had been allegations of possible non-compliance). These should not only summarise the past activities of that state or body in relation to compliance, but should also identify further steps or measures which it would consider (or would like to consider) undertaking to enhance future progress towards effective implementation of the treaty in all its aspects. Reporting would not need to be by consensus, but should summarise the major areas of discussion, disagreement and decision, if any.

It would be a mistake to lean too heavily on the familiar format of past Review Conferences or PrepComs. The new review process requires something different from both. The concept of consensus may need to be reviewed. If applied, consensus might be instituted only for concrete decisions such as updating paragraphs in the Principles and Objectives or establishing a subsidiary body. It would be desirable to have a progress report or summary of debate from each PrepCom, incorporating reports from any parallel committees or subsidiary bodies. This could most practically be produced under the auspices of the Chair. General agreement may be sought to endorse that this report is fair and accurate, but its content should not be made the subject of debate to obtain full agreement or consensus.

It is the responsibility of all states to make the new review process work well. The 1997 PrepCom will probably achieve far less than its advocates, including myself, would like. But it should at least make a serious start to lay the right kind of foundation stones. To squander this hard fought,

post cold war opportunity to turn back the clock on nuclear proliferation could jeopardise the future effectiveness of non-proliferation endeavours.

ends

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fax (0) 171 503 9153  
The address and email remain the same.  
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From acronym@gn.apc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:54 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 22:57:00 GMT  
From: Rebecca Johnson <acronym@gn.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
Subject: NPT opinion part 1

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]  
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]  
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

Dear abolitioners,  
looks like quite a lot of you wanted the NPT opinion piece despite its length. Since it is too time-consuming for me to send only to the addresses that asked for it, I'm sending it to you all, in two parts (to get past the abolition caucus server police who arrest everything of analytical length it seems). I apologise in advance to those of you who didn't want it for clogging up your email with a long opinion.  
rebecca

Launching an Effective Review Process of the NPT in April 1997  
Rebecca Johnson, 13 March, 1997

Introduction  
In May 1995 174 parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) adopted three decisions without a vote. This 'politically binding package', as described by the President of the NPT Review and Extension

Conference, Jayantha Dhanapala, comprised Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty (Decision 1), Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Decision 2), and Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Decision 3). A fourth resolution, on the Middle East, was adopted at the same time, also without a vote.

Taken together, the first three decisions provided for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but with an enhanced review process intended to ensure greater accountability and a stronger mechanism for full implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects. The enhanced review process entails at least three (and possibly four) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings to be held between the five yearly Review Conferences. According to Decision 1, the purpose of the PrepComs would be 'to consider principles, objectives and ways' of promoting full implementation. The PrepComs are empowered to make recommendations to the next Review Conference and possibly other bodies and to establish subsidiary bodies for specific issues relevant to the Treaty. Most importantly, the review process was intended to deal with issues of substance related to the NPT and to look 'forward as well as back'. Its job was not only to evaluate implementation but to 'identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.'

The 1995 decisions sketched out the broad framework for the enhanced review process but did not determine how exactly it should work. This has become the subject of discussions within and among governments, diplomats and non-governmental analysts, in Kiev, Kyoto, Geneva, New York and places in between. With the first review PrepCom under the new process due to take place in New York from April 7-18, 1997, much is still up for grabs.

Unless real consideration is given to how to fulfil the

objectives of the majority of NPT parties who agreed to the enhanced review process in May 1995, the process is likely to be overtaken by inertia, and familiar patterns of approach will ensure that nothing much is allowed to change. The strength of the global non-proliferation regime rests on its authority, credibility and widespread consent. Even as they acknowledge that the NPT is the cornerstone of non-proliferation, states parties clearly wanted more done about the treaty's deep flaws and contradictions. Of grave importance is the apparent view of some of the nuclear weapon states that the treaty has enshrined their right to possess and keep nuclear weapons. The NPT enshrines nothing of the sort, as emphasised once more by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July 1996. The treaty identified five states that possessed nuclear weapons as of January 1, 1967. That may be said to have recognised their possession but did not legitimise it. The treaty set up different -- but no less binding -- obligations on the five declared nuclear weapon states, including article VI, which calls for cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. In addition to demanding that nuclear disarmament be more effectively pursued than in the first 25 years of the treaty, NPT parties in 1995 emphasised universality, safety, the need for stronger safeguards, and problems at the interface between civil and military uses and ambitions with respect to nuclear materials and power.

This article gives my own evolving view for how the foundations might be laid. The aim is to contribute to and stimulate debate in order to help establish the most effective process for addressing substantive issues and ensuring effective implementation and a fully functioning non-proliferation regime. The development of ideas is a fluid process and it is not always possible to identify where a useful approach originated. However

I would particularly like to thank a number of diplomats in Geneva (who know who they are) and the following people with whom I have enjoyed stimulating discussions that have furthered my thinking in this area: Jonathan Dean, Jozef Goldblat, Tariq Rauf, Sharon Riggle, Ben Sanders and John Simpson.

The 1997 PrepCom

Despite indications in November 1996 that the Western Group's nominee for chair of the 1997 PrepCom, Pasi Patokallio of Finland, was acceptable to members of all groups, a recent challenge has emerged. Delegations from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), meeting in New York in January, have put in a bid to chair the 1997 PrepCom, as well as the 1999 PrepCom, a fourth PrepCom if one is held, and the Review Conference in the year 2000. While there is support for the argument that the number of countries in the NAM warrants more generous allocation of Chairs (over 100 NAM members, compared with about 25 in the Western group and 20 in the virtually moribund Group of former Eastern bloc countries), there is considerable frustration among many disarmament delegations in Geneva -- not least among the G-21 group of non-aligned states -- that this procedural challenge is dangerously late and will play into the hands of those who want to prevent the enhanced review process from effectively addressing issues of substance. It is understood that the Western group has already signalled that it is not pushing to chair the 2000 Review. The Eastern European group would also have to agree not to press for their candidates to chair these meetings, which might be more difficult as nominating posts seems to be the only remaining *raison d'etre* for the group. Nevertheless, this procedural question must be clarified without delay, with both the Western and Eastern groups accepting the principle that because the NAM is more numerous, its candidates should chair

the 2000 Review Conference, third and (if held) fourth PrepComs.

The NAM should then drop their challenge and allow Patokallio to go forwards as Chair of the first PrepCom. The sooner this happens the better, as much preparation still needs to be undertaken prior to April 7. If the procedural challenge continues into the first week of the PrepCom, it would divert all attention away from developing the approaches, rules and precedents on which the new review process will depend. Tying the 1997 PrepCom up in procedural knots will benefit no-one but those who want a weakened non-proliferation regime or business as usual.

Agreeing to Patokallio's nomination as chair of the 1997 PrepCom does not necessarily mean accepting his view of how the PrepCom should run! The emerging draft structure is for a PrepCom rather like a shortened Review Conference. At the very beginning basic procedural decisions would be taken, including adoption of rules of procedure, documentation etc. Some time is intended for general debate, with national statements from any parties. To comply with the view that at least 51 percent of time should be devoted to substance, the PrepCom would then debate clusters of issues, divided roughly along the lines of the three main committees: disarmament, safeguards and peaceful uses. These clusters would correspond to the relevant articles of the treaty and agenda items of past Review Conferences, to which related sections of the 1995 Principles and Objectives would be added. There is also a fourth cluster of issues in the P&O, such as universality, which don't correspond directly with treaty articles, but have become very important for states parties. Rather than hold parallel committees (which are deemed difficult for smaller delegations), the idea is for issues to be addressed in turn in formal or informal plenaries, presided over by the PrepCom Chair. There is considerable debate over what kind of

report should emerge from the PrepComs, with a growing preference for a Chair's report, summarising the major debates.

Before there is a rush to adopt what might appear to be a pragmatic way forward, much more thought should be given to the type of outcome desired from the PrepCom debates on substance. In order to address substance coherently and effectively in the review process as a whole, it is necessary to determine what states parties aim to achieve. Deciding on how substance will be addressed is as important as determining what the priorities for discussion should be. This is vital in order to avoid the PrepComs turning into an impotent talk shop.

What should the PrepComs do?

In the early discussions, two kinds of approach began to emerge: i) the PrepCom as a 'mini review conference'; ii) the PrepCom as preparation for the quinquennial review conferences, but with more emphasis on substance than in the past.

Each approach has implications for the procedures adopted, the way in which substance would be likely to be addressed, and the type of outcome and report that would be sought. If the PrepCom is viewed as a mini review conference, it might take the following form: general debate (statements by governments); division into three main committees for debate, including development of committee reports; adoption of a final report, with recommendations to go either to the next PrepCom or to the following Review Conference where they could be acted on. While this would enable there to be discussions of issues, adopting the format of a Review Conference may have significant drawbacks.

Alternatively, some government representatives have taken the view that the PrepComs should focus more on preparing information and allocating tasks so as to feed into the Review Conference, where decisions could be taken in

accordance with past procedure. They acknowledge that the PrepComs are to address substance, but they argue for procedures based on past practice, as in: 'if it aint broke, don't fix it.' Such an approach could uncharitably be characterised as 'business as usual, with a bit more talk about substance.'

In my view, it is clear from the negotiating record and the language of the three decisions in the politically binding package that the enhanced review was not intended to be business as usual. Modelling the PrepComs as mini review conferences may also not be the best use of the time and opportunities either. While few would want to throw away the rules of procedure and reinvent the wheel, some time ought to be spent on analysing the aims of the enhanced review process and what the NPT parties want the PrepComs to achieve (and produce). I would argue that some procedures associated with past practice need not be reproduced for the PrepComs. It may be both desirable and necessary to devote time at the first PrepCom to deciding what procedures would best serve the intentions of states parties when they insisted in 1995 that indefinite extension was to be accompanied by greater accountability.

#### General Debate: Identifying Priorities

Under the new review process, the PrepComs have been allocated 10 working days. Since national statements can be made in the Conference on Disarmament (by observers as well as the 60 participating members) and the United Nations in the General Assembly, First Committee and Disarmament Commission, I would argue against allocating time for general statements of national positions in the PrepComs. It would perhaps be useful to have a day's general debate on the major issues, with arguments from coordinators of particular groups highlighting their concerns, the issues they wish to prioritise, and what they want this particular PrepCom to achieve. I am not saying that only common positions from the traditional three

groupings of the NAM, Group of Western States and Others and Group of Eastern European states are valid, as there are significant divisions in these groups over approach and substance. But if there is agreement on specific issues or non-proliferation concerns among the members of alliances such as NATO, the European Union (EU), nuclear weapon free zones, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) -- or if some or all of the nuclear weapon states wish to make a collective statement ---- the general debate should provide an opportunity for setting out the different views of priorities and objectives.

Similarly, if a certain number of NAM states or European countries or similar grouping wished to put forward their common point of view, even if it did not have the full agreement of their bloc, it would be appropriate to do so in the general debate, with a 'dissenting view' able to be offered by others from the bloc or grouping. A general debate along these lines would help to define the issues of greatest importance to the NPT members at each PrepCom without taking up too much time with the kind of repetitive litany of position, virtue, cliché and criticism that usually characterises a general debate based on national statements.

#### Substance and Main Committees

The Treaty itself remains at the centre of the review process, as was emphasised in paragraph 1 on Decision 1 on Strengthening the Review Process. What, then, is the role of the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995? Are they merely an expression of priorities in 1995 or one time-dependent interpretation of the NPT's obligations and implications? Is it appropriate to renegotiate or update the P&O or does this become a form of 'rewriting' the Treaty? How does consideration of the P&O fit into a structure adapted for reviewing the Treaty?

In paragraph 5 of Decision 1 on strengthening the review process, the 1995 NPT Conference concluded that the present structure of the three main committees be retained, with further consideration of issues which overlap. However, some have interpreted this as requiring the main committee structure only for Review Conferences and not for the PrepComs. Arguing that parallel committees would stretch resources for the Secretariat and smaller delegations too far, there is already a move to hold all PrepCom sessions in plenary and not as main committees. While allowing, perhaps, for more representative participation, this decision would greatly diminish the amount of discussion and work that could be covered in each PrepCom. If all work were to be conducted in plenary, I would have to argue for the general debate to be dispensed with altogether, and replaced by statements addressing the relevant agenda items, as they come up. While recognising the real problems of participation in numerous parallel sessions, I think the question of main committees during the PrepCom should not be closed off entirely. A flexible approach might allow two meetings to be held in parallel at times, even if more would be impractical.

Other publications have already addressed how the articles and preambular paragraphs of the Treaty and the corresponding paragraphs in the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision (P&O) might be divided among the three main committees (footnote: John Simpson, The Preparatory Committees for the 2000 Review Conference: Issues Regarding Substance, PPNN Issue Review 11, March 1997). Rather than duplicate this work I wish to address a different question regarding how substance is categorised. In addition to determining which issues should be addressed in which committees of the PrepCom and Review Conferences, it is necessary to consider what kind of outcome is desired for specific issues. Depending on the desired outcome -- a treaty,

agreed recommendations or identification of concerns in a report, for example -- some issues will lend themselves to different treatment in the PrepComs, which in turn may necessitate a different procedural approach.

### Three Categories of Substance

In practice, there are three distinct categories of issues relevant to implementing the NPT: goal oriented (requiring concrete action); non goal oriented (requiring further discussion, clarification and the possibility of future recommendations); and issues related to more effective monitoring of implementation.

#### Category I) Goal oriented substance

This category includes the concrete objectives covered in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament (paragraphs 3 and 4 of the P&O), which called for completion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996, for commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile materials production ban (fissban), and for 'the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons...' The 'further steps' on security assurances which paragraph 8 of the P&O stated 'could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument' may also be an example of goal oriented substance. In effect, category 1 includes issues where a significant number of states have called for concrete action in the form of a specific measure such as a treaty or other form of binding agreement or instrument.

The P&O have already indicated one approach for such issues, by including some of them in a programme of action, which also set a target date for its first item, the CTBT. Peter Goosen, one of the South African architects of

the enhanced review process, has emphasised that the P&O were intended to be flexible and capable of being updated. Others argue that amending or updating the P&O could be dangerous. Some appear afraid that the P&O will become the subject of review evaluations or negotiations in their own right, thereby taking on a role that should be accorded only to the Treaty itself. Some seem to want to keep the P&O under glass as a kind of inviolable addendum to the Treaty and the indefinite extension decision of 1995. Too rigid an approach would quickly turn the Principles and Objectives into nothing more than a historically interesting snapshot of what were deemed to be the priority issues in 1995. This was surely not the intention of those who agreed to the politically binding package two years ago. According to South Africa, the motivation behind the P&O was not to provide a form of amendment to the NPT, but to be a 'lodestar' or 'yardstick' by which progress could be evaluated. Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia endorsed this view of the P&O as the 'yardsticks in determining the goals or objectives to be achieved by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.' If, as Goosen argues, the PrepComs should 'identify further steps or programmes of action which can be developed or synthesized at the year 2000 Review Conference', procedures will have to be developed for deciding on new or amended paragraphs as items in the P&O are achieved or superseded.

In relation to the P&O's programme of action on nuclear disarmament, some updating is clearly necessary if the P&O are to act as effective yardsticks for future progress. The CTBT was concluded in 1996, as specified in paragraph 4 a of Decision 2. As of March 1, 1997, 142 countries have signed. To many, it appears logical that, having achieved the CTBT, the next item (4 b, the fissile materials ban) should be moved up. However, conflict over objectives and the entry into force requirements during the

final stages of test ban negotiations have given rise to widespread concerns that the CTBT will not become legally binding for some time, if ever. Therefore some states consider that 4 a should be amended to call for measures to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT as early as possible or by the year 2000. Though NPT parties could make some exhortatory reference calling on all states to sign and ratify the CTBT, it would be better to leave consideration of specific measures to bring this about to the test ban treaty signatories and the procedures in the CTBT itself. Delays in bringing the CTBT into effect should not be used to block further steps on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as that would play into the hands of the nuclear weapon states that fought hardest for the rigid provision that threatens the CTBT's implementation, making it hostage to the ratification decisions of 44 states, including India and Pakistan, which have not signed. While many would share the desire to see the CTBT enter into force as early as possible, the prime task of the P&O programme of action is to identify further concrete steps for negotiations or action.

If the fissban were to be moved up, how would this be done? Should it be simply accorded the highest priority in the exact form agreed in May 1995? If not, how can the reference be amended (and what should the new reference say)? Additional questions may require debate, such as whether the next measure on the list is still the next priority objective, or whether it has been superseded, needs re-evaluating, or should be sharpened with a target date.

The third objective (4 c) in the programme of action was a general injunction for systematic and progressive efforts towards eliminating nuclear weapons. This may be too broad to be a useful second step and should probably remain as the third, underlying objective. It

would therefore be important for the parties to tease from this broad objective other concrete steps to reinforce progress as the fissban moves up. In that case, is it necessary for the programme of action to identify only multilateral steps, or could the parties identify a step they desire to be undertaken by all or some of the nuclear weapon states?

Among suggestions for what should follow (or even pre-empt) the fissban as the next priorities for action are: all or some of the six 'immediate steps' identified by the Canberra Commission: taking nuclear forces off alert; removing warheads from their delivery vehicles; ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; ending all nuclear testing (covering non-explosive testing of nuclear warheads as well as the explosions now covered by the CTBT?); initiating negotiations to reduce US and Russian arsenals further (START III); an agreement among the nuclear weapon states on reciprocal 'no first use' undertakings and a 'non-use' undertaking by them in relation to the nuclear weapon states.

Some NGOs argue for a more comprehensive fissban to follow on from the basic 'cut-off' envisaged by item 4 b in the 1995 P&O. This next stage fissban could address past production, providing for declaration and controls of fissile materials in the military and civilian stockpiles, including in warheads. Many also argue for putting plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled warheads under IAEA safeguards, so as to prevent the re-use of nuclear materials in new warheads. Some call for controls on tritium production as a measure to accomplish progressive nuclear disarmament by preventing the reconditioning of boosted warheads, as the tritium (half life 12.3 years) becomes degraded. Another possible measure could be a ban on the production of nuclear weapons (or new warheads), as called for by New Zealand in 1995. A number of NGOs and states parties want

to leap over these incremental measures, arguing that the time has come to identify the objective of a Nuclear Weapon Convention as part of a programme of action for full compliance with the NPT.

While non-nuclear weapon states may be expected to push for some of the above measures to be included in an updated programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the Principles and Objectives, the nuclear weapon states are resisting strenuously. Not all steps are practical at this point, but it is vital that NPT parties discuss the pros and cons of specific follow-on measures in order to maintain the relevance of the P&Os.

The distinct feature of category 1 substance is that debates should be focused on further action. One way would be to seek agreement on updating the references to these issues in the P&O, for example by giving a measure a target date or by identifying a forum such as the CD or P-5 talks to negotiate the desired agreement. The parties are also empowered to set up a subsidiary body, as provided for in paragraph 6 of Decision 1 on the strengthened review process. The procedures, rules, scope and role of subsidiary bodies was not specified, so it will up to the parties attending the first and subsequent PrepComs to determine whether any should be established and if so, how they should work. Most importantly, can subsidiary bodies meet in between the PrepComs, or are they only to be convened during a PrepCom or Review Conference?

The NPT is a treaty and its review process is not designed or authorised to be a negotiating forum. However, any group of like-minded states can establish a forum for negotiating a convention or agreement of interest to them. Therefore, it would be theoretically possible for NPT parties to decide on a subsidiary body to negotiate a particular measure, such as a convention on legally binding security assurances, as referred to in

paragraph 8 of the P&O. However, it is not clear what kind of decision-making authority can be conferred on a subsidiary body set up under the NPT review process. It is likely that any agreements achieved in a subsidiary body would have to take the form of recommendations to the next Review Conference, which would remain the decision-taking authority. Therefore an alternative, and probably more feasible, approach would be for subsidiary bodies to be set up to discuss specific issues and perhaps pave the way for eventual negotiations, in the CD or among relevant states.

In the interests of non-discrimination among states parties to the NPT, the likelihood is that subsidiary bodies would be established as 'open-ended' i.e. open to any party to participate. However, it might also be possible to have subsidiary bodies consisting of a group of states parties with particular regional or political interests in a certain issue, such as a regional nuclear weapon free zone. While some have already argued that subsidiary bodies are not empowered to meet between PrepComs, others consider that intersessional meetings are implied in the concept, with either the PrepCom or the subsidiary body itself determining the frequency and venue. If so, this would also be limited by budget and resources. If subsidiary bodies are able to meet intersessionally, they could be required to provide a progress report to subsequent PrepComs and a report plus recommendations to the Review Conference. If not, it is difficult to see what useful function subsidiary bodies would play.

## Category 2: non goal oriented substance

This category covers issues which may need to be discussed but which do not necessarily lead to decisions on action (at least at this stage). The aim of addressing these questions is not so much to produce a specific outcome or recommendations, since agreement might not be feasible. For example,

some states may not see the issues as problems or may at present be defending national positions that run counter to majority concerns. The principal aim would be to provide a forum for raising concerns relevant to effective operation of the NPT, enabling parties to clarify and exchange information and, if possible, to identify some options for dealing with these issues. Category 2 substance might include the safety and security of nuclear facilities and the transportation of nuclear materials, theft or nuclear blackmail, disposal of fissile materials both from nuclear warheads and from the operation of nuclear power plants. A further example is the commercial trade in nuclear materials, especially the reprocessing of plutonium, which has become a matter of growing concern to some states for reasons of safety, environmental protection and proliferation risks. Operating at the interface between articles I/II and IV of the treaty, non-military trafficking in the indispensable material for nuclear bombs was not envisaged when the NPT was concluded in 1968, but is now viewed by a growing number of states and security analysts as a proliferation minefield that cannot be ignored much longer. Nevertheless, there is considerable resistance to addressing the plutonium trade at present, so category 2 type discussion is needed before states parties could consider concrete targets for action.

Some aspects of safeguards, export control regimes, security assurances or universality might also fall into category 2. Even if a specific treaty or agreement is not envisaged for this category, some issues could be profitably worked on in subsidiary bodies, as well as in the PrepComs and Review Conference. While some discussion would be to increase the level of understanding and information on these issues, the PrepComs and/or subsidiary bodies could also make recommendations to the Review Conference,

which could take decisions on further ways of enhancing safety, security and the non-proliferation objectives of the treaty.

part 2 to follow

=====  
email: acronym@gn.apc.org  
Disarmament Intelligence Review  
24, Colvestone Crescent  
London E8 2LH  
England  
Tel/fax until April 1: +44 171 241 4691  
Please note: from April 1, 1997 the telephone and fax numbers will be changed, as follows: telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857  
fax (0) 171 503 9153  
The address and email remain the same.  
=====

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:44:00 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Update

RTw 03/20 2043 Republicans warn Clinton against arms concessions

WASHINGTON, March 20 (Reuter) - Republican House of Representatives leaders warned President Bill Clinton on Thursday against concessions to Russia on missile systems when he meets President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki.

A letter to the president signed by House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Majority Leader Dick Armey and other Republican leaders responded to what it said were published reports of concessions being considered by Clinton, who was starting two days of talks with Yeltsin on Thursday.

"Specifically, news reports indicate that the administration may seek to conclude an agreement in Helsinki to limit American testing, performance, sensor system support and deployment of key theatre missile defence systems," it said.

"Such limits would gravely compromise our ability to protect U.S. citizens, troops and allies from terrorist missile attacks.

"Moreover, the administration is working to extend the quarter-century-old ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty, which is based on the U.S.-Soviet 'mutual assured destruction' theory and prohibits purely defensive systems," it said.

"Extending the MAD doctrine in a 21st century world where dozens of nations and terrorist groups control nuclear and chemical weapons is itself sheer madness."

An accompanying statement by the Republican Policy Committee, which represents the party's House leadership, said reports had suggested the Clinton administration, "without

consulting Congress, is considering new limits on U.S. missile defences to appease Russian objections to NATO expansion."

The United States and other NATO members have been working to assuage Russian concerns about the extension of NATO to include several former Soviet-allied Warsaw Pact states. New members, expected to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, are due to be announced by NATO in July.

The Republican leaders said if such proposals on missile systems were offered to Yeltsin it would "recklessly prejudice the safety of our forces and the national security of the United States" and Congress, in which the Republicans have a majority, would not support them.

REUTER

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APO 03/20 1815 Clinton Seeks End to Impasse

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- President Clinton today brought a package of arms control concessions to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, hoping the gesture would end a long impasse on the START II missile-reduction treaty.

Clinton wants something in return: A clear commitment by Yeltsin that the treaty will be ratified by the Russian parliament this spring. START II would cut U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals in half by the year 2003.

A senior U.S. official, briefing reporters aboard Air Force One on Clinton's summit gameplan, said the president was confident Yeltsin could get the treaty ratified.

The START II treaty was concluded in 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996. The Russian Duma has declined to approve it partly because Russia would have to dismantle its most powerful missiles and could not afford to replace them with single-warhead weapons permitted under the agreement.

The planned expansion of the NATO military alliance to Russia's western border has heightened resistance in Moscow to a nuclear weapons cutback. Trying to ease Yeltsin's concerns, the administration is offering a charter that would give Russia a voice in NATO but not a veto over military actions.

American and Russian arms experts have been working for six weeks on the package of arms control concessions. Now it will be up to Yeltsin to seal the deal or reject it.

"It can go either way," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But this reflects the outer limits of our flexibility. We've pushed the outer limits as far as we can."

Among the concessions Yeltsin will be offered is delaying for several years the deadline for Russia to blow up silos in which banned missiles are deployed and for scrapping banned bombers and submarines.

However, the long-range warheads on the missiles would have to be removed under the treaty's schedule, the official said.

Also, the two sides have been working on guidelines for a

START III treaty that would set new and lower ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 long-range warheads on each side.

The United States has some 10,000 warheads and the Russians, 8,000 to 9,000. The START II treaty sets the ceilings at 3,000 to 3,5000 warheads.

Clinton brought Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, with him to the summit to oversee the arms control negotiations with the Russians.

The general's toughest job will be to sell the deal to the Senate, which would have to ratify the changes in START II, if Yeltsin agrees to the terms.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From wagingpeace@napf.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997

Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 17:40:39 -0800

From: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation <wagingpeace@napf.org>

To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, INESnet@fy.chalmers.se

Cc: shundahai@radix.net, aphil@web.net, yaro@glas.apc.org, wiednerb@aol.com

Subject: Abolition 2000 Resolution

Dear Abolitionists,

I'm happy to say that we can add the City of Santa Barbara to the supporters of Abolition 2000. I know that similar resolutions have been passed for the cities of Pittsburgh and Oakland, and the County of Alameda.

We will be happy to maintain a list of municipalities supporting Abolition

2000 if we are notified of which other cities have already signed on. We

will also be willing to maintain the general Abolition 2000 mailing list if

that would be helpful.

The Resolution which follows the press release below can be adapted for

use in other parts of the world.

David Krieger

#### SANTA BARBARA CITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOLITION

##### Declares Santa Barbara a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

On March 18, 1997, the Santa Barbara City Council passed a Resolution calling for the nuclear weapons states to complete negotiations by the year

2000 on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons early in the next century. The Council also declared Santa Barbara a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The Resolution was brought to the City Council by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international peace organization headquartered in Santa Barbara. The Foundation was a founding member of the Abolition 2000 Global Network, a network of over 700 citizens organizations around the world that are working to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Cities around the world are being asked to support similar Abolition 2000 Resolutions for Municipalities. David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation said, "Each city in the United States that joins in this effort sends a message to the federal government that the cities are serious about ending the nuclear weapons era. I am proud to say that our city is now a leader in this effort. Similar efforts are being made in cities around the world." The Resolution states that "the end of the Cold War has provided an unparalleled opportunity to end the nuclear weapons era which would fulfill our responsibility to present and future generations. "The cities have always been the primary targets of nuclear weapons," Krieger said, "and therefore they have the most to gain by eliminating nuclear weapons. There is also the issue of money. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have cost trillions of dollars. This money could be far better spent on educating our children, improving our healthcare, and rebuilding our infrastructure." Krieger emphasized that the Resolution did not call for unilateral disarmament, but for multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Ben Eichert and Noey Turk of Santa Barbara City College told the City Council that earlier in the day the Student Senate at the college had adopted a similar resolution for college campuses. They urged the City Council to act in behalf of all Santa Barbara citizens in

supporting the  
elimination of nuclear weapons.  
The Abolition 2000 Resolution calls for the city to send copies  
of this  
Resolution to Congressional Representative Walter Capps, U.S.  
Senators  
Boxer and Feinstein, and President Clinton.  
Founded in 1982, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a nonprofit,  
nonpartisan, international organization seeking to educate the  
public  
through its programs and publications. The Foundation is  
dedicated to  
achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world; creating a permanent  
International  
Criminal Court and strengthening international law; teaching  
peace;  
promoting nonviolent resolution of conflicts; and creating a  
world based  
upon liberty, justice and human dignity. It is a nongovernmental  
affiliate  
of the United Nations and is recognized by that body as a Peace  
Messenger  
Organization.  
For further information please contact the Nuclear Age Peace  
Foundation,  
1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California  
93108,  
telephone (805) 965-3443, fax (805) 568-0466, e-mail  
wagingpeace@napf.org.

X X X

#### ABOLITION 2000 RESOLUTION FOR CITIES

Whereas nuclear weapons pose a continuing threat to civilization,  
the  
human species, and life itself;

Whereas cities have been primary targets of nuclear weapons  
throughout the  
Nuclear Age and remain vulnerable to the massive destructive  
effects of  
nuclear weapons;

Whereas the development and maintenance of nuclear arsenals are  
extraordinarily costly, still costing billions of dollars per  
year, and  
these resources could be far better utilized for rebuilding the  
infrastructure of our cities, supporting the health and welfare  
of our  
citizens, and protecting and enhancing the quality of the  
environment;

Whereas the five declared nuclear weapons states (United States,

Russia,  
United Kingdom, France, and China) promised at the  
Non-Proliferation Treaty  
Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 to pursue "systematic  
and  
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the  
ultimate  
goal of eliminating these weapons";

Whereas the International Court of Justice ruled unanimously in  
July 1996,  
"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to  
a  
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its  
aspects  
under strict and effective international control";

Whereas retired U.S. General Lee Butler, once responsible for all  
U.S.  
strategic nuclear forces, has called nuclear weapons "inherently  
dangerous,  
hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally  
indefensible";

Whereas the end of the Cold War has provided an unparalleled  
opportunity  
to end the nuclear weapons era, which would fulfill our  
responsibility to  
present and future generations,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF  
SANTA BARBARA  
THAT SANTA BARBARA:

1. Declares itself as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and supports the  
further  
development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones throughout the world;
2. Calls for all nuclear weapons to be taken off of alert status,  
for all  
nuclear warheads to be separated from their delivery vehicles,  
and for the  
nuclear weapons states to agree to unconditional no first use of  
these  
weapons;
3. Calls upon the governments of all nuclear weapons states to  
begin  
negotiations immediately on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to  
prohibit and  
eliminate all nuclear weapons early in the next century and to  
complete  
these negotiations by the year 2000; and

4. Orders that copies of this resolution be sent to the elected representatives for this municipality, including the U.S. Representative(s), U.S. Senators, and the President.

Adopted March 18, 1997

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Prepared by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation for the Abolition 2000 campaign. For more information, contact the Foundation at 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California, 93108; Tel. (805) 965-3443; Fax: (805) 568-0466; e-mail [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org); <http://www.napf.org>.

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1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123  
Santa Barbara, CA 93108  
Tel: 805 965 3443  
Fax: 805 568 0466  
E-mail: [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org)  
Web Site: <http://www.napf.org>  
From [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org) Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:07:44 -0800  
From: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation <[wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org)>  
To: [abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org](mailto:abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org), [INESnet@fy.chalmers.se](mailto:INESnet@fy.chalmers.se)  
Subject: Abolition 2000 Resolution - corrected

#### SANTA BARBARA CITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOLITION

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the world  
are being asked to support similar Abolition 2000 Resolutions for  
Municipalities.

David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  
said, "Each  
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The Resolution states that "the end of the Cold War has provided  
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"The cities have always been the primary targets of nuclear  
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Krieger said, "and therefore they have the most to gain by  
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Resolution did  
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Ben Eichert and Noey Turk of Santa Barbara City College told the  
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Resolution to Congressional Representative Walter Capps, U.S.  
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Boxer and Feinstein, and President Clinton.

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through its programs and publications. The Foundation is  
dedicated to  
achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world; creating a permanent  
International

Criminal Court and strengthening international law; teaching peace;  
promoting nonviolent resolution of conflicts; and creating a world based upon liberty, justice and human dignity. It is a nongovernmental affiliate of the United Nations and is recognized by that body as a Peace Messenger Organization.  
For further information please contact the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,  
1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California 93108,  
telephone (805) 965-3443, fax (805) 568-0466, e-mail wagingpeace@napf.org.

X X X

#### RESOLUTION 97-032

#### AN "ABOLITION 2000" RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA BARBARA

Whereas nuclear weapons pose a continuing threat to civilization, the human species, and life itself;

Whereas cities have been primary targets of nuclear weapons throughout the Nuclear Age and remain vulnerable to the massive destructive effects of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the development and maintenance of nuclear arsenals are extraordinarily costly, still costing billions of dollars per year, and these resources could be far better utilized for rebuilding the infrastructure of our cities, supporting the health and welfare of our citizens, and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment;

Whereas the five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China) promised at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 to pursue "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons";

Whereas the International Court of Justice ruled unanimously in

July 1996,

"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";

Whereas retired U.S. General Lee Butler, once responsible for all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has called nuclear weapons "inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible";

Whereas the end of the Cold War has provided an unparalleled opportunity to end the nuclear weapons era, which would fulfill our responsibility to present and future generations,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA BARBARA THAT SANTA BARBARA:

1. Declares itself as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and supports the further development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones throughout the world;
2. Calls for all nuclear weapons to be taken off of alert status, for all nuclear warheads to be separated from their delivery vehicles, and for the nuclear weapons states to agree to unconditional no first use of these weapons;
3. Calls upon the governments of all nuclear weapons states to begin negotiations immediately on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons early in the next century and to complete these negotiations by the year 2000; and
4. Orders that copies of this resolution be sent to the elected representatives for this municipality, including the U.S. Representative(s), U.S. Senators, and the President.

Adopted March 18, 1997

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Prepared by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation for the Abolition

2000  
campaign. For more information, contact the Foundation at 1187  
Coast  
Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California, 93108; Tel.  
(805)  
965-3443; Fax: (805) 568-0466; e-mail [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org);  
<http://www.napf.org>.

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Fax: 805 568 0466  
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Web Site: <http://www.napf.org>  
From [nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org) Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 19:50:26 GMT  
From: National Steering Cttee Nuclear Free Local Authorities  
<[nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)>  
To: [nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org](mailto:nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org)  
Cc: [abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org](mailto:abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org)  
Subject: UK Nuclear News 20 March 1997

>From [GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk) Thu Mar 20 12:33:15 1997  
Received: from [MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:MCR1.poptel.org.uk) by [gnew.gn.apc.org](mailto:gnew.gn.apc.org)  
(8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)  
id MAA26051; Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:33:02 GMT  
From: [GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk)  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:32:43 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 20 Mar  
To: [nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)  
Message-Id: <397271860MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
Status: R

#### DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Thurs 20 Mar 1997

97-8329 Magnox cuts nuclear liabilities by #450m and claims it  
may be  
on course to eliminate its #1.3bn balance sheet deficit.

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97-8330 Previews of the US-Russia summit at Helsinki. G, FT, Ind, T

97-8331 Commons report, due today, expected to be critical of  
Soames

over use of pesticides in Gulf war and misleading the  
Commons. G

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
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From DCulp@nrdc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:15:51 -0500  
From: David Culp <DCulp@nrdc.org>  
To: undisclosed-recipients;;  
Subject: AP: Lott OKs Chemical Weapons Debate

AP Online Washington  
03-20-97 2005 EST

LOTT OKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEBATE

By DAVID BRISCOE= Associated Press Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott promised Thursday to schedule debate next month on the long-delayed chemical weapons treaty, ending a Democratic threat to bottle up all Senate action until he schedules a ratification vote.

Lott, R-Miss., noted there are concerns in the Senate about the 4-year-old treaty's impact on the safety of Americans and on U.S. manufacturers who might be subject to international inspections.

But he said, ``My intent is for this issue to come up when we come back from the recess in early April.'' Congress begins its spring break next week.

The treaty, with 160 signatories, would ban the manufacture and sale of chemical weapons.

President Clinton, in a statement released by the White House, called again for ratification before the Chemical Weapons Convention takes effect April 29.

``It would be harmful to our national interests if the United States, which led the way in developing this treaty, was on the outside not the inside, when it comes into operation,'' said Clinton, who is in Finland for a summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

On the second anniversary of the sarin gas attack that killed 12

people in a Tokyo subway and sickened thousands, Clinton said Americans need to be protected from ``a similar terrorist outrage.''

With Lott promising action on the treaty, Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., agreed to withdraw a Democratic threat to stall action on a bill aimed at encouraging anti-drug efforts with Mexico. The bill later passed 94-5.

Lott said there is disagreement over whether the treaty has to be ratified by April 29, when the 160-nation pact goes into effect. He said that even if ratification comes later, the United States still would play a key role in its implementation.

Opponent, including Sen Jesse Helms, R-N.C., fear it would increase the danger that non-signatories, including terrorists groups, would gain such weaponry. Helms has raise 30 specific objections to the treaty, claiming it poses greater dangers than benefits.

But Clinton, in his statement, said the treaty would eliminate terrorists' largest potential source of chemical weapons by requiring the destruction of stockpiles. He said it also would tie the United States into a global information network to provide early warning of terrorist plans and give law enforcement authorities new authority to investigate and prosecute anyone who acquires or uses chemical weapons on U.S. soil.

On Thursday, Helms said he would free the treaty from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which he chairs, after the administration agrees to support changes at State and the United Nations.

He said, however, he might allow a vote sooner if his concerns about the treaty are addressed. The Senate could not change the treaty but could pass separate legislation dealing with U.S. policy toward it. Ratification requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate.

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From ledwidge@psr.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 11:55:59 -0800  
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dkimball@igc.org  
Subject: ACTION ALERT: You Can Help to Ban Poison Gas

\*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\* Action Alert \*\*\*

The CWC Needs Your Help -- Now

The U.S. Senate is on the verge of having-- or not having-- a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty that would ban the manufacture and possession of poison gas weapons worldwide.

NOW is a particularly important time to make a phone call or fax a note (legibly handwritten is best) to the D.C. office of your Senator, whose support is key to the success of the treaty.

Tell your Senator three things:

- 1) Do not allow Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) to prevent Senate action on the CWC.
- 2) See that a vote on the CWC is scheduled before the Senate's spring recess (scheduled to start TOMORROW, March 21).
- 3) Vote YES on the CWC.

Call the Capitol Switchboard (202-224-3121) and ask to be contacted to your Senator's office.

Key Senators on CWC:

AK Murkowski  
CO Allard

FL Campbell  
GA Mack  
IN Coverdell  
MI Coats  
MN Abraham  
MS Grams  
NH Lott  
NH Gregg  
NM Domenici  
NY D'Amato  
NC Faircloth  
OR Smith  
PA Santorum  
SC Thurmond  
TN Frist  
TX Thompson  
TX Hutchison  
TX Gramm  
UT Bennett  
UT Hatch  
WA Gorton

...and virtually all other Republican Senators

We WILL get a CWC vote scheduled with enough calls and faxes from constituents. Thank you for your help.

For more information reply to this message or contact Lisa Ledwidge at Physicians for Social Responsibility, 202-898-0150 x222.

3/20/97

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 05:39:55 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 08:04:38 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: NY Times on Summit

The New York Times  
March 20, 1997  
Editorial

Play It Again, Boris

After comparing surgical histories in Helsinki, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin will slip some coins into the diplomatic jukebox and play a few top hits from the cold war. Among the old favorites will be nuclear arms reductions, the balance of power in Europe and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The agenda of the convalescing Presidents reflects both the enduring importance of the nuclear weapons issue and the misplaced emphasis the Clinton Administration has given to NATO expansion.

The most threatening legacy of the cold war is the nuclear arsenals still maintained by the United States and Russia. Though the number of nuclear warheads is falling, and the two countries no longer target their missiles at one another, the remaining firepower exceeds any reasonable limit. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin need to devote much time to renewing the efforts of both countries to retire and dismantle nuclear warheads and missiles.

To that end, Mr. Clinton has sensibly offered to explore the outlines of a future arms reduction treaty to encourage the Russian Parliament to ratify the last accord, which was signed during the Bush Administration. Mr. Yeltsin ought to welcome this offer and work with Mr. Clinton to cut warhead levels in each country to the 3,000-to-3,500 range specified in the last treaty and to set lower limits in a future agreement.

But these vital matters may not get sufficient attention in Helsinki. The reason is that Mr. Clinton has loaded the agenda with European security questions revolving around his determination to expand NATO eastward into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic by 1999. At a time when American and Russian officials should be talking about ways to consolidate democracy and free markets in Russia, they have been arguing over the number of tanks that can be stationed in Poland.

Under pressure from Washington, Moscow has at least temporarily given up hopes of stopping this expansion into Central Europe and is instead trying to negotiate the best terms it can before NATO officially issues invitations for new memberships this summer. Washington, in turn, has offered a variety of inducements to Moscow, including a pledge not to place nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and a proposal to cut the number of conventional weapons in Western Europe while freezing the number in Central Europe.

Washington has also promised a modest increase in financial assistance to Russia and an enhanced role for Moscow in international economic institutions.

Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin will no doubt spend considerable time haggling over the terms of a proposed charter that would spell out a new relationship between Russia and NATO. The idea is to make Russia a partner in many NATO activities, including peacekeeping missions like the current one in Bosnia where Russian soldiers are participating. But Russia, at least for now, would not be invited to become a full

NATO member.

The rush to enlarge NATO is not justified by any Russian military threat today. Russian conventional forces are weak, and even a government with imperial ambitions would require years of draining expense before it could threaten Europe again. Nor will NATO growth do anything to bolster the economies of Central European countries, which face a substantial cost to modernize and integrate their military forces into the alliance.

The future stability of Europe depends more than anything on stability in Russia. Rather than taking actions that may isolate Russia and encourage a resurgence of Russian nationalism, the United States ought to concentrate on trying to help Russia rebuild its faltering economy, establish a fair and effective tax system and make democracy irreversible. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin cannot advance those interests by debating the balance of power in Europe.

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Subject: Summit, Ledogar to CD

APn 03/20 1058 Summit-Nuclear

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- President Clinton today brought a package of arms control concessions to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, hoping the gesture would end a long impasse on the START II missile-reduction treaty.

Clinton wants something in return: A clear commitment by Yeltsin that the treaty will be ratified by the Russian parliament this spring. START II would cut U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals in half by the year 2003.

A senior U.S. official, briefing reporters aboard Air Force One on Clinton's summit gameplan, said the president was confident Yeltsin could get the treaty ratified.

But White House press secretary Mike McCurry said later that differences on strategic arms cuts would be "difficult to bridge." The administration's aim, he said, was "to make the world a safer place."

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov touched on the proposals during a 45-minute meeting today, but U.S. officials said the outcome depended

on the Clinton-Yeltsin talks Friday.

Among the concessions Yeltsin will be offered is delaying for several years the deadline for Russia to blow up silos in which banned missiles are deployed and for scrapping banned bombers and submarines.

However, the long-range warheads on the missiles would have to be removed under the treaty's schedule, the official said.

Also, the two sides have been working on guidelines for a START III treaty that would set new and lower ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 long-range warheads on each side.

The United States has some 10,000 warheads and the Russians, 8,000 to 9,000. The START II treaty sets the ceilings at 3,000 to 3,500 warheads.

The START II treaty was concluded in 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996. The Russian Duma has declined to approve it partly because Russia would have to dismantle its most powerful missiles and could not afford to replace them with single-warhead weapons permitted under the agreement.

The planned expansion of the NATO military alliance to Russia's western border has heightened resistance in Moscow to a nuclear weapons cutback. Trying to ease Yeltsin's concerns, the administration is offering a charter that would give Russia a voice in NATO but not a veto over military actions.

American and Russian arms experts have been working for six weeks on the package of arms control concessions. Now it will be up to Yeltsin to seal the deal or reject it.

"It can go either way," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But this reflects the outer limits of our flexibility. We've pushed the outer limits as far as we can."

Clinton brought Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, with him to the summit to oversee the arms control negotiations with the Russians.

The general's toughest job will be to sell the deal to the Senate, which would have to ratify the changes in START II, if Yeltsin agrees to the terms.

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RTos 03/20 1104 Yeltsin: Tough Summit Ahead in Helsinki

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - Russia promised a tough fight Thursday over NATO enlargement but the United States said it would not be deterred by Moscow's objections as the countries' two leaders arrived in the Finnish capital for their summit.

"President Bill Clinton and I face difficult, serious talks," Russian President Boris Yeltsin said at the airport.

But the Kremlin chief, looking in good health after his recent long illness, said it was important to find compromises and maintain the U.S.-Russian partnership that had been forged after the Cold War, despite their differences.

Yeltsin arrived three hours after the wheelchair-bound Clinton, who had to be lifted from the presidential jumbo jet in a catering truck. Clinton injured his leg in an accident last week.

Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky said Yeltsin would

defend Moscow's interests "like never before" at his two-day meeting with Clinton.

The U.S. insistence on taking former Soviet-bloc countries into the Western alliance could force Moscow to review its foreign policy and strengthen links with countries like China, India and Iran, he said.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, arriving with Clinton, said NATO enlargement would happen on schedule even though Washington wanted a good relationship with Moscow. She dismissed Yastrzhembsky's remarks as unimportant "rhetoric."

"I think they have to understand that we have a schedule that is going to go forward and that is the track that we are going to pursue," Albright told reporters.

A dispute over NATO could signal the chilliest summit between the two powers since the end of the Cold War, although Yeltsin's comments suggested he wanted to avoid serious damage to the relationship with Washington.

Russia says NATO's expansion plans will threaten its security, undermine Yeltsin, create new divisions in Europe and represent a breach of trust.

An alliance summit in July is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start membership talks. The new members would not join until 1999.

Clinton is seeking to reassure Moscow NATO enlargement presents no threat, while U.S. officials are hoping to shift the summit focus on to less contentious issues where progress is more likely, such as Russia's economic reforms.

U.S. officials said they would also press Russia at the summit to ratify within the next few weeks a long-delayed 1993 arms agreement cutting long-range nuclear missiles.

Both sides say there is no intention of reaching a formal agreement on NATO at the Helsinki summit, the first time Clinton and Yeltsin have met in almost a year.

Yeltsin, now on fighting form after last year's heart surgery, is keeping a wary eye on his Communist and nationalist critics at home and must be seen to battle for Russia's interests.

His opponents planned a strident anti-Western debate on NATO for Thursday in Russia's parliament, which is where the START-2 nuclear arms treaty has languished unratified.

The two leaders will have dinner Thursday but the main talks take place Friday in a modern, airy villa overlooking the Baltic, the residence of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

Temperatures were below freezing in the Finnish capital and there was a light dusting of snow across the city.

Clinton had agreed to move the summit from Washington to Helsinki because of Yeltsin's health problems, but now finds himself the invalid and on the defensive over NATO.

While that issue tops the summit agenda, the two leaders may also discuss the latest crisis in the Middle East peace process co-sponsored by Moscow and Washington.

They will also discuss Russia's troubled transition to a market economy. There is likely to be more Western help on offer to support Russia as it tackles organized crime and economic

reforms, particularly since Yeltsin has pleased Washington by bringing young reformers into a new-look cabinet this week.

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RTw 03/20 0744 U.S. seeks quick Russian clearance for arms  
treaty

By Arshad Mohammed

HELSINKI, March 20 (Reuter) - The United States will press Russia to ratify a long-delayed treaty cutting nuclear weapons within the next few weeks and sees this as a key aim of the Helsinki summit, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday.

The official was briefing reporters travelling with U.S. President Bill Clinton to Helsinki for a two-day summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin that is expected to concentrate on arms control, NATO expansion and Russian economic reform.

The START-2 treaty, signed in 1993, has not come into force because the Russian parliament has refused to ratify it, saying it puts Moscow at a disadvantage.

The treaty, a landmark in arms control, would sharply reduce U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear arsenals to a maximum of 3,500 warheads on each side. The United States says it has to be ratified by Russia before further cuts are made.

"The central objective on the strategic side at this summit is to get a clear, unequivocal commitment to go ahead and move START-2 through the Duma (Russian parliament) this spring and not string it out any longer," said the official, who asked not to be identified.

He suggested the United States could offer Russia certain reassurances which would help the Duma pass the agreement, including giving Moscow more time to destroy missile silos covered by the deal.

"We're confident that the whole complex of agreements, the proposals that are on offer in Helsinki in their entirety, provide them with the basis to get this through the Duma." the official added.

"If this works right, we will have addressed their concerns on NATO expansion and agreed on the European security side to a package that allows them to say that although they don't agree, their concerns have been met," he said.

START-2, the second agreement under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in January 1993 and called for the cuts in nuclear arsenals to be implemented by the year 2003. The U.S. Senate has already ratified the treaty.

As part of its proposals, the United States was willing to give Russia more time to destroy missile silos provided it met the treaty's deadlines on dismantling nuclear warheads.

U.S. and Russian negotiators have been discussing such a proposal intensively for several weeks, the official said, but added that differences remained and that Clinton and Yeltsin would discuss these during the summit.

"But what is key to us is whatever amount of flexibility they get in terms of actually destroying the silos, that we hold to the original START schedule at least in terms of taking the warheads off," he added. "It's the warheads that kill people and

represent the danger."

The United States also hopes to make progress in Helsinki summit on proposals for cuts under a START-3 treaty, which could cut warhead numbers on each side to just 2,000 -- a fraction of the Cold War level.

The effort to ratify START-2 in Russia has been delayed in part by communists and nationalists in the Duma who argue the treaty took advantage of Russia at a time of weakness.

The treaty obliges Russia to eliminate entirely its huge advantage in land-based, multi-warhead strategic nuclear missiles, seen as the most powerful and potentially destabilising arms.

Several factors have made Russia think twice about the wisdom of START-2. One is NATO expansion, another is pressure from the U.S. Congress for the United States to deploy a national ballistic missile defence system and U.S. plans to deploy theatre missile defences with allies.

REUTER

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RTna 03/20 0717 US arms envoy retires with appeal to non-aligned

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA, March 20 (Reuter) - Retiring U.S. ambassador Stephen Ledogar urged the non-aligned countries on Thursday to drop their demand in the Conference on Disarmament for the nuclear powers to negotiate total disarmament.

In a farewell speech Ledogar expressed "growing frustration" that the 61-member body has so far been unable to launch full negotiations to halt production of nuclear bomb-making fissile material and to ban anti-personnel landmines.

The world's only multilateral disarmament forum is on course to end its first two-month session on March 27 without even having agreed its 1997 agenda, according to diplomats.

India and Pakistan have led the non-aligned movement in demanding that the five declared nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) agree to set up a committee to negotiate total nuclear disarmament by 2020.

In their view, only then could negotiations on fissile material and mines start.

The nuclear powers argue that initial cuts in huge strategic arsenals have been negotiated by the United States and Russia, who aim to reduce their stocks to the level of those of Britain, France and China before widening the disarmament process.

Ledogar, who is retiring after serving as U.S. disarmament ambassador since January 1990, expressed pride in having taken part in successful negotiations in Geneva for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning underground nuclear explosions.

"My sense of pride in these accomplishments is tempered, however, by growing frustration with what I can only describe as a doomed effort to force the nuclear powers to negotiate now in this forum the elements of a disarmament process that they are

conducting elsewhere," the U.S. envoy said.

"The implacable hefters of this linkage crowbar have blocked all work in this body for the foreseeable future, even work which is in the best interests of this body's members. Theirs is a self-defeating effort -- one which works to the disadvantage of the entire world community.

Ledogar said: "I can only hope, as I take leave of you, that a sense of realism will once again assert itself in the CD (Conference on Disarmament), and that the members of this body will not allow it to be paralysed by unrealistic and impolitic demands... The CD should not try to insist on the undoable."

President Clinton, in a message to the opening session in January, urged member states to push ahead with global negotiations to ban landmines and halt production of fissile material (plutonium and highly-enriched uranium).

Landmines are blamed for killing 25,000 civilians a year.

"We are stuck and will be stuck for a long time," a U.S. source told Reuters.

Another Western diplomat said: "The Group of 21 (non-aligned countries) are blocking and blocking. There will be nothing out of this session and we will come back to nothing in May."

Siri Bjerke, state secretary at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, said the forum's priority should be negotiations to ban production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

In a speech, she said: "The credibility of the CD depends on its ability to deliver concrete agreements.

"This credibility is damaged if the CD is used as a vehicle to block achievable progress, by making negotiations on one issue hostage to simultaneous movement on others."

Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, who had been scheduled to speak at Thursday's session, did not take the floor.

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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 09:00:30 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: More Summit Opinions

The Washington Post

By Susan Eisenhower

Russia and the Cold-War Warhorses

With the Helsinki summit at hand, it is vital that we rethink the motives behind many of the influential voices who say we should stand tough against the Russians.

Henry Kissinger, never one to beat around the bush, has come forth this week on NATO expansion. Supporting the alliance's eastward expansion -- despite what he terms "dangerous conditions" -- he said: "Whoever heard of a military alliance begging with a weakened adversary? NATO should not be turned into an instrument to conciliate Russia, or Russia will undermine it."

Perhaps Kissinger hasn't got the word that the Cold War is over. "Adversary" is hardly a contemporary way to characterize a country that has moved forward with market-oriented reforms, held free and fair democratic elections, withdrawn from a bloody civil war and worked closely and productively with the United States under U.S. command in Bosnia. This week Boris Yeltsin appointed a new Council of Ministers, giving greatest power to two prominent Westernizers, former privatization czar Anatoly Chubais and regional radical reformer Boris Nemtsov.

Kissinger's comments and similar rhetoric used by Zbigniew Brzezinski are outdated. But at least they are honest about how they view Russia. Others have been less direct. In fact, the one part of the NATO expansion debate that has not been openly analyzed is the extent to which the expansion advocates have been driven by unreconstructed Cold War attitudes. There is much more of that than Americans living outside the Beltway might imagine. Many of the arguments used in Washington to debate this issue have an old-fashioned ring to them: "Don't appease Russia" and "No new Yalta."

Behind the old-fashioned labels is the view that says all relationships Russia has with the former Soviet republics or its former allies are open to suspicion and that only America should be allowed to dominate the post-Soviet world. "Is Russia really seeking a residual sphere of influence and to dilute the U.S. presence in Europe?" Brzezinski has asked rhetorically. Many who believe this will be happy only when Russia is isolated and excluded from Europe altogether.

Even if Russia had not changed an iota, the country has a legitimate right to be concerned about European security; it is, after all, a European country as well as an Asian one. But with the Soviet Union's agreement to the unification of Germany and acquiescence to Germany's desire to remain in NATO -- as well as the Soviet and then Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Baltic Republics -- the Russians have earned the right to be part of European decision-making. Instead of being part 88 to sell out the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that convinced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union had lost the Cold War. No matter what nuclear arms deals the Soviets dangled, Mr. Reagan declared SDI non-negotiable. Here at home, SDI was much ridiculed -- so much "Star Wars." In Moscow, however, it was taken as proof positive that the Soviet Union was hopelessly outclassed in the competition with the economic powerhouse of the United States, even with more than one quarter of the Soviet gross national product devoted to military

spending. The world shook its head in despair at the time of the Iceland summit, but the most important word Mr. Reagan said at Reykjavik was "No."

Times, thankfully, have changed, and the stakes at the Helsinki Summit are not quite as dramatic. That does not mean, however, that the subject under discussion is unimportant: it is nothing less than the future of the NATO alliance itself. A number of countries belonging to the former Warsaw Pact -- in fact the vast majority -- want very much to join their old enemy, NATO. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are likely to be named first in line by July, when the heads of NATO convene in Madrid. Can this be accomplished without antagonizing Russia? The Clinton administration is trying its best to steer a course between what National Security Adviser Sandy Berger calls the Scylla and Charybdis of NATO enlargement -- Russian antagonism on one hand and Eastern European fears of being left in limbo on the other. In an article in Monday's Washington Post, Mr. Berger even went so far as to remind Russians how twice this century Russia "has been pulled into war" in Eastern and Central Europe by regional "instability." Miss Manners could not have put it more delicately.

The danger of Helsinki is that Mr. Clinton, who has rightly made NATO enlargement a priority, will be tempted to give in to Russian conditions, which predictably have been escalating as the date of the Helsinki Summit has drawn closer. Russia wants assurances that NATO will not engage in subsequent rounds of expansion to include more of its former satellites; it wants a legally binding charter agreement of cooperation with NATO; and it wants guarantees that no nuclear weapons will be stationed on the soil of new members, nor any forward positioned NATO troops, nor any NATO hardware and military installations.

It is clear that Mr. Clinton cannot give in to these unreasonable Russian demands, which would turn NATO membership into a useless piece of paper for the new candidates. Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati has articulated these concerns, stating, "We fully understand the sensitivity of the West not to humiliate a wounded and defeated Russia. But what we don't understand is this curious willingness to accommodate unjustified desires on the Russian side.

The task before Mr. Clinton will be twofold: To remind Mr. Yeltsin how much he and his country stand to benefit from peaceful and democratic coexistence and cooperation with the West -- and we with them. At the same time, he must stand firm on the principle that free and sovereign countries, countries which represent no threat to Russia and never have, have every right to arrange for their own defenses and join whatever alliances they please.

Once in this century, an American president bargained away Eastern and Central Europe's right to self-determination at

Yalta. Mr. Clinton, who seems to be mindful of the judgment of posterity, will find here a historic opportunity to right that wrong. Furthermore, as Mr. Reagan discovered at Reykjavik, the Russians really do understand a "No" when they get one.

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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 18:07:44 -0800  
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Subject: Abolition 2000 Resolution - corrected

SANTA BARBARA CITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOLITION

Declares Santa Barbara a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

On March 18, 1997, the Santa Barbara City Council passed a Resolution calling for the nuclear weapons states to complete negotiations by the year 2000 on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons early in the next century. The Council also declared Santa Barbara a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

The Resolution was brought to the City Council by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international peace organization headquartered in Santa Barbara. The Foundation was a founding member of the Abolition 2000 Global Network, a network of over 700 citizens organizations around the world that are working to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Cities around the world are being asked to support similar Abolition 2000 Resolutions for Municipalities.

David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation said, "Each city in the United States that joins in this effort sends a message to the

federal government that the cities are serious about ending the nuclear weapons era. I am proud to say that our city is now a leader in this effort. Similar efforts are being made in cities around the world."

The Resolution states that "the end of the Cold War has provided an unparalleled opportunity to end the nuclear weapons era which would fulfill our responsibility to present and future generations.

"The cities have always been the primary targets of nuclear weapons," Krieger said, "and therefore they have the most to gain by eliminating nuclear weapons. There is also the issue of money. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have cost trillions of dollars. This money could be far better spent on educating our children, improving our healthcare, and rebuilding our infrastructure." Krieger emphasized that the Resolution did not call for unilateral disarmament, but for multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

Ben Eichert and Noey Turk of Santa Barbara City College told the City Council that earlier in the day the Student Senate at the college had adopted a similar resolution for college campuses. They urged the City Council to act in behalf of all Santa Barbara citizens in supporting the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Abolition 2000 Resolution calls for the city to send copies of this Resolution to Congressional Representative Walter Capps, U.S. Senators Boxer and Feinstein, and President Clinton.

Founded in 1982, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, international organization seeking to educate the public through its programs and publications. The Foundation is dedicated to achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world; creating a permanent International Criminal Court and strengthening international law; teaching peace; promoting nonviolent resolution of conflicts; and creating a world based upon liberty, justice and human dignity. It is a nongovernmental affiliate

of the United Nations and is recognized by that body as a Peace Messenger Organization.

For further information please contact the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California 93108, telephone (805) 965-3443, fax (805) 568-0466, e-mail wagingpeace@napf.org.

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#### RESOLUTION 97-032

#### AN "ABOLITION 2000" RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA BARBARA

Whereas nuclear weapons pose a continuing threat to civilization, the human species, and life itself;

Whereas cities have been primary targets of nuclear weapons throughout the Nuclear Age and remain vulnerable to the massive destructive effects of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the development and maintenance of nuclear arsenals are extraordinarily costly, still costing billions of dollars per year, and these resources could be far better utilized for rebuilding the infrastructure of our cities, supporting the health and welfare of our citizens, and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment;

Whereas the five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China) promised at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 to pursue "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons";

Whereas the International Court of Justice ruled unanimously in July 1996, "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects

under strict and effective international control";

Whereas retired U.S. General Lee Butler, once responsible for all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has called nuclear weapons "inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible";

Whereas the end of the Cold War has provided an unparalleled opportunity to end the nuclear weapons era, which would fulfill our responsibility to present and future generations,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA BARBARA THAT SANTA BARBARA:

1. Declares itself as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and supports the further development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones throughout the world;

2. Calls for all nuclear weapons to be taken off of alert status, for all nuclear warheads to be separated from their delivery vehicles, and for the nuclear weapons states to agree to unconditional no first use of these weapons;

3. Calls upon the governments of all nuclear weapons states to begin negotiations immediately on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons early in the next century and to complete these negotiations by the year 2000; and

4. Orders that copies of this resolution be sent to the elected representatives for this municipality, including the U.S. Representative(s), U.S. Senators, and the President.

Adopted March 18, 1997

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Prepared by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation for the Abolition 2000 campaign. For more information, contact the Foundation at 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, California, 93108; Tel.

(805)  
965-3443; Fax: (805) 568-0466; e-mail [wagingpeace@napf.org](mailto:wagingpeace@napf.org);  
<http://www.napf.org>.

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Web Site: <http://www.napf.org>  
From [nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org) Fri Mar 21 05:39:56 1997  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 19:50:26 GMT  
From: National Steering Cttee Nuclear Free Local Authorities  
<[nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)>  
To: [nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org](mailto:nfla.news@conf.gn.apc.org)  
Cc: [abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org](mailto:abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org)  
Subject: UK Nuclear News 20 March 1997

>From [GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk) Thu Mar 20 12:33:15 1997  
Received: from [MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:MCR1.poptel.org.uk) by [gnew.gn.apc.org](mailto:gnew.gn.apc.org)  
(8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)  
id MAA26051; Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:33:02 GMT  
From: [GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk)  
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 12:32:43 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 20 Mar  
To: [nfzpsc@gn.apc.org](mailto:nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)  
Message-Id: <397271860MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
Status: R

DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Thurs 20 Mar 1997

97-8329 Magnox cuts nuclear liabilities by #450m and claims it  
may be on course to eliminate its #1.3bn balance sheet deficit.

FT

97-8330 Previews of the US-Russia summit at Helsinki. G, FT, Ind, T

97-8331 Commons report, due today, expected to be critical of  
Soames

over use of pesticides in Gulf war and misleading the  
Commons. G

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
Internet: [gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk](mailto:gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk)  
From [DCulp@nrhc.org](mailto:DCulp@nrhc.org) Fri Mar 21 05:39:56 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:15:51 -0500  
From: David Culp <[DCulp@nrhc.org](mailto:DCulp@nrhc.org)>  
To: undisclosed-recipients;;

Subject: AP: Lott OKs Chemical Weapons Debate

AP Online Washington  
03-20-97 2005 EST

LOTT OKS CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEBATE

By DAVID BRISCOE= Associated Press Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott promised Thursday to schedule debate next month on the long-delayed chemical weapons treaty, ending a Democratic threat to bottle up all Senate action until he schedules a ratification vote.

Lott, R-Miss., noted there are concerns in the Senate about the 4-year-old treaty's impact on the safety of Americans and on U.S. manufacturers who might be subject to international inspections.

But he said, ``My intent is for this issue to come up when we come back from the recess in early April.'' Congress begins its spring break next week.

The treaty, with 160 signatories, would ban the manufacture and sale of chemical weapons.

President Clinton, in a statement released by the White House, called again for ratification before the Chemical Weapons Convention takes effect April 29.

``It would be harmful to our national interests if the United States, which led the way in developing this treaty, was on the outside not the inside, when it comes into operation,'' said Clinton, who is in Finland for a summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

On the second anniversary of the sarin gas attack that killed 12 people in a Tokyo subway and sickened thousands, Clinton said Americans need to be protected from ``a similar terrorist outrage.''

With Lott promising action on the treaty, Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., agreed to withdraw a Democratic threat to stall action on a bill aimed at encouraging anti-drug efforts with Mexico. The bill later passed 94-5.

Lott said there is disagreement over whether the treaty has to be ratified by April 29, when the 160-nation pact goes into effect. He said that even if ratification comes later, the United States still would play a key role in its implementation.

Opponent, including Sen Jesse Helms, R-N.C., fear it would increase the danger that non-signatories, including terrorists groups, would gain such weaponry. Helms has raise 30 specific objections to the treaty, claiming it poses greater dangers than benefits.

But Clinton, in his statement, said the treaty would eliminate terrorists' largest potential source of chemical weapons by requiring the destruction of stockpiles. He said it also would tie the United States into a global information network to provide early warning of terrorist plans and give law enforcement authorities new authority to investigate and prosecute anyone who acquires or uses chemical weapons on U.S. soil.

On Thursday, Helms said he would free the treaty from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which he chairs, after the administration agrees to support changes at State and the United Nations.

He said, however, he might allow a vote sooner if his concerns about the treaty are addressed. The Senate could not change the treaty but could pass separate legislation dealing with U.S. policy toward it. Ratification requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate.

###

From 102464.1110@CompuServe.COM Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: 21 Mar 97 09:18:35 EST  
From: Dietrich Fischer <102464.1110@CompuServe.COM>  
To: abolition-caucus <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: Peace Week April 6-13

Dear Abolition Friends, To sustain our efforts, it helps to receive from time to time some encouraging news like the following:

YOU can CREATE HISTORY by writing a letter...

On April 7, representatives from nearly every nation will meet to discuss the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review. Serendipitously, the week of April 6 - 13 has so far been declared PEACE WEEK by 6 U.S. Governors (New Mexico, Indiana, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma and New Jersey - to print out copies of these proclamations see <[www.worldpeace2000.org/proclamations](http://www.worldpeace2000.org/proclamations)>. All Peace Groups can now use this fact to promote their messages of peace.

YOU can help many more Governors and politicians throughout the world to join in declaring PEACE WEEK, so that we can gather support for nuclear disarmament. All World Peace 2000 did was write a letter and ask that the week of April 6, 1997 be declared PEACE WEEK. In addition to the 6 Proclamations, 12 Governors (from Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia) have written that they would declare PEACE WEEK if 1 person in their state requested it. It is hard to imagine that any governor would refuse such a request, so please write to your governor even if you live in another state. It's not too late to have PEACE WEEK declared in your state!

Please visit <[www.worldpeace2000.org/leaders](http://www.worldpeace2000.org/leaders)> to find addresses of all 50 US Governors, and all Heads of State, sample proclamations of peace, and sample letters to send. Just enclose a copy of the proposed Proclamation along with your request. YOU can help millions of people to think about peace with just 1 letter. Please let me know if you do receive a Proclamation so that I can post it on the Internet, so that all peace groups can use this victory to further peace on earth.

Why a Proclamation of Peace for the Week of April 6? April 6, 1997 marks the start of the 1000 Day Count-UP to the Year 2000, a period of time which President Clinton has asked all citizens to use to work together to build a better future. President Clinton is considering a National Proclamation for the entire 1000 Day CountUP. Please write to President Clinton and ask him to declare a Proclamation for the 1000 Day CountUP. Then we'll have a 33-month umbrella that every peace group, environmental group, hunger group, human rights group, civil rights group & every group trying to make a better world can use to further their message.

Five governments (from Barbados, Burma, Brazil, Croatia, Malta) replied that their President or Prime Minister was considering the proposal of endorsing the idea of one day of peace on January 1, 2000 and celebrating the Year 2000 as the Year for Peace on Earth. Please support that proposal by writing to your government. Together we can build a better world, one day at a time.

Robert Alan Silverstein \* p4peace@aol.com  
President, The People For Peace Project  
Webmaster, World Peace 2000

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:27:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: White House Summit Brief

\*\* I'm sending this to you all again, because some folks told me that it didn't transmit before. Hope it works this time. Sorry if its just a boring repeat . . .

If you can get to a t.v. at about 11:45 EST (or 16:45 GMT) today, Clinton and Yeltsin are scheduled to give a Summit wrap-up report.

March 20, 1997  
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY  
4:43 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

(Helsinki, Finland)

For Immediate Release  
20, 1997

March

PRESS BRIEFING BY  
MIKE MCCURRY

Hotel Inter-Continental  
Helsinki, Finland

4:43 P.M. (L)

MR. MCCURRY: Good evening, everybody. Good afternoon, good morning -- what is it? One or the other. President Clinton is upstairs here at our headquarters getting a last briefing from his -- members of his foreign policy team. He met a short while ago with Secretary Madeleine Albright, who is at the moment meeting with her counterpart Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They are clearly working through the substantive issues that we expect to arise on the agenda at the President's working sessions tomorrow.

This evening President Clinton has an opportunity to renew an old acquaintance with Boris Yeltsin. He has not seen him for quite some time. They, no doubt, will compare their respective personal situations -- President Yeltsin clearly vigorously recovering from heart surgery, and President Clinton clearly struggling to recover from knee surgery. But President Clinton continues to enjoy the realities of adjusting to summitry in a wheelchair.

...

The President also is very interested in his bilateral meeting -- this has not been the focus of some of you -- but the President spent a good deal of time with Ambassador Shearer and talking about his upcoming meeting with the Prime Minister and with someone who, I think it's fair to say, the President has been enormously impressed with in his previous meetings. President Ahtisaari has a very keen grasp of issues ranging from the United Nations and reform of the United Nations to all the

issues that are important to European integration, European security. And so the President did spend a fair amount of time preparing for that meeting with President Ahtisaari and also with Prime Minister Lipponen.

So there will be some discussions, and of course, the President intends to express the gratitude of the United States to the people of Finland for their willingness to host this summit. This is obviously an historic occasion; it wouldn't be possible if we didn't have the gracious hospitality of the Finnish people and the Finnish leadership.

So tonight, more of a social start to work on the agenda, start to review some of the important issues. The foreign ministers of the United States and the Russian Federation working through some of the issues on the agenda, and then moving tomorrow into the working session and things that we will, hopefully, report to you at the press conference tomorrow. That's where we stand.

...

Q What's your reaction to the seemingly conciliatory statements made by Yeltsin as he arrived and spoke of hopes for a compromise, said he wanted to leave here as friends? Do you sense a change in tone?

MR. MCCURRY: There are always prior to a meeting different degrees of public statements made. I think ours have been focused on exactly the working agenda the President brings here to Helsinki -- European security, the future of arms control, the importance of economic growth in Russia for the Russian Federation and for the people of Russia, and charting this relationship as we think of the 21st century where we want the United States and the Russian Federation to be as we think about the future of Europe, indeed, think about cleaning away all the last residues of the Cold War era.

And we have been guarded in what we've said on those subjects because there are disagreements that exist. You've heard me say that there will no doubt continue to be disagreements after the meetings tomorrow. But we remain confident that this is a partnership in which two nations can continue to work through the issues that divide them, led by two Presidents that clearly have a personal relationship sufficient to address those differences in an amicable style.

A lot of hard work, in other words. We'll see whether we can bridge some of these differences, but I don't want to speculate on whether we will or not at this point.

Q I'm sorry, but my question was do you detect a change in tone in what Mr. Yeltsin said when he arrived here, in contrast to what he's been saying the last few days?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, his concerns that he has expressed about the future of NATO are well known to us. And I think that all of those statements reflect some of the anxieties concerned, but also some of the opportunities that the Russian Federation foresees. We think about these issues in very much the same way. There are difficult issues there, but we remain confident that the expansion of NATO is the right formula for preserving an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe as we look ahead to the 21st century.

Q Mike, in that same quote, you know, he was saying that President Bill Clinton and his team seem to be prepared to find constructive approaches and compromises. It sounds like he's predicting that the compromising is going to come from you.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, he's perhaps making more difficult my effort to lower expectations at the moment. And I think, based on what I've heard from our team -- from Secretary Albright, from Deputy Secretary Talbott, from some of the members of the President's National Security team, from Sandy Berger and others -- there's a lot of very difficult work that lies ahead and some differences that are going to be difficult to bridge -- whether we're talking about arms control, whether we're talking about issues related to strategic arms reduction, whether we're talking about the vital question of the future of NATO's relationship with Russia.

There are still many issues to be addressed and not clear that all of them will be resolved. But there will be a good work done on all of those in the spirit of partnership that I think defines this relationship.

Q Do you think President Yeltsin will be disappointed in his hope or expectation --

MR. MCCURRY: I think he will find in his friend Bill Clinton a President, a leader willing to work through these issues and to see if we can't come to common understanding on some of the questions related to the agenda the two Presidents have defined. I think we certainly will be meeting with him in a spirit that is open and candid and realistic in dealing with some of the differences that exist. But I don't want to predict that that will lead to success or lead to more work ahead in the future.

Q Mike, are we likely to see any movement on the Russian request to extend the 2003 deadline? And if we did agree to anything along those lines, is it your understanding that that would require reratification by the Senate?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, there will be a lot of discussion about where we are with START II, what the status of ratification is in the Duma, what the implications are as we look beyond START II and what the timing will be for, perhaps, a third round of strategic arms reductions. I don't want to preview that now because we clearly will be doing a lot of work on that tomorrow.

Q As far back as 1945 the United States has occasionally raised the possibility of the Russians joining NATO or becoming associate members of NATO. Do the Russians now have this option?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we have always described the expansion of NATO as an inclusive, nondiscriminatory process. And we established clear criteria. We've talked about the why and the how and we're moving now into the question of the who. And we've always said that that is a process that is open and transparent and available to all. I think in reality the Russian Federation itself has chosen to define its relationship with NATO in a different fashion; thus, the concentrated effort to talk about some charter or some way in which we could find a political commitment on the part of NATO and the Russian Federation to structure a relationship in the future that is something other than membership.

But it was, no doubt, just as important to define that relationship, and we've already seen the advantages that come from cooperation. The Russians' participation in the stabilization force in Bosnia has been a hallmark of the

cooperation that we foresee as we look ahead and think about the relationship that Russia will have to NATO, and that's the type of discussion that's underway. But by no means is anyone excluded. That has been the policy of the Alliance since it took the decisions necessary to open the question of expansion.

Q The Russians have been very tough and pessimistic in their statements. Do you think they really mean it, or is there some kind of -- part of the game?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to predict how their public statements affected their negotiating strategy or how they thought about the preview of this meeting. Again I'd say we've tried to be very correct in laying out what we think the agenda is, what we think the conceivable goals are for discussion, and then stick to that. And there are always different views of how the dialogue will go and sometimes expressed differently by different people in governments. But I think we've looked across the whole range of things that have been said walking up to this summit and we believe that President Yeltsin arrives here determined to work with President Bill Clinton to address all of these issues that the two governments have defined, and we think it will be done in a spirit of partnership.

Q Mike, in terms of the dynamic that you're talking about, the expansion of NATO, is the President just going to sit down and just say to Mr. Yeltsin, look, the idea that we're going to abandon this expansion is just not there, or do they do it in most of the diplomatic terms? How direct will it get?

MR. MCCURRY: By now the Russian Federation, based on the presentation the President made to Foreign Minister Primakov and what they have heard repeatedly -- not only from the United States government, but from Secretary General Solana and from other NATO governments -- the realities are quite clear. The schedule going to July in Madrid is quite clear.

What is not clear is how we do the very important work of defining Russia's role in questions related to the future of NATO, the adaptation of NATO and eventually the expansion of NATO. And that's probably the work that will be done here. And let me remind, too, this is not conclusive in and of itself here, although the United States obviously has a leadership role in the Alliance, this is a decision that is defined by 16 governments

making their decisions. The expansion of NATO is, for our government and for many of our Alliance partners, a treaty amendment, so it does require action by other branches of, indeed, our government and in some cases, other parliaments. So it's a very significant decision and it's one that cannot be taken lightly and cannot be taken unilaterally.

Q I guess -- I was trying to get to the kind of level of discussions you think they are. If you think that they're going -- do you have some concern that this could get a little testy since certainly Mr. Yeltsin wants some reservations on what can be included in NATO and what the NATO expansion will mean the President, at least White House officials are saying, is not prepared to give.

MR. MCCURRY: It has not been a feature of the discussions of these two Presidents that they are testy. They have certainly had disagreements and have been very candid in dealing with issues in the past. But I think they know how to resolve those differences in an amicable way. And the tone of the conversation is most often friendly, although it's sometimes firm and determined as well.

Q How does the White House -- Russian worries about NATO -- how much are they seen for real?

MR. MCCURRY: The public pronouncements that are made? I think that we take them in the context that they're delivered. We understand that there is a vibrant political dynamic in Russia that has to be addressed sometime by the leadership of the Russian Federation. So we account for that as we measure out what various figures in the government say, and then we listen very carefully to what they say as we meet with them face to face, where we do our direct diplomacy.

Q How much do you think they differ from each other?

MR. MCCURRY: They don't differ greatly, there are just differences of tone and nuances sometimes. There's a difference between doing work side by side and then articulating publicly in a way that advances your diplomatic objectives, and perhaps maybe your domestic objectives as well. So there is a difference in tone sometimes. But there are very clear, strong feelings about some of the questions that these two Presidents

have addressed, particularly on the side of the Russian Federation, and we acknowledge that and we respect that and will try to work through that.

Q Has the U.S. government assessed whether this will affect Yeltsin and other -- whether NATO expansion will affect Yeltsin and other democratic politicians in Russia if it does expand, and is the U.S. concerned about that?

MR. MCCURRY: We try to think in a sophisticated way about those who pursue reform and the agendas that they have and the difficulties they face as they advance their objectives and how external factors might impact them. We try to think about that in a serious, sophisticated way, sure.

Q But will it? Is the assessment that it will?

MR. MCCURRY: They are learned experts on that subject, many of them here to comment for many of your news organizations, and I'm sure many of them will help you on that question.

Q Mike, in conversations up until now and today and tomorrow, does the U.S. side communicate to the Russians that they take seriously their concerns and understand the basis of their concerns, while also saying that there's not a whole lot the U.S. is going to do about --

MR. MCCURRY: We do. We understand the historic context in which many average Russian citizens think of NATO because it's defined by the period of the Cold War and it's clear for many people in the Russian Federation that NATO was defined for years and years as the enemy. And making an adjustment to see the possibility of cooperation, partnership and how an expanded NATO becomes a tool that preserves the security of the Russian people is a difficult concept, perhaps, but it is one that we understand we have to articulate, articulate clearly, and we try in our public pronouncements, especially as we communicate in a way that we know will reach the Russian people to talk about the advantages, the opportunities, the importance of plotting a future for Europe that includes NATO as part of the architecture of peace and democracy.

Q The President has taken pains to acknowledge Yeltsin's contribution, the contribution of the Russian people.

Does he feel that it's as important to give Yeltsin, if you will, some political cover at home as it is to get some kind of signal here that Yeltsin at least accepts the inevitability of NATO expansion?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think I just described to you how we try to think in a sophisticated way about the political dynamic that our counterpart faces and I think you can incorporate that answer as an answer to your question.

Q Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia all want to be in this first round of expansion. Is this something that's going to come up in your talks with Yeltsin or do you think you're going to limit it to the other three countries?

MR. MCCURRY: I would be -- it may tangentially arise, but that's really a discussion more for the Alliance itself, the question of who and how we think about membership as we look ahead to Madrid. That could conceivably arise here, but the focus of that work, of course, is more properly in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Q The U.S. takes the position it has for months that Russia doesn't have a realistic picture of NATO. Does the U.s. have a realistic picture of the political problems NATO expansion poses to Yeltsin?

MR. MCCURRY: I think we, as I say, try to be sophisticated in our thinking about the internal dynamic in Russia. We know that that places constraints just as it does everywhere, Barry. You know, you and I have talked over the years about the Middle East and we know how the realities of politics on the street impact the ability of leaders to make decisions. That's, by the way, true for President Bill Clinton, too, as you all know. So I think we do take that into account and we understand the realities that exist and we are, of course, encouraged by some of the steps that have just recently been taken by President Yeltsin with respect to forming a government that appears to be infused with new figures that are committed to reform. We think that's significant, and we acknowledge that and I'm sure that will be something that President Clinton takes into account as he meets with President Yeltsin.

Q You mentioned trying to get this point across to the Russian people the meaning of a new NATO, but that assumes

that the opinion of the Russian people counts in that system now. -- the Russian people at this point aren't terribly politically engaged. Can you address that point that your audience -- if your audience is the Russian people for this sort of education, does it really matter?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I suspect, as with maybe even the American people, there are more immediate concerns sometimes in the lives of the average Russian -- the status of the economy, the status of reform, what types of opportunities are existing as you build a better future. Those are the realities that define the day-to-day lives of most people in this world, and they are impacted by things that happen in the realm of foreign policy, but they are sometimes not as immediate.

I imagine there are a lot of things that we're going to be doing here related to promoting economic development and growth and investment in Russia that in the long run are going to be far more important to the Russian people than the question of how we structure the security architecture of Europe for the 21st century. And I think that's a valuable part of the message that gets communicated from a summit like this as well.

....

Q Mike, after all the talk -- and the talks in Washington last week, could you delineate where the United States, NATO and Russia agree on a charter, if you want to call it that, and where they disagree at this point?

MR. MCCURRY: I probably could, but I won't right now because that's the work that they're going to do tomorrow, and I don't want to preview that. There are areas in which I think they've had good discussions in which they've got a good

concept of what that charter should be, but there, inevitably, are some areas that they're still thinking about and that's the work that Secretary Albright and the Foreign Minister are devoted to probably right now. And it's, I imagine, going to be part of the agenda tomorrow. But some understandings of how that works and what that charter is an important part of the discussion tomorrow.

Q That very same thing. Last night the Russian Press Secretary was saying that they won't be happy with oral agreements, that they want something in writing and very concrete

and very specific. Is NATO prepared to do that?

MR. MCCURRY: I think from our view it's important to have a good understanding of how that relationship will be structured. There are perhaps many different ways you can establish that understanding, but the concept of a charter that really makes clear for all the members of the North Atlantic Council and for the Russian Federation what the obligations are is a useful approach in our view.

Q Mike, how do you make the case to the Russians that the new NATO is not about turning against Russia when the majority of the contenders for new membership cite as their -- high on their list of rationales for wanting to do it is they're scared of Russia? And only yesterday the Lithuanian foreign minister made this --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the best way to answer that question is to point to what we are doing already with the Russian Federation and NATO together, and that's to address the situation of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, specifically trying to stabilize Bosnia as it recovers from the aftermath of a horrible war.

We're doing very good work together with them and we see in that moment of cooperation the utility of an institution like NATO as we think of a Europe that we want to preserve in peace, even though it has historically been a continent that is rife with ethnic conflicts. So the ability to use some of the security architecture in the arrangements of NATO as we think about the identity of European security and think about the way you preserve European security is very, very important and shows what the opportunities and possibilities are for Russia.

Q Mike, what does the United States hope to accomplish in holding out the prospect of arms control concessions coming into these talks? What do you gain by dangling that possibility?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we are hoping, of course, to point ahead to the future of strategic arms reductions as we alert the Duma to the possibilities that exist beyond the ratification of START II. And obviously we think about how we can make the world a safer place as we delimit the size of the strategic arsenals on both sides and how we look ahead to the

future. We are, in short, taking advantage of the enormous change in history that is represented by the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tensions from both sides, and codifying that or looking to codify that in how we approach the question of structuring the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

Q So, if I could follow up, the U.S. is essentially trying to say to the Russian Parliament, look, there's a lot to be gained from going forward with this and we will offer some good faith here if you're willing to act?

MR. MCCURRY: We certainly are trying to show what the possibilities are beyond START II, but we also want to address questions that are important to us, too -- how do we -- as we think about reducing the threat of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, we need to also address what the dangers are in regional theater-type ballistic missiles and we need to think about what the implications are for treaties that we've reached in the past, specifically the ABM. So how you fit those things together in the arms control equation will be a large part of the discussion tomorrow, and there are some outstanding issues there. There are some things, in short, that we want and expect, too, in exchange for looking ahead out on the horizon with respect to arms control.

...

Q Mike, if NATO is so important to European security, what role, if any, should NATO play with the Albania crisis? And a second question: Is Albright's meeting with Primakov specifically focused on the charter, or is she talking about the whole range of issues?

MR. MCCURRY: She is I think focused on some of those issues that were still on the table as the Foreign Minister left the White House and went to talk to President Yeltsin over the weekend, the last several days.

Q What are they specifically?

MR. MCCURRY: They are specifically the things that we'll be probably addressing and talking to you about tomorrow.

...Q Mike, back to the summit for a minute. You talked about changes that NATO has made to reassure the Russians that it's not a threat. Most of those changes occurred since Yeltsin's cold peace speech in Budapest about two and a half

years ago. And as near as we can tell, Yeltsin hasn't changed his public posture on this subject a bit. Are you coming to a point where you're going to say, okay, we just are not going to be able to agree on that; let's see if we can go on to other things?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, that's a good way maybe of having a defining question that we can have on the table as we work ahead tomorrow. I've gotten through saying about as little as I can possibly say about tomorrow, and that's obviously the kind of question that is relevant after we meet with him tomorrow and see where we are.

. . . Q Tonight's event being primarily social, what business will get done, and besides business what will get accomplished?

MR. MCCURRY: On the President's agenda tonight is a bilateral meeting with President Ahtisaari and some other discussions with the Finnish government that he has taken seriously. That's substantively, they will -- we'll work through all of our bilateral issues with the Finnish government at that session, and then move into the dinner in which I think they'll probably talk about what kind of work are we going to do tomorrow and try to take some sense of what the overall tone and nature of the dialogue will be tomorrow.

Q Here in Finland, there is concerns, as you very well know, of a new deal, divided Europe. Now, even if you are not here to bargain, perhaps you want to tell the Finnish audience how are you going to avoid one -- to another?

MR. MCCURRY: We would hope that the people of Finland would understand that the United States approaches the question of the future of Europe and the future of NATO with one overriding objective: to make the 21st century a century of peace for a continent that is undivided from the United Kingdom to the Urals, living with some sense of security about the future of all of the countries that define Europe. It is a moment of enormous hope for Europe as it integrates, as it begins to think about how the institutions of commerce and economics and security can become more interoperable within Europe.

And we want to play a leadership role in helping to make that happen in a nonexclusive manner. We understand and respect the thinking that the people of Finland have always had about NATO itself. We would hope that, as expansion occurs and

as the environment changes and as NATO's utility is shown as we think about the 21st century in peace, that the people of Finland might begin to see in NATO a very useful element of advancing its own security interests.

And we deeply appreciate, by the way, the contributions that the people of Finland have made in things like stabilizing Bosnia, the contributions to providing police monitors for the SFOR mission there, and some -- the American press may not know this, but the Finnish people have also participated in a very significant way in the Balkans by providing monitors to help stabilize the security of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. That's a very significant contribution. And without that contribution from the partners that we have in Europe, the very tensions that we've been talking about that exist in the Balkans may have been a great deal more troublesome.

So, again, our view of the future of Europe is one of peace, and we think that the Finnish people will want to be a part of it.

Q All this we have heard. But, again, it seems that the worries and concerns stem from the fact that, at least in public, it seems that no matter how hard you are convincing the Russians that there is nothing to worry about, that the concerns and the worries still seem to be there.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we would have to acknowledge that history is a powerful -- sets off powerful emotions and sets off memories that linger. But extraordinary things have happened in the last decade. And I think that we need to think more optimistically about what the future will hold if we can bridge these differences and set aside some of the tensions and cleavages that have existed in the past.

You can well understand the concerns that nations have around the perimeter of the Russian Federation. But you can also understand the possibilities that exist if we can invigorate the transition to democracy and market capitalism in Russia so they become a part of the community of nations that really do define a new history for Europe.

And we just -- part of this is the work of what we call sometimes "public diplomacy," and that's part of the work

that we're going to be doing this weekend, but it's also as people see the reality change around them -- perhaps new attitudes will set in.

. . . Q Mike, if the cost to the United States proceeding with NATO expansion is further intransigence by the Russians on arms control, is that in the U.S. national interest to proceed for the good of Central Europe and NATO at the expense of the nuclear arms reduction?

MR. MCCURRY: Oh, I think that the reverse of that is the case -- that proceeding with adaptation of NATO to address the needs of the post-Cold War era and to prepare for the 21st century, while simultaneously advancing the objectives we have in reducing the size of the nuclear arsenals in the Russian Federation and the United States, is manifestly in the interests of all the people in Europe, and indeed all the people on the planet.

So that's what we're trying to make happen. And we believe we've got some opportunity to make that happen.

Okay, thank you.

END                      5:38 P.M. (L)

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:17:46 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit

RTw 03/21 1023 Russia firm on NATO at summit but sees hope

By Timothy Heritage  
HELSINKI, March 21 (Reuter) - Russian President Boris Yeltsin stood his ground on opposition to NATO expansion at summit talks on Friday, despite impassioned efforts by U.S.

President Bill Clinton to sway him.

But a Kremlin spokesman said after the opening session of the summit that they had edged closer to agreement on a deal intended to set out Russia's ties with the Western defence alliance following the end of the Cold War.

The summit wrapped up shortly before 1500 GMT and the two presidents planned a news conference for 1645 GMT. There was no immediate comment from the Russian camp on how the talks had worked out but a U.S. official said things had gone well.

Asked if Yeltsin had altered his position on NATO plans to offer membership to former Soviet bloc states, Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky told reporters after the morning session: "He did not change it even in nuance."

But he added: "I have the impression that during these two hours the presidents not only advanced in understanding their respective positions but did more in that they actually moved towards each other in their positions."

The row over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was a central issue at the summit, and one which both sides made clear would not be resolved at Friday's talks.

Moscow says NATO enlargement would threaten its security but, keen to win as many concessions before the expansion goes ahead, is negotiating an agreement with the alliance under which it would have a bigger say in European security issues.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said Clinton had set out Washington's reasons for supporting NATO expansion Clinton made the case for NATO enlargement "with a great deal of passion," but made clear there had been no breakthrough in the morning.

Yastrzhembsky gave no details but said the leaders could issue a joint statement on European security after the talks.

Yeltsin, 66, is in a corner over NATO expansion, which will move forward when the alliance issues invitations to some eastern European countries this summer. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are expected to be in the first wave.

The Kremlin leader is anxious to maintain good relations with the 16-nation alliance but he cannot afford to be seen by his nationalist and communist enemies not to defend Russia's interests against its former Cold War foes.

Moscow says NATO expansion could play into the hands of these political enemies and undermine Yeltsin's authority. They say it would create new divisions in Europe and that it is opposed by the Russian people.

"If NATO expands it will cause discomfort, not only at an executive level but in all Russia.... We have not been able to explain to our people the 'urgent necessity' of expanding NATO,"

said foreign ministry official Mikhail Timoshkin.

Russian officials made clear Moscow would fiercely oppose any plans to offer NATO membership to former Soviet republics such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus.

They continued rattling the sabre even though talks were already under way between Yeltsin and Clinton, signalling Moscow's determination to fight its corner.

"One mistake has been committed already (by mapping out NATO expansion) and it would be a tragic mistake if we could not stop further expansion of NATO," Sergei Karaganov, a foreign policy expert close to the Kremlin, told reporters.

Kremlin defence aide Yuri Baturin set out Moscow's demands including a binding treaty governing relations with Moscow, having a say in European security matters and no movement of NATO's nuclear weapons into new members states.

Kremlin security aide Boris Berezovsky told reporters the West had shown hypocrisy over NATO expansion, going back on promises not to make such moves.

"We were not blunt enough over NATO in the past. We have to state our opposition clearly," Karaganov said.

APO 03/21 1020 Clinton, Yeltsin Hope for Deal

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- In a long day of seaside summitry, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin debated their differences over NATO expansion. Yeltsin would not budge from his opposition, "not even in nuances."

The two presidents met for hours today at the airy presidential residence on the Gulf of Finland, moving beyond the NATO dispute to another thorny issue: arms control. Yet Yeltsin left no doubt he was dead-set against the spread of NATO to absorb Eastern and Central European countries.

Going into their talks, Yeltsin said he hoped he and Clinton could "erase the differences of opinion" over expanding NATO to former Warsaw Pact nations.

But asked after their morning meetings if the Russian leader had altered his opposition to widening the NATO net, spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky said, "He did not change, not even in nuances."

The differences were discussed openly and "in a good atmosphere," which "helped bring the positions of the sides even closer," Yastrzhembsky said.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the first two-hour session was "by far the most substantive and intense discussion

they've ever had."

There were small signs of progress. Walter Slocumbe, the undersecretary of defense for policy, said in Washington that he expected an announcement from Helsinki on movement toward START III talks. He also said he expected Helsinki to produce some "Russian step forward to ratification" of START II.

The talks took place in the newly built residence with towering glass windows and a breathtaking view of the gulf. In a picture-taking session before the talks began, Clinton told reporters, "I think we'll have a good meeting."

In contrast to his talkative counterpart, Clinton was taciturn. "Boris, we should shake hands," he urged. As they shook, Clinton tried to cut off questions but Yeltsin continued on.

"We always come to an agreement with Bill," he said. "It's the duty of the presidents of the two great superpowers and it's simply our human duty."

"We have the good will to move toward each other and erase the differences of opinion that we now have," he said.

Senior U.S. aides have prepared five tentative documents of understanding. These include one on European security that would set forth areas of agreement, a second on advancing strategic arms control, and a third on U.S. economic assistance to Russia.

The two others, a U.S. official said, would deal with controlling chemical weapons and distinguishing which missile defense systems are considered legal under past accords.

In some ways, this 12th Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in four years was shaping up as their most troublesome. But the two leaders kicked it off with kindly statements.

"I think we'll work something out," Clinton said as they sat down to dine Thursday night. "I hope we will. ... And I'm glad to see President Yeltsin looking so fit and well."

They dined on young reindeer at the presidential palace, on the waterfront alongside an open-air market. Known for its opulent Hall of Mirrors, it was the site in 1990 of a summit between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Clinton's conciliation went beyond warm words.

He brought with him a package of arms control concessions, hoping the offer would end a long impasse on the START II missile-reduction treaty.

In return, Clinton wants a clear commitment from Yeltsin that the treaty will be ratified by the Russian parliament this spring. START II would cut U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals in half by 2003.

On the NATO front, Russia's opposition to the absorption of

its former allies within the alliance beginning next summer is unyielding. "We're going to disagree on NATO enlargement," said Sandy Berger, the U.S. national security adviser.

But Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., writing in an opinion column in today's editions of The Washington Post, criticized Clinton for struggling for three years to decide whether and when to enlarge NATO.

He said the delays have encouraged Russian nationalists to increase their campaign against NATO and discouraged Central and Eastern European countries from their quest to join it. Lott called on the president to "name names" of the countries the United States supports for membership.

Clinton's struggle to promote arms control even while unsettling Russia with NATO spreading to its western border, was centered on pushing Yeltsin for a promise that the Duma -- Russia's parliament -- would approve the START II treaty this spring.

That would eliminate the heavy blockbuster Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and limit Russia to 3,101 long-range warheads by 2003. The United States would be restricted to 3,500.

But Russian critics are convinced the treaty was negotiated during a period of weakness in Moscow and that it leaves Russia with the dilemma of accepting a U.S. edge or building expensive, permissible, single-warhead missiles to achieve parity.

Clinton's answer is to hurry guidelines for a START III treaty. That would cut both sides down to 2,000 to 2,500 while giving Russia a few years beyond 2003 to blow up the silos, bombers and submarines that hold warheads outlawed by START II.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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From int@fme.knooppunt.be Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 16:57:01  
From: Pol D'Huyvetter <int@fme.knooppunt.be>  
To: a-days@knooppunt.be  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, fme@knooppunt.be  
Subject: Int'l Meetings Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days

INVITATION

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International meetings

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Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days (NWAD) 1997

An International Campaign to uphold International Law  
with Non-Violent Direct Actions of Civil Defence

July 8th - NATO Summit Madrid

August 6th - NATO HQ Brussels

August 9th at 'sites of crime'

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Dear friends,

We have scheduled two new internationale meetings to inform and develop further plans on the nuclear weapons abolition days.

You are very welcome to join those meetings !!

\* USA

Monday afternoon April 14 - New York City (during NPT Precomm)

More details about agenda and place will be posted soon.

Roger Smith from NGO Committee on Disarmament is looking for place.

\* Belgium

Saturday and Sunday 3 - 4 May - Gent from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Places to stay and delicious food will be available.

Please let us know if you can make it, or if you want to be kept informed.

And please also note the two new people who joined the team to prepare this campaign.

>From now on you can also contact Hanna Jarvinen and Katri Silvonen at this address. They are from Finland, speak English and full-time volunteers.

Peace,

Pol D'Huyvetter

Contacts NWAD

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*       For Mother Earth International office       *
*****
*       Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium   *
*       Phone/fax +32-9-233 84 39                   *
*       E-mail: int@fme.knooppunt.be                 *
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*****
* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace*
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *
*****
*For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Sri Lanka,*
* USA,aswell as active members/groups in Belarus, Finland, *
* Germany, Netherlands, Rumania and Ukraine *
*****
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From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 10:04:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Conclusion

RTw 03/21 1215 U.S., Russia pledge new round of START talks  
HELSINKI, March 21 (Reuter) - The United States and Russia  
said on Friday they would immediately embark on another round of  
nuclear arms reduction talks once Moscow has ratified the START-2  
treaty.

In a joint statement after their summit, presidents Bill  
Clinton and Boris Yeltsin said they had reached an understanding  
that "once START-2 enters into force, the U.S. and Russia will  
immediately begin negotiations on a START-3 agreement" that will

bring their nuclear arsenals to a level of 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads per side by the end of 2007.

MORE

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UPn 03/21 1221 U.S., Russia make gain on arms control

HELSINKI, March 21 (UPI) -- The presidents of Russia and the United States made firm progress on several arms control issues, including an agreement to begin negotiating deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals once the Russian Parliament ratifies an earlier weapons accord. The two sides say (Friday) they also settled a lingering dispute over the 1972 ballistic missile treaty, which will permit both sides to test such defenses.

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APO 03/21 1222 Excerpts From Summit Statements

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- Excerpts from the joint statements issued at the conclusion of the summit of U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

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#### NATO ENLARGEMENT

"They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level."

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"President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening buildup of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind."

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"President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments ... that NATO members have 'no intention, no plan and no reason' to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so."

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#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

"The presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries" of the convention on prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

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"The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed."

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#### ECONOMIC INITIATIVES

"President Clinton and President Yeltsin have committed to a joint initiative to stimulate investment and growth in Russia, deepen U.S.-Russian economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration with global markets. ... The presidents set as a target that both sides would undertake best efforts for Russia, on commercial conditions generally applicable to newly acceding members, to join the World Trade Organization in 1998. ..."

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RTna 03/21 1231 Clinton, Yeltsin pledge to minimize NATO problems

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin promised Friday to try to avoid problems caused by disagreements over NATO enlargement by boosting ties between the alliance and Moscow.

The pledge to avoid trouble came in a statement issued by the U.S. and Russian leaders at the end of their summit, during which Yeltsin repeated Moscow's stiff opposition to NATO's expansion plans.

Clinton vowed that NATO enlargement would go ahead on schedule, despite Russian objections, and that the alliance would invite some Eastern European states to start membership talks at a Madrid summit in July.

"I reaffirm that NATO enlargement at the Madrid summit will proceed," Clinton said after the summit. "And President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake," he added.

The United States and Russia also said they would immediately embark on another round of nuclear arms reduction talks once Moscow has ratified the START-2 treaty.

Clinton and Yeltsin said they had reached an understanding that "once START-2 enters into force, the U.S. and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START-3 agreement" that will bring their nuclear arsenals to a level of 2,000-2,500 strategic

warheads per side by the end of 2007.

The two sides also resolved a long-running dispute over a Cold War-era treaty and can now each develop missile defenses to tackle new threats.

"Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the (1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile) ABM treaty, while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles," Clinton said.

He also said the Group of Seven leading industrial nations has agreed to give Russia a bigger role at its Denver summit meeting in June.

"We will substantially increase Russia's role in our annual meeting, now to be called the Summit of the Eight," Clinton said.

The agreement appeared to fall short of Moscow's demand to be given full membership in the group.

The G7 members are -- the United States, Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Canada and Italy.

Clinton said all G7 member states had agreed to Russia's new role. He gave no details of how it would differ from Russia's involvement at recent political talks during G7 meetings, but U.S. officials said the intention was to expand it along the same lines.

Russia would remain excluded from core economic discussions at G7 meetings

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From 102464.1110@compuserve.com Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: 21 Mar 97 11:40:53 EST  
From: Dietrich Fischer <102464.1110@compuserve.com>  
To: abolition-caucus <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>  
Subject: nuclear risk assessment

Dear Abolition Friends,

Ike Jeanes has created an important yet easy to use computer program that allows users to explore the median time until a nuclear catastrophe occurs under a variety of assumptions (about the number of members of the nuclear club, the risk of accidents, the level of friendship among nations,

etc.). I have tried it out and found it fascinating and a great eye-opener. Users can easily change the assumptions, at the click of a mouse. It can be downloaded for free from the website

[www.nukefix.org](http://www.nukefix.org)

It takes little space, and if you ever wish to delete it, this can easily be done in 2 seconds, without affecting any other of your files. If you have any questions on how to use it, write to [ike@igc.apc.org](mailto:ike@igc.apc.org).

I would highly recommend it to anyone. I find nothing as persuasive as personal discovery. The website also lists a very useful collection of links to related information and to groups working for nuclear disarmament.

For the benefit of those who do not have previous experience with statistical methods, I teach statistics at Pace University. I have been familiar with Ike's work for the past two years and have verified that the methods he uses are correct.

I would like to point out portions of a communication that has already circulated among some abolitionists: The Nukefix program makes it easy to assess the consequences of nuclear proliferation, the likelihood of accident, and the specific probability of a nuclear use occurring within your remaining lifetime, an answer which is dependent on one's age.

The program shows that we are looking at health risks on orders of magnitude that can exceed those of AIDS, CANCER, or HEART DISEASE in the post-Cold War era, even when all nuclear weapon nations are highly COMPETENT and OSTENSIBLY PEACEFUL.

Proponents of nuclear weapons have long asserted that nuclear deterrence protects nations from war. Yet accidental use poses a far greater risk than many assume, even if each nuclear nation is so careful and sophisticated that it can prevent a nuclear accident for a thousand years. You can make your own assumptions, and see the consequences.

The relationships are substantially axiomatic and non-speculative. Nukefix definitively illustrates this using methods commonly employed in quality control and statistical

failure analysis. Analysis of this kind has not been previously available to the public in such an easy-to-use fashion. With a few mouse clicks, it is possible to develop analysis of sufficient precision that even proponents of nuclear weapons are unable to refute it. Nukefix can help you to lay the nuclear weapons menace to rest.

I think this may be one of the most useful websites on the Internet. No other information can contribute as much to our survival!

Please help make its availability known by referencing it on your website, and by telling friends about it. Thank you,  
Dietrich Fischer

From cfpa@cyberenet.net Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:13:08 -0500  
From: Coalition for Peace Action <cfpa@cyberenet.net>  
To: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation <wagingpeace@napf.org>  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, INESnet@fy.chalmers.se,  
shundahai@radix.net, aphil@web.net, yaro@glas.apc.org, wiednerb@aol.com  
Subject: Re: Abolition 2000 Resolution

David,

Congratulations on the Abolition 2000 resolutions you've gotten passed. So far, Princeton Borough and Roosevelt have passed them in New Jersey. We are working on another 8-10, and if it continues to go well may move on to a statewide referendum this fall. I've broached the subject with our Assemblyman, who attended our annual dinner last Friday, and he's agreed to be the lead Democrat co-sponsor.

By the way, we also have a one page "Guidelines" for passing such resolutions, which I'm attaching to this email.

Sincerely,

Rev. Bob Moore  
Coalition for Peace Action  
40 Witherspoon St.  
Princeton, NJ 08542  
(609)924-5022

[Part 2, Text 89 lines]  
[Unable to print this part]

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:17:54 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: President on Summit

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
(PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: . . . I would like to begin by thanking  
President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen, all the people of  
Finland, for their very gracious hospitality to . . . the  
extremely constructive role that Finland plays in a new era for  
Europe.

This is my first meeting with President Yeltsin in each of our  
second terms, our 11th meeting overall. At each meeting, we have  
strengthened our nation's relationship and laid a firmer  
foundation for peace and security, freedom and prosperity in the  
21st century.

Here at Helsinki, we have addressed three fundamental challenges:  
first, building an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe for  
the first time in history, second, continuing to lead the world  
away from the nuclear threat; and third, forging new ties of  
trade and investment that will help Russia to complete its  
remarkable transformation to a market economy and will bring  
greater prosperity to both our peoples.

A Europe undivided and democratic must be a secure Europe. NATO  
is the bedrock of Europe's security and the tie that binds the  
United States to that security. That is why the United States has  
the way in adapting NATO to new missions and opening its doors  
to the members, in strengthening its ties to non-members of the  
Partnership for Peace, and seeking to forge a strong, practical  
partnership between NATO and Russia.

We are building a new NATO, just as the Russian people are

building a new Russia. I am determined that Russia will become a respected partner with NATO in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure. I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement and the Madrid summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake. But we also have an important and, I believe, overriding agreement.

We agreed that the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized.

We didn't come here expecting to change each other's mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our disagreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.

President Yeltsin and I agreed that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russia document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together, as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and new NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe. We also agreed that our negotiator and those of the other 28 participating states should accelerate their efforts in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to the post-cold war era by setting new limits on conventional forces.

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We also reached agreement in our work to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our arms control efforts. Distinguishing between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles.

Finally, we discussed our economic relationship and the fact that the strong and secure Russia we welcome as a full partner for the 21st century requires that the benefits of democracy and free markets must be felt by Russia's citizens.

President Yeltsin recently demonstrated his determination to reinvigorate economic reform in his State of the Federation address and the appointment of a vigorous new economic team. His bold agenda to improve the investment climate and stimulate growth includes comprehensive tax reform, new energy laws, and tough anti-crime legislation. To help American companies take advantage of new opportunities in Russia, we will mobilize support to help finance billions of dollars in new investment. We will work with Russia to advance its membership in key international economic institutions like the WTO, the Paris Club, and OECD. And I am pleased to announce with the approval of the other G-7 nations that we will substantially increase Russia's role in our annual meeting, now to be called the Summit of the Eight in Denver this June. Here in Helsinki, we have proved once again that we can work together to resolve our differences, to seize our opportunities to build a better future.

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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

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From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:48:30 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: More Summit Reporting

uPn 03/21 1408 Clinton agrees to re-open nuclear treaty

HELSINKI, March 21 (UPI) -- President Clinton has agreed to delay Moscow's implementation of a landmark treaty on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, providing the Russian Parliament ratifies the measure, and to forge ahead with negotiations on even deeper atomic cuts.

In turn, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said he would swiftly introduce to his hard-line legislature the START II accord, a five-year-old pact that limits both nation's arsenals of nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500, and drop objections to testing of defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Yeltsin all but guaranteed approval of START II, saying "I expect the state Duma will make a decision based on my advice," but Clinton conceded it may be difficult to convince the Senate to re-open a treaty it already ratified.

U.S. officials say financial concerns caused Yeltsin to drag his feet on START II, which does away with land-based, multiple-warhead missiles. Cash-strapped Russia would have been forced to build new single-warhead missiles to maintain nuclear parity with the United States once its SS-18s, considered the most destabilizing class of atomic arms, were destroyed.

Clinton has agreed to help ease the burden by giving Moscow until the end of 2003 to dismantle the warheads and until 2007 to destroy the missiles and silos. That should give U.S. and Russian negotiators time to negotiate a START III treaty that caps warheads at no more than 2,500 and for the first time addresses short-range tactical weapons.

U.S. officials say Yeltsin surprised them by agreeing to accept the U. S. interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which will now allow them to test air defense systems without limits on the power or speed of interceptor missiles.

Both presidents also agreed to renegotiate limits on conventional weapons each side can maintain in Europe. Re-opening the Conventional Forces in Europe accord helps ease Russian concerns about NATO expansion by allowing Moscow to

keep more tanks, armored personnel carriers and troops in the flank regions of its territory.

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RTos 03/21 1501 U.S., Russia Seal Deals, Still Differ on NATO

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - The United States and Russia sealed their partnership with deals on everything from nuclear missiles to economic aid at their summit Friday, but differences remained over NATO.

Hailing their summit as a success, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin disagreed on NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe but promised to cut tensions over the issue by building stronger ties between Russia and the 16-nation alliance.

"Great," Clinton said enthusiastically at the end of the presidents' joint news conference. "I can tell he (Yeltsin) feels great...and I feel fine."

Yeltsin, having given reforms a decisive push this week with his cabinet reshuffle, joined forces with Clinton to boost Russia's fledgling market economy, foreign investment and trade -- all to try to bring tangible benefits to the Russian people.

The two men held out the prospect of even deeper cuts in long-range nuclear weapons, to around one-fifth of the level at the height of the Cold War. They also reached other agreements on arms control.

The point, Clinton said, was to combine all these factors in "building an undivided and democratic Europe for the first time in history."

Friday's summit talks, held at the official residence of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari overlooking a partly frozen Baltic Sea, lasted just over four hours.

Both Clinton and Yeltsin have said they were willing to seek compromises in difficult areas and seemed determined to confound predictions that the summit would fail on differences over NATO.

Moscow bitterly opposes NATO's plans to take in former Soviet-bloc states in Eastern Europe, saying it would isolate and threaten Russia. Washington says NATO will take in new members as planned and that all Europe will benefit as a result.

A NATO summit in July is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start accession talks. The new members would not join until 1999 at the earliest.

Clinton reaffirmed that enlargement would go ahead on schedule and added:

"President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake."

Yeltsin said the new NATO-Russia relationship, in the form of a charter that will give Moscow a say in European security affairs, should be in place before the Madrid summit.

On the economic front, the two agreed a bigger role for Russia at a summit of leading industrialized nations which is to take place in Denver in June.

In addition, Clinton backed Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization and the Paris Club, which deals with government debt, while promising to push investment in Russia.

For his part, Yeltsin promised comprehensive reform of Russia's barely functioning tax system and tougher laws to fight corruption and organized crime.

The two men met for the 11th time, although they had not seen each other for almost a year. Clinton is using a wheelchair following a leg injury, while Yeltsin is still recovering from heart surgery and months of illness.

Clinton was due to return to Washington later in the day, while Yeltsin was scheduled to stay on for talks with Ahtisaari Saturday before flying back to Moscow.

RTna 03/21 1454 Problems lurk beneath gloss of U.S-Russia summit

By Nicholas Doughty

HELSINKI (Reuter) - Even if the issue of NATO enlargement did not pull Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin apart, it is already clear that serious problems remain beneath the gloss of success and the pledges of good intentions in Helsinki.

Clinton and Yeltsin made some progress in three areas at their summit -- European security including NATO, arms control and fresh efforts to push Russia's fledgling market economy forward.

Both men gave some ground, although the balance was clearly in Clinton's favor.

Yeltsin repeated Moscow's stiff opposition to NATO's intention of taking in new members that once belonged to the Soviet bloc. But he eased back on the tough anti-Western rhetoric and agreed to help minimize the problems involved.

The U.S. president reaffirmed that NATO enlargement would go ahead on schedule, with an alliance summit in July inviting several countries to start accession talks.

But he went out of his way to ease Russian concerns that NATO expansion would leave it isolated, promising a new deal between the alliance and Russia through a charter that would be "an enduring commitment at the highest political level."

To win U.S. backing for greater Russian involvement in international economic groupings and more foreign investment, Yeltsin had to promise reforms of Russia's chaotic tax system and tougher laws to fight crime and corruption.

At their first summit in almost a year, it was clear that the good working relationship they have established since 1993 was able to produce results.

Once the warm glow has faded, though, both Yeltsin and Clinton will have real trouble on many of these questions.

Yeltsin faces a monumental task in making good his pledges to tighten and speed up economic reforms, not least while the grip of organised crime in Russia is clearly so strong.

His promise to push through the ratification of a long-delayed 1993 nuclear arms treaty may come to little if his Communist and nationalist opponents in parliament continue to attack the treaty in Moscow as a betrayal of Russia's security.

If Yeltsin fails on that score, the prospect of further nuclear arms cuts -- raised in Helsinki -- will fade, since Washington will not proceed with a new round of talks.

For Clinton, there are other troubles.

Getting allies and partners to accept Russia into economic groupings like the World Trade Organization (WTO), as he promised to do, could be difficult.

Moreover, Japan and some other members of the Group of Seven (G7) are less eager to see a bigger Russian role in the most exclusive club of industrialised nations.

He runs the risk of trouble on some of the arms control proposals with Republican members of Congress at home.

But it is NATO enlargement that remains the biggest question, the issue that most divides Russia from the West. Beyond their commitment to work together on this, the two presidents did not break new ground.

It remains to be seen whether the temperature on NATO will stay as low in the weeks ahead, as the alliance picks out countries that were once members of the Warsaw Pact to become new members of the Western elite

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Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:21:31 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org  
Subject: Clinton's Summit Statement

Approved: bozo  
To: ctb-followers  
From: disarmament  
Subject: President on Summit

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
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PRESIDENT CLINTON: . . . I would like to begin by thanking  
President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen, all the people of  
Finland, for their very gracious hospitality to . . . the  
extremely constructive role that Finland plays in a new era for  
Europe.

This is my first meeting with President Yeltsin in each of our  
second terms, our 11th meeting overall. At each meeting, we have  
strengthened our nation's relationship and laid a firmer  
foundation for peace and security, freedom and prosperity in the  
21st century.

Here at Helsinki, we have addressed three fundamental challenges:  
first, building an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe for  
the first time in history, second, continuing to lead the world  
away from the nuclear threat; and third, forging new ties of  
trade and investment that will help Russia to complete its  
remarkable transformation to a market economy and will bring  
greater prosperity to both our peoples.

A Europe undivided and democratic must be a secure Europe. NATO  
is the bedrock of Europe's security and the tie that binds the  
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to the members, in strengthening its ties to non-members of the  
Partnership for Peace, and seeking to forge a strong, practical

partnership between NATO and Russia.

We are building a new NATO, just as the Russian people are building a new Russia. I am determined that Russia will become a respected partner with NATO in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure. I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement and the Madrid summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake. But we also have an important and, I believe, overriding agreement.

We agreed that the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized.

We didn't come here expecting to change each other's mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our disagreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.

President Yeltsin and I agreed that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russia document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together, as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and new NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe. We also agreed that our negotiator and those of the other 28 participating states should accelerate their efforts in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to the post-cold war era by setting new limits on conventional forces.

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From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 13:15:00 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: President on Summit

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We need to be decisive and patient, and we have both with Bill Clinton. I firmly believe that we will be able to resolve all issues, which for the time being are still outstanding. Today's meeting with Bill convinced me of this once again. We will be doing this consistently, step by step. We will have enough both patience and decisiveness, and now I as you put questions to us.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: Recipients of conference

<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>

Subject: PRES. CLINTON SUMMIT STATEMENT 3/21

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:27:43 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
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Subject: White House Summit Brief

\*\* I'm sending this to you all again, because some folks told me that it didn't transmit before. Hope it works this time. Sorry if its just a boring repeat . . .

If you can get to a t.v. at about 11:45 EST (or 16:45 GMT) today, Clinton and Yeltsin are scheduled to give a Summit wrap-up report.

March 20, 1997  
PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY  
4:43 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)

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For Immediate Release

March

20, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY  
MIKE MCCURRY

Hotel Inter-Continental  
Helsinki, Finland

4:43 P.M. (L)

MR. MCCURRY: Good evening, everybody. Good afternoon, good morning -- what is it? One or the other. President Clinton is upstairs here at our headquarters getting a last briefing from his -- members of his foreign policy team. He met a short while ago with Secretary Madeleine Albright, who is at the moment meeting with her counterpart Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They are clearly working through the substantive issues that we expect to arise on the agenda at the President's working sessions tomorrow.

This evening President Clinton has an opportunity to renew an old acquaintance with Boris Yeltsin. He has not seen him for quite some time. They, no doubt, will compare their respective personal situations -- President Yeltsin clearly vigorously recovering from heart surgery, and President Clinton clearly struggling to recover from knee surgery. But President Clinton continues to enjoy the realities of adjusting to summitry in a wheelchair.

...

The President also is very interested in his bilateral meeting -- this has not been the focus of some of you -- but the President spent a good deal of time with Ambassador Shearer and talking about his upcoming meeting with the Prime Minister and with someone who, I think it's fair to say, the President has been enormously impressed with in his previous meetings. President Ahtisaari has a very keen grasp of issues ranging from the United Nations and reform of the United Nations to all the issues that are important to European integration, European security. And so the President did spend a fair amount of time preparing for that meeting with President Ahtisaari and also

with Prime Minister Lipponen.

So there will be some discussions, and of course, the President intends to express the gratitude of the United States to the people of Finland for their willingness to host this summit. This is obviously an historic occasion; it wouldn't be possible if we didn't have the gracious hospitality of the Finnish people and the Finnish leadership.

So tonight, more of a social start to work on the agenda, start to review some of the important issues. The foreign ministers of the United States and the Russian Federation working through some of the issues on the agenda, and then moving tomorrow into the working session and things that we will, hopefully, report to you at the press conference tomorrow. That's where we stand.

...

Q What's your reaction to the seemingly conciliatory statements made by Yeltsin as he arrived and spoke of hopes for a compromise, said he wanted to leave here as friends? Do you sense a change in tone?

MR. MCCURRY: There are always prior to a meeting different degrees of public statements made. I think ours have been focused on exactly the working agenda the President brings here to Helsinki -- European security, the future of arms control, the importance of economic growth in Russia for the Russian Federation and for the people of Russia, and charting this relationship as we think of the 21st century where we want the United States and the Russian Federation to be as we think about the future of Europe, indeed, think about cleaning away all the last residues of the Cold War era.

And we have been guarded in what we've said on those subjects because there are disagreements that exist. You've heard me say that there will no doubt continue to be disagreements after the meetings tomorrow. But we remain confident that this is a partnership in which two nations can continue to work through the issues that divide them, led by two Presidents that clearly have a personal relationship sufficient to address those differences in an amicable style.

A lot of hard work, in other words. We'll see whether we can bridge some of these differences, but I don't want

to speculate on whether we will or not at this point.

Q I'm sorry, but my question was do you detect a change in tone in what Mr. Yeltsin said when he arrived here, in contrast to what he's been saying the last few days?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, his concerns that he has expressed about the future of NATO are well known to us. And I think that all of those statements reflect some of the anxieties concerned, but also some of the opportunities that the Russian Federation foresees. We think about these issues in very much the same way. There are difficult issues there, but we remain confident that the expansion of NATO is the right formula for preserving an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe as we look ahead to the 21st century.

Q Mike, in that same quote, you know, he was saying that President Bill Clinton and his team seem to be prepared to find constructive approaches and compromises. It sounds like he's predicting that the compromising is going to come from you.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, he's perhaps making more difficult my effort to lower expectations at the moment. And I think, based on what I've heard from our team -- from Secretary Albright, from Deputy Secretary Talbott, from some of the members of the President's National Security team, from Sandy Berger and others -- there's a lot of very difficult work that lies ahead and some differences that are going to be difficult to bridge -- whether we're talking about arms control, whether we're talking about issues related to strategic arms reduction, whether we're talking about the vital question of the future of NATO's relationship with Russia.

There are still many issues to be addressed and not clear that all of them will be resolved. But there will be a good work done on all of those in the spirit of partnership that I think defines this relationship.

Q Do you think President Yeltsin will be disappointed in his hope or expectation --

MR. MCCURRY: I think he will find in his friend Bill Clinton a President, a leader willing to work through these issues and to see if we can't come to common understanding on

some of the questions related to the agenda the two Presidents have defined. I think we certainly will be meeting with him in a spirit that is open and candid and realistic in dealing with some of the differences that exist. But I don't want to predict that that will lead to success or lead to more work ahead in the future.

Q Mike, are we likely to see any movement on the Russian request to extend the 2003 deadline? And if we did agree to anything along those lines, is it your understanding that that would require reratification by the Senate?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, there will be a lot of discussion about where we are with START II, what the status of ratification is in the Duma, what the implications are as we look beyond START II and what the timing will be for, perhaps, a third round of strategic arms reductions. I don't want to preview that now because we clearly will be doing a lot of work on that tomorrow.

Q As far back as 1945 the United States has occasionally raised the possibility of the Russians joining NATO or becoming associate members of NATO. Do the Russians now have this option?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we have always described the expansion of NATO as an inclusive, nondiscriminatory process. And we established clear criteria. We've talked about the why and the how and we're moving now into the question of the who. And we've always said that that is a process that is open and transparent and available to all. I think in reality the Russian Federation itself has chosen to define its relationship with NATO in a different fashion; thus, the concentrated effort to talk about some charter or some way in which we could find a political commitment on the part of NATO and the Russian Federation to structure a relationship in the future that is something other than membership.

But it was, no doubt, just as important to define that relationship, and we've already seen the advantages that come from cooperation. The Russians' participation in the stabilization force in Bosnia has been a hallmark of the cooperation that we foresee as we look ahead and think about the relationship that Russia will have to NATO, and that's the type of discussion that's underway. But by no means is anyone

excluded. That has been the policy of the Alliance since it took the decisions necessary to open the question of expansion.

Q The Russians have been very tough and pessimistic in their statements. Do you think they really mean it, or is there some kind of -- part of the game?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to predict how their public statements affected their negotiating strategy or how they thought about the preview of this meeting. Again I'd say we've tried to be very correct in laying out what we think the agenda is, what we think the conceivable goals are for discussion, and then stick to that. And there are always different views of how the dialogue will go and sometimes expressed differently by different people in governments. But I think we've looked across the whole range of things that have been said walking up to this summit and we believe that President Yeltsin arrives here determined to work with President Bill Clinton to address all of these issues that the two governments have defined, and we think it will be done in a spirit of partnership.

Q Mike, in terms of the dynamic that you're talking about, the expansion of NATO, is the President just going to sit down and just say to Mr. Yeltsin, look, the idea that we're going to abandon this expansion is just not there, or do they do it in most of the diplomatic terms? How direct will it get?

MR. MCCURRY: By now the Russian Federation, based on the presentation the President made to Foreign Minister Primakov and what they have heard repeatedly -- not only from the United States government, but from Secretary General Solana and from other NATO governments -- the realities are quite clear. The schedule going to July in Madrid is quite clear.

What is not clear is how we do the very important work of defining Russia's role in questions related to the future of NATO, the adaptation of NATO and eventually the expansion of NATO. And that's probably the work that will be done here. And let me remind, too, this is not conclusive in and of itself here, although the United States obviously has a leadership role in the Alliance, this is a decision that is defined by 16 governments making their decisions. The expansion of NATO is, for our government and for many of our Alliance partners, a treaty amendment, so it does require action by other branches of,

indeed, our government and in some cases, other parliaments. So it's a very significant decision and it's one that cannot be taken lightly and cannot be taken unilaterally.

Q I guess -- I was trying to get to the kind of level of discussions you think they are. If you think that they're going -- do you have some concern that this could get a little testy since certainly Mr. Yeltsin wants some reservations on what can be included in NATO and what the NATO expansion will mean the President, at least White House officials are saying, is not prepared to give.

MR. MCCURRY: It has not been a feature of the discussions of these two Presidents that they are testy. They have certainly had disagreements and have been very candid in dealing with issues in the past. But I think they know how to resolve those differences in an amicable way. And the tone of the conversation is most often friendly, although it's sometimes firm and determined as well.

Q How does the White House -- Russian worries about NATO -- how much are they seen for real?

MR. MCCURRY: The public pronouncements that are made? I think that we take them in the context that they're delivered. We understand that there is a vibrant political dynamic in Russia that has to be addressed sometime by the leadership of the Russian Federation. So we account for that as we measure out what various figures in the government say, and then we listen very carefully to what they say as we meet with them face to face, where we do our direct diplomacy.

Q How much do you think they differ from each other?

MR. MCCURRY: They don't differ greatly, there are just differences of tone and nuances sometimes. There's a difference between doing work side by side and then articulating publicly in a way that advances your diplomatic objectives, and perhaps maybe your domestic objectives as well. So there is a difference in tone sometimes. But there are very clear, strong feelings about some of the questions that these two Presidents have addressed, particularly on the side of the Russian Federation, and we acknowledge that and we respect that and will try to work through that.

Q Has the U.S. government assessed whether this will affect Yeltsin and other -- whether NATO expansion will affect Yeltsin and other democratic politicians in Russia if it does expand, and is the U.S. concerned about that?

MR. MCCURRY: We try to think in a sophisticated way about those who pursue reform and the agendas that they have and the difficulties they face as they advance their objectives and how external factors might impact them. We try to think about that in a serious, sophisticated way, sure.

Q But will it? Is the assessment that it will?

MR. MCCURRY: They are learned experts on that subject, many of them here to comment for many of your news organizations, and I'm sure many of them will help you on that question.

Q Mike, in conversations up until now and today and tomorrow, does the U.S. side communicate to the Russians that they take seriously their concerns and understand the basis of their concerns, while also saying that there's not a whole lot the U.S. is going to do about --

MR. MCCURRY: We do. We understand the historic context in which many average Russian citizens think of NATO because it's defined by the period of the Cold War and it's clear for many people in the Russian Federation that NATO was defined for years and years as the enemy. And making an adjustment to see the possibility of cooperation, partnership and how an expanded NATO becomes a tool that preserves the security of the Russian people is a difficult concept, perhaps, but it is one that we understand we have to articulate, articulate clearly, and we try in our public pronouncements, especially as we communicate in a way that we know will reach the Russian people to talk about the advantages, the opportunities, the importance of plotting a future for Europe that includes NATO as part of the architecture of peace and democracy.

Q The President has taken pains to acknowledge Yeltsin's contribution, the contribution of the Russian people. Does he feel that it's as important to give Yeltsin, if you will, some political cover at home as it is to get some kind of signal here that Yeltsin at least accepts the inevitability of NATO

expansion?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think I just described to you how we try to think in a sophisticated way about the political dynamic that our counterpart faces and I think you can incorporate that answer as an answer to your question.

Q Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia all want to be in this first round of expansion. Is this something that's going to come up in your talks with Yeltsin or do you think you're going to limit it to the other three countries?

MR. MCCURRY: I would be -- it may tangentially arise, but that's really a discussion more for the Alliance itself, the question of who and how we think about membership as we look ahead to Madrid. That could conceivably arise here, but the focus of that work, of course, is more properly in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Q The U.S. takes the position it has for months that Russia doesn't have a realistic picture of NATO. Does the U.s. have a realistic picture of the political problems NATO expansion poses to Yeltsin?

MR. MCCURRY: I think we, as I say, try to be sophisticated in our thinking about the internal dynamic in Russia. We know that that places constraints just as it does everywhere, Barry. You know, you and I have talked over the years about the Middle East and we know how the realities of politics on the street impact the ability of leaders to make decisions. That's, by the way, true for President Bill Clinton, too, as you all know. So I think we do take that into account and we understand the realities that exist and we are, of course, encouraged by some of the steps that have just recently been taken by President Yeltsin with respect to forming a government that appears to be infused with new figures that are committed to reform. We think that's significant, and we acknowledge that and I'm sure that will be something that President Clinton takes into account as he meets with President Yeltsin.

Q You mentioned trying to get this point across to the Russian people the meaning of a new NATO, but that assumes that the opinion of the Russian people counts in that system now. -- the Russian people at this point aren't terribly politically engaged. Can you address that point that your audience -- if

your audience is the Russian people for this sort of education, does it really matter?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I suspect, as with maybe even the American people, there are more immediate concerns sometimes in the lives of the average Russian -- the status of the economy, the status of reform, what types of opportunities are existing as you build a better future. Those are the realities that define the day-to-day lives of most people in this world, and they are impacted by things that happen in the realm of foreign policy, but they are sometimes not as immediate.

I imagine there are a lot of things that we're going to be doing here related to promoting economic development and growth and investment in Russia that in the long run are going to be far more important to the Russian people than the question of how we structure the security architecture of Europe for the 21st century. And I think that's a valuable part of the message that gets communicated from a summit like this as well.

....

Q Mike, after all the talk -- and the talks in Washington last week, could you delineate where the United States, NATO and Russia agree on a charter, if you want to call it that, and where they disagree at this point?

MR. MCCURRY: I probably could, but I won't right now because that's the work that they're going to do tomorrow, and I don't want to preview that. There are areas in which I think they've had good discussions in which they've got a good

concept of what that charter should be, but there, inevitably, are some areas that they're still thinking about and that's the work that Secretary Albright and the Foreign Minister are devoted to probably right now. And it's, I imagine, going to be part of the agenda tomorrow. But some understandings of how that works and what that charter is an important part of the discussion tomorrow.

Q That very same thing. Last night the Russian Press Secretary was saying that they won't be happy with oral agreements, that they want something in writing and very concrete and very specific. Is NATO prepared to do that?

MR. MCCURRY: I think from our view it's important

to have a good understanding of how that relationship will be structured. There are perhaps many different ways you can establish that understanding, but the concept of a charter that really makes clear for all the members of the North Atlantic Council and for the Russian Federation what the obligations are is a useful approach in our view.

Q Mike, how do you make the case to the Russians that the new NATO is not about turning against Russia when the majority of the contenders for new membership cite as their -- high on their list of rationales for wanting to do it is they're scared of Russia? And only yesterday the Lithuanian foreign minister made this --

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the best way to answer that question is to point to what we are doing already with the Russian Federation and NATO together, and that's to address the situation of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, specifically trying to stabilize Bosnia as it recovers from the aftermath of a horrible war.

We're doing very good work together with them and we see in that moment of cooperation the utility of an institution like NATO as we think of a Europe that we want to preserve in peace, even though it has historically been a continent that is rife with ethnic conflicts. So the ability to use some of the security architecture in the arrangements of NATO as we think about the identity of European security and think about the way you preserve European security is very, very important and shows what the opportunities and possibilities are for Russia.

Q Mike, what does the United States hope to accomplish in holding out the prospect of arms control concessions coming into these talks? What do you gain by dangling that possibility?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we are hoping, of course, to point ahead to the future of strategic arms reductions as we alert the Duma to the possibilities that exist beyond the ratification of START II. And obviously we think about how we can make the world a safer place as we delimit the size of the strategic arsenals on both sides and how we look ahead to the future. We are, in short, taking advantage of the enormous change in history that is represented by the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tensions from both sides, and codifying that

or looking to codify that in how we approach the question of structuring the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

Q So, if I could follow up, the U.S. is essentially trying to say to the Russian Parliament, look, there's a lot to be gained from going forward with this and we will offer some good faith here if you're willing to act?

MR. MCCURRY: We certainly are trying to show what the possibilities are beyond START II, but we also want to address questions that are important to us, too -- how do we -- as we think about reducing the threat of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, we need to also address what the dangers are in regional theater-type ballistic missiles and we need to think about what the implications are for treaties that we've reached in the past, specifically the ABM. So how you fit those things together in the arms control equation will be a large part of the discussion tomorrow, and there are some outstanding issues there. There are some things, in short, that we want and expect, too, in exchange for looking ahead out on the horizon with respect to arms control.

...

Q Mike, if NATO is so important to European security, what role, if any, should NATO play with the Albania crisis? And a second question: Is Albright's meeting with Primakov specifically focused on the charter, or is she talking about the whole range of issues?

MR. MCCURRY: She is I think focused on some of those issues that were still on the table as the Foreign Minister left the White House and went to talk to President Yeltsin over the weekend, the last several days.

Q What are they specifically?

MR. MCCURRY: They are specifically the things that we'll be probably addressing and talking to you about tomorrow.

...Q Mike, back to the summit for a minute. You talked about changes that NATO has made to reassure the Russians that it's not a threat. Most of those changes occurred since Yeltsin's cold peace speech in Budapest about two and a half years ago. And as near as we can tell, Yeltsin hasn't changed his public posture on this subject a bit. Are you coming to a point where you're going to say, okay, we just are not going to

be able to agree on that; let's see if we can go on to other things?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, that's a good way maybe of having a defining question that we can have on the table as we work ahead tomorrow. I've gotten through saying about as little as I can possibly say about tomorrow, and that's obviously the kind of question that is relevant after we meet with him tomorrow and see where we are.

. . . Q Tonight's event being primarily social, what business will get done, and besides business what will get accomplished?

MR. MCCURRY: On the President's agenda tonight is a bilateral meeting with President Ahtisaari and some other discussions with the Finnish government that he has taken seriously. That's substantively, they will -- we'll work through all of our bilateral issues with the Finnish government at that session, and then move into the dinner in which I think they'll probably talk about what kind of work are we going to do tomorrow and try to take some sense of what the overall tone and nature of the dialogue will be tomorrow.

Q Here in Finland, there is concerns, as you very well know, of a new deal, divided Europe. Now, even if you are not here to bargain, perhaps you want to tell the Finnish audience how are you going to avoid one -- to another?

MR. MCCURRY: We would hope that the people of Finland would understand that the United States approaches the question of the future of Europe and the future of NATO with one overriding objective: to make the 21st century a century of peace for a continent that is undivided from the United Kingdom to the Urals, living with some sense of security about the future of all of the countries that define Europe. It is a moment of enormous hope for Europe as it integrates, as it begins to think about how the institutions of commerce and economics and security can become more interoperable within Europe.

And we want to play a leadership role in helping to make that happen in a nonexclusive manner. We understand and respect the thinking that the people of Finland have always had about NATO itself. We would hope that, as expansion occurs and as the environment changes and as NATO's utility is shown as we think about the 21st century in peace, that the people of Finland might begin to see in NATO a very useful element of advancing its

own security interests.

And we deeply appreciate, by the way, the contributions that the people of Finland have made in things like stabilizing Bosnia, the contributions to providing police monitors for the SFOR mission there, and some -- the American press may not know this, but the Finnish people have also participated in a very significant way in the Balkans by providing monitors to help stabilize the security of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. That's a very significant contribution. And without that contribution from the partners that we have in Europe, the very tensions that we've been talking about that exist in the Balkans may have been a great deal more troublesome.

So, again, our view of the future of Europe is one of peace, and we think that the Finnish people will want to be a part of it.

Q All this we have heard. But, again, it seems that the worries and concerns stem from the fact that, at least in public, it seems that no matter how hard you are convincing the Russians that there is nothing to worry about, that the concerns and the worries still seem to be there.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we would have to acknowledge that history is a powerful -- sets off powerful emotions and sets off memories that linger. But extraordinary things have happened in the last decade. And I think that we need to think more optimistically about what the future will hold if we can bridge these differences and set aside some of the tensions and cleavages that have existed in the past.

You can well understand the concerns that nations have around the perimeter of the Russian Federation. But you can also understand the possibilities that exist if we can invigorate the transition to democracy and market capitalism in Russia so they become a part of the community of nations that really do define a new history for Europe.

And we just -- part of this is the work of what we call sometimes "public diplomacy," and that's part of the work that we're going to be doing this weekend, but it's also as people see the reality change around them -- perhaps new attitudes will set in.

. . . Q Mike, if the cost to the United States proceeding with NATO expansion is further intransigence by the Russians on arms control, is that in the U.S. national interest to proceed for the good of Central Europe and NATO at the expense of the nuclear arms reduction?

MR. MCCURRY: Oh, I think that the reverse of that is the case -- that proceeding with adaptation of NATO to address the needs of the post-Cold War era and to prepare for the 21st century, while simultaneously advancing the objectives we have in reducing the size of the nuclear arsenals in the Russian Federation and the United States, is manifestly in the interests of all the people in Europe, and indeed all the people on the planet.

So that's what we're trying to make happen. And we believe we've got some opportunity to make that happen.

Okay, thank you.

END                      5:38 P.M. (L)

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Subject: Summit

RTw 03/21 1023 Russia firm on NATO at summit but sees hope

By Timothy Heritage

HELSINKI, March 21 (Reuter) - Russian President Boris Yeltsin stood his ground on opposition to NATO expansion at summit talks on Friday, despite impassioned efforts by U.S. President Bill Clinton to sway him.

But a Kremlin spokesman said after the opening session of the summit that they had edged closer to agreement on a deal

intended to set out Russia's ties with the Western defence alliance following the end of the Cold War.

The summit wrapped up shortly before 1500 GMT and the two presidents planned a news conference for 1645 GMT. There was no immediate comment from the Russian camp on how the talks had worked out but a U.S. official said things had gone well.

Asked if Yeltsin had altered his position on NATO plans to offer membership to former Soviet bloc states, Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky told reporters after the morning session: "He did not change it even in nuance."

But he added: "I have the impression that during these two hours the presidents not only advanced in understanding their respective positions but did more in that they actually moved towards each other in their positions."

The row over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was a central issue at the summit, and one which both sides made clear would not be resolved at Friday's talks.

Moscow says NATO enlargement would threaten its security but, keen to win as many concessions before the expansion goes ahead, is negotiating an agreement with the alliance under which it would have a bigger say in European security issues.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said Clinton had set out Washington's reasons for supporting NATO expansion Clinton made the case for NATO enlargement "with a great deal of passion," but made clear there had been no breakthrough in the morning.

Yastrzhembsky gave no details but said the leaders could issue a joint statement on European security after the talks.

Yeltsin, 66, is in a corner over NATO expansion, which will move forward when the alliance issues invitations to some eastern European countries this summer. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are expected to be in the first wave.

The Kremlin leader is anxious to maintain good relations with the 16-nation alliance but he cannot afford to be seen by his nationalist and communist enemies not to defend Russia's interests against its former Cold War foes.

Moscow says NATO expansion could play into the hands of these political enemies and undermine Yeltsin's authority. They say it would create new divisions in Europe and that it is opposed by the Russian people.

"If NATO expands it will cause discomfort, not only at an executive level but in all Russia... We have not been able to explain to our people the 'urgent necessity' of expanding NATO," said foreign ministry official Mikhail Timoshkin.

Russian officials made clear Moscow would fiercely oppose any plans to offer NATO membership to former Soviet republics

such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus.

They continued rattling the sabre even though talks were already under way between Yeltsin and Clinton, signalling Moscow's determination to fight its corner.

"One mistake has been committed already (by mapping out NATO expansion) and it would be a tragic mistake if we could not stop further expansion of NATO," Sergei Karaganov, a foreign policy expert close to the Kremlin, told reporters.

Kremlin defence aide Yuri Baturin set out Moscow's demands including a binding treaty governing relations with Moscow, having a say in European security matters and no movement of NATO's nuclear weapons into new members states.

Kremlin security aide Boris Berezovsky told reporters the West had shown hypocrisy over NATO expansion, going back on promises not to make such moves.

"We were not blunt enough over NATO in the past. We have to state our opposition clearly," Karaganov said.

APO 03/21 1020 Clinton, Yeltsin Hope for Deal

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- In a long day of seaside summitry, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin debated their differences over NATO expansion. Yeltsin would not budge from his opposition, "not even in nuances."

The two presidents met for hours today at the airy presidential residence on the Gulf of Finland, moving beyond the NATO dispute to another thorny issue: arms control. Yet Yeltsin left no doubt he was dead-set against the spread of NATO to absorb Eastern and Central European countries.

Going into their talks, Yeltsin said he hoped he and Clinton could "erase the differences of opinion" over expanding NATO to former Warsaw Pact nations.

But asked after their morning meetings if the Russian leader had altered his opposition to widening the NATO net, spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky said, "He did not change, not even in nuances."

The differences were discussed openly and "in a good atmosphere," which "helped bring the positions of the sides even closer," Yastrzhembsky said.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the first two-hour session was "by far the most substantive and intense discussion they've ever had."

There were small signs of progress. Walter Slocumbe, the undersecretary of defense for policy, said in Washington that he

expected an announcement from Helsinki on movement toward START III talks. He also said he expected Helsinki to produce some "Russian step forward to ratification" of START II.

The talks took place in the newly built residence with towering glass windows and a breathtaking view of the gulf. In a picture-taking session before the talks began, Clinton told reporters, "I think we'll have a good meeting."

In contrast to his talkative counterpart, Clinton was taciturn. "Boris, we should shake hands," he urged. As they shook, Clinton tried to cut off questions but Yeltsin continued on.

"We always come to an agreement with Bill," he said. "It's the duty of the presidents of the two great superpowers and it's simply our human duty."

"We have the good will to move toward each other and erase the differences of opinion that we now have," he said.

Senior U.S. aides have prepared five tentative documents of understanding. These include one on European security that would set forth areas of agreement, a second on advancing strategic arms control, and a third on U.S. economic assistance to Russia.

The two others, a U.S. official said, would deal with controlling chemical weapons and distinguishing which missile defense systems are considered legal under past accords.

In some ways, this 12th Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in four years was shaping up as their most troublesome. But the two leaders kicked it off with kindly statements.

"I think we'll work something out," Clinton said as they sat down to dine Thursday night. "I hope we will. ... And I'm glad to see President Yeltsin looking so fit and well."

They dined on young reindeer at the presidential palace, on the waterfront alongside an open-air market. Known for its opulent Hall of Mirrors, it was the site in 1990 of a summit between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Clinton's conciliation went beyond warm words.

He brought with him a package of arms control concessions, hoping the offer would end a long impasse on the START II missile-reduction treaty.

In return, Clinton wants a clear commitment from Yeltsin that the treaty will be ratified by the Russian parliament this spring. START II would cut U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals in half by 2003.

On the NATO front, Russia's opposition to the absorption of its former allies within the alliance beginning next summer is unyielding. "We're going to disagree on NATO enlargement," said Sandy Berger, the U.S. national security adviser.

But Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., writing in an opinion column in today's editions of The Washington Post, criticized Clinton for struggling for three years to decide whether and when to enlarge NATO.

He said the delays have encouraged Russian nationalists to increase their campaign against NATO and discouraged Central and Eastern European countries from their quest to join it. Lott called on the president to "name names" of the countries the United States supports for membership.

Clinton's struggle to promote arms control even while unsettling Russia with NATO spreading to its western border, was centered on pushing Yeltsin for a promise that the Duma -- Russia's parliament -- would approve the START II treaty this spring.

That would eliminate the heavy blockbuster Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and limit Russia to 3,101 long-range warheads by 2003. The United States would be restricted to 3,500.

But Russian critics are convinced the treaty was negotiated during a period of weakness in Moscow and that it leaves Russia with the dilemma of accepting a U.S. edge or building expensive, permissible, single-warhead missiles to achieve parity.

Clinton's answer is to hurry guidelines for a START III treaty. That would cut both sides down to 2,000 to 2,500 while giving Russia a few years beyond 2003 to blow up the silos, bombers and submarines that hold warheads outlawed by START II.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

.  
From int@fme.knooppunt.be Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 16:57:01  
From: Pol D'Huyvetter <int@fme.knooppunt.be>  
To: a-days@knooppunt.be  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, fme@knooppunt.be  
Subject: Int'l Meetings Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days

## INVITATION

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International meetings  
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## Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days (NWAD) 1997

An International Campaign to uphold International Law  
with Non-Violent Direct Actions of Civil Defence

July 8th - NATO Summit Madrid  
August 6th - NATO HQ Brussels  
August 9th at 'sites of crime'

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Dear friends,

We have scheduled two new internationale meetings to inform and develop further plans on the nuclear weapons abolition days.

You are very welcome to join those meetings !!

\* USA

Monday afternoon April 14 - New York City (during NPT Precomm)

More details about agenda and place will be posted soon.  
Roger Smith from NGO Committee on Disarmament is looking for place.

\* Belgium

Saturday and Sunday 3 - 4 May - Gent from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Places to stay and delicious food will be available.

Please let us know if you can make it, or if you want to be kept informed.

And please also note the two new people who joined the team to prepare this campaign.

>From now on you can also contact Hanna Jarvinen and Katri Silvonen at this address. They are from Finland, speak English and full-time

volunteers.

Peace,

Pol D'Huyvetter

Contacts NWAD

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*****
*       For Mother Earth International office       *
*****
*       Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium   *
*       Phone/fax +32-9-233 84 39                 *
*       E-mail: int@fme.knooppunt.be              *
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*       WWW:http://www.knooppunt.be/~fme          *
*****
*       Postal account : 000-1618561-19           *
*****
* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace*
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *
*****
*For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Sri Lanka,*
* USA,aswell as active members/groups in Belarus, Finland, *
* Germany, Netherlands, Rumania and Ukraine *
*****

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From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 10:04:43 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: Summit Conclusion

RTw 03/21 1215 U.S., Russia pledge new round of START talks

HELSINKI, March 21 (Reuter) - The United States and Russia said on Friday they would immediately embark on another round of nuclear arms reduction talks once Moscow has ratified the START-2 treaty.

In a joint statement after their summit, presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin said they had reached an understanding that "once START-2 enters into force, the U.S. and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START-3 agreement" that will bring their nuclear arsenals to a level of 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads per side by the end of 2007.

MORE

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UPn 03/21 1221 U.S., Russia make gain on arms control

HELSINKI, March 21 (UPI) -- The presidents of Russia and the United States made firm progress on several arms control issues, including an agreement to begin negotiating deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals once the Russian Parliament ratifies an earlier weapons accord. The two sides say (Friday) they also settled a lingering dispute over the 1972 ballistic missile treaty, which will permit both sides to test such defenses.

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APO 03/21 1222 Excerpts From Summit Statements

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- Excerpts from the joint statements issued at the conclusion of the summit of U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

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NATO ENLARGEMENT

"They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level."

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"President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening buildup of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind."

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"President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments ... that NATO members have 'no intention, no plan and no reason' to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so."

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS

"The presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries"

of the convention on prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

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"The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed."

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#### ECONOMIC INITIATIVES

"President Clinton and President Yeltsin have committed to a joint initiative to stimulate investment and growth in Russia, deepen U.S.-Russian economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration with global markets. ... The presidents set as a target that both sides would undertake best efforts for Russia, on commercial conditions generally applicable to newly acceding members, to join the World Trade Organization in 1998. ..."

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RTna 03/21 1231 Clinton, Yeltsin pledge to minimize NATO problems

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin promised Friday to try to avoid problems caused by disagreements over NATO enlargement by boosting ties between the alliance and Moscow.

The pledge to avoid trouble came in a statement issued by the U.S. and Russian leaders at the end of their summit, during which Yeltsin repeated Moscow's stiff opposition to NATO's expansion plans.

Clinton vowed that NATO enlargement would go ahead on schedule, despite Russian objections, and that the alliance would invite some Eastern European states to start membership talks at a Madrid summit in July.

"I reaffirm that NATO enlargement at the Madrid summit will proceed," Clinton said after the summit. "And President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake," he added.

The United States and Russia also said they would immediately embark on another round of nuclear arms reduction talks once Moscow has ratified the START-2 treaty.

Clinton and Yeltsin said they had reached an understanding that "once START-2 enters into force, the U.S. and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START-3 agreement" that will bring their nuclear arsenals to a level of 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads per side by the end of 2007.

The two sides also resolved a long-running dispute over a

Cold War-era treaty and can now each develop missile defenses to tackle new threats.

"Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the (1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile) ABM treaty, while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles," Clinton said.

He also said the Group of Seven leading industrial nations has agreed to give Russia a bigger role at its Denver summit meeting in June.

"We will substantially increase Russia's role in our annual meeting, now to be called the Summit of the Eight," Clinton said.

The agreement appeared to fall short of Moscow's demand to be given full membership in the group.

The G7 members are -- the United States, Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Canada and Italy.

Clinton said all G7 member states had agreed to Russia's new role. He gave no details of how it would differ from Russia's involvement at recent political talks during G7 meetings, but U.S. officials said the intention was to expand it along the same lines.

Russia would remain excluded from core economic discussions at G7 meetings

\*\*\*\*\*

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From 102464.1110@compuserve.com Fri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997

Date: 21 Mar 97 11:40:53 EST

From: Dietrich Fischer <102464.1110@compuserve.com>

To: abolition-caucus <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>

Subject: nuclear risk assessment

Dear Abolition Friends,

Ike Jeanes has created an important yet easy to use computer program that allows users to explore the median time until a nuclear catastrophe occurs under a variety of assumptions (about the number of members of the nuclear club, the risk of accidents, the level of friendship among nations, etc.). I have tried it out and found it fascinating and a great eye-opener. Users can easily change the assumptions, at

the click of a mouse. It can be downloaded for free from the website

[www.nukefix.org](http://www.nukefix.org)

It takes little space, and if you ever wish to delete it, this can easily be done in 2 seconds, without affecting any other of your files. If you have any questions on how to use it, write to [ike@igc.apc.org](mailto:ike@igc.apc.org).

I would highly recommend it to anyone. I find nothing as persuasive as personal discovery. The website also lists a very useful collection of links to related information and to groups working for nuclear disarmament.

For the benefit of those who do not have previous experience with statistical methods, I teach statistics at Pace University. I have been familiar with Ike's work for the past two years and have verified that the methods he uses are correct.

I would like to point out portions of a communication that has already circulated among some abolitionists: The Nukefix program makes it easy to assess the consequences of nuclear proliferation, the likelihood of accident, and the specific probability of a nuclear use occurring within your remaining lifetime, an answer which is dependent on one's age.

The program shows that we are looking at health risks on orders of magnitude that can exceed those of AIDS, CANCER, or HEART DISEASE in the post-Cold War era, even when all nuclear weapon nations are highly COMPETENT and OSTENSIBLY PEACEFUL.

Proponents of nuclear weapons have long asserted that nuclear deterrence protects nations from war. Yet accidental use poses a far greater risk than many assume, even if each nuclear nation is so careful and sophisticated that it can prevent a nuclear accident for a thousand years. You can make your own assumptions, and see the consequences.

The relationships are substantially axiomatic and non-speculative. Nukefix definitively illustrates this using methods commonly employed in quality control and statistical failure analysis. Analysis of this kind has not been previously available to the public in such an easy-to-use fashion. With a

few mouse clicks, it is possible to develop analysis of sufficient precision that even proponents of nuclear weapons are unable to refute it. Nukefix can help you to lay the nuclear weapons menace to rest.

I think this may be one of the most useful websites on the Internet. No other information can contribute as much to our survival!

Please help make its availability known by referencing it on your website, and by telling friends about it. Thank you,  
Dietrich Fischer

From cfpa@cyberenet.netFri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:13:08 -0500  
From: Coalition for Peace Action <cfpa@cyberenet.net>  
To: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation <wagingpeace@napf.org>  
Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, INESnet@fy.chalmers.se,  
shundahai@radix.net, phil@web.net, yaro@glas.apc.org, wiednerb@aol.com  
Subject: Re: Abolition 2000 Resolution

David,

Congratulations on the Abolition 2000 resolutions you've gotten passed. So far, Princeton Borough and Roosevelt have passed them in New Jersey. We are working on another 8-10, and if it continues to go well may move on to a statewide referendum this fall. I've broached the subject with our Assemblyman, who attended our annual dinner last Friday, and he's agreed to be the lead Democrat co-sponsor.

By the way, we also have a one page "Guidelines" for passing such resolutions, which I'm attaching to this email.

Sincerely,

Rev. Bob Moore  
Coalition for Peace Action  
40 Witherspoon St.  
Princeton, NJ 08542  
(609)924-5022

[Part 2, Text 89 lines]  
[Unable to print this part]

From disarmament@igc.orgFri Mar 21 19:59:32 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:17:54 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: President on Summit

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
(PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: . . . I would like to begin by thanking  
President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen, all the people of  
Finland, for their very gracious hospitality to . . . the  
extremely constructive role that Finland plays in a new era for  
Europe.

This is my first meeting with President Yeltsin in each of our  
second terms, our 11th meeting overall. At each meeting, we have  
strengthened our nation's relationship and laid a firmer  
foundation for peace and security, freedom and prosperity in the  
21st century.

Here at Helsinki, we have addressed three fundamental challenges:  
first, building an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe for  
the first time in history, second, continuing to lead the world  
away from the nuclear threat; and third, forging new ties of  
trade and investment that will help Russia to complete its  
remarkable transformation to a market economy and will bring  
greater prosperity to both our peoples.

A Europe undivided and democratic must be a secure Europe. NATO  
is the bedrock of Europe's security and the tie that binds the  
United States to that security. That is why the United States has  
l the way in adapting NATO to new missions and opening its doors  
to the members, in strengthening its ties to non-members of the  
Partnership for Peace, and seeking to forge a strong, practical  
partnership between NATO and Russia.

We are building a new NATO, just as the Russian people are  
building a new Russia. I am determined that Russia will become a

respected partner with NATO in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure. I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement and the Madrid summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake. But we also have an important and, I believe, overriding agreement.

We agreed that the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized.

We didn't come here expecting to change each other's mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our disagreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.

President Yeltsin and I agreed that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russia document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together, as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and new NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe. We also agreed that our negotiator and those of the other 28 participating states should accelerate their efforts in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to the post-cold war era by setting new limits on conventional forces.

The second area of our discussion involved our obligation to continue to lead the world away from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. We have already taken important steps. We signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We extended the Nonproliferation Treaty. We stopped targeting each other's cities and citizens. We put START I into force. And we are now committed to securing ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention before it goes into force next month so that we can finally begin to banish poison gas from the Earth.

Today President Yeltsin agreed to seek the Duma's prompt ratification of START II, already ratified by the United States Senate. But we will not stop there. The United States is prepared to open negotiations on further strategic arms cuts with Russia under a START III immediately after the Duma ratifies START II. President Yeltsin and I agreed on guidelines for START III negotiations that will cap at 2,000 to 2,500 the number of strategic nuclear warheads each of our countries would retain and

to finish the reductions of START III by the year 2007. Now think about it. This means that within a decade, we will have reduced both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals by 80 percent below their Cold War peak of just five years ago.

We also reached agreement in our work to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our arms control efforts. Distinguishing between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles.

Finally, we discussed our economic relationship and the fact that the strong and secure Russia we welcome as a full partner for the 21st century requires that the benefits of democracy and free markets must be felt by Russia's citizens.

President Yeltsin recently demonstrated his determination to reinvigorate economic reform in his State of the Federation address and the appointment of a vigorous new economic team. His bold agenda to improve the investment climate and stimulate growth includes comprehensive tax reform, new energy laws, and tough anti-crime legislation. To help American companies take advantage of new opportunities in Russia, we will mobilize support to help finance billions of dollars in new investment. We will work with Russia to advance its membership in key international economic institutions like the WTO, the Paris Club, and OECD. And I am pleased to announce with the approval of the other G-7 nations that we will substantially increase Russia's role in our annual meeting, now to be called the Summit of the Eight in Denver this June. Here in Helsinki, we have proved once again that we can work together to resolve our differences, to seize our opportunities to build a better future.

Before I turn the microphone over to President Yeltsin, let me say one word about the bombing in Tel Aviv . . .

\*\*\*\*\*

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:48:30 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: More Summit Reporting

uPn 03/21 1408 Clinton agrees to re-open nuclear treaty

HELSINKI, March 21 (UPI) -- President Clinton has agreed to delay Moscow's implementation of a landmark treaty on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, providing the Russian Parliament ratifies the measure, and to forge ahead with negotiations on even deeper atomic cuts.

In turn, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said he would swiftly introduce to his hard-line legislature the START II accord, a five-year-old pact that limits both nation's arsenals of nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500, and drop objections to testing of defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Yeltsin all but guaranteed approval of START II, saying "I expect the state Duma will make a decision based on my advice," but Clinton conceded it may be difficult to convince the Senate to re-open a treaty it already ratified.

U.S. officials say financial concerns caused Yeltsin to drag his feet on START II, which does away with land-based, multiple-warhead missiles. Cash-strapped Russia would have been forced to build new single-warhead missiles to maintain nuclear parity with the United States once its SS-18s, considered the most destabilizing class of atomic arms, were destroyed.

Clinton has agreed to help ease the burden by giving Moscow until the end of 2003 to dismantle the warheads and until 2007 to destroy the missiles and silos. That should give U.S. and Russian negotiators time to negotiate a START III treaty that caps warheads at no more than 2,500 and for the first time addresses short-range tactical weapons.

U.S. officials say Yeltsin surprised them by agreeing to accept the U. S. interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which will now allow them to test air defense systems without limits on the power or speed of interceptor missiles.

Both presidents also agreed to renegotiate limits on conventional weapons each side can maintain in Europe. Re-opening the Conventional Forces in Europe accord helps ease Russian concerns about NATO expansion by allowing Moscow to keep more tanks, armored personnel carriers and troops in the

flank regions of its territory.

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RTos 03/21 1501 U.S., Russia Seal Deals, Still Differ on NATO

HELSINKI, Finland (Reuter) - The United States and Russia sealed their partnership with deals on everything from nuclear missiles to economic aid at their summit Friday, but differences remained over NATO.

Hailing their summit as a success, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin disagreed on NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe but promised to cut tensions over the issue by building stronger ties between Russia and the 16-nation alliance.

"Great," Clinton said enthusiastically at the end of the presidents' joint news conference. "I can tell he (Yeltsin) feels great...and I feel fine."

Yeltsin, having given reforms a decisive push this week with his cabinet reshuffle, joined forces with Clinton to boost Russia's fledgling market economy, foreign investment and trade -- all to try to bring tangible benefits to the Russian people.

The two men held out the prospect of even deeper cuts in long-range nuclear weapons, to around one-fifth of the level at the height of the Cold War. They also reached other agreements on arms control.

The point, Clinton said, was to combine all these factors in "building an undivided and democratic Europe for the first time in history."

Friday's summit talks, held at the official residence of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari overlooking a partly frozen Baltic Sea, lasted just over four hours.

Both Clinton and Yeltsin have said they were willing to seek compromises in difficult areas and seemed determined to confound predictions that the summit would fail on differences over NATO.

Moscow bitterly opposes NATO's plans to take in former Soviet-bloc states in Eastern Europe, saying it would isolate and threaten Russia. Washington says NATO will take in new members as planned and that all Europe will benefit as a result.

A NATO summit in July is expected to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start accession talks. The new members would not join until 1999 at the earliest.

Clinton reaffirmed that enlargement would go ahead on schedule and added:

"President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake."

Yeltsin said the new NATO-Russia relationship, in the form of a charter that will give Moscow a say in European security affairs, should be in place before the Madrid summit.

On the economic front, the two agreed a bigger role for Russia at a summit of leading industrialized nations which is to take place in Denver in June.

In addition, Clinton backed Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization and the Paris Club, which deals with government debt, while promising to push investment in Russia.

For his part, Yeltsin promised comprehensive reform of Russia's barely functioning tax system and tougher laws to fight corruption and organized crime.

The two men met for the 11th time, although they had not seen each other for almost a year. Clinton is using a wheelchair following a leg injury, while Yeltsin is still recovering from heart surgery and months of illness.

Clinton was due to return to Washington later in the day, while Yeltsin was scheduled to stay on for talks with Ahtisaari Saturday before flying back to Moscow.

RTna 03/21 1454 Problems lurk beneath gloss of U.S-Russia summit

By Nicholas Doughty

HELSINKI (Reuter) - Even if the issue of NATO enlargement did not pull Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin apart, it is already clear that serious problems remain beneath the gloss of success and the pledges of good intentions in Helsinki.

Clinton and Yeltsin made some progress in three areas at their summit -- European security including NATO, arms control and fresh efforts to push Russia's fledgling market economy forward.

Both men gave some ground, although the balance was clearly in Clinton's favor.

Yeltsin repeated Moscow's stiff opposition to NATO's intention of taking in new members that once belonged to the Soviet bloc. But he eased back on the tough anti-Western rhetoric and agreed to help minimize the problems involved.

The U.S. president reaffirmed that NATO enlargement would go ahead on schedule, with an alliance summit in July inviting several countries to start accession talks.

But he went out of his way to ease Russian concerns that NATO expansion would leave it isolated, promising a new deal between the alliance and Russia through a charter that would be "an enduring commitment at the highest political level."

To win U.S. backing for greater Russian involvement in

international economic groupings and more foreign investment, Yeltsin had to promise reforms of Russia's chaotic tax system and tougher laws to fight crime and corruption.

At their first summit in almost a year, it was clear that the good working relationship they have established since 1993 was able to produce results.

Once the warm glow has faded, though, both Yeltsin and Clinton will have real trouble on many of these questions.

Yeltsin faces a monumental task in making good his pledges to tighten and speed up economic reforms, not least while the grip of organised crime in Russia is clearly so strong.

His promise to push through the ratification of a long-delayed 1993 nuclear arms treaty may come to little if his Communist and nationalist opponents in parliament continue to attack the treaty in Moscow as a betrayal of Russia's security.

If Yeltsin fails on that score, the prospect of further nuclear arms cuts -- raised in Helsinki -- will fade, since Washington will not proceed with a new round of talks.

For Clinton, there are other troubles.

Getting allies and partners to accept Russia into economic groupings like the World Trade Organization (WTO), as he promised to do, could be difficult.

Moreover, Japan and some other members of the Group of Seven (G7) are less eager to see a bigger Russian role in the most exclusive club of industrialised nations.

He runs the risk of trouble on some of the arms control proposals with Republican members of Congress at home.

But it is NATO enlargement that remains the biggest question, the issue that most divides Russia from the West. Beyond their commitment to work together on this, the two presidents did not break new ground.

It remains to be seen whether the temperature on NATO will stay as low in the weeks ahead, as the alliance picks out countries that were once members of the Warsaw Pact to become new members of the Western elite

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From disarmament@igc.apc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:21:31 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: abolition-caucus@igc.org  
Subject: Clinton's Summit Statement

Approved: bozo  
To: ctb-followers  
From: disarmament  
Subject: President on Summit

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
(PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: . . . I would like to begin by thanking  
President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen, all the people of  
Finland, for their very gracious hospitality to . . . the  
extremely constructive role that Finland plays in a new era for  
Europe.

This is my first meeting with President Yeltsin in each of our  
second terms, our 11th meeting overall. At each meeting, we have  
strengthened our nation's relationship and laid a firmer  
foundation for peace and security, freedom and prosperity in the  
21st century.

Here at Helsinki, we have addressed three fundamental challenges:  
first, building an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe for  
the first time in history, second, continuing to lead the world  
away from the nuclear threat; and third, forging new ties of  
trade and investment that will help Russia to complete its  
remarkable transformation to a market economy and will bring  
greater prosperity to both our peoples.

A Europe undivided and democratic must be a secure Europe. NATO  
is the bedrock of Europe's security and the tie that binds the  
United States to that security. That is why the United States has  
the way in adapting NATO to new missions and opening its doors  
to the members, in strengthening its ties to non-members of the  
Partnership for Peace, and seeking to forge a strong, practical  
partnership between NATO and Russia.

We are building a new NATO, just as the Russian people are building a new Russia. I am determined that Russia will become a respected partner with NATO in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure. I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement and the Madrid summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake. But we also have an important and, I believe, overriding agreement.

We agreed that the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized.

We didn't come here expecting to change each other's mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our disagreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.

President Yeltsin and I agreed that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russia document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together, as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and new NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe. We also agreed that our negotiator and those of the other 28 participating states should accelerate their efforts in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to the post-cold war era by setting new limits on conventional forces.

The second area of our discussion involved our obligation to continue to lead the world away from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. We have already taken important steps. We signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We extended the Nonproliferation Treaty. We stopped targeting each other's cities and citizens. We put START I into force. And we are now committed to securing ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention before it goes into force next month so that we can finally begin to banish poison gas from the Earth.

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We also reached agreement in our work to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our arms control efforts. Distinguishing between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles.

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Before I turn the microphone over to President Yeltsin, let me say one word about the bombing in Tel Aviv . . .

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997  
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 13:15:00 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: President on Summit

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
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<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From disarmament@igc.apc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 12:25:48 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: Recipients of conference

<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>

Subject: PRES. CLINTON SUMMIT STATEMENT 3/21

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki, Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
(PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: . . . I would like to begin by thanking President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen, all the people of Finland, for their very gracious hospitality to . . . the extremely constructive role that Finland plays in a new era for Europe.

This is my first meeting with President Yeltsin in each of our second terms, our 11th meeting overall. At each meeting, we have strengthened our nation's relationship and laid a firmer foundation for peace and security, freedom and prosperity in the 21st century.

Here at Helsinki, we have addressed three fundamental challenges: first, building an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe for the first time in history, second, continuing to lead the world away from the nuclear threat; and third, forging new ties of trade and investment that will help Russia to complete its remarkable transformation to a market economy and will bring greater prosperity to both our peoples.

A Europe undivided and democratic must be a secure Europe. NATO is the bedrock of Europe's security and the tie that binds the United States to that security. That is why the United States has led the way in adapting NATO to new missions and opening its doors to the members, in strengthening its ties to non-members of the Partnership for Peace, and seeking to forge a strong, practical partnership between NATO and Russia.

We are building a new NATO, just as the Russian people are building a new Russia. I am determined that Russia will become a respected partner with NATO in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure. I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement and the Madrid summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear that he thinks it's a mistake. But we also have an important and, I believe, overriding agreement.

We agreed that the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized.

We didn't come here expecting to change each other's mind about our disagreement, but we both did come here hoping to find a way of shifting the accent from our disagreement to the goals, the tasks, and the opportunities we share. And we have succeeded.

President Yeltsin and I agreed that NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov should try to complete negotiations on a NATO-Russia document in the coming weeks. It would include a forum for regular consultations that would allow NATO and Russia to work and to act together, as we are doing today in Bosnia. It would demonstrate that a new Russia and new

NATO are partners, not adversaries, in bringing a brighter future to Europe. We also agreed that our negotiator and those of the other 28 participating states should accelerate their efforts in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to the post-cold war era by setting new limits on conventional forces.

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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From disarmament@igc.apc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 13:19:35 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: Recipients of conference

<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>

Subject: YELTSIN'S SUMMIT STATEMENT 3/21/97

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki, Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997  
(PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S STATEMENT)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN (Through Interpreter):

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<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.apc.org Fri Mar 21 19:59:33 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 13:22:22 -0800 (PST)  
From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
To: abolition-caucus@igc.org  
Subject: Yeltsin on Summit

Approved: bozo  
To: ctb-followers  
From: disarmament  
Subject: President on Summit

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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

From hgw@scruznet.com Mon Mar 24 19:33:57 1997

Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 22:27:09 -0800 (PST)

From: Healing Global Wounds <hgw@scruznet.com>

To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Cc: pbergel@igc.apc.org, godesstemple@igc.apc.org, citizenalert@igc.org,  
drfrank@well.com, John Hadder <hadder@chem.unr.edu>,  
jones@admin.unr.edu, lcnp@aol.com, lmkai@igc.apc.org,  
LANLaction@aol.com, lmiles@dpp.org, madair@aol.com,  
nfpc@phil.gn.apc.org, nukemuse@igc.apc.org, nirsnet@igc.apc.org,  
opw@teleport.com, pmeidell@igc.apc.org, psrcasf@igc.apc.org,  
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wsdp@igc.apc.org, vsixkilo@cruzio.com

Subject: IMMEDIATE RELEASE: INDIGENOUS ACTIVISTS FROM TAIWAN.....

>Subject: IMMEDIATE RELEASE: INDIGENOUS ACTIVISTS FROM TAIWAN.....

>Date: Thu, 20 Mar 97 22:21:25 -0500

>From: lynn miles <lmiles@dpp.org>

>

>-- [ From: lynn miles \* EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] --

>

>

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

>INDIGENOUS ACTIVISTS FROM TAIWAN,

>ATOMIC BOMB SURVIVORS FROM JAPAN,

>AND ARTISTS FROM MONGOLIA

>TO RIDE GREEN TORTOISE

>

>Late on March 26, a 22-person delegation of activists, artists and

>indigenous peoples from Taiwan, Japan, Mongolia and China will board a bus

>bound for Nevada, to meet with their Shoshone hosts near the Nevada Test

>Site, for four days of conferencing, training, prayer, sweat lodges and

>networking with activists from around North America.

>

>The main organizers of the event, Healing Global Wounds and Shundahai

>network, expect some 400 to 500 people to turn up for the week-long series

>of events. The annual gathering focuses on the U.S. government's nuclear

>weapons testing program conducted at the Nevada Test Site, 60 miles

>northwest of Las Vegas. The testing was discontinued in 1992, but, with the

>U.S. signature barely dry on last year's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the

>Department of Energy has announced that it plans to resume "sub-critical"

>testing this year.

>

>Taking the Asian delegation from Los Angeles to the Test Site is the "Green

>Tortoise," a bus equipped with foam mattresses instead of seats for

>overnight travel. The delegation will leave at about 11:00 PM, arriving at

>the Test Site at noon on the 27th, after an early-morning stop at Tacopah

>Hot Springs, near Shoshone, CA.

>

>The Asian delegation comprises seven people from Taiwan, representing the  
>Taiyal, Amis, Taroko, Peinan, Bunun and Tau ethnic groups, each with a  
>distinct language and culture of its own. The Tau representative, Si Manbang  
>, will

>lecture on her homeland, Orchid Island, which lies offshore from Taiwan and  
>hosts Taiwan\*s only existing nuclear waste dump.

>

>Some ethnologists and cultural anthropologists have predicted that the  
>unique island culture practiced by the Orchid Islanders is doomed to  
>extinction, as the islanders report an increased rate of childhood leukemia  
>and rare cancers. But the indomitable Ms. Manbang sees the Shoshone of Newe  
>Segobia (Nevada and parts of Southern California) as possibly offering hope:  
>"How have the Shoshone, as the most-nuked nation on earth, managed to ward  
>off cultural annihilation?"

>

>Included in the entourage will be three "hibakusha," survivors of the August  
>9, 1945 bombing of Nagasaki, the first use of a plutonium weapon on a  
>civilian population. Another Japanese, a Chinese, three Mongolians from  
>Hohhot, and several Americans complete the 22-person delegation.

>

>For all of them, more than an opportunity to engage in political witness,  
>their days in the Nevada desert are anticipated as a time of cultural and  
>spiritual renewal, a chance to "walk gently upon the earth" while  
>contemplating the words of Corbin Harney, Shoshone elder and spiritual  
>mentor of the event: "There is only one air, one water, one earth. We are  
>all in this together."

>

>

>More information:

>>>On the itinerary and makeup of the delegation:

> Ms Julian Jau, 562-402-3453

>>>On the Healing Global Wounds trainings and days of action:

> The Shundahai Network, 702-647-3095.

>>>For those wanting to participate, or wanting detailed information:

> Shundahai website at <http://macronet.org/macronet/shundahai>.

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>March 26 - April 2, 1997

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>GREEN TORTOISE ADVENTURE TRAVEL

>  
>HEALING GLOBAL WOUNDS -- SHOSHONE TOUR ITINERARY  
>  
>  
>  
>3/26 23:00 Depart Los Angeles on Green Tortoise  
>WED  
>  
>  
>3/27 06:00 Breakfast Tacopah Hot Springs, Shoshone CA  
>THUR 09:00 Arrive Death Valley, meet with Timbisha Shoshone  
> 12:00 arrive Nuclear Test Site: Healing Global Wounds encampment  
>  
>  
>3/28 --3/31 Healing Global Wounds / Action for Nuclear Abolition  
>FRI -- MON Sunrise ceremonies, sweats, trainings, workshops  
>  
>  
>4/1 06:00 Sunrise ceremony, Healing Global Wounds,  
> breakfast, action, lunch  
>TUE 11:00 Depart Healing Global Wounds encampment  
> 12:00 Las Vegas "Nuclear Fools Day Parade."  
> 15:00 Depart Las Vegas  
> 18:30 Arrive Ward Valley (near Needles CA, site of proposed nuclear waste  
>dump).  
> Dinner with Fort Mojave Indian Tribe.  
> 23:00 Depart Ward Valley  
>  
>  
>4/2 06:00 Deep Creek Hot Springs, depart 16:00  
>WED 18:30 Arrive Los Angeles. Dinner program with Taiwanese and  
> environmental activists  
>  
>  
>FROM:  
>Democratic Progressive Party,  
>Department of International Affairs,  
>30 Peiping East Road 9th Floor,  
>Taipei, Taiwan  
>Tel: 886-2-392-9989 ext. 302-308,  
>Fax: 886-2-393-0342,  
>email: lmiles@dpp.org.tw ATTN: Lynn Miles  
>  
>  
Jennifer Olaranna Viereck

Healing Global Wounds  
e-mail- hgw@scruznet.com  
Phone- 408-338-0147  
Fax- 408-338-6408  
PO Box 13, Boulder Creek, CA 95006, USA

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A member of the Abolition 2000 Network

HGW Spring Gathering at the Nevada Test Site: March 27-31  
Action for Nuclear Abolition Camp: March 31-April 4  
Ask for an information packet from shundahi@intermind.net

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"We think that if the powerful countries would reduce their weapons arsenals, we could have peace. But if we look deeply into the weapons, we see our own minds-- our prejudices, fears, and ignorances. Even if we transport all the bombs to the moon, the roots of war and the roots of bombs will still be here, in our bodies and our minds. Non-violence means we strive to act and speak with love and compassion."

Thik Nhat Hanh

Honor the elders;  
Protect the children;  
Protect the Earth;  
Don't be lazy!

Floyd 'Red Crow' Westerman

From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:57 1997  
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 06:13:10 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Conclusion Briefing

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton  
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997

## QUESTIONS RELATED TO NATO, START II AND III, AND ARMS CONTROL (NATO)

Q. Boris Nikolayich, our first impression is that there was not a breakthrough on NATO here in Helsinki. Tell me can there be some kind of movement forward before the Madrid Summit.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, a very principled progress, and they consist of the following: that, yes indeed, we do maintain our positions.

We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal question here.

We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in the agreement with NATO.

And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all heads of state of all 16 member nations of NATO. This is a very principled issue, and we came to agreement on this with President Bill Clinton. That is, all states, all nations -- and this will take place before Madrid -- all heads of state will sign this document. We sign together with Bill Clinton, and then there will be a signature of the general secretary of NATO. And we will believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for all states whose leaders signed this document.

So this is a very principled progress. We didn't talk about this just yesterday and the day before. We couldn't have. We can only talk about this now during these minutes once we've signed the statements.

Q. After all that you've been told about how the world has changed and that there will be no nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, do you still regard NATO's enlargement as a danger to Russia?

And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: No, of course not. No one will think of these as being secondary states. No one is calling that. That's not what's involved here. However, I believe, and Bill believes the same thing, Bill Clinton believes the same, that these decisions that can be taken, they will be taken by all leaders of these nations, which is extremely, extremely important. I already mentioned this.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean any new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second class members.

What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member" One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in.

Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. What is the most important thing NATO is doing today. Working in Bosnia. Who is NATO 00 NATO has a major partnership with Russia in Bosnia, and a partnership for Peace, where we've done joint military exercises and other things.

Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil.

Look, we just announced an agreement here that will reduce nuclear weapons, if we can implement it, within a decade by 80 percent below their Cold War high -- number one. Number two, we have -- the NATO members that have just tabled a proposal on

Conventional Forces in Europe which would put strict limits and would freeze the conventional forces we could have in Europe now, along with having strict limits in the Visegrad countries themselves, which would be the areas where you might expect an old difficulty to arise in new circumstances.

(ABM Treaty)

Q. (Through interpreter.) The Interfax Agency. President Clinton, it is known that in your Congress there is some criticism frequently that you are a critic of -- a supporter of the ABM treaty. Today's meeting, did that convince you to strengthen the ABM treaty?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: You mean -- some people have criticized me in my Congress because I do support the ABM treaty. Yes, that's accurate; they have.

I do support the ABM treaty. I think it's important. I believe in it. And we have, I believe, strengthened the chances that the ABM treaty will survive by the agreement we have made today and the distinctions we have drawn between the missiles that are covered by the ABM treaty and by theater-defense missiles. I believe that very strongly.

There are those in the Congress of the United States -- but they are not a majority -- let me emphasize they are not a majority -- who would undermine the ABM treaty because they don't believe it's in our interest I believe they're wrong. I believe that the ABM treaty has served us well and will continue to serve us well, especially in view of the questions that we have clarified today between us.

...

Q The question is to the Russian President. Boris Mikolaevich, you said that this meeting stated a new phase for these U.S.-Russian relations. What precisely new was introduced into these relations?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first of all we finally were able to determine our positions on issues of European security. We've come to settle our position on NATO and we have described for ourselves the parameters of the NATO-Russian agreement.

Secondly there's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads is being reduced in connection with that. That is significant. This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world.

...

Finally a breakthrough has been made. A joint statement has been signed. We've discussed these issues in great detail with President Clinton. And on chemical weapons, that too.

Any issue we handled we've been able to manage a major breakthrough. We didn't discuss any small issues. We talked only about strategic issues. And on all five issues we were able to find an answer, we were able to find a common point of view. And that's what is reflected in our joint statements.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If I might just support that question, because I think that's a question all the Americans and all the Russians and others will be interested in.

What came out of this meeting that was different? One, the idea that there will be a NATO-Russia agreement that all the leaders will support. That's a significant thing. We agreed to disagree about the question of expansion, but we agreed that there must be a partnership between NATO and Russia going forward into the future.

Two the notion that Russia should play a larger role in international economic institutions, and that if certain internal changes are made, which President Yeltsin has already announced his support for, then the United States will make a more vigorous effort to facilitate investment in Russia.

And third, I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high, more or less 80

percent.

These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm very pleased with them.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You've touched on a very current issue which has to be clarified all the way. Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II, because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II.

Q. Mr. President and Mr. President, one of the most contentious aspects of a potential agreement of charter between NATO and Russia was whether or not it would have to be legally binding on the 16 members of NATO or would simply be a political statement of intent. This agreement that you hope to forge with NATO, do you expect that the legislatures, the U.S. Senate, for example, would have to ratify the agreement, or it would simply be a statement that President Clinton would support?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, we intend to send this treaty and send this agreement to the state Duma for ratification. That's what our intention is. At the same time, we understand that if 16 states will have to coordinate this issue with their parliaments, this will take up many, many months. And therefore, we've come to an agreement that, given these conditions, it will be quite enough, or course, given the goodwill of these states, simply a signature from the -- of the leaders of these countries that would be affixed to this agreement.

How the U.S. would act in this regard, let President Bill Clinton Respond.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you look at the language, President Yeltsin has basically said it accurately. We think it's important to get this agreement up, get it signed, and get it observed -- have it observed. And there are so many of the NATO counties --

what we have called for is for each and every member country to make -- and I believe the exact language of our agreement is, "an enduring commitment at the highest political level." And President Yeltsin described to you how we will manifest that. If our secretary-general, Mr. Solana, and Foreign Minister Primakov succeed in negotiating this agreement within the time frame that we all anticipate they will be able to, then we would expect to all meet somewhere and publicly affix our signatures and reaffirm our commitment to the terms of the agreement.

Q: The question is to the U.S. President. Mr. President, you, both today and on earlier occasions, said that you intend to transform in some way the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After today's meeting with President Yeltsin, what specifically do the United States plan to do to change the current structure of NATO? Thank you.

CLINTON: Well, first let me point out we have already transformed NATO. When I became President there was no Partnership for Peace, for example. There were no joint exercises where you had Russian troops, American troops, Polish troops, French troops, others -- we didn't have these sorts of things. We didn't have a Partnership for Peace with more than two dozen other countries regularly participating with us now in military planning and training and sharing and working together. And we certainly had nothing like our cooperation in Bosnia.

I believe that the old NATO was basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact, and that's why I've been very sensitive to why the Russian people or the Russian leaders would wonder about what the new NATO is. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is no Cold War. We just made an agreement to work to cut our nuclear arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War height, which I would remind you existed just five years ago.

And what we need to recognize is there will be new security threats to Europe. And you can see them. You have dealt -- we've seen them in Bosnia, we've seen them in the other ethnic, religious and racial traumas that you have dealt with along your borders. You see it in the continuing disputes between nations within the European Community.

What we want to do is to provide a way for more and more

countries, either as members or as members of the Partnership for Peace -- Finland is a good example of an active member of the Partnership for Peace -- or because of the special relationship of Russia and the special role Russia will play in the future of Europe and security in the context of the Russia-NATO agreement, we want to provide an opportunity within which all of us can deal with the security aspects of trying to create a Europe that is undivided and democratic for the first time in history.

I would remind you, go back and read from the dawn of nation states on the continent of Europe, there has never been a time when all the people were living under democratic governments and were free of foreign domination. That has never happened. So we are simply trying to create the conditions in which we can grow together.

Will there be questions? Will there be skepticism along the way? Will there be uncertainty? Of course, there will be. But we are not attempting to draw a different dividing line in Europe, just somewhat further to the East. What we are trying to do is to develop structures that can grow and evolve over time so that there will be a united effort by free people to join their resources together to reinforce each other's security, each other's independence, and their common interdependence. And I believe we will succeed at that.

Q: To both Presidents, both of you have had problems with your individual parliaments, and yet --

CLINTON: Seems to be a curse of democracy.

Q: Yes. You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? And to Mr. Clinton, how can you assure Mr. Yeltsin that you won't have a rebellion in the Congress over the anti-missile defense agreement?

YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice. (Laughter.)

CLINTON: Boy, I wish I could give that answer. (Laughter.) Let me answer -- you give me an opportunity, actually, to point out the full elements of this timetable on START III. And for those of you -- if you haven't had time to study it, I want to

make full disclosure here.

Number one, I expect that our Congress, those who believe in the ABM system but who want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, which may someday protect all of our friends in different circumstances, including our friends in Russia -- who knows what use we will put to theater missile defenses when we have troops that have to be protected in the future -- I would think that the members of Congress who believe in the ABM treaty but want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, will be quite pleased by this agreement. I think that is not where the problem could come.

Let me explain what we agreed to today -- and I did it, I might say, with the full concurrence of General Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Cohen, who is not here today but we checked with him.

In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II.

Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this.

But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to

recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue.

So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people.

Q: Boris Nikolayevich, what's your thought on the version that the Russian giving way on the issue of NATO's expansion to the East will be paid by financial generosity of the West?

YELTSIN: First of all, I don't see it that way at all. I don't see this generosity at all. If in the statement on economic issues which we had just signed, if there are formulas in there that investments will be supported, investments going to Russia, and certain sums of money will be appropriated by the American side, that does not mean that this is assistance to Russia. This is assistance to the private sector making investments in Russia. This is assistance to American citizens, not to Russia. Why do you see an exchange here? There's no exchange.

And I categorically disagree with that formulation that in place of one we sort of bartered here and as a result of that we have come up with these ideas. I don't agree with that. I should say that even the order of looking at these issues -- and we've held four tours lasting from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours each -- the order of looking at these issues was as follows.

First, we looked at Europe security and NATO. Secondly, the ABM issue. Then we took up chemical weapons. Then we talked about START III, that is, the reduction of further strategic weapons. And only after that we started talking of economic issues. I did not know that the American side was preparing this. But you see, first we resolved and discussed all of these issues, and only then we approached the economic question. This should tell you that this was not a case where we used this as a poker chip.

CLINTON: I'd just like to support that. And let me say, first

of all, what President Yeltsin said about the order in which we took these issues up is absolutely right, first. Second, I believe that the economic announcements which were made today are in the interest of the American people, both directly and indirectly. . .

Q: I would like to ask something from both of you. How would you react, sir, if Finland would express its willingness to join NATO?

CLINTON: Maybe I should -- you asked both. Since I discussed this with the President --he brought it up with me. President Ahtisaari said to me that he thought Finland had made the right decision to be a member of the Partnership for Peace and to maintain its independence and its ability to work constructively with Russia and with NATO nations, and not be a member of NATO, and that he had no intention of asking that Finland be considered for membership. But he thought that the policy of being able to be considered was a good one because it reinforced the feeling of independence and the security that Finland and other nations who decide to maintain relative independence and membership in the Partnership for Peace had.

So I can do no more than to support the statement that your own President has made about this.

YELTSIN: I, too, would like to respond on this issue. I should say that the reason we respect Finland as a state -- its nation, its people and leadership -- is the fact that Finland is implementing a course of a neutral state, of nonaligning itself to any block. This is very important. This creates a very stable and calm balance within the country. This facilitates good neighborly relations with Russia.

We, with Finland, have a turnover of trade of \$4.7 billion U.S. This is 40 percent of the entire turnover of trade. Find me another country that could equal this sort of turnover in trade with Russia. There is no other country. And for that reason, I believe -- and, of course, this is the matter entirely of the people of Finland and its government, but that which the President of the Finnish Republic, President Ahtisaari, stated very clearly that he is not joining any blocks. This calls for the feeling of respect for him.

Q: The focus question is this: In the Russia-NATO agreement, as

envisaged, if there is disagreement -- Russia disagrees with something NATO wants to do, does Russia have a veto power? The broader question is this: In the Second World War, it was very simple, we were enemies. We were allies I meant to say. During the Cold War, it was very simple, we were enemies. Today, what word describes this relationship where the situation is not so clear and not so simple?

YELTSIN: I can respond by saying that the way we solve these issues is by consensus. That's how it is today, indeed, among the NATO countries. And that's how it will be once we conclude an agreement between Russia and NATO, already with the participation of Russia.

CLINTON: The short answer to your question is, a voice but not a veto. And the answer to your second question is that we are partners, and like all partners, in any partnership, starting with society's most basic partnership, a marriage and a family, and going to business partnerships, there are sometimes disagreements. But partnerships are bound together by shared values, shared interests, and the understanding that what you have in common is always more important than what divides you.

And so you work for the consensus that President Yeltsin outlined. And that's where we are, and I think that's exactly where we ought to be. And that's why we are not going to have the kind of cataclysmic bloodshed in the 21st century that we saw through three world wars, the Cold War, and countless others in the century. If we can stay with that attitude and work on it, we will have a Europe that's not only peaceful, but free and undivided.

Thank you very much.

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From: disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:57 1997  
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:09:13 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Albright and Berger on Summit

Excerpts From:

Transcript: Briefing by Albright, Berger, Summers on Summit  
SecState sees "historic progress" at Helsinki

Helsinki -- Secretary of State Albright told reporters March 21 that "we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia.

"We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand," the Secretary of State said.

"In other words," she said, "by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

"What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation."

Following is the White House transcript:

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)  
March 21, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR  
SANDY BERGER, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS

MCCURRY: An all-star cast here to brief you a little bit about the President's very successful summit with President Yeltsin today. I've asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to start first. She will be followed by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, followed by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. I also have General Shalikashvili here and Robert Bell who is the Senior Director for the National Security Council

for Defense Policy. They're available, too, to either speak or to take any questions you may have on the arms control aspects of today's summit.

A pleasure to have them all here. Thank you all.

Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Well, we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia. We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand.

In other words, by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation.

Summits are different than they used to be. These meetings are not organized to struggle through a crisis, as in the past. They are increasingly a reflection of a mature relationship, which means that they take into account differences, but don't allow those differences to derail a common agenda. For example, we made major progress on arms control here in Helsinki, despite some of the differences on NATO enlargement.

It's very important to keep two aspects in mind -- the future European security cooperation was handled in the broadest possible framework. NATO enlargement is a central issue, but our overall goal is to build wide cooperation between Russia, U.S. and Europe.

The two Presidents talked through their differences on NATO and they understand each other's positions better. They are not likely to agree on everything, but they do agree that our complex security agenda must move forward. The joint statement

on European security is an important document; it reaffirms principles of cooperation, and above all, our commitment to a secure, undivided, and democratic Europe.

The two Presidents also confirmed that to build that new Europe we must integrate a series of mutually supporting institutions. This is important. NATO is a central institution, but it cannot do the job alone. The basis for our work will be the principles of the OSCE, including human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also, as the joint statement points out, the right of every nation to choose the means to ensure its own security. This refers also to the right to enter treaties of alliance.

As major powers outside of Europe, the U.S. and Russia place special importance on using the OSCE framework to play a role in managing crises in Europe, and recent events in Albania are a case in point. The President has already described his discussions on NATO strategy, and in the security document the two sides stressed their determination to rise above the differences through practical steps. The key differences of vision will not derail practical cooperation. The NATO-Russia charter will be the centerpiece of this cooperation in Europe, and we've also shown that we can advance our interest in arms control at the same time.

There are specific references to NATO defense strategy, both conventional and military forces, which in fact describe existing NATO policy. And just to make that clear again, it has been stated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10 that NATO members have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor do they see any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include a reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document, which President Yeltsin welcomed.

Also, on March 14, the North Atlantic Council stated that -- quote -- "In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Also let me reiterate that there is no limit or any restriction on infrastructure in NATO.

So I think that on the whole we can all agree that we have had a successful summit where a very large agenda was dealt with successfully. And I will now let my colleagues explain the other parts of it.

Sandy Berger.

BERGER: If I could just summarize on the NATO-Russia piece, I would say that the Presidents agreed to disagree about NATO enlargement; that means NATO enlargement will go forward as scheduled, as the President has said, in Madrid, at the same time that NATO and Russia work on a charter that develop their own relationship.

Now, the other, second significant mention of this summit has been some substantial breakthroughs in the arms control area. There are three related breakthroughs. One was a firm commitment by President Yeltsin to promptly press for Duma ratification of START II. This commitment by President Yeltsin was facilitated by agreements on two other related matters. One is a set of guidelines or parameters for START III, and the second is, finally, after three years of negotiation, an agreement on ABM-TMD demarkation. That is the line between ABM systems that allows our theater systems to go forward. And let me speak for a moment about both of those statements.

On the START III guidelines that will provide the guidance for negotiations, they provide for reductions to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. For the first time the parties will be negotiating on actual warhead destruction as opposed to simply systems destruction. There will be a timetable for both START II and START III that, in a sense, mesh together. All of the destruction of systems for START II and START III will be completed by the year 2007, as the President indicated. The deactivation of warheads under START II will be extended one year from the beginning of 2003, the deadline, until the end of 2003, as the President indicated.

Obviously, the START II and START III aspects of this are subject to ratification by both our Senate and by the Duma.

Now, the third very significant agreement that has bedeviled arms control negotiators for, I believe, three or four years and has

caused an awful lot of airfare miles on the part of many arms control people is the ABM-TMD issue. And we reached an agreement today which preserves the ABM treaty. Both sides affirm, again, the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty.

It permits all six of our current systems to go forward, unimpeded. It constrains only testing of theater missiles against strategic targets, not something that we have planned, and provides for consultations but no veto through the standing consultative commission in Geneva on new technologies that may be developed in the future, and continued cooperation between the United States and Russia on TMD cooperation -- for example, on sharing early warning information, on joint exercises, on possible joint R&D.

So let me just sum up by trying to state what I think the significance of these two agreements are. In terms of the START guidelines, it means, as the President has said, that within a decade there will be an 80-percent reduction if we are successful in START III of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads that were deployed at the end of the Cold War just five years ago.

Number two, that will provide greater strategic stability at lower levels and, therefore, reduce the nuclear danger for our peoples and for the entire world.

Number three, we will seek to destroy warheads for the first time -- strategic warheads for the first time of arms control. Four, we'll also address non-strategic nuclear weapons in START III -- that is, tactical nuclear weapons as a separate but related issue. And as I say, the significance of this, in part, is it will enable -- has enabled President Yeltsin to say that he will go forward promptly with ratification of START II.

The significance of the ABM-TMD agreement, I would say basically three -- one, we have demonstrated that the ABM treaty can be maintained as a cornerstone of strategic stability and still be adapted to deal with the very real threat of shorter-range missiles that we seek to deal with through our theater systems.

Second of all, it, as I says, reconfirms that all of our current systems can go forward unimpeded; and third, together with the START III guidelines, removes what has been an obstacle to START II ratification in the Duma.

Let me now ask Larry to briefly summarize the economic portions of the meeting.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: On economic issues, this was as positive a summit as any that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have had. The two Presidents devoted much of the lunch discussion to economic issues. President Clinton congratulated President Yeltsin on his March 6th economic speech laying out his economic strategy, going forward, and on his appointment of a new reform-oriented economic team. . . .

Q: I'd like to address a question to Mr. Berger, and perhaps to Bob Bell. As recently as Monday afternoon, quite senior people in the administration were saying that there was no prospect of an ABM-TMD agreement anytime soon. Could you say something about how this came about?

BERGER: I think those same senior officials may have been saying it at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. I think that this was the issue perhaps that most time was spent on in the summit. Well, a good part of the morning session was spent on the Euro-security issues that Secretary Albright has discussed. They then moved to the START and ABM-TMD issues, which continued in various configurations through the afternoon.

I think, finally, when it became absolutely clear that we could both preserve the ABM system, but also proceed ahead with the six systems that we have under -- that we are proceeding with, that agreement fell into place. I'm not sure that we were expecting all that to happen as we got here, but the negotiations from our perspective were very successful.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

BELL: Mike suggests I just give a very short chronology. This started really three and a half years ago when the Clinton administration in the fall of '93, at the five-year ABM review conference, laid down a comprehensive proposal for demarkation that was based on one simple rule, and that was whether you ever tested a theater missile defense system against a strategic target.

That proposal was not accepted by the Russians, and after a year or two of not much progress, we made a fundamental decision to split the negotiations in half and concentrate on the so-called

lower velocity theater missile defense systems where, indeed, we were able to reach agreement, and fully expected that we would be able to sign that and get on with the harder problems that we finally reached resolution on today.

But as those of you who have followed this know, there have been a lot of zigs and zags on this and many previous occasions where we thought that we had agreement to go forward with part one only to find when we got there that the Russians in effect were saying, until we finish the whole problem we're not going to split off part of it.

So going into the last several weeks, really intensive travel, as Sandy said. On this question of the remaining higher velocity systems, we have consistently run into a roadblock wherein the Russians were saying unless an additional set of constraints that were unacceptable to the administration and unacceptable to the chiefs in the military services were added to this demarkation regime, there wouldn't be an agreement on anything; indeed, there wouldn't be an agreement on the START issues and there wouldn't be an agreement on going forward with START II ratification in the Duma. And as Sandy just said, that position held until about 4:00 p.m. this afternoon when we had the breakthrough.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I say, too, that when I met with President Yeltsin in Moscow in January, he said, there are some questions that can only be resolved by Presidents. This question was resolved by two Presidents.

Q: To follow up Bob Bell, please. Bob, are you saying that the Russians, in fact, relinquished their demands for specific performance limits on higher speed, higher capability systems?

BELL: Well, I think it's important to recognize what's agreed and then what is not part of the regime. As Sandy said, we have agreed on a very important testing constraint. We agree that these higher-speed TMD systems -- and we have one principal program that's called the Navy Theater-wide, or Navy Upper Tier System -- for those faster TMD systems, you cannot test them against a strategic target without them getting captured then as an ABM.

Beyond that, we've agreed in this breakthrough agreement that we reached today that for those faster systems, we will share

information on those programs with the Russians so they understand that they're designed to protect our troops and are not aimed at Russia, or designed to deal with the Russians; and second, that as newer technologies emerge, such as a laser program, for example, we will consult with them and talk through the compliance issues they have in their minds if they feel there are compliance issues. But as Sandy said, there is no veto associated with that consultation.

Now, beyond that, we have an obligation, the President has an obligation to uphold the law, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. And he is required to ensure that all of our faster TMD systems comply with the ABM treaty. And we'll continue through the normal Defense Department process to conduct those compliance reviews, just as we did with the Navy Upper Tier System, to be able to certify to Congress that, indeed, it is consistent with the treaty.

Q: Was this agreement on ABM negotiated with Primakov, or was it negotiated with Russian military? And if so, who?

BERGER: It was negotiated at various levels, but it was an agreement reached by the two Presidents.

Q: General Shalikashvili, these concessions that the U.S. is making to the Russians as far as implementing START II, delaying some of the destruction of their silos or their warheads, dismantling some of those warheads, are these unilateral concessions or can the U.S. military similarly delay implementing aspects of START II as well?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I, first of all, wouldn't characterize them at all as concessions. I think what was agreed upon is in the best interest, security interest of the United States. Those time limits that Sandy outlined here are time limits that apply to both, both parties.

Q: Will the U.S. military delay implementing --

BERGER: Can I just add two things? Number one, don't forget that START II was negotiated four years ago and that those timetables were put in place four years ago, so that they're obviously -- there's been some change by virtue of that delay.

Second of all, in order for these -- our Senate has ratified

START II with one set of timetables. If the Duma ratifies START II with a different set of timetables, we would have to submit something back to the Senate, either a protocol with those adjustments, or, ideally if we have START III completed in time, we would submit both together -- the adjustment of the timetable and START III. But the START II obviously is not enforced until there is an exchange of instruments of ratification by the two governments.

Q: Secretary Albright, could you game out for us just how the next weeks go in terms of negotiating this NATO-Russian document? Would it require -- that there be a special U.S. negotiator? How do you see that playing out?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, you have to keep in mind this is a NATO-Russia agreement, and the chief negotiator is the Secretary General of NATO Solana. And he is the one that is going to be carrying on these discussions. And the process will unfold as rapidly as he gets the various pieces into place. So we are hopeful that that agreement as has been discussed here today and in other places will, in fact, be able to be agreed to by all the members fairly rapidly.

Q: And do you think it might be wrapped it before the President comes back to Europe in May?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's possible. But the important point here is that Madrid -- that is, the invitation for accession to new members -- will take place in July no matter what, and that that is on a track of its own. And we would hope, obviously, that the NATO-Russian charter could, in fact, be done as rapidly as possible. But the timetables of the two are not hinged to each other in any way -- two tracks.

Q: Can I follow up on that? As recently as two days ago, President Yeltsin was sounding non-negotiable on the idea that this could be anything but a treaty. Could you describe the process by which he came around to agreeing to a document that was something short of a treaty?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I would say that what was important to him was that there would be an agreement among the various NATO heads to the fact that this was an important agreement. And so, what it said in the language itself is that it would be signed by the leaders of NATO countries and Russia, and this document would be

an enduring commitment at the highest political level.

And I can't speak for President Yeltsin, but the sense that I got from being in the meetings was that he felt that this was an appropriate way to solidify what will clearly be a very important agreement.

BERGER: Can I just add one thing? This is not, obviously, an unprecedented circumstance. The Helsinki Accords, for example, were here in Helsinki -- were signed by leaders. They have had enormous impact. They are enduring commitments, but they don't represent legally binding commitments in that sense.

The second thing I would say is, there are aspects of all of this that relate to, for example, a CFE agreement, if we were to get one, which relate to START II and START III, which obviously would be submitted to Congress for approval.

Q: Madam Secretary, do you share President Yeltsin's confidence of his ability to get START II through communist and nationalist-dominated Duma which has made explicit its connection of ratification with NATO expansion, not merely with ABM issues? And if they do not ratify, if they turn down the treaty, what happens then?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov are committed to pushing, as they can, on ratification in the Duma. And I think that we have to watch the process unfold.

What I think is as important for the Duma as for all of us is that these agreements be seen in the national interest of the respective countries. And it is our belief that once people see how all these interlocking pieces are structured that all will feel comfortable that Russia is in no way threatened by the new NATO. As we have said, there is a new Russia, and there is also a new NATO. And that new NATO does not have a single enemy. And I think it's going to be very important for all to understand how all these documents fit together.

Q: Madam Secretary, could you give us a little of the atmospherics in the room? Did it ever get testy or intense, or what was it like this time? They both looked more tired than after previous summits.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me start, and then Sandy might want to continue. I actually found the whole day intense, but fascinating. Here were two high political leaders who were engaged on a whole range of subjects on which they both had expert knowledge. And they covered -- they would begin discussions and set out what the agenda would be and at certain stages set them aside and then return. I think there is a really quite remarkable dynamic between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They were very glad to see each other again. And they worked hard. They clearly worked hard. They earned their pay today.

BERGER: Let me just add two things. One, in part -- in answer to your question, of course, if they didn't ratify START II, we would operate under START I for so long as that were the case. And that's another part of the answer.

I agree with what the Secretary has said. This was a day that started about 9:00 a.m. and the meetings went until 6:00 p.m. There were supposed to be fairly large breaks. There was really only one break which took place after lunch for about an hour in which there were some side meetings that the Secretary and others had. But this was eight hours of very intense one-on-one discussion -- very frank, very candid. The President was very, very clear in reaffirming our position, reaffirming the five no's that you've all heard so much about with respect to NATO enlargement. President Yeltsin was clear that they didn't like NATO expansion.

But I think this is a pivot point in which they preserved their position that they still don't like NATO enlargement, but they're going to deal with it. And I think that only came after a good deal of back-and-forth between the two leaders.

Q: Did they ever raise their voices?

BERGER: No. I'm not speaking about other people, but they didn't. (Laughter.)

Q: I wonder if the issue of the Baltic states was discussed at all, but, in particular, whether this -- right to choose the means to ensure their own security --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The subject did come up generally, and the

President -- President Clinton made very clear that NATO was open to all market democracies and that we were not going to be a part of creating any new artificial dividing lines in Europe, and that the first countries that would enter NATO would not be the last.

And the phrase that you refer to was, in fact, in the statement as it was accepted, so I can only presume that it would also apply. And I think that this was one of the subjects where, as Sandy said, there was not total agreement. But President Clinton made completely clear what was the American position on that. And that is where some of these no's came in.

Q: Do you now expect within a reasonable time the Baltic states to become NATO applicants?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I'm not going to predict the timing of any of the applicants.

Q: Secretary Albright, can you tell us what happened to cause this late afternoon breakthrough on the ABM treaty, which then seemed to have created all this positive news that you had for us?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, as I said, I think that there are certain decisions that can only be made by Presidents, and we witnessed two strong Presidents making decisions which created a breakthrough.

Q: On the Denver summit, did Mr. Yeltsin indicate he is happy about that, or is he still sticking to his red jacket complaint of a few years ago that he's not yet received the status he deserves?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: My impression, when that was announced or when it was discussed, President Yeltsin seemed very pleased.

MCCURRY: Thank you. I want to thank all the briefers.

I also want to do one thing. I told a little story earlier about the President being awake at night. I want to make it absolutely clear that we are not speculating on what the cause of the bumps in the night were. It may, in fact, have been someone walking around on the ninth floor. And I also want to pay tribute to the fine staff here at the Hotel Inter-Continental for all the help they gave us. They did a wonderful job hosting us

here.

Q: Mike, there were reports of demonstrators banging pots and pans outside the hotel in the middle of the night around the same time. Is it possible that's what woke the President up?

MCCURRY: It's conceivable. That actually is what woke me up. They, I think, were human rights protesters who were outside the front of the hotel around 1:20 a.m., and they were blowing whistles and having a good time -- creating an enjoyable noise.

Q: -- the other 16 heads of states if they are all likely to sign?

MCCURRY: Oh, we have had extensive consultations within the North Atlantic Council. There's been a real deal of preview work done for a number of the items that were on the discussion agenda today. And we will, of course, be going forward with additional briefings to capitals and further consultations with our allies. I expect that we'll also very shortly be in a position to brief Secretary General Solana on this meeting since he has lead responsibility on behalf the Alliance in negotiating with the Russian Federation the details of the charter document.

Okay, thank you, everyone. We'll see you back in Washington Monday.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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Subject: Summit Conclusion Briefing

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton

and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki,  
Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997

QUESTIONS RELATED TO NATO, START II AND III, AND ARMS CONTROL  
(NATO)

Q. Boris Nikolayich, our first impression is that there was not  
breakthrough on NATO here in Helsinki. Tell me can there be some  
kind of movement forward before the Madrid Summit.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't agree with you. It was today that we  
had progress, a very principled progress, and they consist of the  
following: that, yes indeed, we do maintain our positions.

We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and  
a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the  
negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement  
with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal  
question here.

We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President  
Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to  
those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional  
weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military  
infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in  
these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of  
joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in  
the agreement with NATO.

And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be  
binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all  
heads of state of all 16 members nations of NATO. This is a very  
principled issue, and we came to agreement on this with President  
Bill Clinton. That is, all states, all nations -- and this will  
take place before Madrid -- all heads of state will sign this  
document. We sign together with Bill Clinton, and then there will  
be a signature of the general secretary of NATO. And we will  
believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for  
all states whose leaders signed this document.

So this is a very principled progress. We didn't talk about this  
just yesterday and the day before. We couldn't have. We can only  
talk about this now during these minutes once we've signed the  
statements.

Q. After all that you've been told about how the world has changed and that there will be no nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, do you still regard NATO's enlargement as a danger to Russia?

And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: No, of course not. No one will think of these as being secondary states. No one is calling that. That's not what's involved here. However, I believe, and Bill believes the same thing, Bill Clinton believes the same, that these decisions that can be taken, they will be taken by all leaders of these nations, which is extremely, extremely important. I already mentioned this.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean any new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second class members.

What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member" One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in.

Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. What is the most important thing NATO is doing today. Working in Bosnia. Who is NATO 00 NATO has a major partnership with Russia in Bosnia, and a partnership for Peace, where we've done joint military exercises and other things.

Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil.

Look, we just announced an agreement here that will reduce nuclear weapons, if we can implement it, with in a decade by 80 percent below their Cold War high -- number one. Number two, we have -- the NATO members that have just tabled a proposal on Conventional Forces in Europe which would put strict limits and would freeze the conventional forces we could have in Europe now, along with having strict limits in the Visegrad countries themselves, which would be the areas where you might expect an old difficulty to arise in new circumstances.

(ABM Treaty)

Q. (Through interpreter.) The Interfax Agency. President Clinton, it is know that in your Congress there is some criticism frequently that you are a critic of -- a supporter of the ABM treaty. Today's meeting, did that convince you to strengthen the ABM treaty?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: You mean -- some people have criticized me in my Congress because I do support the ABM treaty. Yes, that's accurate; they have.

I do support the ABM treaty. I think it's important. I believe in it. And we have, I believe, strengthened the chances that the ABM treaty will survive by the agreement we have made today and the distinctions we have drawn between the missiles that are covered by the ABM treaty and by theater-defense missiles. I believe that very strongly.

There are those in the Congress of the United States -- but they are not a majority -- let me emphasize they are not a majority -- who would undermine the ABM treaty because they don't believe it's in our interest I believe they're wrong. I believe that the ABM treaty has served us well and will continue to sever us well, especially in view of the questions that we have clarified today between us.

...

Q The question is to the Russian President. Boris Mikolaevich, you said that this meeting stated a new phase for these U.S.-Russian relations. What precisely new was introduced into these relations?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first of all we finally were able to determine our positions on issues of European security. We've come to settle our position on NATO and we have described for ourselves the parameters of the NATO-Russian agreement.

Secondly there's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads is being reduced in connection with that. That is significant. This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world.

...

Finally a breakthrough has been made. A joint statement has been signed. We've discussed these issues in great detail with President Clinton. And on chemical weapons, that too.

Any issue we handled we've been able to manage a major breakthrough. We didn't discuss any small issues. We talked only about strategic issues. And on all five issues we were able to find an answer, we were able to find a common point of view. And that's what is reflected in our joint statements.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If I might just support that question, because I think that's a question all the Americans and all the Russians and others will be interested in.

What came out of this meeting that was different? One, the idea that there will be a NATO-Russia agreement that all the leaders will support. That's a significant thing. We agreed to disagree about the question of expansion, but we agreed that there must be a partnership between NATO and Russia going forward into the future.

Two, the notion that Russia should play a larger role in international economic institutions, and that if certain internal changes are made, which President Yeltsin has already announced his support for, then the United States will make a more vigorous effort to facilitate investment in Russia.

And third, I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues

which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high, more or less 80 percent.

These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm very pleased with them.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You've touched on a very current issue which has to be clarified all the way. Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II, because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II.

Q. Mr. President and Mr. President, one of the most contentious aspects of a potential agreement of charter between NATO and Russia was whether or not it would have to be legally binding on the 16 members of NATO or would simply be a political statement of intent. This agreement that you hope to forge with NATO, do you expect that the legislatures, the U.S. Senate, for example, would have to ratify the agreement, or it would simply be a statement that President Clinton would support?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, we intend to send this treaty and send this agreement to the state Duma for ratification. That's what our intention is. At the same time, we understand that if 16 states will have to coordinate this issue with their parliaments, this will take up many, many months. And therefore, we've come to an agreement that, given these conditions, it will be quite enough, or course, given the goodwill of these states, simply a signature from the -- of the leaders of these countries that would be affixed to this agreement.

How the U.S. would act in this regard, let President Bill Clinton Respond.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you look at the language, President Yeltsin has basically said it accurately. We think it's important to get this agreement up, get it signed, and get it observed -- have it observed. And there are so many of the NATO countries -- what we have called for is for each and every member country to make -- and I believe the exact language of our agreement is, "an enduring commitment at the highest political level." And President Yeltsin described to you how we will manifest that. If our secretary-general, Mr. Solana, and Foreign Minister Primakov succeed in negotiating this agreement within the time frame that we all anticipate they will be able to, then we would expect to all meet somewhere and publicly affix our signatures and reaffirm our commitment to the terms of the agreement.

Q: The question is to the U.S. President. Mr. President, you, both today and on earlier occasions, said that you intend to transform in some way the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After today's meeting with President Yeltsin, what specifically do the United States plan to do to change the current structure of NATO? Thank you.

CLINTON: Well, first let me point out we have already transformed NATO. When I became President there was no Partnership for Peace, for example. There were no joint exercises where you had Russian troops, American troops, Polish troops, French troops, others -- we didn't have these sorts of things. We didn't have a Partnership for Peace with more than two dozen other countries regularly participating with us now in military planning and training and sharing and working together. And we certainly had nothing like our cooperation in Bosnia.

I believe that the old NATO was basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact, and that's why I've been very sensitive to why the Russian people or the Russian leaders would wonder about what the new NATO is. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is no Cold War. We just made an agreement to work to cut our nuclear arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War height, which I would remind you existed just five years ago.

And what we need to recognize is there will be new security threats to Europe. And you can see them. You have dealt -- we've seen them in Bosnia, we've seen them in the other ethnic,

religious and racial traumas that you have dealt with along your borders. You see it in the continuing disputes between nations within the European Community.

What we want to do is to provide a way for more and more countries, either as members or as members of the Partnership for Peace -- Finland is a good example of an active member of the Partnership for Peace -- or because of the special relationship of Russia and the special role Russia will play in the future of Europe and security in the context of the Russia-NATO agreement, we want to provide an opportunity within which all of us can deal with the security aspects of trying to create a Europe that is undivided and democratic for the first time in history.

I would remind you, go back and read from the dawn of nation states on the continent of Europe, there has never been a time when all the people were living under democratic governments and were free of foreign domination. That has never happened. So we are simply trying to create the conditions in which we can grow together.

Will there be questions? Will there be skepticism along the way? Will there be uncertainty? Of course, there will be. But we are not attempting to draw a different dividing line in Europe, just somewhat further to the East. What we are trying to do is to develop structures that can grow and evolve over time so that there will be a united effort by free people to join their resources together to reinforce each other's security, each other's independence, and their common interdependence. And I believe we will succeed at that.

Q: To both Presidents, both of you have had problems with your individual parliaments, and yet --

CLINTON: Seems to be a curse of democracy.

Q: Yes. You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? And to Mr. Clinton, how can you assure Mr. Yeltsin that you won't have a rebellion in the Congress over the anti-missile defense agreement?

YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice. (Laughter.)

CLINTON: Boy, I wish I could give that answer. (Laughter.) Let me answer -- you give me an opportunity, actually, to point out the full elements of this timetable on START III. And for those of you -- if you haven't had time to study it, I want to make full disclosure here.

Number one, I expect that our Congress, those who believe in the ABM system but who want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, which may someday protect all of our friends in different circumstances, including our friends in Russia -- who knows what use we will put to theater missile defenses when we have troops that have to be protected in the future -- I would think that the members of Congress who believe in the ABM treaty but want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, will be quite pleased by this agreement. I think that is not where the problem could come.

Let me explain what we agreed to today -- and I did it, I might say, with the full concurrence of General Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Cohen, who is not here today but we checked with him.

In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II.

Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this.

But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to

that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue.

So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people.

Q: Boris Nikolayevich, what's your thought on the version that the Russian giving way on the issue of NATO's expansion to the East will be paid by financial generosity of the West?

YELTSIN: First of all, I don't see it that way at all. I don't see this generosity at all. If in the statement on economic issues which we had just signed, if there are formulas in there that investments will be supported, investments going to Russia, and certain sums of money will be appropriated by the American side, that does not mean that this is assistance to Russia. This is assistance to the private sector making investments in Russia. This is assistance to American citizens, not to Russia. Why do you see an exchange here? There's no exchange.

And I categorically disagree with that formulation that in place of one we sort of bartered here and as a result of that we have come up with these ideas. I don't agree with that. I should say that even the order of looking at these issues -- and we've held four tours lasting from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours each -- the order of looking at these issues was as follows.

First, we looked at Europe security and NATO. Secondly, the ABM issue. Then we took up chemical weapons. Then we talked about START III, that is, the reduction of further strategic weapons. And only after that we started talking of economic issues. I did not know that the American side was preparing this. But you see, first we resolved and discussed all of these

issues, and only then we approached the economic question. This should tell you that this was not a case where we used this as a poker chip.

CLINTON: I'd just like to support that. And let me say, first of all, what President Yeltsin said about the order in which we took these issues up is absolutely right, first. Second, I believe that the economic announcements which were made today are in the interest of the American people, both directly and indirectly. . .

Q: I would like to ask something from both of you. How would you react, sir, if Finland would express its willingness to join NATO?

CLINTON: Maybe I should -- you asked both. Since I discussed this with the President --he brought it up with me. President Ahtisaari said to me that he thought Finland had made the right decision to be a member of the Partnership for Peace and to maintain its independence and its ability to work constructively with Russia and with NATO nations, and not be a member of NATO, and that he had no intention of asking that Finland be considered for membership. But he thought that the policy of being able to be considered was a good one because it reinforced the feeling of independence and the security that Finland and other nations who decide to maintain relative independence and membership in the Partnership for Peace had.

So I can do no more than to support the statement that your own President has made about this.

YELTSIN: I, too, would like to respond on this issue. I should say that the reason we respect Finland as a state -- its nation, its people and leadership -- is the fact that Finland is implementing a course of a neutral state, of nonaligning itself to any block. This is very important. This creates a very stable and calm balance within the country. This facilitates good neighborly relations with Russia.

We, with Finland, have a turnover of trade of \$4.7 billion U.S. This is 40 percent of the entire turnover of trade. Find me another country that could equal this sort of turnover in trade with Russia. There is no other country. And for that reason, I believe -- and, of course, this is the matter entirely of the people of Finland and its government, but that which the

President of the Finnish Republic, President Ahtisaari, stated very clearly that he is not joining any blocks. This calls for the feeling of respect for him.

Q: The focus question is this: In the Russia-NATO agreement, as envisaged, if there is disagreement -- Russia disagrees with something NATO wants to do, does Russia have a veto power? The broader question is this: In the Second World War, it was very simple, we were enemies. We were allies I meant to say. During the Cold War, it was very simple, we were enemies. Today, what word describes this relationship where the situation is not so clear and not so simple?

YELTSIN: I can respond by saying that the way we solve these issues is by consensus. That's how it is today, indeed, among the NATO countries. And that's how it will be once we conclude an agreement between Russia and NATO, already with the participation of Russia.

CLINTON: The short answer to your question is, a voice but not a veto. And the answer to your second question is that we are partners, and like all partners, in any partnership, starting with society's most basic partnership, a marriage and a family, and going to business partnerships, there are sometimes disagreements. But partnerships are bound together by shared values, shared interests, and the understanding that what you have in common is always more important than what divides you.

And so you work for the consensus that President Yeltsin outlined. And that's where we are, and I think that's exactly where we ought to be. And that's why we are not going to have the kind of cataclysmic bloodshed in the 21st century that we saw through three world wars, the Cold War, and countless others in the century. If we can stay with that attitude and work on it, we will have a Europe that's not only peaceful, but free and undivided.

Thank you very much.

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Subject: Summit Progress: Destroy Warheads

Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New

By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham

Washington Post Staff Writers

Saturday, March 22, 1997; Page A01

If it becomes a treaty, the outline of a new strategic arms agreement announced yesterday by the United States and Russia would for the first time try to make nuclear cuts irreversible by guaranteeing that at least some of the old warheads are destroyed instead of stockpiled for possible future use.

The promise is given in a joint statement issued at the Helsinki summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that commits the two nations to include provisions in a new treaty, to be called START III, that require "transparency" and warhead "destruction." This is the arms control argot for letting the other side watch while warheads are sent to the trash heap or otherwise rendered permanently unusable.

Despite glowing rhetoric from the two leaders in Finland, political rivals back home made clear that parts of the agreements would face domestic opposition.

In Russia, criticism from Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and other hard-liners underlined the risk that START III would never get off the ground, because negotiations on the pact are to begin only after ratification by the Russian parliament of an earlier nuclear arms reduction agreement, START II. Yeltsin pledged yesterday to press for such approval, but opposition to the treaty has been fueled in part by plans going forward for NATO to expand into Eastern Europe.

In Washington, Republican conservatives immediately complained about another agreement reached yesterday defining battlefield missile defense systems permitted under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Many in the GOP favor accelerated

development of such "theater" missile defenses and oppose restrictions on them.

The new plan for START III calls for steps to make permanent the limitations called for by two major nuclear arms reduction agreements negotiated earlier by the two countries: START I in 1991 and START II in 1993. At present, the treaties are slated to expire after 15 years.

In another novel development yesterday, the two sides agreed to consider applying the principle of "transparency" to the plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, helping to ensure it cannot be used later to form the explosive guts of new weapons that could be manufactured if relations ever turned highly sour.

The aim of the new plan is to correct in the next arms control treaty what critics have called a major deficiency of the START I and START II accords, namely that neither accord actually required the destruction of any nuclear warheads.

Instead, partly because both nations were nervous about moving too rapidly to reduce their nuclear arsenals and partly because they were sensitive to the security implications of allowing intensive scrutiny of how they handled these weapons, the accords called only for destruction of the means to deliver some of the nuclear arms held by the two nations.

The earlier accords called, for example, for the wings of certain strategic bombers to be clipped off by an agreed date, for the filling up or withdrawal of tubes that hold some of the nuclear-tipped missiles that could be launched from submarines, and the blowing up of various land-based silos that could be used to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

With no language relating to the warheads themselves, the treaties effectively allowed each side to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that are currently in storage as a deliberate hedge against the advent of a new Cold War. Although each side claims to have dismantled thousands of warheads since the late-1980s, neither side is certain today of precisely how many such weapons remain because all of this work has occurred in secret, without any mutual inspections.

"This is really quite significant," Robert S. Norris, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said

of the plan to require "transparency" of warhead destruction and residual arsenals in START III. "If all of this is successful, it will prevent the retention of secret stockpiles which engender distrust."

A senior U.S. official who participated in the negotiations that led to yesterday's agreement explained that with arsenals of deployed weapons to be limited to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads in a new START III agreement -- instead of the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads allowed by START II -- both governments had recognized the increasing security risk posed by allowing unmonitored stockpiles of stored weapons.

An unstated U.S. concern behind yesterday's agreement is that old Russian warheads kept in storage after being taken off strategic missiles or bombers might eventually be subject to theft by terrorists or illicit sale to nations in the Middle East or elsewhere.

In a separate agreement related to nuclear arms yesterday, the two nations agreed on where to draw the line between a national missile defense system, which is restricted by the ABM treaty, and increasingly powerful "theater" systems for guarding against a shorter-range missile attack, which do not come under the treaty's purview.

The Clinton administration has tried for several years to negotiate with Moscow a clearer distinction between the two kinds of systems in order to avoid any perception that the ABM treaty was being violated. But congressional Republicans have disputed the need for a demarcation agreement, worrying that any deal would end up placing too many limits on development of either theater or strategic missile defenses.

The agreement announced yesterday outlined terms for a deal still to be finalized that would restrict the capabilities of theater defenses to a demarcation standard defined earlier in the Senate. That is, the Pentagon's fastest, longest-range theater systems would remain exempt from ABM treaty coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers/second.

But other terms went farther than some congressional experts had expected by including a provision "not to develop, test or deploy

space-based TMD [theater missile defense] interceptors." The agreement also stipulated that both sides "will exchange detailed information annually" on their theater defense plans and programs.

Although administration officials said the agreement still would permit the United States to proceed with all six antimissile systems under development, GOP missile defense experts in Congress assailed it as an unwarranted and unacceptable set of constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

"The ABM treaty was not designed to impose limits on our theater missile defense systems, only on national defense systems," said Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a leading missile defense proponent. "Imposing limits on interceptor speeds, which the president continues to support, will inevitably result in the future dumbing down of theater missile defense systems, putting the lives of our soldiers overseas at greater risk."

Clinton made no mention yesterday of whether he intended to submit the missile defense agreement to the Senate for ratification. Whether he is required to do so has been another point of bitter dispute between congressional Republicans and the White House.

"The Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in both houses that we didn't want the president to engage in these agreements," said Rep. Bob Livingston (R-La.), the Appropriations Committee chairman. "He's kept these as secret as he possibly could. We knew they were negotiating them, but we had no idea they would sign off on agreements to virtually leave us defenseless against anyone who's not a party to them."

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<disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:57 1997  
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 08:18:49 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Russian Summit Response

APO 03/22 1034 Communists Knock Summit Deals

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia's still-powerful communists reacted with scorn Saturday to the agreements reached by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Helsinki.

Although Yeltsin drew praise from more moderate politicians, the predictably negative response from hardliners offered a preview of the battle the Russian president faces as he returned to Moscow from Helsinki Saturday evening.

In what some called the most important superpower summit since the end of the Cold War, Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to disagree on NATO's eastward expansion, but reached accord on a schedule of significant cuts in nuclear weapons.

They also agreed to make Russia a member of the economic Group of Seven nations, quickly renamed the Summit of Eight.

At a news conference after the summit, Yeltsin jauntily predicted that he would have no difficulty winning support from the Duma, the lower house of parliament, for the START II nuclear disarmament agreement.

But he will have to do it over the fierce opposition of the Communist Party, the largest bloc in the Duma. Communist chief Gennady Zyuganov charged that Yeltsin was "guilty of completely betraying the national interests of the country."

Mikhail Lapshin, leader of the Agrarian Party and a close ally of Zyuganov, predicted that NATO would ultimately cancel the Helsinki agreements, which offer Russia a voice in NATO policy.

Anatoly Lukyanov, another communist in the Duma, said other NATO countries "should be humiliated" that Clinton reached agreements with Yeltsin unilaterally.

But Yeltsin won praise from moderates who argued that he made the best of a difficult situation.

"From my point of view, any step forward, even small, on this road is very important," said Viktor Sheinis, a member of the liberal Yabloko Party. Galina Starovoitova of the Democratic Russia party said the agreements "appear even better than were expected."

And Alexander Shokhin, vice-speaker of the Duma and a Yeltsin supporter, said the accords laid a foundation for a "new structure of European security."

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RTos 03/22 0726 Russia Proclaims Summit Success, Critics Fume

HELSINKI (Reuter) - Russia insisted on Saturday it had won a good deal at the summit with the United States, hailing it as a

breakthrough and denying charges it had been outflanked on NATO enlargement or bought off by the West.

Asked at a news conference whether Russia's bargaining position with the Western alliance had been weakened, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said:

"Russia stands by its negative position on NATO enlargement, and the agreement which we want to sign with NATO is not a pay-off for giving up that position."

"What happened yesterday was a real breakthrough," he added.

Hardline opponents in Moscow begged to differ.

"The meeting was a capitulation by the current traitorous Russian regime before the United States and NATO," said the communist daily *Sovietskaya Rossiya*.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed at the two-day summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton to sign a charter building a new relationship with NATO, despite Moscow's continued opposition to the eastward expansion of the alliance.

Yeltsin dropped a demand that the charter be legally binding and also promised to minimise differences with the West over NATO enlargement, drawing charges from opponents in Russia's parliament (Duma) that Moscow had caved in to shameful defeat.

Both sides portrayed the summit as an even-handed affair with compromises, although Clinton made none on NATO.

The summit agreement on NATO, Primakov said, would "make it more helpful for us to move towards signing the appropriate agreements." Decisions reached in Helsinki "coincide to a great degree with requirements voiced in the Duma."

But the communist Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov poured cold water on this notion, telling Itar-Tass news agency: "Plans to expand NATO to the east will inevitably lead to new lines of division in Europe and the revival of a psychological climate of suspicion and hostility."

Clinton, who arrived home early on Saturday, and Yeltsin did give their post-Cold War partnership a boost with a range of agreements covering issues from Russia's economic place on the world stage to a pledge of further cuts in nuclear weapons.

Although they publicly agreed to differ on NATO enlargement, Yeltsin appeared to have made concessions which enraged his hardline critics at home but delighted the Western alliance and former Soviet bloc states which are clamouring to join.

Poland, expected to be among several former Soviet bloc states invited to start membership talks at a summit of the 16-nation alliance in July, said the Helsinki agreement meant that Russia had accepted NATO enlargement would go ahead.

But Yeltsin, who was to fly back to Moscow later on Saturday after meeting Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari for talks and lunch, stuck to his public line that Moscow views NATO enlargement as a mistake and as a threat to Russia's security.

The meeting was dubbed the "summit of the invalids," with Clinton confined to a wheelchair following a leg injury and Yeltsin still recovering from heart surgery and illness.

Yeltsin had to avoid looking weak in front of his communist and nationalist critics at home, while Clinton wanted to stress the West's real intention of a partnership with Russia.

In Moscow, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said on Friday Russia had been dealt a "crushing defeat," comparable to the 1919 Versailles Treaty which imposed humiliating conditions on Germany at the end of World War One.

Liberals in Moscow were less agitated but Western analysts also saw Yeltsin as the loser.

"This is not an equitable result...you have to worry about the endurance and stability of a result that is not equitable," said John Steinbruner at Washington's Brookings Institution.

However, Yeltsin and Clinton did resolve a dispute over missile defences at their summit and held out the prospect of more talks on cutting their long-range nuclear arsenals.

On economic matters, Clinton promised to try to get Russia into key global economic groupings such as the World Trade Organisation. Yeltsin promised to reform Russia's creaking tax regime and to crack down on corruption and organised crime.

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From disarmament@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:57 1997

Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:27:40 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: Recipients of conference

<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>

Subject: ALBRIGHT & BERGER - SUMMIT

Subject: Albright and Berger on Summit

Excerpts From:

Transcript: Briefing by Albright, Berger, Summers on Summit  
SecState sees "historic progress" at Helsinki

Helsinki -- Secretary of State Albright told reporters March 21 that "we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia.

"We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand," the Secretary of State said.

"In other words," she said, "by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

"What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation."

Following is the White House transcript:

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)  
March 21, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS

MCCURRY: An all-star cast here to brief you a little bit about the President's very successful summit with President Yeltsin today. I've asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to start first. She will be followed by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, followed by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. I also have General Shalikashvili here and Robert Bell who is the Senior Director for the National Security Council for Defense Policy. They're available, too, to either speak or to take any questions you may have on the arms control aspects of today's summit.

A pleasure to have them all here. Thank you all.

Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Well, we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia. We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand.

In other words, by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation.

Summits are different than they used to be. These meetings are not organized to struggle through a crisis, as in the past. They are increasingly a reflection of a mature relationship, which means that they take into account differences, but don't allow those differences to derail a common agenda. For example, we made major progress on arms control here in Helsinki, despite some of the differences on NATO enlargement.

It's very important to keep two aspects in mind -- the future European security cooperation was handled in the broadest possible framework. NATO enlargement is a central issue, but our overall goal is to build wide cooperation between Russia, U.S. and Europe.

The two Presidents talked through their differences on NATO and they understand each other's positions better. They are not likely to agree on everything, but they do agree that our complex security agenda must move forward. The joint statement on European security is an important document; it reaffirms principles of cooperation, and above all, our commitment to a secure, undivided, and democratic Europe.

The two Presidents also confirmed that to build that new Europe we must integrate a series of mutually supporting institutions. This is important. NATO is a central institution, but it cannot do the job alone. The basis for our work will be the principles of the OSCE, including human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also, as the joint statement points out, the right of every nation to choose the means to ensure its own security. This refers also to the right to enter treaties of alliance.

As major powers outside of Europe, the U.S. and Russia place special importance on using the OSCE framework to play a role in managing crises in Europe, and recent events in Albania are a case in point. The President has already described his discussions on NATO strategy, and in the security document the two sides stressed their determination to rise above the differences through practical steps. The key differences of vision will not derail practical cooperation. The NATO-Russia charter will be the centerpiece of this cooperation in Europe, and we've also shown that we can advance our interest in arms control at the same time.

There are specific references to NATO defense strategy, both conventional and military forces, which in fact describe existing NATO policy. And just to make that clear again, it has been stated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10 that NATO members have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor do they see any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include a reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document, which President Yeltsin welcomed.

Also, on March 14, the North Atlantic Council stated that -- quote -- "In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Also let me reiterate that there is no limit or any restriction on infrastructure in NATO.

So I think that on the whole we can all agree that we have had a successful summit where a very large agenda was dealt with successfully. And I will now let my colleagues explain the other parts of it.

Sandy Berger.

BERGER: If I could just summarize on the NATO-Russia piece, I would say that the Presidents agreed to disagree about NATO enlargement; that means NATO enlargement will go forward as scheduled, as the President has said, in Madrid, at the same time that NATO and Russia work on a charter that develop their own relationship.

Now, the other, second significant mention of this summit has been some substantial breakthroughs in the arms control area. There are three related breakthroughs. One was a firm commitment by President Yeltsin to promptly press for Duma ratification of START II. This commitment by President Yeltsin was facilitated by agreements on two other related matters. One is a set of guidelines or parameters for START III, and the second is, finally, after three years of negotiation, an agreement on ABM-TMD demarkation. That is the line between ABM systems that allows our theater systems to go forward. And let me speak for a moment about both of those statements.

On the START III guidelines that will provide the guidance for negotiations, they provide for reductions to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. For the first time the parties will be negotiating on actual warhead destruction as opposed to simply systems destruction. There will be a timetable for both START II and START III that, in a sense, mesh together. All of the destruction of systems for START II and START III will be completed by the year 2007, as the President indicated. The deactivation of warheads under START II will be extended one year from the beginning of 2003, the deadline, until the end of 2003, as the President indicated.

Obviously, the START II and START III aspects of this are subject to ratification by both our Senate and by the Duma.

Now, the third very significant agreement that has bedeviled arms control negotiators for, I believe, three or four years and has caused an awful lot of airfare miles on the part of many arms control people is the ABM-TMD issue. And we reached an agreement today which preserves the ABM treaty. Both sides affirm, again, the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty.

It permits all six of our current systems to go forward, unimpeded. It constrains only testing of theater missiles against strategic targets, not something that we have planned, and provides for consultations but no veto through the standing consultative commission in Geneva on new technologies that may be developed in the future, and continued cooperation between the United States and Russia on TMD cooperation -- for example, on sharing early warning information, on joint exercises, on possible joint R&D.

So let me just sum up by trying to state what I think the significance of these two agreements are. In terms of the START guidelines, it means, as the President has said, that within a decade there will be an 80-percent reduction if we are successful in START III of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads that were deployed at the end of the Cold War just five years ago.

Number two, that will provide greater strategic stability at lower levels and, therefore, reduce the nuclear danger for our peoples and for the entire world.

Number three, we will seek to destroy warheads for the first time -- strategic warheads for the first time of arms control. Four, we'll also address non-strategic nuclear weapons in START III -- that is, tactical nuclear weapons as a separate but related issue. And as I say, the significance of this, in part, is it will enable -- has enabled President Yeltsin to say that he will go forward promptly with ratification of START II.

The significance of the ABM-TMD agreement, I would say basically three -- one, we have demonstrated that the ABM treaty can be maintained as a cornerstone of strategic stability and still be adapted to deal with the very real threat of shorter-range missiles that we seek to deal with through our theater systems.

Second of all, it, as I says, reconfirms that all of our current systems can go forward unimpeded; and third, together with the START III guidelines, removes what has been an obstacle to START II ratification in the Duma.

Let me now ask Larry to briefly summarize the economic portions of the meeting.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: On economic issues, this was as

positive a summit as any that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have had. The two Presidents devoted much of the lunch discussion to economic issues. President Clinton congratulated President Yeltsin on his March 6th economic speech laying out his economic strategy, going forward, and on his appointment of a new reform-oriented economic team. . . .

Q: I'd like to address a question to Mr. Berger, and perhaps to Bob Bell. As recently as Monday afternoon, quite senior people in the administration were saying that there was no prospect of an ABM-TMD agreement anytime soon. Could you say something about how this came about?

BERGER: I think those same senior officials may have been saying it at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. I think that this was the issue perhaps that most time was spent on in the summit. Well, a good part of the morning session was spent on the Euro-security issues that Secretary Albright has discussed. They then moved to the START and ABM-TMD issues, which continued in various configurations through the afternoon.

I think, finally, when it became absolutely clear that we could both preserve the ABM system, but also proceed ahead with the six systems that we have under -- that we are proceeding with, that agreement fell into place. I'm not sure that we were expecting all that to happen as we got here, but the negotiations from our perspective were very successful.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

BELL: Mike suggests I just give a very short chronology. This started really three and a half years ago when the Clinton administration in the fall of '93, at the five-year ABM review conference, laid down a comprehensive proposal for demarkation that was based on one simple rule, and that was whether you ever tested a theater missile defense system against a strategic target.

That proposal was not accepted by the Russians, and after a year or two of not much progress, we made a fundamental decision to split the negotiations in half and concentrate on the so-called lower velocity theater missile defense systems where, indeed, we were able to reach agreement, and fully expected that we would be able to sign that and get on with the harder problems that we finally reached resolution on today.

But as those of you who have followed this know, there have been a lot of zigs and zags on this and many previous occasions where we thought that we had agreement to go forward with part one only to find when we got there that the Russians in effect were saying, until we finish the whole problem we're not going to split off part of it.

So going into the last several weeks, really intensive travel, as Sandy said. On this question of the remaining higher velocity systems, we have consistently run into a roadblock wherein the Russians were saying unless an additional set of constraints that were unacceptable to the administration and unacceptable to the chiefs in the military services were added to this demarcation regime, there wouldn't be an agreement on anything; indeed, there wouldn't be an agreement on the START issues and there wouldn't be an agreement on going forward with START II ratification in the Duma. And as Sandy just said, that position held until about 4:00 p.m. this afternoon when we had the breakthrough.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I say, too, that when I met with President Yeltsin in Moscow in January, he said, there are some questions that can only be resolved by Presidents. This question was resolved by two Presidents.

Q: To follow up Bob Bell, please. Bob, are you saying that the Russians, in fact, relinquished their demands for specific performance limits on higher speed, higher capability systems?

BELL: Well, I think it's important to recognize what's agreed and then what is not part of the regime. As Sandy said, we have agreed on a very important testing constraint. We agree that these higher-speed TMD systems -- and we have one principal program that's called the Navy Theater-wide, or Navy Upper Tier System -- for those faster TMD systems, you cannot test them against a strategic target without them getting captured then as an ABM.

Beyond that, we've agreed in this breakthrough agreement that we reached today that for those faster systems, we will share information on those programs with the Russians so they understand that they're designed to protect our troops and are not aimed at Russia, or designed to deal with the Russians; and second, that as newer technologies emerge, such as a laser

program, for example, we will consult with them and talk through the compliance issues they have in their minds if they feel there are compliance issues. But as Sandy said, there is no veto associated with that consultation.

Now, beyond that, we have an obligation, the President has an obligation to uphold the law, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. And he is required to ensure that all of our faster TMD systems comply with the ABM treaty. And we'll continue through the normal Defense Department process to conduct those compliance reviews, just as we did with the Navy Upper Tier System, to be able to certify to Congress that, indeed, it is consistent with the treaty.

Q: Was this agreement on ABM negotiated with Primakov, or was it negotiated with Russian military? And if so, who?

BERGER: It was negotiated at various levels, but it was an agreement reached by the two Presidents.

Q: General Shalikashvili, these concessions that the U.S. is making to the Russians as far as implementing START II, delaying some of the destruction of their silos or their warheads, dismantling some of those warheads, are these unilateral concessions or can the U.S. military similarly delay implementing aspects of START II as well?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I, first of all, wouldn't characterize them at all as concessions. I think what was agreed upon is in the best interest, security interest of the United States. Those time limits that Sandy outlined here are time limits that apply to both, both parties.

Q: Will the U.S. military delay implementing --

BERGER: Can I just add two things? Number one, don't forget that START II was negotiated four years ago and that those timetables were put in place four years ago, so that they're obviously -- there's been some change by virtue of that delay.

Second of all, in order for these -- our Senate has ratified START II with one set of timetables. If the Duma ratifies START II with a different set of timetables, we would have to submit something back to the Senate, either a protocol with those adjustments, or, ideally if we have START III completed in time,

we would submit both together -- the adjustment of the timetable and START III. But the START II obviously is not enforced until there is an exchange of instruments of ratification by the two governments.

Q: Secretary Albright, could you game out for us just how the next weeks go in terms of negotiating this NATO-Russian document? Would it require -- that there be a special U.S. negotiator? How do you see that playing out?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, you have to keep in mind this is a NATO-Russia agreement, and the chief negotiator is the Secretary General of NATO Solana. And he is the one that is going to be carrying on these discussions. And the process will unfold as rapidly as he gets the various pieces into place. So we are hopeful that that agreement as has been discussed here today and in other places will, in fact, be able to be agreed to by all the members fairly rapidly.

Q: And do you think it might be wrapped it before the President comes back to Europe in May?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's possible. But the important point here is that Madrid -- that is, the invitation for accession to new members -- will take place in July no matter what, and that that is on a track of its own. And we would hope, obviously, that the NATO-Russian charter could, in fact, be done as rapidly as possible. But the timetables of the two are not hinged to each other in any way -- two tracks.

Q: Can I follow up on that? As recently as two days ago, President Yeltsin was sounding non-negotiable on the idea that this could be anything but a treaty. Could you describe the process by which he came around to agreeing to a document that was something short of a treaty?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I would say that what was important to him was that there would be an agreement among the various NATO heads to the fact that this was an important agreement. And so, what it said in the language itself is that it would be signed by the leaders of NATO countries and Russia, and this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level.

And I can't speak for President Yeltsin, but the sense that I got from being in the meetings was that he felt that this was an

appropriate way to solidify what will clearly be a very important agreement.

BERGER: Can I just add one thing? This is not, obviously, an unprecedented circumstance. The Helsinki Accords, for example, were here in Helsinki -- were signed by leaders. They have had enormous impact. They are enduring commitments, but they don't represent legally binding commitments in that sense.

The second thing I would say is, there are aspects of all of this that relate to, for example, a CFE agreement, if we were to get one, which relate to START II and START III, which obviously would be submitted to Congress for approval.

Q: Madam Secretary, do you share President Yeltsin's confidence of his ability to get START II through communist and nationalist-dominated Duma which has made explicit its connection of ratification with NATO expansion, not merely with ABM issues? And if they do not ratify, if they turn down the treaty, what happens then?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov are committed to pushing, as they can, on ratification in the Duma. And I think that we have to watch the process unfold.

What I think is as important for the Duma as for all of us is that these agreements be seen in the national interest of the respective countries. And it is our belief that once people see how all these interlocking pieces are structured that all will feel comfortable that Russia is in no way threatened by the new NATO. As we have said, there is a new Russia, and there is also a new NATO. And that new NATO does not have a single enemy. And I think it's going to be very important for all to understand how all these documents fit together.

Q: Madam Secretary, could you give us a little of the atmospheric in the room? Did it ever get testy or intense, or what was it like this time? They both looked more tired than after previous summits.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me start, and then Sandy might want to continue. I actually found the whole day intense, but fascinating. Here were two high political leaders who were

engaged on a whole range of subjects on which they both had expert knowledge. And they covered -- they would begin discussions and set out what the agenda would be and at certain stages set them aside and then return. I think there is a really quite remarkable dynamic between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They were very glad to see each other again. And they worked hard. They clearly worked hard. They earned their pay today.

BERGER: Let me just add two things. One, in part -- in answer to your question, of course, if they didn't ratify START II, we would operate under START I for so long as that were the case. And that's another part of the answer.

I agree with what the Secretary has said. This was a day that started about 9:00 a.m. and the meetings went until 6:00 p.m. There were supposed to be fairly large breaks. There was really only one break which took place after lunch for about an hour in which there were some side meetings that the Secretary and others had. But this was eight hours of very intense one-on-one discussion -- very frank, very candid. The President was very, very clear in reaffirming our position, reaffirming the five no's that you've all heard so much about with respect to NATO enlargement. President Yeltsin was clear that they didn't like NATO expansion.

But I think this is a pivot point in which they preserved their position that they still don't like NATO enlargement, but they're going to deal with it. And I think that only came after a good deal of back-and-forth between the two leaders.

Q: Did they ever raise their voices?

BERGER: No. I'm not speaking about other people, but they didn't. (Laughter.)

Q: I wonder if the issue of the Baltic states was discussed at all, but, in particular, whether this -- right to choose the means to ensure their own security --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The subject did come up generally, and the President -- President Clinton made very clear that NATO was open to all market democracies and that we were not going to be a part of creating any new artificial dividing lines in Europe, and that the first countries that would enter NATO would not be the last.

And the phrase that you refer to was, in fact, in the statement as it was accepted, so I can only presume that it would also apply. And I think that this was one of the subjects where, as Sandy said, there was not total agreement. But President Clinton made completely clear what was the American position on that. And that is where some of these no's came in.

Q: Do you now expect within a reasonable time the Baltic states to become NATO applicants?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I'm not going to predict the timing of any of the applicants.

Q: Secretary Albright, can you tell us what happened to cause this late afternoon breakthrough on the ABM treaty, which then seemed to have created all this positive news that you had for us?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, as I said, I think that there are certain decisions that can only be made by Presidents, and we witnessed two strong Presidents making decisions which created a breakthrough.

Q: On the Denver summit, did Mr. Yeltsin indicate he is happy about that, or is he still sticking to his red jacket complaint of a few years ago that he's not yet received the status he deserves?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: My impression, when that was announced or when it was discussed, President Yeltsin seemed very pleased.

MCCURRY: Thank you. I want to thank all the briefers.

I also want to do one thing. I told a little story earlier about the President being awake at night. I want to make it absolutely clear that we are not speculating on what the cause of the bumps in the night were. It may, in fact, have been someone walking around on the ninth floor. And I also want to pay tribute to the fine staff here at the Hotel Inter-Continental for all the help they gave us. They did a wonderful job hosting us here.

Q: Mike, there were reports of demonstrators banging pots and pans outside the hotel in the middle of the night around the same

time. Is it possible that's what woke the President up?

MCCURRY: It's conceivable. That actually is what woke me up. They, I think, were human rights protesters who were outside the front of the hotel around 1:20 a.m., and they were blowing whistles and having a good time -- creating an enjoyable noise.

Q: -- the other 16 heads of states if they are all likely to sign?

MCCURRY: Oh, we have had extensive consultations within the North Atlantic Council. There's been a real deal of preview work done for a number of the items that were on the discussion agenda today. And we will, of course, be going forward with additional briefings to capitals and further consultations with our allies. I expect that we'll also very shortly be in a position to brief Secretary General Solana on this meeting since he has lead responsibility on behalf the Alliance in negotiating with the Russian Federation the details of the charter document.

Okay, thank you, everyone. We'll see you back in Washington Monday.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997  
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 13:25:24 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Washington Post on the Summit

Sunday, March 23 1997; Page C06 The Washington Post  
(EDITORIAL)

### A Useful Summit

RUSSIA'S POWER HAS faded steadily over the past 10 years, but the iconography of Moscow-Washington summits remains generally unchanged. That has produced an odd phenomenon. It used to be that two leaders of more or less equal geopolitical weight could

come to a hard-fought compromise and then go home and crow. Now there is not much to keep President Clinton from scoring an easy victory, but he has to be careful not to proclaim it. Such tact allows Russian President Boris Yeltsin to go on cooperating and to claim victory, or at least a draw, when he returns to Moscow. But it also complicates Mr. Clinton's efforts to convince skeptics here and in central Europe that he hasn't sold out U.S. or third-country interests.

In Helsinki Friday, Mr. Clinton got what he wanted -- de facto Russian acquiescence of NATO expansion eastward. In return, it appears that he gave Mr. Yeltsin small wins -- this June's G-7 meeting in Denver will be called "the Summit of the Eight" -- and "concessions" that are as much in U.S. interest as in Russia's, such as a pledge to further reduce nuclear-weapon arsenals. Still, both sides have to portray the package as a carefully balanced compromise.

All that said, it's also true that this was a useful, productive summit. Mr. Yeltsin came to Helsinki with a weak hand, but he played it well, both tactically and as a matter of principle. He couldn't stop NATO from accepting new members, such as Poland, but he could have lobbed some rhetorical hand grenades as he retreated and thereby shaken up Europe. That would have been self-defeating in the long run, but it might have felt good for a time. Instead he chose a statesman's role. Europe and the world were watching, he said before the eight-hour negotiations, "that we do not lose the partnership that has developed in recent years. . . . We will part from the summit as friends."

Potentially the most sensible accomplishment of the day was the two leaders' agreement on a new arms control treaty, known as Start III, under which each side would reduce, by the year 2007, its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads -- one-fifth of the levels of five years ago. Russia has yet to ratify Start II, in part because it would have to destroy thousands of one type of weapon and then, to reach parity with the United States, actually build a new class of missile. That's plainly not what Russia should be spending money on, even if it had the money. Friday's agreement provides the assurance that those new weapons won't have to be built. But whether that's enough to persuade Russia's parliament to ratify Start II is uncertain -- and without Start II, Start III can't happen.

Mr. Yeltsin also agreed to enter a new relationship with NATO,

even as he continues to register his opposition to the alliance's expansion, and he dropped his insistence that the new NATO-Russia charter be ratified by every NATO member's parliament. The merits of the new consultative mechanism will depend on the details; drawing Russia in is in everyone's interest -- as long as Mr. Clinton sticks to his commitment, repeated Friday, that Moscow will have "a voice, not a veto."

Now that the U.S.-Russia relationship is, for the moment, on track, Mr. Clinton can turn to a no-less-crucial challenge of shaping the new Europe. That is to ensure that the newly independent nations that will not enter NATO on the first go-round, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, emerge with their sovereignty and security well protected.

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Subject: Yeltsin Post-Summit

Sunday, March 23 1997; Page A25 The Washington Post

Summit Brings Yeltsin No Praise From Russians  
Leader's Political Will Remains A Major Question in Moscow

By David Hoffman  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, March 22 -- President Boris Yeltsin returned today from his talks with President Clinton in Helsinki to criticism that Russia gained nothing from the meeting and warnings that ratification of the START II strategic arms accord will depend on whether Yeltsin finally lobbies for it.

Clinton said in his radio address in the United States today that the summit is "leading the world away from the nuclear threat." But Russians said the potential for further progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons rests on whether Yeltsin can summon the

political will to do what he has not yet done -- persuade Russia's lower house of parliament, the State Duma, to approve the four-year-old treaty.

In Helsinki, Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to begin a new round of strategic arms negotiations, START III, to significantly reduce the levels of nuclear weapons. But their joint statement in Helsinki said those negotiations would begin only after START II takes effect.

The START II nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by Yeltsin and then-President George Bush in January 1993 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate last January, but it has made no headway in the Duma, where Communists and nationalists are the largest factions.

Yeltsin told a news conference in Helsinki, "I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice." However, backers of the treaty in the Russian parliament have complained for a long time that Yeltsin's support was practically invisible. They repeated today that unless he makes a concerted effort to overcome opposition in the parliament, the treaty will continue to languish.

"What we will really need is a real promotional campaign. Until now we haven't had this kind of campaign," said Vladimir Averchev, a legislator from the centrist Yabloko bloc who serves on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Yeltsin's long illness and the distractions of the presidential campaign last year have left the strategic arms accord low on parliament's list of priorities. Even those members who support ratification have bemoaned the lack of support from Yeltsin's administration in answering critics and explaining how it would affect Russia's weakened defense forces.

Yeltsin promised last year to get the treaty ratified by April, but then nothing happened. When then-Defense Secretary William J. Perry came to the Duma last October to make a pitch for the treaty, he ran into a buzz saw of opposition.

The START II treaty provides for between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads on each side. The treaty requires dismantling the more dangerous multi-warhead missiles, which the Soviet Union had deployed. But

critics say Russia now cannot afford to build up to the maximum level of single-warhead missiles that would be needed to remain on a par with the United States. The lower levels being discussed for a new treaty -- between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads -- would be easier for Russia, but the United States is insisting the START II treaty be ratified before new, lower levels are negotiated.<p>Moreover, the START II treaty has become enmeshed in a parliamentary backlash to NATO expansion among communists and nationalists. Yeltsin and Clinton remained deadlocked over NATO expansion at their talks but agreed to keep working on a NATO-Russia charter. Yeltsin dropped his earlier demand that the charter be legally binding.

"Yeltsin got what he deserved: a complete no," said Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. "The impression was as if he was summoned by the master who listened to him first and then said, 'The decision has already been taken.' " Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in last year's presidential election, said Yeltsin "got it in the backside from his friend Bill."

Another Duma member from Yabloko was also critical. Mikhail Yuryev told the Interfax news agency that "the enlarged NATO will be directed against Russia." He said Russia must "reexamine its foreign policy priorities" and "start to gradually form . . . new blocks to oppose NATO," suggesting Russia look to Iran, India and China as allies who "dislike the West."

A nationwide strike is being planned for Thursday because of wage and pension delays. Ruslan Aushev, president of the Russian republic of Ingushetia, told Interfax that Russia should not be obsessed with NATO expansion. "We now have so many problems, especially economic ones, which are far more important than this issue, problems that need to be solved without delay," he said.

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UPn 03/21 1710 Pena takes oath as Energy secretary



made.

Enclosed is a brief summary of the decisions related to nuclear weapons reductions made at the Summit. If you would like excerpts of transcripts from the press briefings of Clinton, Yeltsin and U.S. administration officials, or more information, please contact Kathy at the Disarmament Clearinghouse. More thorough reports and analysis will be available in the next issue of the Disarmament Clearinghouse UPDATE! (coming soon in early April).

In the weeks ahead we will have much work to do to solidify and further develop progress from the Summit. We will count on you to keep the pressure on to ensure continued progress with bold cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century.

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FOR MORE INFORMATION:

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The Disarmament Clearinghouse is a project of: Greenpeace, Peace Action, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Plutonium Challenge and Women's Action for New Directions.

#### START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS . . . .

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"There's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads being reduced in connection with that. That is significant. This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

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"I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues

which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high - more or less 80 percent. These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm very pleased with them."

President Clinton, March 21, 1997, Helsinki Finland.

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### START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS...

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#### SUMMARY

(The focus of this summary is nuclear weapons reductions.)

#### INDEX

##### START II and III

- Destroying Warheads
- Implementation -Russian Ratification of START II
  - Timeline Implementing START II & III
  - US Senate and Implementing START II & III

- ABM Treaty Agreement -US Senate Response to ABM Treaty
- NATO Expansion and Nuclear Weapons in Eastern Europe

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#### START II . . . & START III

"Today President Yeltsin agreed to seek the Duma's prompt ratification of START II, already ratified by the United States Senate. But we will not stop there. The United States is prepared to open negotiations on further strategic arms cuts with Russia under a START III immediately after the Duma ratifies START II. President Yeltsin and I agreed on guidelines for START III negotiations that will cap at 2,000 to 2,500 the number of strategic nuclear warheads each of our countries would retain and to finish the reductions of START III by the year 2007. Now think about it. This means that within a decade, we will have reduced both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals by 80 percent below their Cold War peak of just five years ago."

President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

## DESTROYING WARHEADS

If it becomes a treaty, the outline of a new strategic arms agreement announced yesterday by the United States and Russia would for the first time try to make nuclear cuts irreversible by guaranteeing that at least some of the old warheads are destroyed instead of stockpiled for possible future use.

The promise is given in a joint statement issued at the Helsinki summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that commits the two nations to include provisions in a new treaty, to be called START III, that require "transparency" and warhead "destruction." This is the arms control argot for letting the other side watch while warheads are sent to the trash heap or otherwise rendered permanently unusable. . .

The new plan for START III calls for steps to make permanent the limitations called for by two major nuclear arms reduction agreements negotiated earlier by the two countries: START I in 1991 and START II in 1993. At present, the treaties are slated to expire after 15 years.

In another novel development yesterday, the two sides agreed to consider applying the principle of "transparency" to the plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, helping to ensure it cannot be used later to form the explosive guts of new weapons that could be manufactured if relations ever turned highly sour.

The aim of the new plan is to correct in the next arms control treaty what critics have called a major deficiency of the START I and START II accords, namely that neither accord actually required the destruction of any nuclear warheads.

Instead, partly because both nations were nervous about moving too rapidly to reduce their nuclear arsenals and partly because they were sensitive to the security implications of allowing intensive scrutiny of how they handled these weapons, the accords called only for destruction of the means to deliver some of the nuclear arms held by the two nations.

The earlier accords called, for example, for the wings of certain strategic bombers to be clipped off by an agreed date, for the filling up or withdrawal of tubes that hold some of the nuclear-tipped missiles that could be launched from submarines,

and the blowing up of various land-based silos that could be used to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

With no language relating to the warheads themselves, the treaties effectively allowed each side to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that are currently in storage as a deliberate hedge against the advent of a new Cold War. Although each side claims to have dismantled thousands of warheads since the late-1980s, neither side is certain today of precisely how many such weapons remain because all of this work has occurred in secret, without any mutual inspections.

"This is really quite significant," Robert S. Norris, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said of the plan to require "transparency" of warhead destruction and residual arsenals in START III. "If all of this is successful, it will prevent the retention of secret stockpiles which engender distrust."

A senior U.S. official who participated in the negotiations that led to yesterday's agreement explained that with arsenals of deployed weapons to be limited to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads in a new START III agreement -- instead of the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads allowed by START II -- both governments had recognized the increasing security risk posed by allowing unmonitored stockpiles of stored weapons.

An unstated U.S. concern behind yesterday's agreement is that old Russian warheads kept in storage after being taken off strategic missiles or bombers might eventually be subject to theft by terrorists or illicit sale to nations in the Middle East or elsewhere.- from: Washington Post, "Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New" By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham March 22, 1997

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## IMPLEMENTING START II AND III - RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF START II

Q: "You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? . . ." Press Pool, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

YELTSIN: "As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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APO 03/22 1034 Communists Knock Summit Deals

... At a news conference after the summit, Yeltsin jauntily predicted that he would have no difficulty winning support from the Duma, the lower house of parliament, for the START II nuclear disarmament agreement.

But he will have to do it over the fierce opposition of the Communist Party, the largest bloc in the Duma. Communist chief Gennady Zyuganov charged that Yeltsin was "guilty of completely betraying the national interests of the country."...

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Yeltsin promised last year to get the treaty ratified by April,

but then nothing happened. When then-Defense Secretary William J. Perry came to the Duma last October to make a pitch for the treaty, he ran into a buzz saw of opposition. . .

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"Yeltsin got what he deserved: a complete no," said Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. "The impression was as if he was summoned by the master who listened to him first and then said, 'The decision has already been taken.' " Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in last year's presidential election, said Yeltsin "got it in the backside from his friend Bill." ...

The Washington Post, March 23 1997, "Summit Brings Yeltsin No Praise From Russians Leader's Political Will Remains A Major Question in Moscow" By David Hoffman.

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#### IMPLEMENTING START II AND III - TIMELINE

"In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II. . ."

President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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#### IMPLEMENTING START II & III U.S. SENATE -

"Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this."

"But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue."

"So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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#### ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM) AGREEMENT

"We also reached agreement in our work to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our arms control efforts. Distinguishing between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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"Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II, because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to

prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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## US SENATE RESPONSE TO ABM TREATY AGREEMENT

The agreement announced yesterday outlined terms for a deal still to be finalized that would restrict the capabilities of theater defenses to a demarcation standard defined earlier in the Senate. That is, the Pentagon's fastest, longest-range theater systems would remain exempt from ABM treaty coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers/second.

But other terms went farther than some congressional experts had expected by including a provision "not to develop, test or deploy space-based TMD [theater missile defense] interceptors." The agreement also stipulated that both sides "will exchange detailed information annually" on their theater defense plans and programs.

Although administration officials said the agreement still would permit the United States to proceed with all six antimissile systems under development, GOP missile defense experts in Congress assailed it as an unwarranted and unacceptable set of constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

"The ABM treaty was not designed to impose limits on our theater missile defense systems, only on national defense systems," said Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a leading missile defense proponent. "Imposing limits on interceptor speeds, which the president continues to support, will inevitably result in the future dumbing down of theater missile defense systems, putting the lives of our soldiers overseas at greater risk."

Clinton made no mention yesterday of whether he intended to submit the missile defense agreement to the Senate for ratification. Whether he is required to do so has been another point of bitter dispute between congressional Republicans and the White House.

"The Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in both houses that we didn't want the president to engage in these agreements," said Rep. Bob Livingston (R-La.), the Appropriations Committee

chairman. "He's kept these as secret as he possibly could. We knew they were negotiating them, but we had no idea they would sign off on agreements to virtually leave us defenseless against anyone who's not a party to them."

(from: Washington Post, "Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New" By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham March 22, 1997.)

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#### NATO EXPANSION & NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

"We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal question here."

"We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in the agreement with NATO."

"And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all heads of state of all 16 members nations of NATO. . . And we will believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for all states whose leaders signed this document."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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Q: "And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?" (From Press Pool March 21, Helsinki, Finland)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: "Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean many new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second

class members."

"What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member? One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in."

"Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. . . ."

"Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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Subject: Summit Analysis

The New York Times, March 24, 1997

OPINION - FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Not Yet

WASHINGTON -- So it's all O.K. now?

That's the word from the Clinton folks. They got the mood music they were looking for in Helsinki: The Russians will complain about NATO expansion, but Boris Yeltsin will accept the goodies the U.S. offered him to tolerate NATO's moving closer to

Russia's border. Therefore, we will have the best of all worlds: NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, vague assurances to the Balts and others left out that they can join later and even some progress on arms control thrown in to boot. As one U.S. official quipped to me, referring to my own criticism of NATO expansion: "When do we get to see the headline 'Clinton Right on NATO Expansion, Critics All Wrong.'?"

Not yet.

To be fair, if Clinton is able to achieve this best-of-all-worlds scenario, it would indeed merit real praise. My priority is that the arms control treaties with Russia be implemented and the reform process there be enhanced. That is what would really secure European stability. If the Administration can deliver both, while also pursuing its dubious, politically inspired NATO expansion scheme, then it would be churlish to oppose this Helsinki package.

But we are a long way from drawing that conclusion. To begin with, many of the key issues involving NATO expansion remain unresolved: What will happen to all the countries, particularly the Balts, that don't get into NATO now? How will the U.S. Congress react when it discovers that Clinton's Helsinki package comes with a price tag of at least \$40 billion, and a U.S. military commitment to defend the Polish border? How will Russia's parliament react to this deal?

But beyond these unanswered questions, I remain a skeptic because this Helsinki "success" is based on two white lies. The first is that while the Russians don't like NATO expansion, they've decided to make the best of it. In truth, that is not what Helsinki demonstrates. What it shows is that "Russia has concluded it is simply too weak to stop expansion," notes Johns Hopkins University foreign policy specialist Michael Mandelbaum, a leading critic of NATO expansion.

And the problem with expanding NATO on such terms, Mandelbaum argues, is that up to now "the entire post-cold war security structure in Europe, whether the unification of Germany or the conventional and nuclear arms control treaties, has been based on Russian consent. NATO expansion will be a departure from that. After NATO expands, the new European order will rest not on Russian consent, but on Russian weakness."

In other words, what Helsinki proves is that we won the cold war. But we knew that. The question is: Are we making the most of it? Should NATO expansion be a priority, even if it weakens Yeltsin or diminishes Russian cooperation elsewhere, such as against Iran?

The other white lie is the Clinton argument that expanding NATO will stabilize democratic reform in Central Europe and be good for Russia, because NATO has changed and Russia has changed. In truth, the way to strengthen free-market democracy in Central Europe is by bringing these nations into the E.U. common market, not by giving them NATO nukes. But more important, the very reason Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic want to join NATO is that they think NATO has not changed -- that it is still an anti-Russian alliance -- and because they feel that Russia has not changed -- that it is still the Soviet Union. (Never mind that Russia now has a cabinet led by economic reformers more progressive than half the nations now trying to join NATO.)

What Clinton said to Yeltsin in Helsinki was: We will pay you to pretend that NATO expansion is something other than what it is. We will pay you to forget that NATO is expanding because you're weak and because we still see you as the main threat to European stability, not as an equal member of the club. For now, Mr. Yeltsin is willing to be bought because he has no choice. But we should have no illusions: Mr. Clinton's "New Europe" is being built on white lies.

Mamma always said: When you don't call things by their real name, you get in trouble. That's what's going on here. I don't know when or where, but this sort of diplomacy will lead to trouble. So pardon me for sticking with the headline: "Clinton Still Wrong on NATO Expansion, Critics Still Right."

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The New York Times March 24, 1997

In Clinton-Yeltsin Sidelight: Progress on Arms Control  
By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- While focused on NATO expansion and Russia's place in a new Europe, the summit meeting between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki last week also

produced important progress on arms control.

Nuclear weapons used to be the central issue between the Soviet Union and the United States, but now Moscow and Washington want stability at lower, safer and cheaper levels of armament and expenditure.

In Helsinki, the two presidents agreed -- subject to approval by both legislatures, which will not be easy -- to cut the number of long-range warheads on each side to no more than 2,000 to 2,500 by the end of 2007 in a third strategic arms reduction treaty, START III.

While some retired generals like Lee Butler, once head of the Strategic Air Command, now urge elimination of all nuclear weapons, START III would represent a cut far below current stockpiles and one the Pentagon would not have been likely to approve even a few years ago.

Equally important, START III would require for the first time the destruction of warheads themselves under inspection, not allowing the nuclear material to be stored and reused. The treaty guidelines would also make permanent the 1991 START I and 1993 START II accords -- assuming the Russian Parliament finally ratifies the latter, as Yeltsin promises. Those agreements are now to expire after 15 years.

The START III numbers represent a cut of nearly 80 percent from the high point of nuclear stockpiles, fewer than seven years ago. START III is a cut of about 65 percent in the total of deployed long-range warheads permitted under START I and a cut of about a third from the 3,000 to 3,500 allowed under START II.

If the Russian Parliament refuses to ratify START II, then START I limits remain in place; Congress has mandated that the United States not reduce unilaterally to fewer than 6,000 warheads.

The idea of the START III guidelines is to push the Russian Parliament to see the benefits of ratifying START II, which is a prerequisite. START II requires the elimination of all land-based multiple-warhead missiles, the backbone of Russia's force, while allowing Washington to keep its submarine-based multiple-warhead missiles. Some Russians regarded START II as unfair as soon as it was signed, but American officials argue that the old Soviet force is decaying anyway, and that Moscow hasn't the money to modernize it.

START III would preserve parity without the need for Russia to build more single-warhead missiles to reach START II limits. Given that START II was signed in 1993, the Americans also agreed -- subject to ratification -- to extend by one year the deadline a year for removing warheads from weapons due to be destroyed, to the end of 2003. They also agreed to extend the deadline to destroy the launchers themselves -- bombers, missile silos or submarines -- to the end of 2007. Washington will continue to help pay for the destruction.

The two presidents also agreed how to distinguish shorter-range, "theater" missile defenses, intended to protect troops and ships, from longer-range strategic missile defenses that are all but banned under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile, or ABM treaty. The agreement allows Washington to proceed with all theater missile defenses under development.

To reassure Moscow that the ABM treaty will not be violated and that Russian strategic nuclear parity with America will not be undermined, the pact limits the speed and range of target missiles and commits both sides not to develop, test or deploy space-based theater missile interceptors or to deploy such missiles against each other.

Some congressional Republicans want no curbs on the development of theater missile defenses, while others want to scrap the ABM treaty. But Clinton administration officials say Moscow's acceptance of current U.S. theater missile development should satisfy Congress.

The two presidents also issued a statement promising to push for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention before it comes into force on April 29.

While Washington is legally bound to destroy chemical weapons anyway, Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has held up a vote to bargain for treaty changes and a reorganization that could put the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency back under the State Department.

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From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997

Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 06:39:23 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: Republicans on ABM Deal

RTos 03/24 0652 Republicans Denounce U.S.-Russia Missile Deal

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - House Speaker Newt Gingrich and two other key Republicans on Sunday denounced an anti-ballistic missile agreement signed by President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin last week.

In a joint statement, Gingrich, House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bob Livingston of Louisiana and Rep. Chris Cox of California said the accord would halt the development of the most effective possible ballistic missile defense.

"If allowed to stand, this agreement will place the lives of our brave fighting men and women -- and ultimately millions of Americans -- in jeopardy," the three lawmakers said.

At their summit, Clinton and Yeltsin also reached a series of arms agreements, including a pledge to make further deep cuts in long-range nuclear arms.

But it was the missile-defense accord that drew the ire of the Georgia Republican and his colleagues.

U.S. officials said the two presidents late in their summit settled a long-running dispute over the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and can now each develop theater missile defenses to tackle new threats.

U.S. officials said the two leaders agreed to define which theater missile systems would not violate the ABM treaty, but the accord would permit deployment of all six missile interceptor programs under development by the Pentagon.

But Republicans took issue with a provision "not to develop, test or deploy space-based (theater missile defense) interceptors," arguing it would place unacceptable constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

Specifically, some Republicans lawmakers have been pushing a proposal to expand a missile monitoring system already used aboard Navy ships into a system creating a ballistic shield, a scaled-down version of President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program that would be prohibited under the agreement.

A Gingrich aide explained that the accord would limit development of such existing systems which are not covered by the ABM treaty, although it would not prevent developing a ballistic shield system "from scratch."

Diplomats and politicians were setting standards that should be determined by engineers and scientists, he said.

"We cannot allow this deliberate weakening of our national defense, nor a dangerous reliance on hollow arms control agreements," the congressmen said in their statement.

REUTE

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Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 06:13:10 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Conclusion Briefing

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki, Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997

QUESTIONS RELATED TO NATO, START II AND III, AND ARMS CONTROL (NATO)

Q. Boris Nikolayich, our first impression is that there was not breakthrough on NATO here in Helsinki. Tell me can there be some kind of movement forward before the Madrid Summit.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, a very principled progress, and they consist of the

following: that, yes indeed, we do maintain our positions.

We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal question here.

We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in the agreement with NATO.

And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all heads of state of all 16 members nations of NATO. This is a very principled issue, and we came to agreement on this with President Bill Clinton. That is, all states, all nations -- and this will take place before Madrid -- all heads of state will sign this document. We sign together with Bill Clinton, and then there will be a signature of the general secretary of NATO. And we will believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for all states whose leaders signed this document.

So this is a very principled progress. We didn't talk about this just yesterday and the day before. We couldn't have. We can only talk about this now during these minutes once we've signed the statements.

Q. After all that you've been told about how the world has changed and that there will be no nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, do you still regard NATO's enlargement as a danger to Russia?

And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: No, of course not. No one will think of these

as being secondary states. No one is calling that. That's not what's involved here. However, I believe, and Bill believes the same thing, Bill Clinton believes the same, that these decisions that can be taken, they will be taken by all leaders of these nations, which is extremely, extremely important. I already mentioned this.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean any new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second class members.

What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member" One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in.

Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. What is the most important thing NATO is doing today. Working in Bosnia. Who is NATO 00 NATO has a major partnership with Russia in Bosnia, and a partnership for Peace, where we've done joint military exercises and other things.

Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil.

Look, we just announced an agreement here that will reduce nuclear weapons, if we can implement it, within a decade by 80 percent below their Cold War high -- number one. Number two, we have -- the NATO members that have just tabled a proposal on Conventional Forces in Europe which would put strict limits and would freeze the conventional forces we could have in Europe now, along with having strict limits in the Visegrad countries themselves, which would be the areas where you might expect an old difficulty to arise in new circumstances.

(ABM Treaty)

Q. (Through interpreter.) The Interfax Agency. President Clinton, it is know that in your Congress there is some criticism frequently that you are a critic of -- a supporter of the ABM treaty. Today's meeting, did that convince you to strengthen the ABM treaty?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: You mean -- some people have criticized me in my Congress because I do support the ABM treaty. Yes, that's accurate; they have.

I do support the ABM treaty. I think it's important. I believe in it. And we have, I believe, strengthened the chances that the ABM treaty will survive by the agreement we have made today and the distinctions we have drawn between the missiles that are covered by the ABM treaty and by theater-defense missiles. I believe that very strongly.

There are those in the Congress of the United States -- but they are not a majority -- let me emphasize they are not a majority -- who would undermine the ABM treaty because they don't believe it's in our interest I believe they're wrong. I believe that the ABM treaty has served us well and will continue to sever us well, especially in view of the questions that we have clarified today between us.

...

Q The question is to the Russian President. Boris Mikolaevich, you said that this meeting stated a new phase for these U.S.-Russian relations. What precisely new was introduced into these relations?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first of all we finally were able to determine our positions on issues of European security. We've come to settle our position on NATO and we have described for ourselves the parameters of the NATO-Russian agreement.

Secondly there's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads is being reduced in connection wit that. That is significant. This is a very principled issues, and its encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world.

...

Finally a breakthrough has been made. A joint statement has been signed. We've discussed these issues in great deal with President Clinton. And on chemical weapons, that too.

Any issue we handled we've been able to manage a major breakthrough. We didn't discuss any small issues. We talked only about strategic issues. And on all five issues we were able to find an answer, we were able to find a common point of view. And that's what is reflected in our joint statements.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If I might just support that question, because I think that's a question all the Americans and all the Russians and others will be interested in.

What came out of this meeting that was different? One, the idea that there will be a NATO-Russia agreement that all the leaders will support. That's a significant thing. We agreed to disagree about the question of expansion, but we agreed that there must be a partnership between NATO and Russia going forward into the future.

Two the notion that Russia should play a larger role in international economic institutions, and that if certain internal changes are made, which President Yeltsin has already announced his support for, then the United States will make a more vigorous effort to facilitate investment in Russia.

And third, I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high, more or less 80 percent.

These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm very pleased with them.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You've touched on a very current issue which has to be clarified all the way. Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II,

because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II.

Q. Mr. President and Mr. President, one of the most contentious aspects of a potential agreement of charter between NATO and Russia was whether or not it would have to be legally binding on the 16 members of NATO or would simply be a political statement of intent. This agreement that you hope to forge with NATO, do you expect that the legislatures, the U.S. Senate, for example, would have to ratify the agreement, or it would simply be a statement that President Clinton would support?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, we intend to send this treaty and send this agreement to the state Duma for ratification. That's what our intention is. At the same time, we understand that if 16 states will have to coordinate this issue with their parliaments, this will take up many, many months. And therefore, we've come to an agreement that, given these conditions, it will be quite enough, or course, given the goodwill of these states, simply a signature from the -- of the leaders of these countries that would be affixed to this agreement.

How the U.S. would act in this regard, let President Bill Clinton Respond.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you look at the language, President Yeltsin has basically said it accurately. We think it's important to get this agreement up, get it signed, and get it observed -- have it observed. And there are so many of the NATO countries -- what we have called for is for each and every member country to make -- and I believe the exact language of our agreement is, "an enduring commitment at the highest political level." And President Yeltsin described to you how we will manifest that. if our secretary-general, Mr. Solana, and Foreign Minister Primakov succeed in negotiating this agreement within the time frame that we all anticipate they will be able to, the we would expect to all meet somewhere and publicly affix our signatures and reaffirm

our commitment to the terms of the agreement.

Q: The question is to the U.S. President. Mr. President, you, both today and on earlier occasions, said that you intend to transform in some way the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After today's meeting with President Yeltsin, what specifically do the United States plan to do to change the current structure of NATO? Thank you.

CLINTON: Well, first let me point out we have already transformed NATO. When I became President there was no Partnership for Peace, for example. There were no joint exercises where you had Russian troops, American troops, Polish troops, French troops, others -- we didn't have these sorts of things. We didn't have a Partnership for Peace with more than two dozen other countries regularly participating with us now in military planning and training and sharing and working together. And we certainly had nothing like our cooperation in Bosnia.

I believe that the old NATO was basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact, and that's why I've been very sensitive to why the Russian people or the Russian leaders would wonder about what the new NATO is. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is no Cold War. We just made an agreement to work to cut our nuclear arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War height, which I would remind you existed just five years ago.

And what we need to recognize is there will be new security threats to Europe. And you can see them. You have dealt -- we've seen them in Bosnia, we've seen them in the other ethnic, religious and racial traumas that you have dealt with along your borders. You see it in the continuing disputes between nations within the European Community.

What we want to do is to provide a way for more and more countries, either as members or as members of the Partnership for Peace -- Finland is a good example of an active member of the Partnership for Peace -- or because of the special relationship of Russia and the special role Russia will play in the future of Europe and security in the context of the Russia-NATO agreement, we want to provide an opportunity within which all of us can deal with the security aspects of trying to create a Europe that is undivided and democratic for the first time in history.

I would remind you, go back and read from the dawn of nation states on the continent of Europe, there has never been a time when all the people were living under democratic governments and were free of foreign domination. That has never happened. So we are simply trying to create the conditions in which we can grow together.

Will there be questions? Will there be skepticism along the way? Will there be uncertainty? Of course, there will be. But we are not attempting to draw a different dividing line in Europe, just somewhat further to the East. What we are trying to do is to develop structures that can grow and evolve over time so that there will be a united effort by free people to join their resources together to reinforce each other's security, each other's independence, and their common interdependence. And I believe we will succeed at that.

Q: To both Presidents, both of you have had problems with your individual parliaments, and yet --

CLINTON: Seems to be a curse of democracy.

Q: Yes. You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? And to Mr. Clinton, how can you assure Mr. Yeltsin that you won't have a rebellion in the Congress over the anti-missile defense agreement?

YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice. (Laughter.)

CLINTON: Boy, I wish I could give that answer. (Laughter.) Let me answer -- you give me an opportunity, actually, to point out the full elements of this timetable on START III. And for those of you -- if you haven't had time to study it, I want to make full disclosure here.

Number one, I expect that our Congress, those who believe in the ABM system but who want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, which may someday protect all of our friends in different circumstances, including our friends in Russia -- who knows what use we will put to theater missile defenses when we have troops that have to be protected in the future -- I would

think that the members of Congress who believe in the ABM treaty but want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, will be quite pleased by this agreement. I think that is not where the problem could come.

Let me explain what we agreed to today -- and I did it, I might say, with the full concurrence of General Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Cohen, who is not here today but we checked with him.

In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II.

Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this.

But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue.

So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than

President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people.

Q: Boris Nikolayevich, what's your thought on the version that the Russian giving way on the issue of NATO's expansion to the East will be paid by financial generosity of the West?

YELTSIN: First of all, I don't see it that way at all. I don't see this generosity at all. If in the statement on economic issues which we had just signed, if there are formulas in there that investments will be supported, investments going to Russia, and certain sums of money will be appropriated by the American side, that does not mean that this is assistance to Russia. This is assistance to the private sector making investments in Russia. This is assistance to American citizens, not to Russia. Why do you see an exchange here? There's no exchange.

And I categorically disagree with that formulation that in place of one we sort of bartered here and as a result of that we have come up with these ideas. I don't agree with that. I should say that even the order of looking at these issues -- and we've held four tours lasting from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours each -- the order of looking at these issues was as follows.

First, we looked at Europe security and NATO. Secondly, the ABM issue. Then we took up chemical weapons. Then we talked about START III, that is, the reduction of further strategic weapons. And only after that we started talking of economic issues. I did not know that the American side was preparing this. But you see, first we resolved and discussed all of these issues, and only then we approached the economic question. This should tell you that this was not a case where we used this as a poker chip.

CLINTON: I'd just like to support that. And let me say, first of all, what President Yeltsin said about the order in which we took these issues up is absolutely right, first. Second, I believe that the economic announcements which were made today are in the interest of the American people, both directly and indirectly. . .

Q: I would like to ask something from both of you. How would you react, sir, if Finland would express its willingness to join

NATO?

CLINTON: Maybe I should -- you asked both. Since I discussed this with the President -- he brought it up with me. President Ahtisaari said to me that he thought Finland had made the right decision to be a member of the Partnership for Peace and to maintain its independence and its ability to work constructively with Russia and with NATO nations, and not be a member of NATO, and that he had no intention of asking that Finland be considered for membership. But he thought that the policy of being able to be considered was a good one because it reinforced the feeling of independence and the security that Finland and other nations who decide to maintain relative independence and membership in the Partnership for Peace had.

So I can do no more than to support the statement that your own President has made about this.

YELTSIN: I, too, would like to respond on this issue. I should say that the reason we respect Finland as a state -- its nation, its people and leadership -- is the fact that Finland is implementing a course of a neutral state, of nonaligning itself to any block. This is very important. This creates a very stable and calm balance within the country. This facilitates good neighborly relations with Russia.

We, with Finland, have a turnover of trade of \$4.7 billion U.S. This is 40 percent of the entire turnover of trade. Find me another country that could equal this sort of turnover in trade with Russia. There is no other country. And for that reason, I believe -- and, of course, this is the matter entirely of the people of Finland and its government, but that which the President of the Finnish Republic, President Ahtisaari, stated very clearly that he is not joining any blocks. This calls for the feeling of respect for him.

Q: The focus question is this: In the Russia-NATO agreement, as envisaged, if there is disagreement -- Russia disagrees with something NATO wants to do, does Russia have a veto power? The broader question is this: In the Second World War, it was very simple, we were enemies. We were allies I meant to say. During the Cold War, it was very simple, we were enemies. Today, what word describes this relationship where the situation is not so clear and not so simple?

YELTSIN: I can respond by saying that the way we solve these issues is by consensus. That's how it is today, indeed, among the NATO countries. And that's how it will be once we conclude an agreement between Russia and NATO, already with the participation of Russia.

CLINTON: The short answer to your question is, a voice but not a veto. And the answer to your second question is that we are partners, and like all partners, in any partnership, starting with society's most basic partnership, a marriage and a family, and going to business partnerships, there are sometimes disagreements. But partnerships are bound together by shared values, shared interests, and the understanding that what you have in common is always more important than what divides you.

And so you work for the consensus that President Yeltsin outlined. And that's where we are, and I think that's exactly where we ought to be. And that's why we are not going to have the kind of cataclysmic bloodshed in the 21st century that we saw through three world wars, the Cold War, and countless others in the century. If we can stay with that attitude and work on it, we will have a Europe that's not only peaceful, but free and undivided.

Thank you very much.

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To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Albright and Berger on Summit

Excerpts From:

Transcript: Briefing by Albright, Berger, Summers on Summit  
SecState sees "historic progress" at Helsinki

Helsinki -- Secretary of State Albright told reporters March 21 that "we have just concluded a major summit in which there was

historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia.

"We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand," the Secretary of State said.

"In other words," she said, "by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

"What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation."

Following is the White House transcript:

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)  
March 21, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS

MCCURRY: An all-star cast here to brief you a little bit about the President's very successful summit with President Yeltsin today. I've asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to start first. She will be followed by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, followed by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. I also have General Shalikashvili here and Robert Bell who is the Senior Director for the National Security Council for Defense Policy. They're available, too, to either speak or to take any questions you may have on the arms control aspects of today's summit.

A pleasure to have them all here. Thank you all.

Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Well, we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia. We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand.

In other words, by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation.

Summits are different than they used to be. These meetings are not organized to struggle through a crisis, as in the past. They are increasingly a reflection of a mature relationship, which means that they take into account differences, but don't allow those differences to derail a common agenda. For example, we made major progress on arms control here in Helsinki, despite some of the differences on NATO enlargement.

It's very important to keep two aspects in mind -- the future European security cooperation was handled in the broadest possible framework. NATO enlargement is a central issue, but our overall goal is to build wide cooperation between Russia, U.S. and Europe.

The two Presidents talked through their differences on NATO and they understand each other's positions better. They are not likely to agree on everything, but they do agree that our complex security agenda must move forward. The joint statement on European security is an important document; it reaffirms principles of cooperation, and above all, our commitment to a secure, undivided, and democratic Europe.

The two Presidents also confirmed that to build that new Europe we must integrate a series of mutually supporting institutions. This is important. NATO is a central institution, but it cannot

do the job alone. The basis for our work will be the principles of the OSCE, including human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also, as the joint statement points out, the right of every nation to choose the means to ensure its own security. This refers also to the right to enter treaties of alliance.

As major powers outside of Europe, the U.S. and Russia place special importance on using the OSCE framework to play a role in managing crises in Europe, and recent events in Albania are a case in point. The President has already described his discussions on NATO strategy, and in the security document the two sides stressed their determination to rise above the differences through practical steps. The key differences of vision will not derail practical cooperation. The NATO-Russia charter will be the centerpiece of this cooperation in Europe, and we've also shown that we can advance our interest in arms control at the same time.

There are specific references to NATO defense strategy, both conventional and military forces, which in fact describe existing NATO policy. And just to make that clear again, it has been stated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10 that NATO members have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor do they see any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include a reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document, which President Yeltsin welcomed.

Also, on March 14, the North Atlantic Council stated that -- quote -- "In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Also let me reiterate that there is no limit or any restriction on infrastructure in NATO.

So I think that on the whole we can all agree that we have had a successful summit where a very large agenda was dealt with successfully. And I will now let my colleagues explain the other parts of it.

Sandy Berger.

BERGER: If I could just summarize on the NATO-Russia piece, I would say that the Presidents agreed to disagree about NATO enlargement; that means NATO enlargement will go forward as scheduled, as the President has said, in Madrid, at the same time that NATO and Russia work on a charter that develop their own relationship.

Now, the other, second significant mention of this summit has been some substantial breakthroughs in the arms control area. There are three related breakthroughs. One was a firm commitment by President Yeltsin to promptly press for Duma ratification of START II. This commitment by President Yeltsin was facilitated by agreements on two other related matters. One is a set of guidelines or parameters for START III, and the second is, finally, after three years of negotiation, an agreement on ABM-TMD demarkation. That is the line between ABM systems that allows our theater systems to go forward. And let me speak for a moment about both of those statements.

On the START III guidelines that will provide the guidance for negotiations, they provide for reductions to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. For the first time the parties will be negotiating on actual warhead destruction as opposed to simply systems destruction. There will be a timetable for both START II and START III that, in a sense, mesh together. All of the destruction of systems for START II and START III will be completed by the year 2007, as the President indicated. The deactivation of warheads under START II will be extended one year from the beginning of 2003, the deadline, until the end of 2003, as the President indicated.

Obviously, the START II and START III aspects of this are subject to ratification by both our Senate and by the Duma.

Now, the third very significant agreement that has bedeviled arms control negotiators for, I believe, three or four years and has caused an awful lot of airfare miles on the part of many arms control people is the ABM-TMD issue. And we reached an agreement today which preserves the ABM treaty. Both sides affirm, again, the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty.

It permits all six of our current systems to go forward, unimpeded. It constrains only testing of theater missiles

against strategic targets, not something that we have planned, and provides for consultations but no veto through the standing consultative commission in Geneva on new technologies that may be developed in the future, and continued cooperation between the United States and Russia on TMD cooperation -- for example, on sharing early warning information, on joint exercises, on possible joint R&D.

So let me just sum up by trying to state what I think the significance of these two agreements are. In terms of the START guidelines, it means, as the President has said, that within a decade there will be an 80-percent reduction if we are successful in START III of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads that were deployed at the end of the Cold War just five years ago.

Number two, that will provide greater strategic stability at lower levels and, therefore, reduce the nuclear danger for our peoples and for the entire world.

Number three, we will seek to destroy warheads for the first time -- strategic warheads for the first time of arms control. Four, we'll also address non-strategic nuclear weapons in START III -- that is, tactical nuclear weapons as a separate but related issue. And as I say, the significance of this, in part, is it will enable -- has enabled President Yeltsin to say that he will go forward promptly with ratification of START II.

The significance of the ABM-TMD agreement, I would say basically three -- one, we have demonstrated that the ABM treaty can be maintained as a cornerstone of strategic stability and still be adapted to deal with the very real threat of shorter-range missiles that we seek to deal with through our theater systems.

Second of all, it, as I says, reconfirms that all of our current systems can go forward unimpeded; and third, together with the START III guidelines, removes what has been an obstacle to START II ratification in the Duma.

Let me now ask Larry to briefly summarize the economic portions of the meeting.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: On economic issues, this was as positive a summit as any that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have had. The two Presidents devoted much of the lunch discussion to economic issues. President Clinton congratulated

President Yeltsin on his March 6th economic speech laying out his economic strategy, going forward, and on his appointment of a new reform-oriented economic team. . . .

Q: I'd like to address a question to Mr. Berger, and perhaps to Bob Bell. As recently as Monday afternoon, quite senior people in the administration were saying that there was no prospect of an ABM-TMD agreement anytime soon. Could you say something about how this came about?

BERGER: I think those same senior officials may have been saying it at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. I think that this was the issue perhaps that most time was spent on in the summit.

Well, a good part of the morning session was spent on the Euro-security issues that Secretary Albright has discussed. They then moved to the START and ABM-TMD issues, which continued in various configurations through the afternoon.

I think, finally, when it became absolutely clear that we could both preserve the ABM system, but also proceed ahead with the six systems that we have under -- that we are proceeding with, that agreement fell into place. I'm not sure that we were expecting all that to happen as we got here, but the negotiations from our perspective were very successful.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

BELL: Mike suggests I just give a very short chronology. This started really three and a half years ago when the Clinton administration in the fall of '93, at the five-year ABM review conference, laid down a comprehensive proposal for demarkation that was based on one simple rule, and that was whether you ever tested a theater missile defense system against a strategic target.

That proposal was not accepted by the Russians, and after a year or two of not much progress, we made a fundamental decision to split the negotiations in half and concentrate on the so-called lower velocity theater missile defense systems where, indeed, we were able to reach agreement, and fully expected that we would be able to sign that and get on with the harder problems that we finally reached resolution on today.

But as those of you who have followed this know, there have been a lot of zigs and zags on this and many previous occasions where

we thought that we had agreement to go forward with part one only to find when we got there that the Russians in effect were saying, until we finish the whole problem we're not going to split off part of it.

So going into the last several weeks, really intensive travel, as Sandy said. On this question of the remaining higher velocity systems, we have consistently run into a roadblock wherein the Russians were saying unless an additional set of constraints that were unacceptable to the administration and unacceptable to the chiefs in the military services were added to this demarcation regime, there wouldn't be an agreement on anything; indeed, there wouldn't be an agreement on the START issues and there wouldn't be an agreement on going forward with START II ratification in the Duma. And as Sandy just said, that position held until about 4:00 p.m. this afternoon when we had the breakthrough.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I say, too, that when I met with President Yeltsin in Moscow in January, he said, there are some questions that can only be resolved by Presidents. This question was resolved by two Presidents.

Q: To follow up Bob Bell, please. Bob, are you saying that the Russians, in fact, relinquished their demands for specific performance limits on higher speed, higher capability systems?

BELL: Well, I think it's important to recognize what's agreed and then what is not part of the regime. As Sandy said, we have agreed on a very important testing constraint. We agree that these higher-speed TMD systems -- and we have one principal program that's called the Navy Theater-wide, or Navy Upper Tier System -- for those faster TMD systems, you cannot test them against a strategic target without them getting captured then as an ABM.

Beyond that, we've agreed in this breakthrough agreement that we reached today that for those faster systems, we will share information on those programs with the Russians so they understand that they're designed to protect our troops and are not aimed at Russia, or designed to deal with the Russians; and second, that as newer technologies emerge, such as a laser program, for example, we will consult with them and talk through the compliance issues they have in their minds if they feel there are compliance issues. But as Sandy said, there is no veto

associated with that consultation.

Now, beyond that, we have an obligation, the President has an obligation to uphold the law, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. And he is required to ensure that all of our faster TMD systems comply with the ABM treaty. And we'll continue through the normal Defense Department process to conduct those compliance reviews, just as we did with the Navy Upper Tier System, to be able to certify to Congress that, indeed, it is consistent with the treaty.

Q: Was this agreement on ABM negotiated with Primakov, or was it negotiated with Russian military? And if so, who?

BERGER: It was negotiated at various levels, but it was an agreement reached by the two Presidents.

Q: General Shalikashvili, these concessions that the U.S. is making to the Russians as far as implementing START II, delaying some of the destruction of their silos or their warheads, dismantling some of those warheads, are these unilateral concessions or can the U.S. military similarly delay implementing aspects of START II as well?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I, first of all, wouldn't characterize them at all as concessions. I think what was agreed upon is in the best interest, security interest of the United States. Those time limits that Sandy outlined here are time limits that apply to both, both parties.

Q: Will the U.S. military delay implementing --

BERGER: Can I just add two things? Number one, don't forget that START II was negotiated four years ago and that those timetables were put in place four years ago, so that they're obviously -- there's been some change by virtue of that delay.

Second of all, in order for these -- our Senate has ratified START II with one set of timetables. If the Duma ratifies START II with a different set of timetables, we would have to submit something back to the Senate, either a protocol with those adjustments, or, ideally if we have START III completed in time, we would submit both together -- the adjustment of the timetable and START III. But the START II obviously is not enforced until there is an exchange of instruments of ratification by the two

governments.

Q: Secretary Albright, could you game out for us just how the next weeks go in terms of negotiating this NATO-Russian document? Would it require -- that there be a special U.S. negotiator? How do you see that playing out?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, you have to keep in mind this is a NATO-Russia agreement, and the chief negotiator is the Secretary General of NATO Solana. And he is the one that is going to be carrying on these discussions. And the process will unfold as rapidly as he gets the various pieces into place. So we are hopeful that that agreement as has been discussed here today and in other places will, in fact, be able to be agreed to by all the members fairly rapidly.

Q: And do you think it might be wrapped it before the President comes back to Europe in May?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's possible. But the important point here is that Madrid -- that is, the invitation for accession to new members -- will take place in July no matter what, and that that is on a track of its own. And we would hope, obviously, that the NATO-Russian charter could, in fact, be done as rapidly as possible. But the timetables of the two are not hinged to each other in any way -- two tracks.

Q: Can I follow up on that? As recently as two days ago, President Yeltsin was sounding non-negotiable on the idea that this could be anything but a treaty. Could you describe the process by which he came around to agreeing to a document that was something short of a treaty?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I would say that what was important to him was that there would be an agreement among the various NATO heads to the fact that this was an important agreement. And so, what it said in the language itself is that it would be signed by the leaders of NATO countries and Russia, and this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level.

And I can't speak for President Yeltsin, but the sense that I got from being in the meetings was that he felt that this was an appropriate way to solidify what will clearly be a very important agreement.

BERGER: Can I just add one thing? This is not, obviously, an unprecedented circumstance. The Helsinki Accords, for example, were here in Helsinki -- were signed by leaders. They have had enormous impact. They are enduring commitments, but they don't represent legally binding commitments in that sense.

The second thing I would say is, there are aspects of all of this that relate to, for example, a CFE agreement, if we were to get one, which relate to START II and START III, which obviously would be submitted to Congress for approval.

Q: Madam Secretary, do you share President Yeltsin's confidence of his ability to get START II through communist and nationalist-dominated Duma which has made explicit its connection of ratification with NATO expansion, not merely with ABM issues? And if they do not ratify, if they turn down the treaty, what happens then?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov are committed to pushing, as they can, on ratification in the Duma. And I think that we have to watch the process unfold.

What I think is as important for the Duma as for all of us is that these agreements be seen in the national interest of the respective countries. And it is our belief that once people see how all these interlocking pieces are structured that all will feel comfortable that Russia is in no way threatened by the new NATO. As we have said, there is a new Russia, and there is also a new NATO. And that new NATO does not have a single enemy. And I think it's going to be very important for all to understand how all these documents fit together.

Q: Madam Secretary, could you give us a little of the atmosphere in the room? Did it ever get testy or intense, or what was it like this time? They both looked more tired than after previous summits.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me start, and then Sandy might want to continue. I actually found the whole day intense, but fascinating. Here were two high political leaders who were engaged on a whole range of subjects on which they both had expert knowledge. And they covered -- they would begin discussions and set out what the agenda would be and at certain

stages set them aside and then return. I think there is a really quite remarkable dynamic between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They were very glad to see each other again. And they worked hard. They clearly worked hard. They earned their pay today.

BERGER: Let me just add two things. One, in part -- in answer to your question, of course, if they didn't ratify START II, we would operate under START I for so long as that were the case. And that's another part of the answer.

I agree with what the Secretary has said. This was a day that started about 9:00 a.m. and the meetings went until 6:00 p.m. There were supposed to be fairly large breaks. There was really only one break which took place after lunch for about an hour in which there were some side meetings that the Secretary and others had. But this was eight hours of very intense one-on-one discussion -- very frank, very candid. The President was very, very clear in reaffirming our position, reaffirming the five no's that you've all heard so much about with respect to NATO enlargement. President Yeltsin was clear that they didn't like NATO expansion.

But I think this is a pivot point in which they preserved their position that they still don't like NATO enlargement, but they're going to deal with it. And I think that only came after a good deal of back-and-forth between the two leaders.

Q: Did they ever raise their voices?

BERGER: No. I'm not speaking about other people, but they didn't. (Laughter.)

Q: I wonder if the issue of the Baltic states was discussed at all, but, in particular, whether this -- right to choose the means to ensure their own security --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The subject did come up generally, and the President -- President Clinton made very clear that NATO was open to all market democracies and that we were not going to be a part of creating any new artificial dividing lines in Europe, and that the first countries that would enter NATO would not be the last.

And the phrase that you refer to was, in fact, in the statement as it was accepted, so I can only presume that it would also

apply. And I think that this was one of the subjects where, as Sandy said, there was not total agreement. But President Clinton made completely clear what was the American position on that. And that is where some of these no's came in.

Q: Do you now expect within a reasonable time the Baltic states to become NATO applicants?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I'm not going to predict the timing of any of the applicants.

Q: Secretary Albright, can you tell us what happened to cause this late afternoon breakthrough on the ABM treaty, which then seemed to have created all this positive news that you had for us?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, as I said, I think that there are certain decisions that can only be made by Presidents, and we witnessed two strong Presidents making decisions which created a breakthrough.

Q: On the Denver summit, did Mr. Yeltsin indicate he is happy about that, or is he still sticking to his red jacket complaint of a few years ago that he's not yet received the status he deserves?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: My impression, when that was announced or when it was discussed, President Yeltsin seemed very pleased.

MCCURRY: Thank you. I want to thank all the briefers.

I also want to do one thing. I told a little story earlier about the President being awake at night. I want to make it absolutely clear that we are not speculating on what the cause of the bumps in the night were. It may, in fact, have been someone walking around on the ninth floor. And I also want to pay tribute to the fine staff here at the Hotel Inter-Continental for all the help they gave us. They did a wonderful job hosting us here.

Q: Mike, there were reports of demonstrators banging pots and pans outside the hotel in the middle of the night around the same time. Is it possible that's what woke the President up?

MCCURRY: It's conceivable. That actually is what woke me up.

They, I think, were human rights protesters who were outside the front of the hotel around 1:20 a.m., and they were blowing whistles and having a good time -- creating an enjoyable noise.

Q: -- the other 16 heads of states if they are all likely to sign?

MCCURRY: Oh, we have had extensive consultations within the North Atlantic Council. There's been a real deal of preview work done for a number of the items that were on the discussion agenda today. And we will, of course, be going forward with additional briefings to capitals and further consultations with our allies. I expect that we'll also very shortly be in a position to brief Secretary General Solana on this meeting since he has lead responsibility on behalf the Alliance in negotiating with the Russian Federation the details of the charter document.

Okay, thank you, everyone. We'll see you back in Washington Monday.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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Subject: Summit Conclusion Briefing

Excerpts from

Joint Statements By, And News Conference With, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at Summit in Helsinki, Finland

11:46 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Friday, March 21, 1997

QUESTIONS RELATED TO NATO, START II AND III, AND ARMS CONTROL (NATO)

Q. Boris Nikolayich, our first impression is that there was not breakthrough on NATO here in Helsinki. Tell me can there be some kind of movement forward before the Madrid Summit.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, a very principled progress, and they consist of the following: that, yes indeed, we do maintain our positions.

We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal question here.

We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in the agreement with NATO.

And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all heads of state of all 16 members nations of NATO. This is a very principled issue, and we came to agreement on this with President Bill Clinton. That is, all states, all nations -- and this will take place before Madrid -- all heads of state will sign this document. We sign together with Bill Clinton, and then there will be a signature of the general secretary of NATO. And we will believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for all states whose leaders signed this document.

So this is a very principled progress. We didn't talk about this just yesterday and the day before. We couldn't have. We can only talk about this now during these minutes once we've signed the statements.

Q. After all that you've been told about how the world has changed and that there will be no nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, do you still regard NATO's enlargement as a danger to Russia?

And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons

from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: No, of course not. No one will think of these as being secondary states. No one is calling that. That's not what's involved here. However, I believe, and Bill believes the same thing, Bill Clinton believes the same, that these decisions that can be taken, they will be taken by all leaders of these nations, which is extremely, extremely important. I already mentioned this.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean any new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second class members.

What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member" One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in.

Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. What is the most important thing NATO is doing today. Working in Bosnia. Who is NATO 00 NATO has a major partnership with Russia in Bosnia, and a partnership for Peace, where we've done joint military exercises and other things.

Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil.

Look, we just announced an agreement here that will reduce nuclear weapons, if we can implement it, with in a decade by 80 percent below their Cold War high -- number one. Number two, we have -- the NATO members that have just tabled a proposal on Conventional Forces in Europe which would put strict limits and would freeze the conventional forces we could have in Europe now,

along with having strict limits in the Visegard countries themselves, which would be the areas where you might expect an old difficulty to arise in new circumstances.

(ABM Treaty)

Q. (Through interpreter.) The Interfax Agency. President Clinton, it is know that in your Congress there is some criticism frequently that you are a critic of -- a supporter of the ABM treaty. Today's meeting, did that convince you to strengthen the ABM treaty?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: You mean -- some people have criticized me in my Congress because I do support the ABM treaty. Yes, that's accurate; they have.

I do support the ABM treaty. I think it's important. I believe in it. And we have, I believe, strengthened the chances that the ABM treaty will survive by the agreement we have made today and the distinctions we have drawn between the missiles that are covered by the ABM treaty and by theater-defense missiles. I believe that very strongly.

There are those in the Congress of the United States -- but they are not a majority -- let me emphasize they are not a majority -- who would undermine the ABM treaty because they don't believe it's in our interest I believe they're wrong. I believe that the ABM treaty has served us well and will continue to sever us well, especially in view of the questions that we have clarified today between us.

...

Q The question is to the Russian President. Boris Mikolaevich, you said that this meeting stated a new phase for these U.S.-Russian relations. What precisely new was introduced into these relations?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first of all we finally were able to determine our positions on issues of European security. We've come to settle our position on NATO and we have described for ourselves the parameters of the NATO-Russian agreement.

Secondly there's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons,

that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads is being reduced in connection with that. That is significant. This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world.

...

Finally a breakthrough has been made. A joint statement has been signed. We've discussed these issues in great detail with President Clinton. And on chemical weapons, that too.

Any issue we handled we've been able to manage a major breakthrough. We didn't discuss any small issues. We talked only about strategic issues. And on all five issues we were able to find an answer, we were able to find a common point of view. And that's what is reflected in our joint statements.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If I might just support that question, because I think that's a question all the Americans and all the Russians and others will be interested in.

What came out of this meeting that was different? One, the idea that there will be a NATO-Russia agreement that all the leaders will support. That's a significant thing. We agreed to disagree about the question of expansion, but we agreed that there must be a partnership between NATO and Russia going forward into the future.

Two, the notion that Russia should play a larger role in international economic institutions, and that if certain internal changes are made, which President Yeltsin has already announced his support for, then the United States will make a more vigorous effort to facilitate investment in Russia.

And third, I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high, more or less 80 percent.

These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm very pleased with them.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You've touched on a very current issue which has to be clarified all the way. Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II, because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II.

Q. Mr. President and Mr. President, one of the most contentious aspects of a potential agreement of charter between NATO and Russia was whether or not it would have to be legally binding on the 16 members of NATO or would simply be a political statement of intent. This agreement that you hope to forge with NATO, do you expect that the legislatures, the U.S. Senate, for example, would have to ratify the agreement, or it would simply be a statement that President Clinton would support?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, we intend to send this treaty and send this agreement to the state Duma for ratification. That's what our intention is. At the same time, we understand that if 16 states will have to coordinate this issue with their parliaments, this will take up many, many months. And therefore, we've come to an agreement that, given these conditions, it will be quite enough, or course, given the goodwill of these states, simply a signature from the -- of the leaders of these countries that would be affixed to this agreement.

How the U.S. would act in this regard, let President Bill Clinton Respond.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you look at the language, President Yeltsin has basically said it accurately. We think it's important to get this agreement up, get it signed, and get it observed -- have it observed. And there are so many of the NATO counties -- what we have called for is for each and every member country to make -- and I believe the exact language of our agreement is, "an

enduring commitment at the highest political level." And President Yeltsin described to you how we will manifest that. If our secretary-general, Mr. Solana, and Foreign Minister Primakov succeed in negotiating this agreement within the time frame that we all anticipate they will be able to, then we would expect to all meet somewhere and publicly affix our signatures and reaffirm our commitment to the terms of the agreement.

Q: The question is to the U.S. President. Mr. President, you, both today and on earlier occasions, said that you intend to transform in some way the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After today's meeting with President Yeltsin, what specifically do the United States plan to do to change the current structure of NATO? Thank you.

CLINTON: Well, first let me point out we have already transformed NATO. When I became President there was no Partnership for Peace, for example. There were no joint exercises where you had Russian troops, American troops, Polish troops, French troops, others -- we didn't have these sorts of things. We didn't have a Partnership for Peace with more than two dozen other countries regularly participating with us now in military planning and training and sharing and working together. And we certainly had nothing like our cooperation in Bosnia.

I believe that the old NATO was basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact, and that's why I've been very sensitive to why the Russian people or the Russian leaders would wonder about what the new NATO is. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is no Cold War. We just made an agreement to work to cut our nuclear arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War height, which I would remind you existed just five years ago.

And what we need to recognize is there will be new security threats to Europe. And you can see them. You have dealt -- we've seen them in Bosnia, we've seen them in the other ethnic, religious and racial traumas that you have dealt with along your borders. You see it in the continuing disputes between nations within the European Community.

What we want to do is to provide a way for more and more countries, either as members or as members of the Partnership for Peace -- Finland is a good example of an active member of the

Partnership for Peace -- or because of the special relationship of Russia and the special role Russia will play in the future of Europe and security in the context of the Russia-NATO agreement, we want to provide an opportunity within which all of us can deal with the security aspects of trying to create a Europe that is undivided and democratic for the first time in history.

I would remind you, go back and read from the dawn of nation states on the continent of Europe, there has never been a time when all the people were living under democratic governments and were free of foreign domination. That has never happened. So we are simply trying to create the conditions in which we can grow together.

Will there be questions? Will there be skepticism along the way? Will there be uncertainty? Of course, there will be. But we are not attempting to draw a different dividing line in Europe, just somewhat further to the East. What we are trying to do is to develop structures that can grow and evolve over time so that there will be a united effort by free people to join their resources together to reinforce each other's security, each other's independence, and their common interdependence. And I believe we will succeed at that.

Q: To both Presidents, both of you have had problems with your individual parliaments, and yet --

CLINTON: Seems to be a curse of democracy.

Q: Yes. You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? And to Mr. Clinton, how can you assure Mr. Yeltsin that you won't have a rebellion in the Congress over the anti-missile defense agreement?

YELTSIN: As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice. (Laughter.)

CLINTON: Boy, I wish I could give that answer. (Laughter.) Let me answer -- you give me an opportunity, actually, to point out the full elements of this timetable on START III. And for those of you -- if you haven't had time to study it, I want to make full disclosure here.

Number one, I expect that our Congress, those who believe in the ABM system but who want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, which may someday protect all of our friends in different circumstances, including our friends in Russia -- who knows what use we will put to theater missile defenses when we have troops that have to be protected in the future -- I would think that the members of Congress who believe in the ABM treaty but want us to be able to develop theater missile defenses, will be quite pleased by this agreement. I think that is not where the problem could come.

Let me explain what we agreed to today -- and I did it, I might say, with the full concurrence of General Shalikashvili and Secretary of Defense Cohen, who is not here today but we checked with him.

In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II.

Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this.

But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the

Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue.

So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people.

Q: Boris Nikolayevich, what's your thought on the version that the Russian giving way on the issue of NATO's expansion to the East will be paid by financial generosity of the West?

YELTSIN: First of all, I don't see it that way at all. I don't see this generosity at all. If in the statement on economic issues which we had just signed, if there are formulas in there that investments will be supported, investments going to Russia, and certain sums of money will be appropriated by the American side, that does not mean that this is assistance to Russia. This is assistance to the private sector making investments in Russia. This is assistance to American citizens, not to Russia. Why do you see an exchange here? There's no exchange.

And I categorically disagree with that formulation that in place of one we sort of bartered here and as a result of that we have come up with these ideas. I don't agree with that. I should say that even the order of looking at these issues -- and we've held four tours lasting from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours each -- the order of looking at these issues was as follows.

First, we looked at Europe security and NATO. Secondly, the ABM issue. Then we took up chemical weapons. Then we talked about START III, that is, the reduction of further strategic weapons. And only after that we started talking of economic issues. I did not know that the American side was preparing this. But you see, first we resolved and discussed all of these issues, and only then we approached the economic question. This should tell you that this was not a case where we used this as a poker chip.

CLINTON: I'd just like to support that. And let me say, first of all, what President Yeltsin said about the order in which we took these issues up is absolutely right, first. Second, I

believe that the economic announcements which were made today are in the interest of the American people, both directly and indirectly. . .

Q: I would like to ask something from both of you. How would you react, sir, if Finland would express its willingness to join NATO?

CLINTON: Maybe I should -- you asked both. Since I discussed this with the President --he brought it up with me. President Ahtisaari said to me that he thought Finland had made the right decision to be a member of the Partnership for Peace and to maintain its independence and its ability to work constructively with Russia and with NATO nations, and not be a member of NATO, and that he had no intention of asking that Finland be considered for membership. But he thought that the policy of being able to be considered was a good one because it reinforced the feeling of independence and the security that Finland and other nations who decide to maintain relative independence and membership in the Partnership for Peace had.

So I can do no more than to support the statement that your own President has made about this.

YELTSIN: I, too, would like to respond on this issue. I should say that the reason we respect Finland as a state -- its nation, its people and leadership -- is the fact that Finland is implementing a course of a neutral state, of nonaligning itself to any block. This is very important. This creates a very stable and calm balance within the country. This facilitates good neighborly relations with Russia.

We, with Finland, have a turnover of trade of \$4.7 billion U.S. This is 40 percent of the entire turnover of trade. Find me another country that could equal this sort of turnover in trade with Russia. There is no other country. And for that reason, I believe -- and, of course, this is the matter entirely of the people of Finland and its government, but that which the President of the Finnish Republic, President Ahtisaari, stated very clearly that he is not joining any blocks. This calls for the feeling of respect for him.

Q: The focus question is this: In the Russia-NATO agreement, as envisaged, if there is disagreement -- Russia disagrees with something NATO wants to do, does Russia have a veto

power? The broader question is this: In the Second World War, it was very simple, we were enemies. We were allies I meant to say. During the Cold War, it was very simple, we were enemies. Today, what word describes this relationship where the situation is not so clear and not so simple?

YELTSIN: I can respond by saying that the way we solve these issues is by consensus. That's how it is today, indeed, among the NATO countries. And that's how it will be once we conclude an agreement between Russia and NATO, already with the participation of Russia.

CLINTON: The short answer to your question is, a voice but not a veto. And the answer to your second question is that we are partners, and like all partners, in any partnership, starting with society's most basic partnership, a marriage and a family, and going to business partnerships, there are sometimes disagreements. But partnerships are bound together by shared values, shared interests, and the understanding that what you have in common is always more important than what divides you.

And so you work for the consensus that President Yeltsin outlined. And that's where we are, and I think that's exactly where we ought to be. And that's why we are not going to have the kind of cataclysmic bloodshed in the 21st century that we saw through three world wars, the Cold War, and countless others in the century. If we can stay with that attitude and work on it, we will have a Europe that's not only peaceful, but free and undivided.

Thank you very much.

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From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997  
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:59:37 -0800 (PST)  
From: disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Progress: Destroy Warheads

Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New

By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham

Washington Post Staff Writers

Saturday, March 22, 1997; Page A01

If it becomes a treaty, the outline of a new strategic arms agreement announced yesterday by the United States and Russia would for the first time try to make nuclear cuts irreversible by guaranteeing that at least some of the old warheads are destroyed instead of stockpiled for possible future use.

The promise is given in a joint statement issued at the Helsinki summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that commits the two nations to include provisions in a new treaty, to be called START III, that require "transparency" and warhead "destruction." This is the arms control argot for letting the other side watch while warheads are sent to the trash heap or otherwise rendered permanently unusable.

Despite glowing rhetoric from the two leaders in Finland, political rivals back home made clear that parts of the agreements would face domestic opposition.

In Russia, criticism from Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and other hard-liners underlined the risk that START III would never get off the ground, because negotiations on the pact are to begin only after ratification by the Russian parliament of an earlier nuclear arms reduction agreement, START II. Yeltsin pledged yesterday to press for such approval, but opposition to the treaty has been fueled in part by plans going forward for NATO to expand into Eastern Europe.

In Washington, Republican conservatives immediately complained about another agreement reached yesterday defining battlefield missile defense systems permitted under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Many in the GOP favor accelerated development of such "theater" missile defenses and oppose restrictions on them.

The new plan for START III calls for steps to make permanent the limitations called for by two major nuclear arms reduction agreements negotiated earlier by the two countries: START I in 1991 and START II in 1993. At present, the treaties are slated to

expire after 15 years.

In another novel development yesterday, the two sides agreed to consider applying the principle of "transparency" to the plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, helping to ensure it cannot be used later to form the explosive guts of new weapons that could be manufactured if relations ever turned highly sour.

The aim of the new plan is to correct in the next arms control treaty what critics have called a major deficiency of the START I and START II accords, namely that neither accord actually required the destruction of any nuclear warheads.

Instead, partly because both nations were nervous about moving too rapidly to reduce their nuclear arsenals and partly because they were sensitive to the security implications of allowing intensive scrutiny of how they handled these weapons, the accords called only for destruction of the means to deliver some of the nuclear arms held by the two nations.

The earlier accords called, for example, for the wings of certain strategic bombers to be clipped off by an agreed date, for the filling up or withdrawal of tubes that hold some of the nuclear-tipped missiles that could be launched from submarines, and the blowing up of various land-based silos that could be used to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

With no language relating to the warheads themselves, the treaties effectively allowed each side to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that are currently in storage as a deliberate hedge against the advent of a new Cold War. Although each side claims to have dismantled thousands of warheads since the late-1980s, neither side is certain today of precisely how many such weapons remain because all of this work has occurred in secret, without any mutual inspections.

"This is really quite significant," Robert S. Norris, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said of the plan to require "transparency" of warhead destruction and residual arsenals in START III. "If all of this is successful, it will prevent the retention of secret stockpiles which engender distrust."

A senior U.S. official who participated in the negotiations that led to yesterday's agreement explained that with arsenals of

deployed weapons to be limited to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads in a new START III agreement -- instead of the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads allowed by START II -- both governments had recognized the increasing security risk posed by allowing unmonitored stockpiles of stored weapons.

An unstated U.S. concern behind yesterday's agreement is that old Russian warheads kept in storage after being taken off strategic missiles or bombers might eventually be subject to theft by terrorists or illicit sale to nations in the Middle East or elsewhere.

In a separate agreement related to nuclear arms yesterday, the two nations agreed on where to draw the line between a national missile defense system, which is restricted by the ABM treaty, and increasingly powerful "theater" systems for guarding against a shorter-range missile attack, which do not come under the treaty's purview.

The Clinton administration has tried for several years to negotiate with Moscow a clearer distinction between the two kinds of systems in order to avoid any perception that the ABM treaty was being violated. But congressional Republicans have disputed the need for a demarcation agreement, worrying that any deal would end up placing too many limits on development of either theater or strategic missile defenses.

The agreement announced yesterday outlined terms for a deal still to be finalized that would restrict the capabilities of theater defenses to a demarcation standard defined earlier in the Senate. That is, the Pentagon's fastest, longest-range theater systems would remain exempt from ABM treaty coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers/second.

But other terms went farther than some congressional experts had expected by including a provision "not to develop, test or deploy space-based TMD [theater missile defense] interceptors." The agreement also stipulated that both sides "will exchange detailed information annually" on their theater defense plans and programs.

Although administration officials said the agreement still would permit the United States to proceed with all six antimissile

systems under development, GOP missile defense experts in Congress assailed it as an unwarranted and unacceptable set of constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

"The ABM treaty was not designed to impose limits on our theater missile defense systems, only on national defense systems," said Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a leading missile defense proponent. "Imposing limits on interceptor speeds, which the president continues to support, will inevitably result in the future dumbing down of theater missile defense systems, putting the lives of our soldiers overseas at greater risk."

Clinton made no mention yesterday of whether he intended to submit the missile defense agreement to the Senate for ratification. Whether he is required to do so has been another point of bitter dispute between congressional Republicans and the White House.

"The Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in both houses that we didn't want the president to engage in these agreements," said Rep. Bob Livingston (R-La.), the Appropriations Committee chairman. "He's kept these as secret as he possibly could. We knew they were negotiating them, but we had no idea they would sign off on agreements to virtually leave us defenseless against anyone who's not a party to them."

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Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 08:18:49 -0800 (PST)  
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Subject: Russian Summit Response

APO 03/22 1034 Communists Knock Summit Deals

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia's still-powerful communists reacted with scorn Saturday to the agreements reached by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Helsinki.

Although Yeltsin drew praise from more moderate politicians,

the predictably negative response from hardliners offered a preview of the battle the Russian president faces as he returned to Moscow from Helsinki Saturday evening.

In what some called the most important superpower summit since the end of the Cold War, Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to disagree on NATO's eastward expansion, but reached accord on a schedule of significant cuts in nuclear weapons.

They also agreed to make Russia a member of the economic Group of Seven nations, quickly renamed the Summit of Eight.

At a news conference after the summit, Yeltsin jauntily predicted that he would have no difficulty winning support from the Duma, the lower house of parliament, for the START II nuclear disarmament agreement.

But he will have to do it over the fierce opposition of the Communist Party, the largest bloc in the Duma. Communist chief Gennady Zyuganov charged that Yeltsin was "guilty of completely betraying the national interests of the country."

Mikhail Lapshin, leader of the Agrarian Party and a close ally of Zyuganov, predicted that NATO would ultimately cancel the Helsinki agreements, which offer Russia a voice in NATO policy.

Anatoly Lukyanov, another communist in the Duma, said other NATO countries "should be humiliated" that Clinton reached agreements with Yeltsin unilaterally.

But Yeltsin won praise from moderates who argued that he made the best of a difficult situation.

"From my point of view, any step forward, even small, on this road is very important," said Viktor Sheinis, a member of the liberal Yabloko Party. Galina Starovoitova of the Democratic Russia party said the agreements "appear even better than were expected."

And Alexander Shokhin, vice-speaker of the Duma and a Yeltsin supporter, said the accords laid a foundation for a "new structure of European security."

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RTos 03/22 0726 Russia Proclaims Summit Success, Critics Fume

HELSINKI (Reuter) - Russia insisted on Saturday it had won a good deal at the summit with the United States, hailing it as a breakthrough and denying charges it had been outflanked on NATO enlargement or bought off by the West.

Asked at a news conference whether Russia's bargaining position with the Western alliance had been weakened, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said:

"Russia stands by its negative position on NATO enlargement, and the agreement which we want to sign with NATO is not a pay-off for giving up that position."

"What happened yesterday was a real breakthrough," he added.

Hardline opponents in Moscow begged to differ.

"The meeting was a capitulation by the current traitorous Russian regime before the United States and NATO," said the communist daily *Sovietskaya Rossiya*.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed at the two-day summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton to sign a charter building a new relationship with NATO, despite Moscow's continued opposition to the eastward expansion of the alliance.

Yeltsin dropped a demand that the charter be legally binding and also promised to minimise differences with the West over NATO enlargement, drawing charges from opponents in Russia's parliament (Duma) that Moscow had caved in to shameful defeat.

Both sides portrayed the summit as an even-handed affair with compromises, although Clinton made none on NATO.

The summit agreement on NATO, Primakov said, would "make it more helpful for us to move towards signing the appropriate agreements." Decisions reached in Helsinki "coincide to a great degree with requirements voiced in the Duma."

But the communist Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov poured cold water on this notion, telling Itar-Tass news agency: "Plans to expand NATO to the east will inevitably lead to new lines of division in Europe and the revival of a psychological climate of suspicion and hostility."

Clinton, who arrived home early on Saturday, and Yeltsin did give their post-Cold War partnership a boost with a range of agreements covering issues from Russia's economic place on the world stage to a pledge of further cuts in nuclear weapons.

Although they publicly agreed to differ on NATO enlargement, Yeltsin appeared to have made concessions which enraged his hardline critics at home but delighted the Western alliance and former Soviet bloc states which are clamouring to join.

Poland, expected to be among several former Soviet bloc states invited to start membership talks at a summit of the 16-nation alliance in July, said the Helsinki agreement meant that Russia had accepted NATO enlargement would go ahead.

But Yeltsin, who was to fly back to Moscow later on Saturday after meeting Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari for talks and lunch, stuck to his public line that Moscow views NATO enlargement as a mistake and as a threat to Russia's security.

The meeting was dubbed the "summit of the invalids," with Clinton confined to a wheelchair following a leg injury and

Yeltsin still recovering from heart surgery and illness.

Yeltsin had to avoid looking weak in front of his communist and nationalist critics at home, while Clinton wanted to stress the West's real intention of a partnership with Russia.

In Moscow, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said on Friday Russia had been dealt a "crushing defeat," comparable to the 1919 Versailles Treaty which imposed humiliating conditions on Germany at the end of World War One.

Liberals in Moscow were less agitated but Western analysts also saw Yeltsin as the loser.

"This is not an equitable result...you have to worry about the endurance and stability of a result that is not equitable," said John Steinbruner at Washington's Brookings Institution.

However, Yeltsin and Clinton did resolve a dispute over missile defences at their summit and held out the prospect of more talks on cutting their long-range nuclear arsenals.

On economic matters, Clinton promised to try to get Russia into key global economic groupings such as the World Trade Organisation. Yeltsin promised to reform Russia's creaking tax regime and to crack down on corruption and organised crime.

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From disarmament@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997

Date: Sat, 22 Mar 1997 07:27:40 -0800 (PST)

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

To: Recipients of conference

<alt.activism.nuclear-test.news@conf.igc.apc.org>

Subject: ALBRIGHT & BERGER - SUMMIT

Subject: Albright and Berger on Summit

Excerpts From:

Transcript: Briefing by Albright, Berger, Summers on Summit  
SecState sees "historic progress" at Helsinki

Helsinki -- Secretary of State Albright told reporters March 21 that "we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia.

"We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand," the Secretary of State said.

"In other words," she said, "by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

"What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation."

Following is the White House transcript:

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
(Helsinki, Finland)  
March 21, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS

MCCURRY: An all-star cast here to brief you a little bit about the President's very successful summit with President Yeltsin today. I've asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to start first. She will be followed by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, followed by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers. I also have General Shalikashvili here and Robert Bell who is the Senior Director for the National Security Council for Defense Policy. They're available, too, to either speak or to take any questions you may have on the arms control aspects of today's summit.

A pleasure to have them all here. Thank you all.

Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Well, we have just concluded a major summit in which there was historic progress in

European security, nuclear arms reduction, and economic cooperation with Russia. We were able to advance America's interest by cooperating on deep arms cuts, while building the new Europe, which President Clinton has talked about -- a new Europe where NATO enlargement will take place and NATO-Russian cooperation will expand.

In other words, by pursuing our partnership with Russia, ensuring the enlargement of NATO, and advancing the arms control agenda all at the same time, President Clinton made history in Helsinki.

What we have seen today is an exercise in statesmanship at the highest levels -- two Presidents who have not agreed on everything, but have showed true leadership and cemented their cooperation.

Summits are different than they used to be. These meetings are not organized to struggle through a crisis, as in the past. They are increasingly a reflection of a mature relationship, which means that they take into account differences, but don't allow those differences to derail a common agenda. For example, we made major progress on arms control here in Helsinki, despite some of the differences on NATO enlargement.

It's very important to keep two aspects in mind -- the future European security cooperation was handled in the broadest possible framework. NATO enlargement is a central issue, but our overall goal is to build wide cooperation between Russia, U.S. and Europe.

The two Presidents talked through their differences on NATO and they understand each other's positions better. They are not likely to agree on everything, but they do agree that our complex security agenda must move forward. The joint statement on European security is an important document; it reaffirms principles of cooperation, and above all, our commitment to a secure, undivided, and democratic Europe.

The two Presidents also confirmed that to build that new Europe we must integrate a series of mutually supporting institutions. This is important. NATO is a central institution, but it cannot do the job alone. The basis for our work will be the principles of the OSCE, including human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also, as the joint statement points out, the right of every

nation to choose the means to ensure its own security.  
This refers also to the right to enter treaties of alliance.

As major powers outside of Europe, the U.S. and Russia place special importance on using the OSCE framework to play a role in managing crises in Europe, and recent events in Albania are a case in point. The President has already described his discussions on NATO strategy, and in the security document the two sides stressed their determination to rise above the differences through practical steps. The key differences of vision will not derail practical cooperation. The NATO-Russia charter will be the centerpiece of this cooperation in Europe, and we've also shown that we can advance our interest in arms control at the same time.

There are specific references to NATO defense strategy, both conventional and military forces, which in fact describe existing NATO policy. And just to make that clear again, it has been stated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10 that NATO members have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor do they see any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include a reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document, which President Yeltsin welcomed.

Also, on March 14, the North Atlantic Council stated that -- quote -- "In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Also let me reiterate that there is no limit or any restriction on infrastructure in NATO.

So I think that on the whole we can all agree that we have had a successful summit where a very large agenda was dealt with successfully. And I will now let my colleagues explain the other parts of it.

Sandy Berger.

BERGER: If I could just summarize on the NATO-Russia piece, I would say that the Presidents agreed to disagree about NATO

enlargement; that means NATO enlargement will go forward as scheduled, as the President has said, in Madrid, at the same time that NATO and Russia work on a charter that develop their own relationship.

Now, the other, second significant mention of this summit has been some substantial breakthroughs in the arms control area. There are three related breakthroughs. One was a firm commitment by President Yeltsin to promptly press for Duma ratification of START II. This commitment by President Yeltsin was facilitated by agreements on two other related matters. One is a set of guidelines or parameters for START III, and the second is, finally, after three years of negotiation, an agreement on ABM-TMD demarkation. That is the line between ABM systems that allows our theater systems to go forward. And let me speak for a moment about both of those statements.

On the START III guidelines that will provide the guidance for negotiations, they provide for reductions to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. For the first time the parties will be negotiating on actual warhead destruction as opposed to simply systems destruction. There will be a timetable for both START II and START III that, in a sense, mesh together. All of the destruction of systems for START II and START III will be completed by the year 2007, as the President indicated. The deactivation of warheads under START II will be extended one year from the beginning of 2003, the deadline, until the end of 2003, as the President indicated.

Obviously, the START II and START III aspects of this are subject to ratification by both our Senate and by the Duma.

Now, the third very significant agreement that has bedeviled arms control negotiators for, I believe, three or four years and has caused an awful lot of airfare miles on the part of many arms control people is the ABM-TMD issue. And we reached an agreement today which preserves the ABM treaty. Both sides affirm, again, the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty.

It permits all six of our current systems to go forward, unimpeded. It constrains only testing of theater missiles against strategic targets, not something that we have planned, and provides for consultations but no veto through the standing consultative commission in Geneva on new technologies that may be

developed in the future, and continued cooperation between the United States and Russia on TMD cooperation -- for example, on sharing early warning information, on joint exercises, on possible joint R&D.

So let me just sum up by trying to state what I think the significance of these two agreements are. In terms of the START guidelines, it means, as the President has said, that within a decade there will be an 80-percent reduction if we are successful in START III of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads that were deployed at the end of the Cold War just five years ago.

Number two, that will provide greater strategic stability at lower levels and, therefore, reduce the nuclear danger for our peoples and for the entire world.

Number three, we will seek to destroy warheads for the first time -- strategic warheads for the first time of arms control. Four, we'll also address non-strategic nuclear weapons in START III -- that is, tactical nuclear weapons as a separate but related issue. And as I say, the significance of this, in part, is it will enable -- has enabled President Yeltsin to say that he will go forward promptly with ratification of START II.

The significance of the ABM-TMD agreement, I would say basically three -- one, we have demonstrated that the ABM treaty can be maintained as a cornerstone of strategic stability and still be adapted to deal with the very real threat of shorter-range missiles that we seek to deal with through our theater systems.

Second of all, it, as I says, reconfirms that all of our current systems can go forward unimpeded; and third, together with the START III guidelines, removes what has been an obstacle to START II ratification in the Duma.

Let me now ask Larry to briefly summarize the economic portions of the meeting.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SUMMERS: On economic issues, this was as positive a summit as any that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have had. The two Presidents devoted much of the lunch discussion to economic issues. President Clinton congratulated President Yeltsin on his March 6th economic speech laying out his economic strategy, going forward, and on his appointment of a new reform-oriented economic team. . . .

Q: I'd like to address a question to Mr. Berger, and perhaps to Bob Bell. As recently as Monday afternoon, quite senior people in the administration were saying that there was no prospect of an ABM-TMD agreement anytime soon. Could you say something about how this came about?

BERGER: I think those same senior officials may have been saying it at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. I think that this was the issue perhaps that most time was spent on in the summit.

Well, a good part of the morning session was spent on the Euro-security issues that Secretary Albright has discussed. They then moved to the START and ABM-TMD issues, which continued in various configurations through the afternoon.

I think, finally, when it became absolutely clear that we could both preserve the ABM system, but also proceed ahead with the six systems that we have under -- that we are proceeding with, that agreement fell into place. I'm not sure that we were expecting all that to happen as we got here, but the negotiations from our perspective were very successful.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

BELL: Mike suggests I just give a very short chronology. This started really three and a half years ago when the Clinton administration in the fall of '93, at the five-year ABM review conference, laid down a comprehensive proposal for demarkation that was based on one simple rule, and that was whether you ever tested a theater missile defense system against a strategic target.

That proposal was not accepted by the Russians, and after a year or two of not much progress, we made a fundamental decision to split the negotiations in half and concentrate on the so-called lower velocity theater missile defense systems where, indeed, we were able to reach agreement, and fully expected that we would be able to sign that and get on with the harder problems that we finally reached resolution on today.

But as those of you who have followed this know, there have been a lot of zigs and zags on this and many previous occasions where we thought that we had agreement to go forward with part one only to find when we got there that the Russians in effect were saying, until we finish the whole problem we're not going to

split off part of it.

So going into the last several weeks, really intensive travel, as Sandy said. On this question of the remaining higher velocity systems, we have consistently run into a roadblock wherein the Russians were saying unless an additional set of constraints that were unacceptable to the administration and unacceptable to the chiefs in the military services were added to this demarcation regime, there wouldn't be an agreement on anything; indeed, there wouldn't be an agreement on the START issues and there wouldn't be an agreement on going forward with START II ratification in the Duma. And as Sandy just said, that position held until about 4:00 p.m. this afternoon when we had the breakthrough.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I say, too, that when I met with President Yeltsin in Moscow in January, he said, there are some questions that can only be resolved by Presidents. This question was resolved by two Presidents.

Q: To follow up Bob Bell, please. Bob, are you saying that the Russians, in fact, relinquished their demands for specific performance limits on higher speed, higher capability systems?

BELL: Well, I think it's important to recognize what's agreed and then what is not part of the regime. As Sandy said, we have agreed on a very important testing constraint. We agree that these higher-speed TMD systems -- and we have one principal program that's called the Navy Theater-wide, or Navy Upper Tier System -- for those faster TMD systems, you cannot test them against a strategic target without them getting captured then as an ABM.

Beyond that, we've agreed in this breakthrough agreement that we reached today that for those faster systems, we will share information on those programs with the Russians so they understand that they're designed to protect our troops and are not aimed at Russia, or designed to deal with the Russians; and second, that as newer technologies emerge, such as a laser program, for example, we will consult with them and talk through the compliance issues they have in their minds if they feel there are compliance issues. But as Sandy said, there is no veto associated with that consultation.

Now, beyond that, we have an obligation, the President has an

obligation to uphold the law, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. And he is required to ensure that all of our faster TMD systems comply with the ABM treaty. And we'll continue through the normal Defense Department process to conduct those compliance reviews, just as we did with the Navy Upper Tier System, to be able to certify to Congress that, indeed, it is consistent with the treaty.

Q: Was this agreement on ABM negotiated with Primakov, or was it negotiated with Russian military? And if so, who?

BERGER: It was negotiated at various levels, but it was an agreement reached by the two Presidents.

Q: General Shalikashvili, these concessions that the U.S. is making to the Russians as far as implementing START II, delaying some of the destruction of their silos or their warheads, dismantling some of those warheads, are these unilateral concessions or can the U.S. military similarly delay implementing aspects of START II as well?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I, first of all, wouldn't characterize them at all as concessions. I think what was agreed upon is in the best interest, security interest of the United States. Those time limits that Sandy outlined here are time limits that apply to both, both parties.

Q: Will the U.S. military delay implementing --

BERGER: Can I just add two things? Number one, don't forget that START II was negotiated four years ago and that those timetables were put in place four years ago, so that they're obviously -- there's been some change by virtue of that delay.

Second of all, in order for these -- our Senate has ratified START II with one set of timetables. If the Duma ratifies START II with a different set of timetables, we would have to submit something back to the Senate, either a protocol with those adjustments, or, ideally if we have START III completed in time, we would submit both together -- the adjustment of the timetable and START III. But the START II obviously is not enforced until there is an exchange of instruments of ratification by the two governments.

Q: Secretary Albright, could you game out for us just how the

next weeks go in terms of negotiating this NATO-Russian document? Would it require -- that there be a special U.S. negotiator? How do you see that playing out?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, you have to keep in mind this is a NATO-Russia agreement, and the chief negotiator is the Secretary General of NATO Solana. And he is the one that is going to be carrying on these discussions. And the process will unfold as rapidly as he gets the various pieces into place. So we are hopeful that that agreement as has been discussed here today and in other places will, in fact, be able to be agreed to by all the members fairly rapidly.

Q: And do you think it might be wrapped it before the President comes back to Europe in May?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's possible. But the important point here is that Madrid -- that is, the invitation for accession to new members -- will take place in July no matter what, and that that is on a track of its own. And we would hope, obviously, that the NATO-Russian charter could, in fact, be done as rapidly as possible. But the timetables of the two are not hinged to each other in any way -- two tracks.

Q: Can I follow up on that? As recently as two days ago, President Yeltsin was sounding non-negotiable on the idea that this could be anything but a treaty. Could you describe the process by which he came around to agreeing to a document that was something short of a treaty?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I would say that what was important to him was that there would be an agreement among the various NATO heads to the fact that this was an important agreement. And so, what it said in the language itself is that it would be signed by the leaders of NATO countries and Russia, and this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level.

And I can't speak for President Yeltsin, but the sense that I got from being in the meetings was that he felt that this was an appropriate way to solidify what will clearly be a very important agreement.

BERGER: Can I just add one thing? This is not, obviously, an unprecedented circumstance. The Helsinki Accords, for example, were here in Helsinki -- were signed by leaders. They have

had enormous impact. They are enduring commitments, but they don't represent legally binding commitments in that sense.

The second thing I would say is, there are aspects of all of this that relate to, for example, a CFE agreement, if we were to get one, which relate to START II and START III, which obviously would be submitted to Congress for approval.

Q: Madam Secretary, do you share President Yeltsin's confidence of his ability to get START II through communist and nationalist-dominated Duma which has made explicit its connection of ratification with NATO expansion, not merely with ABM issues? And if they do not ratify, if they turn down the treaty, what happens then?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov are committed to pushing, as they can, on ratification in the Duma. And I think that we have to watch the process unfold.

What I think is as important for the Duma as for all of us is that these agreements be seen in the national interest of the respective countries. And it is our belief that once people see how all these interlocking pieces are structured that all will feel comfortable that Russia is in no way threatened by the new NATO. As we have said, there is a new Russia, and there is also a new NATO. And that new NATO does not have a single enemy. And I think it's going to be very important for all to understand how all these documents fit together.

Q: Madam Secretary, could you give us a little of the atmosphere in the room? Did it ever get testy or intense, or what was it like this time? They both looked more tired than after previous summits.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me start, and then Sandy might want to continue. I actually found the whole day intense, but fascinating. Here were two high political leaders who were engaged on a whole range of subjects on which they both had expert knowledge. And they covered -- they would begin discussions and set out what the agenda would be and at certain stages set them aside and then return. I think there is a really quite remarkable dynamic between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They were very glad to see each other again. And they

worked hard. They clearly worked hard. They earned their pay today.

BERGER: Let me just add two things. One, in part -- in answer to your question, of course, if they didn't ratify START II, we would operate under START I for so long as that were the case. And that's another part of the answer.

I agree with what the Secretary has said. This was a day that started about 9:00 a.m. and the meetings went until 6:00 p.m. There were supposed to be fairly large breaks. There was really only one break which took place after lunch for about an hour in which there were some side meetings that the Secretary and others had. But this was eight hours of very intense one-on-one discussion -- very frank, very candid. The President was very, very clear in reaffirming our position, reaffirming the five no's that you've all heard so much about with respect to NATO enlargement. President Yeltsin was clear that they didn't like NATO expansion.

But I think this is a pivot point in which they preserved their position that they still don't like NATO enlargement, but they're going to deal with it. And I think that only came after a good deal of back-and-forth between the two leaders.

Q: Did they ever raise their voices?

BERGER: No. I'm not speaking about other people, but they didn't. (Laughter.)

Q: I wonder if the issue of the Baltic states was discussed at all, but, in particular, whether this -- right to choose the means to ensure their own security --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The subject did come up generally, and the President -- President Clinton made very clear that NATO was open to all market democracies and that we were not going to be a part of creating any new artificial dividing lines in Europe, and that the first countries that would enter NATO would not be the last.

And the phrase that you refer to was, in fact, in the statement as it was accepted, so I can only presume that it would also apply. And I think that this was one of the subjects where, as Sandy said, there was not total agreement. But President Clinton made completely clear what was the American position on that.

And that is where some of these no's came in.

Q: Do you now expect within a reasonable time the Baltic states to become NATO applicants?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I'm not going to predict the timing of any of the applicants.

Q: Secretary Albright, can you tell us what happened to cause this late afternoon breakthrough on the ABM treaty, which then seemed to have created all this positive news that you had for us?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, as I said, I think that there are certain decisions that can only be made by Presidents, and we witnessed two strong Presidents making decisions which created a breakthrough.

Q: On the Denver summit, did Mr. Yeltsin indicate he is happy about that, or is he still sticking to his red jacket complaint of a few years ago that he's not yet received the status he deserves?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: My impression, when that was announced or when it was discussed, President Yeltsin seemed very pleased.

MCCURRY: Thank you. I want to thank all the briefers.

I also want to do one thing. I told a little story earlier about the President being awake at night. I want to make it absolutely clear that we are not speculating on what the cause of the bumps in the night were. It may, in fact, have been someone walking around on the ninth floor. And I also want to pay tribute to the fine staff here at the Hotel Inter-Continental for all the help they gave us. They did a wonderful job hosting us here.

Q: Mike, there were reports of demonstrators banging pots and pans outside the hotel in the middle of the night around the same time. Is it possible that's what woke the President up?

MCCURRY: It's conceivable. That actually is what woke me up. They, I think, were human rights protesters who were outside the front of the hotel around 1:20 a.m., and they were blowing whistles and having a good time -- creating an enjoyable noise.

Q: -- the other 16 heads of states if they are all likely to sign?

MCCURRY: Oh, we have had extensive consultations within the North Atlantic Council. There's been a real deal of preview work done for a number of the items that were on the discussion agenda today. And we will, of course, be going forward with additional briefings to capitals and further consultations with our allies. I expect that we'll also very shortly be in a position to brief Secretary General Solana on this meeting since he has lead responsibility on behalf the Alliance in negotiating with the Russian Federation the details of the charter document.

Okay, thank you, everyone. We'll see you back in Washington Monday.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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Sunday, March 23 1997; Page C06 The Washington Post  
(EDITORIAL)

### A Useful Summit

RUSSIA'S POWER HAS faded steadily over the past 10 years, but the iconography of Moscow-Washington summits remains generally unchanged. That has produced an odd phenomenon. It used to be that two leaders of more or less equal geopolitical weight could come to a hard-fought compromise and then go home and crow. Now there is not much to keep President Clinton from scoring an easy victory, but he has to be careful not to proclaim it. Such tact allows Russian President Boris Yeltsin to go on cooperating and to claim victory, or at least a draw, when he returns to Moscow. But it also complicates Mr. Clinton's efforts to convince

skeptics here and in central Europe that he hasn't sold out U.S. or third-country interests.

In Helsinki Friday, Mr. Clinton got what he wanted -- de facto Russian acquiescence of NATO expansion eastward. In return, it appears that he gave Mr. Yeltsin small wins -- this June's G-7 meeting in Denver will be called "the Summit of the Eight" -- and "concessions" that are as much in U.S. interest as in Russia's, such as a pledge to further reduce nuclear-weapon arsenals. Still, both sides have to portray the package as a carefully balanced compromise.

All that said, it's also true that this was a useful, productive summit. Mr. Yeltsin came to Helsinki with a weak hand, but he played it well, both tactically and as a matter of principle. He couldn't stop NATO from accepting new members, such as Poland, but he could have lobbed some rhetorical hand grenades as he retreated and thereby shaken up Europe. That would have been self-defeating in the long run, but it might have felt good for a time. Instead he chose a statesman's role. Europe and the world were watching, he said before the eight-hour negotiations, "that we do not lose the partnership that has developed in recent years. . . . We will part from the summit as friends."

Potentially the most sensible accomplishment of the day was the two leaders' agreement on a new arms control treaty, known as Start III, under which each side would reduce, by the year 2007, its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads -- one-fifth of the levels of five years ago. Russia has yet to ratify Start II, in part because it would have to destroy thousands of one type of weapon and then, to reach parity with the United States, actually build a new class of missile. That's plainly not what Russia should be spending money on, even if it had the money. Friday's agreement provides the assurance that those new weapons won't have to be built. But whether that's enough to persuade Russia's parliament to ratify Start II is uncertain -- and without Start II, Start III can't happen.

Mr. Yeltsin also agreed to enter a new relationship with NATO, even as he continues to register his opposition to the alliance's expansion, and he dropped his insistence that the new NATO-Russia charter be ratified by every NATO member's parliament. The merits of the new consultative mechanism will depend on the details; drawing Russia in is in everyone's interest -- as long as Mr. Clinton sticks to his commitment, repeated Friday, that Moscow

will have "a voice, not a veto."

Now that the U.S.-Russia relationship is, for the moment, on track, Mr. Clinton can turn to a no-less-crucial challenge of shaping the new Europe. That is to ensure that the newly independent nations that will not enter NATO on the first go-round, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, emerge with their sovereignty and security well protected.

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Sunday, March 23 1997; Page A25 The Washington Post

Summit Brings Yeltsin No Praise From Russians  
Leader's Political Will Remains A Major Question in Moscow

By David Hoffman  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, March 22 -- President Boris Yeltsin returned today from his talks with President Clinton in Helsinki to criticism that Russia gained nothing from the meeting and warnings that ratification of the START II strategic arms accord will depend on whether Yeltsin finally lobbies for it.

Clinton said in his radio address in the United States today that the summit is "leading the world away from the nuclear threat." But Russians said the potential for further progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons rests on whether Yeltsin can summon the political will to do what he has not yet done -- persuade Russia's lower house of parliament, the State Duma, to approve the four-year-old treaty.

In Helsinki, Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to begin a new round of strategic arms negotiations, START III, to significantly reduce

the levels of nuclear weapons. But their joint statement in Helsinki said those negotiations would begin only after START II takes effect.

The START II nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by Yeltsin and then-President George Bush in January 1993 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate last January, but it has made no headway in the Duma, where Communists and nationalists are the largest factions.

Yeltsin told a news conference in Helsinki, "I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice." However, backers of the treaty in the Russian parliament have complained for a long time that Yeltsin's support was practically invisible. They repeated today that unless he makes a concerted effort to overcome opposition in the parliament, the treaty will continue to languish.

"What we will really need is a real promotional campaign. Until now we haven't had this kind of campaign," said Vladimir Averchev, a legislator from the centrist Yabloko bloc who serves on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Yeltsin's long illness and the distractions of the presidential campaign last year have left the strategic arms accord low on parliament's list of priorities. Even those members who support ratification have bemoaned the lack of support from Yeltsin's administration in answering critics and explaining how it would affect Russia's weakened defense forces.

Yeltsin promised last year to get the treaty ratified by April, but then nothing happened. When then-Defense Secretary William J. Perry came to the Duma last October to make a pitch for the treaty, he ran into a buzz saw of opposition.

The START II treaty provides for between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads on each side. The treaty requires dismantling the more dangerous multi-warhead missiles, which the Soviet Union had deployed. But critics say Russia now cannot afford to build up to the maximum level of single-warhead missiles that would be needed to remain on a par with the United States. The lower levels being discussed for a new treaty -- between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads -- would be easier for Russia, but the United States is insisting the START II treaty be ratified before new, lower levels are negotiated.<p>

Moreover, the START II treaty has become enmeshed in a parliamentary backlash to NATO expansion among communists and nationalists. Yeltsin and Clinton remained deadlocked over NATO expansion at their talks but agreed to keep working on a NATO-Russia charter. Yeltsin dropped his earlier demand that the charter be legally binding.

"Yeltsin got what he deserved: a complete no," said Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. "The impression was as if he was summoned by the master who listened to him first and then said, 'The decision has already been taken.'" Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in last year's presidential election, said Yeltsin "got it in the backside from his friend Bill."

Another Duma member from Yabloko was also critical. Mikhail Yuryev told the Interfax news agency that "the enlarged NATO will be directed against Russia." He said Russia must "reexamine its foreign policy priorities" and "start to gradually form . . . new blocks to oppose NATO," suggesting Russia look to Iran, India and China as allies who "dislike the West."

A nationwide strike is being planned for Thursday because of wage and pension delays. Ruslan Aushev, president of the Russian republic of Ingushetia, told Interfax that Russia should not be obsessed with NATO expansion. "We now have so many problems, especially economic ones, which are far more important than this issue, problems that need to be solved without delay," he said.

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UPn 03/21 1710 Pena takes oath as Energy secretary  
WASHINGTON, March 21 (UPI) -- With Vice President Al Gore officiating, former Transportation Secretary Federico Pena took the oath of office as energy secretary.  
At a brief White House ceremony Friday, Pena reiterated his commitment to finding solutions to a variety of problems facing his department, headed by the dilemma of storing the nation's

nuclear waste.

The government is required by court order to begin accepting the waste in January, and the Energy Department already has conceded it will not meet the deadline. Utilities that have paid the government billions of dollars to finance the project have filed suit.

Pena told senators during his confirmation hearing he had no immediate solution but promised to move ahead with the evaluation of a proposed underground storage site in Nevada.

Other problems facing the department include safeguarding the nation's nuclear weapons materials, easing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, overseeing deregulation of the electric industry, and speeding the high-cost nationwide cleanup of nuclear weapons production sites.

Pena, a former Denver mayor with little experience with nuclear issues, replaced Hazel O'Leary, who as energy secretary faced controversy over her allegedly excessive travel schedule.

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Subject: START TALKING - SUMMIT PROGRESS 3/23

START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS

Dear Activist Leaders: March 22, 1997

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Thank you for your efforts to persuade President Clinton to  
START TALKING!

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Your efforts persuading Senators to urge the President to START Talking, your letters and postcards to the President and administration, and your media work and public education made a difference. Because of these efforts, nuclear arms reductions were prominent on the agenda in Helsinki, and progress has been made.

Enclosed is a brief summary of the decisions related to nuclear weapons reductions made at the Summit. If you would like excerpts of transcripts from the press briefings of Clinton, Yeltsin and U.S. administration officials, or more information,

please contact Kathy at the Disarmament Clearinghouse. More thorough reports and analysis will be available in the next issue of the Disarmament Clearinghouse UPDATE! (coming soon in early April).

In the weeks ahead we will have much work to do to solidify and further develop progress from the Summit. We will count on you to keep the pressure on to ensure continued progress with bold cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century.

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FOR MORE INFORMATION:

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The Disarmament Clearinghouse is a project of: Greenpeace, Peace Action, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Plutonium Challenge and Women's Action for New Directions.

#### START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS . . . .

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"There's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, that is, of START III. That's 85 percent of the overall arsenal of warheads being reduced in connection with that. That is significant. This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

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"I think almost unexpected even among us, we were working along here hoping this would happen, we resolved a number of road blocks relating to START II and the other related issues which permitted us to say that President Yeltsin would prompt ratification of START II, and we would together support guidelines for START III which we would hope could be negotiated quickly after that, which would reduce the Cold War arsenals to over 80 percent from their Cold War high - more or less 80 percent. These are dramatic and very substantial results and I'm

very pleased with them."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997, Helsinki Finland.

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## START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS...

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### SUMMARY

(The focus of this summary is nuclear weapons reductions.)

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#### START II and III

- Destroying Warheads
- Implementation -Russian Ratification of START II
  - Timeline Implementing START II & III
  - US Senate and Implementing START II & III

- ABM Treaty Agreement -US Senate Response to ABM Treaty
- NATO Expansion and Nuclear Weapons in Eastern Europe

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#### START II . . . & START III

"Today President Yeltsin agreed to seek the Duma's prompt ratification of START II, already ratified by the United States Senate. But we will not stop there. The United States is prepared to open negotiations on further strategic arms cuts with Russia under a START III immediately after the Duma ratifies START II. President Yeltsin and I agreed on guidelines for START III negotiations that will cap at 2,000 to 2,500 the number of strategic nuclear warheads each of our countries would retain and to finish the reductions of START III by the year 2007. Now think about it. This means that within a decade, we will have reduced both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals by 80 percent below their Cold War peak of just five years ago."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

#### DESTROYING WARHEADS

If it becomes a treaty, the outline of a new strategic arms agreement announced yesterday by the United States and Russia would for the first time try to make nuclear cuts irreversible by

guaranteeing that at least some of the old warheads are destroyed instead of stockpiled for possible future use.

The promise is given in a joint statement issued at the Helsinki summit between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that commits the two nations to include provisions in a new treaty, to be called START III, that require "transparency" and warhead "destruction." This is the arms control argot for letting the other side watch while warheads are sent to the trash heap or otherwise rendered permanently unusable. . .

The new plan for START III calls for steps to make permanent the limitations called for by two major nuclear arms reduction agreements negotiated earlier by the two countries: START I in 1991 and START II in 1993. At present, the treaties are slated to expire after 15 years.

In another novel development yesterday, the two sides agreed to consider applying the principle of "transparency" to the plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, helping to ensure it cannot be used later to form the explosive guts of new weapons that could be manufactured if relations ever turned highly sour.

The aim of the new plan is to correct in the next arms control treaty what critics have called a major deficiency of the START I and START II accords, namely that neither accord actually required the destruction of any nuclear warheads.

Instead, partly because both nations were nervous about moving too rapidly to reduce their nuclear arsenals and partly because they were sensitive to the security implications of allowing intensive scrutiny of how they handled these weapons, the accords called only for destruction of the means to deliver some of the nuclear arms held by the two nations.

The earlier accords called, for example, for the wings of certain strategic bombers to be clipped off by an agreed date, for the filling up or withdrawal of tubes that hold some of the nuclear-tipped missiles that could be launched from submarines, and the blowing up of various land-based silos that could be used to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

With no language relating to the warheads themselves, the treaties effectively allowed each side to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that are currently in storage as a deliberate

hedge against the advent of a new Cold War. Although each side claims to have dismantled thousands of warheads since the late-1980s, neither side is certain today of precisely how many such weapons remain because all of this work has occurred in secret, without any mutual inspections.

"This is really quite significant," Robert S. Norris, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said of the plan to require "transparency" of warhead destruction and residual arsenals in START III. "If all of this is successful, it will prevent the retention of secret stockpiles which engender distrust."

A senior U.S. official who participated in the negotiations that led to yesterday's agreement explained that with arsenals of deployed weapons to be limited to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads in a new START III agreement -- instead of the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads allowed by START II -- both governments had recognized the increasing security risk posed by allowing unmonitored stockpiles of stored weapons.

An unstated U.S. concern behind yesterday's agreement is that old Russian warheads kept in storage after being taken off strategic missiles or bombers might eventually be subject to theft by terrorists or illicit sale to nations in the Middle East or elsewhere.- from: Washington Post, "Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New" By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham March 22, 1997

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## IMPLEMENTING START II AND III - RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF START II

Q: "You each have made arms control agreements here that, you know, the parliaments will want a say in. To Mr. Yeltsin, can you guarantee that the Duma will follow your lead and ratify this? . . ." Press Pool, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

YELTSIN: "As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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APO 03/22 1034 Communists Knock Summit Deals

... At a news conference after the summit, Yeltsin jauntily predicted that he would have no difficulty winning support from the Duma, the lower house of parliament, for the START II nuclear

disarmament agreement.

But he will have to do it over the fierce opposition of the Communist Party, the largest bloc in the Duma. Communist chief Gennady Zyuganov charged that Yeltsin was "guilty of completely betraying the national interests of the country."...

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MOSCOW, March 22 -- President Boris Yeltsin returned today from his talks with President Clinton in Helsinki to criticism that Russia gained nothing from the meeting and warnings that ratification of the START II strategic arms accord will depend on whether Yeltsin finally lobbies for it. . .

The START II nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by Yeltsin and then-President George Bush in January 1993 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate last January, but it has made no headway in the Duma, where Communists and nationalists are the largest factions.

Yeltsin told a news conference in Helsinki, "I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice." However, backers of the treaty in the Russian parliament have complained for a long time that Yeltsin's support was practically invisible. They repeated today that unless he makes a concerted effort to overcome opposition in the parliament, the treaty will continue to languish.

"What we will really need is a real promotional campaign. Until now we haven't had this kind of campaign," said Vladimir Averchev, a legislator from the centrist Yabloko bloc who serves on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Yeltsin's long illness and the distractions of the presidential campaign last year have left the strategic arms accord low on parliament's list of priorities. Even those members who support ratification have bemoaned the lack of support from Yeltsin's administration in answering critics and explaining how it would affect Russia's weakened defense forces.

Yeltsin promised last year to get the treaty ratified by April, but then nothing happened. When then-Defense Secretary William J. Perry came to the Duma last October to make a pitch for the treaty, he ran into a buzz saw of opposition. . .

Moreover, the START II treaty has become enmeshed in a parliamentary backlash to NATO expansion among communists and

nationalists. Yeltsin and Clinton remained deadlocked over NATO expansion at their talks but agreed to keep working on a NATO-Russia charter. Yeltsin dropped his earlier demand that the charter be legally binding.

"Yeltsin got what he deserved: a complete no," said Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. "The impression was as if he was summoned by the master who listened to him first and then said, 'The decision has already been taken.'" Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in last year's presidential election, said Yeltsin "got it in the backside from his friend Bill." ...

The Washington Post, March 23 1997, "Summit Brings Yeltsin No Praise From Russians Leader's Political Will Remains A Major Question in Moscow" By David Hoffman.

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#### IMPLEMENTING START II AND III - TIMELINE

"In order to implement START II in a way that is economically feasible for Russia, but does not in any way compromise the security of the American people, what we agreed to do in this framework is to set a date of 2007 for the full implementation of the reductions in START III, but to delay the date of all the destructions in START II to 2007. We also agreed to move from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2003 the time that Russia would have to deactivate the warheads covered by START II. . ."

President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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#### IMPLEMENTING START II & III U.S. SENATE -

"Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction -- ultimate destruction of the missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this."

"But I have to tell you, when the Russians advanced this possibility, when President Yeltsin advanced this possibility with me today, the thought that the American people might be able to live in a world within a decade where the nuclear arsenals had been reduced by 80 percent, and the thought that, in addition to that, accelerating the time we had anticipated it would take us

to meet the START III targets would save our Department of Defense precious dollars that we need to secure our defense in other ways, and will, therefore, enhance our national defense as well as reducing the threat caused General Shalikashvili to recommend this to me, caused Secretary Cohen to sign off on it, and made me think it was a very good arrangement, indeed, for the Russian people and for the American people, and, indeed, for anybody else who would be affected by what we do on this issue."

"So, yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. It may take us a little longer than President Yeltsin indicated it would take him with the Duma, but I think we will both get a favorable result because this is so clearly in the interests of the Russian the American people."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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#### ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM) AGREEMENT

"We also reached agreement in our work to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our arms control efforts. Distinguishing between ballistic missile systems restricted by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses that are not restricted has been a very difficult issue to resolve. Today, after three years of negotiations, we agreed to preserve the ABM Treaty while giving each of us the ability to develop defenses against theater missiles."

President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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"Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the state Duma has not yet ratified START II, because ABM was suspended. There was no belief that the treaty from '92 on ABM is not only being complied with by the Russian administration, but in the future conditions are being created which would not allow circumvention of the treaty. In other words, we for the state Duma were able to prepare the ground so that the Duma could positively look at the issue of ratifying START II."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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#### US SENATE RESPONSE TO ABM TREATY AGREEMENT

The agreement announced yesterday outlined terms for a deal still to be finalized that would restrict the capabilities of theater defenses to a demarcation standard defined earlier in the Senate. That is, the Pentagon's fastest, longest-range theater systems would remain exempt from ABM treaty coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers/second.

But other terms went farther than some congressional experts had expected by including a provision "not to develop, test or deploy space-based TMD [theater missile defense] interceptors." The agreement also stipulated that both sides "will exchange detailed information annually" on their theater defense plans and programs.

Although administration officials said the agreement still would permit the United States to proceed with all six antimissile systems under development, GOP missile defense experts in Congress assailed it as an unwarranted and unacceptable set of constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

"The ABM treaty was not designed to impose limits on our theater missile defense systems, only on national defense systems," said Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a leading missile defense proponent. "Imposing limits on interceptor speeds, which the president continues to support, will inevitably result in the future dumbing down of theater missile defense systems, putting the lives of our soldiers overseas at greater risk."

Clinton made no mention yesterday of whether he intended to submit the missile defense agreement to the Senate for ratification. Whether he is required to do so has been another point of bitter dispute between congressional Republicans and the White House.

"The Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in both houses that we didn't want the president to engage in these agreements," said Rep. Bob Livingston (R-La.), the Appropriations Committee chairman. "He's kept these as secret as he possibly could. We knew they were negotiating them, but we had no idea they would sign off on agreements to virtually leave us defenseless against anyone who's not a party to them."

(from: Washington Post, "Destroy Warheads? This Is the START Of Something New" By R. Jeffrey Smith and Bradley Graham March 22,

1997.)

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## NATO EXPANSION & NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

"We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake, and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, the Russia-NATO agreement, and this is the principal question here."

"We have agreed on the parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. This is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to those new members of NATO, to not proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military infrastructure which remains in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too will be included in the agreement with NATO."

"And finally, we come to an agreement that this document will be binding for all. For that reason, everyone will sign this, all heads of state of all 16 members nations of NATO. . . And we will believe that document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, for all states whose leaders signed this document."

President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland

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Q: "And to President Clinton: This exclusion of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the promise that there will be no big troop buildup in the new states, does that mean that NATO's new members will be second-class members?" (From Press Pool March 21, Helsinki, Finland)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: "Let me say, Terry, the -- in answer to the question you raised to me, emphatically no, this does not mean any new members will be second-class members. That's one of the things that we have committed ourselves to. There are no second class members."

"What are the two most important things that you get if you're a member? One is the security guarantee, the mutual security guarantee. The other is a place in the military command structure. These will be available to any new members taken in."

"Now, we also want to make it clear that in addition to the security guarantee and participation in the military command structure, NATO is a different organization today than it was. We have a different mission. . . ."

"Now, on the two questions you mentioned, on the nuclear question, the NATO military commanders reached an independent judgment that based on the facts that exist in the world today, they have no reason, therefore no intention and no plan to station any nuclear weapons on members soil."  
President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

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From Disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997  
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 06:27:59 -0800 (PST)  
From: Disarmament@igc.org  
To: ctb-followers@igc.org  
Subject: Summit Analysis

The New York Times, March 24, 1997

OPINION - FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Not Yet

WASHINGTON -- So it's all O.K. now?

That's the word from the Clinton folks. They got the mood music they were looking for in Helsinki: The Russians will complain about NATO expansion, but Boris Yeltsin will accept the goodies the U.S. offered him to tolerate NATO's moving closer to Russia's border. Therefore, we will have the best of all worlds: NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, vague assurances to the Balts and others left out that they can join later and even some progress on arms control thrown in to boot. As one U.S. official quipped to me, referring to my own criticism of NATO expansion: "When do we get to see the headline

'Clinton Right on NATO Expansion, Critics All Wrong.?'

Not yet.

To be fair, if Clinton is able to achieve this best-of-all-worlds scenario, it would indeed merit real praise. My priority is that the arms control treaties with Russia be implemented and the reform process there be enhanced. That is what would really secure European stability. If the Administration can deliver both, while also pursuing its dubious, politically inspired NATO expansion scheme, then it would be churlish to oppose this Helsinki package.

But we are a long way from drawing that conclusion. To begin with, many of the key issues involving NATO expansion remain unresolved: What will happen to all the countries, particularly the Balts, that don't get into NATO now? How will the U.S. Congress react when it discovers that Clinton's Helsinki package comes with a price tag of at least \$40 billion, and a U.S. military commitment to defend the Polish border? How will Russia's parliament react to this deal?

But beyond these unanswered questions, I remain a skeptic because this Helsinki "success" is based on two white lies. The first is that while the Russians don't like NATO expansion, they've decided to make the best of it. In truth, that is not what Helsinki demonstrates. What it shows is that "Russia has concluded it is simply too weak to stop expansion," notes Johns Hopkins University foreign policy specialist Michael Mandelbaum, a leading critic of NATO expansion.

And the problem with expanding NATO on such terms, Mandelbaum argues, is that up to now "the entire post-cold war security structure in Europe, whether the unification of Germany or the conventional and nuclear arms control treaties, has been based on Russian consent. NATO expansion will be a departure from that. After NATO expands, the new European order will rest not on Russian consent, but on Russian weakness."

In other words, what Helsinki proves is that we won the cold war. But we knew that. The question is: Are we making the most of it? Should NATO expansion be a priority, even if it weakens Yeltsin or diminishes Russian cooperation elsewhere, such as against Iran?

The other white lie is the Clinton argument that expanding NATO will stabilize democratic reform in Central Europe and be good for Russia, because NATO has changed and Russia has changed. In truth, the way to strengthen free-market democracy in Central Europe is by bringing these nations into the E.U. common market, not by giving them NATO nukes. But more important, the very reason Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic want to join NATO is that they think NATO has not changed -- that it is still an anti-Russian alliance -- and because they feel that Russia has not changed -- that it is still the Soviet Union. (Never mind that Russia now has a cabinet led by economic reformers more progressive than half the nations now trying to join NATO.)

What Clinton said to Yeltsin in Helsinki was: We will pay you to pretend that NATO expansion is something other than what it is. We will pay you to forget that NATO is expanding because you're weak and because we still see you as the main threat to European stability, not as an equal member of the club. For now, Mr. Yeltsin is willing to be bought because he has no choice. But we should have no illusions: Mr. Clinton's "New Europe" is being built on white lies.

Mamma always said: When you don't call things by their real name, you get in trouble. That's what's going on here. I don't know when or where, but this sort of diplomacy will lead to trouble. So pardon me for sticking with the headline: "Clinton Still Wrong on NATO Expansion, Critics Still Right."

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The New York Times March 24, 1997

In Clinton-Yeltsin Sidelight: Progress on Arms Control  
By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- While focused on NATO expansion and Russia's place in a new Europe, the summit meeting between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki last week also produced important progress on arms control.

Nuclear weapons used to be the central issue between the Soviet Union and the United States, but now Moscow and Washington want stability at lower, safer and cheaper levels of armament and expenditure.

In Helsinki, the two presidents agreed -- subject to approval by both legislatures, which will not be easy -- to cut the number of long-range warheads on each side to no more than 2,000 to 2,500 by the end of 2007 in a third strategic arms reduction treaty, START III.

While some retired generals like Lee Butler, once head of the Strategic Air Command, now urge elimination of all nuclear weapons, START III would represent a cut far below current stockpiles and one the Pentagon would not have been likely to approve even a few years ago.

Equally important, START III would require for the first time the destruction of warheads themselves under inspection, not allowing the nuclear material to be stored and reused. The treaty guidelines would also make permanent the 1991 START I and 1993 START II accords -- assuming the Russian Parliament finally ratifies the latter, as Yeltsin promises. Those agreements are now to expire after 15 years.

The START III numbers represent a cut of nearly 80 percent from the high point of nuclear stockpiles, fewer than seven years ago. START III is a cut of about 65 percent in the total of deployed long-range warheads permitted under START I and a cut of about a third from the 3,000 to 3,500 allowed under START II.

If the Russian Parliament refuses to ratify START II, then START I limits remain in place; Congress has mandated that the United States not reduce unilaterally to fewer than 6,000 warheads.

The idea of the START III guidelines is to push the Russian Parliament to see the benefits of ratifying START II, which is a prerequisite. START II requires the elimination of all land-based multiple-warhead missiles, the backbone of Russia's force, while allowing Washington to keep its submarine-based multiple-warhead missiles. Some Russians regarded START II as unfair as soon as it was signed, but American officials argue that the old Soviet force is decaying anyway, and that Moscow hasn't the money to modernize it.

START III would preserve parity without the need for Russia to build more single-warhead missiles to reach START II limits. Given that START II was signed in 1993, the Americans also agreed -- subject to ratification -- to extend by one year the deadline a year for removing warheads from weapons due to be

destroyed, to the end of 2003. They also agreed to extend the deadline to destroy the launchers themselves -- bombers, missile silos or submarines -- to the end of 2007. Washington will continue to help pay for the destruction.

The two presidents also agreed how to distinguish shorter-range, "theater" missile defenses, intended to protect troops and ships, from longer-range strategic missile defenses that are all but banned under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile, or ABM treaty. The agreement allows Washington to proceed with all theater missile defenses under development.

To reassure Moscow that the ABM treaty will not be violated and that Russian strategic nuclear parity with America will not be undermined, the pact limits the speed and range of target missiles and commits both sides not to develop, test or deploy space-based theater missile interceptors or to deploy such missiles against each other.

Some congressional Republicans want no curbs on the development of theater missile defenses, while others want to scrap the ABM treaty. But Clinton administration officials say Moscow's acceptance of current U.S. theater missile development should satisfy Congress.

The two presidents also issued a statement promising to push for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention before it comes into force on April 29.

While Washington is legally bound to destroy chemical weapons anyway, Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has held up a vote to bargain for treaty changes and a reorganization that could put the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency back under the State Department.

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From disarmament@igc.org Mon Mar 24 19:33:58 1997

Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 06:39:23 -0800 (PST)

From: disarmament@igc.org

To: ctb-followers@igc.org

Subject: Republicans on ABM Deal

RTos 03/24 0652 Republicans Denounce U.S.-Russia Missile Deal

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - House Speaker Newt Gingrich and two other key Republicans on Sunday denounced an anti-ballistic missile agreement signed by President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin last week.

In a joint statement, Gingrich, House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bob Livingston of Louisiana and Rep. Chris Cox of California said the accord would halt the development of the most effective possible ballistic missile defense.

"If allowed to stand, this agreement will place the lives of our brave fighting men and women -- and ultimately millions of Americans -- in jeopardy," the three lawmakers said.

At their summit, Clinton and Yeltsin also reached a series of arms agreements, including a pledge to make further deep cuts in long-range nuclear arms.

But it was the missile-defense accord that drew the ire of the Georgia Republican and his colleagues.

U.S. officials said the two presidents late in their summit settled a long-running dispute over the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and can now each develop theater missile defenses to tackle new threats.

U.S. officials said the two leaders agreed to define which theater missile systems would not violate the ABM treaty, but the accord would permit deployment of all six missile interceptor programs under development by the Pentagon.

But Republicans took issue with a provision "not to develop, test or deploy space-based (theater missile defense) interceptors," arguing it would place unacceptable constraints on possible new technological breakthroughs.

Specifically, some Republican lawmakers have been pushing a proposal to expand a missile monitoring system already used aboard Navy ships into a system creating a ballistic shield, a scaled-down version of President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program that would be prohibited under the agreement.

A Gingrich aide explained that the accord would limit

development of such existing systems which are not covered by the ABM treaty, although it would not prevent developing a ballistic shield system "from scratch."

Diplomats and politicians were setting standards that should be determined by engineers and scientists, he said.

"We cannot allow this deliberate weakening of our national defense, nor a dangerous reliance on hollow arms control agreements," the congressmen said in their statement.

REUTE

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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
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From aslater@igc.apc.org Mon Mar 24 19:32:42 1997  
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:22:18 -0800 (PST)  
From: ALICE SLATER <aslater@igc.apc.org>  
To: mupj@igc.org  
Subject: Letter to Clinton, re NPT

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]  
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]  
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

Dear Karina,  
Howard Hallman asked me to forward this draft letter to you which I adapted from Colby Lowe's letter. I mailed it to the US Abolition list, together with Major Owens letter and a cover letter which I will attach at the bottom of the draft. Since the Yeltsin summit, it probably should be edited again. Is there anything further we can do? Are you doing anything about Owens' Congressional letter? Love, Alice

President William Clinton  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We applaud your progress in lowering the dangers of nuclear weapons: ratification of START II, the nuclear free zone protocols of Pelindaba (Africa) and Rarotonga (South Pacific), the extension of the nuclear test moratorium, and the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

At the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting at the UN on April 7th to 18th, you will have the opportunity to build on those achievements. We urge you to honor U.S. political and legal commitments to nuclear disarmament by taking a stand at the PrepComm in favor of starting negotiations in 1997 for a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The International Court of Justice ruled in July, 1996 that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." (emphasis added)

The UN General Assembly resolution passed in December (with the vote of China), called upon all states to fulfill their obligation under the World Court decision immediately by commencing negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

Some of our most distinguished generals and admirals, including General Lee Butler have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons in this post-cold war era.

The prestigious Canberra Commission reported last summer that the very existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of some states was an incentive for non-nuclear weapon states to acquire them and that we must abolish nuclear weapons to safeguard the future. The Commission recommended 6 immediate steps that could be taken in 1997:

1. Negotiate a CTBT (this has been achieved)
2. Take nuclear forces off alert
3. Remove warheads from delivery vehicles
4. End deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons
5. Initiate negotiations to further reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals
6. Develop an agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and an undertaking of non-use in relation to the non-nuclear weapons states.

We urge you to do what the vast majority of Americans long for put an end to the nuclear scourge by beginning negotiations on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. Seize the opportunity of this NPT PrepComm to earn a revered place in history by being remembered as the American President who got rid of the bomb.

Sincerely,

March 19, 1997

Dear USA Signer of the Abolition 2000 Statement,

On behalf of the Working Group for the NPT PrepComm of the Abolition 2000 Network I am writing to enroll your support for moving our nuclear abolition agenda forward. On April 7th to 18th, the nations of the world will gather at the UN in New York giving abolitionists an excellent opportunity to influence further steps for disarmament. But the work must begin now in our own country! We are calling on citizens all over the world to petition their governments to come to the NPT PrepComm with instructions to call for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention to be completed by the year 2000, with timebound steps set forth in the convention leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In addition, we are calling on the nuclear powers at the PrepComm to implement the immediate recommendations of the Canberra Commission and to agree to set up inter-sessional working groups between meetings to continue nuclear disarmament discussions.

Here in the United States, our job is particularly urgent. That is why we have enclosed a draft letter to President Clinton which you may adapt and send to Secretary of State Madeline Albright as well at the State Department, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC, 20520. Its important that they hear from many of us!

Also enclosed is a letter from Congressman Major Owens (D.NY), who is seeking the signatures of additional Members of Congress, in a call to President Clinton to honor the World Court Decision and the advice of General Butler and others by reviewing our nuclear policy, bringing it into conformity with the ICJ decision, and to take the lead on beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. Please urge your own Congressperson to sign on to this important letter.

The Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) sent the enclosed Abolition 2000 letter by myself and Alyn Ware to 90 members of parliaments in countries all over the world. We mailed these materials to Abolition 2000 supporters abroad and asked them to contact their parliamentarians to see how they can be assist in getting their governments to support our Abolition 2000 stand for : (1)treaty negotiations to begin in 1997, (2) the implementation of the Canberra recommendations for immediate action (See letter to PGA from Alice Slater and Alyn Ware), and (3) our new proposal to set up inter-sessional working groups between PrepComms.

With this world-wide effort, and a special focus here in the USA, we will prevail!

Peace,

Alice Slater

Alice Slater

GRACE

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment

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howard, is this an actual way to contact you via e-mail? i'm trying to contact jim & char, as well as phil miller, by the addresses you sent out in the last mailing. looking forward to seeing you again next week. anything i should know ahead of time? need me to bring anything?

let me know....

bruce

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URGENT NEWS ALERT: DISCUSSION OF SUMMIT ARMS REDUCTIONS ISSUES  
ON "TALK OF THE NATION" - PUBLIC RADIO  
TODAY, MARCH 26, 1997 2:00 P.M. (EST)

\*please call in: 1-800-989-8255\*

We need to make it clear that the disarmament measures are desired by the public, and in our REAL security interests.

For more \*talking points\* or assistance, please call me:

Kathy Crandall, Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
(202) 898 0150 ext. 232

We persuaded the President to START Talking in Helsinki, now its our turn.

\*\*\*\*\*

UPn 03/25 1455 Clinton: Terrific time in Helsinki

WASHINGTON, March 24 (UPI) -- President Clinton says he had a "terrific meeting" in Helsinki with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

He told reporters Tuesday, "It was good for the United States, good for the people of Russia."

He says the results were remarkable and that he was thankful his medical team made it possible for him to travel to Finland so soon after his surgery to repair a torn tendon.

Clinton said: "It went fine and it was a remarkable thing -- not only the progress we made on NATO, but especially on our commitment to slash the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia by 80 percent from their Cold War highs within a decade."

The 80 percent cut is the total that would be accomplished with the combined ratification of START I, START II and START III treaties.

At the close of the two-day summit, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on a series of arms control measures, including the guidelines for a START III treaty once START II is ratified by Russia and new terms for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Moscow also agreed to negotiate a charter with NATO despite reservations about enlargement of the defense alliance.

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RTos 03/25 1709 Russia Praises Yeltsin Role at Summit

MOSCOW (Reuter) - The Kremlin on Tuesday defended President

Boris Yeltsin's performance at last week's Helsinki summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton and rejected charges he had ceded too much ground over NATO expansion.

A compromise by Yeltsin, in which he dropped demands for a deal mapping out relations with NATO to be legally binding, was called a "crushing defeat" by his communist opponents.

But presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky, describing the Helsinki talks as the presidents' toughest summit yet, said Yeltsin had resisted NATO's plans to take in former Soviet bloc countries and compromised only to avoid new East-West conflict.

"Compromise solutions had to be found...to avoid a senseless worsening in relations between Russia and the West, and between Russia and the United States, and to avoid a degeneration into confrontation," Yastrzhembsky told a news briefing.

"In these conditions, Boris Yeltsin proved himself a skillful diplomat and negotiator, able to obtain the most possible."

Yastrzhembsky's comments, and the line presented by many Russian officials since last week's summit, reflect acceptance by the Kremlin of the realities of power status.

The Kremlin message is that Russia was in a tight corner in Helsinki over NATO expansion, a compromise was in the interests of Moscow and global stability and Yeltsin made the best of a bad hand.

"According to President Yeltsin, these were the tensest talks he has ever conducted with the Americans," Yastrzhembsky said in his most detailed comments so far on the summit.

"Sometimes it seemed that the talks were destined to failure because the two presidents were extremely firm and uncompromising in defending their views."

He said historians could one day call the summit the most important "in the post-confrontation period," meaning since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

But that may largely be because Yeltsin dropped demands that the deal Moscow is negotiating with NATO to define post-Cold War ties with the Western defence alliance must be legally binding.

The 66-year-old president now says the deal must be politically binding, meaning it can be signed just by state leaders and need not be ratified by national parliaments.

So far, the opposition reaction has been muted although Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov has accused Yeltsin of betraying Russia.

Analysts who support the Kremlin have been more prominent than the opposition since the summit, supporting the view that Yeltsin came away with as much as he could from Helsinki.

Glossing over the negative aspects, Yastrzhembsky presented

the achievements at the summit as:

- progress towards an agreement defining relations with NATO, which he said Moscow hoped to sign before a NATO summit in July which will offer membership to some states

- the United States and NATO had undertaken not to build up permanent NATO combat forces close to Russia's borders

- Washington and NATO stated "clearly and forcefully" their commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states

- positions were now closer on revising a 1990 treaty on conventional forces in Europe

- mutual commitment to arms control agreements including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles treaty on missile defence systems

- U.S. support for Russia's entry to international economic and trade organisations.

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RTw 03/25 1804 Senate unwise to fight Clinton over Pena - O'Leary

By Sonali Paul

WASHINGTON, March 25 (Reuter) - Former U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary said on Tuesday that Senate Republicans unnecessarily damaged ties with the White House by delaying the approval of her successor over a nuclear waste controversy.

"The posturing over the confirmation of Federico Pena was not a wise game in the long term," O'Leary said at a news briefing, referring to delays caused by Senate Energy Committee Chairman Frank Murkowski, an Alaskan Republican.

"It did not create an atmosphere nor a platform for the majority in the Senate ... and the sitting executive branch leadership to build any trust on any issues," she said.

Senate Energy Committee members and the administration will have to repair the damage to tackle two key issues -- the storage of radioactive waste from commercial nuclear plants and the approval of a treaty to curb carbon emissions.

On the radioactive waste issue, the nuclear industry is pushing Congress to force the administration into building a temporary dump near Yucca Mountain in Nevada while it weighs whether to use the mountain as a permanent burial ground.

On the global climate change treaty, which is due to be negotiated by the end of this year, industry groups are fighting any new moves that would raise the cost of burning fossil fuels, such as coal and oil.

"I'm concerned that to the extent industry is overheated on these issues, then that will further fan the flames in Congress in general. That has to be attended to," O'Leary said.

O'Leary went out of her way to clarify comments she had

made, and which Murkowski had quoted, suggesting that she had disagreed with the White House opposition to a temporary nuclear waste dump in Nevada.

"I am in favour of an interim facility when it's appropriate, that is when we know where a permanent facility can and will be built," she said, adding that this view was in line with President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore.

Murkowski's fight with the White House, she said, amounted to a battle over the timing of a decision on an interim facility, with Murkowski pressing for a decision next year.

The Clinton administration plans to have an initial assessment on whether a permanent repository can be built at Yucca Mountain at the end of 1998 and a final decision before 2000 on whether to build it there.

"They were quarreling, I believe, about 18 months," which in the scheme of a major engineering project is not a big difference, she said.

REUTER

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(Public Radio's call-in talk show with Ray Suarez)

Today, March 26  
2:00 pm est (11am pst, 12pm mst, 1pm ct . . .)

TOPIC:  
**\*\*Helsinki Summit - Disarmament Agreements and  
Republican Concern About Missile Defense\*\***

GUESTS:  
Jack Mendelsohn with the Arms Control Association vs.  
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The New York Times  
March 26, 1997

A Good Deal on Missile Defenses

According to some Congressional Republicans, last week's Helsinki agreement between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin on missile defenses dangerously threatens American security. They are wrong on two counts. The Helsinki deal permits all current American missile defense programs to proceed as planned. Beyond that, it is crucial to a larger arms-control package that will make Americans safer by helping to lock in radical reductions in Russian offensive nuclear weapons arsenals.

By almost any measure, this was a big victory for the White House. But the Administration will still have to cultivate moderate Republican support to win the Congressional approval

necessary to turn a summit understanding into a binding agreement.

The controversy hinges on the distinction between exotic and unproven systems for defending the entire North American continent, like the Reagan Administration's "Star Wars" program, and more modest systems designed to shield local theaters of battle from attacks by shorter-range missiles launched by rogue states like Iraq and Iran. Continental systems for defending the United States against Russian missile attack are effectively banned by the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, while battlefield theater-defense systems like the Patriot missiles used in the gulf war are not.

Last week's deal in Helsinki clarified the status of more advanced theater-defense weapons that could, in theory, be used to defend the entire continent.

The agreement allows the United States to proceed as planned with all its theater-defense programs. They cannot, however, be tested at the higher speeds and longer ranges necessary for continental defense, nor be tested from space. Both sides also agreed not to deploy these theater defenses against each other's missile forces. Research on continental and space-based systems would still be able to proceed.

This agreement to restrict defensive missile systems should, in turn, help persuade Russia's Parliament to ratify the huge nuclear missile reduction Mr. Yeltsin signed in 1993. That is far more important to the security of the American continent than missile defenses. Given the dubious reliability of Russia's internal administrative controls, Washington's main concern is to reduce nuclear stockpiles to the lowest possible levels. Russians will accept lower ceilings if they can be sure that the remaining warheads will not have to run a gantlet of continental missile defenses.

Many Republicans, however, would prefer to scrap the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, contending that it is outmoded in the post-cold-war world. Rogue states, they argue, may one day develop long-range missiles that will require a continental defense system. But this is a hypothetical danger. The real and present danger lies in the Russian stockpile. That can best be met by locking in the deep negotiated reductions in Russian missile forces, while pursuing research against potential

dangers from rogue regimes.

Mr. Yeltsin had to stand up to his own hawks to accept the Helsinki deal. It is a deal that answers America's legitimate defensive needs while brightening the prospects for an important arms-reduction package. Congress should recognize these benefits and give its approval.

The Washington Post

Wednesday, March 26 1997; Page A01

## Helms Signals Vote Likely On Chemical Weapons Pact Senator, Albright Warm to an Unlikely Alliance

By Thomas W. Lippman

Washington Post Staff Writer

WINGATE, N.C., March 25 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), standing next to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in another meeting of their mutual admiration society, signaled today that he will allow an international treaty banning chemical weapons to come to a ratification vote in the Senate.

Helms, who has been using his position to block the treaty, still opposes the pact and today called it "overrated." But he said he may be willing to let it go through as a result of arduous negotiations with his committee's senior Democrat, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), over "21 different issues."

"There will be no problem with it if we continue to negotiate as we have been doing for the past few days," Helms said at a joint news conference with Albright, whom he invited here to give a speech. "If both sides will sit down and be realistic about it, there is a very real chance of approving the treaty."

Biden's press secretary, Larry Spinelli, said the meeting "was certainly a very positive couple of hours" and "Biden felt optimistic they had made some progress."

Helms and Albright talked to reporters gathered on the lawn behind a stately old former antique store that is now the Jesse Helms Center, a foundation partly funded by Taiwanese contributions that will house Helms's Senate papers. He has donated his papers to nearby Wingate University, a small Baptist-affiliated school that he attended when it was a junior college.

Despite their political differences, Helms and Albright have developed at least in public a warm relationship of easy banter and respect for each other's views. Helms, typically a bitter critic of the Clinton administration's foreign policy, warmly welcomed Albright's nomination to be secretary of state and presided over quick and painless confirmation hearings for her.

The political odd couple spent today together, touring local businesses, meeting community leaders and students and proclaiming their esteem for each other.

When Laura Welsh, a Wingate student from Beckley, W.Va., asked Albright during a classroom session what was her "toughest negotiation" during her tenure as ambassador to the United Nations during President Clinton's first term, Albright paused a moment, then replied, "With Jesse Helms."

Helms, sitting at a student's desk in the front row, grinned and flashed a thumbs-up.

In her speech at the Jesse Helms Lecture at Wingate tonight, Albright said some people find her cordial relations with the conservative Helms "puzzling. They wonder what we have in common."

She noted their manifest differences: He is from rural North Carolina, she was born in Prague. "He's a Republican and before I became a diplomat and had all my partisan instincts surgically removed, I was a Democrat," she said.

Helms is a square dance man, Albright continued, while she has "done the Macarena, and unlike Vice President Gore, I actually move."

She said the key to their good relations can be found on the first page of Helms's book, where he wrote that "being an American in the 20th century is the greatest fortune that can befall a human being."

Albright, a refugee and immigrant whose unabashed patriotism appeals to Helms, said that while they do not always agree, "We both understand that our ability to debate differences freely and without fear can never be taken for granted. . . . We both believe that the concept of individual liberty set out in the American Constitution remains, after more than 200 years, the world's most powerful and positive force for change. And we both agree that if our freedoms are to survive through the next American century, we cannot turn our backs on the world." Helms would not have expected Albright to temper her views on specific issues to accommodate him, and in her lecture tonight she did not do so.

For example, she called on his committee to approve a 1979 U.N.-sponsored Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, a pact Helms opposes.

"When it comes to the rights of more than half the people on Earth, America should be leading the way," said Albright, who has instructed American diplomats around the world to make women's rights a central focus of U.S. foreign policy.

"Around the world appalling abuses are being committed against women, from domestic violence to dowry murders to forcing young girls into prostitution. Some say all this is cultural and

there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal and we have a responsibility to stop it," she said.

And she renewed the administration's appeal for approval of the chemical arms treaty, which would ban the production and use of poison gas weapons. The pact has been ratified by dozens of countries, enough to put it into effect April 29 with or without U.S. participation. If the Senate has not consented to ratification by that time, the United States will be excluded from the treaty's enforcement system.

Until today Helms had exhibited no public sign of flexibility on the chemical pact. He and other defense hawks have said the treaty is unenforceable, cannot be verified, will do nothing to stop countries such as Libya from developing chemical weapons and would subject U.S. manufacturers to intrusive and possibly unconstitutional inspections.

Helms had been demanding modifications to the treaty. The administration, arguing that it is too late to modify the accord, has been offering conditions and restrictions it is prepared to accept in the Senate's resolution of ratification, which would set the terms on which the United States would join the treaty system.

Helms also had said he wanted to defer action on the treaty until after the Senate completes work on issues he said are more important, such as United Nations reform, but he backed off that position today.

He said the U.N. issue "has nothing to do with the chemical treaty," and promised to hold new hearings on the treaty in the first week after Congress returns from the current recess.<p>In Washington, Mark Schoeff Jr., a spokesman for Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), a leading Republican supporter of the treaty, said that Lugar believed the recent work by Helms and Biden "would perhaps lead to good results" for the chemical weapons treaty.

Staff writer Eric Pianin in Washington contributed to this report.

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## Yeltsin Tells Russians That Conciliation on NATO Paid Off

By ALESSANDRA STANLEY

MOSCOW -- Answering critics who accuse him of capitulating to the West on NATO expansion, Russian President Boris Yeltsin defended his conciliatory stance at his summit meeting in Helsinki last week with President Clinton.

"Of course, we could have furrowed our brows and pounded the table with our shoes as happened during the Cold War years," Yeltsin said in a radio address broadcast Wednesday. "But what would that have achieved? Another round of irreconcilable enmity, anew isolation for Russia."

Yeltsin, who knew at the outset that he would not change Clinton's mind about expanding NATO eastwards, did his best to secure Russia its own partnership agreement with the Western alliance. He told his listeners he had scaled back some of the more dangerous aspects of NATO expansion and had won important concessions on strategic nuclear weapons agreements and economic issues.

But he also boasted of accomplishments that are likely to be disputed in Washington -- let alone Moscow. He said he had won concessions on anti-ballistic missile defenses. U.S. officials say it was mainly Yeltsin who gave ground. The Russian president said that Clinton "promised me that at the next G-7 meeting, Russia will become a full-fledged member of that club." Yeltsin asserted proudly: "The G-7 will become the G-8."

Russia's ailing economy does not yet meet the requirements for membership. At the summit meeting, Clinton did say the Group of Seven industrial nations would be renamed G-8, but he hedged on how fully Russia would be allowed to participate, saying he had pledged to "substantially increase Russia's role at our annual meeting."

Wednesday was the first time Yeltsin publicly discussed the summit meeting since he held a joint press conference with Clinton in Helsinki last Friday. Even before he got home, his nationalist and Communist opposition lambasted his performance. Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov called the agreements "the Treaty of Versailles," and said Yeltsin had "betrayed Russia's national interest."

But despite acid criticism from opposition leaders, most Russians have paid little attention to the Helsinki meeting. Newspapers and television programs have been more interested in a Cabinet shake-up last week that gave reform-minded officials like Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, 37, a popular former governor of Nizhni Novgorod, a second chance to jump start Russia's stalled economic reform program.

And Yeltsin's government has been preoccupied by a nationwide strike called for Thursday by trade unions and political opposition groups to protest the nonpayment of salaries and pensions to tens of millions of workers. Union leaders are predicting that up to 20 million people will take to the streets. Protest rallies are planned all over Russia.

On Wednesday, while Yeltsin was explaining his Helsinki negotiating strategy, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin held a press conference flanked by Chubais and Nemtsov to plead for time and patience.

"I want everyone to know that we see this problem, we feel and understand this problem," Chernomyrdin said. He pledged that the Government and private employers would pay \$2 billion in back wages and pensions this month.

Chernomyrdin seemed worried about the day of protest. "We must not get carried away by emotion and provocation," he said. "We have been solving and will be solving these problems."

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By JOHN DIAMOND

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Taking on his former Republican colleagues, Defense Secretary William Cohen said Thursday that President Clinton gave up nothing by agreeing with Russia to ban space-based theater missile defense systems.

Cohen defended agreements between the United States and Russia at last week's Helsinki summit that reaffirmed the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, committed the two nations to sharing details of their theater missile defenses and restricted development of theater defenses that could be based in space.

House Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., and two other senior House Republicans criticized the agreement as a giveaway that "will place the lives of our brave fighting men and women -- and ultimately millions of Americans -- in jeopardy."

In a speech at a Navy League convention, Cohen rejected those criticisms. Any space-based system that could protect troops in a military theater could also be used to shoot down an intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at the United States. Such systems are banned by the ABM treaty, Cohen said.

"So this provision has given up nothing. It's given up zero. It simply confirms the fact of where we are today," Cohen said. "But I think it's important that we understand what was not agreed to at Helsinki."

Among other things, none of the agreements did anything to impinge on several parallel efforts the Pentagon is undertaking to develop anti-missile systems to protect deployed troops. These include the Hawk, Patriot, MEADS, Thaad, Navy Theater-wide and Upper-Tier systems.

"Every one of these programs can go forward as they've been planned," Cohen said.

Missile defense has been a long-running partisan dispute between conservative Republicans and the White House. Cohen, when he was a Republican senator from Maine, took a moderate position, mediating legislative settlements between the administration and Congress over missile defense.

Republicans who favor a national missile defense system view the ABM Treaty as an obstacle.

The original intent of the treaty was to limit systems that could shoot down incoming ballistic missiles.

The thinking was that improving anti-missile systems would only push the superpowers to build more nuclear missiles to improve the chances of breaking through the shield, thus accelerating the arms race. In addition, both sides agreed that the side possessing a reliable missile shield might be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike because it would feel safe from retaliation.

Cohen said the Helsinki agreement, which requires Senate approval, draws a clear line between national and theater missile defenses. Despite criticism to the contrary, Cohen said the

Helsinki agreement does nothing to restrict the capability of theater defenses that would be used to protect troops, warships and combat areas.

For example, there is no restriction on the speed at which theater missile interceptors could fly.

The agreement does, however, limit the speed and range of an incoming missile against which these interceptors could be tested.

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RTna 03/27 1415 Conference on disarmament fails to make progress

By Stephanie Nebehay

GENEVA (Reuter) - The U.N-sponsored Conference on Disarmament ended its first two-month session of 1997 Thursday without having made any substantial progress, its chairman said.

Grigori Berdennikov, Russia's ambassador and current chairman, called on the forum's 61 members to break the deadlock and launch negotiations later this year on halting production of nuclear bomb-making fissile material.

The body, which resumes May 15, also faces major hurdles to starting its own negotiations for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines, according to the negotiator.

But, speaking as an envoy from one of five declared nuclear weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States), he said non-aligned countries had little chance of convincing the majors to negotiate total nuclear disarmament.

"Unfortunately, I cannot report to you any substantial progress," Berdennikov told a final news conference. "There is no consensus for negotiations on any topic..."

"I think that there should be willingness to come to a certain compromise.

The question is where this compromise lies and people have very different ideas where it should be."

Western diplomats agreed that prospects appeared slim for a breakthrough in the May-June session, but some held out hope progress could be made on the sidelines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) review conference in New York in April. The third and last 1997 of the Geneva talks starts on July 28.

Berdennikov said: "The positions are still very far (apart) and if you ask me whether I see the light at the end of the tunnel, I would say very dimly."

He said Russia's priority would be launching the stalled negotiations to halt production of fissile material (plutonium and highly-enriched uranium), known as fissile "cut-off" talks.

This was the next step in nuclear disarmament, laid down under the NPT framework, after last year's clinching of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning nuclear blasts.

"But as both chairman and the Russian representative, I confirm that for that there is no consensus," he added.

India and Pakistan have led the non-aligned in demanding the five declared nuclear powers agree to set up a committee to negotiate total nuclear disarmament by the year 2020. In their view, only then could negotiations on fissile and mines start.

But the nuclear powers argue initial cuts in huge strategic arsenals have been negotiated by the United States and Russia, who aim to reduce their stocks to the level of those of Britain, France and China before widening the disarmament process.

Berdennikov, asked how to address non-aligned demands to set up a negotiating committee to discuss total nuclear disarmament, replied: "They shouldn't be so frustrated. Look at what happened in Helsinki.

"After all, who could imagine well just several years ago that we would be talking about 80 to 85 percent reductions," the Russian envoy said. "Those are real things.

Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed in Helsinki last week that once the START-2 strategic arms reduction treaty enters into force, they would move negotiate a fresh pact that would take long-range nuclear arms down to about 20 percent of their Cold War levels.

Berdennikov said: "It is very difficult to expect the five (nuclear weapon states) -- or at least the four -- to change their attitude," he said, adding China had a "special position."

"At least we are convinced that we are doing our best and we cannot do more," Berdennikov added.

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By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER

AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Three years after the first plane was delivered to its Missouri base, B-2 stealth bombers will be declared ready this week to take on nuclear and conventional combat missions.

If called upon, one of the strategic bombers' jobs will be to drop an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon designed to destroy underground enemy targets, a senior military officer said last week.

"With the B-2, the deeply buried target killer will come on board," said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Six B-2s will become part of the Pentagon's "nuclear war plan" as of Tuesday, the officer said. Air Force officials declined to comment on the date, saying it was classified.

Thirteen of the huge, bat-winged bombers are stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The Air Force expects to have 21 B-2s in service by early in the next decade.

If the cost of the research, development, procurement and operational support is factored in, each plane carries a \$2.2 billion price tag, according to the publication Defense Week.

The B-2 was designed to be able to reach deep into enemy territory to attack heavily defended targets -- and then return safely -- because it is difficult to detect in flight. It has no vertical tail surfaces and its skin absorbs, rather than reflects, radar signals.

The B-2's first flight was in July 1989 and the first bomber entered service at Whiteman in December 1993.

The aircraft was declared to have reached a "limited" capability for delivering non-nuclear weapons at the beginning of this year.

It takes time for such planes, their crews and logistical support systems to be declared fully ready to take on such missions, explained Robert S. Norris, a military analyst with the Natural Resources Defense Council.

"There is a whole manual of things that have to be done," he said. "The Air Force is very strict about this; they go by the book."

As of Jan. 1, 1998, two more B-2s will be available to take on missions under the nuclear war plan, the senior military officer said.

The earth-penetrating nuclear weapon, known as the B-61 (Mod 11), has been modified to be able to attack buried targets such as command-and-control bunkers or other military-related facilities.

"It's the only capability we have to reach these targets that are buried several hundred feet under ground," the senior officer said.

Several nations, including Libya, Iraq and North Korea, are believed to have burrowed into the earth to protect military sites. The officer noted that the Russians also "have a penchant

for burying things underground."

Last year, then-Defense Secretary William Perry raised eyebrows when he asserted that Libya was building a chemical weapons facility inside a mountain near the city of Tarhunah, and warned that a military strike against the alleged plant was an option. But Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak publicly derided that idea, saying Egyptian inspectors have not found such activity at the site.

The less-advanced B-1 bomber is expected to be taken out of the nuclear war plan on Sept. 30, and receive only conventional bombing missions.

Once the B-61 earth-penetrating nuclear bombs come on line with the B-2, the Pentagon will scrap its decades-old B-53 nuclear bombs, the senior officer said.

He declined to disclose exactly how many of the B-61 weapons are in the U.S. arsenal, saying only that "tens" will be available and that "tens" of B-53s will be retired.

Norris said he believed roughly 30 to 50 B-61s are available.

At the beginning of the B-2 program in the early 1980s, the Air Force had hoped to build 132 of the aircraft. That number was reduced to 75, and later to 21.

Critics of the planes point to their high cost, but supporters claim the price is worth it given the B-2's 16-bomb payload and the fact it can deliver precision-guided munitions as well as the bunker-busting bombs.

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APn 03/30 2139 Russia-NATO

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin will sign a charter establishing a new relationship with NATO at a meeting in Paris in May, a news agency reported Sunday.

The ITAR-Tass news agency did not provide details of the charter or the Paris meeting. The report cited an unidentified Kremlin source.

No one was available to confirm the report Sunday night at the Kremlin and the Russian foreign ministry. In Paris, the French foreign ministry had no comment.

The charter, which Yeltsin and President Clinton discussed at their summit in Helsinki, Finland, earlier this month, is expected to include assurances that NATO would not put nuclear weapons or additional troops on the territory of new members.

It also would give Russia a voice in NATO but not a veto over military actions.

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said Saturday that Moscow would like to sign such a charter before a July summit in Madrid, Spain, where NATO is to invite new members from the former East bloc, with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary seen as the main candidates.

But Primakov also told reporters "you cannot sign a document before it is finished."

"I want to avoid the impression all questions are resolved."

Yeltsin is expected to attend the Madrid summit, ITAR-Tass said, citing the same Kremlin source.

Clinton administration officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, have said they viewed a European Union summit in the

Netherlands in May as a logical occasion for concluding a NATO-Russia pact.

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RTos 03/28 2338 U.S. Settles With Radiation Test Victims

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The White House Friday said it had reached settlements with families of 16 people who were injected with plutonium or uranium in Cold War experiments, and moved to prevent people from being exploited ever again by government research.

The White House also said it will propose legislation to make an additional 600 uranium miners or their families eligible for compensation for lung diseases they suffered.

"Compassion and concern are at the core of our response to human radiation experiments -- compassion for those who may have been part of unethical experiments in the past and concern to ensure that any future subjects of human research are fully protected," Energ Secretary Federico Pena said.

With the 16 settlements totaling \$6.5 million, Pena said at a news conference that the administration had closed claims by all known victims of government-sponsored radiation tests that a presidential advisory committee said should be compensated.

The committee was formed by President Clinton in 1994 to study the secret history of radiation tests done on sometimes unwitting subjects during the Cold War era.

Pena said the White House ordered new rules for secret research that require scientists to obtain informed consent from potential subjects, disclose identities of the sponsoring agency, and tell subjects that the test is classified.

The rules also require the head of an agency conducting secret human research to approve each project, and require permanent records of the secret experiments.

While the committee found most of the studies from the 1940s through the 1970s were done for proper medical reasons, it said the government should compensate about 75 subjects of tests it said were unethical and deceptive.

That included 18 people who were thought to be terminally ill and were injected with plutonium or uranium without their consent to gauge effects of nuclear fallout.

The administration said the family of one of these subjects did not want to participate in the settlement, and the family of another subject could not be found, while 55 subjects of the research listed for compensation could not be traced.

The government has had a program to compensate uranium miners who suffered lung cancer and lung diseases, which the administration said it will try to expand.

Pena said the White House will push a bill that broadens eligibility for the program and would compensate an additional 600 miners or their families with \$50 million over 15 years.

Claims so far have been approved for 1,303 miners. This bill would make eligible almost half of 1,270 claims that have been denied, an administration spokeswoman said.

While an interagency review has found no ongoing classified experiments involving human subjects, Pena said all agencies will

be required to report publically each year if they are involved in any such classified experiments.

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APO 03/28 1957 Japan Nuke Plant May Face Suit

By MARI YAMAGUCHI

Associated Press Writer

TOKYO (AP) -- Prosecutors said Friday they were preparing to file criminal charges against top officials of a nuclear plant who are accused of covering up an accident a year and a half ago.

The plutonium breeder reactor in western Japan spewed caustic sodium from a secondary cooling system during the Dec. 8, 1995, incident. No one was hurt, but an official committed suicide as details of a bungled cover-up emerged. The reactor has been shut down since the accident, which has delayed Japan's ambitious plutonium program and fanned public opposition.

The prosecutors' ongoing investigation follows a complaint filed a year ago by local anti-nuclear activists -- a move intended to push prosecutors to lodge criminal charges.

Top executives and several other officials at the government-funded Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., or Donen, are suspected of heavily editing a videotape taken after the accident to conceal the most serious damage, while hiding a second videotape. They also are suspected of lying in official reports about the accident.

Charges are expected to be filed in the coming weeks. If indicted, they would be the first officials to be charged with criminally violating a law that covers the oversight of Japan's nuclear reactors.

Donen officials have publicly apologized and disciplined those directly responsible for trying to conceal the severity of the accident at the plant, 220 miles west of Tokyo. It is named after Monju, the Buddhist deity of wisdom.

The controversial breeder reactor uses plutonium, a highly toxic and radioactive substance that can also be used to make nuclear weapons. The core of the reactor is cooled with sodium, which is very volatile.

Donen's reputation suffered another blow earlier this month when fires at its nuclear reprocessing plant in Tokaimura, 70 miles northeast of Tokyo, exposed 37 workers to low-level radiation.

The prosecutors, who had initially planned to charge Donen officials by the end of March, apparently have decided to beef up the investigation because of the latest accident, the national newspaper Nihon Keizai reported.

In the case of the Tokaimura accident, delays in handling the emergency and failures by nuclear officials to properly report the damage and the release of radiation are alleged.

Japan has set 2030 as a target date for developing a commercially viable breeder reactor that could produce plutonium as part of its reaction process.

Other nations, including the United States, Britain and Germany have abandoned plans for such reactors because of the high costs and dangers of handling plutonium.

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Statement of Dr. Victor Reis  
Assistant Secretary for  
Defense Programs  
Department of Energy  
before the  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
March 19, 1997

Although the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation has receded, the United States continues to face a broad spectrum of national security challenges. To meet these challenges, President Clinton has stated that "the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States."

Additionally, the United States Senate START II ratification text states that "the United States is committed to proceeding with a robust Stockpile Stewardship program, and to maintain nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities that will ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at the START II level and meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems in conformance with United States policies and to underpin deterrence. "

The ability of the United States to respond effectively to the national security challenges of the 21st century will be determined by the decisions we make and actions we take now. The United States has: agreed to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratified START II, and signed the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Once ratified by the 44 nuclear capable states, any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion will be banned. At the present time 41 of the 44 states have signed the Treaty.

Within this new strategic context the Department must continue to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the enduring stockpile, without nuclear testing. The Department will meet this national security challenge through the vigorous implementation of the integrated Stockpile Stewardship and Management program (SSMP), a scientific and technical challenge perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project.

The Department's objective is to implement a program that:

Supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent with a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, without nuclear testing, as the weapons complex is reduced in size, modernized and made more efficient.

Preserves the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories and the manufacturing facilities; and

Ensures that activities needed to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent are compatible with the nation's arms-control and nonproliferation commitments, including the CTBT.

The Department recognizes the inherent risk in a program to develop a surrogate for underground testing. It has been over four years since the last nuclear test. During that time, we have successfully addressed an issue with the Trident I (W76) warhead by using a combination of analysis, new experimental data, archived test and manufacturing data, and most importantly the collective judgement of the two weapon design laboratories. This success, using the experimental and testing tools available today, provides confidence that the even more powerful computing and testing tools to be developed will allow us to solve future stockpile problems without nuclear testing. However, in the event that testing should be required, the Department will maintain the capability to conduct underground nuclear tests as directed by the President and the Congress.

Last year the Administration committed to Congress that funding for Defense Programs activities would total approximately \$4 billion per year for the next 10 years. The FY 1998 request is \$3.6 billion for Weapons Activities operations and maintenance account and \$1.5 billion for the new Defense Asset Acquisition Account for a total of \$5.1 billion in FY 1998. Of this amount, about \$4 billion would be obligated in FY 1998 with the balance obligated in future years against ongoing construction projects. From 1998 through 2002, the President's budget requests \$20.1 billion for Defense Programs activities.

The FY 1998 request allows us to build upon significant accomplishments during FY 1996 and FY 1997. DOE's production plants at Pantex, Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and Kansas City continue to support the day-to-day needs of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile by

making the necessary repairs and providing replacement parts. The Pantex plant safely disassembled 1064 nuclear weapons in FY 1996. We recently demonstrated through delivery of the first B-61 Modification 11 kits that the DOE nuclear weapons complex remains capable of meeting DoD requirements. Working with the laboratories and plants, DOE delivered the first conversion kit in late December 1996, meeting the accelerated schedule requested by the DoD. The B-61 Mod 11 will replace the B-53, which is the oldest bomb in the stockpile and does not have modern safety features. The dual track tritium program continues to make progress on the regulatory, technical and policy activities associated with the program. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE governing the interactions between the two agencies was signed in May 1996. Recently the Department and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) announced plans to conduct in-reactor tests of tritium target rods this fall in a TVA operating reactor. The Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) program selected a prime contractor, Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., and began a technical analysis of the components that would be used in the APT. In addition, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) would remain on warm standby for possible use in producing tritium. The action is being funded by the Office of Nuclear Energy. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) program completed Title I design of the project and the Department selected the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as the site for construction. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) program awarded two contracts for the next generation of super

computers and accepted delivery of the world's fastest computer, capable of performing over one trillion operations per second.

The Department also completed a number of key environmental documents required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) including: the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS); the Nevada Test Site Wide EIS; and the Pantex Site Wide EIS. With these documents complete, DOE can: begin construction of the new experimental facilities needed by the stockpile stewardship program; establish a plutonium pit production capability at Los Alamos; downsize the manufacturing complex while maintaining the necessary industrial capabilities to support the stockpile; conduct subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site; and continue to safely store plutonium pits from

dismantled weapons at the Pantex plant.

The Department is in consultation with the DoD, revising and updating the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP) plan, which describes in detail our plans for maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground testing and no new-design nuclear warhead production. We will provide a copy of this classified plan, known as the "Green Book" to the Congress after the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan is signed by the President. We will continue to work closely with the DoD to refine and implement this plan to meet fully the requirements of the President's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan.

#### Annual Certification

A primary DOE responsibility is to annually certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. On August 11, 1995, the President announced that he would seek a zero yield CTBT. At that time he directed the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to advise him annually on the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, in order to determine whether the United States should continue to observe the CTBT or resume underground nuclear testing. The two Secretaries are to be advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, and the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories on whether the stockpile is safe and reliable in the absence of nuclear testing.

All active and inactive weapon types have been assessed by the weapons design laboratories and the DoD-led joint Project Officers Group. The laboratory directors and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command have provided their advice to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The first annual certification was signed on February 7, 1997, by both Secretaries certifying to the President that the stockpile is "safe and reliable" and that "there is no need to conduct an underground nuclear test at this time."

#### STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

The Stockpile Management Program continues its historic responsibilities to provide near term and long term support for the stockpile, and for ensuring an adequate supply of tritium. It also includes new programs and procedures to deal with the aging stockpile, which has an average age of 14 years. Along with stockpile surveillance, the historic responsibilities include: normal maintenance; corrective maintenance and system

refurbishment; and weapon dismantlement.

Almost 50 years of stockpile history have shown that continuous surveillance, repair, and replacement of components and subsystems are commonplace. In fact, the nine weapons types that will comprise the START II stockpile have already been retrofitted to varying degrees and some have had major components of the nuclear warhead replaced. At the present time, we cannot predict with any certainty when stockpile problems will arise in the future, but we are addressing these issues through our Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Department is carrying out the recommendations of the 1996 GAO report on nuclear surveillance activities. At the requested funding level, our goal is to eliminate most backlogs in flight and laboratory tests within two years and all backlogs prior to the end of FY 2000.

### Role of the Production Plants

The production plants at Savannah River, Pantex, Kansas City, and Oak Ridge are essential components to the success of Stockpile Stewardship and Management. The Department's approach to maintain these key industrial facilities is detailed in the final PEIS on Stockpile Stewardship and Management and supported by the Secretary of Energy's Record of Decision issued on December 19, 1996. While ongoing production activities at the plants will help maintain production skills to attract and retain the next generation of technicians, DOE is establishing a fellowship program at the plants. The plants have been directed to identify prioritized needs for the fellowship program. Their responses are due by mid-April 1997. None of the funds will be obligated until the report required by section 3166 of the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act is provided to the Congress.

In FY 1997 the four plants will continue to produce the replacement parts and make the necessary repairs to support the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. One of the most significant accomplishments was the accelerated delivery of the conversion kits from the Kansas City and Oak Ridge Y-12 plants for the B61 modification 11 program. The B61 modification 11 satisfies the mission requirements of the B53 gravity bomb. The B53 is the oldest weapon in the stockpile and does not meet modern safety design criteria. All B53s will be retired shortly. DOE plans to begin dismantlement of this system by FY 1999.

In FY 1998 DOE expects to demonstrate a limited plutonium pit production capability at Los Alamos, a

capability the DOE has not had since the closing of the Rocky Flats plant in 1992. In reestablishing war reserve support capability, DOE plans to manufacture a Trident II (W-88) pit in FY 1998, a Peacekeeper (W-87) pit in FY 2000 and a B61 bomb pit in FY 2002. A larger pit production capacity will be in place by FY 2003.

Although there will be downsizing of the production plants commensurate with the needs of a smaller stockpile, none of the plants will be closed. The Strategic Management Restructuring Initiative (SMRI) will support implementation of the Department's decision to downsize in place. The SMRI program involves downsizing the following operations: (1) the weapons assembly/disassembly and high explosives missions at Pantex; (2) nonnuclear components production at Kansas City; (3) weapons secondary and case fabrication at Oak Ridge Y-12; and (4) consolidation of tritium operations at Savannah River. We will also reestablish pit component fabrication at Los Alamos. The DOE will make use of existing facilities at the sites which will be upgraded, repaired and or modified to meet current environment, safety and health requirements. DOE will, through section 3161 of the FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, mitigate the impacts of downsizing on the affected workers and communities.

#### Enhanced Surveillance

Enhanced Surveillance is an integrated program involving the four production plants and the three weapons laboratories. In this program we will develop the predictive measures to address the maintenance needs of the stockpile. The basic goals of the program are: to predict in advance defects that might develop in the enduring stockpile due to aging or other reasons; develop a means to assess the safety and reliability impacts; and to ensure that problems are corrected before they reduce safety or reliability of the stockpile. The Enhanced Surveillance Program (ESP) builds upon existing Defense Programs' research and development activities, nonnuclear testing, nondestructive evaluation/surveillance activities and will develop new predictive models, new techniques for data analysis, and offers the possibility of in-situ, real time, non-destructive monitoring for warheads.

The ESP focuses on six major areas: 1) materials characterization and surveillance; 2) materials aging model development; 3) component surveillance and diagnostics; 4) component performance models; 5) enhanced systems testing; and 6) system performance models. The surveillance techniques, procedures, and

models developed in this program will be incorporated into the ongoing core surveillance program when we are confident of their validity. With these new tools, our program of stockpile surveillance will emphasize prediction and preventive maintenance.

The ESP is a logical step between the traditional surveillance program and the anticipated weapons refurbishment requirements. It will be closely coordinated and integrated with the Stockpile Life Extension Program, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, and the Advanced Manufacturing Design and Production Technology programs.

### Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP)

The mission of the SLEP is to ensure continued high confidence in the performance, safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile while exercising the infrastructure and intellectual capabilities needed to sustain the weapons as a credible deterrent. The SLEP is a new DOE maintenance management strategy that will continuously focus the design and manufacturing activities required to maintain all of the stockpile warheads in a safe and reliable condition. The SLEP establishes the activities needed to meet nuclear weapon stockpile commitments to DoD, and provides the basis for coordinating stockpile activities between DOE and DoD. It builds on and enhances past practices to maintain a viable nuclear weapons stockpile. Detailed schedules

for each weapon are being developed through weapon-specific DoD/DOE Project Officer Groups. The underpinning concept for the SLEP is "all components of a nuclear weapon are limited life components." The SLEP focuses and prioritizes the efforts of the weapons complex. The Enhanced Surveillance program will provide data to better understand material and component aging phenomena and determine the Life-limit of components and materials. This in turn provides the needed information to determine a life extension program and sustain a safe, reliable stockpile to meet DoD performance requirements.

The SLEP integrates stockpile management activities and establishes requirements and priorities to support budget and workload planning. These activities to support the stockpile are embodied in four key functions: maintenance, surveillance, assessment and certification, and refurbishment. The underpinning activities for these functions rely on science and modeling based capabilities and our ability to manufacture a reliable product.

## Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technology (ADaPT)

The Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technologies Initiative will provide the nuclear weapons complex with advanced capabilities for: designing, developing, and certifying components and systems; and producing, assembling, and delivering the components and systems products. Over the next decade ADaPT will radically change how DOE supports the nuclear weapons stockpile by infusing new product and process technologies, and adopting state-of-the-art business and engineering practices. The funding from this program to the plants and laboratories addresses enterprise modeling, product realization, and model-based design and manufacturing. An example of the work done under this program is the development of a laser-cutting workstation for application to weapon remanufacturing. In FY 1997, the ADaPT program will be integrated with existing efforts in Process Development at the production plants, and will be continued at essentially the same level of effort in FY 1998.

## Dual Revalidation

Dual Revalidation is a new, robust form of peer review designed to assure both DOE and DoD that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. Under Dual Revalidation, two teams perform independent evaluations, the first team drawn from the original design laboratory and the second team from the alternate laboratory. Using archived data and performing nonnuclear tests, teams will analyze and evaluate stockpiled weapons, weapons components, and weapons materials to determine if they still meet military requirements. Dual Revalidation provides a baseline assessment of the condition of the warhead today and a process to identify future problems. The evaluation is managed by the joint DoD/DOE Project Officers Group and is expected to take 2-3 years for each warhead type. The W-76 is the first warhead currently undergoing revalidation. The increased involvement in and technical understanding of the assessment process by the DoD will provide a basis for their confidence in the stockpile, which was previously supplied by nuclear

testing. This new process will revalidate that the stockpile meets its specifications delineated in the Military Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS).

## Tritium

An integral part of ensuring a viable stockpile is the capability to provide an adequate supply of tritium, a radioactive gas required for all U.S. nuclear weapons to operate as designed. Tritium, with a half life of 12.3 years, decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per annum. To meet current stockpile requirements, the Department is recycling tritium from retired and dismantled weapons. To support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP) approved by the President on March 11, 1996, a new tritium production source will be needed as early as 2005 to maintain the START I stockpile and the associated 5-year tritium reserve, and to maintain the ability to "hedge" to START I even when the START II treaty enters into force.

The Department continues to make progress on a dual track tritium strategy for developing a reliable source of tritium to meet national security requirements. One track includes the purchase of a commercial reactor or irradiation services. The other track requires the development and testing of an accelerator for the production of tritium. In addition, the FFTF is being kept on warm standby for possible contribution to meeting tritium needs. The funds for this action is provided by the Office of Nuclear Energy. By late 1998 the Department will have demonstrated all major aspects of the accelerator technology and the use of tritium producing rods in a commercial light water reactor. The procurement process will be structured so that a contract could be placed to either purchase irradiation services or purchase or lease a reactor. Based on these activities, DOE will have refined the cost estimates for both programs. By the end of 1998, the Department, in consultation with the DoD and OMB, will select one of these alternatives as the primary tritium production method. The other, will comprise an assured backup capability. In an attempt to meet congressional concerns about tritium supply, Secretary Pe\$ha has promised to review the dual track time line. If the decision cannot be accelerated to 1997, DOE will notify Congress consistent with section 3133 of the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. The dual track approach has the support of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

There are no serious technical issues associated with the production of tritium in a light water reactor, but there are regulatory and licensing steps to be taken. The Department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding last May governing the interaction between the two agencies for target qualification and NRC reactor licensing activities. On February 7, 1997, the DOE announced

that the TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1 was selected as the host utility for the Lead Test Assembly. The Watts Bar test involves placement of 32 specially designed twelve-foot "target" rods into four of the nearly two hundred regular fuel assemblies in the plant's reactor core. These targets, which contain no uranium or plutonium, are designed to replace a standard component of reactor fuel assemblies. During the plant's normal 18-month operating cycle, the rods will produce and retain small amounts of tritium. Following the test, the rods will be shipped by DOE carrier to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for disassembly and examination.

Previously, DOE has tested smaller rod segments in one of its test reactors with excellent results. The Watts Bar test is intended to confirm those results using rods of the same length as those now typically used in commercial reactors. Additional target qualification studies are needed to support regulatory and owner approval for their use in commercial reactors.

The Department has issued a Draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for the purchase of one or more commercial light water reactors or irradiation services. A final RFP is scheduled for release in April with utility responses due in June. The DOE expects to make a preliminary selection of one or more utilities early in 1998.

With regard to the accelerator alternative, there are several features and portions of the technology that need to be demonstrated at production power levels and the cost of design, construction and operations needs to be refined. The exploration of the accelerator concept includes: a development effort to select between technical alternatives; testing to establish performance and reliability; the use of industry for conceptual and engineering design and, if built, construction and commissioning. These efforts will narrow the design, cost and schedule uncertainties.

Last year the Department selected a prime contractor, Burns and Roe Enterprises Inc. teamed with General Atomics to add to the Los Alamos and Savannah River team. Los Alamos has completed the construction of the first test items for the accelerator and others are being manufactured. The first of the accelerator components, an injector, is being tested and exceeding performance specifications. Thousands of samples of materials, welds, and structures have been or are being irradiated to confirm choices and projections of performance for materials for the so-called "target-blanket" the part of the plant in which the tritium would actually be made. First results of these tests are currently being analyzed. The design of the

accelerator has been favorably reviewed by two external review groups. The combined team has produced a Draft Conceptual Design report and an associated cost estimate, which is under intense review by the prime contractor and the Department. The Department is on track for issuing a final Conceptual Design Report in April of this year. We have made excellent progress on the schedule with the increased funding in FY 1996 and FY 1997 provided by the Congress. We have been able to advance some of the technology demonstrations which are key to proving the concept and making an informed decision in late 1998.

### Transportation of Special Nuclear Materials

The transportation of special nuclear materials remains an important element of stockpile management as a result of weapons dismantlement and the restructuring and consolidation of military bases in the United States. The Department provides for the transportation of special nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and weapons components throughout the continental United States via specially designed safe, secure tractors and trailers (SST's).

The Department has accumulated more than 83 million miles of over-the-road experience with no accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive materials, and without damage or compromise of the cargo. Much of this can be attributed to the well managed, highly trained, competent, and dedicated work force of more than 260 couriers with nationwide secure communications. In addition, largely due to our specialized in-house training capability, the nuclear material couriers are one of the most highly effective protective forces in the world. Seventeen new trailers called Safe Guard Transporters (SGT), incorporating the latest advances in materials and transportation technology, are currently being built at the Kansas City Plant.

### Dismantlement

Since the end of World War II, the Department and its predecessors have disassembled some 55,000 nuclear warheads in a safe, secure, and an efficient manner. In FY 1996, 1064 weapons were dismantled at the Pantex Plant. We expect to dismantle the 944 nuclear weapons in FY 1997 and 1200 weapons in FY 1998. The Pantex dismantlement workload is expected to remain stable for the next few years as we reduce the nuclear stockpile consistent with our arms control commitments.

### Emergency Response

The Emergency Response program is a national capability that provides critical technical expertise necessary to resolve any major radiological emergency or nuclear accident within the United States and abroad. The all-volunteer force that makes up the cadre of deployment forces is mostly from the nuclear weapons laboratories.

While a nuclear weapon accident is extremely unlikely, we are prepared to effectively mitigate the consequences of an accident. We are in the final planning stages for a full field training exercise scheduled for late May, where, for the first time ever, the DOE will exercise its responsibilities as the lead federal agency in providing command and control as well as the necessary technical expertise to resolve the accident.

The Department plays a vitally important support role in combating acts of nuclear terrorism, through its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). NEST provides the FBI with the operational and technical assistance in response to a terrorist nuclear or radiological dispersal threat in the United States, and supports the State Department in a similar role overseas. We have vigorously pursued updating this program based on the available intelligence to counter the current nuclear threat and trends in these activities. Our present and near term activities include continuance of in-depth contingency planning, rigorous training, a challenging interagency exercise program, and pursuit of much needed improvements in the areas of nuclear search, diagnostics, device assessment, and disablement capabilities.

## STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

The Stockpile Stewardship program addresses the issue of maintaining confidence in stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing through a technically challenging science-based program utilizing upgraded or new experimental and computational capabilities. The program continues major initiatives in high energy density research with lasers and accelerated research and development in advanced computations to acquire and use data to improve predictive capabilities -- the foundation of the science-based approach. Major new experimental facilities are planned to expand and enhance the scientific and engineering base for stockpile stewardship, and to assure that we can continue to attract and retain the high quality personnel needed to make the scientific and technical judgements related to the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.

The highly qualified laboratory staffs continue to make valuable contributions to solving scientific problems using knowledge and technologies from the weapons programs. One example is a program called Peregrine. Based on the computer codes developed by the weapons labs to show how radiation affects materials, Peregrine promises to provide the medical community with a more efficient and effective method of administering radiation therapy to cancer patients. Research is conducted in collaboration with Stanford University, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Harper Hospital (Detroit) and other cancer research centers. Peregrine with its enhanced modeling and computing capability is expected to provide more precise and successful treatment of complicated tumors around eyes, sinuses, neck, mouth and in and around the lungs. We are discussing with the DoD the possibility of providing this technique to cancer patients in military hospitals. Peregrine will continue to benefit from computing advances made by the ASCI program.

#### Advanced Experimental Capabilities

The proposed National Ignition Facility (NIF) is designed to produce, for the first time in a laboratory setting, conditions of temperature and density of matter close to those that occur in the detonation of nuclear weapons. The ability to study the behavior of matter and the transfer of energy and radiation under these conditions is key to understanding the basic physics of nuclear weapons and predicting their performance without underground nuclear testing. Experiments at the NIF will provide data essential to test the validity of computer based predictions and demonstrate how aged or changed materials in weapons could behave under these unique conditions. Two JASON panels, which are comprised of scientific and technical national security experts, have stated that the NIF is the most scientifically valuable of all programs proposed for science-based stockpile stewardship.

The NIF project currently has about 300 persons involved in design and project-specific research and development. Title I design work for the facility is now complete. During the Title I process the design was refined for the Lawrence Livermore site with additional experimental capabilities added. This has increased the total project costs by \$125.3 million. NIF will now be constructed so that the first bundle of eight lasers will be available for experiments two years before the project is complete. The project will begin site preparation work in FY 1997 which will allow major

construction to begin in FY 1998 and project completion by the third quarter of FY 2003.

The FY 1998 budget request includes \$31 million in operations and maintenance funds for NIF. These funds will enable industry to produce components (optics) for NIF. The FY 1998 budget also requests \$876 million, full funding for NIF construction under the Defense Asset Acquisition Account, though the planned obligations during FY 1998 will only be \$198 million. The balance of the funds will be obligated annually throughout the construction period until project completion in FY 2003.

Current hydrodynamic testing facilities, the Pulsed High Explosive Radiographic Machine Emitting X-rays (PHERMEX) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Flash X-Ray facility (FXR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), were adequate to meet the challenges of stockpile stewardship in conjunction with nuclear testing. In the absence of nuclear testing, however, more capable hydrodynamic testing facilities such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility are needed. Through its dual-axis, multi-time viewing capability, the DARHT facility will provide crucial experimental data on many of the warheads in the stockpile and will directly support performance and safety revalidation, enhanced surveillance, and an improved predictive capability. Furthermore as the most capable hydrodynamic testing facility in the complex, the DARHT facility will play a central role in developing advanced technologies for a potential next-generation Advanced Hydrodynamics Test Facility. Construction on DARHT was resumed last May following dissolution of the federal court injunction which had halted all actions associated with the facility. The FY 1998 request for DARHT totals \$46 million: \$22 million to complete construction of the first arm of the facility and the balance to complete the engineering and design of the second arm.

The Atlas facility, to be constructed at Los Alamos National Laboratory, is another new experimental facility needed by the stockpile stewardship program. The facility provides a pulsed power experimental capability to address primary and secondary weapons physics in an energy rich, high energy density environment. Construction of Atlas is scheduled to begin later this year. The FY 1998 budget includes \$14 million. The funds will be used to continue long lead procurement, complete building modifications, and to install Atlas pulsed power equipment.

The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), while not a new facility, is the most powerful neutron research facility in the world, providing an intense source of pulsed neutrons for experiments supporting national security and civilian research. Neutrons are unique and valuable probes of matter on scales ranging from the subatomic to complex materials. At low energies, neutrons are used to study many critical weapons materials issues. At higher energies, neutrons probe the small-scale structure of atomic nuclei, which is important for studies of nuclear weapons processes. At the very highest energies, neutrons can penetrate very thick materials providing unique surveillance capabilities. This capability will be important in supporting the enduring stockpile and anticipating rather than reacting to problems in the stockpile.

#### Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) Computations and Information Management.

The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) and Stockpile Computing is a key element of the SSMP that will provide the critical advanced simulation tools needed for ongoing and future certification and assessment of the safety and reliability of the weapons in the stockpile. These tools will support weapons designers and analysts who will use them to certify and assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons. The future role of simulation has already been demonstrated in the assessment of the W76 issue.

Aging issues drive the size of the simulation capabilities required. During the design phase for the weapons in today's stockpile, limitations in simulation and computing were overcome by keeping the designs consistent in 2 dimensions and through the extensive use of underground testing. We already know that the aging issues we will encounter will not be so accommodating. Cracks, gaps and material degradation are 3D effects which will require significantly more simulation capabilities than previously existed. A simple calculation of the computing power needed to support 3D, additional resolution, and more complete physics simulation shows that a computer running at well over 100 trillion floating points operations per second (TeraFLOPS) is required.

In addition, this level of simulation capability will be required in the 2004 time frame to allow "test-based" weapons analysts to validate that the simulations accurately reflect the "real world". The 2004 time frame is critical because that is when we will have lost half of the current "test-based" designer and analyst capability. These designers and analysts are considered "master craftsmen and women" who have earned that status by learning and understanding scientific issues associated with nuclear weapons and then checking themselves with an extensive program of underground tests. They are "masters" at using a tool set (which included underground testing) to certify weapons and assess safety and reliability issues. With the loss of underground testing, these "masters"

are now required to continue to do their jobs of certification and assessment with a new tool set, in which a major component will be large scale, complex simulations. It is critical that this group of designers and analysts validate that the new simulation tools allow them to continue to have confidence in the weapons even in the absence of underground testing.

While the simulation capabilities provided by ASCI in the near-term will significantly improve our ability to certify and assess weapons without testing, at least 100 TeraFLOPS are required before full system performance and safety simulation are possible. This level is a critical threshold needed for validation.

The simulation capabilities in excess of 100 TeraFLOPS are required before the simulation tools are robust enough to be meaningful, and these "robust" tools must be available by 2004 so that the Department can make a smooth transition away from "test-based" certification and assessment. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) is designed to provide this level of simulation capabilities in the time frame required.

With the increased funding provided by the Congress in FY 1997, we are initiating work on at least 3 additional aging codes focussed on critical weapon initiation sequences, expanding joint work with the computer industry to fund large scalable memory capability on Option Red (1 TeraFLOPS) and Option Blue (3 TeraFLOPS) computers, and by increasing alliances with universities. The FY 1998 program growth of \$53.2 million will be used to sustain this momentum by executing activities in the current program plan, including critical performance and safety code development activities and pushing the capabilities of computer hardware.

We also have seen some significant achievements in simulation in FY 1997. This year has seen the delivery of the largest computer in the world to support Stockpile Stewardship. On December 4, 1996 the Intel Corporation broke the long standing 1 TeraFLOPS barrier. This and the follow-on computers are intended to move the simulation capabilities to the 100 TeraFLOPS level by 2004. ASCI code development has also shown a great deal of promise. Even though ASCI is only one and one half years old, the eleven code projects have made significant progress moving the simulations from 2D to 3D and on to parallel computers. This has lead to a better understanding of the challenges involved with simulation of aging and re-manufactured weapons.

The ASCI simulation capabilities will link the experimental data from the Aboveground Experimental facilities (AGEX), archival nuclear test data, and improved scientific understanding to provide high-confidence predictive simulation capabilities needed to support decisions about the enduring stockpile.

ASCI and Core Computations and Modeling supports another element of SSMP, the Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP), by providing simulation capabilities needed to predict requirements for replacement of aged components and to ensure that those replacements do not introduce new problems into the stockpile. Finally, ASCI complements and accelerates the ongoing efforts of the Defense Programs core research program for advances in physics, material

sciences, and computational modeling. ASCI's computational advances will benefit other applications including: global climate modeling, medical and drug design each improving the quality of life.

Core Computations and Modeling are the activities, principally at the three weapons laboratories, that address current stockpile operational and maintenance requirements. We will provide clear, effective and integrated planning to incorporate the new capabilities developed through ASCI into the central stockpile computing environment. As the Stockpile Stewardship PEIS and the Stewardship Management Plan are implemented, we will develop a Defense Programs Information Architecture to meet current and future needs. This architecture will be integrated with the DOE, DoD and other information systems.

## Test Readiness

President Clinton established a set of Safeguards under which U.S. adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is conditioned. These safeguards include maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear testing activities should the United States deem it necessary. To this end, the Department maintains the necessary infrastructure of the Nevada Test Site and the specialized facilities, equipment and skilled personnel required for nuclear testing. The Department has requested \$157 million in FY 1998 to maintain test readiness. The safe execution of a nuclear test requires a complex series of operations that exercise several areas of expertise including: nuclear explosive design and fabrication; diagnostic instrument design; emplacement and calibration; radioactive material containment; timing and firing, data recording, etc. Certification of the personnel and equipment to accomplish these operations will be assured by a number of ongoing and planned experimental activities utilizing both the Nevada Test Site and weapon laboratory facilities. The majority of these nuclear test-related operations, however, will be exercised through the Department's subcritical experiments at the NTS.

Subcritical experiments use high explosives to evaluate nuclear weapon materials (such as plutonium) by studying their behavior under extreme pressure conditions. The experiments are designed so the nuclear material will remain subcritical. In other words, there will be no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction created and, thus, they are consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These experiments will provide currently scarce empirical data on the high pressure behavior of weapon materials, realistic benchmark data on the dynamic, nonnuclear behavior of components of today's stockpile, the effects of remanufacturing techniques, the effects of

aging materials, and other technical issues. Improving our basic knowledge of the science of plutonium through these experiments is an essential part of our program of stockpile stewardship without nuclear testing. The Department is planning to conduct two of these subcritical experiments in FY 1997 and expects to conduct four experiments in FY 1998.

In the interest of transparency and building public confidence, the Department requested the JASONs to review the first two planned subcritical experiments and the results of the Department's internal evaluations of their potential for criticality. The JASONs have completed their review and stated that "these particular experiments will add valuable scientific information to our data base relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons, and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to criticality. Therefore these experiments are consistent with the provisions of the CTBT signed by President Clinton on September 24, 1996."

#### Technology Transfer

The technology transfer program is designed to advance a broad range of critical weapons core competencies by leveraging the vast resources of the private sector, to cost share the development of the best, most efficient, and affordable technologies needed to meet the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management program. The majority of the activities are partnership called Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) which have been selected on the basis of their contribution to the advanced technology needs of the weapons complex. These technology partnerships are supportive of a number of Defense Programs Initiatives including the ADaPT and ASCI.

In FY 1997 Congress provided an additional \$10 million for Technology Transfer activities with direction to increase efforts in support of the American Textile Partnerships (AMTEX) and the Advanced Computational Technology Initiative ( ACTI) partnerships. We also plan to support AMTEX at \$10 million and ACTI at \$5 million in FY 1997. We plan to support the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program at approximately \$10 million through the use of prior year balances and Weapons Support Agreements. The FY 1998 budget continues these activities at the following levels: AMTEX--\$5.5 million, ACTI--\$12 million and PNGV--\$7.5 million.

## FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET SUMMARY

The Defense Programs request for FY 1998 totals \$5.1 billion, of which \$3.6 billion is for Weapons Activities operation and maintenance account (\$1.4 billion for stockpile stewardship, \$1.8 billion for stockpile management and \$303 million for Program Direction). The Defense Programs is also requesting \$1.5 billion for the Defense Asset Acquisition account, including \$1,034.2 million for the transition to full construction funding. Overall, the Defense Programs request represents an increase of \$1.2 billion above the FY 1997 appropriation. The increase is entirely for construction of new facilities and is primarily due to the inclusion of full funding in the FY 1998 request. Without the required budget authority to fully fund construction projects, the FY 1998 funding level would be \$4.0 billion, a 3.4 percent increase over the FY 1997 appropriation.

Beginning in FY 1998, Defense Programs will be funded from two appropriation accounts: (1) Weapons Activities Operations and Maintenance; and (2) the Defense Asset Acquisition. This change is consistent with the Administration's creation of Defense Asset Acquisition accounts across DOE to improve Department-wide planning and decision making for asset acquisition. This new account provides obligational authority for expenditures on all current year construction projects, as well as providing "up front" budget authority for new projects. This approach will promote more effective project planning, budgeting, and management by helping to ensure that all costs and benefits are evaluated when decisions are being made about providing resources. In FY 1998, the transition year, budget authority is requested to complete all ongoing projects begun in prior years. The transition to up front budget authority does not affect the annual obligations profile or anticipated outlays.

### 120 DAY STUDY

Section 3140 of the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act and Section 302 of the FY 1997 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act requires the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan to reorganize the field activities and management of the Defense Programs activities. DOE's report must identify all significant functions performed at operations and area offices and make recommendations as to where those functions should be performed.

The Department contracted with the Institute for

Defense Analyses (IDA) to take a fresh look at the management structure of Defense Programs, to establish a baseline of functions and responsibilities and where they are performed, and to develop realignment options for DOE to consider in developing a reorganization plan.

IDA has completed their study and is preparing their final report. The Department is reviewing IDA's draft report and will prepare a report to Congress which will recommend specific organizational changes.

## CONCLUSION

The United States faces a broad array of national security challenges as we enter the 21st century. The Department of Energy is committed to using all of its unique and valuable people, plants and laboratories to address the many challenges that will arise. We view stockpile stewardship and stockpile management as a single, integrated program. The critical capabilities and competencies of both the weapons laboratories and production plants must be maintained in the national security interest. The Department will work with the Congress to ensure that a complete and integrated set of capabilities and appropriate manufacturing capacity is maintained. Through a strong Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program the DOE will be a strong partner with the DoD in maintaining our country's nuclear deterrent.

Dear Mr. Hallman,

I have indicated my support to Senator Hutchison. Because we are in the most intense time of the Texas Legislative session, I will not be able to do much more at this time.

Sincerely,

Phil Strickland  
Christian Life Commission

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INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS  
NetNews - April 1997

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The IGC newsletter contains important information about your IGC account, and IGC's products and services. NetNews is the official newsletter of the Institute for Global Communications which operates the PeaceNet, EcoNet, ConflictNet, LaborNet and WomensNet computer networks. Articles can be found in their entirety:

- o On the IGC NetNews Web page at <http://www.igc.org/igc/netnews/>
- o In the IGC newsgroup called 'igc.netnews', available to everyone with IGC accounts.
- o Send e-mail to <[get-netnews@igc.org](mailto:get-netnews@igc.org)> and receive the complete edition of the most current Netnews.

Here is a summary of what you will find.

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In the April 97 Issue

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IGC Net News, April 1997

- \* Scott Weikart Interview, IGC's Acting Executive Director
- \* Products News
- \* News of the Nets
- \* Featured Member Profile
- \* Support News
- \* Corporate Watch: The High Cost of High Tech
- \* Donate to IGC's Special Projects
- \* New Online Courses for IGC Members

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Interview with Scott Weikart, IGC's Acting Executive Director

Scott speaks about his past and present, the main challenges facing IGC right now, IGC's future as an ISP, and the search for a permanent Executive Director:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/weikart.html>

Also read an important announcement about staffing changes at IGC:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/message.html>

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Product News

Introducing our new Professional Web site which includes Secure Commerce Server for credit card transactions, IntraNet Solution with password protection, and the powerful Excite search engine. Also: Light Web sites and Standard Web sites for exactly the right price and options:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/products.html>

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#### News of the Nets

Read about JusticeNet which provides coverage of prison and prisoner rights issues.

The APC holds its Annual Meeting in South Africa and adds 3 new members in Senegal, Denmark and The Netherland, bringing their global membership to 25.

Members Natural Resource Defence Council unveil their new Green Guide:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/nets.html>

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#### Featured Member Program

Learn how you can promote your organization's work through IGC's new Featured Member Program:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/fmp.html>

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#### Support News

Read about additions to the Support Web pages, dates and times for Network downtime, etiquette recommendations for newsgroups, and IGC's access number database when you're going on the road:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/support.html>

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#### Corporate Watch: The High Cost of High Tech

This month's Corporate Watch Feature addresses the environmental, economic and social costs of computers and the corporations that make them. With commentary by Ted Smith, Jeanne Gauna, John Barton and Kirkpatrick Sale:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/netnews/corpwatch.html>

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Donate to IGC's Special Projects

Now you can donate online to support one of IGC's Special Projects. This issue's features are EcoNet's EcoJustice Networking Project, and PeaceNet's African American Networking. We need your support!

<https://swww.igc.apc.org/igc/contrib.html>

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New Online Courses For IGC Members

IGC is pleased to offer a series of courses online for our members, created in collaboration with ZMagazine. The courses last for 10 weeks and begin on April 7. Fees are \$50 for one course and \$100 for either two or three courses. Registration is open now, and late registrants will be accepted until April 20.

The first semester's courses include:

- \* ELECTRONIC ACTIVISM ON THE INTERNET
- \* ORGANIZING: THE LOST ART
- \* INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS
- \* U.S. CAPITALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
- \* PARENTING FOR PROGRESSIVES IN THE LATE 20th CENTURY
- \* SEEING BETTER (Visual Arts)
- \* STRATEGIC RESEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE ANALYSIS
- \* INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY
- \* CONCEPTUALIZING A BETTER ECONOMY

Registration forms and information on other courses can be found at <http://www.igc.org/lolu>.

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Net News is the newsletter of the Institute for Global Communications, home of PeaceNet, EcoNet, LaborNet, ConflictNet and WomensNet.

IGC's mission is to expand and inspire movements for peace, economic and social justice, human rights and environmental sustainability around the world by providing and developing accessible computer networking tools.

Need information?

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APO 03/31 2203 U.S. Warns of Tritium Production

By H. JOSEF HEBERT

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Some of the Energy Department's nuclear weapons specialists raised deep concerns over the proposed use of an experimental reactor in Washington state to produce tritium, a gas needed for atomic warheads, according to an internal memo.

The concerns were outlined in a memo, written more than eight months ago, that is expected to provide ammunition to those who want the test reactor at the Hanford nuclear reservation near Richland, Wash., to be shut down as previously planned.

A copy of the memo, which expressed the views of the defense programs office within the Energy Department, was provided Monday by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, a private group that has been critical of the Hanford facility's use in future tritium production.

"They're saying it would be very expensive and very dangerous to use this reactor," said Arjun Makhijani, a nuclear physicist and president of the Institute in nearby Takoma Park, Md.

Terry Lash, the Energy Department's director of the office of nuclear energy, said in a telephone interview Monday that the department is taking the concerns raised in the memo into account.

"We have made no decision about whether or not to restart the reactor," he said. "We would not propose going forward if there were any questions about the safety of the facility."

In one of her last actions, outgoing Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary announced last January that Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility, an experimental reactor destined to be mothballed, would be kept on standby for possible production of tritium.

The department also is considering using civilian nuclear reactors, or building a linear accelerator -- a technology not yet fully tested -- to produce tritium, a gas that decays relatively quickly but is needed for nuclear warheads to function properly. Currently tritium from dismantled warheads is being used because the country has no tritium production facility.

The Energy Department is considered the Hanford facility as a backup if the two other options -- use of civilian reactors or development of a linear accelerator -- run into problems.

But the memo raised numerous concerns about converting the Hanford test reactor into a facility that would use large amounts of plutonium as a fuel.

It said the reactor would have to be "substantially modified" and undergo extensive testing, not currently being planned, to ensure safety. They also questioned whether the facility could be converted to meet the Energy Department's time schedule and within the costs anticipated.

The memo called the proposed schedule for converting the reactor as "overly aggressive" and suggested that more extensive testing than currently envisioned will be necessary to ensure the reactor can be operated safely.

Once a test facility for developing breeder nuclear technology, the Fast Flux Facility has been the focus of intense controversy in the Northwest.

Washington's congressional delegation saw potential tritium production as a way to keep the reactor open and save 370 jobs. But others -- including many environmentalists and state officials in neighboring Oregon -- want it closed.

The 16-page memo was written William Kelly of the defense programs office to a number of Energy Department officials and transmitted on the Internet shortly after a July, 23, 1996, meeting during which the department's tritium options were extensively discussed.

The memo characterized some modification proposals as "plug and crank" and paper regulatory changes, instead of the "rigorous, independent verification and validation process" needed to ensure the reactor can operate safely even in the most severe conditions.

The reactor was designed as a test facility and would have to be modified "to stretch capacity as a production facility" -- a change that could put the plant at risk -- and result in costs soaring, the memo continued.

"The schedule proposed is overly aggressive and does not take into account the increased uncertainty in completing additional analyses, plant modifications, code validations, and readiness assessments in a highly regulated environment," Kelly wrote.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

howard, i just now learned that my sister has had a stroke and is near death in a coma in st louis. i have to go and be with her and i will not be able to make the mupj meeting starting friday. i will check in with you as soon as i can at this address--please ask everybody there to be in prayer for teri. she's 39 years old, which is way too young in my opinion to go thru all this.

i'll talk to you soon. thanks,

bruce edwards

Greetings,

I forwarded your query to the list administrator:

owner-abolition-caucus@igc.org

---

| Arthur McGee (IGC Technical Support) <support4@igc.org> |  
| Institute for Global Communications <http://www.igc.org/> |  
| Voice: +1-415-561-6100 Fax: +1-415-561-6101 |  
| PeaceNet \* EcoNet \* ConflictNet \* WomensNet \* LaborNet |

---

> Date: Thu, 3 Apr 1997 16:29:43 -0800 (PST)  
> From: mupj@igc.apc.org  
> To: support@igc.org  
> Subject: where's abolition-caucus?  
>  
> Dear Friends:  
> I haven't received anything from abolition-caucus for about a week?  
> Is there anything wrong?  
>  
> Thanks for your help,  
>  
> Howard Hallman  
>

**\*URGENT\***

The Department of Energy plans to announce a subcritical experiment today - stay tuned for the forthcoming Press Release.

RTw 04/04 0411 Non-aligned nations hear plea for nuclear-free world

By Nelson Graves

NEW DELHI, April 4 (Reuter) - More than 100 nations in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) began four days of meetings on Friday with a denunciation of the nuclear powers and a plea for permanent representation on the U.N. Security Council.

Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral exhorted the 113-nation movement to press the five declared nuclear powers -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- to abandon their arsenals.

Gujral inaugurated a two-day meeting of senior officials of NAM member states with a plea that developing nations be given permanent representation on the United Nations Security Council. NAM foreign ministers will meet on April 7-8.

The five permanent representatives on the powerful council are the five official nuclear powers.

"No nuclear weapon power is prepared to abandon its weapons or even contemplate a date when they might free the world entirely of these weapons," Gujral said. "The Non-Aligned have to be resolved and unshakable in their right to secure a nuclear weapon-free world within a time-bound framework."

One of the founding members of NAM, which is comprised mainly of developing nations, India has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would ban nuclear weapons tests.

India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but says it has never built the bomb, claims the CTBT would lock in the nuclear powers' monopoly and allow them to use sophisticated scientific means of perfecting their weapons.

Gujral also used the NAM platform to press for adding more permanent members to U.N. Security Council.

India has been campaigning for one of the potential new seats. But Germany and Japan are believed to be the frontrunners in the drive for permanent membership.

"We cannot allow any expansion in permanent membership which is discriminatory in any way," Gujral said. "NAM members cannot be relegated to a secondary status and must be included in the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent membership."

The Indian foreign minister said NAM had defeated colonialism and apartheid, but now faced new challenges.

"Suddenly new ideas have sprung on us, claiming to be norms -- labour standards or the social clause, global investment regimes, good governance and the right of humanitarian intervention, environmental conditionalities, new forms of

protectionism," he said.

The chairman of the two-day meeting of senior NAM officials, Colombian ambassador to the U.N. Julio Londono Paredes, rejected claims the movement, created as an ostensibly neutral body during the Cold War, was now irrelevant.

"Our voice is the other voice, despite the fact that arm-chair analysts seem to believe NAM no longer has a raison d'etre," he said.

"Major issues have made people turn their sights on us. They are waiting with bated breath to see what our decisions are."

But Gujral said NAM was unable to respond as rapidly to events as developed nations, whose leaders meet more often in the Group of Seven, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the European Union.

He said the movement also had to widen its sights to take in "the big issues, the global challenges and opportunities."

More than 70 foreign ministers and several dozen more senior officials will begin the two-day ministerial meeting on Monday. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will address the meeting.

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Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232, 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

Dear Howard,

Thanks so much for getting the poll to Clinton. We should also try Gore, Pena, etc. After you left, Karina took the lead in getting the group together for follow-up. I adapted the press advisory and it went to every member of Congress today (through the help of Karina and the AFSC network) with a request that the Congressperson contact President Clinton and ask him to revise his nuclear policy and also that the Congress call a hearing on nuclear policy in light of American public opinion. If you get any other good ideas, contact Karina who has set up a network to maximize the impact of the poll. I spoke to Selinda Lake who said she would send it to Rahum Emanuel(?), the new George Stephanopolos, Special Assistant to Clinton. Selinda also sent it to Elizabeth Furze. Many thanks again for your help.

Regards,

Alice Slater

GRACE

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment

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To: PSR friends and supporters  
Fr: Lisa Ledwidge  
RE: Subcriticals Announced

The US government today announced it will conduct a series of "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments beginning this June. Below please find:

1. PSR's response
2. US Dept. of Energy's official announcement
3. DOE Q&A fact sheet on subcriticals

For more info, contact Lisa or Daryl at PSR National.

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\*\*\* PSR NEWS ALERT \*\*\*

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 4, 1997  
CONTACT: 202-898-0150

### Arms Control Group Blasts Clinton Administration Decision to Conduct Underground Nuclear Weapons Experiments in Nevada

(Washington, DC) - In response to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announcement that it will conduct a series of underground, "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) reiterated its charge that "the experiments are unnecessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal, are unnecessary to maintain the readiness to resume nuclear testing, and undermine the goal of implementing the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)."

"We are very disappointed that Secretary Pena and the Clinton Administration have decided to pursue a series of underground nuclear weapons experiments at the Nevada Test Site. The high international political and non-proliferation costs far outweigh the dubious technical utility of the experiments. We reiterate our call for the immediate cancellation of these experiments," said Daryl Kimball, Director of Security Programs for PSR.

The Department of Energy announced that it will conduct two experiments this year at the Nevada Test Site, at an underground complex formerly-known as the Low-Yield Nuclear Explosions Research (LYNER) facility. The first subcritical experiment is scheduled for June 1997 with a second experiment later this fall. Additional subcritical experiments are also planned.

"Although the independent JASONs scientific group has said 'these particular experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons,' the DOE has not demonstrated that it cannot maintain the safety of the existing nuclear arsenal without subcritical

experiments or that these experiments are essential at this time to carry out current policy directives," charged Kimball.

"There is no evidence to date to suggest that potential problems such as plutonium aging have degraded the performance of the weapons designs in the active U.S. arsenal. The DOE has failed to conduct an independent, technical review of the need for these activities," said Kimball.

Many arms control observers and diplomatic officials also believe that conducting the underground subcritical experiments would have a severe and negative impact on securing the formal entry-into-force of the CTBT, which requires the ratification of the Treaty by 44 named nuclear weapons-capable states.

"The Clinton Administration has also failed to conduct a thorough evaluation the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation impacts of conducting such activities, particularly the impact of such experiments on the U.S. goal of securing the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," added Kimball.

The DOE announcement comes on the eve of an international meeting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that will convene in New York from April 7 to April 18.

According to Mr. Kimball, "The U.S. subcritical experiments may add to the difficulty of securing the support for the CTBT from some nuclear capable states such as India and Pakistan, which are concerned that the United States may be able to continue nuclear weapons development through the laboratory-based, "stockpile stewardship" programs, including activities such as subcritical experiments."

Though the Clinton Administration and the DOE claim that the subcritical experiments are allowed under the recently-signed "zero-yield" CTBT, Kimball also noted that "the experiments would set an unfortunate precedent that could complicate the ability of the U.S. and other states to verify that the terms of the CTBT are not violated by any nation.

The recently-signed CTBT, prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The DOE asserts that the "subcritical" experiments will not violate the letter of the CTBT because they are not designed to produce a release of energy (i.e. explosion) from a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.

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PSR is a national organization with 20,000 members committed to the prevention of nuclear war, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to address the environmental and health impacts of nuclear arms production. You may contact PSR for additional information on subcritical experiments and the CTBT.

Physicians for Social Responsibility  
1101 Fourteenth Street, N.W., Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Telephone (202) 898-0150  
Fax (202) 898-0172

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## STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY FEDERICO PENA ON THE SCHEDULE FOR SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

At the United Nations last year, as the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, President Clinton firmly committed the United States to the pursuit of a world free of nuclear testing, observing that this treaty was the culmination of the work of American Presidents -- both Republican and Democrat -- over the past four decades.

When the President made the decision to pursue a zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, he stated that, even in the absence of nuclear testing, we would maintain "strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership from acting against the interests of the United States." The President also declared that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is a necessary condition for U.S. entry into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is the direct responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE). To this end,\*\*\* we are announcing today a schedule for subcritical experiments -- an essential component of the Department's program for ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. The first in a series of these experiments is now scheduled for June 1997, with a second similar experiment to follow sometime this fall.\*\*\*

Over many decades, a group of distinguished scientists known as the JASONs has provided the U.S. Government independent, expert analyses in defense and arms control issues. At the request of the Department of Energy, the JASONs conducted a review of the designs of the Department's first two subcritical experiments. In a January 1997 letter transmitting this review to Acting Secretary of Energy Charles Curtis, the JASONs concluded that "these particular experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons, and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to criticality." Yesterday, the JASONs formally released their report.

Subcritical experiments are essential to our commitments to a world free of nuclear testing and a reliable nuclear deterrent and are fully consistent with the CTBT. In addition, these experiments complement other elements of DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management program such as the National Ignition

Facility and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative -- additional tools which will help supply the confidence in stockpile safety and reliability the President has required in order to support the CTBT.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty represents an advancement of peace and security for the American people. It is a clear demarcation between the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War world: between a runaway arms race, fear of nuclear proliferation and concern about environmental degradation -- and increased stability, enhanced security and ongoing international cooperation. The Department of Energy is proud of its contribution toward these important national and international goals.

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## DOE FACTS

### ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SCHEDULE FOR SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

#### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

##### Q. WHAT ARE SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

A. Subcritical experiments are an essential component of the Department's science-based stockpile stewardship program designed to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile under a test ban. These experiments use high explosives and nuclear weapon materials (including special nuclear materials like plutonium) to gain important data that will be used to maintain the stockpile without conducting nuclear explosions banned by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Secretary of Energy today announced the schedule for the conduct of these experiments.

##### Q. ARE SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)?

A. Subcritical experiments are fully consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by President Clinton last September at the United Nations. The treaty bans "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." Subcritical experiments, on the other hand, are configured such that no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction can occur even though special nuclear materials will be present. In other words, the configuration of each experiment guarantees that no nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty can result.

##### Q. HOW DOES THE CONDUCT OF SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS SUPPORT THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY?

Subcritical experiments provide the United States with the means

to gain important data need to maintain the stockpile without conducting nuclear explosions. In 1993, President Clinton directed the Department of Energy to develop a science-based stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the U.S. stockpile would remain safe and reliable under a test ban regime. In August, 1995, President Clinton elaborated six safeguards which would condition U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Subcritical experiments directly support three of those safeguards, including:

\* SAFEGUARD A: "the conduct of a Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program . . . including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs,"

\*SAFEGUARD B: "the maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources . . .," and

\*SAFEGUARD C: "the maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty."

Thus, the conduct of subcritical experiments, along with other stockpile stewardship and management activities, will allow the United States to abide by the provisions of the CTBT not to conduct nuclear test explosions and will greatly reduce the likelihood that SAFEGUARD F (which involves U.S. withdrawal from the treaty due to lack of confidence in the safety or reliability of a critical nuclear weapon type) will ever need to be invoked.

**Q: HOW ARE THESE EXPERIMENTS IMPORTANT FOR OUR NATION'S STOCKPILE?**

A: These experiments will contribute to the Department of Energy's national defense-related mission in two important ways:

**SCIENCE BASED STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP:** In order to maintain safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile without nuclear testing, the Department of Energy (DOE) has developed, at the President's direction, a "Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program. The SSBS program will utilize advanced computer simulations and experimental programs on which the assessment of the safety and performance of the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile will be based. Confidence in these assessments can be significantly improved with data from subcritical experiments. Specifically, such experiments will provide needed data on the behavior of weapon materials and components, as well as the effects of remanufacturing techniques, aged materials, and other technical issues.

**NUCLEAR TEST READINESS:** By exercising a number of operations similar to nuclear testing (since these experiments do involve

high explosive, special nuclear materials and will be done underground at the Nevada Test Site), the experiments will effectively maintain the Department's nuclear test readiness capabilities. This activity assists in implementing the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguard, announced August 11, 1995.

**Q: WHY IS THE DEPARTMENT CONDUCTING SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS UNDERGROUND?**

**A:** By conducting subcritical experiments in an already existing underground complex on the Nevada Test Site (NTS), public and NTS worker safety will be best ensured, environmental impacts will be minimized, and the cost to the taxpayer will be reduced since the development of an above-ground reusable chamber would take years to design, build and certify for safety.

**Q: WHAT TRANSPARENCY MEASURES IS THE DEPARTMENT PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS?**

**A:** In the interest of transparency, the Department is taking several actions to assure the public that these experiments will indeed be subcritical. The first two experiments have been reviewed by technical experts at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories to assure they will remain subcritical (consistent with the CTBT) and that all operations will adhere to safety and environmental laws and regulations. Each subsequent experiment will be reviewed in a similar fashion.

In addition, a review of the designs of the first two planned subcritical experiments has been conducted by the JASONs, an independent group of eminently qualified scientists. They concluded that the experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons, and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to criticality. A report written by the JASON subgroup was released yesterday on this subject and the JASONs will have access to experimental results.

Subsequent subcritical experiments will be assessed by a similar independent review process.

**Q: HOW CAN THE PUBLIC OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE EXPERIMENTS?**

**A:** The Department has prepared and written visual material on these experiments that are available to the public. We understand that such information will be helpful in informing members of the public that these experiments will be conducted in full compliance with the environmental, safety and policy guidelines. Information is available which describes, in general terms, the underground experiment complex and design, the objectives and nature of the experiments to be conducted there, relevant operational considerations, and the procedures used to assure

their compliance with safety and policy requirements. DOE/HQ  
Public Information can be reached at 202 586 5575.

end

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

April 3, 1997

Contact: Doug Baj or Whitney Williams at 202-667-0901

-- AMERICANS FEEL UNSAFE WITH CURRENT NUCLEAR STOCKPILE --  
-- WANT ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS --

A Lake Sosin Snell & Associates Poll Finds Broad Consensus  
Across Gender, Regional & Political Lines

Washington, DC --- With the Cold War an increasingly distant memory, a substantial majority of Americans no longer see any reason for maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons. They support - by a nine to one margin - an international treaty to eliminate nuclear arms, according to a Lake Sosin Snell & Associates poll released today by Abolition 2000, a global network representing 700 non-governmental organizations that work for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The nationwide survey of 1,006 Americans found a public feeling unsafe with the nuclear status quo. Eighty-four percent would feel safer in a world in which no country, including the United States, has nuclear weapons.

The survey found strong public disagreement with current federal budget priorities in which the U.S. spends more on building and maintaining nuclear weapons than on Head Start, fighting illiteracy, and providing college scholarships combined.

Unlike defense-related surveys conducted in earlier years, there is no significant gender gap and regional variation in these findings. Republicans and Democrats also are in broad agreement. Opposition to maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile - and support for an international treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons - is shared across the board by men and women, Democrats and Republicans, and throughout every region of the country.

"Americans see no reason for maintaining the Cold War nuclear policy and see every reason for eliminating the nuclear threat once and for all," said Alice Slater, president Global Resource Action Center for the Environment. "It doesn't seem to matter whether you're liberal or conservative, pro-defense spending or not - the bottom line is that the bomb makes us feel unsafe and we want to be rid of it. It's time for our leaders to end this final chapter of the Cold War", said Slater.

Among the survey's findings:

\* Americans Feel Unsafe With Current Nuclear Arsenal: Compared to the current nuclear status in which the U.S. and other countries have nuclear weapons, 84 percent of Americans polled said they would feel safer knowing for sure that no country,

including the U.S., had nuclear weapons.

\* **Strong Support for International Treaty:** 87 percent of Americans want the U.S. to negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons (68 percent say they strongly agree).

\* **Too Many Tax Dollars Spent on Nuclear Stockpile:** Nearly 8 in 10 Americans - 77% - believe that the U.S. budget for nuclear weapons is too high. When informed that more tax dollars are spent on building and maintaining nuclear weapons than on Head Start, fighting illiteracy and providing college scholarships combined, 74 percent disagreed with this spending priority.

"Rarely do we see such a broad consensus on this type of public policy issue," said Celinda Lake, president of Lake Sosin Snell & Associates. "The great nuclear public policy divide of the post-World War II era has gone the way of the Cold War."

Lake's firm conducted the survey from March 27 to 30th, 1997. The survey was called by paid, trained and professionally supervised interviewers using a replicated, stratified random digit dial process.

The maximum margin of error for this sample is +/- 3.1 percent.

Said GRACE's Slater: "Nuclear arms issues may not garner many headlines these days, but it doesn't mean that Americans aren't worried about this vast and unnecessary arsenal in our midst. Even with the planned cuts in nuclear arms recently agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, it would leave the US and Russia each with more than double the number of warheads held by England, France and China combined. To the public, it just doesn't make any sense."

For further information, contact Doug Baj or Hunter Hohlt at 202-667-0901.

\*\*\*\*\*URGENT NEWS ALERT\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENT IN JUNE, 1997\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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Enclosed in this e-mail message please find:

- I. PENA'S PRESS RELEASE
- II. DOE'S FACTS - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
- III. PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY - PRESS RELEASE
- IV. GREENPEACE FACT SHEET

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(Also look for the Executive Summary of the JASON report referred to . . . coming out to you soon.)

#### STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY FEDERICO PENA ON THE SCHEDULE FOR SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

At the United Nations last year, as the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, President Clinton firmly committed the United States to the pursuit of a world free of nuclear testing, observing that this treaty was the culmination of the work of American Presidents -- both Republican and Democrat -- over the past four decades.

When the President made the decision to pursue a zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, he stated that, even in the absence of nuclear testing, we would maintain "strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership from acting against the interests of the United States." The President also declared that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is a necessary condition for U.S. entry into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is the direct responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE). To this end,\*\*\* we are announcing today a schedule for subcritical experiments -- an essential component of the Department's program for ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. The first in a series of these experiments is now scheduled for June 1997, with a second similar experiment to follow sometime this fall.\*\*\*

Over many decades, a group of distinguished scientists known as the JASONs has provided the U.S. Government independent, expert

analyses in defense and arms control issues. At the request of the Department of Energy, the JASONS conducted a review of the designs of the Department's first two subcritical experiments. in a January 1997 letter transmitting this review to Acting Secretary of Energy Charles Curtis, the JASONS concluded that "these particular experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons, and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to criticality." Yesterday, the JASONS formally released their report.

Subcritical experiments are essential to our commitments to a world free of nuclear testing and a reliable nuclear deterrent and are fully consistent with the CTBT. In addition, these experiments complement other elements of DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management program such as the National Ignition Facility and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative -- additional tools which will help supply the confidence in stockpile safety and reliability the President has required in order to support the CTBT.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty represents an advancement of peace and security for the American people. It is a clear demarcation between the Cold War Era and the post-Cold War world: between a runaway arms race, fear of nuclear proliferation and concern about environmental degradation -- and increased stability, enhanced security and ongoing international cooperation. The Department of Energy is proud of its contribution toward these important national and international goals.

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## DOE FACTS

### ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SCHEDULE FOR SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

#### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

##### Q. WHAT ARE SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

A. Subcritical experiments are an essential component of the Department's science-based stockpile stewardship program designed to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile under a test ban. These experiments use high explosives and nuclear weapon materials (including special nuclear materials like plutonium) to gain important data that will be used to maintain the stockpile without conducting nuclear explosions banned by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Secretary of Energy today announced the schedule for the conduct of these experiments.

**Q. ARE SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)?**

A. Subcritical experiments are fully consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by President Clinton last September at the United Nations. The treaty bans "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." Subcritical experiments, on the other hand, are configured such that no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction can occur even though special nuclear materials will be present. In other words, the configuration of each experiment guarantees that no nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty can result.

**Q. HOW DOES THE CONDUCT OF SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS SUPPORT THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY?**

Subcritical experiments provide the United States with the means to gain important data need to maintain the stockpile without conducting nuclear explosions. In 1993, President Clinton directed the Department of Energy to develop a science-based stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the U.S. stockpile would remain safe and reliable under a test ban regime. In August, 1995, President Clinton elaborated six safeguards which would condition U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Subcritical experiments directly support three of those safeguards, including:

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Thus, the conduct of subcritical experiments, along with other stockpile stewardship and management activities, will allow the United States to abide by the provisions of the CTBT not to conduct nuclear test explosions and will greatly reduce the likelihood that SAFEGUARD F (which involves U.S. withdrawal from the treaty due to lack of confidence in the safety or reliability of a critical nuclear weapon type) will ever need to be invoked.

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**NUCLEAR TEST READINESS:** By exercising a number of operations similar to nuclear testing (since these experiments do involve high explosive, special nuclear materials and will be done underground at the Nevada Test Site), the experiments will effectively maintain the Department's nuclear test readiness capabilities. This activity assists in implementing the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguard, announced August 11, 1995.

**Q: WHY IS THE DEPARTMENT CONDUCTING SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS UNDERGROUND?**

**A:** By conducting subcritical experiments in an already existing underground complex on the Nevada Test Site (NTS), public and NTS worker safety will be best ensured, environmental impacts will be minimized, and the cost to the taxpayer will be reduced since the development of an above-ground reusable chamber would take years to design, build and certify for safety.

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JASONS will have access to experimental results.

Subsequent subcritical experiments will be assessed by a similar independent review process.

**Q: HOW CAN THE PUBLIC OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE EXPERIMENTS?**

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PSR Physicians for Social Responsibility

1101 Fourteenth Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005

Telephone (202) 898-0150 Fax (202) 898-0172

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 4, 1997  
CONTACT: (202-898-0150)

**Arms Control Group Blasts Clinton Administration Decision to Conduct Underground Nuclear Weapons Experiments in Nevada**

(Washington, DC) - In response to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announcement that it will conduct a series of underground, "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) reiterated its charge that "the experiments are unnecessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal, are unnecessary to maintain the readiness to resume nuclear testing, and undermine the goal of implementing the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)."

"We are very disappointed that Secretary Pena and the Clinton Administration have decided to pursue a series of underground nuclear weapons experiments at the Nevada Test Site. The high international political and non-proliferation costs far outweigh the dubious technical utility of the experiments. We reiterate our call for the immediate cancellation of these experiments," said Daryl Kimball, Director of Security Programs for PSR.

The Department of Energy announced that it will conduct two experiments this year at the Nevada Test Site, at an underground complex formerly-known as the Low-Yield Nuclear Explosions Research (LYNER) facility. The first subcritical experiment is scheduled for June 1997 with a second experiment later this fall. Additional subcritical experiments are also planned.

"Although the independent JASONs scientific group has said 'these particular experiments will add valuable scientific information to our database relevant to the performance of our nuclear weapons,' the DOE has not demonstrated that it cannot maintain the safety of the existing nuclear arsenal without subcritical experiments or that these experiments are essential at this time to carry out current policy directives," charged Kimball.

"There is no evidence to date to suggest that potential problems such as plutonium aging have degraded the performance of the weapons designs in the active U.S. arsenal. The DOE has failed to conduct an independent, technical review of the need for these activities," said Kimball.

Many arms control observers and diplomatic officials also believe that conducting the underground subcritical experiments would have a severe and negative impact on securing the formal entry-into-force of the CTBT, which requires the ratification of the Treaty by 44 named nuclear weapons-capable states.

"The Clinton Administration has also failed to conduct a thorough evaluation the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation impacts of conducting such activities, particularly the impact of such experiments on the U.S. goal of securing the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," added Kimball.

The DOE announcement comes on the eve of an international meeting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that will convene in New York from April 7 to April 18.

According to Mr. Kimball, "The U.S. subcritical experiments may add to the difficulty of securing the support for the CTBT from some nuclear capable states such as India and Pakistan, which are concerned that the United States may be able to continue nuclear weapons development through the laboratory-based, "stockpile stewardship" programs, including activities such as subcritical experiments."

Though the Clinton Administration and the DOE claim that the subcritical experiments are allowed under the recently-signed "zero-yield" CTBT, Kimball also noted that "the experiments would set an unfortunate precedent that could complicate the ability of the U.S. and other states to verify that the terms of the CTBT are not violated by any nation.

The recently-signed CTBT, prohibits "any nuclear weapon test

explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The DOE asserts that the "subcritical" experiments will not violate the letter of the CTBT because they are not designed to produce a release of energy (i.e. explosion) from a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.

PSR is a national organization with 20,000 members committed to the prevention of nuclear war, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to address the environmental and health impacts of nuclear arms production. You may contact PSR for additional information on subcritical experiments and the CTBT.

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## SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS

April 1, 1997

By Bruce Hall, Greenpeace

### WHAT ARE THEY?

The Department of Energy plans two "subcritical" nuclear weapons-related experiments at the Nevada Test Site in 1997. Four Subcritical tests are in the works for 1998. More will take place in 1999.

The Department of Energy claims that these underground experiments, involving high explosives and either nuclear weapons plutonium or uranium, are designed not to produce a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. The plutonium or uranium involved will fall short of a critical mass - thus the term "subcritical."

These experiments are part of the U.S. efforts to maintain the ability to "break out" or the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should a president decide to resume full-scale testing. They are being used, among other reasons, to maintain test "readiness."

The experiments will help nuclear weapons scientists at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories advance the frontiers of nuclear weapons science. Specifically, the data gleaned from these experiments will be plugged into the world's fastest supercomputers so that weaponeers will be able to better predict nuclear weapons performance in the absence of nuclear testing.

### WHEN

The first experiment code-named REBOUND has been designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The second experiment codenamed HOLOG has been designed by Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory in California.

The Department of Energy has announce that REBOUND will take place in June. Secretary of Energy, Pena voiced support for conducting these test during confirmation hearings early this year.

The 1997 experiments do not involve actual nuclear warheads. In laypeoples' terms they involve strips of plutonium placed next to conventional explosives about 900 feet underground. There is noting to guarantee that future experiments will not involve actual nuclear weapons or prototype warheads.

DOE officials say the tests are also necessary to assess the way in which age affects the plutonium and uranium in nuclear weapons.

The DOE plans to conduct ICEBOUND, ASH, BOOMERANG and BEECH in 1998.

The Energy Department originally planned to begin conducting subcritical experiments in 1996, but they were forced to postpone the tests because of their potential negative impact on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations. Grassroots opposition and the concern of several delegations at the test ban negotiations were key to achieving this postponement.

#### WHAT'S WRONG WITH THESE TESTS

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed on September 24, 1996. It bans "nuclear weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions." Its known loosely as a zero yield treaty, but the terms "nuclear weapons test explosions" and "nuclear explosions" were not defined. Because these experiments don't produce a yield, DOE officials argue that they are within the letter of the treaty. Critics charge that they certainly violate the spirit of the treaty.

The U.S. commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be seen as nothing less than permanent. Maintaining a breakout ability by conducting these experiments undermines the integrity of that important and disarmament and non-proliferation measure.

Conducting these underground nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site can only raise questions about U.S. compliance with the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We will make the already daunting task of verifying that treaty more difficult.

The U.S. will create a norm under which the Russians or Chinese could feel justified in conducting similar underground nuclear weapons tests at Novay Zemlya and Lop Nor. We will make the already daunting task of verifying that treaty more difficult.

Several non-nuclear countries have voiced concern that the U.S.

is continuing nuclear weapons development in spite of the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These experiments will only serve to validate those concerns and may stiffen the resistance to the test ban from such key countries as India.

#### WHAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DO

Cancel these tests. They are out of step with the growing momentum toward nuclear disarmament.

Close the Nevada Test Site and seek agreement among Russia and China to formally close their test sites as well. France has closed and is vacating their South Pacific test sites at Moruroa and Fangataufa.

#### ABOUT THE NEVADA TEST SITE and U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING

The U.S. had conducted a total of 934 tests in Nevada between 1951 and 1992. 100 of those were above ground.

The United States has conducted a total of 1,054 nuclear tests.

The United States tested nuclear weapons in New Mexico, Colorado, Mississippi, Alaska, Nevada, the South Atlantic and throughout the South Pacific.

The Nevada Test Site lies about 90 miles north of Las Vegas.

The United Spends over \$100 million annually to maintain readiness at the Nevada Test Site.

The subcritical experiments cost roughly \$10 million each.

**\*\*FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Hall at Greenpeace's Nuclear Disarmament Campaign: 202 319 2514.**

\*\*\*\*\*

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APO 04/04 1734 U.S. To Set Underground Nuke Blasts

By H. JOSEF HEBERT

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- After a year's delay, the Energy Department said Friday it will conduct two underground explosions this year using nuclear materials at the federal test site in Nevada.

The tests have prompted protests from anti-nuclear proliferation groups, which view them as a possible prelude to renewed atomic testing and development of new weapon designs.

Energy Secretary Federico Pena, who announced the tests, said they are "an essential component of the department's program for ensuring the safety and reliability of the (nuclear weapons) stockpile."

Energy Department scientists took pains to emphasize that each of the two underground tests -- one in June and a second in the fall -- will involve chemical, not nuclear, explosions. Officials said the largest explosion would be equivalent to 81 pounds of TNT.

Although small amounts of plutonium -- about a pound for each of three charges in the first test -- will be present, the package is designed so that it will not achieve a nuclear chain reaction.

The tests are "fully consistent" with the nuclear test-ban treaty signed by President Clinton last September, said Joan Rohlfing, deputy assistant secretary for national security.

"It will not in any way facilitate new-weapons development," Rohlfing said in a conference telephone call with reporters.

In anticipation of the government's announcement, several hundred protesters gathered at gates to the Nevada test site in recent days. Twenty-two protesters were arrested Thursday when they blocked highway traffic by chaining themselves to concrete-filled barrels.

Critics have questioned whether these experiments are needed to ensure the existing nuclear stockpile is reliable -- as DOE nuclear scientists contend. They argue that scaled-back tests at weapons labs can develop the information needed.

"The program they have put together is vastly larger and more expensive than what is needed. It's a program that if it were ultimately successful would also enable them to design new weapons without testing," said Tom Cochran, a leading nuclear weapons expert with the private Natural Resources Defense Council.

Cochran said nuclear nonproliferation efforts "would be better served" if the Nevada test site were closed down. The government conducted 928 nuclear weapons tests during the Cold War years at the Nevada site, the last in 1992.

Energy Department officials, trying to dispel concern about the tests, released a review of the test design by an independent panel of scientists, known as the Jason group.

The Jason report said the tests would add "valuable scientific information" on the performance of nuclear weapons. "There is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to

criticality," the scientific panel concluded.

The detonations 980 feet underground are supposed to help scientists determine how parts of a warhead, including the small amount of plutonium, behave under explosive pressure. This information will be used later to develop computer models that simulate actual nuclear detonation.

Plans had been announced in late 1995 for a series of six such "subcritical" tests with the first four expected last year. But the tests were delayed for a variety of reasons, including problems developing an environmental impact statement and to get an independent scientific review, said Rohlfiing.

"What the Energy Department is doing is using technical jargon to cover up the real issues," said Bruce Hall of Greenpeace, which participated in this week's protests at the test site.

"They're advancing the frontier of nuclear weapons science to help them better predict the performance of nuclear weapons."

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 4, 1997

GREENPEACE & SHUNDAHAI NETWORK: ACTION FOR NUCLEAR ABOLITION

In response to the announcement today by the US Department of Energy confirming the schedule for its so-called "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments, Greenpeace and Shundahai Network: Action for Nuclear Abolition express the following views:

For the past week, activists working to bring about a nuclear weapons-free future have brought their protests to the Nevada nuclear weapons Test Site. Today the US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it will, once again, make the Test Site "ground zero" for a move that could drive the world back into a nuclear arms race.

The DOE announced their plans to begin a controversial series of subcritical nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site. The first of these tests, codename "Rebound," is set for this June. "Holog" has been scheduled for this fall. "Icebound," "Beech," "Ash," and "Boomerang" are now being planned for 1998.

The DOE justifies these experiments as "an essential component of the Department's program for ensuring the safety and reliability of the [nation's nuclear weapons] stockpile." The DOE takes pains to convince critics that subcritical experiments, designed not to produce a nuclear chain reaction, fall within the letter of the recently-signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Clearly, however, these experiments violate the spirit of that hard-won treaty, which bans "all nuclear weapons test explosions" and includes a strong call for disarmament.

The subcritical experiments are designed to produce data that can be plugged into the world's fastest supercomputers, so that

weaponeers can better predict the performance of nuclear weapons. The DOE also states that the subcritical tests will be used for the United States to maintain "the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty." In real terms, then, the subcriticals are for the U.S. to maintain the ability to break out of the test ban. They are part of a multi-billion dollar program to determine - on the backs of taxpayers - what the world has know for five decades: when nuclear weapons "perform," they obliterate cities and kill thousands of people in a split second.

Yesterday, a group of very committed activists did what the Clinton administration seems unable to find the common sense to do: they shut the Nevada Test Site - land still claimed by the Western Shoshone under the terms of the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley, which gave US citizens right of passage but did not actually cede the land to the US government -- and put a temporary end to the nuclear madness that has been taking place there since 1951. Their non-violent human blockade lasted for five hours. The DOE announcement comes as those arrested in yesterday's protest remain in jail for demonstrating the courage of their convictions.

Next week, over 150 nations will gather in New York City to begin a review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which commits the U.S., and other nuclear powers, to "pursue negotiations in good faith toward the goal of nuclear disarmament." These subcritical tests send the very strong message that, despite our signature on this treaty and President Clinton's statement that the test ban "points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced and eliminated," the U.S. believes nuclear weapons are here to stay.

Greenpeace and Shundahai Network: Action for Nuclear Abolition call on Energy Secretary Pena and President Clinton to cancel the subcritical tests and close down nuclear operations at the Nevada Test Site. It is time for the United States to lead the world toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Hall, Greenpeace, or Reinard Knutsen, Shundahai Network at (702) 647 3095; or Deborah Rephan, Greenpeace News Desk at (202) 319 2492.

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## The NPT PrepCom: Documentation On-Line

As part of its Nuclear Futures project, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) will be putting documents from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting (PrepCom) on the BASIC website. The documents will include official speeches and draft texts, as well as analysis and updates of the meeting.

Documents will be found at:

<http://www.igc.apc.org/basic/>

In so far as possible, speeches will appear on the day they are delivered.

For those without web access, documentation will also appear on:

<gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/11/orgs/basic>

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 4, 1997

GREENPEACE & SHUNDAHAI NETWORK: ACTION FOR NUCLEAR ABOLITION

In response to the announcement today by the US Department of Energy confirming the schedule for its so-called "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments, Greenpeace and Shundahai Network: Action for Nuclear Abolition express the following views:

For the past week, activists working to bring about a nuclear weapons-free future have brought their protests to the Nevada nuclear weapons Test Site. Today the US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it will, once again, make the Test Site "ground zero" for a move that could drive the world back into a nuclear arms race.

The DOE announced their plans to begin a controversial series of subcritical nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site. The first of these tests, codename "Rebound," is set for this June. "Holog" has been scheduled for this fall. "Icebound," "Beech," "Ash," and "Boomerang" are now being planned for 1998.

The DOE justifies these experiments as "an essential component of the Department's program for ensuring the safety and reliability of the [nation's nuclear weapons] stockpile." The DOE takes pains to convince critics that subcritical experiments, designed not to produce a nuclear chain reaction, fall within the letter of the recently-signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Clearly, however, these experiments violate the spirit of that hard-won treaty, which bans "all nuclear weapons test explosions" and includes a strong call for disarmament.

The subcritical experiments are designed to produce data that can be plugged into the world's fastest supercomputers, so that weaponeers can better predict the performance of nuclear weapons. The DOE also states that the subcritical tests will be used for the United States to maintain "the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty." In real terms, then, the subcriticals are for the U.S. to maintain the ability to break out of the test ban. They are part of a multi-billion dollar program to determine - on the backs of taxpayers - what the world has known for five decades: when nuclear weapons "perform," they obliterate cities and kill thousands of people in a split second.

Yesterday, a group of very committed activists did what the Clinton administration seems unable to find the common sense to do: they shut the Nevada Test Site - land still claimed by the Western Shoshone under the terms of the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley, which gave US citizens right of passage but did not

actually cede the land to the US government -- and put a temporary end to the nuclear madness that has been taking place there since 1951. Their non-violent human blockade lasted for five hours. The DOE announcement comes as those arrested in yesterday's protest remain in jail for demonstrating the courage of their convictions.

Next week, over 150 nations will gather in New York City to begin a review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which commits the U.S., and other nuclear powers, to "pursue negotiations in good faith toward the goal of nuclear disarmament." These subcritical tests send the very strong message that, despite our signature on this treaty and President Clinton's statement that the test ban "points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced and eliminated," the U.S. believes nuclear weapons are here to stay.

Greenpeace and Shundahai Network: Action for Nuclear Abolition call on Energy Secretary Pena and President Clinton to cancel the subcritical tests and close down nuclear operations at the Nevada Test Site. It is time for the United States to lead the world toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Hall, Greenpeace, or Reinard Knutsen, Shundahai Network at (702) 647 3095; or Deborah Rephan, Greenpeace News Desk at (202) 319 2492.

Greetings, friends. Here are a few useful items for your abolition tool kit. John Burroughs and I will be at the NPT PrepCom in New York for the next two weeks. We'll try to check in by e-mail. Also, messages can be left for us at the WSLF office. -- Jackie Cabasso

San Francisco Examiner, Saturday, March 29, 1997, A-13

William M. Arkin

Ho hum, another new warhead

Washington

THE FIRST new nuclear warhead to reach the Air Force since the end of the Cold War was formally received in February, and not one major newspaper or television network thought the event important enough to report.

The "B61 Mod 11" is a 12-foot bomb that can burrow some 50 feet into the ground before detonating with a blast many thousands of times greater than the largest conventional weapon in the U.S. arsenal.

Nuclear war planners -- yes, they are still busy, despite President Clinton's constant assurances that the threat of nuclear war has disappeared -- claim the "earth penetrator" is needed to destroy Russian command bunkers buried deep underground.

The weapon previously earmarked for this task, the B53, is 6 million times bigger than the B61 Mod 11 in terms of its blast -- the arithmetic is truly stunning -- and so huge that the new B-2 stealth bomber can't easily carry it.

In the "logic" of nuclear war, the new weapon is necessary and an "improvement." In other words, smaller is somehow a moral step forward because fewer Russian citizens will be incinerated if the button is ever pushed.

Though Clinton does not have to grapple with the nuclear nightmare as did his predecessors, the first order of business of his foreign policy team this year has been to coax Russian legislators into ratifying the START II Treaty. This agreement, signed in January 1993, would further reduce strategic nuclear arsenals to some 3,500 warheads.

Moscow has hesitated on this, complaining of the inequities and expenses involved in implementing the mandated reductions.

In the "logic" of nuclear war, Russian nuclear forces are probably more vulnerable to an American first strike than ever before.

However valid this scenario may be, it is in America's interest to alleviate these concerns. Yet, despite our stated primary objective of improving relations with Russia, we are posing a greater nuclear threat to Russian forces and command centers.

How did this happen?

It starts when computer targeting models generated by Strategic Command in Omaha point to a few bunkers that might survive an all-out nuclear attack. The B53 is old and too big to fit into the B-2.

In the bizarre world of nuclear deterrence, a few dozen B61 Mod 11 bombs will "improve" matters. The fact that we can still launch thousands of nuclear warheads to destroy everything else in sight is not enough.

Because the United States does not assemble nuclear weapons from scratch, the B61 Mod 11 is a modification of a B61 already in the arsenal. In fact,

the Department of Energy downplays its significance, telling the trade newspaper Defense News it "is not new, in any way, shape or form."

Many in the arms control community agree. Making too big of a deal about the "new" weapon, they say, might further upset START II ratification and even undermine the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

They are saying keep quiet about a new nuclear weapon so as not to get too many people upset. New or not new, the reality is that the B61 mod 11 represents a mind-set that does U.S. national security more harm than good. Russian naysayers can conclude rightly that their worst-case view is indeed valid.

Clinton authorized the B61 Mod 11 when he signed the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. The connection with larger U.S. interests was never made.

START II ratification was not then considered critical. The otherwise minor program did not seem to signal either aggressive intentions toward Russia or a potential for public outcry.

Now, as agreed reductions founder and disarmament stagnates, nuclear advocates have their first post-Cold War weapon, with the aid of arms controllers who cannot see the forest for the trees.

It is the routine nature of it all that is the most frightening.

----- William M. Arkin, columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is former director of military research at Greenpeace International. At one time an Army intelligence officer and defense analyst, he is co-author of "Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military." This commentary was written for Pacific News Service in San Francisco.

\*\*\*\*\* APO 03/31  
0128 B-2 Bombers Ready for Missions

By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER  
AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Three years after the first plane was delivered to its Missouri base, B-2 stealth bombers will be declared ready this week to take on nuclear and conventional combat missions.

If called upon, one of the strategic bombers' jobs will be to drop an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon designed to destroy underground enemy targets, a senior military officer said last week.

"With the B-2, the deeply buried target killer will come on board," said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Six B-2s will become part of the Pentagon's "nuclear war plan" as of Tuesday, the officer said. Air Force officials declined to comment on the date, saying it was classified.

Thirteen of the huge, bat-winged bombers are stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The Air Force expects to have 21 B-2s in service by early in the next decade.

If the cost of the research, development, procurement and operational support is factored in, each plane carries a \$2.2 billion price tag, according to the publication Defense Week. The B-2 was designed to be able to reach deep into enemy territory to attack heavily defended targets -- and then return safely -- because it is difficult to detect in flight. It has no vertical tail surfaces and its skin absorbs, rather than reflects, radar signals.

The B-2's first flight was in July 1989 and the first bomber entered

service at Whiteman in December 1993.

The aircraft was declared to have reached a "limited" capability for delivering non-nuclear weapons at the beginning of this year.

It takes time for such planes, their crews and logistical support systems to be declared fully ready to take on such missions, explained Robert S. Norris, a military analyst with the Natural Resources Defense Council.

"There is a whole manual of things that have to be done," he said. "The Air Force is very strict about this; they go by the book."

As of Jan. 1, 1998, two more B-2s will be available to take on missions under the nuclear war plan, the senior military officer said.

The earth-penetrating nuclear weapon, known as the B-61 (Mod 11), has been modified to be able to attack buried targets such as command-and-control bunkers or other military-related facilities.

"It's the only capability we have to reach these targets that are buried several hundred feet under ground," the senior officer said.

Several nations, including Libya, Iraq and North Korea, are believed to have burrowed into the earth to protect military sites. The officer noted that the Russians also "have a penchant for burying things underground."

Last year, then-Defense Secretary William Perry raised eyebrows when he asserted that Libya was building a chemical weapons facility inside a mountain near the city of Tarhunah, and warned that a military strike against the alleged plant was an option. But Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak publicly derided that idea, saying Egyptian inspectors have not found such activity at the site.

The less-advanced B-1 bomber is expected to be taken out of the nuclear war plan on Sept. 30, and receive only conventional bombing missions.

Once the B-61 earth-penetrating nuclear bombs come on line with the B-2, the Pentagon will scrap its decades-old B-53 nuclear bombs, the senior officer said.

He declined to disclose exactly how many of the B-61 weapons are in the U.S. arsenal, saying only that "tens" will be available and that "tens" of B-53s will be retired.

Norris said he believed roughly 30 to 50 B-61s are available. At the beginning of the B-2 program in the early 1980s, the Air Force had hoped to build 132 of the aircraft. That number was reduced to 75, and later to 21.

Critics of the planes point to their high cost, but supporters claim the price is worth it given the B-2's 16-bomb payload and the fact it can deliver precision-guided munitions as well as the bunker-busting bombs.

\*\*\*\*\*

Excerpts from  
Statement of C. Paul Robinson, Director Sandia National Laboratories

United States Senate  
Committee on Armed Services  
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

March 19, 1997

B61 Bomb Modification 11

For twenty years we have known that there was a need to replace the B53 thermonuclear bomb with a system equipped with modern surety features. Yet, replacement was repeatedly postponed. Today, I am very pleased to report

that we have begun the replacement of the B53 without designing a new weapon and are bringing the replacement on-line in record time with only a very modest budget.

On November 20, 1996, Modification 11 of the B61 bomb passed its certification flight tests. All electrical and mechanical interfaces performed as expected. In December, four complete retrofit kits were delivered to the Air Force, two weeks ahead of schedule. This delivery met the milestone to support Mod. 11 conversions in the field by a joint DOE/DoD team in January. The B61 Mod. 11 has been accepted as a "limited stockpile item" pending additional tests during 1997.

Work on the B61-11 had been authorized in August 1995, with a requested delivery date of December 31, 1996. This schedule required one of the most efficient development efforts in our laboratory's history. The retrofit involved repackaging the B61-7 into a new, one-piece, earth-penetrating steel case designed by Sandia.

The Mod. 11 will now permit us to retire the B53, which is a 35-year-old weapon, and provide the operational military with a safer, more secure, and flexible system. This program establishes one route to keeping the stockpile modern.

#### Bomb Impact Optimization System (BIOS) Exploratory Program

Sandia is largely responsible to the Department of Energy for all non-nuclear aspects of nuclear bomb design. Building on the success of the B61-11, we are examining changes to other B61 designs to add additional value to these systems for our military customers.

One such effort is the Bomb Impact Optimization System (BIOS) program, in which Sandia is investigating the feasibility of modifying a B61 payload for use in a guided glide bomb for low-altitude release from a B-2 bomber against defended target complexes. This effort includes analysis, design, model fabrication and testing, and ground and flight testing of a functional prototype.

\*\*\*\*\*

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Western States Legal Foundation is part of Abolition 2000,

A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Fri, 04 Apr 1997 09:56:56 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 4 Apr  
>To: nfzpsc@gn.apc.org

>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

>  
>Fri 4 Apr 1997

>  
>97-8395 The damaged Windscale Pile No 1 at Sellafield is now safe  
> enough to tackle, 40 years after Britain's worst nuclear  
> disaster. Simon Holberton reports. FT

>97-8396 UK Gulf war illness inquiry held up `by too few cases', says  
> Surgeon General. DT

>97-8400 Russia develops strain of anthrax that is resistant to all  
> known antibiotics, say defectors. T

>  
>Thurs 3 Apr 1997 - nil -

>  
>  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.

>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.

>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

>  
>  
Stewart Kemp (nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)

\*\*\*\*\*

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\*\*\*\*\*

Oslo, April 5, 1997

Environment, development - and the military

Ahead of the Rio UNCED meeting in 1992 the IPB ran a campaign to have the conference address the military as a central theme for any meaningful discussion of the environment ant development problems. With little success.

Again NPT or disarmament events will concur in time and place, in the UN building in NY for two weeks from April 7, with the CSD 5 session (Commission for Sustainable Development). Whether they are present in NY or staying at home NPT/Peace activists should use the CSD 5/Earth Summit as a splendid occasion to raise and communicate the military sector's decisive importance

for the resolution of environment/development problems.

A year ago our colleagues in the 55-member Norwegian NGO Forum for Environment and Development (where a wide range of sectors cooperate) started to show considerable interest in the perspectives we cultivate in the Forum Working group for peace, environment and development.

One practical result is that a substantial part (one sixth of total) of our recent position paper with requests to the Norwegian Government deals with the relation between peace, military and security.

The paper will be considered by the Norwegian delegation to CSD and UNGASS, the Rio/UNCED + 5 meeting in June 97. I distribute the text in the hope that peace/disarmament forces in other countries can benefit from it - and use it to influence the positions of their own government's delegation to the CSD and Earth Summit + 5 meetings:

#### 4. PEACE, SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

" Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the

environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its future development."

"Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible."

"States shall resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the charter of the United Nations"

Agenda 21, Principles 24-26

The military sector has required and consumed resources, harmed social and economic development, and ruined environment and ecosystems. With an estimated 250 wars with more than 110 million killed, innumerable wounded and approximately 50 million refugees, the 20th century has been the bloodiest in human history. Moreover, in terms of value the goods destroyed and resources consumed in wars and preparations for war exceed any other sector or activity in modern history.

If military resources are not reallocated to promote social and economic and civilian well-being, the aim of sustainable development cannot be reached. The UNCED secretariat has estimated the total costs of implementing Agenda 21 at US\$ 561 billion per year. Despite great problems in financing such indispensable efforts for human survival and security, the world continues to spend over \$700 billion per year on military security, or \$1.4 million per minute (1994).

>From a sustainable development point of view, the military is an unproductive or, rather, counter-productive, sector. About 100 million land mines have been deployed in 69 countries. One mine costs \$3 to make, but \$ 200-1000 to remove and destroy. Land mines kill or wound 500 persons every week. An area of approximately the same size as the Nordic countries (750.000-1500.000 sq. km) is used for military purposes; military planes consume 1/4 of all jet fuel used in the world; the production of one intercontinental missile consumes 4.500 tons of steel, 1.200 tons of concrete, 50 tons of aluminum, 12.5 tons of chrome, 750 kg of titanium, 120 kg of beryllium. During their life cycle weapons generate enormous amounts of toxic chemicals (cyanides, pesticides, PCB phenoles and heavy metals. The US alone generates 400.000-500.000 tons of military toxic waste (nuclear waste not included). Approximately 10% of the area of the former DDR is heavily polluted by the military activities of the former Soviet Union.

Both individual studies and the report of the UN Secretary General, "Critical trends", makes it clear that environmental and resource problems will be a major source of conflict and risk to security in the future. Such factors also play a role in ethnic conflicts and are a type of problem that cannot be resolved with weapons.

\* The Earth Summit + 5 should urge the ECOSOC and the Security Council, and all military alliances of the world, to help strengthen non-military international security efforts in order to reduce armaments and develop capacities for early conflict identification and non-violent resolution, as a prerequisite for sustainable development.

\* The CSD should request all UN member states to investigate the interrelations between investments in the fields of defence and

social and environmental policy.

\* The CSD working program should ensure that the principles of sustainable production and consumption efficiency and sufficiency measures are applied also to the military sector. In consideration of the immense risks posed by the arms culture and armed conflicts, states should start to honour their undertaking of general and complete disarmament in Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Clear targets should be set during the UNGASS, eg. to:

- Reduce military expenditures by 10 % per year in the next 5 years
- Shift resources from defense to sustainable civilian production

- Develop a public peace program resembling the public health program  
- Train for non-violent conflict resolution as a part of school curricula

- Develop community planning to prevent conflicts  
- Reduce the military's land use and ensure that area planning is in accordance with the objectives and principles of Agenda 21, chapter 10

- Develop, with the full participation of major civic groups, indicators to measure progress in this Agenda 21 field

- Ensure that the life cycle of weapons respects the NGO-suggested principles of corporate accountability
- Ban the production, trade, storage and use of antipersonnel landmines.

\* At the UNGASS states should strengthen their commitments to follow up Agenda 21, chapters 19 and 20, goals on toxic chemicals, and make these applicable also to the military sector (as stated in Para. 20.22.h) by:

- Making the Code of conduct and corporate accountability and the "polluter pays" principle applicable also to the military sector

- Concluding a ban on the production of weapons grade fissile materials

- Complying with the 1996 Opinion of the World Court by concluding by year 2000 a treaty for the timebound abolition of nuclear weapons

- Opening all nuclear waste storage sites to inspection
- Ensuring safe management of nuclear materials
- Undertaking a thorough study of the effects of the nuclear and

chemical arms races on the health and environment of indigenous populations and how to secure adequate repair and compensation for damage done to these peoples and their land.

Dear Friends,

The public relations firm which GRACE hired to do the poll for Abolition 2000 on US public opinion on nuclear policy suggested that we follow up the release of the poll with letters to the editor and op-ed pieces. Listed below is a letter to the editor which I wrote today that incorporates some of the poll data with the very sad and outrageous news that Clinton is planning to blow up explosives and plutonium in two "sub-critical" tests this year, with 4 more in 1998 and others planned in 1999. I hope you will all adapt this to your own papers and communities and let them know the government is out of touch with the people who want to put an end to nuclear weapons. Thanks for your help. If you haven't already received the complete DOE announcement with their b---s--- explanation of how the tests don't violate the CTB!?!?! (including special news of the jumpin' Jasons who gave it their imprimatur of good housekeeping with dire dreadful Drell and Dr. Strangelove Garwin) it was posted by Kathy Crandall at <disarmament@igc.apc.org>  
Here's my letter--I hope you'll do one too. Alice Slater

PS: If you need more info about the poll than that which was posted to you on April 2nd and 3rd, please let me know. We had a very good press conference in Washington, and the grassroots turn out was gratifying. Karina Woods of Peace Action (panukes@igc.apc.org) is coordinating an effort to get the poll around to Congress with sunflowers. An adaptation of the press release you all received was distributed by the American Friends Service Committee to every member of Congress on Friday, April 4th, calling for hearings on nuclear policy in light of overwhelming American public opinion in favor of abolition and negotiation of a treaty, and also asking the members of Congress to contact Clinton and ask him to change his policy.

April 5, 1997

Editor, New York Times  
BY FAX: 556-3622

Dear Editor,

It is painfully ironic that on the very day you prominently report that President Clinton has launched a full-scale effort to ratify a treaty banning the use of deadly chemical weapons, (April 5th) , a much smaller article notes that Clinton plans to conduct two sub-critical nuclear tests this year, 1000 feet beneath the desert at the Nevada test site. With a ban on biological weapons in place since 1975, and a chemical weapons ban nearing ratification in the Senate, it makes no sense that our government is unwilling to ban the third and most lethal arm of the triad of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons.

A substantial majority of Americans – 84 % -- responded that they feel unsafe with the nuclear status quo in a nationwide survey of over 1000 Americans released on April 3rd by Abolition 2000, an international network of 700 organizations working to eliminate nuclear weapons. The respondents polled answered that they would feel safer in a world in which no country,

including the US, has nuclear weapons . Americans no longer see any reason for maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons. They support-by a nine to one margin - or 87% - an international treaty to eliminate nuclear arms according to the Lake Sosin Snell & Associates poll results.

The nations of the world convene at the UN on April 7th at a meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference to review the progress made by the nuclear powers to live up to their Non-Proliferation Treaty promises to make good faith efforts to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. It is shockingly insensitive and arrogant for our government to announce, only three days before the UN meeting, that yet another round of lethally toxic tests are planned at the devastated Nevada test site.

Statements by some of our most distinguished military leaders that the continued possession of nuclear weapons is a stimulus to other nations to acquire them, coupled with the new data on American public opinion, should be a signal to the Clinton administration to cancel the sub-critical tests and begin negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, just as we have done for biological and chemical weapons. Our leaders are out of touch with the people and their own military experts. It time to end this final chapter of the cold war.

Sincerely,

Alice Slater

Alice Slater  
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Dear friends,

IEER, INESAP and WSLF are holding jointly a Symposium on April 11 in the UN Headquarters. We hope to attract delegations to the NPT PrepCom as well as participants of the many NGOs which will be in New York for the next two weeks.

Please find attached the program and list of speakers.

Best regards,  
Martin

The Road to a Nuclear Weapons Free World:  
Treaties, Materials, and Verification Issues

IEER/INESAP/WSLF Symposium

New York City, UN Headquarters, April 11, 1997, 9 a.m.-7 p.m.

Morning Session

- 9:00 - 9:15 Welcome and Introduction - Jackie Cabasso
- 9:15 - 9:30 Making existing and proposed treaties work for nuclear disarmament - Arjun Makhijani
- 9:30 - 9:45 Discussion

Role of existing and new treaties in nuclear disarmament

- 9:45 - 10:45 Panel: Discussion of existing and proposed treaties
  - CTBT - Suren Gadekar
  - NPT - Zia Mian
  - START (all three) and ABM treaties - Alla Yaroshinskaya (asked)
  - Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - Nigel Chamberlain
- 10:45 - 11:15 Discussion

11:15 - 11:40 Break

- 11:40 - 12:10 Keynote address: India's potential role in achieving total nuclear disarmament - Bhabani Sen Gupta (asked)
- 12:10 - 12:30 Discussion

- 12:30 - 2:30 Lunch session (on invitation by IEER):  
Natalia Mironova: The need for international and national NGOs to coordinate their work with grassroots groups, followed by informal discussion

Afternoon Session

Role of nuclear material control and disposition in disarmament

- 2:30 - 3:00 Panel on military nuclear-weapon-usable materials

- Disposition of Russian plutonium excess and US-Russia collaboration on nuclear weapons-usable materials production and stockpiles - Anatoli Diakov
- Interrelations of tritium production and nuclear disarmament - Martin Kalinowski

3:00 - 3:30 Discussion

3:30 - 4:00 Panel civilian/military connections

- The relation of further spread of civilian nuclear power and proliferation risks from an Asian perspective - Yu-Mi Mun
- Disposition options for military origin fissile materials - Ed Lyman

4:00-4:30 Discussion

4:30 - 5:00 Break

New venue: Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium  
Steps towards a NWFW and their verification

5:00 - 5:45 Panel on nuclear materials

- Changing requirements for safeguards in shifting from a non-proliferation to a NWFW regime - Martin Kalinowski
- Verifying warhead dismantlement and released materials - Ted Taylor
- Safeguards on geologic repositories - Johan Swahn

5:45 - 6:00 Discussion

6:00 - 6:30 Panel on nuclear weapons development

- Policies regarding no new weapons development as well as existing weapons designs and knowledge - Greg Mello
- Prohibitions on laboratory testing - Andrew Lichterman and Jackie Cabasso

6:30 - 7:00 Discussion

7:00 Adjourn

This Symposium is jointly organized by

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The Road to a Nuclear Weapons Free World:  
Treaties, Materials, and Verification Issues

List of speakers of the IEER/INESAP/WSLF Symposium

Jacqueline Cabasso  
is the Executive Director of the Western States Legal  
Foundation.

Nigel Chamberlain  
is a campaigner with the Cumbria and Northern Region chapter  
of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Prof. Anatoli Diakov  
is director of the Center for Arms Control and Environmental  
Studies in Moscow. Currently he is visiting research fellow at  
the Princeton Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. He  
is member of the Coordinating Committee of INESAP.

Dr. Suren Gadekar  
edits "Anumukti: A Journal Devoted to Non-Nuclear India," and  
works at the Institute for Total Revolution, a Gandhian institute  
located in the tribal village of Vedchhi, Gujarat.

Dr. Martin Kalinowski  
is a nuclear physicist working as research fellow with IANUS at  
the Technical University Darmstadt. He is member of the  
Coordinating Committee of INESAP.

Prof. Andrew Lichterman  
is assistant professor of law at the John F. Kennedy University  
Law School in California and a pro bono attorney for Western  
States Legal Foundation.

Dr. Ed Lyman  
is scientific director of the Nuclear Control Institute in  
Washington, DC.

Dr. Arjun Makhijani  
is president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental

Research in Takoma Park, Maryland. He authored and co-authored numerous studies and books on nuclear-weapons-related issues.

Greg Mello

is director of the Los Alamos Study Group. He is a hydrogeologist and engineer.

Dr. Zia Mian

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Natalia Mironova

is the chairman of the Movement for Nuclear Safety in Chelyabinsk, Russia

Yu-Mi Mun

is a campaigner working with the Korean Federation of Environmental Movement, currently she is studying energy policy at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (EEP) at the University of Delaware.

Bhabani Sen Gupta

is advisor to the Indian Minister for External Affairs on disarmament issues. He is currently founding an Indian NGO Coalition for disarmament.

Dr. Johan Swahn

is currently visiting research fellow at the Center for Energy and Environment Studies, Princeton University; he has a position as Assistant Professor at the Institute of Physical Resource Theory, Chalmers University of Technology in Goeteborg, Sweden. He is member of the Coordinating Committee of INESAP.

Dr. Ted Taylor

is a former Los Alamos nuclear weapons designer and currently a visiting research fellow at the Princeton Center for Energy and Environmental Studies.

Alla A. Yaroshinskaya

won the Right Livelihood Award in 1992 for her work on Chernobyl. She is advisor to the President of the Russian Federation and Secretary of the Journalist Union of the Russian Federation and President of the Charitable Fund.

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Welcome to the abolition-caucus mailing list!

If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo@igc.org" with the following command in the body of your email message:

```
unsubscribe abolition-caucus
```

If you try to unsubscribe from this mailing list, and your request is rejected, then send mail again to "Majordomo@igc.org" with the following command in the body of your email message:

```
unsubscribe abolition-caucus mupj@igc.apc.org
```

Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it:

[Last updated on: Tue Oct 1 6:58:01 1996]

WELCOME to the Abolition-Caucus list server of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons!

The following commands may be used by sending them in the body of a message addressed to 'Majordomo@igc.apc.org':

```
subscribe abolition-caucus <address>
unsubscribe abolition-caucus <address>
who abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org
info abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org
help
```

This list is 'open' meaning that anyone can subscribe themselves.

A word of caution: as e-mail becomes increasingly popular, many users are experiencing 'e-mail fatigue' from the amount of mail, list server, and conference messages. Also, in some countries, messages are billed by the number of characters received, which can make e-mail prohibitively expensive for some. Therefore, please keep messages as short as possible and avoid duplicating information from other conferences.

For other questions regarding the abolition-caucus list server, contact the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St., Cambridge, MA, USA 02142-1096  
Phone: (617)868-5050  
Fax: (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org  
<http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW/IPPNW.html>

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BACKGROUND:

In April 1995, during the first weeks of the NonProliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, activists from around the world recognized that the issue of nuclear abolition was not on the agenda. Activists met together to write the following statement that has become the founding document of the Abolition 2000 Network. Over 600 NGOs on six continents have now signed it and are actively working in ten working groups to accomplish the eleven points listed here. To sign on to this statement please send a fax or email stating the contact name, organization name, address, fax, telephone and email to: Pamela Meidell, Facilitator, Abolition 2000 Global Network Office, P.O. Box 220, Port Hueneme, CA 93044 USA; tel: +1 805/985 5073, fax: +1 805/985 7563, email: pmeidell@igc.apc.org OR if you are in Africa, the Middle East or Europe: Xanthe Hall, IPPNW Germany, Krtestrae 10, Berlin, D-10967, Germany; fax:+49 30 693 8166, email: ippnw@oln.comlink.de

#### STATEMENT:

A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.

Further, the inextricable link between the "peaceful" and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true "inalienable" right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.

We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.

We call upon all states -- particularly the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto -- to take the following steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:

- 1) Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.\*
- 2) Immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

- 3) Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.
- 4) Cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems.
- 5) Prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
- 6) Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.
- 7) Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring, and close all nuclear test sites.
- 8) Create additional nuclear weapons free zones such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga.
- 9) Recognize and declare the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.
- 10) Establish an international energy agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.
- 11) Create mechanisms to ensure the participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition.

A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.

\* The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapons-usable radioactive materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate the measures listed above which should be implemented independently without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT.

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Abolition 2000 Signup Form (Please feel free to reproduce and distribute).

Abolition 2000  
A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

"Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil will insure peace for future generations."

--U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry on June 4, 1996, the day Ukraine officially gave up its nuclear weapons. Russian and Ukrainian defense secretaries joined him in a ceremony planting sunflowers on a former missile silo.

The following organization endorses the Abolition 2000 Statement:

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact

Person: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_ Fax: \_\_\_\_\_ Email: \_\_\_\_\_

We enclose \_\_\_\_\_ (indicate amount here in your national currency) for Network Support. Please make checks or drafts payable to The Atomic Mirror/Abolition 2000 or transfer money directly to account no. 09384 33840 (the Atomic Mirror/Abolition 2000 account) at the Bank of America (bank code 510 000 655).

We would like to participate in/receive more information about the following WorkingGroup/s: \_\_\_\_\_