

SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS -

JASON STUDY

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REPORT DATE: March 6, 1997

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1.1)

The authors, a subgroup of JASON, reviewed the first two sub-critical experiments (SCEs) now planned, called Holog and Rebound, to be performed underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). We conclude that:

- a. They will add valuable scientific information for understanding physical properties of Plutonium (Pu) under conditions relevant to the performance of primaries of nuclear weapons.
- b. For these particular experiments, no conceivable scenario will lead to criticality. Therefore these experiments are consistent with the provisions of the CTBT signed by President Clinton on September 24, 1996.
- c. While the peer review process was adequate for these two tests, we are not satisfied that the process is adequate as a model for future experiments.

While there is no question that US stockpile nuclear weapons would function today as designed, there are gaps in the scientific understanding of their performance. The Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SBSSMP) is charged to fill these gaps through "programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends."

A program of SCEs in SBSSMP properly inter-relates with other experiments, diagnostic studies, and simulations. Our subgroup did not review Holog and Rebound in this broad context. The nature of these particular tests makes the analysis of their potential criticality and containments straightforward. However, as part of our charge to examine the peer review process, we recognized that future SCEs could pose more complex questions. This led us to discuss issues that need to be addressed in developing the broader scientific program of SCEs and we comment

on them in this report. Several important questions to be answered in developing program plans are the following:

- a. What data will be valuable for retaining confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of the enduring stockpile? More specifically, wet gaps should be filled in our present knowledge of the equation of state, constitutive relations, surface properties, ejecta, spall effects, and phase changes of Pu under conditions of an explosion in order to improve predictions of the performance of a bomb primary?
- b. If material changes due to radiation and possible corrosion are seen in aging bombs in the stockpile, what additional data relevant to the properties and behavior of the boost cavity during the primary implosion are required?
- c. What data and understanding of physical properties of Pu relevant to weapon performance are required for predicting possible performance differences of new primaries that are manufactured by various methods of production?

The answers to such questions will provide guidance for developing an efficient, cost effective, and environmentally safe program of SCEs, some of which may be better performed above ground or at sites other than NTS.

RELEVANCE OF HOLOG & REBOUND (1.2)

Holog and Rebound are the first two proposed SCEs and the only ones that we reviewed. Both experiments will be performed underground at the U1A (formerly LYNER) facility at NTS. These two experiments involve limited quantities of plutonium and high-explosives in distributed configurations. They utilize well established techniques of materials science experiments. While we will continue to label these experiments as subcritical, in keeping with accepted use, we note that they are not weapons tests at all, but weapons-related physics tests in which the nuclear properties of plutonium play no role.

In Holog there are two explosive-driven configurations with point initiation, designed to characterize ejecta production from shocked Pu in a flat plate geometry. Holographic measurements will be made of the size distribution and of the velocity vs. size correlation of the emerging particles. One configuration will use close to 50 grams of high explosive to shock a flat plate target with an aggregate of 77.5 grams of plutonium on the surface. The other will use involve 50 grams of high explosive to shock a flat plate with 50 grams on the surface.

The Rebound configuration uses high-explosive driven flyer plates to generate planar-shock waves in an array of coin-sized samples

of plutonium. The goal of these measurements is to obtain data over a range of high pressures as input for more accurate determination of the Pu equation of state. There will be three separate experimental stands. For the high pressure studies, 462 grams of Pu will be shocked by a metal flyer plate driven by 81 pounds of high explosive to create a maximum pressure of 2.3 megabars (Mbars); the corresponding numbers for medium pressure studies are 424 grams of Pu, 51 pounds generating 1.7 Mbars peak; and for low pressure studies, 589 grams of Pu, 28 pounds generating 0.8 Mbars.

There is no claim that the data from these experiments are needed immediately as part of the SBSSMP in order to retain confidence in the reliability and performance of the U.S. stockpile, but they are sensible ones to start with and there is merit in initiating them at existing facilities. The experience gained will help guide the future SBSSMP SC program.

PROGRAM ASPECTS (1.3)

In developing a program of SCEs over the long term, it will be important to identify and focus on those measurements critical to a successful stewardship program under a CTBT. The subcritical tests should be carried out within the context of a broader program including static and dynamic experiments above ground. It is only the basis of numerous laboratory (above-ground) experiments investigating the material properties of a wide variety of analog materials, as well as static experiments on Pu, that the sub-critical experiments can be properly formulated and analyzed. A combination of laboratory experiments and materials theory must play a crucial role in supporting a program of science-based stewardship.

The scientific motivation for underground experiments is to examine the dynamic properties of Pu-containing sample assemblies. However, Pu can be studied over a significant portion of the appropriate pressure-temperature range in conventional static experiments, above ground. For thermodynamic properties, the static and dynamic results should be in close agreement; the two experimental approaches offer a means of independently validating the results. Because static experiments are far easier to perform than explosive-driven subcritical tests (with turn-around time of hours to days, rather than several weeks or months), there is much to be learned from experiments above ground, including determinations of phase diagrams (solid-solid and melting), equations of state and strength over a wide - and relevant - range of pressures and temperatures. The greater pace of laboratory experiments allows for quicker response to experimental findings.

Current regulations dictate that Holog and Rebound be performed at NTS. Possible changes in the rules imposed by regulatory authorities may affect how and where future SC's are performed. For example, events involving the NTS at the local level, or of

international agreements requiring full transparency of experimental facilities may make experiments at the NTS impossible. The stewardship program should be prepared for such changes of the rules and design a facility for above-ground subcritical experiments that could be built and put into operation, without undue delay.

We recommend that containment designs and processes be explored to reduce the cost of experiments and to provide more flexibility, subject to analysis of their safety and determination of their sub-critical nature. In this context, it is in the possibility of forming jets, such as are produced by shaped in non-planar geometries, that increase the cost of containment and the difficulty of doing above ground experiments. Nevertheless, the advantages of above-ground facilities are great and planning and design should go forward to make them available, should they be permitted.

To the degree that there is concern about relating static and dynamic measurements, for example of the strength or other time-dependent mechanical properties, it is profitable to examine a variety of Pu analog materials under both static and dynamic conditions. Though more demanding than the static experiments, above-ground dynamic experiments are logistically far easier to perform than underground tests, and have much shorter turn-around times. They are essential for developing a fundamental understanding of relevant material properties at a robust enough level to allow detailed simulation.

A broad understanding of material properties is required to address problems associated with either "aging," or surface preparation, and texture need to be studied in a variety of materials in order to be reliably understood, for example via micromechanical models (e.g., atomistic and continuum models of defects). Similarly, radiation effects of aging can be examined in analog materials. As aging can involve the creation of new phases or compounds (e.g., through corrosion), there is a strong incentive for pursuing experiments on a wide variety of materials other than Pu.

Materials theory plays a crucial role in bolstering confidence in simulations. A basic understanding of the underlying process is desirable, especially for simulations under new conditions. For example, it is necessary to develop quantitative models of radiation damage and corrosion if the effects of aging are to be reliably understood. A hierarchy of theoretical models, from ab-initio quantum theory to semi-empirical statistical mechanics (e.g., lattice dynamics and molecular dynamics) and micromechanics (e.g., atomistic and continuum) can, in principle, address this problem. Theoretical approaches require a basis for experiments on a wide variety of materials examined over a broad range of pressures and temperatures.

The three weapons labs have substantial expertise in condensed matter theory and materials science, and in associated computational simulation. Theory and simulation cannot obviate experiment in the foreseeable future, but they provide a framework within which to lay out an experimental strategy, and help to understand experimental results. Moreover, the ASCI program can be expected to enhance and deepen expertise in simulation over the coming years.

The value of integrating above-ground experiments and theory on the one hand, with the subcritical experiments on the other, is twofold. First, the diversity of approaches used and materials studied provide an important check on the reliability of results that are used as input for simulations: static and dynamic experiments should agree with each other when interpreted by theory; and it is important to understand why the results for different materials do or do not agree with each other. Second, because the objective is to have a robust understanding of material properties, experiments should be designed to test specific scientific questions.

Each subcritical experiment should answer specific questions that cannot be resolved by theory and above-ground experiments. The approach can be outlined in terms of matrix designating studies of increasing difficulty, hence decreasing frequency.

Samples: Difficulty >>>

	Non-Pu		Pu
Difficulty	THEORY	+	+
	EXPERIMENTS		
	Static(lab)	+	+
	Dynamic(lab)	+	-
	Underground	-	+

Studies not involving special problems are indicated by "+". Those that do re indicated by "-": above-ground dynamic experiments on Pu face major regulatory hurdles , whereas underground experiment on non-Pu targets are generally not cost effective. A combination of dynamic laboratory experiments on analog materials and static experiments on both Pu and analog

materials should be used to refine the issues that can only be resolved by subcritical experiments. Support of static and dynamic laboratory experiments with a small fraction of the effort put into subcritical experiments would yield a major increment in basic understanding, and hence reliability of simulation.

PEER REVIEW OF CRITICALITY (1.4)

We are satisfied, on the basis of evidence presented to us that the experiments Holog and Rebound cannot result in the assembly of a critical configuration of Pu. The peer review of the Livermore experiment, Holog, by a Los Alamos expert and of the Los Alamos experiment, Rebound, by a Livermore expert added to our confidence in safety of these experiments. Although the process was adequate for these two tests, we are not satisfied that it is unambiguous and strict enough to handle future experiments which may come closer to the margin of criticality. The review process consisted of theoretical calculations of criticality of extreme configurations that are "obviously" closer to critical than any configurations that could arise in the course of the experiment that might go awry. The calculated configurations were found to be subcritical by a comfortably wide margin, and that was the end of the peer-review process.

This process is vulnerable to the criticism on two counts: (1) No discussion was presented on the limits of error of the theoretical calculations. (2) No analysis was presented of possible ways in which specific experiments could go awry. It is not obvious "a priori" that with a limited quantity of explosive the most dangerous configuration necessarily has all the Pu lumped together. It would be helpful to apply to this peer review process methods used in modern risk-based safety analyses. We recommend that, in future peer-review of subcritical experiments, various kinds of "maximum credible accidents" should be defined and analyzed in detail.

As requested, we assessed the process of peer-review only in the narrow context of assuring the subcriticality of experiments. In a wider context, an independent review process should also address the scientific importance and cost-effectiveness of SCEs. By this process, inconsequential and redundant experiments could be discouraged, time and money could be saved, and the focus of the stewardship program could be sharpened.

DIAGNOSTICS AND CREDIBILITY (1.5)

The diagnostics of Holog will include three separate detectors that can place an upper limit on any unexpected nuclear yield, on the order of 1 mg HE-equivalent (or 1 nanoton). This limit appears to be the smallest yield that can be reliably measured with reasonable effort given the current states of the art. these detectors are well conceived, will add to the assurance that no unplanned nuclear processes occur, and should be included

impossible future subcritical experiments. We look forward to reviewing results from them after this experiment. Detectors such as these may provide enhanced future transparency of treaty compliance, and should be located outside the containment barrier.

The planned detectors will be sensitive to prompt fission neutrons produced in (n, γ) reactions, and delayed γ 's arising from decay of fission products. They are within the state of the art and well chosen. It would be wise to carry out quantitative analyses on two fronts. First, it would be good to document the sensitivity of the detection system, i.e., to determine the energy release threshold for detection. Second, an analysis should be carried out concerning the possibility of false positive signals. Given the redundancy of detectors, we have no reason to think that false positives will pose a real problem, but the threshold of tolerability of false signals is likely to be low in a cooperative verification regime.

The CTBT, in accord with its negotiating record, forbids explosions that produce any nuclear yield. The U.S. interprets this to mean that experiments in which conventional high explosives assemble a critical mass of fissionable material are prohibited. However, it is difficult to measure the criticality of a briefly assembled, barely critical mass, as any self-generated nuclear energy will be many orders of magnitude less than the yield figure of 1 mg. Therefore any feasible diagnostic measuring the actual degree of subcriticality would require an external source of neutrons. In the current state of the art, a direct criticality measurement is not impossible but it is fraught with difficulty; it would require irradiation of the sample by a strong external neutron source during the experiment. This would seriously interfere with other diagnostics, and could possibly produce a false positive measurement. We therefore believe that the omission of a criticality measurement on these two experiments is the correct choice.

Las Vegas Review Journal
Saturday, April 05, 1997
Nuclear material tests planned

By Keith Rogers
Review-Journal

Stirring up controversy among anti-nuclear activists, the Department of Energy announced Friday it will proceed with the first two in a series of below-ground nuclear materials experiments at the Nevada Test Site.

The experiments, known as subcritical or zero-yield, will use chemical explosives to shock and compress plate-shaped discs of weapons-grade plutonium. The detonations will occur in June and in the fall and will stop short of erupting into nuclear chain reactions, agency officials said in an hour-long teleconference from Washington, D.C.

"The experiments are fully consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We took great pain to explain the nature of these experiments throughout the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations," said Joan Rohlfing, a special assistant for national security at the Energy Department.

Rohlfing and Robin Staffin, deputy secretary for research and development for the agency's defense programs, said the experiments are essential for maintaining confidence in the reliability of the stockpile as it ages, although no problems with U.S. nuclear bombs exist.

About 200 anti-nuclear activists have been protesting at the test site since Sunday, when 66 protesters were arrested and cited for trespassing. Protesters, in part, have focused on the upcoming tests.

Preparations for the experiments began in 1995 but the first two -- Rebound, an experiment by the Los Alamos, N.M., national laboratory, and Holog, by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California -- had been delayed because the test site's impact statement had not been completed and there were questions about foreign "transparency," or on-site verification of the experiments to ensure they are not full-scale nuclear tests.

The experiments will cost as much as \$15 million each, according to an agency spokesman in Las Vegas.

Full-scale U.S. nuclear tests have been put on hold indefinitely since the government began observing a moratorium in 1992, but a directive by President Clinton requires the test site, 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, to maintain a state of readiness to resume tests should the need arise.

Rohlfing said Russian and Chinese officials are being kept abreast of the experiments but no dates for them were announced.

"We notified both governments of our intention to conduct these experiments. As we get closer to the date, then we would communicate that information as well," she said.

Staffin said Rebound, scheduled for June, will use three plutonium plates, each about the diameter of a 50-cent piece and weighing about a pound. Scientists have named the three plutonium charges after the Three Stooges -- Larry, Moe and Curly.

The second experiment, Holog, set for the fall, will use high-level explosives to detonate 2 and 3 ounces of plutonium, he said.

In announcing the experiments, Energy Secretary Federico Pena said they are "essential to our commitments to a world free of nuclear testing and a reliable nuclear deterrent."

He said they are "fully consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

Anti-nuclear activists reacted bitterly to the announcement, saying the experiments will compromise ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was signed by United Nations countries last year.

They said the clandestine nature of the experiments, with no foreign observers and with the detonations occurring in caverns off tunnels at the bottom of a 926-foot shaft, raises questions about the United States' sincerity regarding Article Six of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The article commits the world's nuclear powers to pursue negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.

Bruce Hall of the anti-nuclear Greenpeace disarmament campaign, said, "The timing of this announcement is horrible."

"Next week over a hundred countries are coming to New York to discuss the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the U.S. has signed. To make this announcement right before the conference (sends) a message that our nuclear weapons are here to stay and we still think about fighting nuclear war."

Rick Nielsen, executive director of Citizen Alert, a statewide environmental group, said, "It's astonishing that with the budget carte blanche that defense and weapons programs have historically enjoyed that now we have a supposed need to conduct these tests because of a lack of data."

"This is absurd. We've been testing and blowing them up for more than 40 years (in Nevada) and now there's no data. It's almost too hard to believe," Nielsen said.

Daryl Kimball, a nuclear weapons policy expert for the Physicians for Social Responsibility, said the Jason Panel -- a group of independent scientists that released a report this week advising the Department of Energy about the experiments -- did not say the experiments are essential or must be conducted this year.

"The dubious technical benefits are outweighed by the non-proliferation costs," Kimball said. "This could make verification of the test ban more difficult because it might set a precedent that other countries might emulate."

The Jason Report claims the experiments will add valuable scientific information about plutonium, but, it said, "We are not satisfied that the (peer review) process is adequate as a model for future experiments."

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse
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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY AND NOTE TO GROUPS:

THIS LETTER WITH THE BELOW-LISTED ORGANIZATIONS WAS HAND DELIVERED TO ENERGY SECRETARY FEDERICO PENA ON FRIDAY 4/4/97 BY MILITARY PRODUCTION NETWORK PROGRAM DIRECTOR MAUREEN ELDREDGE.

SEVERAL GROUPS WHO ARE NOT MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF MPN HAVE SINCE INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THE LETTER AND ASKED TO SIGN-ON. THEREFORE, WE HAVE DECIDED TO OPEN THE LETTER TO ADDITIONAL GROUP SIGN-ONS, AND WE WILL RE-SEND IT WITH ALL THE ORGANIZATIONS LISTED AT THE END OF THIS WEEK.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE GOVERNMENT'S TEN YEAR PLANNING PROCESS PUT FORWARD UNDER DOE'S AL ALM IS THREATENING TRUE CLEANUP AND GOOD PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, PLEASE CALL MARYLIA KELLEY AT (510) 443-7148--OR CALL ANY OF THE THREE PHONE NUMBERS LISTED IN THE BODY OF THE LETTER.

IN ORDER FOR THIS TO HAVE ADDITIONAL IMPACT, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THERE TO BE A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED NUMBER OF GROUPS FROM AROUND THE COUNTRY. PLEASE CONSIDER BECOMING A SIGNER.

TO SIGN-ON, SEND YOUR NAME AS A CONTACT AND YOUR ORGANIZATION'S NAME AND LOCATION TO <marylia@igc.apc.org> or fax same to (510) 443-0177. THANKS.
--MARYLIA

April 4, 1997

Secretary Federico Pena
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Secretary Pena:

As citizens living with the legacy of nuclear weapons production, we are deeply concerned about the current direction of the Department of Energy's Environmental Program (EM), as being implemented by the Assistant Secretary for EM, Mr. Alvin Alm.

A key tenet for achieving success in cleaning up the Cold War legacy is the vital role the public must play in making decisions that will affect our health and well being for generations to come. The Department of Energy has a long and troubled relationship with our communities, based on a fundamental disregard for our protection and operations cloaked for decades in a veil of secrecy. The credibility of the agency has been very low, and mistrust of DOE actions colors many of our dealings with the Department. Over the past four years, DOE has made progress in the areas of openness and stakeholder involvement regarding EM policies and decisions, by developing respect for community and public interest voices. Unfortunately, this progress has come to a grinding halt under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Al Alm, and has even reversed itself.

With the advent of Assistant Secretary Alm's Ten Year Plan, we have seen a return to limited public involvement, short deadlines, sporadic and

inconsistent release of important documents and information, obscured budget justifications, and the re-emergence of the Decide-Announce-Defend model which more frequently than not proved disastrous in our communities. A perception continues at the Department that stakeholder involvement means holding a meeting AFTER documents have been prepared, with minimal opportunity to provide substantive comments or make real changes. Blanket statements in various documents that the Ten Year Plan "has been developed with full stakeholder collaboration" simply do not reflect the truth. Citizen groups and members of DOE advisory boards (Fernald, Hanford, Rocky Flats, Oak Ridge, Sandia, Pantex), have not received documents in a timely fashion, if at all. If members of DOE's own advisory boards cannot get documents, then the general public has little hope of contributing meaningfully to a process that could not only affect them and their children for decades, but also result in violation of compliance agreements and continue the degradation of our environment.

Despite frequent meetings with Assistant Secretary Alm to address these issues, and repeated assurances that DOE is committed to stakeholder involvement in the cleanup program, we have seen little change in program implementation. Few substantive changes have been made in response to comments, and recommendations from citizen advisory boards have been ignored. There is growing evidence that the EM program, under Assistant Secretary Alm, simply does not understand that meaningful public participation requires more than meetings. True public involvement involves listening to input and making programmatic changes. Furthermore, it appears that headquarters instructions to the field are frequently ignored and promises made by the Assistant Secretary are not carried out by his staff and/or field organization. Management of the EM program is extremely difficult and requires strong, consistent oversight which currently appears to be lacking.

The issues that the Environmental Management program must address are numerous and challenging. While there has been movement ahead in many aspects of the cleanup program, little progress has been made in reaching national level consensus on key issues. One such example is the debate surrounding nuclear waste and transfers between sites. In our view, Assistant Secretary Alm has underestimated the importance of consistently and regularly involving stakeholders and regulatory agencies in the resolution of such contentious issues. Problems of such magnitude cannot be resolved within one plan or one set of public meetings.

We held on to the hope that, if Under Secretary Grumbly remained at DOE, the problems in the EM program would be dealt with, and public participation and openness would again be a centerpiece of DOE's decision-making process. However, with Under Secretary Grumbly's departure, we are faced with a dismal reality that DOE has slid back to the Cold War era of end-runs around the public in its decision-making process.

Based upon our extensive experience with the EM program, we have reason to question Assistant Secretary Alm's record in managing this program thus far. We request that you evaluate whether Mr. Alm can successfully fulfill the mission of the EM program and create a program that is based on public involvement and has community support. We have lived too long with the nuclear nightmare to allow DOE to effectively exclude the public from its

decision-making, whether because of inaction, poor management, or bureaucratic inertia. We will continue to demand more accountability by DOE and more involvement by the public.

This is an urgent issue, and we hope that you will address our concerns immediately. Millions of dollars are spent daily, and the radiation hazards remain. We await your response. If you have further questions, please contact Lisa Crawford, Fernald Residents for Environmental Safety and Health (513-738-1688), Tom Marshall, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center (303-444-6981), or Maureen Eldredge, Military Production Network (202-833-4668).

Sincerely,

American Friends Service Committee, Denver, CO
Byron Plumely

Citizen Alert, NV
Rick Nielsen

Coalition for Health Concern, KY
Ronald Lamb

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, NM
Jay Coghlan

Environmental Defense Institute, ID
Chuck Brocius

Fernald Residents for Environmental Safety and Health, OH
Lisa Crawford

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment, NY
Alice Slater

Hanford Education Action League, WA
Lynne Stembridge

Los Alamos Study Group, NM
Greg Mello

Miamisburg Environmental Safety and Health, OH
Sharon Cowdrey

Nashville Peace Action, TN
C.R. Cheney

Neighbors in Need, OH
Velma Shearer

Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, TN
Ralph Hutchison

Panhandle Area Neighbors and Landowners, TX

Doris Smith

Peace Action, National Office
Gordon Clark

Peace Farm, TX
Mavis Belisle

Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security, OH
Vina Colley

Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, CO
Tom Marshall

Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumps, TX
Beverly Gattis

Snake River Alliance, ID
Beatrice Brailsford

Southwest Research and Information Center, NM
Don Hancock

Tri-Valley Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment, CA
Marylia Kelley

Western States Legal Foundation, CA
Jacqueline Cabasso

CONSIDER ADDING YOUR GROUP'S NAME HERE.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP TO SUPPORT GOOD PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CLEANUP
DECISION-MAKING.

Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley CAREs * 5720 East Ave. #116 * Livermore, CA 94550
Ph: (510) 443-7148 * Fx: (510) 443-0177

>Date: 03 Apr 97 08:40:26 -0800
>Reply-To: larry@salata.com
>Sender: owner-nukenet@envirolink.org
>Precedence: bulk
>From: larry@salata.com (Larry Fletcher)
>To: NUKENET@envirolink.org
>Subject: Suit Against Nuke Fusion Facility

>
> SUIT TARGETS NEW NUCLEAR FUSION FACILITY
>

> Posted to the web: Mon Mar 31 21:23:38 EST 1997

> LIVERMORE, California, Mar. 31, 1997 (ENS) - Organizations
> representing communities near nuclear weapons sites across America
> have formally notified Energy Secretary Federico Pena that they intend
> to reopen a lawsuit settled in their favor, because the Department of
> Energy (DOE) has failed to comply with the judge's ruling. The 29
> groups will ask a federal judge to halt construction plans for the new
> National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's largest laser. The NIF
> will induce a fusion reaction, simulating reactions in the explosion
> of thermonuclear warheads.

> The original lawsuit was settled in 1990 when the DOE signed a
> stipulation, similar to a pledge, to undertake two programmatic
> environmental reviews of its operations and plans.

> Spokesperson for the coalition, Marylia Kelley of Livermore-based
> Tri-Valley CAREs, says one of the programmatic reviews, on Stockpile
> Stewardship and Management on the reconfiguration of the nuclear
> weapons complex, including weapons laboratories, is "totally
> inadequate."

> The second PEIS promised by the Energy Department was supposed to deal
> with waste created by radioactive and chemical processes and
> environmental restoration. Now, six years later, this document has not
> been completed. DOE's Draft Waste Management PEIS, released in 1995,
> has been widely criticized by environmental groups for relying on
> inaccurate data. Its status is unclear. The promised PEIS on
> environmental remediation was never conducted.

> The original settlement says the parties must be given at least 10
> days notice, so the groups are free to file their renewed lawsuit
> early in April.

> They will ask Washington, DC Federal District Court Judge Stanley
> Sporkin to block planned DOE actions such as construction of the
> controversial National Ignition Facility (NIF) until the terms of the
> 1990 settlement are properly implemented.

> The groups' letter to Secretary Pena specifically asks DOE to delay
> moving forward with the NIF ground breaking until these legal issues
> are resolved. On March 11 the DOE announced approval of construction
> of the NIF. The ground-breaking ceremony is scheduled for the end of

> May. The NIF will be built next to the Lawrence Livermore National
> Laboratory in Livermore, California, about 20 miles east of the San
> Francisco Bay area and one-quarter of a mile from Kelley's home.
>
> The National Ignition Facility will house the world's largest laser
> which will produce a nuclear fusion reaction. A DOE statement says NIF
> will, "create conditions similar to the center of the sun and other
> stars."
>
> The \$1.2 billion stadium sized facility will, "play a vital role in
> DOE's science-based stockpile stewardship and management program to
> maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground
> testing," according to the DOE.
>
> "The National Ignition Facility will help the United States meet the
> conditions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reduce the global
> nuclear danger. The country will also benefit from cutting edge
> science in astrophysics and fusion energy," said then Acting Secretary
> of Energy Charles Curtis. President Bill Clinton signed the
> Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996 and has pledged to
> pursue experimental means of maintaining confidence in the reliability
> and performance of nuclear weapons.
>
> Bruce Tarter, director of the Livermore National Laboratory said, "The
> National Ignition Facility will make a fundamental contribution to our
> technical understanding of aging nuclear weapons. The hundreds of men
> and women who have carried us to this point are now ready to convert
> this critical scientific effort into concrete, steel and lasers."
>
> The NIF will direct the energy of 192 laser beams onto a small (one
> millimeter) capsule containing isotopes of hydrogen to induce a fusion
> reaction that will produce more energy than comes from the laser beam,
> duplicating what happens in the explosion of nuclear warheads.
>
> Temperatures in the fuel capsule at NIF could reach 100 million
> degrees with pressures 100 billion times that of the earth's
> atmosphere. When used with other data and advanced computational
> capability, results will allow assessment, without testing, of the
> reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile as it ages, according
> to a DOE statement.
>
> The NIF is intended to be a multipurpose research facility with
> defense and civilian applications such as fusion energy research and
> astrophysics. NIF will have 50 times the energy of any laser now in
> existence and will produce, for the first time in a laboratory
> setting, conditions of matter close to those that occur in the center
> of the sun and other stars.
>
> But back in the neighborhood, Kelley and other residents have
> documented alarming levels of nuclear contamination already emanating
> from the Livermore Laboratory. Kelley says the groundwater under her
> home is part of an off-site contaminated plume being emitted from the
> laboratory. High levels of tritium have been measured in the
> rainwater. One sample yielded concentrations of tritium 7 times higher

> than state and federal action limits. In 1994 high levels of plutonium
> were discovered in a neighborhood park near where she lives.
>
> In 1995 the California State Health Department released a study of
> malignant melanoma in children born in Livermore showing a 6.4 times
> elevated incidence of the deadly skin cancer 6.4 times above average.
> Children not born in Livermore who moved there before the study were
> found to have an incidence of malignant melanoma 2.5 times the
> national average.
>
> Kelley is concerned that the NIF will, "add incrementally to the
> tritium pollution that exists in our community, and also produce
> radioactive waste."
>
> "So we're going back to the judge and asking him to send the
> Department of Energy back to the drawing board and force them to
> comply with the law. Additionally we're going to ask the judge not to
> allow them to construct the new facility until they do an adequate
> environmental review."
>
> The DOE evidently believes it has satisfied the stipulation it signed
> in 1990 to settle the lawsuit. The agency statement announcing
> construction approval says, "Livermore was selected as the NIF site in
> December 1996, following the November release of the Programmatic
> Environmental Impact Statement on the Stockpile Stewardship and
> Management Program, DOE's comprehensive plan for maintaining the
> safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile through
> science."
>
> Funding to begin site preparation for NIF was included in the fiscal
> year 1997 congressional appropriation. Full construction funding is
> requested in the 1998 congressional budget request currently before
> Congress.
>
> Construction of NIF is expected to create 900 long-term jobs in the
> San Francisco Bay area. About 6,000 jobs nationally and 3,000 locally
> will be created during the peak construction period planned to occur
> between 1998 and 2000.
>
> The groups listed in the "Notice of Intent to Enforce Stipulation"
> delivered to Secretary Pena are, in alphabetical order: Atomic Mirror,
> Bay Area Nuclear Waste Coalition, Citizen Alert, Citizens for
> Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping, Citizens Opposed to a Polluted
> Environment, East Bay Peace Action, Friends of the Earth, Hayward Area
> Peace and Justice Fellowship, Lane County American Peace Test,
> Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, Livermore Conversion Project,
> Los Alamos Study Group, Nashville Peace Action, Natural Resources
> Defense Council, Neighbors in Need, Nevada Desert Experience, Nuclear
> Age Peace Foundation, Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, Peace
> Farm of Texas, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, San Jose Peace
> Center, Seattle Women Act for Peace/Women Strike for Peace, Shundahai
> Network, Sonoma County Center for Peace and Justice, Tri-Valley CAREs
> (Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment), Western States Legal
> Foundation, Women Concerned/Utahans United, and the Women's

> International League for Peace and Freedom.

>

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>

>

>--- NetMgr 1.00.g3+

Marylia Kelley

Tri-Valley CAREs * 5720 East Ave. #116 * Livermore, CA 94550

Ph: (510) 443-7148 * Fx: (510) 443-0177

Reminder: NATO forum April 12, NYC

You are invited to a special open forum on Saturday April 12, on NATO and nuclear weapons: expansion or abolition? The co-sponsors are the International Peace Bureau and the Abolition 2000 caucus. There will also be brief presentations of the IPB and Abolition 2000, and an opportunity to ask questions, pick up literature etc.

The speakers so far are:

Admiral Eugene Carroll (Ret. US Navy, Centre for Defense Information))

Doug Roche, (former Canadian Ambassador)

Solange Fernex (IPB Vice-President, France)

Sharon Riggle (Centre for European Security and Disarmament, Brussels)

Anatoli Diakov, (Russia, scientist)

Time: from 10.00 - 1.00 p.m. One hour of presentations and 2 hours of discussion.

Location: 777 UN Plaza (Church Center), corner of 44th St and 1st Ave, New York City.

Language: English only. All are welcome.

To be followed by lunch and workshops on NATO and other Abolition 2000 topics in the afternoon.

From: Colin Archer, Secretary-General

International Peace Bureau

41 rue de Zurich, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland.

Tel: +41-22-731-6429, Fax: 738-9419

Email: ipb@gn.apc.org - Web: <http://www.itu.ch/ipb/>

IPB is a member of Abolition 2000 - a Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, and many other international bodies

RTw 04/07 0853 Non-aligned push for nuclear, chemical disarmament

By Sonali Verma

NEW DELHI, April 7 (Reuter) - More than 100 non-aligned countries vowed on Monday to press for complete nuclear disarmament and expressed concern over slow progress in pushing through a ban on chemical weapons, an official spokesman said.

"It has been agreed that a very strong statement on nuclear disarmament will come out from the New Delhi conference that will focus on the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework," a spokesman for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) foreign ministers' conference told a news briefing.

Spokesman Rakesh Sood said NAM ministers, who started meeting on Monday in sessions closed to the media, had also called for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention to be implemented swiftly.

"The two countries in the world (the United States and Russia) who have declared that they possess chemical weapons have yet to ratify the treaty," he said.

U.S. President Bill Clinton, who signed the pact in 1993, last week launched a drive to steer it through the Senate.

NAM was founded in 1961 at the height of the Cold War as a platform for neutral countries that were not sheltered by military alliances with either superpower.

Its members have for decades been at loggerheads with other countries over disarmament.

Last year, eight non-aligned nations did not vote in favour of a United Nations treaty aimed at banning nuclear test blasts, saying it was discriminatory and did not commit the five nuclear powers to complete disarmament by a specific deadline.

This year, arms control talks in Geneva have been deadlocked since the NAM, led by India and Pakistan, demanded the nuclear powers agree to set up a committee to negotiate total nuclear disarmament by the year 2020 as a prerequisite to discussions on fissile material production and landmines.

The nuclear powers are Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States. India and Pakistan say they have no nuclear weapons, but experts say either can quickly assemble the bomb.

NAM's 113 member nations were also pressing for an end to controls over technology exports, curbs which they said were discriminatory and not transparent, Sood said.

The movement is to issue a final statement on Tuesday when the conference ends.

REUTE

NEARLY COMPLETED NUCLEAR TEST SITE IN NEED OF MISSION

A moratorium killed its intended purpose.

But the government wants the \$100 million structure used.

By Robert Macy -- ASSOCIATED PRESS

printed in Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday, April 6, 1997

MERCURY, Nev. -- The gleaming, high-tech fortress jutting

from the windswept hillside is a costly reminder of an era when the United States engaged the Soviet Union in a game of nuclear brinkmanship.

The Device Assembly Facility, conceived in the Cold War chill of the Reagan years, is a \$100 million plant with nothing to produce.

It stands in stark contrast to the decaying buildings scattered around it at the remote Nevada Test Site, one-time proving ground for America's nuclear arsenal.

Designed to assemble 40 or 50 nuclear weapons a year in what was to be an accelerated testing program, the high-security edifice, the size of two football fields, is about ready for duty.

But there's an even chance the facility will never be used for anything, officials say.

With thick, steel-reinforced concrete walls, the 100,000-square-foot hillside monolith was designed to offer a fail-safe environment for handling one of the world's most dangerous products.

It was in this building 85 miles northwest of Las Vegas that America planned to assemble -- for testing -- deadly new weapons that would challenge the Soviets for dominance into the 21st century.

Yet in the early 1980s, when plans were first drawn for the DAF, no one contemplated a faded red menace and an end to a half-century of nuclear testing.

Now, after an initial outlay of \$100 million and a decade of construction, not to mention an \$8 million annual operating cost, the DAF is searching for a mission.

Department of Energy officials, who cringe at any suggestion the DAF is a white elephant, are busily trying to find a use for the facility when it becomes operational later this year.

The original mission of the DAF faded with the imposition of a nuclear test moratorium in October 1992. The last of 928 atmospheric and underground nuclear tests at the Nevada site was conducted a month earlier.

"If we had known a moratorium was coming, I doubt we would have ever built the facility," concedes John McGrail, director of the DOE stockpile stewardship program. "The facility was conceived when we were doing 15 to 16 nuclear tests a year. Remember, this was during the Reagan administration, when you had unlimited funds for defense. We had embarked on a policy of spending the Russians into bankruptcy."

Scientists at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos -- the national laboratories that designed America's nuclear arsenal -- assembled the last of the weapons in a cluster of aging buildings. The site, known as Area 27, had been in use since the early days of testing, which began in Nevada in 1951.

Faced with growing safety concerns at Area 27, the Energy Department sought funds to build a state-of-the-art building where scientists could assemble up to 50 nuclear-weapons experiments annually.

With the elaborate scientific and security systems built into

the DAF, McGrail had hoped the facility could be used to help in taking apart thousands of nuclear weapons, as called for in the START disarmament treaties.

That work is now being done in Amarillo, Texas, and McGrail doubts any work will be shifted to the DAF because of the political clout of the Texas congressional delegation.

Rick Higgs, DAF facility manager, said the DAF could provide unprecedented safety and security for Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore in laboratory testing of the nation's existing nuclear inventory.

He says it could provide a staging point for non-nuclear weapons experiments that continue at the test site.

Officials have explored some possible uses with the private sector, but those options are limited because of the narrow focus of the structure's original mission.

McGrail says there is a 50-50 chance the building could be shut down altogether.

Walking down a hospital-clean hallway, Higgs explained the workings of towering assembly-bay buildings and "Gravel Gerties," circular buildings designed for final assembly or disassembly of nuclear weapons.

Named after a 1950s Dick Tracy character, the five "Gerties" include a roof of gravel and dirt 21 feet thick that would collapse in the event of a radioactive accident, trapping most of the material.

The facility, which contains more than one million cubic feet of concrete, is ringed by two barbed-wire fences with motion sensors. The only entry is through a double security gate.

Each building is self-contained within the giant structure, with separate air filtration systems and heavy walls with earth fill between them to prevent any explosion short of a nuclear blast from damaging other units.

"In retrospect, it was too large," McGrail says. "It could have been built half as big. In 1983, we were projecting the nuclear weapons program would double in the next 20 years.

"If only we had known the Cold War was going to be won."

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

>From GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk Mon Apr 7 13:19:57 1997
Received: from MCR1.poptel.org.uk by gnew.gn.apc.org (8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)
id NAA14484; Mon, 7 Apr 1997 13:19:43 GMT
From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk
Date: Mon, 07 Apr 1997 14:19:25 GMT
Subject: NPU Bulletin 5-7 Apr
To: nfzns@gn.apc.org
Message-Id: <49785690MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>
Status: R

DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Mon 7 Apr 1997

97-8407 Today is last day for submissions to EA of views on BNFL's plan to commission its new MOX plant at Sellafield. FT

Sun 6 Apr 1997 - nil -

Sat 5 Apr 1997

97-8401 BNFL fined #20,000 for disregarding repeated warnings that bridge carrying radioactive waste over a commuter rail line was in danger of collapse. Ind,FT,T,DT

97-8402 US could face sanctions unless it ratifies chemical weapons convention, Clinton warns the Senate. FT

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.
Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

Christian Science Monitor
April 8, 1997

US Quietly Adds A Bunker-Buster To Nuclear Arsenal

Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON --

Even as it preaches global arms control, the Clinton administration has quietly added substantial new punch to the America's atomic arsenal.

The radar-evading B-2 "stealth" bomber was officially put into the US nuclear force April 1. And the Air Force now has an atomic bomb to be used by the B-2 against underground bunkers. The 12-foot-long B61-11 drills deep into the earth before exploding in a small blast whose shockwaves can crush targets hundreds of feet below.

The weapons are the biggest enhancement of US nuclear capability since the cold war's end. The US can now launch precision raids from its own soil against command bunkers in Russia or the kind of chemical-weapons factory the US says Libya is building inside a mountain.

Defense officials suspect an increase in such underground complexes since the pummeling Iraqi facilities took in the Gulf war.

But arms-control experts scorn the weapons as destabilizing perpetuations of the arms race and new impediments to global disarmament.

The dispute has further intensified the debate over post-cold-war US nuclear policy ignited when former senior US generals joined in December with counterparts from Russia and elsewhere to call for the elimination of atomic weapons.

"This does seem to be a sort of 'in your face' policy at a time when the US is trying to convince the rest of the world not to develop nuclear weapons and to decrease their arsenals," says Joe Cirincione of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington think tank that specializes in conflict resolution.

"For those who think that these are problems that disappeared with the end of the cold war, this is a wake-up call," he says. Mr. Cirincione and other critics contend that by boosting the capability to wage nuclear war, the Clinton administration is raising serious questions about the US commitment to nuclear arms control. One result could be to further stiffen the Russian parliament's refusal to ratify the 1993 START II accord on reducing nuclear warheads, they say.

Critics also contend that enhancing the US atomic arsenal flies in the face of popular domestic sentiments. A survey released last week by the Abolition 2000 anti-nuclear coalition found that a majority of Americans support the elimination of all atomic arms.

Russia, China, and other threats

US officials insist that the administration is committed to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. They point to the ongoing cuts in warheads under the START I accord with Moscow, US ratification of START II, and the recent offer by the administration to Russia of further reductions in a START III agreement.

But, officials add, with Russia and China improving their atomic capabilities and foes such as Iran and Libya pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction, the US nuclear deterrent must be kept as effective as possible within the bounds of international arms-control treaties.

"What we are doing ... is saying to other nations that if you bury bunkers like Saddam Hussein did, you will be at risk," asserts Kathleen Bailey of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., one of the nation's nuclear-weapons design labs. "It is a good message in terms of non-proliferation," she says.

New or not?

The dispute over the two new weapons involves several issues. They include whether the B61-11 is a new warhead, as some arms control advocates contend, or simply a modified version of an existing design that was mandated by safety considerations, as the Clinton administration insists.

The question goes to a pledge the US has repeated mantra-like since 1993 that it has no intention of designing or building new warheads.

Critics say the B61-11 breeches that undertaking, weakening the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which won indefinite extension at the United Nations in 1995.

By continuing to improve its arsenal, they say, the US may encourage would-be third-world nuclear powers to ignore the treaty and pursue clandestine atomic programs.

Such a trend could also occur because most of the potential targets against which the B-2/B61-11 combination would be used are in the third world, critics argue.

They also are concerned that the US is undermining the 1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits test explosions and was approved by the UN in September.

The B61-11 was produced through a new program in which the US is substituting test explosions for computer simulations to maintain the safety of its warheads. While the program is allowed by the CTBT, critics say its use to produce new weapons could impede or jeopardize the pact's chances of winning ratification by a requisite 44 countries.

From: Disarmament Clearinghouse
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005
TEL: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 FAX: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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Welcome to the newscope mailing list!

If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list,
send the following command in email to
"newscope-request@ecunet.org":

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Or you can send mail to "Majordomo@ecunet.org" with the following command
in the body of your email message:

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unsubscribe newscope
```

Here's the general information for the list you've
subscribed to, in case you don't already have it:

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#### No info available for newscope.
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"NEWSCOPE" by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on July 21, 1993 at 21:36 Eastern, about SUBSCRIPTION-ONLY WEEKLY NEWS SOURCE (319 notes).

Note 319 by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on April 8, 1997 at 12:17 Eastern (18207 characters).

Newscope

A Newsletter for United Methodist Leaders

Vol. 25, No. 15/April 11, 1997

Communication Agency Sets New Plan To Resource Conferences

The UM Communications (UMCom) governing board, meeting April 3-4 in Nashville, agreed to phase out its five jurisdictional field-staff positions and to replace them with a Nashville-based staff consisting of an associate general secretary, a networking specialist, and an administrative assistant. A supporting team will include at least one representative from each of the 66 U.S. annual conferences and a majority of the agency's professional staff, according to Robert W. Edgar, president of Claremont (Calif.) School of Theology, who headed the task force that created the proposal. Edgar said the team concept will send UMCom's professional staff into the field, share annual conference talent across conference lines, and develop a pool of funds to hire outside expertise when needed to provide services to all conferences instead of just some of them.

"There can be no more critical issue for any national agency of the denomination than the effectiveness of its services to and collaboration with the regional bodies of the church," said Judy Weidman, UMCom general secretary, in her address to the commission.

A study of the present operating style found field staffers were known by people who work within the states where they reside or in adjoining states, but they were not as well known by leaders in other states within the jurisdictions.

An hour-long discussion of the proposal surfaced concern for present jurisdictional staff members and a formal resolution expressed appreciation for their fine work. The new plan was approved by a large majority of the 26-member commission.

The jurisdictional staffers are Deanna K. Armstrong, Kansas City, Mo.; Ervin M. Dailey, Nashville, Tenn.; Roderick Hargo, Dayton, Ohio; Donald K. Small, Phoenix, Ariz.; and Paula Watson, Midland Park, N.J.

New Welfare Act Raises New Church-State Questions

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, signed by President Clinton last August, raises serious church-state questions.

Under the act, state governments can contract with churches to administer aid to the poor (Sec. 104). The act sanctions the notion that houses of worship can -- and should -- perform government functions while simultaneously engaging in their spiritual mission. Under the law, churches must promise not to discriminate against recipients of benefits on the basis of their religious practice and no funds can be used for worship, instruction, or proselytization (Sec. 104).

Previously, no government funds could be offered to "pervasively sectarian" organizations. To get around this provision, many churches established separate agencies to administer social programs, thus making these programs eligible for government funding. That step is no longer necessary.

"Never before has Congress proposed that governments contract with religious organizations to perform state functions," says Derek Davis, editor of Church and State. He also says the law is certain to be challenged and could go to the Supreme Court. Davis, a professor at Baylor University, says the act will result in a "myriad of entanglement issues." For example, Davis says, "The state must police the organizations with which it contracts in order to ensure that federal and state eligibility guidelines are being followed and that funds are used properly." The professor also predicts churches will have problems with a law that forbids their members from explaining the underlying message of faith that motivates them. "Wise religious bodies will stay away [from becoming agents of the state]," says Davis. "Wise government, meanwhile, should have never offered the temptation in the first place." -- Liberty, March-April

The issue is not new to the UMC. The 1968 General Conference said that religious affiliation should not exempt any social welfare agency from governmental standards. The assembly noted, however, "There is a new awareness of the need for welfare services to be complemented by action for social change [and] churches should have no stake in programs that continue dependency or embody attitudes and practices that may be described as 'welfare colonialism'." The body noted that acceptance of government funds make criticism of government practices difficult if not impossible. -- 1996 Book of Resolutions, pages 516-519

Fund Created to Extend Participation in DISCIPLE

A fund to extend participation in the DISCIPLE: Becoming Disciples Through Bible Study ministry has been created by The Board of the UM Publishing House (UMPH), meeting April 3-5 in San Antonio.

Noting that many persons are unable to pay costs involved in a DISCIPLE program and yet affirming the life-transforming value of the ministry, the board created "The DISCIPLE Connection." DISCIPLE graduates and current participants will be asked to support a fund to be used for direct expenses. No monies will be used to cover administration of the fund nor to reimburse UMPH for overhead costs related to the development and marketing of the

program. The first project will be to provide videos and other materials for Spanish-speaking persons in the U.S., Central, and South America.

UMPH sales for the first six months of the fiscal year ending July 31 totaled \$56.8 million, up \$5.2 million over the same period last year and \$1.4 million above budget. Net operating revenue for the same period totaled \$4.3 million, compared to a loss of \$196,554 in the same period last year. President and Publisher Neil Alexander said the improved numbers are a result of increased sales, better expense control, better inventory management, careful administration of cash, and the reduction of 43 staff positions through attrition and early retirements.

Due to 1996 deficits, UMPH contributions for clergy pensions to be presented to annual conferences in June will total only \$500,000, compared to \$1 million given in previous years. The board anticipates that improved 1997 sales will result in larger contributions in June 1998.

In other business, the board agreed to: 1) end the Circuit Rider Award program; 2) presented the final award to Juanita and Rudy Ramus, two local pastors who increased membership of St. John UMC in Houston from 23 members in 1992 to 1,331 members at the end of 1995; and 3) learned that the Cokesbury Bookstore, at the UM Reporter building in Dallas, closed in December because of operating deficits and fewer than expected visitors to the building.

Short Takes

Over 700 persons marched March 23 from Ezion-Mt. Carmel UMC (Del.) to the Public Safety Building to support their pastor, Lawrence Livingston. In a traffic stop, Police Officer Kurtis Crawford, sprayed Livingston with mace and hit him with a nightstick (Newscope, March 28). The mayor told the police chief to fire Crawford or resign himself. The chief resigned. The city prosecutor later dropped all charges. Livingston has filed a formal complaint against Crawford. -- Wendy Green

"News Odyssey," a 30-minute news program produced by UM Communications (UMCom) for the Odyssey Cable network, got off to a strong start in February, according to Judy Weidman, UMCom general secretary. She reports that in the first six weeks of the program, there were some one million exposures, costing about 32 cents per viewer.

Clean-up of a pesticide spill at Harper (Kan.) UMC (Newscope, Feb. 21) is expected to begin later this month. Pastor Lee Louderback expects negotiations between the church and Orkin Pest Control Company to be completed in the coming weeks. In the meantime, the 262-member congregation will continue meeting in a loaned Seventh Day Adventist Church and renting downtown Harper office space until early fall. The church received \$15,000 in aid

from other churches and church supplies from Cokesbury's Church Disaster Fund.

The pesticide spill occurred in July, 1995, when workers treating the church for termites accidentally drilled into the heating and air conditioning ducts.

-- Kathy Kruger Noble

The suicide of 39 persons associated with Heaven's Gate is partially due to the refusal of the group's founder, Marshall H. Applewhite, to accept his homosexuality, according to Troy D. Perry, founder and moderator of the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches. "I call upon the news media to expose the true factors which lead to this tragedy: one man's denial and repression of his God-given sexuality and, on a greater level, society's rejection of and hostility toward gay men and lesbians," said Perry.

Eight graduate students, who have chosen careers as Christian educators, are recipients of the 1997-98 John Q. Schisler Graduate Awards given by the UM Office of Loans and Scholarships and the Section on Deacons and Diaconal Ministries. The eight scholarships total \$13,700. The 1997-98 recipients are: Kimberly Broerman, the Divinity School, Duke University, Durham, N.C.; Darlene Cools, Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, Evanston, Ill.; Camille A. Reeves, Saint Paul School of Theology, Kansas City, Mo.; Karen Martindell, Methodist Theological School in Ohio, Delaware, Ohio; Lisa A. Marchal, Methodist Theological School in Ohio; Allison Carr, Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary; Rita Yackley, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, Ky.; and Nancy Walker, Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary.

The nine denominations participating in the Consultation on Church Union (COCU) apparently agree on everything except the concept of episcopacy, according to a COCU Commission on Theology. Cynthia Campbell, chair of theological commission and president of McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, brought a report on the work of her commission to a March 16-18 meeting of the COCU executive committee in Memphis. The committee voted that each participating denomination should send a delegation of 10 leaders (including men, women, ethnic minorities, and persons under age 35) to a COCU plenary session at St. Louis in December, 1998 .

Additional erratum to The 1996 Book of Resolutions: The resolution on Pan Methodist Unity (p. 347) should be replaced with a petition on a Commission on Union (p. 931 Advance DCA). That resolution commits the UMC in principle to a reunion of the UM, AME, AME Zion and CME churches and continues a study commission's work by establishing a Commission on Union composed of six representatives from each denomination. Operating with a \$100,000 quadrennial budget, the commission is to present a plan of union to the General Conferences of each participating denomination.

"Take 5," a UM Communications' (UMCom) radio public-service announcement campaign, recently received an Angel Award from Excellence in Media. For information, call (800) 476-7766.

UMs in the Melbourne and Fort Meyers (Fla.) districts sent 29,000 pounds of fruit from their back yards to help feed hungry people in Appalachia, W.Va. The Feb. 17 delivery was coordinated by the Society of St. Andrew. In March, the society collected citrus during a one-day event in West Palm Beach, Fla., for a Christian children's ministry in the ghettos of New York City. --
Florida Conference UM Review

Noting that Americans are exposed to an average of 16,000 media messages a day, the National Council of Churches is sponsoring a "Media Awareness Year." The year will be launched with a live teleconference, "Family, Community, and Media Values" on May 6, 7:30-9:00 p.m. (ET) from UMCom studios in Nashville. Garlinda Burton, editor of the Interpreter, will be a participant in the event. Call 212-870-3802 to host a downlink site. The council also has published The Church and Media, a booklet that contains three policy statements on media (to order, call 212-870-2574). A two-hour (or a 26-minute edited version) videotape of a teleconference on violence in the media is available from Ecuofilm (800-251-4091).

"Adam and Steve?" A 30-minute discussion of same sex marriages will be aired May 8 at 12:30 p.m. and May 9 at 3 a.m. (ET) on the Odyssey T.V. Cable Channel. Kathleen La Camera, a clergymember of New York Conference, will examine the issue with David Otto, a biblical scholar. The program is produced by UM Communications.

Positions Available

Four positions with the General Board of Global Ministries (GBGM): executive secretary for leadership education with the Women's Division, executive secretary for urban ministries, assistant general secretary for institutional ministries, and assistant general secretary for evangelization and church growth. Contact Deneen Cooper, GBGM, 475 Riverside Dr., Rm. 300, New York, NY 10115.....Youth minister. Contact Steve Dodson, McKendree UMC, 1570 Lawrenceville-Suwanee Rd., Lawrenceville, GA 30243 (770-339-9801).....Director of music ministries. Contact Tom Claycomb, First UMC, 401 So. Spring Ave., Sioux Falls, SD 57104.....Director of scouting/youth serving ministries for the General Commission on UM Men. Contact Office of Human Resources, General Board of Discipleship (615-340-7200).....Director of Christian education and family ministries. Contact Susan Cox-Johnson, Community UMC, 1600 W. Broadway, Columbia, MO 65203 (573-445-6131).....Director of Asbury Hills UM Camp. Contact Search Committee, 317 Ayers Circle, Summerville, SC 29485....Volunteer pastors for two congregations and a community college in

the Island of Utila in Honduras and six congregations in Belize. Contact Walter A. Whithurst, director UM VIM, 159 Ralph McGill Blvd., NE #305, Atlanta, GA 30308 (404-659-5060).....Editor of the Mississippi Christian Advocate. Contact Bishop Marshall Meadors, P.O. Box 931, Jackson, MS 39205-0931 by May 15.

Personalia

William Farley Smith, 55, minister of music at St. Marks UMC in Harlem N.Y. and a musician who adapted and arranged 29 spirituals for the UM Hymnal, died March 18 in New York. Smith also created a music scholarship fund for underprivileged children.....Charles P. Teague, dean of the faculty at Brevard (N.C.) College and a clergymember of the Western North Carolina Conference, has been named president of Spartanburg (S.C.) Methodist College.....Steven Hughes, pastor of Highland Park UMC in Topeka, Kan., will be appointed superintendent of the Ottawa District in Kansas East Conference.....Several appointments in the North Alabama Conference: Gerald A. Champion, pastor of Albertville First UMC, to the Gadsden District; Gary D. Formby, pastor of Lester Memorial UMC, Oneonta, to the Huntsville District; O'neil Ridgeway, pastor of Center Grove UMC, Huntsville, to the Roanoke District; Jerry E. Sisson, pastor of Canterbury UMC, to Birmingham-West District; Billy L. York, pastor of Trinity UMC, Homewood, to the Albertville District; and Michael M. Steward, pastor of Jacksonville UMC, to director of the Conference Council on Ministries.....Two superintendents to be appointed in South Carolina Conference: Edward McDowell Jr., pastor of Francis Burns UMC, Columbia, to the Anderson District, and Larry D. McCutcheon, pastor of Cumberland UMC, Florence, to the Charleston District.....Five new superintendents will be appointed in the Holston Conference: J.N Howard, pastor of First UMC, Marion, Va., to a new district in the Big Stone Gap/Kingsport area; Robert Cantrell, pastor of St. Luke UMC, Chattanooga, Tenn., to the Chattanooga District; William Kilday Jr., pastor of Fountain City UMC, Knoxville, to the Johnson City District; Raymon E. White, pastor of Lennon-Senney UMC, Knoxville, to the Knoxville District; and Gordon L. Ridenour, pastor of First Centenary UMC, Chattanooga, to the Oak Ridge District.....John F. Fiedler, pastor of First UMC, Hurst, Texas, will be appointed pastor of the 3,500-member First UMC, Dallas. He follows Hal Brady, who recently moved to St. Luke UMC, Columbus, Ga.....Melissa Traver, a senior at Oxford College of Emory University, Atlanta, is the recipient of a \$500 Allan J. Burry Scholarship.....Five campus ministers pursuing doctorates were awarded a total of \$12,500 as 1997-98 recipients of the Baker Graduate Awards: Guy R. Brewer, area director for Miami Campus Ministries in Coral Gables, Fla., and a D.Min. candidate at Asbury Theological Seminary; John Mark Forrester, UM campus minister at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, who plans to begin work on a D.Min. at Columbia Theological Seminary, Decatur, Ga., this fall; Kristen J. Leslie, former campus minister at Adrian (Mich.) College and a Ph.D. candidate at Claremont (Calif.) School of Theology; William D. Mills, pastor at the Wesley Foundation at Eastern New Mexico University, Portales, and a Ph.D. candidate at Texas Tech University; and Mary Jo Sims-Baden, dean of the chapel at West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, W.Va., and a D.Min. candidate at Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, D.C.....James W. Lane continues as president of the National Association of Annual Conference Lay Leaders. Gerald Richardson, named in the April 4 issue as president, is the new

vice-president.....Brad Motta, pastor of Pearl River (N.Y) UMC, and past president of Christian Educators Fellowship, will be appointed pastor of Morristown (N.J.) UMC.....Paul and Diane Copeland received a "Foster Parents of the Year Award" from the school of social work at Southern Illinois University and an association of social workers. Paul is pastor of Wesley UMC in Mt. Vernon, Ill.....Allan Boesak, one of South Africa's most prominent clergymen in the struggle against apartheid, appeared briefly in a Cape Town court recently to face 21 counts of theft and nine of fraud. A trial is set for August 4.

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(Remember that is planned that the B-2 would carry the B61-11 earth penetrating bomb)

APn 04/08 1617 B-2 Halt  
By SUSANNE M. SCHAFFER  
AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Air Force has stopped sending B-2 stealth bombers on training missions after a shaft assembly connecting an engine on one of the aircraft broke in flight, officials said Tuesday.

The step came just a week after the planes were given the go-ahead to fly nuclear and conventional combat missions.

Thirteen bombers, each with a price tag of \$2 billion-plus, are based at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.

In layman's terms, the shaft assembly connects the engine to a gear box that powers the aircraft's generators and hydraulic pumps. The plane that encountered the problem was able to return safely to base, using the power of its three other engines, said an Air Force official.

In a statement, the Air Force said the commander of the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman "has placed the wing's B-2s under a precautionary stand-down of routine training missions."

Air Force engineers were working with the aircraft's prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, and a subcontractor to solve the problem, the statement said. The halt will continue until all aircraft have been inspected and cleared, it said.

Two B-2s that are still undergoing testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California have been inspected and given the go-ahead to resume test flights.

Last May, the Air Force suspended B-2 test flights after discovering a cracked part during an inspection. Officials said the cracked part -- a clamp that connects the exhaust duct to the engine -- was not a safety hazard but had to be fixed.

On the first of this month, six of the B-2s became part of the Pentagon's "nuclear war plan," meaning they could be detailed to fly specific missions to deliver nuclear weapons.

The flying-wing B-2 bomber was designed to be able to reach deep into enemy territory to attack heavily defended targets because it is difficult to detect in flight. It has no vertical tail surfaces and its skin absorbs, rather than reflects, radar signals.

The B-2's first flight was in July 1989 and the first bomber entered service at Whiteman in December 1993.

In all, the Air Force expects to have 21 of the aircraft in its fleet by early in the next decade.

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>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Tue, 08 Apr 1997 15:00:46 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin  
>To: nfznsc@gn.apc.org  
>  
>  
>Tue 8 Apr 1997  
>  
>97-8410 British Energy to buy 12.5 per cent stake in Humber Power,  
> marking its first venture into gas-fired power generation  
> FT,Ind,DT  
>  
>  
>

Stewart Kemp (nfznsc@gn.apc.org)

A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would provide for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, was released at the United Nations yesterday, April 7 at a special ceremony in the Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium.

The release was attended by media, government representatives and representatives of disarmament organizations. The release coincided with the first day of a meeting of States Parties to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York, which is a Preparatory Committee Meeting for a full review of the NPT scheduled in the year 2000. A number of States at the NPT meeting called for progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons including negotiations leading to the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

A number of countries including New Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia, said that the NPT Prep Com should work on substantive issues, not just on procedure for the review in the year 2000, and suggested that informal working groups continue discussing such substantive issues between the end of this Prep Com and the next one in the year 1998. The current NPT Prep Com continues meeting until April 18.

Copies of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, and a Statement of Purpose explaining how negotiations towards such a convention could commence, are available from the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, 666 Broadway, Rm 625, New York, NY 10012. Phone 212 674 7790. Fax 212 674 6199

## 1997 NPT Briefing 2: Getting Started

written by Rebecca Johnson, with thanks to Sharon Riggle.

The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT Parties finally got underway late on Monday, April 7, with the election of Pasi Patokallio of Finland as Chair and adoption of an amended agenda. Early challenges over the allocation of Chairs among the PrepComs and disagreements over the agenda were resolved in prior consultations. Before Patokallio, a representative from the Western grouping of NPT States Parties, could be elected, the head of the Secretariat, Engeniy Gorkovskiy, informed the PrepCom of an 'understanding' reached among States Parties. According to this understanding, a representative of the Eastern European Group of States would chair the second PrepCom in 1998, and a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) representative would be proposed for the third PrepCom in 1999 and also the presidency of the Review Conference in 2000. Poland and Ukraine later called for the presidency of the Review Conference in 2005 to go to a member of the Eastern European grouping. Few expect the outmoded cold war group system to remain unchanged for that long.

The PrepCom also agreed that states that wished to observe (Brazil, Pakistan and Israel) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could attend open sessions. The opening of the PrepCom was delayed several hours due to the refusal by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as the successor state to Yugoslavia's seat. In the end this dispute and a further problem over the membership of North Korea were allayed by the non-appearance of the representatives of these two countries.

The first full day of the PrepCom was given to a general debate and exchange of views, with statements from 38 delegations: the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated states, France on behalf of the five declared nuclear weapon states (NWS), Indonesia, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, China, Russia, the United States, Philippines, Ghana, Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Singapore, Mongolia, South Korea, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Norway, Poland, Malaysia, Switzerland, Japan and Viet Nam.

While each delegation emphasised the major issues that it wanted the review process to address, few tackled the difficult questions of how the enhanced review system should (or could) be implemented. Many stressed the new features of accountability and the necessity for identifying future action, in addition to reviewing the past, but there was a paucity of concrete proposals or ideas for how the new process should operate. South Africa and others had insisted on amendments to the draft agenda to leave it with enough flexibility to consider subsidiary bodies, sub-groups or intersessional working groups and how decisions or debates would be recorded. The United States warned that 'treating the process as a referendum' on the efforts of some of the parties (taken to mean the NWS) or 'giving unequal emphasis to any of the Treaty's goals' (viewed as a reference to nuclear disarmament) 'would be neither productive nor constructive and certainly would not serve our shared interests in creating

a meaningful and effective process'.

The PrepCom did not seek to change its rules of procedure at this point. Although main committees will not be established separately in this PrepCom, there was general acceptance of Patokallio's proposal to cluster the issues covered by the Treaty and by the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O) according to whether they address nuclear disarmament, nuclear energy or safeguards. Discussion on the nuclear disarmament cluster will begin on Wednesday April 9 in a closed session, from which observers, press and NGOs will be excluded.

#### How to proceed

Arguing that this first PrepCom was initiating 'a qualitatively different process' than the previous NPT reviews, Canada proposed that each session should produce 'a distilled compilation of proposals, not a consensus document'. Using the structure of the NPT, with recommendations under the preamble and each of the Treaty's ten articles, Canada proposed a 'rolling document' which would be an inventory of 'views, evaluations and proposals...as an evolving basis for eventual negotiations on recommendations to go forward to the 2000 Review Conference'. Backing Canada's ideas, New Zealand also suggested that 'sub-groups' could be appointed to work in more depth on some issues, within the PrepComs and/or intersessionally. South Africa proposed that the Chair could facilitate decision-making by working with a smaller, representative group of about 25 key states, akin to the President's Group set up by the 1995 Review Conference president, Jayantha Dhanapala. South Africa also left open the question of an intersessional subsidiary body to facilitate conclusion of work on security assurances by the year 2000.

The EU considered that the PrepCom 'remains preparatory in nature' with the job of recommending, while 'the Review Conference itself decides', a position strongly echoed by China and the United States. To report from one PrepCom to another, the EU favoured a 'neutral mechanism', such as a Chair's summary not requiring consensus, and proposed that outgoing and incoming Chairs should consult each other in the periods between two meetings. The EU took the view that subsidiary bodies could only be established within the main committees of an actual Review Conference and argued for decision-making at the PrepCom to be based on consensus. Japan also advocated that the PrepComs should produce some form of a Chair's summary report, with annexes, with a final report from the last PrepCom meeting consisting of two parts: review and recommendations. Indonesia, however, preferred that a draft final document be developed as a rolling text and negotiated in the PrepComs, arguing that intersessional meetings 'with no financial implications' could facilitate the negotiations on a rolling text. Indonesia supported consensus-based decision-making, but also proposed that voting could be used if all attempts to achieve consensus had been exhausted.

Where several delegations, including South Africa, New Zealand and Canada, regarded the P&Os as dynamic and updateable yardsticks, Japan argued against revising the P&O. Instead, the Review Conference should aim to formulate a new set of objectives, 'taking into account views expressed in discussions held prior to and during the Conference'. Canada called the P&O a 'means to an end'. The EU, United States, Mexico, China and others stressed that the process was to be centred on the Treaty itself. China said that the P&Os

derived from the NPT, which remains the 'source', and also stressed that "'review' is not 'negotiation'", and the NPT process 'should not replace the ongoing or future work of the CD'.

Japan and Indonesia argued that from now on PrepComs and the Review Conference should be held in New York (for continuity, participation and to keep costs down). Switzerland wanted past precedent to be followed, with the Review Conferences and at least some of the PrepComs being held in Geneva.

The major issues

Although the EU, China and the United States stressed that there should be balance among the main issues, it was clear from the statements of Mexico, Switzerland, South Africa, Malaysia, Algeria, Indonesia and many others that nuclear disarmament was the highest priority. The importance of universality was also emphasised, but with few practical ideas for bringing the few remaining hold-out states on board. France made a statement on behalf of itself, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States which expressed 'our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those of article VI.' The NWS also reaffirmed their commitment to early entry into force of the CTBT and to immediate negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile materials (fissban).

Nuclear Disarmament

Many delegations (especially NAM) referred to important milestones in 1996: concluding the CTBT by September; the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July; the Canberra Commission report in August; the statement from 61 retired Generals and Admirals in December, and so on. Many states also encouraged ratification of START II and welcomed the Helsinki Summit agreement by the US and Russia to initiate START III negotiations. Russia and the United States listed their achievements in reducing their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Several delegations argued for immediate implementation of measures identified by the Canberra Commission, such as taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from missiles, ending deployment of non-strategic weapons outside the NWS territories, and for all the NWS to commit to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

South Africa put on record its concern about the 'non-proliferation implications' of the planned expansion of NATO and consideration of 'the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European Defence Policy'. Concerns about NATO were also expressed by China and Belarus, with both China and Russia emphasising that nuclear weapons should only be deployed on the NWS' own territory.

Opinion was divided over what the PrepComs and review process should do on nuclear disarmament. NAM countries, including Mexico, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria and Iran, pushed for an ad hoc committee and for negotiations to commence in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) based on the 20-year timetable identified in the programme of action supported by 28 of the 30 NAM countries in the G-21. Malaysia called for negotiations to start in 1997 with a view to early conclusion of a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their

elimination. The commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention was supported by 115 states, including China (which reiterated support in its statement), in a vote in the UN General Assembly in December 1996 (51/45M). The call was endorsed by a majority of the European Parliament on March 13, 1997. To coincide with the opening of the NPT Conference, several NGOs on Monday launched a model nuclear weapon convention at the UN, to show how the technical and legal complexities might be worked out. Russia reiterated its 1996 proposal for a Treaty for Nuclear Security and Strategic Stability.

Western delegations, including the declared NWS, prioritised commencement and early conclusion of a fissban in the CD. Referring to the P&O, many urged that fissban negotiations should begin immediately on the basis of the Shannon report and mandate agreed in March 1995. Indonesia, Iran and Vietnam also identified a fissban as an important step to accomplish in the CD. NAM countries such as Peru and Algeria continued to push for the fissban to include stocks.

Security Assurances, the subject of a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 984) just prior to the NPT Conference in 1995, were also mentioned by many delegations. South Africa wanted the NPT process to address this issue, arguing that they should 'provide a significant benefit' to NPT parties and 'an incentive' to those who have so far refused to sign the Treaty. Several countries agreed, with Egypt and Viet Nam suggesting that an instrument with legally binding security assurances could be adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the Treaty. Ghana called for the CD to work on making security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states legally binding, while Algeria, Indonesia and Iran considered further negotiations important but did not specify the venue.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) were also mentioned by several delegations. Many referred with satisfaction to recent successes, including entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco covering Latin America and the Caribbean, and the signing of the Treaties of Pelindaba (Africa) and Bangkok (South East Asia). Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic called for Central Asia to be declared a NWFZ, as supported by their countries plus Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in the Almaty Declaration of February 28, 1997. Belarus and Ukraine called for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Syria and Iraq all urged Israel to join the NPT and participate in creating a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

#### Safeguards

Many delegations from all groups emphasised the importance of strengthening IAEA safeguards and supporting the implementation of the 93+2 programme, which had been given added impetus by the recent agreement on a model protocol, due to be adopted on May 15.

#### Nuclear Energy

Several delegations made passing reference to the importance of nuclear cooperation for 'peaceful purposes'. Australia, Japan, Mongolia and others referred positively to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and hoped-for progress on a Convention on the safety of radioactive waste management and spent fuel. Liability, physical protection of nuclear materials and illicit

trafficking were also raised.

Iran raised export controls as 'private, secretive and non representative', saying that they were used to discriminate against non-nuclear-weapon states of the South. South Africa summed up the more widely held view that export controls are an 'essential component' of the global non-proliferation regime, but also endorsed greater transparency, in order to 'lend increased confidence and credibility to the system'.

ends

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=====

>To: start3-europenwfz@igc.org  
>From: Daniel Durand <ddur@FranceNet.fr>

>  
>The Mouvement de la Paix support this list.  
>I send the information about the next meeting in north of France on Nato enlargement.

>  
>\*\*\*\*\*

>  
>Boulogne sur mer, March 24, 1997

>  
>PRESS RELEASE

>  
>INFORMATION : OPPOSITION TO NATO EXPANSION AND TO INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING IS GROWING THROUGHOUT EUROPE

>  
>The day after Clinton and Yeltsin met in Helsinki, on March 22, in Boulogne sur mer (north of France), representatives of peace and environmental organizations from Great Britain (campaign for nuclear disarmament, CND), Belgium (Vrede and For mother earth), and France (peace committees from Boulogne, Dunkirk, Lille, Amiens) exchanged their views on security challenges, and action for peace and disarmament in Europe.

>  
>Plans of NATO enlargement, the reinforcement of projection and intervention forces, the excessive level of military spending, the risk of a return of nuclear weapons in the center of Europe create great concerns and suggest concerted actions of peace movements.

>  
>NATO expansion, far from improving security of countries involved, will increase tensions and divisions, by building a new fortress in the center of Europe.

>Also, it will result in tremendous costs, an estimated amount of 100 billion dollars, and in increased military spending in all countries.  
Against whom ?

>  
>Movements represented believe that such plans can be defeated if action is taken now, and if a new conception of security in Europe is promoted, one based on cooperations in particular with the East and South.

>  
>In order to inform public opinion and put pressure on governments, a calendar of actions was set up :

>  
>- May 4-8 : week of action in each country. Letters will be sent to governments, delegations will visit ministries or institutions involved, in order to oppose plans of NATO enlargement. A press conference will be held in Brussels, in the presence of representatives of various peace movements in Europe.

>  
>- May 15- June 15 : twinned actions of peace committees from various countries in Europe for peaceful cooperations in Europe.

>  
>- May 16-June 28 : a cardboard Trident missile will be carried from



Howard--

Thank you for all your prayers for my sister and I. Everything is s l o w l y improving for Teri. She is out of the coma as of Monday night, and we are in the process of diagnosing damage and planning possible rehab strategies. I will attempt to keep you informed.

About the meeting. Yes, I am willing to continue serving if you'll have me. Please do send minutes and/or anything else you think helpful. I will begin whatever work was assigned to me as soon as possible.

Thank you for all your work on MUPJ's behalf.

Sincerely,

Bruce Edwards

It may be of interest that the Government of Canada has published a electronic transcript of a consultation between the Government Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Canadian NGOs on "the Implications of the World Court Project Advisory Opinion" held recently in Ottawa.

NGO representatives included The Hon. Douglas Roche, members of Project Ploughshares, Physicians for Global Survival, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, and the Centre for Research in Nonviolence, Quebec - took part.

The document is 35 to 50 pages depending on font size used, and can be read at:

[http://www.parl.gc.ca/committees352/fore/evidence/73\\_97-03-18/fore73\\_blk101.html](http://www.parl.gc.ca/committees352/fore/evidence/73_97-03-18/fore73_blk101.html) Transcript of Canadian NGO discussion with Government on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons (English)

or via the Abolition 2000 section at the address below. Translation in French is also available.

Ross Wilcock

[rwilcock@web.net](mailto:rwilcock@web.net)

<http://www.web.net/~pgs/>

By Evelyn Leopold

UNITED NATIONS, April 8 (Reuter) - In an effort to convince the world they were committed to nuclear non-proliferation, the five declared nuclear powers late on Tuesday stressed disarmament progress over the past two years.

The statement by the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China was made to a conference of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the first such meeting since the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995.

South Africa and other non-nuclear states want the meeting to begin negotiating a treaty, to be completed by the year 2000, binding nuclear powers never to use the bomb against a state without atomic weapons, even in the event of war.

The five pointed out that last year's Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was now signed by 140 states. They pledged to work toward a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosives.

They welcomed talks between Washington and Moscow for further reductions of nuclear arms, and pointed out their commitments to nuclear weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and Africa.

They also said they were ready to work with Southeast Asian states in creating a similar weapons free-zone.

Diplomats said the statement was the first from all five countries. China in the past had objected to such a collective statement, saying its "no-first-nuclear strike" position had to be included. The issue was avoided on Tuesday.

The five reaffirmed "our countries' strong and continuing support for the NPT" and expressed "determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the treaty."

Earlier at the meeting, South Africa criticised the enlargement of NATO as not being in the spirit of the NPT.

"The planned expansion of NATO would entail an increase in the number of non-nuclear weapon states which participate in nuclear training, planning and decision-making and which have an element of nuclear deterrence in their defence policies," South Africa's U.N. Ambassador K.J. Jele, said.

South Africa would "like to place on record our concern about the non-proliferation implications of the plans for the expansion of NATO and the proposals which have been made for a dialogue in Europe on the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European defence policy," he said.

NATO plans to invite several former Communist Warsaw Pact states to join the alliance at a July summit in Madrid. The favourites are Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. But it says the new states will not get nuclear arms.

South Africa, the only country to build a secret nuclear arsenal and then dismantle them, was responsible for forging the compromise that led to an indefinite extension of the NPT.

This extension was agreed in 1995 as part of a package that included annual reviews of the treaty and a commitment by

nuclear weapons states to reduce atomic arms with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.

The NPT essentially represents a bargain between the world's five declared nuclear powers and other nations.

Non-nuclear states pledge not to develop atomic weapons but are given access to nuclear technology for civilian uses. The treaty also contains a disarmament pledge.

REUTE

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UPn 04/08 1748 Senate avoids nuke showdown

WASHINGTON, April 8 (UPI) -- The Senate sidestepped a showdown (Tuesday) over a bill to establish a nuclear waste storage facility in Nevada. That came after Republicans warned Democrats, including Nevada senators filibustering the measure, that any delays on that bill could work against a chemical weapons ban sought anxiously by the Clinton administration.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse

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## BASIC Press Advisory: South Africa Sees Nuclear Non-Proliferation Problems in NATO Expansion

South Africa Sees Nuclear Non-Proliferation Problems in NATO Expansion and European Deterrence and Calls for a Legal Guarantee Against Nuclear Attack from Britain, China France, Russia and US by 2000.

8 April 1997

At the first meeting of the new review process for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), South Africa today criticized plans for the expansion of NATO, in particular its nuclear aspects, and the discussions about a continuing role for nuclear deterrence in Europe. K.J. Jele, South African Ambassador to the United Nations, said:

"We would, however, like to place on record our concern about the non-proliferation implications of the plans for the expansion of NATO and the proposals which have been made for a dialogue in Europe on the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European Defence Policy. The planned expansion of NATO would entail an increase in the number of non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in nuclear training, planning and decision-making and which have an element of nuclear deterrence in their defence policies."

The issue of NATO's continued reliance on nuclear weapons and the implications for expanding the "nuclear guarantee" to more states will continue to be an issue throughout the two-week long meeting.

South Africa wants the meeting to begin negotiating a treaty on negative security assurances, binding the nuclear weapon states never to use their nuclear weapons against a state without nuclear weapons, even in the event of war involving the use of chemical or biological weapons. A general commitment along these lines has been made by the nuclear weapon states to NPT parties, but they have so far rejected providing this guarantee in treaty form. The NPT decisions of 1995 included a commitment to consider such a treaty. South Africa is now asking the nuclear weapon states to honour their commitments by agreeing the treaty by the year 2000.

The meeting, which began yesterday, has the job of recommending better means of implementing the NPT. It is the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the year 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties gave the Preparatory Committees a new substantive and

forward looking mandate in the review process.

South Africa, which built and later destroyed a small nuclear arsenal and subsequently joined the NPT, has played a key role in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was South Africa's proposals at the 1995 NPT Conference that led to the package of agreements that made the Treaty permanent, created the stronger review process now underway, and established of a set of goals in Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament including a call for a treaty on negative security assurances.

'South Africa is trying to make the world a safer place. The Western powers are refusing to guarantee not to use their nuclear weapons against countries without the bomb while guaranteeing that they will now use their nuclear weapons to 'defend' Poland, Hungary and the Czechs, preparing the ground for the 'Eurobomb' and continuing to train Turks, Belgians, Greeks, Dutch, Germans and Italians pilots to drop H bombs', said Daniel Plesch, BASIC's director.

\*\*\*\*\*

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\*\*\*BASIC is placing all of the speeches from the NPT Prepcom on its Website and Gopher site \*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

NUCLEAR TEST BAN ALERT: REPLY REQUESTED

\*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

April 9, 1997

TO: supporters of a comprehensive nuclear test ban  
FR: Daryl Kimball, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and  
John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World

RE: Request for Support on CTBT Sign-On Letter  
(Response Requested by APRIL 24, 1997)

The United States Senate is expected to debate and vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention during the week of April 14. Assuming that the Senate votes to ratify the CWC, a number of nuclear disarmament organizations hope to build on the CWC effort by urging the Clinton Administration and the Senate to begin consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1997.

Time is the greatest enemy of the CTBT and we need your help to ensure that this very important treaty moves forward as quickly as possible. We hope that other U.S.-based organizations will join us in signing this very simple letter to each member of the Senate that urges support and swift action on the CTBT.

We want to deliver this letter to Senate offices within days of the completion of Senate deliberations on the CWC. To be effective, we need your organization's support for this letter to demonstrate the breadth and range of interest in a nuclear test ban.

Further information on test ban issues developed by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers will be delivered to Capitol Hill during the week of May 5.

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*If you can add your support, please call, fax, or email your name and organization NO LATER THAN 5pm (EST) APRIL 24 to:\*\*

Jenny Smith at Council for a Livable World (phone 202-543-4100; fax 202-543-6297; or electronic mail at <jsmith@clw.org> )

OR

Kathy Crandall at the Disarmament Clearinghouse (phone 202-898-0150 extension 232; fax 202-898-0172; or electronic mail at <disarmament@igc.apc.org> )

Thank you in advance!

DRAFT

dgk 4/9

April 25, 1997

United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Attn. Defense/Foreign Policy Aide

Dear Senator,

We write to express our strong support for an initiative vital to U.S. national security -- the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This Treaty is important to protect our nation from the continuing threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

For decades, the test ban has consistently received bipartisan political support and the support of over 80% of the American public. After nearly three years of negotiations, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks were completed last year and the Treaty was opened for signature on September 23, 1996. President Clinton, the leaders of the other nuclear powers and over 160 other countries have signed the CTBT. Now, the signatory states must ratify the Treaty to effect its formal entry into force.

The CTBT strengthens America's national security by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the global nuclear danger. By establishing a permanent, "zero-yield" ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for any purpose, the CTBT would the potential for a new nuclear arms race because it impedes the development and prevent the deployment of new, sophisticated nuclear weapons designs.

In addition, the CTBT prevents non-nuclear and "threshold" states from carrying out the types of tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal. If the five declared nuclear weapon states ratify the test ban treaty, it would also strengthen the global norm against testing and weapons development that helps make the nuclear "have-not" nations far less inclined to try to develop nuclear arsenals. Thus, the CTBT is vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and the emergence of new nuclear weapons threats from America's potential nuclear adversaries, which could destabilize international security and pose a threat to U.S. interests.

The CTBT would also establish a far-reaching verification regime that includes a global network of sophisticated seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide monitoring stations and on-site inspection system that will provide unprecedented access to test sites to deter and detect any possible violation. Without the CTBT, our nation's ability to detect surreptitious nuclear testing

activities would be severely compromised.

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The United States must continue to provide global nuclear non-proliferation leadership by moving quickly to ratify the CTBT so that it may formally enter into force. We urge support for this historic treaty and hope that the Senate acts upon it no later than the end of this year.

For more information, please contact John Issacs at the Council for a Livable World (202-543-4100). Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

John Isaacs,  
Council for a Livable World

Daryl Kimball,  
Physicians for Social Responsibility

\*\*\*\*\*

TO SIGN-ON PLEASE RESPOND BY APRIL 24, 1997 5:00 PM (EST) TO:

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OR

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\*\*\*\*\*

Dear Friends,  
Here is an important endorsement of our work. Alice

>Return-Path: <JohnKlotz@compuserve.com>  
>Date: Tue, 8 Apr 1997 10:13:15 -0400  
>From: "John C. Klotz" <JohnKlotz@CompuServe.COM>  
>Subject: Sierra Club Letter  
>To: Alice Slater <aslater@IGC.APC.ORG>  
>Cc: Selma Brackman <WARPEACE@INTERPORT.NET>, Gary Ferdman <myriamm@AOL.COM>,  
> John Klotz <jklotz@ibm.net>, LCNP <lcnp@AOL.COM>,  
> Betty Obal <PAINTL@IGC.APC.ORG>, Bill Pace <WORLD FED@IGC.APC.ORG>,  
> Maurice Paprin <WRL@IGC.APC.ORG>, Clayton Ramey <CRAMEY@IGC.APC.ORG>,  
> Bre Reiber <PSRNYC@IGC.APC.ORG>, Roger Smith <DISARMTIMES@IGC.APC.ORG>,  
> Aaron Tovish <TOVISH@AOL.COM>, Alyn Ware <LXNP@AOL.COM>,  
> Cora Weiss <SRFNYUSA@IGC.APC.ORG>

>Alice and Everyone:

>I now have hard copy. Yes, they really signed it!!

>I want to particularly thank Alice and the gang at PNSR (Bobbie Linfield  
>and Doris Miller) who have given me so much encouragement the past few  
>years.

>Copy follows.

>JCK

><http://www.walrus.com/~jklotz/>

>-----  
>-----  
>subject:

> Sierra at the Un (NPT PrepComm)  
> Date:  
> Tue, 8 Apr 1997 07:06:15 -0400  
> From:  
> "John C. Klotz" <JohnKlotz@compuserve.com>  
> To:  
> rhea jezer <rjezer@ix.netcom.com>

>Dear Friends and Others:

>Yesterday San Francisco signed off on a letter to the Preparatory  
>Committee of Treaty States of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT  
>PrepComm) now meeting at the UN. As some of you may know, I was designated  
>as the Sierra Club's "Non-Governmental Organization" (NGO) representative  
>to the PrepComm. As a part of my functions, I drafted the statement for the  
>Club to the PrepComm which was signed yesterday. I am deeply indebted to  
>those in the Club who have been so supportive of my efforts of late -  
>particularly in the nuclear area.

>The Task Force for a Nuclear Free Future to which Jim Mays appointed me in  
>January 1996 was continued by Rhea Jezer and we are among the sponsors of a  
>forum being held at the NYC City Bar on April 26th. Betty Quick has been  
>particularly helpful and enthusiastic about that project.

>  
>That the Club is issuing a strong nuclear disarmament statement at the UN  
>is not just a victory for me, but for those who have counseled and advised  
>me in first seeking and obtaining a position where I could help make it  
>happen. In particular that's Susan Holmes our own colleague on the National  
>Board of Directors. Of the national volunteers, Ross Vincent who gave me  
>the green light and Anne Ehrlich who both pioneered the Club's nuclear  
>policy and wielded a light blue pencil as an editor of the statement. To  
>them, I also tender a heartfelt thank you.

>  
>Yet, without Susan's encouragement and advice on wending the Club's  
>corridors of power, the following statement would never have been made:

>  
>"April 7, 1997

>  
>Preparatory Committee of State Parties  
>to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
>United Nations  
>New York, New York

>  
>Dear Sirs and Mesdames:

>  
>The Sierra Club respectfully urges that the Preparatory Committee establish  
>as its highest priority the immediate initiation and conclusion by the year  
>2000 of negotiations for a nuclear weapons abolition convention that would  
>require the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound  
>framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

>  
>In 1970, by reason of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
>Nuclear Weapons (NPT), each of the State Parties undertook the obligation  
>to pursue in good faith, negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. In  
>1995, the Final Document of the NPT Review and Extension Conference stated  
>among its principals that compliance with Article VI required "the  
>immediate commencement and early conclusion on a convention banning the  
>production of fissile material for nuclear weapons" and the "determined  
>pursuit by the nuclear weapons States of systematic and progressive efforts  
>to reduce nuclear weapons ... with the ultimate goals of eliminating those  
>weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament."

>  
>On July 8, 1996, to these treaty obligations for nuclear disarmament  
>negotiations, was added the legal and moral imperative of the decision of  
>the International Court of Justice which held, among other things, that  
>"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a  
>conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects  
>under strict and effective international control."

>  
>For more than a hundred years, the members of the Sierra Club have  
>dedicated themselves to practice and promote the responsible use of the  
>Earth's ecosystems and resources. In recent years, the Club has enunciated  
>a policy of "environmental security" which called upon governments to take



15 East 26 St., Room 915  
New York, NY 10010  
212-726-9161 (tel)  
212-726-9160 (fax)  
aslater@igc.apc.org <email>

Please spread this notice far and wide!

**NUCLEAR WASTE ALERT!!**

S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 is on the MOVE!

**CALL YOUR SENATORS TODAY!**

**VOTE AGAINST FINAL PASSAGE!**

This bill would set the largest nuclear waste transport program in history in MOTION. It would send commercial and defense high-level waste on highways and railways to Nevada, for no good reason, other than to relieve the nuclear industry of their waste burden. In the process, the bill runs roughshod over environmental laws and environmental justice. ACT NOW!

The Details:

Sen. Murkowski (R-AK) introduced a substitute bill today, Wednesday April 9. Murkowski had been working with Sen. Bingaman (D-NM) on changes. As of today, the dealmaking has fallen apart, and Bingaman has stated he won't support the bill because Murkowski wasn't willing to make enough changes.

What are the changes?

The substitute includes some minor changes to the bill, but makes no truly substantive changes that would make the bill acceptable.

\*It changes the radiation release standard for Yucca Mtn. from 100mR to a standard based on the NAS study of a year ago. This study was widely trashed for its outrageous assumptions and methods.

\*It caps the size of the interim storage facility at Yucca Mtn. and requires 5% of the capacity be defense waste. (this isn't really much of a change from last year's bill).

\*It removes the preemption of Federal environmental law, but retains the preemption of State, Local, and Tribal laws.

The bill still would require an interim storage dump at the Nevada site within 24 months after Yucca Mtn is found NOT to be acceptable as a permanent repository. This provision was particularly damaging the deal Murkowski was trying to broker, because it requires waste to come to NV, even if NV is not the final resting place.

**HOW MUCH TIME IS LEFT?**

The bill probably will go through one more cloture vote (a vote to end a filibuster), probably on Friday.

**A VOTE ON FINAL PASSAGE COULD COME AS EARLY AS FRIDAY!**

**CALL THE DC OFFICE OF YOUR SENATOR NOW! (SWITCHBOARD - 202-224-3121)**

**NO! ON CLOTURE**

NO! ON FINAL PASSAGE

PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT, PROTECT JUSTICE, STOP NUCLEAR WASTE!

IMPORTANT TARGETS: Cleland (D-GA); Torricelli (D-NJ); Chaffee (R-RI); Lautenberg (D-NJ); Johnson (D-SD); Landrieu (D-LA).

Maureen Eldredge

Program Director

Military Production Network

2000 P St. NW, Suite 408

Washington, DC 20036

Ph: 202-833-4668 Fax:202-8334670

1. "Lott Seeks Vote on Chemical Arms Treaty," 4/9 Washington Post

2. "Senate Vote Now Likely on Chemical Arms Treaty," 4/9 New York Times

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Lott Seeks Vote on Chemical Arms Treaty

Helms Remains an Obstacle to Long-Delayed Action in Senate

By Thomas W. Lippman

Washington Post Staff Writer

Wednesday, April 9 1997; Page A12

The Washington Post

More than three years after beginning consideration, the Senate appears to be moving quickly toward a final decision on whether to ratify a treaty banning the production and use of poison gas weapons that is bitterly opposed by hard-line arms control opponents and many conservative Republicans.

Majority Leader Trent Lott (Miss.) said last night that he is seeking unanimous consent to put the treaty to a vote, perhaps as early as next week. In anticipation of Lott's move, Democratic leader Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.) dropped an announced plan to block other pending legislation in an effort to force Lott's hand.

In order to put the treaty known as the Chemical Weapons Convention to a vote, however, Lott needs the approval of Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), an entrenched foe of the agreement. Last night, aides to Helms said he is still not prepared to go along.

Helms told Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at a hastily scheduled committee hearing yesterday that "some in the administration are still stonewalling" on conditions Helms is seeking to place on U.S. participation in the international chemical control system created by the treaty.

Helms might be prepared to let the treaty emerge from his committee and go to a vote of the full Senate despite his objections, aides said, but only if Lott agrees to oppose the treaty when the full Senate takes it up.

If Lott agrees, supporters of the treaty said last night, the administration's appeal for a quick vote might backfire because it is unlikely that treaty supporters could get the two-thirds vote they need for ratification with Lott joining Helms in opposing it.

"There is no agreement on the Chemical Weapons Convention," Lott said in a statement last night. "I am meeting with senators and representatives of the administration tomorrow [Wednesday] and hope we can conclude an agreement. A number of issues -- both substantive and procedural -- need to be resolved, and I hope they will be."

The reason for the deadline atmosphere after more than three years is that 70 nations have already ratified the treaty. That's enough to put it into effect April 29 with or without U.S. participation. If the United States has not ratified it by that date, Albright said yesterday, the United States will be excluded for at least a year from an international enforcement system, no Americans will be members of international inspection teams and U.S. chemical manufacturers could face sanctions from participating nations.

Albright asked to make her first appearance before Helms's committee as secretary of state as part of the war of dueling national security celebrities between the administration and Helms. Each side has marshaled an array of former defense secretaries, arms control experts and senior military officers to support its case.

Yesterday morning, the committee heard three former secretaries of defense -- Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar

Weinberger and James Schlesinger -- denounce the treaty as unenforceable, unverifiable and a threat to U.S. security interests. They argued that the countries most likely to use poison gas weapons, such as Iraq, are unlikely to ratify the treaty and would violate it even if they did.

Albright asked to be heard because she thought the hearings on the treaty this week were stacked in favor of the opposition. Helms made clear yesterday that his much-publicized friendship with Albright does not extend to yielding to her entreaties on the chemical accord.

The intention of the treaty is to ban the production, sale, possession and use of nerve gas weapons and their component chemicals. Opponents say they approve of the goal but not of the instrument.

"It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will not work," Helms said.

It is too late to modify the treaty, but Helms has proposed a "resolution of ratification" that would place 30 conditions on U.S. ratification. He and the administration have reached agreement on 22, officials said, but those remaining are unacceptable to the White House, which regards them as "treaty-killers."

Helms is demanding that Chinese, Cubans and Iranians be excluded from inspection teams sent to this country; that the international enforcement organization in The Hague be liable for any damages suffered by leaks of proprietary business information from inspected U.S. firms; that international inspectors obtain criminal search warrants before visiting U.S. facilities; and that the United States retain the right to use tear gas in some military operations.

@CAPTION: Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright speaks with Sen. Jesse Helms before Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

\*\*\*\*\*

The New York Times  
April 9, 1997

Senate Vote Now Likely on Chemical Arms Treaty  
By STEVEN LEE MYERS

WASHINGTON -- With Democrats threatening to stall action on most other legislation, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., indicated Tuesday that the full Senate would vote on whether to approve a treaty to ban chemical weapons.

In a day of conflicting reports, the Democratic minority leader said Lott had pledged to bring the treaty to a vote before the pact takes effect in three weeks. Later, Lott issued a statement saying only that he hoped he could "conclude" such an agreement with the administration on Wednesday.

"A number of issues -- both substantive and procedural -- need to be resolved," Lott said in the statement issued Tuesday evening. "And I hope they will be soon."

Even as the prospects for a vote improved, and the administration's optimism that the treaty will get through the Senate, it faced intense attack by prominent conservatives. They appeared before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, whose chairman, Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, is one of the treaty's most steadfast opponents.

The critics -- three former secretaries of defense under Republican presidents, joined by a fourth who sent a letter -- argued that the treaty would do little to rid the world of chemical weapons.

Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense under President Ronald Reagan, said it would expose American chemical manufacturers to international scrutiny and even espionage by foreign inspectors, while it allowed countries that continue to stockpile chemical weapons to elude detection and punishment.

"It cannot be verified," Weinberger declared, "and it cannot be enforced."

Tuesday's hearing came only days after President Clinton held a pep rally on the White House's South Lawn with prominent Republican supporters of the treaty, including former Secretary of State James Baker III and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell.

The treaty, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It expands a looser ban on the use of poison gas in warfare first imposed by the Geneva Convention of 1925. The treaty, negotiated during the Reagan and Bush administrations and signed in the waning days of George Bush's presidency in 1993, has been ratified by 70 nations and takes effect on April 29, among them.

But even if the Senate does not approve it, the treaty still imposes restrictions on the exports of American chemical companies and subjects them to possible penalties.

In the jockeying Tuesday, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., warned that the Democrats would refuse to take action on any legislation "except in cases of emergency" unless the Republican leadership allowed a vote.

Daschle later dropped his threat after receiving assurances from Lott in a telephone conversation that the treaty would go to the floor of the Senate by next week, according to Daschle's spokeswoman, Ranit Schmelzer. By indicating to Daschle that the treaty would go to a vote, though not scheduling one, Lott appeared to put pressure on Helms to come to some agreement with the Clinton administration. Helms has insisted he would not allow the treaty out of his committee for a vote unless the administration did more to address his concerns.

In Tuesday's hearing, there was no sign that he was softening his opposition. Helms said the treaty would do nothing to protect American soldiers or citizens from chemical weapons, while exposing companies to burdensome regulations and unconstitutional inspections.

"Outside the Beltway, where people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call a bum deal," Helms said.

Lott also appeared to be pressuring the administration. Speaking to reporters at the Capitol, he said he did not think the April 29 date necessarily bound the United States, as the White House has strenuously argued. But he said it was a "major treaty" and every effort should be made to reach agreement before then.

Lott's spokeswoman, Susan Irby, said Tuesday night that Lott had discussed scheduling a vote by a unanimous consent agreement, a procedural move that can be blocked by any senator, including Helms.

But she added that if the administration wanted an agreement, it needed to "start making progress" on unrelated issues, including a reorganization of the State Department and affiliated agencies and a plan to pay back dues to the United Nations.

In addition to Weinberger, the committee heard criticism from James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld, secretaries of defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford.

Schlesinger derided the treaty's provisions that allow for inspections of chemical companies to insure that weapons are not being produced, saying that was "a godsend to foreign intelligence agencies."

In a letter, Richard Cheney, the secretary of defense under Bush, added his opposition.

"The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and the international community's record of responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical threat," Cheney wrote.

In a sign of the importance of the treaty to the administration, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright hastily

arranged an appearance Tuesday afternoon. She told the committee that the nation should not refuse the treaty simply because rogue states refuse to comply or try to cheat.

"When it comes to the protection of Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough," she said. "Those who abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by which all should be judged."

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
21 Dupont Circle, 5th Floor  
Washington, DC 20036  
Phone: 202-223-5956  
Fax: 202-785-9034  
<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/poison/>

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 4 LINES REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

## I. Unanimous Consent agreement for a date to vote on the CWC

Senators Lott and Daschle continue to negotiate a Unanimous Consent agreement. Most say that an agreement can be reached tomorrow or the next day.

## II. The Hearings

The Helms people are now suggesting that more hearings are needed. This may push the vote date back to April 23nd.

Today's hearings with panels that included Richard Pearle, Jeane Kirpatrick and Fred Ikle (opposed), and then Brent Scowcroft, Edward Rowney and Elmo Zumwalt (supportive) attracted much less media attention than yesterday's panels. Senator Helms stayed for the opponents panel and then called upon Senator Hagel (R-NE) to chair most of the supporters panel. Senator Biden stayed for both panels. Senators Kerry and Feinstein engaged the opponents panel in vigorous questioning, and then left before the supporters panel was completed. Several people suggested, including Senator Helms's staff, that Senator Feinstein became somewhat sympathetic with the opponents view of articles X and XI of the treaty.

## III. The Executive Branch

Given the possibility that the vote date may slide past the anticipated April 18 until the 22nd, the Executive branch is evaluating whether it can prepare the necessary materials in time to deposit the instruments of ratification prior to April 29th. They have twice changed the amount time they believe they need to do the job.

## IV. The Media

Mary McGory will do a piece in the Washington Post tomorrow or the next day. Richard Cohen has completed a story for the National Journal. Rick Newman did a story in this week's edition of Newsweek.

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

NUCLEAR TEST BAN ALERT: REPLY REQUESTED

\*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\* SIGN-ON LETTER \*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

April 9, 1997

TO: supporters of a comprehensive nuclear test ban  
FR: Daryl Kimball, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and  
John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World

RE: Request for Support on CTBT Sign-On Letter  
(Response Requested by APRIL 24, 1997)

The United States Senate is expected to debate and vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention during the week of April 14. Assuming that the Senate votes to ratify the CWC, a number of nuclear disarmament organizations hope to build on the CWC effort by urging the Clinton Administration and the Senate to begin consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1997.

Time is the greatest enemy of the CTBT and we need your help to ensure that this very important treaty moves forward as quickly as possible. We hope that other U.S.-based organizations will join us in signing this very simple letter to each member of the Senate that urges support and swift action on the CTBT.

We want to deliver this letter to Senate offices within days of the completion of Senate deliberations on the CWC. To be effective, we need your organization's support for this letter to demonstrate the breadth and range of interest in a nuclear test ban.

Further information on test ban issues developed by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers will be delivered to Capitol Hill during the week of May 5.

\*\*\*\*\*

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OR

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Thank you in advance!

DRAFT

dgk 4/9

April 25, 1997

United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Attn. Defense/Foreign Policy Aide

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For decades, the test ban has consistently received bipartisan political support and the support of over 80% of the American public. After nearly three years of negotiations, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks were completed last year and the Treaty was opened for signature on September 23, 1996. President Clinton, the leaders of the other nuclear powers and over 160 other countries have signed the CTBT. Now, the signatory states must ratify the Treaty to effect its formal entry into force.

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In addition, the CTBT prevents non-nuclear and "threshold" states from carrying out the types of tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal. If the five declared nuclear weapon states ratify the test ban treaty, it would also strengthen the global norm against testing and weapons development that helps make the nuclear "have-not" nations far less inclined to try to develop nuclear arsenals. Thus, the CTBT is vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and the emergence of new nuclear weapons threats from America's potential nuclear adversaries, which could destabilize international security and pose a threat to U.S. interests.

The CTBT would also establish a far-reaching verification regime that includes a global network of sophisticated seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide monitoring stations and on-site inspection system that will provide unprecedented access to test sites to deter and detect any possible violation. Without the CTBT, our nation's ability to detect surreptitious nuclear testing

activities would be severely compromised.

The CTBT would also end further radioactive pollution of the environment from testing. Since 1945, six nations have conducted 2,046 nuclear test explosions -- an average of one test every nine days. The 528 atmospheric tests conducted until 1980 spread dangerous radioactive fallout. Underground blasts create high-level nuclear waste contamination and many have "vented" radioactive gases. The U.S. Energy Department reports that 114 of the 723 U.S. nuclear tests since 1963 released radioactive material into the atmosphere.

The United States must continue to provide global nuclear non-proliferation leadership by moving quickly to ratify the CTBT so that it may formally enter into force. We urge support for this historic treaty and hope that the Senate acts upon it no later than the end of this year.

For more information, please contact John Issacs at the Council for a Livable World (202-543-4100). Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

John Isaacs,  
Council for a Livable World

Daryl Kimball,  
Physicians for Social Responsibility

\*\*\*\*\*

TO SIGN-ON PLEASE RESPOND BY APRIL 24, 1997 5:00 PM (EST) TO:

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## 'KILLER AMENDMENTS' SEEN ON TREATY

\*Afternoon News Highlights\*

(NEWS 04/09/97; 34 lines)

Item Key: 2461

## 'KILLER AMENDMENTS' SEEN ON TREATY

By Richard Sammon, CQ Staff Writer

Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, S.D., today said he expects "at least a dozen killer amendments" to be offered next week to an international chemical weapons treaty.

Daschle said he expects Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., to offer "many constraints" on the treaty as amendments, specifically ones that would carve out special implementation, inspection and verification procedures for the United States that would not apply to other signatories.

As many as 32 amendments may be offered, Daschle said, although many of those may be noncontroversial clarifying amendments.

Daschle said he has an "assurance" from Republican leaders that an agreement can be reached this week to call up the treaty (Treaty Doc 103-21) sometime next week. But no agreement is being discussed to set a time certain for a vote.

There is pressure to finish action on the treaty at least a few days before its April 29 effective date to provide time for administrative procedures that are necessary for ratification.

Daschle said the vote "is going to be close, but I think we have them." A two-thirds majority vote is necessary for treaties to be ratified.

Dear All,

## UK GENERAL ELECTION UPDATE

On the Web on Thursday there is to be a discussion on nuclear weapons. Guest speakers are myself and Lionel Trippet. The web site has been established by VIRGIN, the Independent newspaper and the homeless newspaper "The Big Issue".

There is also a chat line where comments can be made on the key issues around nuclear weapons.

The discussion will be on-line from 1900 hrs till 2100 hrs (BST) on Thursday 10 APRIL on the web site - virgin.net.

When you get their visit the General Election site and the discussion area.

Have fun and hope to read your pearls of wisdom on-line tomorrow night or see your comments up there between now and 1 May.

## WHY TRIDENT SHOULD BE AN ELECTION ISSUE

All three main political Parties are committed to retaining nuclear weapons, by doing so they are committing Britain to:-

- \* spending at least  $\pounds$ 1,500 million pounds each year on Trident;
- \* being treated as a pariah on the world arms control and disarmament stage;
- \* another five years of adding to the already vast radioactive and toxic waste legacy of past nuclear weapons production, and seemingly:
- \* starting discussions on/or to decide upon a replacement for Trident, as this decision will have to be made at the turn of the century.

It is sad to see so little of substance in the Party manifestos on an issue which is a fundamental part of Britain's international relations and our defence and foreign policy.

The nuclear status quo cannot survive. The self-denying ordinance of the non-nuclear powers is beginning to break down. We either move deliberately towards global nuclear disarmament or slide towards ever-increasing nuclear proliferation. Our political leaders have an opportunity that will not be repeated - to show true vision and courage, and play a positive part in the disarmament process.

What is required, is not a deafening silence on this key area of policy. But a commitment to practical and realistic steps that

will fulfill Britain's obligation towards measures that will halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons and eventually ban them.

#### WHO WILL BE TAKING PART

William Peden - A CND Activist for over thirteen years. An expert on British nuclear weapons policy. Presently the Parliamentary/Political Officer for CND.

Lionel Tripett - A CND activist for more years than anyone can remember. Present the Peace Education Officer for CND responsible for promoting nuclear disarmament in schools and colleges in the UK and abroad.

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CND is part of ABOLITION 2000 - A global network to eliminate nuclear weapons

Dear All,

I have been asked to put this out to everyone. It was written by Sid Jeffries, a member of CND Council and of CND's Campaigns Group. It is his own interpretation although CND broadly agrees with it.

I thought it may be of use to campaigners out there. Particularly to use during the PrepCom.

In peace

William Peden  
CND Campaigns Team

The Advisory Opinion  
of the International Court of Justice  
on the threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.

i) The threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in all conceivable circumstances.

ii) The Advisory Opinion implies that even "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a state would be at stake" no presently available or conceivable nuclear device could be threatened or used legally, that is without violating humanitarian law.

iii) Such illegality, whether by threat or use, constitutes a war crime, and the Court confirmed that the Nuremberg Principles apply to nuclear weapons.

iv) The I.C.J. unanimously emphasised the legal obligation of the nuclear weapon states, under Article VI of the N.P.T. "to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith."

This interpretation has been endorsed by Peter Weiss, Chairperson of the Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy, A. van den Biesen, Sec. of IALANA, and Cdr. Rob Green R.N. (Rtd.) and George Farebrother, Chair and Sec. of the World Court Project (U.K.).

The Dispositif (2.D) makes it quite clear by a unanimous vote that, without exception, "A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law ..."

The Dispositif goes on (2.E) to state that, "It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law,

"However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."

It is quite explicit here that there exists a general prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons except in exceptional circumstances. The question revolves entirely around a clear understanding of what these exceptional circumstances can be said to embrace.

Firstly, the Court did not find that the threat or use of any presently available or conceivable nuclear weapon fails within the compass of this extreme exception. Since there is a general prohibition against their use because they contravene the "strict requirements" of "the international law applicable in armed conflict and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law," they remain prohibited even in an extreme circumstance because, allowing for the principles of proportionality and necessity, the Court affirmed that the same restraints apply in all circumstances.

The Opinion, indeed, specifically notes (para. 95) that, "In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons..... the use of such weapons is scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements." The slight doubt present in this observation ( i.e. "scarcely reconcilable" ) is the same doubt expressed in the preceding para. 94 where the Court expresses scepticism that "a limited use," such as "the 'clean' use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons" is "feasible".

However, the Court considers it does not have "sufficient elements of fact" for an absolute determination. Since there is no insufficiency in "the elements of fact" (Dispositif [2E] and paras. 94 & 95) at the disposal of the Court with regard to presently available or conceivable nuclear weapons, this insufficiency necessarily applies to future technology which might possibly satisfy these "strict requirements."

Para. 94 also expresses the Court's belief that any tendency in the use of any nuclear weapon "to escalate into all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons" would fail these "strict requirements" and the Court's scepticism that this tendency can be overcome.

But para. 94 contains a further crucial point : that, even "supposing such limited use were feasible," a further condition must be met. Namely, "the precise circumstances justifying use." This is amplified in paras. 96 & 97, and in the Dispositif.

The Dispositif (2E) refers to the Court's inability to conclude definitively on two different grounds. One is "the elements of fact at its disposal," discussed above. Secondly the Court refers to a restraint due to "the current state of international law."

This is clarified both in the Dispositif and in paras. 96 & 97 where the Court observes that the only possible circumstance where a state's use of a technologically acceptable nuclear weapon may possibly escape the

general prohibition is "an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which its very survival would be at stake."

The Court, therefore, can be understood to have issued a general, that is comprehensive, prohibition against the threat or use of nuclear weapons while necessarily defining any exceptions to this general prohibition.

The Advisory Opinion signals that any exceptions to this general prohibition must satisfy two criteria. Firstly the nuclear weapon used must satisfy the "strict requirements of international humanitarian law," a condition beyond any technology presented to the Court. And secondly, even then, it could only, possibly, escape the prohibition of the law if used in extreme circumstances.

The Court was unable to determine an absolute ban but in specific cases there can be no indeterminate judgement. The prohibition is general unless an exceptional case can satisfy all the conditions for legality.

I believe such legality for the threat or use of any nuclear weapon is presently inconceivable.

It should also be noted that para. 97 (quoted above) clarifies the Dispositif's reference (2E) to "the very survival of a State." "A state" refers exclusively to the state threatening or using nuclear weapons.

This specifically calls into question NATO's common defence policy, the so-called 'nuclear umbrella,' under which U. S. nuclear weapons are stationed within other states, ostensibly for their protection. NATO plans to extend its common nuclear defence policy to new members among the eastern European states this summer, on the very anniversary of the ICJ Advisory Opinion.

Another salient point is contained in para. 48 where the Court confirms that the possession of nuclear weapons does indeed constitute a threat of their use. The prohibition of the Court makes no distinction between threat and use.

The Court specifically refers to the "clean" use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons and does not hide its doubts that these can meet the "strict requirements" of humanitarian law. Here we enter the daunting domain of technology. Nevertheless we must attempt to address this question to justify our full confidence in the strong wording of this interpretation of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion.

Dr. Eric Grove is a distinguished British naval historian and defence expert who has written and lectured extensively on maritime strategy and has researched the history of the British Bomb. Dr. Grove has given his opinion that "with nuclear weapons above about 10 kilotons the blast and heat effects predominate over radiation; below 10 KT radiation effects predominate. The classic example is the neutron bomb : with a yield of some 5 KT it produces some of the radiation effects of a 20 KT weapon. Hence a nuclear weapon of less than about 10 KT yield is indistinguishable

from a chemical or biological weapon - for which there is no minimum acceptable size." Dr Frank Barnaby, ex-Aldermaston scientist and a member of the British Test Team at Maralinga, Australia, endorses this view.

A graphic illustration of the meaning of the ICJ Advisory Opinion is provided by Peter Weiss, one of the highest possible legal authorities on this issue, having been intimately involved in the presentation of the ICJ World Court Project case to the ICJ.

"..the really important part of the Court's 'possible exception' is its insistence that even in an extreme circumstance case, the threat and use of one or more nuclear weapons would have to conform to the basic rules of humanitarian law. So, suppose the IRA got hold of a multi-megaton nuke and threatened to wipe out Wales and all of Southern England unless the UK Parliament signed an act ceding the northern counties to the Republic, it would not be justified for the UK to threaten to wipe out all of Ireland, or actually to do so. Then there is always the hypothetical case of a small, 'harmless' nuke being used to destroy a mass destruction nuke before the latter can be used to threaten the survival of a state. The answer to that one is that, even if there were such a thing as a harmless nuke, which is highly doubtful, the same purpose could be achieved by conventional weapons."

Only this understanding of the Advisory Opinion can justify the observation of Court President Bedjaoui : "I cannot insist strongly enough that the inability of the Court to go further ... cannot in any way be interpreted (his emphasis) as itself evidence of a half-open door for the recognition of the legal permissibility of using nuclear weapons.

I believe my interpretation accurately and succinctly gives the sense of the Opinion in popular campaigning terms. It is presented here to challenge the much more limited and, I believe, inaccurate interpretations of the ICJ Opinion which have been put forward, despite clearly contradicting the comments of ICJ President Bedjaoui.

I believe the significance of this interpretation is not substantially different to that of more technically accurate phrasings, such as, "The Court found no legal circumstance for any threat, let alone use, of nuclear weapons." -- WCP (UK) Chair Rob Green. Or IPB Vice President Fredrick S. Heffermehl's formulation : "The Court itself was unable to imagine any situation where use could be legal." Or Peter Weiss' interpretation "The threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any conceivable circumstances.

Peter Weiss has observed, "CND can adopt (their) formulation, so long as it is prepared to challenge those objecting to (their) formulation by asking them to come up with a credible scenario in which nuclear weapons could be used to insure the survival of a nuclear-threatened state without violating humanitarian law."

The Court undoubtedly recognised that there exists no body able to prosecute the illegal threat or use of nuclear weapons. It is surely in

this light that it took upon itself, unasked, the responsibility for affirming, unanimously, the obligation to prosecute nuclear disarmament.

This obligation is expressly the responsibility of all "182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"

Sid Jeffries

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Today's Christian Science Monitor (4/8/97) under the title "US Quietly Adds A Bunker-Buster To Nuclear Arsenal" describes an atomic bomb to be used by the B2 stealth bomber to destroy underground bunkers. The article states "The 12-foot long B61 -11 drills deep into the earth before exploding in a small blast whose shockwaves can crush targets hundreds of feet below."

"One result could be to further stiffen the Russian parliament's refusal to ratify the 1993 START II accord on reducing nuclear warheads."

There's more in the article.

I've been unable to send a message to Sherman against the E-mail address that is on our roster. Speaking to his son, there may be a mistake, but a message sent to the address suggested by Sherman's son has also been returned to me as undeliverable. It's problems like this that I'm hoping Sherman and I can work out to the benefit of all our board members.

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Wed, 09 Apr 1997 14:09:14 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 9 Apr  
>To: nfzpsc@gn.apc.org  
>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY  
>  
>Weds 9 Apr 1997  
>  
>97-8413 Knutsford-based NNC wins #2m contract in Chernobyl improvement  
> programme. MEN 8 Apr  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
>  
>

Stewart Kemp (nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)

Poisoning the Atmosphere

By Mary McGrory

This week's trashing by three old hawks of the treaty to ban poison gas was as diverting as it was bound to be -- after all, it's an all-Republican idea, negotiated by Ronald Reagan, signed by George Bush's secretary of state. The best moment came when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), who always weeps for the strong, gavelled down Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) for picking on James Schlesinger, who is still the most arrogant man in Washington. But none of it helped Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), who is torn between an 84 percent approval rating for the treaty and the bared-teeth opposition of his right wing in the Senate.

Lott tried to ease himself off the horns of his dilemma by telling Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) that he would try to get the treaty, which was signed just before Bush left office in 1993, to the floor by unanimous consent. How is not clear, since conservatives are lining up behind Helms to throw a monkey wrench into the works.

The three Republican defense secretaries had little to add to the long discussion. Mostly they demonstrated how little they have changed since they were the lords of the Earth. They hated arms control treaties then, and they still do, and they distrust foreigners, too. In an era of multilateralism, they brought back the robust days of "We're Number One."

Donald Rumsfeld, who served under Gerald Ford, was less didactic than the two others, perhaps as a consequence of the humbling experience of having been Bob Dole's national campaign chairman. But Caspar Weinberger, hunched and waxen pale, was as brisk and dismissive as he was when he ran the Pentagon and bought two of every weapon ever wheeled out for his inspection and regarded arms control agreements as an assault on the country's manhood and intelligence. Schlesinger, who did the Pentagon for Ford and has Energy and the CIA in his portfolio, lounged in his chair, one arm thrown over the back, and grandly told Democrats they were "on the wrong wicket."

Kerry put a direct question to him. Would we be better off without a treaty, better off being totally outside the controls being set up? He asked for a yes or no answer, which is alien to Schlesinger's garrulous style. Kerry asked him twice in his gentlemanly way, but Helms banged the gavel. "You are talking to a former director of the CIA," he bellowed at Kerry. "He should know what he is talking about."

The idea that Schlesinger needs a defender is somewhat of a misreading of his assertive personality, and Helms's wrath may have come from someone who knows he is losing an argument. It is of course painful to him that the hawks' idol, Ronald Reagan, started the mischief on poison gas. He signed a bill to eliminate by 2004 the use, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Weinberger and Schlesinger laid down a barrage of red herrings and dire rumors. Schlesinger said the treaty would be "a godsend to foreign intelligence agents" because of its provisions for international inspections of chemical weapons installations. Kerry braided their alarms and neuroses together into a question to trap them. Wouldn't the provision for inspection and shared technology reduce the offensive capability of chemical weapons, and wasn't that the purpose of the treaty and their purpose as well?

Weinberger said crossly that it was a "complicated" formulation.

Retired Gen. Colin Powell and a host of other military luminaries have endorsed the convention, as it is called. And public opinion is at a favorable high tide.

A more ambitious arms control group has launched a more daring arms control initiative. Abolition 2000 had a meeting at the National Press Club to introduce the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons by the millennium. Their biggest weapon: a poll by Celinda Lake, which shows that the same number of Americans who want the chemical weapons convention approved also favor the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Eighty-four percent, regardless of age, sex, race or party, said they would feel "safer" if all nations, including the United States, destroy their stockpiles.

They reached their conclusions independently of retired Gen. Lee Butler and scores of other like-minded military people. Daschle is not surprised. He encounters the same sentiment in South Dakota: "The two big issues for them are campaign reform and nukes, and they don't feel that Congress has the guts to solve either one. They regard Russia as a friend now; they don't know how our weapons are targeted or why, especially the young."

Someone should tell the Republican senators. They talk about conditions for voting on poison gas, which include breaking the ABM Treaty so they can build an anti-missile defense. Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) toils for the treaty confident it will somehow pass, with the help of yet uncounted Republicans.

"It would be difficult to explain why you voted no to a rational audience," he said.

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RTw 04/09 1738 Australia's Butler criticizes nuclear powers

By Evelyn Leopold

UNITED NATIONS, April 9 (Reuter) - Australia's U.N. ambassador Richard Butler, a leading proponent of disarmament, on Wednesday criticised a joint statement by the five nuclear powers as nearly empty of content.

"There are no specific proposals for further nuclear disarmament," he told a news conference. "Why don't they step forward and say 'we will take immediate steps to reduce the danger.'"

The statement of the five -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China, was made to a conference of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) late on Tuesday.

China for the first time joined the other four in issuing Tuesday's joint declaration. Beijing refused in the past, saying reference to its "no-first-strike" nuclear policy had to be included even if the others did not share it. The issue was avoided in the Tuesday statement.

The five outlined steps that had been taken since 1995, including signing on to nuclear free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, and progress made at a recent Russia-US summit in Helsinki in getting preliminary agreement on reducing more nuclear war heads by 2008.

They also pointed to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, signed by almost all countries in September 1996. Butler was instrumental in bringing the proposed treaty to a vote.

This week's NPT meeting was the first since the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, the 25th anniversary of the pact. To get the extension, the five powers had to promise they would take specific steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Under the pact non-nuclear states pledge to work towards getting rid of nuclear weapons in return for a promise by non-nuclear powers not to acquire them.

"A lot of countries went through real pain," Butler said. "Their deepest fear was that nuclear weapons states would pocket the extension and walk away as they did in the past."

"But I don't see in this statement enough specificity," he said.

South Africa and other non-nuclear states want the meeting to begin negotiating a treaty, to be completed by 2000, binding nuclear powers never to use the bomb against a state without atomic weapons, even in the event of war.

But the current session will produce no specific plans and is part of an annual review of the treaty.

South Africa, the only country to build a secret nuclear arsenal and then dismantle them, was responsible for forging the compromise that led to an indefinite extension of the NPT.

REUTER

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Vijai Nair wrote:

I am not a supporter of the CTBT in its present form as I agree entirely with the reservations that my Government [India] has with the text that was manoeuvred through the UNGA without having been rightly cleared by the CD. The induction of the B 61-mod 11 and the continued indulgence in subcritical tests are ample proof that the CTBT, as interpreted by the US Administration is designed to give technologically advanced states, endowed with abundant resources and a well established data base from which to proceed, the ability to carry on with vertical nuclear proliferation.

However, I do believe that a properly defined and wholly tied up CTBT is essential for our crucial objective - THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Therefore while agreeing with your concept to bombard Senators with material to get the CTBT ratified in 1997, I cannot help but draw your attention to certain flaws in the text of your proposed draft.

[A] "Now, the signatory states must ratify the Treaty to effect its formal entry into force." COMMENT: Whether signatories ratify this Treaty or not, it cannot come into force when this act is predicated on ratification by specific states that have refused to sign the Text and did not even give it the consensus to pass through the CD. I have no doubt that India will not give its consent to the CTBT in its present form. The act of ratification is futile if the Treaty has to be renegotiated [altered] after three years.

[B] "By establishing a permanent, "zero-yield" ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for any purpose, the CTBT would [?] the potential for a new nuclear arms race because it impedes the development and prevent the deployment of new, sophisticated nuclear weapons designs." COMMENT: In so far as the US Administration is concerned this factor has already been proven redundant by the development, production and induction of the B 61- mod 11 bomb.

[C] "In addition, the CTBT prevents non-nuclear and "threshold" states from carrying out the types of tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal." COMMENT: This belief is badly misplaced. Nothing stops non-signatory states from conducting a nuclear test if and when that states security compulsions demand. The national security of these states is as paramount to their citizens as that of the US is to US citizens. I am sure the Indian Government holds this view - its self restraint notwithstanding.

[D] "If the five declared nuclear weapon states ratify the test ban treaty, it would also strengthen the global norm against testing and weapons development that helps make the nuclear "have-not" nations far less inclined to try to develop nuclear arsenals." COMMENT: The inclination to develop and field nuclear weapons by states is not a function of ratification of a Treaty by states that have thousands of nuclear weapons, but that of the threat perceptions engendered by the refusal of the latter to agree to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

I am penning these thoughts with a view that the Abolition Caucus, while continuing the good work of convincing their governments to eliminate nuclear

weapons, also works to buttoning up the loop holes that have been left in the questionable process of arms control agreements so that they are truly meaningful. I have no doubt that the easiest thing would be to convince my Government not to exercise its nuclear option if the global community agreed to institute a global, honest and viable nuclear weapons convention that would have no exceptions.

Best of luck. Warm regards.

Vijai Nair

\*\*\*\*\*Executive Director

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Date: April 9, 1997

Statement of Secretary Federico Peña  
On the Resignation of Deputy Secretary Charles B. Curtis  
And the Nomination of Elizabeth Moler  
As Deputy Secretary of Energy

I deeply regret Charlie Curtis' decision to submit his resignation. Mr. Curtis is a man of great intellect and excellent judgment, with a strong commitment to public service. Although we have only worked

together a short time, I have benefited from his expertise and wise counsel. I have also seen the tremendous respect and regard that Department of Energy employees hold for him. I know I speak for the President and all employees at the Department when I say that he will be missed.

Mr. Curtis has served as Deputy Secretary since August 1995, and as Under Secretary of Energy since February 1994. As Deputy Secretary, he served as chief operating officer of the Department and had direct responsibility for the management and administration of national security, energy, and science and technology programs. He has helped lead the Department's national security programs out of a Cold War environment into a reconfigured weapons complex focused on maintaining

the weapons stockpile without testing and reducing the spread of nuclear materials worldwide. Under his leadership, our national laboratories have moved toward improved management while ensuring the nation remains the world leader in basic and applied science and engineering. Charlie Curtis has had a lasting impact on our nation's energy and national security policies, and I wish him the very best in his future endeavors.

I am, however, very pleased with President Clinton's announcement today of his intention to nominate as Deputy Secretary Elizabeth Moler. Ms. Moler is presently Chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Prior to joining FERC in 1988, she served as senior counsel to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and worked for the late Senator Henry M. Jackson and for Senator J. Bennett Johnston.

She will serve as chief operating officer, and I will rely on her management expertise, her understanding of energy issues, her leadership, and her wise counsel to help ensure that the Department of Energy continues to deliver more results at less cost for American taxpayers. With her expertise and experience with utility issues, she will be a tremendous resource to help determine how our nation faces some of the most fundamental changes in how electricity is delivered to homes, communities and businesses nationwide. I could not be more pleased with this nomination, and I look forward to having Betsy join the DOE team.

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From: Disarmament Clearinghouse

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Dear Howard,

Next week, FOR will be sending a notice to local groups and key contacts about the need to support passage of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In your March letter asking FOR to endorse the CWC, you mentioned that the Senate will consider the treaty in mid-April. Do you now have more precise information about when it is going up for ratification in the Senate?

Also, do you perhaps have a list of senators who are the "swing" votes in the decision? Such a list could be very helpful in organizing FOR chapters to become active and lobby for the treaty's passage.

Thanks very much!

Peace,  
Claire Cocco

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## SENATE MAJORITY LEADER HOLDS REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING

APRIL 10, 1997

SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR TRENT LOTT (R-MS)

We are still working on substance and procedure on how we move on the conventional weapons convention.

Again, I think we've made progress there. I've met and talked with administration officials. It looks like we may be able to resolve a couple of other issues we were very worried about, very concerned about -- search and seizure provisions. We haven't got the language worked out but I believe the administration is indicating that they think they can do something in that area that would help our concern some.

Also, we think maybe we're going to get an agreement on the riot control use of tear gas. So, we're getting down to two or three very critical issues that will still probably not be agreed to and will have to be debated and voted on on the floor of the Senate. We're looking at the time frame. We do expect to get started on the issue next week probably in the form of the bill, S-495, I believe it is.

Then, it would be followed by taking up the chemical weapons issue early in the next week. We do have the Passover period which gives us a little bit of a time problem, of that Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday.

But we believe we can get it to a consideration and then see how it plays out.

QUESTION: Not next week, the week after?

LOTT: We will begin on it next week, on the process. But to make sure we have plenty of time to debate it and also a closed session of the Senate to hear information that is classified. It takes some time. So, you're talking about, you know, maybe as long as 15 hours of general debate. But we're talking about a limited number of amendments with, you know, limits on amendments in the areas where there has been agreement reached.

But we think it would take the better part of probably four or five days.

All right, questions?

QUESTION: Which one are you going to go to, definitively it's the next...

LOTT: No, it's not necessarily the next issue. In fact, we will have some intervening issues. We are still working on seeing if we can clear the nomination of Pete Peterson to be ambassador. We think that

the Alexis Herman nomination may be ready for consideration next week to be secretary of labor.

That would probably take some time because there are some issues that have been raised that have to be answered for the senators before they would want to vote on that nomination. So, things like that could intervene.

QUESTION: Have you made progress with the administration on your parallel foreign policy issues that you've mentioned?

LOTT: Yes I think we have made progress. And I don't think maybe we've made enough of that. There were some very important issues that we call parallel issues to the weapons treaty or convention issue. One of course was UN reform. Now we're very unsatisfied with the way money is spent. And how much spent at the United Nations. We think that our fee that we are charged to be in the UN is unfair, it needs to be modified.

So we have set up a working group on that. We've met with Secretary Albright twice. Once when she was actually still at the UN with Bill Richardson and a bipartisan bicameral group. And we have sort of identified the areas of greatest concern, what we think the arrearage is. And we're beginning to work on a way to deal with that. So I think progress has been made there.

Also on State Department reauthorization, Chairman Helms has received assurances and reassurances and multiple assurances, but I still think we're going to have to get a little more specificity in that area as to what might be involved and when we can expect some action on that and the president's cooperation.

But very, very importantly -- you know, we feel that the administration is got to understand that treaties are strictly a two way street that under the Constitution involves the Senate.

They've been holding back treaties. They come up here and say oh you've got to move the treaties we want while holding back treaties that we're very interested in and concerned about and think we should be involved in advise and consent.

I identified three of those in a letter to the president, January 8.

LOTT: I got a response March 21, that was the date from Sandy Berger. I actually got the letter just last week. But they did indicate they agreed with us. And they were going to send up two of the three treaties, the conventional forces in Europe treaty, the demarcation issue with regards to ABM. They still don't agree with us on multi-lateralization where the former Soviet Union countries have been, you know, involved. But they are separate countries now.

We think that the Senate should consider that since there are additional countries being involved not just Russia. So, we'll continue to discuss that one but they are indicating they are going to send two out of three. I think that is an important development. I think it is a

concession on the part of the administration. And that, I view as a step in the right direction.

## I. Date for a vote on CWC

At a press conference of opponents to the CWC, it was announced that Senator Lott will schedule a vote on the CWC for April 24. A unanimous consent agreement outlining the terms of that vote remain unclear. Some congressional staff say that there is a "gentleman's agreement" between Senators Lott and Daschle on April 24th as the vote date.

April 24th as the date for a vote troubles some senate staff because the executive branch stated that they needed at least 6 days to prepare the instruments of ratification. Moreover, a treaty must be "enrolled by the Senate," which can take any where from 2 to 14 days.

## II. More Hearings

Senator Helms plans to call additional hearings on the CWC. Verification and legal issues are among the group of topics he plans to cover. These hearings will take place next week on Tuesday and Wednesday.

## III. Alternatives to the chemical weapons ban

Senator Lott stated that S. 495 the "Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act" will be considered next Wednesday on the Senator floor. There is no unanimous consent agreement on the amount of time the Senate will allocate to consideration of this bill. Some fear that this is another way for arms control opponents to run out the clock on the CWC. Senator Leahy, a key Judiciary Committee member, will probably block this bill.

## IV. CWC opponents release poll

Frank Gaffney and an informal group of convention opponents released a poll prepared by Frank Luntz. These opponents claim that the poll shows that the American people do not support the CWC. The questions focus in on particular parts of the treaty. There were more treaty supporters (4) in the audience of this press conference than there were journalists (1). We are reviewing the results of this Luntz poll with outside experts.

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## Disarmament Intelligence Review

### 1997 NPT Briefing 2: Getting Started

(written by Rebecca Johnson, with thanks to Sharon Riggle.)

The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT Parties finally got underway late on Monday, April 7, with the election of Pasi Patokallio of Finland as Chair and adoption of an amended agenda. Early challenges over the allocation of Chairs among the PrepComs and disagreements over the agenda were resolved in prior consultations.

Before Patokallio, a representative from the Western grouping of NPT States Parties, could be elected, the head of the Secretariat, Engeniy Gorkovskiy, informed the PrepCom of an 'understanding' reached among States Parties. According to this understanding, a representative of the Eastern European Group of States would chair the second PrepCom in 1998, and a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) representative would be proposed for the third PrepCom in 1999 and also the presidency of the Review Conference in 2000. Poland and Ukraine later called for the presidency of the Review Conference in 2005 to go to a member of the Eastern European grouping. Few expect the outmoded cold war group system to remain unchanged for that long.

The PrepCom also agreed that states that wished to observe (Brazil, Pakistan and Israel) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could attend open sessions. The opening of the PrepCom was delayed several hours due to the refusal by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as the successor state to Yugoslavia's seat. In the end this dispute and a further problem over the membership of North Korea were allayed by the non-appearance of the representatives of these two countries.

The first full day of the PrepCom was given to a general debate and exchange of views, with statements from 38 delegations: the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated states, France on behalf of the five declared nuclear weapon states (NWS), Indonesia, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, China, Russia, the United States, Philippines, Ghana, Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Singapore, Mongolia, South Korea, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Norway, Poland, Malaysia, Switzerland, Japan and Viet Nam.

While each delegation emphasised the major issues that it wanted the review process to address, few tackled the difficult questions of how the enhanced review system should (or could) be implemented. Many stressed the new features of accountability and the necessity for identifying future action, in addition to reviewing the past, but there was a paucity of concrete proposals or ideas for how the new process should operate. South Africa and others had insisted on amendments to the draft agenda to leave it with enough flexibility to consider subsidiary bodies, sub-groups or intersessional working groups and how decisions or debates would be recorded. The United States warned that 'treating the process as a referendum' on the efforts of some of the parties (taken to mean the NWS) or 'giving unequal emphasis to any of the Treaty's goals' (viewed as a reference to nuclear disarmament) 'would be neither productive nor constructive and certainly would not serve our shared interests in creating a meaningful and effective process'.

The PrepCom did not seek to change its rules of procedure at this point. Although main committees will not be established separately in this PrepCom, there was general acceptance of Patokallio's proposal to cluster the issues covered by the Treaty and by the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O) according to whether they address nuclear disarmament, nuclear energy or safeguards. Discussion on the nuclear disarmament cluster will begin on Wednesday April 9 in a closed session, from which observers, press and NGOs will be excluded.

## How to proceed

Arguing that this first PrepCom was initiating 'a qualitatively different process' than the previous NPT reviews, Canada proposed that each session should produce 'a distilled compilation of proposals, not a consensus document'. Using the structure of the NPT, with recommendations under the preamble and each of the Treaty's ten articles, Canada proposed a 'rolling document' which would be an inventory of 'views, evaluations and proposals...as an evolving basis for eventual negotiations on recommendations to go forward to the 2000 Review Conference'. Backing Canada's ideas, New Zealand also suggested that 'sub-groups' could be appointed to work in more depth on some issues, within the PrepComs and/or intersessionally. South Africa proposed that the Chair could facilitate decision-making by working with a smaller, representative group of about 25 key states, akin to the President's Group set up by the 1995 Review Conference president, Jayantha Dhanapala. South Africa also left open the question of an intersessional subsidiary body to facilitate conclusion of work on security assurances by the year 2000.

The EU considered that the PrepCom 'remains preparatory in nature' with the job of recommending, while 'the Review Conference itself decides', a position strongly echoed by China and the United States. To report from one PrepCom to another, the EU favoured a 'neutral mechanism', such as a Chair's summary not requiring consensus, and proposed that outgoing and incoming Chairs should consult each other in the periods between two meetings. The EU took the view that subsidiary bodies could only be established within the main committees of an actual Review Conference and argued for decision-making at the PrepCom to be based on consensus. Japan also advocated that the PrepComs should produce some form of a Chair's summary report, with annexes, with a final report from the last PrepCom meeting consisting of two parts: review and recommendations. Indonesia, however, preferred that a draft final document be developed as a rolling text and negotiated in the PrepComs, arguing that intersessional meetings 'with no financial implications' could facilitate the negotiations on a rolling text. Indonesia supported consensus-based decision-making, but also proposed that voting could be used if all attempts to achieve consensus had been exhausted.

Where several delegations, including South Africa, New Zealand and Canada, regarded the P&Os as dynamic and updateable yardsticks, Japan argued against revising the P&O. Instead, the Review Conference should aim to formulate a

new set of objectives, 'taking into account views expressed in discussions held prior to and during the Conference'. Canada called the P&O a 'means to an end'. The EU, United States, Mexico, China and others stressed that the process was to be centred on the Treaty itself. China said that the P&Os derived from the NPT, which remains the 'source', and also stressed that "'review' is not 'negotiation'", and the NPT process 'should not replace the ongoing or future work of the CD'.

Japan and Indonesia argued that from now on PrepComs and the Review Conference should be held in New York (for continuity, participation and to keep costs down). Switzerland wanted past precedent to be followed, with the Review Conferences and at least some of the PrepComs being held in Geneva.

The major issues

Although the EU, China and the United States stressed that there should be balance among the main issues, it was clear from the statements of Mexico, Switzerland, South Africa, Malaysia, Algeria, Indonesia and many others that nuclear disarmament was the highest priority. The importance of universality was also emphasised, but with few practical ideas for bringing the few

remaining hold-out states on board. France made a statement on behalf of itself, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States which expressed 'our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those of article VI.' The NWS also reaffirmed their commitment to early entry into force of the CTBT and to immediate negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile materials (fissban).

## Nuclear Disarmament

Many delegations (especially NAM) referred to important milestones in 1996: concluding the CTBT by September; the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July; the Canberra Commission report in August; the statement from 61 retired Generals and Admirals in December, and so on.

Many states also encouraged ratification of START II and welcomed the Helsinki Summit agreement by the US and Russia to initiate START III negotiations. Russia and the United States listed their achievements in reducing their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Several delegations argued for immediate implementation of measures identified by the Canberra Commission, such as taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from missiles, ending deployment of non-strategic weapons outside the NWS territories, and for all the NWS to commit to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

South Africa put on record its concern about the 'non-proliferation implications' of the planned expansion of NATO and consideration of 'the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of the European Defence Policy'. Concerns about NATO were also expressed by China and Belarus, with both China and Russia emphasising that nuclear weapons should only be deployed on the NWS' own territory.

Opinion was divided over what the PrepComs and review process should do on nuclear disarmament. NAM countries, including Mexico, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria and Iran, pushed for an ad hoc committee and for negotiations to commence in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) based on the 20-year timetable identified in the programme of action supported by 28 of the 30 NAM countries in the G-21. Malaysia called for negotiations to start in 1997 with a view to early conclusion of a nuclear weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. The commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention was supported by 115 states, including China (which reiterated support in its statement), in a vote in the UN General Assembly in December 1996 (51/45M). The call was endorsed by a majority of the European Parliament on March 13, 1997. To coincide with the opening of the NPT Conference, several NGOs on Monday launched a model nuclear weapon convention at the UN, to show how

the technical and legal complexities might be worked out. Russia reiterated its 1996 proposal for a Treaty for Nuclear Security and Strategic Stability.

Western delegations, including the declared NWS, prioritised commencement and early conclusion of a fissban in the CD. Referring to the P&O, many urged that fissban negotiations should begin immediately on the basis of the Shannon report and mandate agreed in March 1995. Indonesia, Iran and Vietnam also identified a fissban as an important step to accomplish in the CD. NAM countries such as Peru and Algeria continued to push for the fissban to include stocks.

Security Assurances, the subject of a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 984) just prior to the NPT Conference in 1995, were also mentioned by many delegations. South Africa wanted the NPT process to address this issue, arguing that they should 'provide a significant benefit' to NPT parties and 'an incentive' to those who have so far refused to sign the Treaty. Several countries agreed, with Egypt and Viet Nam suggesting that an instrument with legally binding security assurances could be adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the Treaty. Ghana called for the CD to work on making security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states legally binding, while Algeria, Indonesia and Iran considered further negotiations important but did not specify the venue.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) were also mentioned by several delegations. Many referred with satisfaction to recent successes, including entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco covering Latin America and the Caribbean, and the signing of the Treaties of Pelindaba (Africa) and Bangkok (South East Asia). Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic called for Central Asia to be declared a NWFZ, as supported by their countries plus Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in the Almaty Declaration of February 28, 1997. Belarus and Ukraine called for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Syria and Iraq all urged Israel to join the NPT and participate in creating a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

### Safeguards

Many delegations from all groups emphasised the importance of strengthening IAEA safeguards and supporting the implementation of the 93+2 programme, which had been given added impetus by the recent agreement on a model protocol, due to be adopted on May 15.

### Nuclear Energy

Several delegations made passing reference to the importance of nuclear cooperation for 'peaceful purposes'. Australia, Japan, Mongolia and others referred positively to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and hoped-for progress on a Convention on the safety of radioactive waste management and spent fuel. Liability, physical protection of nuclear materials and illicit trafficking were also raised.

Iran raised export controls as 'private, secretive and non representative', saying that they were used to discriminate against non-nuclear-weapon states of the South. South Africa summed up the more widely held view that export controls are an 'essential component' of the global non-proliferation regime, but also endorsed greater transparency, in order to 'lend increased confidence and credibility to the system'.

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Rebecca Johnson

By the end of the fourth day of the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) under the enhanced review process, States Parties had discussed the first cluster of issues, on nuclear disarmament, and considered some procedures for reporting and transmitting proposals or recommendations to the next PrepCom and to the 2000 Review Conference. Acting on South Africa's proposal, the Chair of the PrepCom, Pasi Patokallio, convened a group of around 25 key states for focused consultations on how debates and any decisions or proposals might be reported to future meetings. No It is too early for any decisions. Since the sessions were closed to NGOs for most of Wednesday and Thursday and statements were not always obtainable, this briefing cannot be comprehensive but will attempt to give a fair picture, notwithstanding those restrictions.

#### Reporting on the PrepComs

South Africa and Canada proposed that each PrepCom should produce a report in three parts. Canada suggested a part 1 on procedural agreements, part 2 on substance, structured according to the articles in the Treaty, and part 3 containing recommendations to the next PrepComs and the Review Conference. There was also some interest in attaching a compilation of proposals, indicating the degree of support each had garnered. South Africa's suggestions were only slightly different: part 1 would deal with substantive or procedural issues 'where there is a possibility of achieving a consensus'; part 2 would cover issues to be addressed at the next PrepCom; and part 3 would include draft recommendations to the Review Conference. South Africa also suggested that part 3 should contain a listing of proposals supported at the PrepCom, which could also form an initial basis for a rolling text. Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Japan, Ireland and others endorsed or contributed to this general approach. At the same time, there was a widely held view that the PrepComs should avoid getting locked into negotiating a bracketed text too early in the process, although elements could be compiled with a view to elaborating a rolling text during the final PrepCom before the Review Conference. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for rolling texts to be developed at the second and third PrepComs, as a basis for a final document. However, there are differences of opinion about whether this means beginning early negotiations on a full bracketed text or to compile paragraphs that are drafted or agreed during the early PrepComs so that they can be 'rolled over' for negotiations at the Review Conference.

#### NAM Statement

Following the plenary statements on the second day, Indonesia insisted that the PrepCom be briefly opened on Thursday for the public to hear the NAM statement, which had been delayed in part due to the NAM Foreign Ministers Meeting in New Delhi, which finished on April 8. Calling the NPT a 'key international instrument in stemming both vertical and horizontal proliferation', the NAM stressed that the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 were 'an integral and interlinked undertaking'. They underlined the importance of balancing the obligations

and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). In particular, the NAM prioritised: universality; legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states; a fissile materials production ban (fissban); the elimination of nuclear arsenals, 'to be pursued through the establishment of an ad hoc committee' in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), taking into account the programme of action for nuclear disarmament, proposed by 28 members of the G-21 (non-aligned states in the CD); nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) 'where they do not now exist'; and unimpeded and non-discriminatory access to nuclear materials and technology for 'peaceful' purposes 'on an assured and long-term basis'. Without naming Israel, the NAM called on that country to accede to the NPT without delay and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. No reference was made to NAM members who are not party to the NPT. It was particularly noticeable that the reference to the fissban omitted mention of stockpiles and the call for a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD did not specify a mandate to negotiate the G-28 programme, but rather to take it into account.

The NAM statement made reference to a working paper to be circulated at the NPT Conference. This was unavailable at time of writing, but deals with nuclear disarmament in 'a specified framework of time'. Two members of the NAM [Chile and South Africa] wanted their reservation on the specified time-frame for elimination to be noted, but stressed that they remain committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and have 'sought to engage' the NWS on 'the practical steps and negotiations required to adopt a programme of systematic and progressive steps to totally eliminate nuclear weapons in the shortest time possible.'

#### Nuclear Disarmament

The first 'cluster' to be discussed was that corresponding to Main Committee I, with delegations putting forward their views on nuclear disarmament, security assurances, nuclear-weapon free zones and also universality. On nuclear disarmament, many delegations focused on the three point programme of action in the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision (P&O). Apart from the NAM statement and South Africa, the main interventions during the two day debate were from western delegations. Australia, Sweden, Britain, the United States, France, Germany, New Zealand and others wanted the PrepCom and Review Conference to welcome the CTBT and call for full ratification and early entry into force. Canada wanted it noted that article V (relating to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions) has been redefined and overtaken by the CTBT and is now 'an historical footnote to an old debate' on which no more time should be spent. South Africa suggested that article 4a of the P&O could be updated with a call for all NPT parties to ratify the CTBT and work for its early implementation.

#### Fissban

Most of these states also stressed the importance of getting negotiations on a fissban started in the CD on the basis of the mandate and report agreed in March 1995. Canada proposed that 'pending conclusion' of the fissban the NWS should be urged to commit themselves to 'forever cease production of fissile material' for weapons, to reduce their fissile material stockpiles and place more under IAEA safeguards. Norway proposed voluntary measures to be undertaken by all nuclear capable states 'to increase transparency on holdings of weapons grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched

uranium (HEU)', including declaration, clarification and inspections of the stocks. Norway called for strict accounting and secure handling and storage procedures. Understood not to cover the fissile materials still in nuclear warheads, Norway's proposal for transparency could offer a preliminary way of addressing the problem of stocks in parallel with fissban negotiations in the CD. Britain wanted to obtain agreement that all NPT parties would back CD negotiations on the basis of the March 1995 mandate, as supported by them in 4b of the P&O.

#### Further Progress

Statements from France and Britain, as well as Canada, Ireland, Germany, South Africa and Australia, welcomed the Helsinki Summit agreements with regard to START II and III. Some also welcomed unilateral measures by France and Britain, which those countries had listed in their statements. South Africa called on the three minor NWS to 'join in the process of structured and verified nuclear disarmament'. Canada called on these 'other' NWS not to increase their arsenals and to engage in five-power nuclear disarmament negotiations in parallel with START III. Canada had earlier put forward ideas for all the NWS to undertake measures such as demating nuclear warheads, verifying warhead destruction, further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, reduction in delivery systems, commitments not to pursue development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and so on.

Referring to a long term objective of negotiating the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, Finland proposed a regime of transparency and unilateral constraints on the deployment and stockpiles of tactical weapons. Voluntary withdrawals already declared could be given more legal weight and possibly verified under the auspices of the NPT framework. With regard to a 'series of external opinions' on the obligations of the NWS under article VI, Ireland listed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission's recommendations, the March 14 resolution passed by the European Parliament and the model nuclear weapons convention recently launched by lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts. Ireland, Canada and New Zealand supported NAM calls for a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD, suggesting that it could usefully discuss ways forward and identify issues which the CD might negotiate.

South Africa reiterated its concerns about the proliferation risks of NATO expansion, which prompted vehement opposition from Britain, France and the United States. They considered it irrelevant to the NPT and indignantly denied that the transfer of nuclear weapons among NATO members might violate the Treaty's articles I and II. In their lengthy statements, the three western nuclear powers listed the ways in which they had reduced their arsenals, curtailed fissile material production and so on. In response to arguments from South Africa, Canada and others that all five should engage in nuclear arms reduction talks, Britain repeated its version of the 'Chinese thesis', that when the US and Russian arsenals were in the hundreds, the UK would be prepared to join talks on nuclear disarmament. France said that its 'participation in international negotiations on nuclear arsenals is not relevant now' and quoted President Chirac regarding France's deterrent capacity compared with that of Russia and the United States.

South Africa's call for subsequent PrepComs to work on security assurances was supported by others, including Australia. There was some support for

further NWFZ, with South Africa giving explicit endorsement to the work on this by five Central Asian countries, although this had been dropped from the NAM statement.

#### Conclusion

It is understood that debate on the nuclear disarmament cluster has now been concluded. The debate appeared limited to fewer than 20 NPT parties. Some interesting ideas have been put forward, but until the procedure for reporting and transmitting recommendations is decided, their status is unclear. There were a couple of sharp exchanges, with the United States objecting to Ireland's mention of the nuclear weapon convention and its desire for the NWS to 'set out their perspective' on what further steps could be undertaken. Most contributors, including South Africa (a NAM state), underlined the importance of the step by step approach, rather than what Britain called a 'blueprint' for nuclear disarmament. Comments by Britain and the US that nuclear disarmament could not be separated from efforts to promote global stability and conventional disarmament prompted Canada to reject such linkage 'when every last bow and arrow or Swiss army knife is gone.'

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1. "A False Sense of Security," Charles Krauthammer, 4/11
2. "Lott Outlines Chemical Arms Treaty Plan," Washington Post 4/11

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## A False Sense of Security

If we can't enforce a 1925 treaty banning the actual use of chemical weapons, how can the CWC ban their production?

By Charles Krauthammer

Friday, April 11 1997; Page A27  
The Washington Post

Rolf Ekeus, one of the unsung heroes of our time, knows something about weapons of mass destruction. He is head of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) for the disarmament of Iraq, the outfit that gets harassed and threatened as it goes around Iraq looking for the monster weapons that Saddam has promised to get rid of.

In a recent address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ekeus reported what he found. Iraq, he said, possesses not just the odd Scud missile or two, but an operational missile force that includes working missiles, launchers, support vehicles, fuel and the chemical or biological warheads to go on them. Iraq also is believed to possess the ability to produce chemical and biological agents, and might have stocks of these as well.

Thus, despite the most intrusive inspection regime ever imposed on any country in history -- an inspection regime undertaken in the uniquely favorable conditions of full international backing on a country totally isolated and defeated in war -- Iraq continues to hide these proscribed weapons.

Keep this in mind when you hear President Clinton, in a last-ditch effort to get a wary Senate to pass the international Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), use the phrase "banish poison gas from the earth." At a lavish pro-CWC ceremony April 4, he promised that "by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention . . . we can give our children something our parents and grandparents never had -- broad protection against the threat of chemical attack."

It will do nothing of the sort. Sure, those countries that have no interest in building or using chemical weapons will sign the CWC and adhere to it. But those countries that want to continue making chemical weapons as the poor man's nuke -- North Korea, Syria and Libya, for example -- will do one of two things:

Either they will not sign the CWC and thus be subject to no inspection. Or they will sign it knowing that, given Iraq's experience, they will have no problem getting away with concealment. If Iraq, under an exponentially more intrusive inspection regime, can hide missiles, they can surely hide a roomful of nerve gas.

The CWC will be useless at giving us "protection against the threat of chemical attack." In fact, worse than useless. The CWC will not just give us a false sense of security, it will make rogue states even more secure in their pursuit of illegal weapons. Why? Because now, with just a little effort and guile, they can get the stamp of approval of some international inspection agency.

After all, that is what Iraq did with nukes before the Gulf War. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iraq was repeatedly inspected and certified nuclear weapons-free by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Only after the Gulf War did we discover that Iraq had not one but several parallel nuclear programs going on, all undetected. Had the war broken out 18 to 24 months later, Iraq would have entered it nuclear armed -- and IAEA-approved.

If the CWC will not stop the bad guys from getting chemical weapons, what's the point? CWC advocates have a fallback: It will make a statement. By rendering chemical weapons programs "illegal" -- I quote Sen. Joseph Biden, at the opening of Senate hearings on the treaty, April 8 -- "it will also provide us with a valuable tool: moral suasion of the

entire international community to isolate and tar  
get those states who violate the norm."

This is fiction (the "international community") deploying fatuousness ("moral suasion") to enforce a fantasy (international "norms"). Consider an even more morally compelling international "norm": the prohibition against the actual use of chemical weapons. (CWC merely bans possession.) The Geneva Protocol on that dates back to 1925. Well, in 1988, in the face of this venerable norm, Saddam dropped  
poison gas on rebellious Kurds, killing 5,000 innocents.

How did the "international community" respond to this horrific violation of the Geneva Protocol? It found even "moral suasion" too strenuous. It did nothing.

Today, Ekeus's UNSCOM reports repeatedly to the U.N. Security Council about Saddam's flagrant violations of the "norms" imposed upon him regarding weapons of mass destruction. How does the Security Council -- the "international community" in executive session -- respond? It has loosened the embargo on Iraqi oil.

In international relations, there are no controlled experiments. There is only history. If we don't learn from history, we learn nothing. In light of our experience with Iraq -- the circumvention of the most intrusive inspection regime ever devised and the flabbiness of the response of the international community -- the president's faith that the CWC will "give our children something our parents and grandparents never had -- broad protection against the threat of chemical attack" is deeply misplaced and highly dangerous.

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## Lott Outlines Chemical Arms Treaty Plan

By Helen Dewar  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Friday, April 11 1997; Page A18  
The Washington Post

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) yesterday outlined a schedule for action on a treaty banning chemical weapons that anticipates a ratification vote shortly before the pact takes effect on April 29.

The main obstacle to the four-year-old treaty remains Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). Helms said in an interview that while he remains opposed to the pact, he sees "some indications" that the Clinton administration may be willing to negotiate on key points, which he declined to specify. "I want to work it out so we can get to a vote," he said, but only if "the White House stops stonewalling."

Earlier, Democrats urged Lott to act on his own to bring the treaty to the Senate floor if Helms tries to tie it up in his committee or otherwise thwart action.

"Senator Lott is going to have to pull the trigger, so to speak," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations panel. Biden described the struggle as a "test of leadership" for Lott. "If he lets Helms roll him, he's dead," Biden said. But if Lott helps the treaty win passage, he faces a backlash from the Republican Party's right wing, which sees the pact as a "litmus test" of Lott's conservatism, Biden added.

Biden said the pact can withstand crippling amendments and garner the two-thirds majority required to approve treaties, even if Lott, who has not said how he will vote, goes against the treaty. Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) offered a similar assessment Wednesday.

But other treaty supporters seemed less confident, saying the margin of victory probably lies with about 15 Republicans,

some of whom might be swayed by Lott's position.

Helms, who conducted two days of hearings on the treaty this week, wants one or two more days of hearings, including testimony from companies that oppose the treaty, which has the support of the chemical industry's main trade association. "People are coming out of the woodwork to oppose this treaty," he said.

At a news briefing, Lott said he plans to open debate on the chemical weapons issue next week with consideration of a bill sponsored by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) to ban chemical and biological weapons within the United States and impose sanctions against other countries that use them.

While proponents of Kyl's bill say it would be more effective than the treaty in combating chemical weapons, opponents characterize it as a fig leaf to provide political cover for senators who oppose the treaty.

Lott said debate on the treaty will begin during the week of April 21 and take "the better part of probably four or five days," including 15 hours of debate and a closed session to hear confidential material. This gives Lott another 10 or more days to work out disputes involving Helms and others. But it could also delay a final vote until only a day or so before April 29, when the treaty, which 16 countries signed and 70 ratified, takes effect -- with or without U.S. approval.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has warned that if the Senate misses the ratification deadline, the United States will be excluded for at least a year from international enforcement efforts and that American chemical companies could face sanctions from other countries.

While some contentious issues have been resolved in negotiations with the Clinton administration, Lott said, others can only be resolved in the Senate.

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By Sarah Seeds

We thought we'd drop by with a quick update from the recent Highway 95 blockade by Action for Nuclear Abolition! But first I want to let you know that at least in a few places the connections are beginning to become obvious. The Las Vegas Review-Journal ran a story about the Ward Valley Sacramento action on the page before the article on the 95 blockade, and one of the local TV stations followed their blockade story with coverage of the Livermore NIF action. Thanks to all of you- keep those actions coming.

The week began on Easter Sunday with a line crossing following a ceremony led by Starhawk. The award for best ensemble performance went hands (feet and hoofs) down to MADCOW (Mothers and Daughters, Council of Women) for their moooving die in. On Monday, in a joint effort with Healing Global Wounds, five entries into the test site were shut down, stopping the flow of traffic and trapping over 10 worker busses and 3 waste shipments. Using a combination of lock boxes and tripods, the Main Mercury and Old Mercury roads were shut down, as was Airport, where three points of entry were sealed. Wackenhut Security employees and Nye County Sheriffs cleared Old Mercury in a scuffle that was a bit...physical...at times but noone was hurt and noone was even arrested. Over on Main Mercury we had a tripod blow down under the onslaught of 50 mph winds but Adriana wants everyone to know her broken shoulder blade and fractured heel are doing fine.

Tuesday we had one of the most successful Vegas city events any of us can remember thanks to great street theater and the presence of a giant Quetzacuatl puppet. Our Nuclear Fools Day parade and Call-In Day (and thanks to all of you who pestered the White House) drew local participation, wonderful guest speakers (Steve Lopez was a real crowd pleaser) and lots of local media. When the last prop had been loaded we headed back to camp to prepare for an action some of us have waited years to do.

Highway 95 runs north and south bound and it's where you have to be to get into or out of the test site. We chose a spot just over the county line to insure that we would be arrested and tried and would be able to follow through with legal proceedings out of Vegas. This meant bypassing the Nye County sheriffs and being in the rough, but familiar hands of the Wackenhuts and the lesser known, but scarier Nevada Highway Patrol. Before dawn we had somehow beat the odds (and the inevitable screw ups) and were in place. Southbound was covered by a courageous crew spreadeagled across the road in lockbox devices we called candles. Over on northbound, where we anticipated a slightly more menacing situation (remember, this is the way in to the site) we got to play with a few more toys. The line up went something like this: nearest the shoulder (but not near enough as we later learned to my strained amusement) I was locked into a concrete barrel with another resister locked in from the other side. She was attached on the other end to a lovely old junked Buick, tires deflated, that was our centerpiece. The car afforded lockdown positions for "Turbo" in the trunk, "Face Bump" underneath and Taj in the engine compartment. Just for good measure we had one more in a barrel by the median. After a bit of traffic direction which included turning the shoulder into a lane and sending through the semis, we had a little lull while NHP surveyed the scene. Meanwhile southbound was

acquiring an impressive line of stuck traffic, northbound had a nuclear waste truck on hold and 17 worker buses for 5 hours. Translation: We Shut Them Down.

The break up of the blockade was rough but not uniformly brutal. Almost all of the 16 arrestees (including 2 accidentals and a member of the Fourth Estate) were injured but we're all healing now so don't be afraid to read on. Being on the end (not to mention old, half blind and locked down) I can't report in too much detail, but here's what I know. Our barrel got disengaged and dragged away (with us holding hands inside). Others were cut out with at least one heart-in-mouth extraction where Taj's wrist was way too close to the blade. Whatever didn't get wrenched in the dragging got slammed in the loading process. Southbound was next and there was some roughing on their side as people were extracted, dragged and stuffed. By the time we arrived at the familiar cages it was clear that we had at least two people who needed medical treatment. It doesn't sound like they got it, despite the trip to the hospital. But we all rendezvoused at the lovely Clark County Jail.

Suffice it to say that holding pens with occupancy of 26 (women's) and 28 (men's) are more than normally unpleasant when crammed with 56 and 64 humans respectively. As for the amenities; there were none. And yes, blankets are an amenity. The women's cell was an equal opportunity nightmare. Everything from drug bust detox to weepy suburban moms on DUI's. The food? Bad enough that after a while it was impossible to tell who was intentionally on a food and water fast and who was just disgusted. We were in there 24-30 hours. We were lucky; some women were into their second week in this hellhole.

Now listen up, boys and girls. Those NV trainings are important. Thanks to strong solidarity and good quick decision making skills we were able to get all our people out, though not until 2 women were forcibly removed, several of the men were dragged by the hair (most of which came out) and the cops finally had to resort to wheeling people out in wheelchairs.

As I write we are all healing (one lucky crew in Baja, no less) and preparing for an April 25 arraignment. And if noone edits it out, I want to ask you all to consider some of the ways you can plug in, help out and turn up the heat. Obviously there's the small matter of the legal defense fund that is now up to \$5.00. A few of us are looking at international law options as both defendants and plaintiffs. We need to pick all available brains. Expert witnesses in the relevant scientific and medical disciplines are invited to check in. But you know all that.

**MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANYTHING ELSE, WE NEED YOU HERE, THERE AND EVERYWHERE IN JUNE TO STOP REBOUND! NO SUBCRITICALS!! NOT NOW, NOT EVER!!!**

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We only have One Water...One Air...One Mother Earth."

Corbin Harney, Newe (Western Shoshone) Spiritual Leader;

Founder and Executive Director, Shundahai Network

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## First the Treaty, Then the Hard Work

By David Kay, Ronald F. Lehman and R. James Woolsey

Sunday, April 13 1997; Page C07  
The Washington Post

The debate over ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is primarily about the political psychology of arms control. Is the arms-control process soporific? Do treaties lull us into ignoring threats and neglecting our defenses? Do we substitute paper for reality? Do decision makers avoid politically incorrect declarations of violations in the face of conflicting strategic or trade calculations? Do governments hesitate to enforce obligations in a world routinely opposed to rocking the boat?

Too often the answer is yes. Worse, the end of the Cold War and the growth of the global marketplace are increasing those pressures that undermine enforcement.

Thus, critics are correct to ask whether we are in danger of forgetting the lessons of history. They are wrong, however, if they believe that nothing has been learned. The United States is not doomed to repeat past mistakes. The CWC was negotiated specifically with the weaknesses of previous arms-control regimes in mind. Its provisions and process were crafted with a clear understanding that a political commitment to verification and compliance often weakens after the signing ceremonies are over.

That is why the treaty expands the prohibitions against chemical weapons and provides new tools to strengthen America's hand in identifying violations. And that is why the treaty can help establish the basis in international law and public opinion for the United States, with or without the support of others, to take those actions necessary to eliminate threats where we find them. For these reasons, the Senate should give its consent to ratification. A failure now to take advantage of the new tools provided by the CWC would be a major setback to national security.

Verification of a chemical weapons ban, however, will require more than a treaty. Monitoring prohibited activities will require both a wide range of skills and tenacious forensics. Enforcement will require political will, diplomatic art and military power. Still, some critics argue that the treaty cannot be sufficiently verified no matter what we do. Others note that states such as Libya and Syria may not sign the treaty. We do not take these concerns lightly.

We know from firsthand experience that cheating can pose risks for America and its allies. Each of us has experienced the challenges and frustrations associated with enforcing international obligations. One of us, David Kay, worked for eight years in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where a flawed inspection regime allowed Iraq to come within months of having a nuclear-weapons capability. He then led the early U.N. inspection team into post-gulf war Iraq that uncovered that program. Months of attempting to counter Iraqi cheating, deception and coercion, and four days being held hostage in a Baghdad parking lot makes one appreciate the dangers of inadequate or unenforced arms-control treaties.

But the critics are wrong when they argue that the means provided by the CWC are as intrinsically weak as those exercised in IAEA nuclear safeguards. They can offer additional security. The drafters of the CWC learned a great deal from the limitations of nuclear safeguards. CWC inspectors will have challenge inspection authority and tools that even today -- outside of Iraq -- nuclear safeguard inspectors still lack. International teams of

inspectors have used these inspection techniques; they are not foolproof, but they do work. The right to go wherever the inspectors suspect prohibited activities are being carried out and to return again if doubts persist, coupled with access to sophisticated new technologies, will pose an important deterrent to cheating and raise the risk of detection for those who decide to try. The odds of successfully detecting significant cheating will be higher than we have had reason in the past to believe.

Chemical weapons are a real military threat, but they are difficult to use in a militarily effective fashion, especially when compared with modern conventional arms. That is what led the U.S. military to decide to abolish them from our own arsenal. Iraq's first attempts to use mustard gas without careful training ended up killing more Iraqi troops than Iranian. Iraq gave up on the use of chemical weapons for more than a year as it retrained and re-equipped its forces. Producing large amounts of chemical agent, testing delivery and training troops increase the risk of discovery in the face of all-source intelligence reinforced by a vigorous on-site inspection regime.

It is hard to understand why the critics of the CWC believe it is to the advantage of U.S. forces -- who one day may have to face an adversary armed with chemical weapons -- to let such development proceed unhindered by vigorous inspection. Such inspections can slow a chemical weapons program, make it more expensive and less effective and can develop the usable evidence needed to convince doubting allies. A perfect solution? No. But clearly it is better than the available alternatives. One strongly suspects that countries such as Libya understand their vulnerability to a CWC with the United States as a vigilant member better than do some of the critics of the CWC.

No arms-control treaty will ever guarantee no cheating, and everyone must understand that the terrorist threat will remain, with or without the treaty. The CWC offers some help here. Treaty-implementing legislation increases sensitivity to suspicious chemical-related activities and strengthens enforcement, but certainly far more is needed. The response to potential chemical terrorism must include enhanced law enforcement and intelligence efforts and also better training of police, fire and emergency medical personnel. As an open society that stands as the all-purpose Satan to all who find themselves dissatisfied with their lot in the post-Cold War disorder, the United States is the logical target for such terrorism. To reject tools that may help make the difference in preventing even a single disaster would be a tragedy, all the more so if the reason given is that the treaty must first be made foolproof. We can't get perfection. We still need more tools, strong policy support and the will to implement aggressively.

Skeptics are no doubt right that some states will not join the CWC initially or perhaps ever, but that does not mean that the treaty is without impact even on these regimes. First, the treaty prohibits trade with non-members in the precursor chemicals that make production of chemical weapons easy. Rogue states can, of course, resort to illegal trade and more difficult chemical processes, but neither alternative is simple or cheap or without risk. With the CWC, and thus with far greater international support and legitimacy, the United States can execute a wide range of options, including military action, if it detects chemical trade that is illegal. This is a far cry from the present situation.

Thus, the CWC offers at the outset verification tools that go beyond those of other arms-control treaties. The CWC provides additional mechanisms to press for universal participation and strengthens obligations to punish cheating. A vigorous U.S. voice in the CWC will reinforce these efforts. American leadership in the CWC's councils, American inspectors pushing the envelope of inspection tactics in the field and American technology giving those inspectors abilities that no other arms-control inspectors have ever had can ensure that this treaty contributes to our and the world's security.

Time is running out. Without U.S. membership the treaty will never meet its full potential. Without U.S. membership, rogue states will find it easier to avoid the consequences of their actions. And without U.S. membership, U.S. leadership against rogue chemical weapons threats will be hollow. Instead of demanding a foolproof treaty on the grounds that the United States cannot trust itself to take the additional steps that must be taken, let us ratify the treaty and get on with the whole job that must be done.

David Kay was chief U.N. weapons inspector for Iraq following the gulf war. Ronald Lehman was director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Bush administration and served in the Reagan administration as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs and assistant secretary of defense. Former CIA director James Woolsey was chief negotiator on the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in the Bush administration and an at-large delegate to the START talks in the Reagan administration.

Can a Southern Populist Mirror a Brahmin Elitist?

By LEONARD A. COLE

NEWARK, N.J.--The Chemical Weapons Convention goes into effect April 29, but the United States is not a party to it. Failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the agreement would be reminiscent of its decision on another treaty earlier in the century. In 1919-1920, the Senate rejected U.S. membership in the League of Nations by refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles at the close of World War I. That action signaled this country's sharp turn to isolationism, a policy condemned by history, for Nazism and fascism flourished overseas with scarcely a nod from America.

As the Senate now weighs the treaty to ban poison gas, several issues seem hauntingly familiar. In 1919, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, acknowledged that U.S. entry into the league was favored by "the people generally," but he still adamantly opposed it. Newspaper editorials supporting entry outnumbered those against by 10-1. Similarly, a recent poll shows 84% of the public supports the Chemical Weapons Convention. And a count of editorials in the past year placed 138 in support of ratification, 11 opposed.

The lineup of leading characters has striking parallels, too: Democratic president, GOP Senate, bipartisan support for the agreement and a cluster of Republican nay-sayers led by a powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge, a New England patrician, was a thorn to President Woodrow Wilson and his favored treaty, just as Southern populist Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) is to President Bill Clinton today. That Helms might muster enough votes to block the two-thirds needed for ratification, as Lodge did, mortifies Senate Democrats--and many Republicans.

Helms has presented the White House with 31 conditions for ratification. They include an odd mix of reservations about the treaty and demands that have nothing to do with it. One such demand, which the administration has agreed to consider, is the elimination of certain government agencies, including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which helped develop the CWC.

But the White House is rejecting complaints by Helms and other opponents that the treaty would be unduly expensive, unverifiable and allow outside inspectors to steal company secrets. The Chemical Manufacturers Assn., which represents 90% of the chemical industry, says joining would be a bargain. Trial inspections have convinced industry leaders that their secrets would be protected. Moreover, since countries that have not signed will face trade restrictions by countries that have joined, failure to ratify has been estimated as costing \$600 million in lost exports.

Of course, no treaty can be foolproof, but a parade of knowledgeable officials has testified that the country would be better with the treaty than without. Support has come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, past directors of the Central Intelligence Agency

and its current acting director, veterans groups and arms-control chiefs from the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations.

James A. Baker III, George Bush's secretary of state, worries that failure to ratify the CWC "will send a message of American retreat from engagement in the world." Whether this means broad isolationism, as happened after rejection of the League of Nations, is unclear. But failure of the United States to join the chemical pact will have dismaying consequences far beyond the terms of the CWC itself.

Several arms-control agreements await Senate consideration, and the CWC was thought the most likely among them to succeed. Not many people, it was assumed, are fans of poison gas. But if the convention is defeated, the chances for ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and other nuclear reduction agreements will probably be dismal. A U.S. turn inward will weaken international efforts to cut nuclear arsenals elsewhere.

Second, current negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention will be fatally impaired. Some senators object to the CWC because verification cannot be foolproof. But most recognize that the elaborate monitoring and verification measures provided by the CWC would catch cheating of any consequence. Confirming compliance of a ban on biological weapons is more complex than on chemical weapons. A Senate that does not approve a chemical treaty with verification measures is hardly likely to agree to one on biological weapons.

Third, failure to ratify the chemical ban will be interpreted to mean that we do not take chemical-weapons proliferation seriously. This is plainly self-defeating. We are eliminating our chemical arsenal anyway, and ignoring the treaty suggests we do not care if others do the same.

Fourth, rejecting the pact will injure U.S. credibility, in general. Not only was this country an original signer of the convention in 1993, we wrote much of the text during the 10 years of negotiations. If we back away now, who will trust our leadership in developing other international agreements?

As with this pact, the United States also wrote much of the League Covenant after World War I. Yet, resistance to the league and the chemical treaty stems from much the same point: that the United States would ostensibly be ceding control of its security interests.

Lodge argued that U.S. troops would fall under league authority because Article X of its covenant required members to oppose aggression. Nonsense, said Wilson, calling Lodge's reservation an attempt to nullify the covenant. The Constitution trumps any external authority, the president said, and the U.S. would never lose control of its own forces.

Just as Lodge dismissed Wilson's assurances, Helms rejects Clinton's on the chemical treaty. For Helms, Article XI of the CWC is the hitch. It prohibits restrictions on chemical trade among parties to the pact, though the clause states such trade must be for "peaceful purposes." Ignoring the peaceful-purposes requirement, Helms says rogue regimes could demand access to our chemicals for nefarious activities. The administration counters that the treaty's words mean what they say.

Helms and his clutch of treaty opponents remain obdurate. In 1919, Lodge predicted that only by accepting his reservations would the Versailles Treaty be ratified, "and it will not be ratified, in my judgment, in any other way." Sound familiar? After posting reservations about the chemical treaty, Helms vowed that the administration's "opposition to making essential changes will ensure the Senate never ratifies" it.

To the shame of the Senate and the country, Lodge prevailed in his day. The sad and terrible consequences of that determination should be recalled as today's Senate considers a measure to help rid the world of poison gas.

- - -

Leonard A. Cole, Who Teaches Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, Is the Author of "The Eleventh Plague: the Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare" (W.h. Freeman and Co.)

Here are the addresses for two nuclear related websites from Australia:

The Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)'s Abolition 2000 website, with regular updates including our media releases.

<http://www.ozemail.com.au/~mapw>

and Friends of the Earth's new site with everything you ever wanted to know about uranium mining and the nuclear fuel cycle in Australia

<http://www.vicnet.net.au/~seaus/index.html>

greg barber

medical association for the prevention of war

ph/facs: +61 3 9480 6312

pager: +61 3 625 1532

email: [mapw@Ozemail.com.au](mailto:mapw@Ozemail.com.au)

I've sent this on to the WRL Disarmament Task Force, though WRL as such can't sign on without going through formal processes.

Fraternally,

David McReynolds

(I'll also send it to a couple of other lists)

Important new web sites hosted at IGC:

Corporate Watch monitors the human rights and environmental records of transnational corporations, at <http://www.corpwatch.org>

LaborTech, the upcoming annual conference on labor and technology, at <http://www.labornet.org/labortech>

National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, activist resources for immigration policies, at <http://www.nnirr.org>

National Commission for Democracy in Mexico, news and resources from the Zapatistas and others, at <http://www.igc.org/ncdm>

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| 03/11/97 | 1920 | Direct Dial: Washington DC Area | 2MN  | 0.00 |         |

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op-ed in Philadelphia Inquirer, 4/14/97

## Why U.S. should ratify the treaty to ban chemical weapons globally

By Vil S. Mirzayanov

A few days ago, Jane's of London reported that Russia had developed as many as eight new nerve gases that may not be covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention -- a development seized on by opponents of the convention, awaiting a vote this month in the U.S. Senate.

The foes, among them Republican Sen. Jesse Helms, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, cite these new nerve agents as evidence that the convention can be circumvented and that the treaty should be voted down.

Having seen Russia's chemical weapons complex from the inside, I disagree. I am thoroughly convinced that a ban on chemical weapons must be established and that the convention is the vehicle to accomplish that goal.

For 26 years, I worked at the state Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow. This facility was integral to a secret weapons development program, code-named ``novichok."

Beginning in October 1991, I publicly and frequently voiced my grave concerns about the direction of the Russian chemical weapons program. I was arrested in October 1992 and imprisoned in the infamous KGB prison in Moscow. Charged with revealing state secrets, I was put on trial until the case was dismissed in 1994 for lack of evidence.

One product of the novichok program was a chemical agent known as A-232. Only a few tons of A-232 were produced, and the Red Army never approved this agent for deployment. In addition, as many as five other lethal chemical agents were developed in the novichok program as it peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Some 15,000 tons of Substance 33 -- similar to the nerve agent VX -- were manufactured. Limited, experimental quantities of the agent A-230, which gained Red Army approval in 1990, also were produced. These three agents -- Substance 33, A-230 and A-232 -- were the springboard for at least three binaries -- chemical mixtures that can be stored separately but combined at the last moment to make deadly poison gas.

Under optimal conditions, the novichok-5 binary is five to eight times more deadly than the nerve agent VX. The lethality of the binary based on Substance 33 is 10 times more effective than the nerve agent soman, which, like VX, is in the U.S. chemical arsenal.

Had I not revealed the novichok program to the outside world, the convention's inspectors would have had a very difficult time discovering this covert program because some components of the novichok agents are ordinary organophosphates, used for fertilizer and pesticides. However, inspectors can use the road map I have already publicly provided to dismantle the novichok



It was negotiated under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. President Clinton has made a priority of getting it ratified by April 29, the date the international treaty goes into force.

Such Republican luminaries as Mr. Bush's secretary of state, James A. Baker 3d, and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, are pressing for ratification.

But Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) refuses to let the treaty out of his committee. He has been holding hearings this week packed with treaty opponents.

Republican Majority Leader Trent Lott said last week that he was willing to put the treaty to a full vote but now seems unwilling to buck Sen. Helms.

The losers are America's citizens and military forces.

Sen. Helms and other critics claim, misleadingly, that the treaty will make America more vulnerable to chemical attack.

But President Reagan already committed America to destroy its chemical weapons stocks, unilaterally, by 2004.

And there are no signs the treaty will lull the administration into letting its guard down. It has asked Congress for money to expand the military's efforts to protect troops against chemical and biological attack.

The treaty has strong U.S. military backing. The generals know Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical weapons in the gulf war not by fear America would retaliate in kind -- but by stern U.S. warnings that he would be punished heavily by conventional weapons.

The most frequent complaint is that rogue nations would ignore the treaty -- or sign it and lie. Of course, no one expects a Libya or Iraq simply to roll over and behave.

But the treaty provides for extremely intrusive inspections in signatory countries whenever suspicions are raised. Despite what critics claim, the pact doesn't undercut international controls on export of technology for making chemical weapons. And it bolsters controls on export of dual-use chemicals that might be diverted for weapons.

The American chemical industry is pressing for ratification because otherwise its products would be subject to trade sanctions.

If the Senate fails to act before the treaty comes into force, America will be denied a seat on its oversight body, which will set the rules and choose the inspectors. And if we don't join the 72 countries that already have ratified, the Russian duma won't do so either.

No one claims the treaty is perfect. But the country that designed it shouldn't abandon it just because it goes only partway to solving the problems. Especially when the main obstacle is that a petty tyrant won't let it come to a vote.

## Forbes Radio Ads To Oppose Pact On Poison Gas

Monday, April 14 1997; Page A04  
The Washington Post

Former Republican presidential candidate Malcolm S. "Steve" Forbes yesterday announced a nationwide advertising campaign to urge the Senate to withhold ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, arguing that verification of the treaty's provisions will be "next to impossible."

The Clinton administration has launched what it bills as a bipartisan political effort to ratify the treaty before an April 29 deadline, when it will take effect with or without U.S. participation.

Supporters of the treaty to ban production and use of poison gas weapons say that failure to ratify the pact, which has already been approved by 70 nations, will exclude the United States from an international enforcement mechanism for at least a year and expose U.S. chemical manufacturers to the risk of sanctions.

The Forbes advertisements, which will be broadcast on radio here and in key states around the country, mention the opposition of former Republican defense secretaries Richard B. Cheney, Caspar W. Weinberger and Donald Rumsfeld.

Other leading Republicans, including former president George Bush -- during whose term the treaty was largely negotiated -- and former secretary of state James A. Baker III, have lined up behind the White House.

Appearing on CBS's "Face the Nation," Forbes said Clinton had given America "a bum treaty" that was "unverifiable and unenforceable."

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
21 Dupont Circle, 5th Floor  
Washington, DC 20036  
Phone: 202-223-5956  
Fax: 202-785-9034  
<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/poison/>

SUBJECT: ON-LINE INTERNET CONFERENCE/DISCUSSION ON THE CWC

"The chemical weapons treaty will restrain the proliferation and will reduce the threat of the use of chemical weapons in our lifetime. It is the first ever treaty to try to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction."

Senator Byron Dorgan  
April 8, 1997 debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention

"I think it is important to show that [the CWC] is not effective, that it will not banish poison gas or shield our soldiers..."

Senator James Inhofe  
April 8, 1997 debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Center for Defense Information will host an on-line conference/discussion sessions on the CWC. The initial session will be on Wednesday, April 16, 1997 from 1400-1500 (2:00 - 3:00 pm) Eastern Standard Time.

This is the second in our series of on-line discussions focusing on significant and timely issues regarding U.S. national security policy. Active and passive participation is open to all. Those receiving this message may alert compatriot's interested in the CWC of the date/time.

The objective of these sessions is to stimulate information and idea exchanges about the issues being considered. There is only one ground rule: if you wish to actively participate in the discussion, either asking a question, making a comment, or replying to previous entries, NO AD Hominem attacks.

To participate, sign on to CDI's website at <http://www.cdi.org> and find "Chatroom" on the main menu. Follow the instructions at that point. This will allow you to type and read messages during the session, subject only to the transmission queue. If you have a particular position you want to stake out, please prepare it beforehand so it is as concise as possible. Otherwise you may find you miss out on some of the ongoing exchanges.

Please log on a few minutes before 2:00 so we can begin on time.

As an initial point of departure, the April 16 session will take up the significance of the April 29 "deadline" for CWC ratification, and move on to the broader issues of compliance and verification.

To avoid wasting time getting started, CDI has posted some background information on the continuing debate regarding the CWC on our website in the "Chat" area. Please take some time to familiarize yourself with this information be prepared to discuss/refute/support/modify these and/or present your alternatives. Also be thinking of what these imply for U.S. policy should we not ratify the CWC, and issues which might arise during implementation of the Treaty.

I look forward to "seeing you on-line" April 16 from 2:00 to 3:00.

Sincerely,

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Mon, 14 Apr 1997 14:54:46 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 12-14 Apr  
>To: nfznc@gn.apc.org

>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

>  
>Mon 14 Apr 1997

>  
>97-8433 Thousands of miniaturised computers inside missiles and other  
> weapon systems to be reprogrammed to overcome problem of  
> `Millennium bug': cost to MoD estimated at #100m. T

>  
>Sun 13 Apr 1997

>  
>97-8428 US develops N-bomb capable of destroying deeply hidden bunkers.

> Obs

>97-8429 Kremlin refurbishes nuclear bunkers as fear of Nato grows.

> STimes

>97-8430 BNFL Fuel Business Group, Preston, wins contract to supply  
> technology to Japan's nuclear fuel industry. MEN 11

>  
>Sat 12 Apr 1997 - nil -

>  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.

>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.

>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

>  
>  
Stewart Kemp (nfznc@gn.apc.org)

Media Advisory from Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Forbes to Testify on Dangers of CWC for U.S. Business

What: Hearing on the Dangers of CWC Ratification for U.S. Business

When: Tuesday, April 15, 1997 at 2 p.m.

Where: SD-419

Washington DC--Steve Forbes will testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow against ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. He will lead a panel of business executives who are concerned about the effects of the CWC for U.S. businesses, including new regulatory burdens and the potential for increased industrial espionage.

Also testifying will be Ralph Johnson, Vice President of Dixie Chemical Company, Inc., a member of the Chemical Manufacturers Association which does not share CMA's enthusiasm for the treaty, and Wayne Spears, Chairman of Spears Manufacturing. A complete list of witnesses follows:

Panel 1:

Steve Forbes, President and CEO, Forbes Inc.

Panel 2:

Wayne Spears, Chairman Spears Manufacturing (makes adhesive for PVC pipe)

Ralph Johnson, Vice President, Dixie Chemical Company, Inc.

Kevin Kearns, President, U.S. Business Industrial Council

Kathleen Bailey, Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore

Bruce Merrifield, Former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Reagan

Minority Witnesses

Fred Webber, President CMA

Bill Rensch, Under Secretary for Commerce

To all Abolition2000 Network Members,

Find following the press releases from the NPT Prep Comm \*\*\*\*\*

ABOLITION2000  
PRESS RELEASE  
APRIL 10, 1997

Contact: Janet Bloomfield or  
Karina Wood at GRACE: (212) 726-9161

#### DISARMAMENT: TIME TO ACT!

(NEW YORK) Disarmament experts from the Australian government-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons today renewed their call for immediate action on reducing and abolishing the nuclear threat.

Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia echoed the recent statements of the former U.S. Commander of Strategic Air Command, General Lee Butler, pronouncing: "Nuclear weapons are absolutely useless and that is the point."

Dr. Ron McCoy of Malaysian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear war pointed out that if the United States made a serious commitment to disarm, the disarmament process would quickly pick up speed, and the abolition of nuclear weapons would become a reality.

The undeniable truth of this message has forced the nuclear weapon states onto the defensive. The United States continually repeats its laundry list of arms control accomplishments to prove its compliance with the disarmament mandate (Article 6) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): namely, achievement of a CTBT, implementation of START I, ratification of START II and commitment with Russia to begin START III negotiations.

These measures, while significant and welcome, are not enough. Even if START III is implemented, by 2007 there will still be at least 4,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals combined, plus thousands of warheads in storage. The nuclear arsenals of the UK, France and China will not have been cut. The number of warheads held by undeclared nuclear weapon states may have increased by then.

We must not wait ten years to do so little when negotiations for ridding the world of ALL its nuclear weapons could start now. The only obstacle to progress is a lack of political will on the part of the U.S. and the nuclear weapon states.

In contrast to the U.S., many other states recognize that world opinion is demanding action. Ireland drew attention to the growing demands for urgent action. Indicators of this are:

- The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice confirming the legal obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to complete disarmament.
- Report of the Canberra Commission with practical steps to a nuclear weapon free world.
- European Parliament Resolution (Mar. 97) calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

- and most recently, preparation by a committee of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts of a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. These expert voices are supported overwhelmingly by citizens worldwide. For example a recent poll showed that 87% of Americans want the US to negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons.\*

It is time for the nuclear weapon states to stop stalling and start disarming.

30 –  
\*survey conducted of 1006 Americans by Lake, Sosin, Snell and Assoc. from March 27th to 30th 1997.

CALENDAR  
OF ABOLITION 2000  
AND OTHER NGO EVENTS DURING THE NPT PREPCOM

Friday, April 11th

Symposium: The Road to a  
Nuclear Weapons Free World:  
Materials, Technology, and  
Verification Issues  
9:00am-5:00pm  
UN Conference Room B

Speakers  
Anatoli Diakov, Center for Arms Control & Environmental  
Studies; Ed Lyman, Nuclear Control Institute; Yu-Mi Mun,  
Korean Federation of  
Environmental Movements;  
Martin Kalinowski, INESAP;  
Suren Gadekar; Nigel Chamberlain, CND; Ted Taylor, former nuclear weapons  
designer; Johan Swahn, Chalmers Univ. of Tech., Sweden; Jacqueline  
Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation and Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group

Saturday, April 12th  
Public Forum on NATO  
and Nuclear Weapons  
10:00am-4:00pm  
777 UN Plaza  
(Church Center

\*\*\*\*\*ABOLITION 2000

APRIL 7, 1997  
Contact: Stephanie Fraser or  
Alyn Ware, (212) 674 7790

Release of Draft Nuclear  
Weapons Abolition Treaty

On Monday, April 7, from 5-7 p.m., the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy will release a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention at the United Nation's Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium as part of Abolition 2000's campaign to have an international nuclear weapons abolition treaty negotiated by the year 2000.

The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has been drafted by an international consortium of lawyer, scientists and disarmament experts. It outlines procedures to dismantle and destroy all nuclear weapons, safeguard weapons materials and ensure compliance with the requirements to abolish nuclear weapons.

"Maintaining the nuclear status quo means that the risk of use of nuclear weapons, whether by intent, accident or miscalculation, increases every day," says Merav Datan, principal drafter of the model convention. "This convention represents our determination to eliminate the possibility of nuclear devastation."

>From April 7-18, members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes 186 countries, will be meeting at the United Nations to discuss nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Ambassador Abdullah Ahmad, Special Envoy of Malaysia to the United Nations, who will speak at the release, notes that, "Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates States, particularly the nuclear weapons States, to negotiate in good faith for complete nuclear disarmament." Ambassador Abdullah urges all States members of the NPT to "use the opportunity provided over the next two weeks to ensure the commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention."

-- 30 --

CALENDAR  
OF ABOLITION 2000  
AND OTHER NGO EVENTS DURING THE NPT PREPCOM

Tuesday, April 8th

PANEL The Washington Square Park  
2:30 - 3:30pm,  
near Garibaldi statue

Monday, April 7th

Launching of the Nuclear Weapons Convention,  
UN Dag Hammarskjold  
Library Auditorium.

Speakers:  
Ambassador  
Abdullah Ahmed,  
Special Envoy of  
Malaysia to the UN,  
Jurgen Scheffran,

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation,  
Jonathan Schell,  
author of "The Fate of the Earth" and "The Abolition"  
and Merav Datan,  
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

\*\*\*\*\*

## ABOLITION 2000

A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons  
Working Group for the

Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

'Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil will insure peace for future generations.'

US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, June 4, 1996, the day Ukraine officially gave up its nuclear weapons.

Russian and Ukrainian defense secretaries joined him in a ceremony planting sunflowers on a former missile silo.

### FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

Contact: Chris West or Janet Bloomfield on 211 726 9161.

April 8, 1997

-- AMERICANS FEEL UNSAFE WITH CURRENT NUCLEAR STOCKPILE --

-- WANT ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS --

A Lake Sosin Snell & Associates Poll Finds Broad Consensus Across Gender, Regional & Political Lines

Washington, DC – With the Cold War an increasingly distant memory, a substantial majority of Americans no longer see any reason for maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons. They support - by a nine to one margin - an international treaty to eliminate nuclear arms, according to a Lake Sosin Snell & Associates poll released on April 4th by Abolition 2000, a global network representing 700 non-governmental organizations that work for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The nationwide survey of 1,006 Americans found a public feeling unsafe with the nuclear status quo. Eighty-four percent would feel safer in a world in which no country, including the United States, has nuclear weapons.

The survey found strong public disagreement with current federal budget priorities in which the U.S. spends more on building and maintaining nuclear weapons than on Head Start, fighting illiteracy, and providing college scholarships combined.

Unlike defense-related surveys conducted in earlier years, there is no significant gender gap and regional variation in these findings. Republicans and Democrats also are in broad agreement. Opposition to maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile - and support for an international treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons - is shared across the board by men and women, Democrats and Republicans, and throughout every region of the country.

"Americans see no reason for maintaining the Cold War nuclear policy and see every reason for eliminating the nuclear threat once and for all," said

Alice Slater, president Global Resource Action Center for the Environment.  
"It doesn't seem to matter whether you're liberal of conservative,  
pro-defense spending or not - the bottom line is that the bomb makes us feel  
unsafe and we want to be rid of it. It's time for our leaders to end this  
final chapter of the Cold War", said Slater.  
-- more --

C/O GRACE (Global Resource Action Center for the Environment)  
15 East 26th Street, Rm 915, New York, NY, 10010 - Tel 212-726-9161 - Fax  
212-726-9160 - aslater@igc.apc.org

Among the survey's findings:

- Americans Feel Unsafe With Current Nuclear Arsenal: Compared to the current nuclear status in the U.S. and other countries have nuclear weapons, 84 percent of Americans polled said they would feel safer knowing for sure that no country, including the U.S., had nuclear weapons.
- Strong Support for International Treaty: 87 percent of Americans want the U.S. to negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons (68 percent say they strongly agree).
- Too Many Tax Dollars Spent on Nuclear Stockpile: Nearly 8 in 10 Americans - 77% - believe that the U.S. budget for nuclear weapons is too high. When informed that more tax dollars are spent on building and maintaining nuclear weapons than on Head Start, fighting illiteracy and providing college scholarships combined, 74 percent disagreed with this spending priority.

"Rarely do we see such a broad consensus on this type of public policy issue," said Celinda Lake, president of Lake Sosin Snell & Associates. "The great nuclear public policy divide of the post-World War II era has gone the way of the Cold War."

Lake's firm conducted the survey from March 27 to 30th, 1997. The survey was called by paid, trained and professionally supervised interviewers using a replicated, stratified random digit dial process. The maximum margin of error for this sample is +/- 3.1 percent.

Said GRACE's Slater: "Nuclear arms issues may not garner many headlines these days, but it doesn't matter that Americans aren't worried about this vast and unnecessary arsenal in our midst. Even with the planned cuts in nuclear arms recently agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, it would leave the US and Russia each with more than double the number of warheads held by England, France and China combined. To the public, it just doesn't make any sense."

For further information, contact Chris West or Janet Bloomfeild at 212-726-9161

-- Ends --

C/O Global Resource Action Center for the Environment  
15 East 26th Street, Rm 915, New York, NY, 10010 - Tel 212-726-9161 - Fax  
212-726-9160 - aslater@igc.apc.org

\*\*\*\*\*

END

## I. Unanimous Consent agreement

In the back-and-forth between Senators Lott and Daschle on an unanimous consent agreement on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the draft agreement has been passed from Daschle's office to Lott's office. It is reported that the current agreement would set a vote on the nuclear waste bill on Tuesday, Alexis Herman's nomination as Labor Secretary on Wednesday, consideration of Senator Kyl's Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act, otherwise known as S. 495, and the Chemical Weapons Convention on April 24th. Under this agreement, debate on the CWC might begin on Friday, April 19th.

This is not a deal until Lott and Dashle make it a deal. As one can see from the schedule, there is very little margin for error.

Some have reported that the Majority Whip's office has left open the possibility to take up yet another piece of legislation other than Senator Kyl's bill. Opponents of the CWC may be trying to run out the clock on the CWC.

## II. Hearings

Some senate staff report that the letter signed by Abram Chayes et al on constitutional issues and the CWC caused Senator Helms and his staff to forgo hearings on these issues. As has already been reported, the hearings on Tuesday will focus on business issues and the hearings on Thursday will focus on verification issues.

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

## CMEP: VIEWERS BEWARE -- PBS' "FRONTLINE" TO AIR BIASED PRO-NUCLEAR SHOW

By Bill Magavern, Critical Mass Energy Project

On April 22, Earth Day, PBS' "Frontline" will air a show called "Nuclear Reaction." Having been interviewed for the show, and having seen the press release promoting it, I believe (as does Ralph Nader, who was also interviewed) that it will be a very biased piece of pro-nuclear propaganda.

My letter to "Frontline" (attached) spelled out in detail many of the reasons why I believe the producers are planning an unbalanced, elitist, obsolete and inaccurate look at nuclear power. In response, I received a cursory letter from "Frontline" Senior Executive Producer David Fanning, brushing off my comments and refusing to pursue a dialogue about the problems I raised. It is clear that Fanning has refused our request to make the show more balanced.

The "Frontline" press release includes producer Jon Palfreman's assertion that "an objective analysis of the nuclear industry's accident record shows it to be extremely safe in comparison with other complex technologies. So some researchers have concluded that people's extreme reactions to it are driven as much by psychology and politics as by actual risk." What is truly extreme is the length to which a pro-nuclear zealot like Palfreman is willing to go to try to resuscitate a failing industry.

The "correspondent" for "Nuclear Reaction" is Richard Rhodes, author of "Nuclear Renewal," published by Whittle Books in 1993. "Frontline" has given Rhodes an hour of national television time for an adaptation of his book, which has not fared well in the marketplace of ideas -- an Atlanta bookstore is selling it for \$2.98. Rhodes advocates plutonium reprocessing and building a new generation of "inherently safe" breeder reactors. He lionizes the nuclear programs of France and Japan and minimizes the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. His main purpose is to convince Americans to stop worrying and learn to love the atom. He was present when I was interviewed, and seemed confused about the difference between plutonium and high-enriched uranium, or HEU, which he referred to as "HEW."

If you think public broadcasting owes us something better than this claptrap, contact David Fanning, "Frontline" senior executive producer; ph:617-783-3500; fax:617-254-0243; 125 Western Avenue, Boston, MA 02134. Send copies of your comments to your local PBS channel. You can also comment on the "Frontline" web site at [www.pbs.org](http://www.pbs.org).

---

March 11, 1997

David Fanning  
Senior Executive Producer  
Michael Sullivan

Executive Producer  
Frontline  
125 Western Ave.  
Boston, MA 02134

Dear Messrs. Fanning and Sullivan:

On Wednesday, January 8, I was interviewed by Jon Palfreman for a "Frontline" show on nuclear power. The interview took place at Ralph Nader's office, and, because Palfreman's interview with Nader ran late, I observed a substantial part of that interview as well.

Based on that experience, I am very concerned that the "Frontline" show Palfreman is producing will be extremely biased, and will contribute nothing valuable to the debate over nuclear issues. Having been told by the Palfreman Film Group that it was preparing a comprehensive look at nuclear energy and nuclear waste, I was surprised to find that the interviews instead focussed on a small number of issues, many of them peripheral to the topic. During the interviews with me and Nader, Palfreman went well beyond asking questions -- he consistently advocated pro-nuclear positions. Although he behaved politely throughout, he was extremely argumentative. In fact, Nader, who must be one of the more interviewed people on the planet, said he'd never seen anything like it. He was very upset by Palfreman's unprofessional journalism. I urge you to watch the unedited videotape of the interviews and judge for yourselves whether Palfreman was engaged in an attempt to gather information for a balanced report or an effort to argue the pro-nuclear position with nuclear energy opponents.

Palfreman's questions and assertions make his thesis pretty clear: nuclear power really isn't so bad, but people have an irrational fear of it. He quoted a Robert Dupont as saying that nuclear power would be the first industry destroyed by fear. This false argument is extremely elitist. You will insult the intelligence of the American people and your viewing audience if you tell them they just need to get over their irrational fears and learn to love the atom. In fact, almost all of the people working to protect communities across the country from the dangers of nuclear reactors and nuclear waste are quite rational, and history has proved them right. That the show is scheduled to air on Earth Day, April 22, only compounds the insult.

Palfreman took extremely pro-nuclear positions, making ridiculous claims like "No one's ever died from nuclear power." He spent a lot of time with both me and Nader trying to downplay the dangers of radiation released by the nuclear industry and play up the dangers of other sources of radiation, like radon. He even seemed to disagree with the scientific consensus that the biological effects of radiation increase linearly with the dose. Palfreman perhaps has aligned himself with the lunatic fringe that believes some doses of radiation are good for you.

Palfreman was scornful of the energy contributions and potential of energy efficiency and renewable energy, both of which have much more promise than nuclear power. When I talked about efficiency, he said he wanted to talk about the "real world." His bias took him to some blatant

self-contradictions. For example, he asked whether ruling out nuclear power in a country like China, with its vast coal reserves, might worsen global warming. I replied that, in fact, we should encourage China to invest in energy efficiency rather than coal or nuclear power, because efficiency investments are far more effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. When I pointed out that the U.S. had made enormous energy efficiency gains, he discounted that by saying the U.S. was a rich country. But if China can not afford to pay for energy efficiency technology, how will it ever be able to afford nuclear plants, which are far more expensive than efficient refrigerators, light bulbs and motors?

Oddly enough, Palfreman expressed no interest in the current debate over nuclear power's future in an electricity industry undergoing restructuring and greater market competition. He was interested only in rehashing the same tired, old arguments nuclear apologists have made for decades. "Frontline" viewers would benefit much more from a balanced discussion of what will happen with nuclear power plants in states that are moving toward retail competition for electricity. But, of course, that would require an admission that nuclear power in most parts of the U.S. can not compete with other electricity sources, and Palfreman refuses to even talk about the economics of nuclear power. Every time Nader or I brought up economics, he insisted on changing the subject.

Palfreman was quite enamored of a discredited Department of Energy research program into an Integral Fast Reactor, a breeder reactor project terminated by Congress in 1994. Although its proponents touted the IFR as a miracle machine that would burn radioactive waste, the program in fact had so many environmental, proliferation and fiscal problems that it was rejected even by pro-nuclear experts at the National Academy of Sciences and the DOE.

One of the IFR's few champions is Richard Rhodes, your report's "correspondent." Rhodes, who was present when I was interviewed and asked one or two questions, has written a pro-nuclear propaganda piece, Nuclear Renewal, which, among other things, buys the pro-IFR arguments that Congress, DOE and NAS rejected.

Furthermore, it seems likely that the show will focus on the handful of major countries that still have active nuclear construction programs, in an effort to make it look like the U.S. is missing out on a promising technology. You have an obligation to point out that most of the world has turned away from nuclear power, and that important allies like Germany, Great Britain and Italy will probably never again build reactors in their countries.

On Friday, January 10, I spoke over the telephone with Kathy Boisvert, associate producer for the Palfreman Film Group. I told her that I believed the show was headed toward being very biased toward the nuclear industry. She assured me that they were doing a "fair and objective" look at nuclear power, and said they had given us time and space to present our views. (In fact, we gave them time and space.)

I have also found that Palfreman produced a "Frontline" show on breast implants. Consumer advocates knowledgeable on the breast implant

issue consider the show to have been an extremely biased hatchet job that tried to downplay the problems with silicon breast implants and portray the implant manufacturers as victims of our legal system.

The Palfreman Group, of course, has every right to produce a pro-nuclear report, but it should not pretend that the piece is fair and objective. I will certainly not make any effort to block the airing of the report, but I do hope "Frontline" will try to make it as balanced as possible.

When Boisvert originally contacted me to ask questions and schedule the interview, she identified herself as being with "Frontline." I have watched many "Frontline" shows over the years, and have often been impressed with their quality (the breast implant report being a major exception). I also was interviewed more than once for the research for a "Frontline" show on energy in 1992. That report did an excellent job of covering events leading to the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Based on that experience, I believed that any interviewers representing "Frontline" would be professional and fair. Therefore, I agreed to be interviewed for this report on nuclear energy. This recent interview destroyed my belief in the fairness and professionalism of "Frontline" interviewers.

Please respond to this letter as soon as you can. I thank you in advance for your consideration of the issues I have raised.

Sincerely,

Bill Magavern  
Director  
Critical Mass EnergyProject

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To receive regular alerts on energy policy through the Internet, sign up for the Critical Mass listserver by sending the following message to:  
listproc@essential.org

SUBSCRIBE CMEP-LIST Your Name - Organization (no acronyms) - Home state

The Critical Mass Energy Project world wide web site is located at:  
<http://www.citizen.org/CMEP>

The Critical Mass email address is [cmep@essential.org](mailto:cmep@essential.org)

>From GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk Thu Apr 10 12:15:12 1997  
Received: from MCR1.poptel.org.uk by gnew.gn.apc.org (8.8.5/Revision: 2.06 03 December 1996)  
id MAA25632; Thu, 10 Apr 1997 12:14:58 GMT  
X-UIDL: 860696033.004  
From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 1997 13:14:33 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 10 Apr  
To: nfzns@gn.apc.org  
Message-Id: <497133050MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
Status: R

## DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Thurs 10 Apr 1997

97-8416 N/power officials in Japan admit lying to gvt about safety  
procedures during accident at Tokaimura plant in March. FT  
97-8417 BNFL and French counterpart Cogema bidding to convert 50 tonnes  
of plutonium from US bombs into fuel for reactors: activists  
protest at proposals to ship it across Atlantic. NewSc 12  
97-2572 Researchers link childhood cancers with industrial sites but  
find no connection with nuclear installations. G,Ind

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

REPLY-TO: int@fme.knooppunt.be  
-----

Dear friends,

The second international meeting of the Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days 1997 will take place in Belgium (Gewad 15, 9000 Gent) on Saturday and Sunday 3 - 4, May 1997.

We will start at 10 a.m. and end at 7 p.m. on Saturday, 6 p.m. on Sunday.

To plan agenda, food and accommodation, please fill in and return the attached form as soon as possible.

Hope to see you in May!

Peace and beautiful springtime,

Katri Silvonen & Hanna Jarvinen  
For Mother Earth International

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Agenda proposal:

- Introduction of participants and groups
- Expectations from this meeting
- Video on ICJ decision
- Work-shop on the implications of the ICJ-decision for NATO nuclear policy, and which legal steps/strategy do we follow in the preparation of this NVDA-campaign.
- Report and planning working-groups (with time-plan)
  - \* Statement of purpose NWAD 1997
  - \* networking (endorsers, majordomo, mailings, meetings, etc ...)
  - \* outreach (flyer, poster, ....)
  - \* lobby (draft letter for NATO-leaders, ...)
  - \* legal (legal planning)
  - \* actions (update planning July 8th, August 6th and 9th 1997)
  - \* media (report and planning)
  - \* logistics (for Madrid and Peace Camp Brussels)
  - \* finances (report and planning)

...and for sure we will play GAMES!

\*\*\*\*\*

Return-form for NWAD -97 meeting in Gent on 3 - 4, May 1997

\*\*\*\*\*

0 YES, I want to attend the meeting and will arrive

in Gent on \_\_\_\_\_

0 NO, I can not attend but have following message/request for

the meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Organisation: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

Fax: \_\_\_\_\_

E-mail: \_\_\_\_\_

end

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
RETURN FORM ATTACHED  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

>From : Claire Greensfelder (Plutonium Free Future) <greensfelder@igc.org>  
& Pol D'Huyvetter (For Mother Earth International) <polFME@aol.com>

PLEASE TRY TO SIGN ON TODAY  
AND CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION IN YOUR NETWORKS

THIS RESOLUTION WILL BE GIVEN PERSONALLY NEXT WEDNESDAY MORNING TO GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATES ATTENDING THE PREPARATORY MEETINGS FOR THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW 2000 AND THE COMMISSION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT MEETING PREPARING FOR RIO+5 (REVIEW OF THE EARTH SUMMIT) BOTH MEETINGS ARE CURRENTLY IN SESSION (APRIL 7-25) AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

Dear friends and safe energy activists around the world,

Attached you'll find a resolution which will be handed to UN delegates next week. This resolution was approved initially by the Abolition 2000 Caucus of NGO's accredited to the NPT Prep Com meeting. Abolition 2000 is a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons with over 700 endorsing organizations from around the world. The approval of this resolution on Article IV of the NPT - concerning the "peaceful uses" of nuclear energy is an important political bridge between the peace movement and the ecological and human-rights movements. Already, today - on the first day we circulated this resolution - more than three dozen NGO's representing over 100 nations have endorsed its recommendations! We will put up the initial list of endorsers on email to you by Monday, and we will repost the entire list of endorsers (hopefully including your organization) after Wednesday.

We encourage you and your organization to sign on today, and to spread it quickly through your networks, and **GET BACK TO US BY EMAIL OR FAX BY TUESDAY AFTERNOON - 15 April, New York City time**, so that we can add the global community to our list of endorsers that will be distributed to delegates on Wednesday 16 April - the day of NGO presentations to the NPT. Of course, we welcome you to send endorsements after next week to us at the following addresses/fax/email:

For a Nuclear Free and Solar-Powered Future!

Claire Greensfelder, Plutonium Free Future  
P.O. Box 2589, Berkeley, California USA (Shasta Bioregion) 94709  
tel: +1-510-540-7645  
fax: +1-510-540-6159  
email: greensfelder@igc.org

Pol D'Huyvetter, For Mother Earth International  
Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium  
tel +32-9-2338439  
fax +32-9-233-7302  
email: polFME@aol.com (before april 21st)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
NGO Resolution and Recommendations of the Abolition Caucus  
to Delegates to Prep Com 1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2000 Review  
Concerning Article IV -- re: The "Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy"  
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and creation of UN Solar Energy Agency

11 April 1997

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that entered into force in 1970, recognizes an "inalienable right" to all the Parties to the Treaty to "develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". This point was reaffirmed and expanded upon in Decision II, Points 14-20 of the agreements of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

We acknowledge, however that there is an inextricable link between the "peaceful" and "military" uses of many nuclear technologies and materials. Further, we are aware that the proliferation of the peaceful atom has caused the widespread distribution of nuclear technology and therefore fissile materials and tritium with potential military applications.

We note with concern that not only are there unacceptable economic, environmental, social and public health costs with atomic power, there is additionally, still no solution for the growing problem of nuclear waste. Additionally, numerous incidents and accidents at civilian nuclear plants including accidents with transboundary consequences have irreversibly contaminated large parts of our earth.

We therefore resolve firmly that there is a higher "inalienable right" that must be guaranteed and that is the right to a clean and healthy environment with safe land, food, water and sustainable and renewable energy technologies for all people and future generations.

This right to a clean, healthy and safe environment has been agreed to and reaffirmed in the statements and documents from numerous international meetings and conferences of governments and NGO's, including, among others:

1. The Women's Action Agenda 21 of Miami (November 1991)
2. The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 of the Earth Summit (June 1992)
- 3.. The Salzburg Declaration of the World Uranium Hearing (September 1992)
4. The Abolition 2000 Statement (April 1995, with over 700 signatories as of April 1997.)
5. The Platform for Action of the 4th World Conference of Women, Beijing (Sept.1995)
6. The Resolution of the No More Chernobyls Conference, Kiev (April 1996)

7. The Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit Statement, Albuquerque, New Mexico( November 1996)

8. The Moorea Declaration of the Abolition 2000 Conference, Maharepa Village, Moorea, Te Ao Maohi (French Polynesia) (January 1997)

9. The United Nations Development Programme Report - "Energy After Rio" (February 1997) in preparation for the Rio+5 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (scheduled for June 1997)

Therefore we recommend:

1. Immediate governmental initiatives for the creation of a new UN International Solar\* Energy Agency, to promote energy efficiency programs and renewable energy technology transfer

2. The creation of a new working group to review Article IV of the NPT, in order to address the civilian-military ambivalence as the inherent danger of nuclear power to proliferation. The promotion of nuclear power by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Article I) should cease. The transfer of nuclear technologies should halt. This recommendation includes limiting the mission of the IAEA to safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities.

3. An international halt on the construction of new nuclear power plants (NPP's). The phase out of all existing plants and the ending of spent fuel reprocessing and the reuse of plutonium as MOX fuel. The end to all ongoing and planned uranium mining activities. We are especially alarmed about the export of the economically failed Western nuclear industries into Eastern Europe and Asia, given that most Western countries have a virtual moratorium on construction of new NPP's.

4. Respect for Indigenous Peoples right to self-determination and political independence including their right to end all ongoing and planned nuclear waste dumping on their lands, and prohibit on the transport of nuclear materials through their territories.

\* We use the title "Solar Energy Agency" instead of "Renewable or Sustainable" because wind, biomass, ocean wave, and other like technologies derive their energy potential directly from the sun. There is a similar proposal put forward by the NGO EuroSolar.

ENDORSED BY THE FOLLOWING NGO'S AND INDIVIDUALS:

please note if you are signing as an individual,  
with organization for identification only by marking an asterisk\* next to  
your name

| Individual Name | Organization |
|-----------------|--------------|
| Address         | Country      |



Dear Abolition friends

Following is a piece Rob Green and I have written about the links between the ICJ Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and NATO. We hope it will be especially useful to activists working for the Abolition Days actions this year. However, we are very willing to make alterations as a result of any comments you might have.

George Farebrother  
.....

## NATO NUCLEAR ILLEGALITY

By Rob Green & George Farebrother, World Court Project UK

The following notes summarise what we believe are the strongest arguments flowing from the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 which can be used in exposing the illegality of NATO's nuclear policy.

It is important to recognise that none of our arguments will guarantee success in court. However, we are convinced that what we have to say is plausible and carries conviction.

### A. NATO's Nuclear Umbrella

First, it is important to emphasise that the Court found threat and use to be indivisible. Whatever is illegal about use is also illegal about threat. This relates directly to nuclear deterrence.

Next, Paragraph 97 of the Advisory Opinion states that the Court "cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake". The Dispositif, or summary of conclusions, uses the phrase "in which the very survival of a State would be at stake".

There are several points to note about this.

- 1) The lawyers we have asked agree that the body of the Opinion carries more weight than the Dispositif.
- 2) According to the President of the Court, "This cannot in any way be interpreted as a half-open door to the recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". It is much more than simply a recognition of the fact that in this area the Court did not have enough evidence to come to a conclusion. The entire thrust of the Opinion is to delegitimise nuclear weapons.
- 3) In the wording in the Dispositif, "a State" could be interpreted as meaning the weapons could be used on behalf of another State. However, the words "its very survival" in

paragraph 97 suggests that only self-defence threat or use might be allowed and that collective threat or use is illegal. Rupert Ticehurst, an international law lecturer at Kings College London, argues: "Because the effects of nuclear weapons are so severe, the circumstances when they might be lawfully used must be extreme. To this extent, the ICJ is placing these weapons in a different category to other weapons.

Generally, the laws of armed conflict and the use of force allow for collective self-defence - of course this is provided for in the UN Charter. However, because nuclear weapons may only be lawfully used in an extreme circumstance (and I say 'may') the rules on collective self-defence are not applicable to their use. States are entitled to use conventional weapons in collective self-defence but nuclear weapons may only be used in cases of individual self-defence (again I say 'may').

I am not basing my whole interpretation on the word 'its' alone. My interpretation is based upon the general position that the ICJ took. I think that their view is that nuclear States can only use nuclear weapons when their survival is at stake. If the collective self-defence argument is applicable to nuclear weapons then they could have been lawfully used against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor etc. I don't think this is what the ICJ has in mind when it referred to an extreme scenario of self-defence."

Another of our lawyers says we ought to be cautious about using this argument and that a good lawyer working for a government could find weaknesses in it. However, Rupert feels that it is very plausible and should be pushed.

The UK government clearly believes otherwise. In a recent letter to a supporter the UK Ministry of Defence states : "We would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence (which under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty includes collective defence of our NATO allies) in extreme circumstances." NATO doctrine almost certainly applies to any new NATO States such as Poland etc. It is important to distinguish between the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed in the new States (which NATO says is not on the agenda), and the new States being part of a nuclear alliance, which compounds the illegality of collective nuclear defence if our interpretation of the Advisory Opinion is correct.

3) Even in these very limited circumstances, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with international humanitarian law. (Paragraph 105D). The Court found no circumstance in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not violate humanitarian law. Thus any use must, for example, discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, and respect neutral States.

The NATO nuclear States deploy some, at least, of the nuclear

warheads on behalf of the Alliance as a whole and, as we have seen above, are willing to use them in collective self-defence.

Although some of these warheads might be relatively small, the majority are far larger in their yield than the Hiroshima bomb. For example, most Trident warheads are 100 kilotons - about 8 times larger than Hiroshima. Such enormous destructive power, combined with the ability to cause untold human suffering and damage to generations to come from radiation effects, makes them incapable of complying with humanitarian law.

## B. NATO's First Use Option

NATO retains the option of using nuclear weapons first. In paragraph 94 of the Opinion, the Court challenged the nuclear States that they had neither specified any legal circumstance for use, nor convinced it that "limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons." It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which using nuclear weapons first would not have such a tendency.

When combined with the need to satisfy the principles of humanitarian law in the event of an attack on a NATO member State, we can therefore argue that NATO first use is illegal.

This is especially applicable to the most likely scenario for the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the NATO nuclear States. The US, UK and France have plans to use nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear "rogue" States to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to protect US/UK/French so-called "vital interests" anywhere in the world. These fall far short of "an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."

## C. The Nuremberg Connection

The Court's confirmation that the Nuremberg Principles apply to nuclear weapons has serious implications for all involved in implementing NATO's nuclear policy. For example, military professionals need to be seen to be acting within the law if they are to be distinguished from hired killers or terrorists.

Military professionals shunned chemical and biological weapons before they were prohibited, because they were too indiscriminate and repulsive. NATO's plans to use even low-yield nuclear weapons are vulnerable to the Court's finding that the effects of nuclear weapons are unique, more severe and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons. Also radiation effects are analogous to those of biological weapons. In so doing, the Court confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons - only in many respects far worse.

## D. Unanimous Call for Nuclear Disarmament

The judges' unanimous call in paragraph 105F for nuclear disarmament went further than Article VI of the NPT, by stating that negotiations should be concluded irrespective of any treaty on general and complete disarmament, behind which hitherto the nuclear States have hidden. This challenges the current perception among NATO decision-makers that "nuclear might is right" and lawful, and that NATO nuclear policy is sustainable. Although NATO's nuclear plans are secret, its post-Cold War posture shows that it has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons; it is determined to maintain a nuclear warfighting capability; and it is prepared to threaten to use low-yield warheads first, backed by massive nuclear strikes when its public stance is one of last-resort, so-called "minimal deterrence" in self-defence.

#### E. NATO as an Alliance

NATO is a nuclear alliance. Some of the UK's nuclear weapons, for example, are dedicated to NATO use. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group takes collective decisions. Therefore NATO, as an institution as well as its individual members, carries responsibility for its nuclear policy.

There is no evidence whatsoever that NATO nuclear planning has taken its legal obligations, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice, into account. The burden of proof is now on NATO to show that its threat or use scenarios comply with humanitarian law.

#### F. The Authority of the International Court of Justice

The UK government has consistently argued that the Opinion is not binding and changes nothing. It is not the Court's job to make law, but to clarify existing law. I don't agree it changes nothing) However, the UK made written and oral submissions to the Court, and the UK Foreign Minister has pledged "both moral and material support" to it, adding that "the more we accept that international law must be the foundation of international relations, the safer we shall all be."

More generally, we can point out that the ICJ is the Court of the United Nations. It can give Advisory Opinions on any question at the request of a UN agency, such as the General Assembly, in order to assist that agency in discharging its duties. These Opinions are not binding, but they do clarify international law with the highest possible authority. An Advisory Opinion is only given after careful and lengthy deliberation and after full hearings involving all interested states and UN agencies. In this case, 43 states, a record number (including the UK) filed written submissions and 22 (again including the UK) made oral statements.

Furthermore, the UK government has signed the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and has affirmed the Nuremberg Principles. It is therefore bound to abide by these. Thus, the ICJ's decision

that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally violate the Law of War as codified in these conventions and principles means that all parties to them are under an obligation to respect this.

It is also worth pointing out that in December 1994, by a comfortable majority, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested the Court to deliver its Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On 10 December 1996, an even larger majority of the UNGA adopted Resolution 51/45M which "takes note of" the Opinion and "expresses its appreciation to the ICJ". The Resolution went on to call for "negotiations in 1997 leading to the early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention".

please add the following endorsement and send to Senator's Allard and Campbell

CO

The Colorado Coalition for the Prevention of Nuclear War

President, Robert Kinsey

and

The Just Peace Task Force, Rocky Mountain Conference, United Church of Christ

>>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>>Date: Fri, 11 Apr 1997 12:43:26 GMT  
>>Subject: NPU Bulletin 11 Apr  
>>To: nfznc@gn.apc.org  
>>  
>>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY  
>>  
>>Fri 11 Apr 1997  
>>  
>>97-8419 CIA admits failure to warn Gulf war commanders of location of  
>> chemical weapons dumps in Iraq, possibly exposing troops to  
>> Sarin and other toxic agents. G,DT  
>>  
>>  
>>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
>>  
>>

Stewart Kemp (nfznc@gn.apc.org)

\*Clinton's remarks to America's newspapers editors, CWC excerpts. Note that in the Q&A section, he misspeaks and says that Iran has ratified the treaty.

April 11, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE ANNUAL MEETING THE AMERICAN SOCIETY  
OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

J.W. Marriott Hotel  
Washington, D.C.

12:17 P.M. EDT

Excerpts on the Chemical Weapons Convention

President Clinton:

Now America must rise to the challenge of ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, and doing it before it takes effect on April 29th, less than three weeks from today.

This century opened with the horror of chemical warfare in the trenches of World War I. Today, at the dawn of a new century, we have the opportunity to forge a widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, even as we know it remains a grave, grave threat in the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires other nations to do what we decided to do more than a decade ago -- get rid of all chemical weapons. In other words, the treaty is about other nations destroying their chemical weapons. As they do so and renounce the development, production, acquisition, or use of chemical arms, and pledge not to help others acquire them or produce them, our troops will be less likely to face one of the battlefields most lethal threats. As stockpiles are eliminated and the transfer of dangerous chemicals is controlled, rogue states and terrorists will have a harder time getting the ingredients for weapons. And that will protect not only military forces, but also innocent civilians.

By giving us new tools for verification, enabling us to tap a global network for intelligence and information, and strengthening our own law enforcement, the treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and to punish those who seek to violate its rules.

The Chemical Weapons Convention reflects the best of American bipartisanship -- negotiated under President Reagan and President Bush, supported by a broad and growing number of Americans, including every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the Carter administration. Last week at the White House, I was proud to welcome a remarkable cross-section of these supporters, including former Secretary of State James Baker, General Colin Powell, other military leaders, legislators, arms control experts and representatives from small and large businesses, religious groups, and scientists.

I urge the Senate to do what is right and ratify this convention. If we fail to do it, we won't be there to enforce a treaty that we helped to write, leaving our military and our people more vulnerable to a silent and sudden killer. We will put ourselves in the same column with rogue nations like Libya and Iraq that reject this treaty, instead of in the company of those that set the norms for civilized behavior in this world. We will subject our chemical companies, among our leading exporters, to severe trade restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions of dollars in sales, and cost many Americans good jobs. And perhaps most important, we will send a clear signal of retreat to the rest of the world at the

very time when we ought to be sending the opposite signal.

America has led the effort to establish an international ban against chemical weapons. Now we have to ratify it and remain on the right side of history. If we do, there will be new momentum and moral authority to our leadership in reducing even more the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.

Within my lifetime we've made enormous strides. Stepping back from the nuclear precipice, from the bleak time of fallout shelters and air raid drills. But we have so much more to do. We have to strengthen the world's ability to stop the use of deadly diseases as biological weapons of war. We have to freeze the production of raw materials used for nuclear bombs. We must give greater bite to the global watchdogs responsible for detecting hidden weapons systems and programs. Continuing this progress demands constant work, nonstop vigilance, and American leadership.

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Excerpt from Q & A:

Q Mr. President, my county of 70,000 people is at risk from 7 percent of the nation's stockpile of aging chemical weapons, the nerve agents it's referred to. We don't have the highways to evacuate -- we need to; we don't have the civil defense infrastructure. The disposal plan is behind the time line.

Two questions. As a political matter, wouldn't it make sense to bring even more intensive scrutiny to these sites? There are eight sites scattered across the country; our whole nation is at risk from the downside of the old chemical warfare. And as a moral matter, doesn't it make sense for your administration to step up the disposal and make sure that the highway infrastructure is in place for escape routes and civil defense?

THE PRESIDENT: You've asked me a question no one's ever asked me before, but I can tell you the answer to the first question is, does it make more sense to bring more attention to the country about it -- the answer to that is yes -- if, for no other reason, not just because of what your people may be exposed to, but because one of the reasons we decided to destroy all this before I ever came along -- my predecessors made that decision, it was the right one -- is that you don't want even small amounts of these kinds of chemicals in the wrong hands -- can be used for very bad things.

And let me also say -- now, on the second question, I will have to go back and see what the facts are and see what we can do to accelerate it. I don't know enough now to give you a sensible answer, but you've asked a good question and I will get an answer and I'll get back to you. And let me just make one other point on this. Some of the opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention say, well, you know, you can't protect everybody against everything. Well, if that were the standard, we'd never have any treaties and we wouldn't pass any laws.

You know, still, some people may be able to cook up chemical weapons in laboratories in their garages. But if you look at what happened to the Japanese people, for example, when the extremist sect unleashed the sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, it was a devastating thing.

Now, maybe they could or could not do that once the chemical weapons regime is fully in force and we have much tighter restrictions on what can cross national lines. But one thing we know for sure: Japan has already ratified this treaty because they have suffered through this and they know even if somebody who has got a half-cocked idea and a home-baked laboratory can go out and do something terrible like this, there will be fewer incidents like this if we pass the Chemical Weapons Convention.

And I think it's very interesting -- a lot of the objections that have been raised to this convention in America were totally dismissed out of hand in Japan, a country that has genuinely suffered from chemicals like this in the hands of terrorists. But that goes back to the question the gentleman from Alabama asked and it's one of the reasons we want to destroy our stockpiles as

quickly as possible, because, in addition to the risks that people in the area are exposed to, we want to minimize the chances that anybody ever can get their hands on any of this for mischievous, evil purposes.

Q Mr. President, some opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention are arguing that, indeed, it would let the fox into the henhouse; that is to say, a country, perhaps Iran, a signatory, would gain access to our development techniques for making chemical weapons, which are relatively simple, but more importantly, to those regarding defenses against chemical weapons in the fields. What is your response to that argument? And are you in any position to negotiate a change of any sort in the document if that were necessary to get the votes for ratification?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, it is -- let me answer the second question first, and then I'll go back. In general, obviously no one country can change the body of a treaty which has already been ratified by other countries; we can't do that, and lots of other countries have ratified it.

But every country is empowered to, in effect, attach a set of understandings as to what the treaty means, and as long as they're not plainly inconsistent with the thrust of the document and don't violate it, they can go forward. And one of the things we've been doing with a lot of the opponents and the skeptics of the treaty -- Senator Helms, for example, and others raised, I think, 30 different questions in the beginning, and we have reached agreement, I believe, in 20 of those 30 areas, and we've offered alternatives that we believe are reasonable in the other areas.

Let me just say for those of you who may not understand this, Iran is a signatory of the -- they have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iraq and Libya have not and will not. The concern is that if a country is attacked by chemical weapons and they are part of the treaty, that all the rest of us have pledged to do something to help them. And the concern would be -- well, what if Iran is attacked by Iraq and the United States and Germany, for example, give them a lot of sophisticated defense technology on chemical weapons and they turn around and use the chemical weapons against someone else. In other words, if they turned out to have lied about their promise in the treaty. That's the argument.

We have made it clear that, as regards other countries, we will not do anything to give them our technology -- not Iran, not anybody -- and that what our response will be -- will be limited to helping them deal with the health effects of the attack. We will help people in medical ways and with other things having to do with the health consequences.

So I believe that the compromise we have reached on that, once it becomes fully public and the language is dealt with, will be acceptable to at least most of those who have opposed the treaty on that ground.

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
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Washington, DC 20036  
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Fax: 202-785-9034  
<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/poison/>

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 12 LINES REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

Dear Abolitionists, In my capacity as convenor of the "Overcoming Nuclear Threats" Working Group, I offer the following article just submitted to the New Zealand International Review, a prestigious journal on international affairs.

It is in response to a rather desperately pro-nuclear piece called "The abolition of nuclear weapons: possibilities and practicalities - Ron Smith suggests that abandonment of nuclear deterrence might not necessarily have favourable consequences". Smith is Director of Defence and Strategic Studies in the University of Waikato's Department of Political Science and Public Policy. It is an appalling apologia for nukes from an academic in a State with nuke-free legislation.

I would of course welcome comments! I believe that this is a crucial debate which, if we can win it, is a key factor governing how soon we will achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Best wishes,

Rob Green

UK Chair, World Court Project

\* \* \*

## WHY NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS A DANGEROUS ILLUSION

Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired) replies to Ron Smith

In the January/February 1997 issue of the New Zealand International Review, Ron Smith argued against the growing tide in favour of the abolition of nuclear weapons. On the following point I have no dispute with him. He wrote: "The crucial issue is that of the value of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world. If it still has value, then that value must be measured against what we take to be the value of a nuclear weapons-free world... We cannot discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons without discussing nuclear deterrence."

What if nuclear deterrence has no value? I will argue that this is in fact the case; and that the whole doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

### Flying With The Bomb

I served in the Royal Navy for twenty years from 1962-82. As a Fleet Air Arm Observer (navigator and weapon system operator), I flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike jets from 1968-72; and for the next five years in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters equipped with the WE-177 Nuclear Depth Bomb (NDB). As one of four nuclear crews in a Buccaneer squadron, my pilot and I

were assigned a target from NATO's Single Integrated Operational Plan, and were ordered to plan to attack it with a free-fall WE-177 thermo-nuclear bomb.

## Nuclear v Conventional Deterrence Between States

NDBs were withdrawn from the Royal Navy in 1992. By then, new conventional ASW weapons had been developed which were able to neutralise all currently envisaged naval targets. Indeed, as far as the USA is concerned, Ron Smith rightly stated: "There is nothing it could do with nuclear weapons that it cannot do with modern conventional weapons." Therefore conventional deterrence - which is credible - is the military answer to his fear that, without nuclear deterrence, "disastrous wars between the major powers are likely to occur again."

Modern industrial States, increasingly interdependent on multinational conglomerates, the globalisation of trade and sensitive to public opinion, are increasingly constrained from going to war with each other. But even if this argument is not accepted, there is a fundamental logical objection to relying on nuclear deterrence. Although the risk of conventional deterrence failing is greater, the damage would be confined to the belligerent States - and the environmental damage would usually be repairable. What is at stake from deterrence failing between nuclear weapon States is the devastation and poisoning of not just the belligerent powers, but potentially of all forms of life on the planet. Meanwhile, retention of nuclear arsenals encourages proliferation of the problem, and with it this unacceptable risk.

## Falklands War

In my last appointment as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, I helped to provide round-the-clock intelligence support to British forces in the Falklands War. I know what a close-run thing that war was. If Argentine aircraft had sunk one of the main troopships before the landing force had got ashore, the British might have had to withdraw. What would Thatcher have done? Polaris had clearly not deterred Galtieri from invading. With victory in his grasp, it is doubtful that he would have believed even Thatcher would have seriously threatened a nuclear strike on Argentina. Yet rumours abounded that a Polaris submarine had been moved south within range of Buenos Aires. If she had so threatened, my assessment was that he would have very publicly called her bluff and relished watching Reagan try to rein her in. And in the last resort, it is likely that the Polaris Commanding Officer would have either refused the order or faked a malfunction, and returned to face the court martial.

## Gulf War

My scepticism over nuclear deterrence grew when the Berlin Wall came down; but it took the Gulf War to make me break out of my

pro-nuclear brainwashing. As the first ex-RN Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them, it was very traumatic.

In the run-up to the Gulf War, my military intelligence training warned me that the US-led coalition's blitzkrieg/punitive expedition strategy would give Saddam Hussein the pretext he needed to attack Israel - an undeclared nuclear weapon State. If thereby Israel was drawn into the conflict, this might split the coalition. If not, he still stood to gain widespread Arab support for being the first Arab leader for years to take on the Israelis.

My greatest fear was that the Iraqi leader would be provoked enough to attack Israel with chemical-headed Scud missiles. Knowing that West German technical support was involved in the warhead design, Israel's Prime Minister Shamir would come under massive pressure to retaliate with a nuclear strike on Baghdad. Iraq had the best anti-nuclear bunkers Western technology could provide; but even if Saddam did not survive, what would happen next? With Baghdad a radiated ruin, the entire Arab world would erupt in fury against Israel and her friends: there would be terror bombings in every allied capital; Israel's security would be destroyed forever; and Russia would be sucked in.

The first Scud attack hit Tel Aviv on the night of 17 January 1991. For the first time, the second most important city of a de facto nuclear State had been attacked and its capital threatened. Worse, the aggressor did not have nuclear weapons. The rest of the world still waits to learn what Bush had to promise Shamir for not retaliating - fortunately, the warhead was conventional high explosive, and casualties were light. The Israeli people, cowering in gas-masks in their basements, learned that night that their nuclear "deterrent" had failed in its primary purpose. Some 38 more Scud attacks followed.

Meanwhile, in Britain the IRA just missed wiping out the entire Gulf War Cabinet with a mortar bomb attack from a van in Whitehall. They were not deterred by Polaris - yet a more direct threat to the government could barely be imagined.

### Nuclear Deterrence Won't Work Against Terrorists

To my surprise, in 1993 my Secretary of State for Defence agreed with me. In a keynote speech on 16 November at the Centre for Defence Studies in King's College, London entitled "UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?", Malcolm Rifkind almost agonised over the problem:

"... I have to say that it is difficult to be confident that an intended deterrent would work in the way intended, in the absence of an established deterrent relationship... Would the threat be understood in the deterrent way in which it

was intended; and might it have some unpredictable and perhaps counter-productive consequence? Categorical answers to these questions might be hard to come by, and in their absence the utility of the deterrent threat as a basis for policy and action would necessarily be in doubt... it is difficult to see deterrence operating securely against proliferators."

By an "established deterrent relationship" presumably he meant the unstable, irrational balance of terror between two trigger-happy, paranoid power blocs - otherwise known as the Cold War. Its inherent instability was evidenced by the inevitable struggle for "escalation dominance". More than 50,000 nuclear warheads was the ridiculous result; while health, education, and other services that make up civilised society deteriorated on both sides through lack of resources.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and an unchecked arms trade, it is only a matter of time before terrorists get a nuclear weapon. They are the most likely "proliferators", because nuclear blackmail is the ultimate expression of megalomania and terrorism. Yet nuclear deterrence cannot be relied upon against such threats.

This nightmare will intensify as long as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council insist on the Bomb to "guarantee" their ultimate security - when in fact it does the exact opposite - while trying to deny it to other States. Such a policy of nuclear apartheid is hypocritical and unsustainable.

### Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Security

The Falklands and Gulf Wars taught me that competing for unilateral security leads to more insecurity, both for others and ultimately oneself. We need a new understanding of security: one that sees it as a safety net for all, not a "win/lose" military game which leaves the underlying problems which caused the war unresolved, and feeds the arms trade. True security lies in fostering a just, sustainable world order.

The Bomb directly threatens security - both of those who possess it and those it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is a security problem, not a solution. This is because it provokes the greatest threat: namely, the spread of nuclear weapons to megalomaniac leaders and terrorists - who are least likely to be deterred.

### Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Democracy

Democracy depends on responsible use of political and military power, with leaders held accountable to the will of the majority of the people. If a democratic nation is forced to use State-sanctioned violence to defend itself, its leaders must stay within recognised moral and legal limits. Nuclear deterrence is about threatening the most indiscriminate violence possible,

unrestrained by morality or the law. It is therefore a policy of gross irresponsibility, and the antithesis of democratic values.

Furthermore, democracy within a State operating a nuclear deterrence policy is inevitably eroded by the need for secrecy and tight control of equipment, technology and personnel. The history of the British Bomb shows that every major decision was taken without even full Cabinet knowledge, let alone approval.

### What If Terrorists Try Nuclear Blackmail?

The first rule is that on no account should the threat of nuclear annihilation be used to try and oppose them. They will just call your bluff - because targeting them with even a small nuclear weapon would be impossible without incurring unacceptable collateral damage and provoking global outrage. Indeed, they would relish taking as many others with them as they could. So nuclear weapons are worse than useless in such a crisis.

My advice would be to emulate how the French authorities dealt with a man with explosives wrapped around his chest who hijacked a class of schoolchildren and threatened to blow them up if his demands were not met. They exhausted him by lengthy negotiations while installing surveillance devices to determine his condition and location. At an optimum moment Special Forces moved in and shot him dead with a silenced handgun.

The most important underlying point to make here is that the surest way to minimise the chances of a nuclear hijack is to stop treating the Bomb as top asset in the security business and the ultimate political virility symbol.

### Nuclear Weapons Are Self-Detering

Fortunately for us all, the one aspect of nuclear deterrence which probably does work is that nuclear weapons are in fact self-detering. My evidence for this again comes from a British Secretary of State for Defence. In his 16 November 1993 speech, Rifkind said:

"...there is sometimes speculation that more so-called 'useable' nuclear weapons - very low-yield devices which could be used to carry out what are euphemistically called 'surgical' strikes - would allow nuclear deterrence to be effective in circumstances where existing weapons would be self-detering."

He went on to warn against reviving a war-fighting role for them, because this would:

"...be seriously damaging to our approach to maintaining stability in the European context, quite apart from the impact it would have on our efforts to encourage non-proliferation and greater confidence outside Europe.

This is not a route that I would wish any nuclear power to go down."

Unfortunately, he contradicted his own wise words by supporting the replacement of Polaris by Trident; and more specifically by supervising the recent introduction of a low-yield, single warhead in the missile load of the Trident submarine currently on patrol. He justified this by the need to find an answer to the fact that six 100 kiloton, MIRV'd warheads atop the other missiles are not a credible deterrent threat to "rogue" States threatening British "vital interests" anywhere in the world.

Any sane potential aggressor intent on acquiring nuclear weapons should heed Churchill's warning after Dresden: "The Allies risk taking over an utterly ruined land" - and that was conventional bomb damage. Even a low-yield "demonstration" strike (rumoured to be in growing favour among US, UK and French planners searching for roles for their nuclear arsenals) would so outrage world opinion that it would be self-defeating.

For a nuclear State facing defeat by a non-nuclear State, there is evidence that nuclear weapons are again self-deterring. The US in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, preferred withdrawal to the ultimate ignominy of resorting to nuclear revenge.

For all these reasons, I conclude that nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

>From Nuclear Deterrence To Abolition

On 4 December 1996 in Washington, General Lee Butler USAF (Ret'd), Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command from 1992- 94, explained to the National Press Club why he, too, had "made the long and arduous journey from staunch advocate of nuclear deterrence to public proponent of nuclear abolition." He warned: "Options are being lost as urgent questions are unasked, or unanswered; as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War patterns and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward toward a chilling world where the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction."

As a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, General Butler had joined Field Marshal Lord Carver, Chief of the UK Defence Staff in 1973-76, in stating: "The risks of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to deterrence... The end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost."

Their first recommended step towards this is for all nuclear forces to be taken off alert. This would "reduce dramatically the chance of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear weapons launch."

Apart from making the world much safer, it would puncture the myths of nuclear deterrence doctrine once and for all.

ENDS

Rebecca Johnson

As the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) under the 1995 decisions on enhancing the NPT review process ends its first week, questions about the purpose, powers and direction of the new process remain hanging. What appears to be emerging is a PrepCom process that will regularly air the issues, but where decisions on future action continue to be regarded as the five-yearly prerogative of Review Conferences. There are some disagreements over how to make recommendations to further PrepComs. Most delegations are in favour of recommendations being formulated for the next PrepCom, but consider it too early to decide on what to recommend for the year 2000. The battleground for determining the powers and role of the PrepComs has become the debates in the Chair's Consultations of around 25 key states over the reporting products from the PrepComs, i.e. how each PrepCom should record and transmit the sense and outcome of its deliberations to the next PrepCom and to the Review Conference. There is general agreement that working on bracketed language for a rolling should be avoided this early in the process.

The emerging framework is for a three part report. The first part would cover procedures and substance in a descriptive manner. This would either be wholly a factual, technical report of what meetings were held, papers distributed, agreements on procedures and so on; or it could include a description or summary by the Chair of the primary substantial and procedural issues discussed during the PrepCom. It is envisaged that part 2 could contain agreed recommendations to the next PrepCom, such as priority being given to discussion of certain issues. Part 3 is shaping up to be a list, compilation or inventory of the proposals from States Parties put forward during the PrepCom. South Africa had originally suggested this as 'supported and unsupported proposals'. The likelihood is that states will not want to weight them in this way, although some favour identifying the state which originated each proposal. Compiling the proposals would not require consensus, but would be a useful means of indicating to future PrepComs what had been put forward or prioritised by certain countries, without prejudging or recommending future action.

Two key questions are causing most difficulty: whether to identify issues where there is consensus; and whether to group the proposals according to the three clusters (nuclear disarmament; safeguards; and non-military uses), the treaty articles (as proposed by Canada), the 7 themes addressed in the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O), a combination of the clusters and the P&O themes, or some other way. The United Kingdom, in particular, seems concerned that if an issue fails to get consensus it might appear to be a step backward from consensus achieved in 1995 or it might be construed that consensus issues are accorded a higher priority. Other states disagree with this interpretation. In their view, if consensus can be obtained on some of the issues, they could be recommended directly for consideration at the Review Conference, clearing the way for more time to be spent in subsequent PrepComs on the issues where there are substantial differences of view. Rolling a consensus position over to the Review Conference would not preclude raising this issue at another PrepCom, if a change in political conditions were to warrant it. Proponents see the approach as a way of

enabling the review process to use its time more effectively, by focusing on the more contentious issues. Some believe that the underlying reason for British opposition is concern that without the padding of issues where there is already substantial acceptance, the PrepCom process will focus more and more on nuclear disarmament issues, thereby increasing pressure on the nuclear weapon states.

## Safeguards

Friday's closed debate started work on cluster 2 issues, principally safeguards and nuclear weapon free zones. As before, the majority of statements were from Western delegations, which strongly welcomed the work by the IAEA on the 93+2 programme, particularly the recent conclusion of a draft model protocol to strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The IAEA Board of Governors will be meeting on May 15-16. The Netherlands on behalf of the European Union (EU), as well as Britain, Japan, South Africa, Australia, South Africa, Canada and others urged adoption of the protocol. Prompted by the Iraqi experience, which showed that a clandestine nuclear weapon programme could be developed by an NPT party, notwithstanding safeguards agreements with the IAEA, the Programme 93+2 and draft protocol are aimed at giving the IAEA greater powers to verify the completeness, as well as the correctness of declarations from NPT members and states with related safeguards agreements. Statements by the EU, Canada, Britain, Australia and others also endorsed the export controls applied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. The NAM called for 'unilaterally enforced restrictive measures' beyond IAEA safeguards to be removed. As export controls are an over-lap issue between clusters 2 and 3, further statements are expected, so the issue will be dealt with more fully in a future NPT briefing.

## Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Egypt on behalf of the Arab League, of which all members are now NPT parties, following recent accession by United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Oman, recalled the resolution on the Middle East proposed by the depositary states at the 1995 Conference and called on the PrepCom to address this issue as a matter of urgency. Referring to the 'imbalance between the compliance by all Arab states' with the NPT and 'the risk imposed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policies and its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities', Egypt, supported also in the general NAM statement, called for full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including accession by Israel to the NPT, placement of its unsafeguarded facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and early establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all weapons of mass destruction.

Several statements welcomed conclusion and signature of the Pelindaba and Bangkok Treaties, which established NWFZs in Africa and South-East Asia respectively, although problems remain regarding accession to the Bangkok protocols by certain of the nuclear weapon states. The Marshall Islands, on behalf of the South Pacific Forum, expressed 'satisfaction at the permanent cessation of French nuclear testing' in the region and welcomed the signing of the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by France, the United States and Britain. The Forum called for further assistance in cleaning up contaminated nuclear test sites, resettling displaced people and restoring

the affected areas to economic productivity, stressing the need to exercise the precautionary principle with regard to nuclear matters.

The Kyrgyz Republic introduced a working paper welcoming the initiative of five states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. Their initiative, contained in the February 28 Almaty Declaration, was welcomed by Egypt, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. New Zealand pushed for more positive consideration of the concept of a nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere. In an attempt to allay suspicions articulated during the PrepCom by Britain, that this initiative was an 'attack on the freedom of the high seas', New Zealand said the aim was to promote shared goals and enable the parties to the four zones covering the Southern hemisphere to work together more effectively, and 'we envisage no additional legal commitment beyond the existing treaties'.

#### More on Nuclear Disarmament

During Friday, more information and statements became available to expand the information provided in NPT Briefing # 3 on the nuclear disarmament debates. In addition to urging early entry into force of the CTBT, Sweden proposed that concrete steps identified by the Canberra Commission could and should be undertaken immediately, including taking nuclear forces off alert and removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles. Japan made the same proposals and also invited the NWS to provide a report on their progress towards nuclear disarmament, as suggested in the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution 51/45G. Ambassador Laurence Edwards of the Marshall Islands stressed the need to 'start negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a Nuclear Weapons Convention', suggesting that this could be assisted through establishment of an intersessional working group under the auspices of the NPT review process. Edwards warned that if progress were not made towards eliminating nuclear weapons, 'the whole system of non-proliferation might be at risk'.

NPT Briefing # 3 reported in error that Britain, United States and France had objected to concerns raised by South Africa concerning the implications for NPT commitments of the planned expansion of NATO, if it maintained its present nuclear policies. Only Britain responded directly on this matter. I am also informed that NPT Briefing # 3 slightly over-stated the proposal by Finland for transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons, which was explained to me verbally (since NGOs are excluded from the meeting room and no written statement was available). I apologise, and reiterate the need for greater access by NGOs to this enhanced review process, which would increase transparency, confidence and the accuracy of our reporting.

Although the anticipated working paper from the non-aligned movement (NAM, comprising more than a hundred nations) has not yet been circulated, it is understood that the present draft calls for the Conference on Disarmament to establish a nuclear disarmament committee 'to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention.' The nuclear disarmament committee was to 'take into account' the G-28 programme of action in CD/1419 (August 8, 1996). The NAM also wanted a treaty banning the 'production and stockpiling of fissile material' (fissban) for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Calling on the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to adopt a flexible approach on

nuclear disarmament and express their commitment 'to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons', the NAM intend to show that their demands for a time-bound framework and nuclear weapon convention are complementary with further bilateral and plurilateral progress by the NWS on reducing their arsenals step by step.

Discussion will continue on Monday in closed plenary on cluster 2 issues. It is expected that Patokallio will conduct further Chair's Consultations with the group of around 25 key states on decision-making, recommendations and reporting procedures. Debate on the 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy will begin on Tuesday.

ends

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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 1997 10:39:24 GMT  
Subject: NPU Bulletin 15 Apr  
To: nfznsc@gn.apc.org  
Message-Id: <497191442MCR1@MCR1.poptel.org.uk>  
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## DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Tues 15 Apr 1997

- 97-8437 Leak of toxic material at nuclear centre in Nizhny Novgorod injures 43. Ind
- 97-8438 Iran developing missile capable of reaching Israel, experts say. T
- 97-8439 The next gvt faces some hard decisions about defence cuts and their effect on our ability to fight a major war, argues Christopher Bellamy. Ind

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

"NEWSCOPE" by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on July 21, 1993 at 21:36 Eastern, about SUBSCRIPTION-ONLY WEEKLY NEWS SOURCE (320 notes).

Note 320 by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on April 15, 1997 at 11:19 Eastern (16194 characters).

Newscope

A Newsletter for United Methodist Leaders

Vol. 25, No. 16/April 18, 1997

### Ecumenical Commission Seeks to Reduce Polarization in UMC

An intentional effort to "diminish polarization" in the UMC between individuals and groups with differing theological perspectives was approved in principle by the General Commission on Christian Unity and Interreligious Concerns (GCCUIC), meeting April 3-6 in Convent Station, N.J.

Included in the preliminary outline are two dialogue sessions involving representatives of various groups with a focus on "what binds us together, as well as what divides us." 20A possible theme might be that of the 1996 General Conference: "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty; and in all things, charity."

The beginning point for dialogue "is a recognition of our mutual need for each other," GCCUIC directors said in unanimously supporting the concept of dialogue. Details for the program will be developed by commission staffers.

In another action, directors approved in principle the development of an "Act of Repentance, Healing, and Commitment" on behalf of the UMC recognizing the role racism has played in divisions within the Wesleyan movement.

Bruce W. Robbins, general secretary of the commission, said that such an act might be developed in connection with a 1998 meeting of GCCUIC in Philadelphia. It was there in St. George's Methodist Church that racism led directly to a divided church and formation of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. He said an act of repentance could be instrumental in furthering present Pan Methodist cooperation between AME, AME Zion, CME and UM churches.

Also receiving preliminary approval was a dialogue to involve as many members as possible of the ecumenical family who share the Wesleyan heritage.

In another part of their meeting, GCCUIC directors heard Joan Brown Campbell, general secretary of the National Council of Churches, say that actions of the Christian right may be pushing other evangelicals toward "mainline" ecumenical agencies. -- Robert Lear, UMNS

## UM Church Houses Jewish Congregation

The bulletin board on the side of St. Paul and St. Andrew UMC in New York City carries the times of Shabbat (sabbath) services, and includes the names of two rabbis as leaders of Congregation B'nai Jeshurun. Use of the UM sanctuary by the Jewish congregation followed the 1991 roof collapse of their 77-year-old temple, located a few blocks away.

In the words of Dennis Hevesi, writing in The New York Times, the two congregations have "prayed together, ... delved into their theological connections and differences, ... joined forces in social causes, ... shared each other's pain, including memories of the Holocaust, ... danced together," and opened their arms to Muslims and other faiths.

On April 4, the General Commission on Christian Unity and Interreligious Concerns joined with some 1,200 Jewish worshipers as part of their spring meeting in Convent Station, N.J. -- Robert Lear, UMNS

## Churches Anxiously Await Supreme Court Decision

Churches are anxiously awaiting a Supreme Court decision on whether the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is constitutional. The act ensures that government may not substantially burden the religious exercise of persons or institutions unless the government has a compelling interest in doing so.

The case, argued Feb. 19 before the Supreme Court, comes because a 74-year-old building housing a 2,000-member Roman Catholic congregation in Boerne, Texas, was designated "historic," and the congregation was therefore denied the right to make alterations to expand its 230-seat building. St. Peter's Church sued the city, arguing that RFRA guaranteed the church's right to exercise its religion freely. A Court of Appeals agreed. The city then took the case to the Supreme Court (Newscope, March 14).

A national Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion filed a friend-of-the-court brief with St. Peter's. The coalition, which includes the General Board of Church and Society, says, "The case is not just about one church's free exercise or one aspect of the right to religious freedom. It is about all American's rights to practice their religion in countless ways." The coalition argues that if the Supreme Court finds the act unconstitutional, "then Americans generally will have little protection for their everyday expressions of faith."

A decision is expected before July 4.

## Short Takes

Presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church USA have rejected the amendment

implementing their participation in the "covenanting" provisions of the Consultation on Church Union.<sup>20</sup>The April 1 tally is 58 in favor, 85 opposed and two "no action."

Are there conscious intelligent beings on other planets? Bishop Mack B. Stokes (retired) says yes. "We should not insult Almighty God by supposing that in all the billions of galaxies, each with its billions of stars, God is simply engaged in producing cosmic waste," he writes in a newspaper for First UMC, Tulsa, Okla.

The courage and faith of Bishop Judy Craig (Ohio West) is evident in her column in the West Ohio UM Review. After learning that a biopsy showed "several sites of ductal invasive cancer" in her right breast, she said she prayed, cried, and agonized prior to her March 31 mastectomy. "I am at the beginning of a journey of indeterminate length," she said. "Little is certain except this: `...all I have needed, thy hand hath provided...'."

"Genesis: A Living Conversation" will be rebroadcast in its entirety beginning Sunday, April 27, at 7 p.m. (ET) (PBS) and continuing every Sunday evening through June.

A National March of Solidarity to Challenge Hate in America was held April 11-12 in Columbia, S.C. The assembly unveiled a monument to commemorate burned churches. The structure includes the names of the more than 200 churches that have burned over the last two years.

Twenty-two denominations, including the UMC, celebrated 125 years of producing the International Uniform Bible Lessons used by some 30 million Protestants. The April 13 celebration was held in a Presbyterian church in Indianapolis, where the original committee met in April, 1872. The celebration featured a short play to honor the memory of Benjamin Franklin Jacobs, a Southern Baptist layman, and John W. Vincent, a Methodist clergyman. In the 1860s, these two dreamed that all Protestants would use the same Bible text in their Sunday schools.

In 10 days an army of volunteers rebuilt a church in Chelford, Ark. Destroyed by fire in November, 1995, St. Mark's Missionary Baptist Church was rebuilt by 337 volunteers from 19 states who worked around the clock and completed their work on March 26. "The church was burned in hatred, but it has been rebuilt with love," said Joan Brown Campbell, general secretary of the National Council of Churches.

United Theological Seminary in Dayton, Ohio, plans to introduce a program for persons who hold a master's degree and want to be ordained to the new order of deacon. "Basic 24," a program to be introduced in September, will include 24 semester hours of work in biblical studies, church history, mission, theology, worship and liturgy, plus elective courses. The program will also meet the needs of laypersons or pastors in churches that don't require a master's degree for ordination.

The General Council on Finance and Administration executive committee voted April 8 that KPMG Peat Marwick will serve as the 1997-2000 auditors for general agencies receiving general church funds. The agreed-upon fee is \$100,000 less than the 1996 base fee.

A new state-of-the-art learning center at the General Board of Discipleship in Nashville will officially open this September. However, events are scheduled at the new facility this month. The center includes video and tele-conferencing equipment for use by churches, conferences, and UM agencies (615-340-7567).

Over 1,300 UM clergy have signed "In All Things Charity," a document that opposes UM discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Addressing a counter document, "The More Excellent Way," Greg Dell, spokesperson for the original 15 signers of the charity statement, says "Careful scholarship indicates that the witness of Scripture and Christian tradition is no more unanimous, settled, or correct in rejecting homosexual commitments of love than it was in prohibiting the ordination of women, or justifying the holding of slaves."

The UMC has followed two unexamined policies, according to Lyle E. Schaller, a well-known church consultant: 1) to cut back on organizing new congregations, and 2) to encourage the emergence of smaller congregations. He notes that the number of UM congregations, with an average worship attendance of 200 or more, dropped from 4,221 in 1972 to 3,936 in 1994. He asserts that the proportion of congregations with over 800 persons at worship in the UMC is about one-third the proportion for the rest of American Protestantism. -- Circuit Rider, April 1997

There are now 67 editions of The Upper Room, including braille, large-print and special languages, with a total circulation of 3 million. The magazine of daily devotions began in 1935. Other magazines produced by the unit of the General Board of Discipleship include: Alive Now! (circulation of 76,000); Pockets (104,000); Weavings (39,000); and Devo'zine (56,500).

Two great ways to spend your money: To help flood victims in upper mid-western states and tornado victims in Tennessee and Kentucky, give to UMCOR's Domestic Disaster Response #901670-1. To help flood victims in Bolivia, give to UMCOR Advance #982450-8 marked for "Bolivia Floods."

The pastor, who successfully led the movement to free Chinese persons from a York, Pa., prison, says she is a UM today because of DISCIPLE Bible Study. Joan Maruskin, whose efforts to gain asylum for passengers of the Golden Venture succeeded Feb. 26, was a DISCIPLE member while attending Stewartstown (Pa.) UMC around the time of her divorce. She noted the love and concern she received at a difficult time. She subsequently entered the UM ministry as a second career. -- Cindy Gettins, The Link

North Carolina Conference reports a membership growth of 1,803 persons in 1996. Seventeen churches, chartered since 1979, account for 1,143 (63%) of the total. The conference plans to start five new churches each year.

An Academy for Spiritual Formation will begin May 19 at Camp Sumatanga, near Birmingham, Ala. Sponsored by the Upper Room, the academy is a two-year, in-depth, experience in spiritual formation. The group will meet eight times in week-long sessions over the next two years (615-340-7232). -- Cheryl A. Capshaw

Cokesbury now carries three church management computer software packages for Windows: the Shepherd's Staff, Shelby Windows, and Creative Church Information Systems (CCIS). If you have an annual support agreement for a DOS product such as UMIS, you can receive an upgrade to CCIS at no additional charge. Data from your DOS system can be ported to your Windows system with software from the systems manufacturer (call 1-800-409-5346 for information and demonstration disks).

An Episcopal committee investigating allegations of sexual misconduct by Long Island clergy said the investigation into claims made in Penthouse will take longer than originally expected. The magazine alleged that a Long Island priest lured young Brazilian men to the diocese for homosexual orgies with clergy. No date for a final report was offered by the committee.

Noting there are over 100 million people who are "on the move" across international boundaries, the World Council of Churches is encouraging you to participate in the "Ecumenical Year of Churches in Solidarity with Uprooted

People." The council cites causes of the large number of refugees as political repression, economic need, environmental damage, ethnic tensions, and human rights violations. Churches are encouraged to: 1) increase awareness by study; 2) join a human-rights or advocacy group; 3) make a public witness; 4) extend hospitality; 5) engage in advocacy; and 6) offer shelter or refuge. Your church can become a sponsor of a refugee family (call Lilia Fernandez of UMCOR, 212-870-3805). For a packet of resources (\$3), contact Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 658, New York, NY 10115 (212-870-3153).

The fight against 1.4 million abortions each year is the greatest moral issue of our day, according to Dan White of the Arlington (Va.) District Hispanic Ministries. Writing in Lifewatch, White says, "When abortion is no longer the scourge upon our nation and within our church it now is, church historians will judge those who supported, and those who opposed, abortion." The quarterly newsletter is published by the unofficial Task Force of UMs on Abortion and Sexuality.

Want to help rebuild one of two burned Baptist churches? In McComb Mississippi, call Jon Hosford (601-684-1170). In Barnwell, S.C., call Dolly Fogle (800-383-9615). -- UM Volunteers in Mission

#### Positions Available

Steward of Financial Resources for Minnesota Conference. Contact Joyce Erickson, 122 W. Franklin Ave., Room 400; Minneapolis, MN 55404.....Youth Director. Contact Jack Singerman, Christ UMC in Kettering Ohio (937-293-3151).....Director of youth ministry. Contact Doug Fosselman, Church of the Messiah UM, 51 No. State St., Westerville, OH 43081 (FAX 614-882-2161).

#### Personalia

Stephen D. Bryant, a General Board of Discipleship (GBOD) executive responsible for the Academy for Spiritual Formation and the Walk to Emmaus, has been elected editor and publisher of the Upper Room Division of GBOD. He succeeds Janice T. Grana, who is moving to North Carolina.....Elizabeth S. Gamble, pastor of Pleasant Grove UMC in Ryland Heights, Ky., has been appointed associate general secretary of the General Commission on Christian Unity and Interreligious Concerns.....Three additional appointments in the Holston Conference: Calvin W. Maas, associate director of the Conference Council on Ministries, will be appointed director; Darris Doyal, superintendent of the Kingsport District, will be appointed director of

congregational development; and Charles E. Lippse, pastor of First Broad St. UMC, Kingsport, Tenn., will be appointed steward of clergy concerns..... New Superintendents in the Virginia Conference: Stephen Bray, pastor of Fairlington UMC, Alexandria, to the Alexandria District; David F. Jarvis II, pastor of Fairfax UMC, to the Arlington District; Lee B. Sheaffer, director of the Council on Ministries, to the Ashland District; Robinson H. McAden, pastor of Aldersgate UMC, Alexandria, to the Danville District; Elizabeth A.S. Wright, pastor of Aldersgate UMC, to the Eastern Shore District; Timothy W. Whitaker, pastor of Centenary UMC, Richmond, to the Norfolk District; R. Franklin Gillis Jr., pastor of Bon Air UMC, Richmond, to the Richmond District; Alton M. Washington, pastor of Huntington Court UMC, Roanoke, to the Staunton District.....Michael W. Safley, a clergymember of the North Carolina Conference and dean of students at Methodist College in Fayetteville, has been named president of the Raleigh, N.C.-based Methodist Home for Children.....UM winners of awards given April 3 in Boston by the Religious Public Relations Council include: Lynne DeMichelle of the Indiana Area, Hoosier UM News; Barbara Dunlap-Berg, Bill Wolf, and Pamela Crosby of UM Communications; Jeneane Jones and Nancy Carter of the General Board of Global Ministries; Elaine Justice of Candler School of Theology; and Mary Edlund of the Minnesota Conference.

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Yep,

Good ole' Wyden voted for Mobile Chernobyl...Put out the call far and wide..fax, email, call, write, picket, poster, paint this message LOUD and CLEAR!

YOU BLEW IT! RON (FILL IN YOUR SENATOR'S NAME)...When (and I mean WHEN) these NUKES (literally) hit the street...Who's gonna clean up YOUR mess???

WHO ARE YOU WORKING FOR ANYWAY????

Rick Gold (Voter) and Director,
Lane County American Peace Test
454 Willamette
Eugene, Oregon 97401
(541)484-9884

Today at around 11 pm the Senate voted on the Mobile
>Chernobyl bill (S104) in Congress!

>1.) Stop Mobile Chernobyl from rolling into your town!

>

> NUCLEAR WASTE IS HEADING YOUR WAY! TIME TO STOP AN INDUSTRY BILL!

>

>

>Mobile Chernobyl concerns one of the most deadly substances
>known to humans, irradiated fuel from commercial nuclear
>reactors. This nuclear waste is a witches' brew of short and
>very long-lived radioactive substances (dangerous life over
>240,000 years!), just a few seconds exposure to unshielded
>irradiated fuel can kill you!

>

>While this stuff will be dangerous for nearly a quarter of a
>million years, the nuclear industry is in a huge hurry to begin
>moving it away from their reactors. Now, as long as they keep
>running the reactors, we'll have ever more nuclear waste piling
>up at the 109 plants around the country.

>

>POLITICAL UPDATE: The nuclear industry-backed "Mobile Chernobyl"
>bill (S.104) was voted out of the Senate Energy and Natural
>Resources Committee two weeks ago. S. 104 would begin the
>transportation of lethal radioactive wastes through 43 states,
>set a dangerous radiation release standard from a final nuclear
>waste dump (resulting in one death out of every 286 exposed
>individuals) and preempt any federal, state or local laws
>(including health and environmental laws) which are
>"inconsistent" with the bill!!!

>

>Fortunately, President Clinton has promised to veto this
>legislation and in a meeting with Energy Secretary Pena this
>morning, that pledge was reiterated. However, we need 34
>Senators to uphold a veto and our vote count is perilously close.
>Industry is putting enormous pressure on Senators such as Sen.

>Wyden(D-OR) who was one of only four House Commerce Committee
>members to vote against a similar House bill last year, but then
>flipped and voted for S. 104 in the committee vote two weeks ago.
>Industry has turned up the heat and has taken out full page ads
>in Oregon and Connecticut.

>
>WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO 34 VOTES SO EVERY SENATOR NEEDS TO HEAR FROM
>US BECAUSE OF THIS PRESSURE, BUT ESPECIALLY THE FOLLOWING SWING
>VOTES: Bingaman (D-NM), Campbell (R-CO), Chafee (R-RI), Dodd (D-
>CT), Torricelli (D-NJ), Cleland (D-GA), Wyden (D-OR), Lautenberg
>(D-NJ).

>
>WHAT YOU CAN DO: CALL YOUR SENATOR NOW. TELL HIM OR HER TO
>OPPOSE THE DANGEROUS S. 104 NUCLEAR WASTE BILL. OUR HEALTH AND
>SAFETY DEPEND ON DEFEATING THIS BILL.

>
> Congressional Switchboard (202) 224-3121
>

>=====

April 16, 1997 NPT Briefing 5: Substantive Debate Concludes

Rebecca Johnson

The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the enhanced review process for the NPT Review Conference in 2000, chaired by Pasi Patokallio of Finland, has only two working days left. During closed debates on nuclear disarmament, safeguards and energy, more than one third of the 186 states parties to the NPT addressed the PrepCom. As discussion on the final cluster of issues concluded with a desultory session on the non-military uses of nuclear energy, the focus shifted to negotiations among some 25 key states on the structure and content of the report from the PrepCom. Though procedural in nature, questions on how recommendations and proposals are transmitted to future PrepComs and to the 2000 Review Conference are extremely important as they will affect the substantive role, usefulness and credibility of the new process, which was set up in 1995 to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and the accountability of its States Parties.

The vast majority do not consider it necessary or useful for the PrepComs to negotiate a consensus report or declaration as such. As reported in NPT Briefing # 4, a three part report is envisaged, with a technical and descriptive summary under the auspices of the Chair, recommendations to the next PrepCom and draft recommendations to the next Review Conference. The Chair's consultations broke up on Tuesday evening with no agreement on the structure and status of the PrepCom's reports. The major issue is whether Parties will try to get consensus on some of the recommendations to the next PrepCom or the 2000 Review Conference. As the drawbacks and benefits of forwarding some agreed recommendations on substance as well as procedure were debated in chambers and corridors off the main committee room, the ideas first put forward by Canada, South Africa and Japan garnered increasing support. Other delegations, including New Zealand and Britain, also offered language which they hoped might attract consensus on issues such as the IAEA Programme 93+2, nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) and universality. A few NAM countries, notably Iran, needed reassurance that forwarding some recommendations by consensus neither precluded future discussion of those issues nor gave them greater or lesser consequence.

Linked with the consensus question is determination of the status of the PrepCom report: will the Chair seek consensus on his summing up of the debate, or would it be better for this part of the report to be issued as the Chair's own views? In this regard, Patokallio rounded off the nine sessions of closed debate with his tentative summary on the three clusters. Other decisions facing the NPT Parties include: whether to recommend that time be allocated at future PrepComs to consideration of particular subject areas, as South Africa and others want for security assurances; whether draft recommendations should be summarised by the Chair, listed or annexed in whole or in precis, and how recommendations should be grouped: whether by cluster, or their relation to the relevant treaty article and/or section of the 1995 Principles and Objectives (P&O). There is also the question of whether to have some kind of introduction (chapeau) to the report which could enable Parties to endorse general statements of support for the 1995 Conference decisions and resolution. Some states may want this as a fallback in case consensus is not sought or not obtainable this year on

recommendations covering issues such as universality or the fissile materials ban.

Security Assurances

On behalf also of Kenya, Nigeria and Sudan, Myanmar proposed a draft protocol to the NPT on negative security assurances (NSA), calling for 'further efforts at the NPT PrepComs with a view to achieving an international legal instrument on security assurances by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000'. Nigeria endorsed Myanmar's proposal, calling for 'a procedural mechanism that will ensure conclusion of a protocol [on no-use, no first use assurances] at the year 2000 NPT Review Conference'. The NPT Parties in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) backed negotiations under NPT auspices of a legal instrument on security assurances, but did not specifically endorse the protocol proposal. The United States responded swiftly, saying that 'there is not now enough common ground among the key countries on which to base the negotiation of such a treaty'. Urging further consolidation of security assurances commitments through nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) arrangements and the 1995 UN Security Council resolution 984, the United States was 'opposed to the negotiation of a global NSA treaty, or of an NSA Protocol to the NPT'.

Nuclear Energy

A number of delegations, including Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa and the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union (EU) pledged support for the IAEA's role in promoting nuclear power, especially to developing countries, through its Technical Cooperation Programme. The EU noted that in 1996, the IAEA spent \$48 million on the promotion of nuclear energy, which 'comfortably outstripped overall Agency spending'. While backing nuclear power, South Africa questioned its appropriateness for 'least developed countries, bearing in mind the infrastructural burdens that such [transfers of nuclear technology and equipment] place on recipients.' Nevertheless, South Africa argued that the 'optional aspect' of the technical cooperation fund be made mandatory. Japan, Canada, Australia, the EU and others stressed the importance of safety and supported the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which entered into force in October 1996. According to the EU, this Convention 'aims at the implementation of sound safety principles for the operation of nuclear power reactors, whilst respecting the prerogatives and competences of States Parties'. Finalisation of a draft text on a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and other initiatives were also mentioned, including recent progress on civil liability for nuclear damage, under the auspices of the IAEA.

The NAM statement reiterated the 'inalienable right' of NPT parties to research, production and use of nuclear energy for 'peaceful' purposes. The NAM called for 'preferential treatment' and 'free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology' to NPT parties. Australia pointed out that while only a minority [around 40 states] of NPT parties have nuclear power programmes of their own and 'derive little benefit from its application', issues of safety and security are vital to all. Echoing the concerns made earlier by the Marshall Islands, Australia noted the 'potential for harm inherent in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology' and especially stressed the sea transshipments of radioactive materials. The Kyrgyz Republic spoke of 'severe problems' concerning

radioactive wastes left over from past, including the unpredictable threat of disaster for its region. Asking for assistance in clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants, Kyrgyzstan said that all storage and transports should be in accordance with international agreements, including the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

During the general debate, Argentina and Uruguay had also raised concerns about the export and transport of plutonium and other radioactive materials, especially using shipping routes close to their coasts. Japan, which has recently received controversial cargoes of spent fuel and plutonium by sea from France and Britain, said that nuclear fuel cycle programmes 'should be carried out under the principle of not holding surplus plutonium and keeping the programmes as transparent as possible.' Japan mentioned that nine countries had reached an in-principle agreement on guidelines for plutonium management, including annual publication of plutonium holdings. Norway noted problems related to 'former nuclear operations', including discontinued nuclear weapon programmes, and proposed that the conversion of nuclear materials from military to civilian uses should be looked at more closely in ensuing PrepComs. Norway called for shared resources and assistance in the field of clean-up, storage and disposal of radioactive contaminants and 'sensitive' [weapon useable] nuclear materials.

Several countries, including South Africa, Australia, Japan and Canada, endorsed the EU view that export controls were 'an obligation complementary to safeguards flowing from the Treaty'. However, most delegations also underlined the need for more information and openness from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. The NAM called for 'unilaterally enforced restrictive measures' to be removed. China endorsed the NAM position and said that non-proliferation measures should 'facilitate rather than hamper the legitimate rights of developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.'

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The Republic of Belarus put forward its initiative on a 'nuclear-weapon-free space' in Central and Eastern Europe, arguing that this would reduce the risk of renewed nuclear confrontation in Europe, contribute to the 'search for solutions to the problem of the expansion of NATO' and to the security of countries in the region 'with different approaches to the pan-European security structure', and contribute to the process of disarmament, as well as other benefits. Belarus went on to describe the different options for setting up such a NWF 'space', including the range of provisions which could be considered. Poland responded by saying that it preferred the word 'enlargement' to 'expansion' of NATO, since the Polish people _wished_ to join NATO. Dismissing the 'possible creation of the proposed denuclearised zone before the NATO enlargement question is solved', Poland said that NWFZs were effective 'in regions of tension which definitely is not the case in Central Europe'. However, Poland welcomed the progress on a NWFZ in Central Asia, as proposed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Norway and Mongolia, which had unilaterally declared itself a nuclear weapon free state in 1992, also supported the Central Asian NWFZ.

The United States reiterated its seven criteria for establishment of NWFZs and said it looked forward to further talks with ASEAN states in June, in the hope of resolving its problems with the protocols to the Bangkok Treaty.

Echoing Britain's criticism of the proposed Southern Hemisphere NWFZ, the US delegation said that it 'opposes any effort to develop a NWFZ that in any way seeks to impose restrictions of the rights of states to the unfettered access to and use of the oceans and high seas as recognised by international law.'

Safeguards

Almost all the delegations which addressed article III issues explicitly supported the IAEA Programme 93+2 for strengthening the safeguards regime. In this regard, the United States said it would support the IAEA Board of Governors' request for protocols to be concluded with states whose safeguards agreements were not comprehensive, including the US itself. China suggested that the NWS should apply the measures in the model protocol that 'each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation objectives'. Britain proposed language for possible consensus on 93+2 in the PrepCom report. Japan suggested that the NWS should additionally 'consider voluntarily applying the IAEA safeguards to all of their peaceful-use nuclear facilities, although the NPT does not require them to do so'. Some countries, including Britain, France and Japan, recalled concerns and attempts to remedy non-compliance with their Treaty obligations by Iraq and North Korea (DPRK). The NAM backed fullscope safeguards as a condition of new supply arrangements regarding the transfer of special nuclear materials or equipment. The NAM also required that nuclear materials from dismantled warheads or otherwise transferred from military uses should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

Towards Conclusion

On Wednesday April 16, NPT parties will be addressed by non-governmental organisations on matters relating to the NPT in an open, informal session from 10.30 am to 1.00 pm. Closed consultations will then resume to try and finalise the PrepCom report.

ends

=====
email: acronym@gn.apc.org
Disarmament Intelligence Review
24, Colvestone Crescent
London E8 2LH
England

NOTE NEW NUMBERS
telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857
fax (0) 171 503 9153
=====

Dear all - copy of mailing going out to activists in Wales, Scotland and England follows. Please let anyone you feel might be interested know about it.

Danny Thompson

>16 April 1997

>

>

>

>Dear Friend

>

>Recruitment of Coordinator for Abolition 2000 UK

>

>You may have heard that I will shortly be leaving the National Peace Council to take up a new job in Ireland. This unfortunately means that I will also be leaving Abolition 2000 UK, which I have been coordinating since July last year.

>

>It is important that we ensure there is time for work to be handed over to a new coordinator, and for this reason we will need to recruit quickly.

>

>The enclosed paper gives an outline of the job, and details the skills required. I would be grateful if you could circulate this paper to anyone you feel would be interested in and suitable for the job - and publicise the vacancy as widely as possible.

>

>I will be sad to be leave Abolition 2000 UK - particularly at a time when the network continues to grow, and we face the challenges presented by a likely new government. Please help to ensure that we continue to be a effective resource for all those working for the abolition of nuclear weapons by assisting us in finding a new Coordinator.

>

>Yours with thanks

>

>

>Danny Thompson

>

>P.S. Don't forget that our next meeting is on Monday 12 May at 1.00pm, at Quaker International Centre, Byng Place, London WC1. An agenda and further details will be sent out next week

>

>

>

>ABOLITION 2000 UK - PART TIME COORDINATOR

>

>Applications are invited for the above post.

>

>The coordinator will work two days each week, based at the offices of the National Peace Council in Islington, north London. The successful applicant will be employed as a freelance consultant, and will be paid a fee of £500 per calendar month. It is envisaged that the appointment will initially be for 12 months.

- >
- >Abolition 2000 UK is a network of more than 60 organisations working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons according to a fixed timetable. It is part of the global Abolition 2000 network, founded on a detailed 11-point statement which gives a framework for worldwide nuclear disarmament.
- >
- >The job involves organising regular meetings of network members, keeping interested organisations and individuals up-to-date with new developments, communicating with global network members, coordinating campaigning and media work, and facilitating the lobbying of decision makers at the highest level. It is anticipated that volunteer help will be available.
- >
- >The successful candidate should possess the following skills:
 - >
 - > Computer literate, with experience of the Internet and electronic communications
 - > Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing.
 - > Ability to work on own initiative.
 - > Familiarity with key players and ideas in nuclear disarmament.
 - > Campaigning/ outreach experience.
 - > Experience of working with the media.
 - > Experience of managing volunteers.
 - > Experience of producing publications and/or promotional materials.
 - > Experience of organising meetings and other events.
 - > Fundraising experience.
 - > Personal commitment to nuclear disarmament.
- >
- >Please apply with a detailed CV and letter explaining why you are suitable for the post.
- >
- >Closing date for applications is Friday 2 May 1997
- >
- >Interviews will take place in London on Thursday 15 May 1997

National Peace Council UK (npc@gn.apc.org)

Some Senate offices are starting to receive letters, emails, faxes and phone calls from Militia groups. The Montana senators are under intensive pressure from these groups. I invite people to make suggestions on public education activities we might undertake to enrich the knowledge of the public and elected leaders on the CWC and the views expressed by the Militia groups.

Draft People's Resolution For the Sessation of Nationwide Nuclear Activities

Wheras, the claims of unlimited peacetime nuclear energy "too cheap to meter" have proven false with current estimates of costs ranging from four trillion dollars (\$4,000,000,000,000,000.00) in taxpayer and/or ratepayer, and/or bondholder financed welfare; and

Wheras, the Nuclear cycle is a war which continues unabated on the peoples of America posing a continuing threat to life and limb from mining of uranium on indigenous lands, transporting, separating, enriching and developing Plutonium and all its Nuclear by-products; and

Wheras, the spread of Nuclear technology has scattered over 1000 tons of plutonium (enough to make 100,000 nuclear bombs), the world's most carcinogenic poison, worldwide bringing the world every closer to Nuclear annihilation;

Wheras, the real costs of mining, engineering, building, developing, generating, insuring, maintaining, testing, storing, transporting, burying or retrieving nuclear materials and wastes grows prohibitively more expensive each and every day; and

Wheras, there exists no safe, economical or realistic place to permanently dispose of any component,, isotope, or waste for a period of 240,000 years; and

Wheras, the International Court of Justice ruled unanimously in July 1996, "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THAT THE UNITED STATES:

1. Declares an immediate sessation of all activities relating to the mining, engineering, building, developing, generating, insuring, maintaining, testing, storing, transporting, burying or retrieving of nuclear materials and wastes; and

2. Calls upon the governments of all nuclear nations to enact a worldwide sessation of all activities relating to the mining, engineering, building, developing, generating, insuring, maintaining, testing, storing, transporting, burying or retrieving of nuclear materials and wastes; and

3. Calls upon peoples worldwide to join together in open dialog about what to do with all the worldwide remnants of the Nuclear age.

Humbly submitted for comments by Rick Gold, Lane County American Peace Test, 454 Willamette, Eugene, Oregon 97401. (541)484-9884

April 16, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER AND NSC
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY ROBERT BELL

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 16, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER
AND
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY
ROBERT BELL

The Briefing Room

1:35 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCURRY: First, for your enjoyment and entertainment today, given the President's focus on foreign policy matters of great significance, I've asked the President's National Security Advisor, Samuel R. Berger, to be here to tell you more about the work the President's doing today on two fronts: first, his meeting with a bipartisan group of senators and members of the House, tonight for a real intense session on foreign policy objectives the administration is pursuing that we hope we will pursue in a bipartisan way; then secondly, the work the President will do today to secure the very necessary ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Sandy will also then introduce my favorite briefer at the White House, Mr. Robert Bell, the NSC Senior Director for Defense and Arms Control Policy -- close enough? And he can walk you through a real important development in the CWC debate on the Senate, occurring today, which we put out some paper on earlier.

Mr. Berger, welcome to the Briefing Room.

Q Does that ensure the passage, these conditions that you've agreed to?

MR. BERGER: Okay, let me just say a few things first.

Does that mean I'm the second favorite briefer? I'm certainly not the favorite, I guess. (Laughter.)

Q Don't worry about it. We make up our own minds. (Laughter.)

MR. BERGER: Tonight, as Mike indicated, the President will be hosting a meeting at Blair House of a very broad cross-section of congressional leadership, particularly those who are involved in foreign affairs appropriations and defense policy issues on the Hill.

This is a session that will go from roughly 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. It is something the President has wanted to do since very early in the year, just to call together and convene a mini-retreat with the Congress to talk about a fairly broad range of our foreign policy objectives over the next four years and engage in a give-and-take with the members of Congress.

The President will be talking about NATO enlargement. He'll be talking about Asia and our relationships there. He'll be talking about how we -- our fight against terrorism and drugs, expanding the international trading system, Bosnia, a wide range of issues in an exchange with the leadership. And I think it's a very important opportunity for both the President and the congressional

leadership to build a kind of bipartisan consensus around America's leadership in the world.

Now, as part of that, the President will speak directly tonight to this group about a priority that is coming to a head next week, and that is the Chemical Weapons Convention. And I want to say a few words about that, and then I want to ask Bob to brief you on some quite important developments over the past few days.

There is an enormous amount at stake in the vote which we now expect will take place next week on the Chemical Weapons Convention. First is the question of America's leadership in the fight against weapons of mass destruction. We have been the prime movers of this treaty for almost 20 years. The negotiations began under President Reagan; they came to conclusion under President Bush, who signed this treaty. And if we now, having, in a sense, been the originators and the prime drivers of this treaty, fail to ratify it, we become associated with the outlier nations, as opposed to those who are inside the treaty trying to build a new regime against chemical weapons. We become associated with the Iraqs and the Libyas, as opposed to the broad swath of the international community that's fighting chemical weapons.

General Schwarzkopf in his characteristically straightforward way, I don't particularly want to be associated with those thugs. And I think issue number one is America's ability to continue to lead in the world in fighting weapons of mass destruction.

Second, I think most of you are aware, we are destroying our chemical weapons stockpiles. This is a decision that was made in the '80s because of judgment by our military and civilian leaders that we did not need them, that they were not a necessary or appropriate weapon. So this treaty is about other people destroying their stockpiles, not about us destroying our stockpiles, and reducing the threat to a future American military unit that might be on the battlefield.

Third, this treaty makes it harder for rogue states to develop chemical weapons by, first of all, even if they're outside of the treaty, by imposing restrictions on the transfer of chemicals that can be used for chemical weapons; by a very aggressive inspection system whereby if there's a suspected location in which prohibited weapons are being manufactured, international inspectors can be sent to that site; and, third, by putting them outside the system, outside the international community.

So it is another tool to isolate and fight the development of chemical weapons by rogue states. Finally, it is another tool in the ability to fight terrorists who might use chemical weapons. Obviously, nothing can stop the terrorists from cooking up chemical weapons in their basement, but by reducing the stockpiles, these enormous stockpiles in the hands of most of the countries in the world, many of the countries in the world, by restricting the transfer of these chemicals by imposing an inspection regime, all of these things together will make it more difficult for terrorists to obtain these weapons.

And that is why this is a treaty that is supported by a very, very broad, cross-section of Democrats and Republicans across a very broad, ideological spectrum. Obviously, President Bush, every chairman of the joint chiefs of staff for the past 20 years, and a very distinguished array of former military CINCS and chiefs, Paul Nitze, Ed Rowley, negotiators of arms control agreements under President Reagan and others, Secretary Baker, veterans groups, chemical manufacturers -- there is broad support for this treaty.

We, as I said, expect and hope to see a vote next week, because the treaty will come into force on April 29th. And if we are not in the treaty in the beginning, we will not be part of shaping how the institutions of this treaty take hold. We will not be part of the inspection teams. We will not be part of the executive committee that operates this treaty. We'll be on the outside rather than on the inside.

Now, what I want to ask Bob to brief you on is the result of a process that has been going now for over two months, and resulted from some early -- an early conversation that President Clinton had with Senator Lott, from which Senator Lott formed a group of senators to work with the administration, seeing whether we could address many of the concerns that have been raised by those who have some difficulties with the treaty. And in parallel, there has been a

process between Senator Biden and Senator Helms. And as a result of those two processes, there are over 25 amendments to the articles of ratification that have been agreed to and that were released today by Senator Biden. And I want Bob to go through that with you and explain it because it really does address the broad range of concerns that have been raised about this treaty.

There still are some concerns that we can't address without gutting the treaty. We can't address some of these which are actually, in a sense, killer amendments. But we have gone the extra mile here to try to, in a serious and good-faith fashion, address the concerns that many had about various aspects of this treaty. And I think as a result of that, the treaty that the Senate will vote on next week will be much stronger and tighter with the amendment's stronger and tighter regime than the one that was before them last year.

Q Does the agreement on the conditions ensure passage?

MR. BERGER: No, I wouldn't say that, Helen. I think that this is very much up in the air at this point. There is some strenuous opposition from some groups. And I would not say that this is -- the outcome of this is at all certain. And I hope that all of you will focus attention on this issue because I think it is really a jump ball at this point.

Q Sandy, while we have you for a second, there is a report from Israel television that the police in Israel are recommending that Prime Minister Netanyahu be indicted for his role in selecting that attorney general, and I wonder if you would care to react to this report.

MR. BERGER: I've seen the report, Wolf, but this is a matter for -- internal matter involving the Israeli government, the Israeli judicial system, and I don't think it's appropriate for me to comment on.

Q Sandy, do you see any prospect for compromise on these four so-called "killer amendments" that are out there now?

MR. BERGER: I think on each of those, we have -- and Bob will describe it -- we have put forward an alternative which I think addresses much of the concern that is embodied in those areas. But I think at the end of the day, there will be a group of senators who will oppose the treaty and who do oppose the treaty.

Q What is the President going to do to make sure that at least the vote comes? Is he meeting personally with Senator Helms? Is there anything else he can do to those --

MR. BERGER: The President has been very, very active and will continue to be active. From the beginning, he's talked to many senators about this, spoken with Senator Lott particularly about

it several times. We had the event here in the White House -- the President will be making more phone calls. We had last week a session with about 15 senators here at the White House. He will raise it tonight at the retreat, and I suspect that he'll be speaking to it more in the next week.

Q Will Senator Lott be at the retreat tonight? Will Arney and Gingrich -- any of the --

MR. BERGER: I believe Senator Lott will be there. I don't believe the Speaker will be there tonight.

Q Was he invited?

MR. BERGER: I don't have the list, honestly.

Q Could you provide the list for us?

MR. BERGER: Maybe after the event. I'd rather give you the list of people who actually come than the list of people who --

Q If it's leadership in foreign policy and defense, wouldn't Senator Helms and the Speaker at least have been invited?

MR. BERGER: Oh, they certainly were invited.

MR. MCCURRY: They were both invited and unable to attend.

MR. BERGER: I think there, obviously, in a situation like this always going to be conflicts. But there will be 35, 40 members.

Q Do you think the Senate's going to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention?

MR. BERGER: Ann, I honestly don't know the answer to that question. I'm not trying to be cute here. I think that this is -- I think there are a lot of undecided senators. I think the stakes are enormously high, and I think it would be a tremendous setback for the fight against terrorism and the fight against chemical weapons if we did not ratify this treaty. But I can't tell you that I know what the outcome will be.

Q Sandy, let me go back just for a minute to the Netanyahu topic just for a minute. I know that it's an internal matter vis-a-vis Israel, but clearly that has ramifications for the United States. I mean, what are the U.S. concerns as they relate to this?

MR. BERGER: No, I'm not going to answer it any differently than I answered to Wolf. Dennis Ross is in Israel, he will go forward in his meetings. He'll be meeting with the Prime Minister I believe today.

Q What is the status of State Department reorganization? Senator Helms -- obviously, that's a priority for him to at least in some way mollify him --

MR. BERGER: We have been very, very actively engaged over the past several weeks in an internal exercise to develop a set of options for the President that he can decide among for reform of the foreign policy agencies. How you reform them is a subject of some disagreement. That there needs to be reform, I think, is not subject to disagreement. I would expect that we'll be in a position to present those options to the President in the very near future.

Q Is he going to be briefing the group tonight on the options?

MR. BERGER: I suspect that they may raise this issue, but as of now, we have not gone to the President with the options. But I think that we are a very -- we're getting close to being able to do that.

Q Can you just talk a little more about what the President hopes to get out of tonight?

MR. BERGER: I think -- let me take this last question and then we'll ask Bob to step up. I think there is no concrete or specific objective -- that is, agreement, on the level of the State Department appropriations bill. I think this is part of a larger process and a way of doing business that I think we've tried very hard since January to engage in, and that is, bring the Congress into the formulation of foreign policy to the extent we can, trying to seek bipartisan consensus where we can. The Secretary of State has been very active in that. The Secretary of Defense -- by definition, anytime he speaks to anybody in the administration, it's a bipartisan conversation.

I've been very active in it, and Ambassador Richardson, in spending time on the Hill, trying to explain what we're doing, trying to listen to the Hill in terms of their views. And so I think it's a give-and-take where the President has an opportunity to define what his core objectives are as he did to the newspaper editors and in the State of the Union, and then focus particularly on two or three for this discussion, probably NATO, perhaps Bosnia, Asia, CWC, given the fact that there is a limited amount of time. And I'm sure the senators and congressmen will have their own individual matters they'll want to raise.

Thank you.

MR. BELL: As Sandy said, we believe that yesterday was a milestone in the Senate's ratification proceedings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Final agreement was reached on 23 conditions to the resolution of ratification that will accompany this treaty. Agreement was reached with Senator Helms, Chairman of the Foreign

Relations Committee.

Now, as everyone here knows, and I'm sure across the country in schools and homes as well, the United States Constitution provides that treaties can only be ratified and entered into force by the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. This is the advice part, these conditions. And we hope to get to the consent part next week.

As Sandy said, reaching this milestone is really a tribute to many, many different leaders and officials who have been involved the last two and a half months in this process. The White House deeply appreciates the cooperations and good offices of the Majority Leader who, as Sandy said, established this nine-member steering group and engaged in meetings over about 30 hours that produced about two-thirds of the conditions in this package.

I just want to say from my involvement in the process, that Senator Lott is a very tough negotiator, indeed, and would just remind you that last September, when the treaty was set aside, the point of departure was that if we could agree on perhaps three conditions -- three conditions -- we might be able to get the treaty back up. We're here today with agreement on 23 -- I think this could get as high as 25 or perhaps 30 by the time the treaty is called up Wednesday. So it's come a long ways.

We would also want to thank all of the senators that were involved in Senator Lott's steering group -- task force, that is -- Senator Nickles, Senator Helms, Senator Kyl, Senator Stevens, Senator McCain, Senator Warner, Senator Coverdell, Senator Shelby, and Senator Smith, which was indeed a representative sampling of the views within the Republican caucus on this treaty; and, of course, the senior staff, including Senator Lott's lead negotiator, Randy Scheunemann had carried the ball for about 30 more hours of negotiations. And last but certainly not least, to Senator Biden and Senator Helms who, themselves, as Senator Biden said in his cover letter, spent about 28 hours negotiating this package and carrying it from the 17 mark to the 23 mark, with maybe a few more to come.

Now, outside this package, there are two critical issues that have been under intense negotiation between Sandy Berger and Senator Lott himself that have been at the heart of a lot of the debate on the treaty. That is the issue of search warrants and the issue of those appropriate uses of riot control agents, or RCAs in wartime scenarios. I think we're very close on that, and we hope to get final agreement very soon on those two issues, taking the package to 25. Now, these agreed conditions represent extraordinary progress over two and a half months in addressing virtually all of the issues that have been raised during the debate on the treaty.

I might add that you've heard criticism of the treaty, to be sure, over the last few weeks, particularly the last few days, including in hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. And I would just say that many of the critics, most of the critics, both in

the op-ed pieces, the editorials and witnesses before the committee, have not -- I repeat -- not been privy to these conditions. So we would hope that as soon as we can make these conditions available to those that have raised so many concerns about the treaty, that their concerns would be moderated or perhaps even allayed, and we could broaden the base of bipartisan support for the treaty.

As it stands today, and assuming that we do close with the Majority Leader on the search warrant and riot control agent issue, we would then go to the floor next week for a debate on the treaty that will probably focus on three fundamental propositions where we've not been able to reach agreement with Senator Helms, even though as Sandy said, we have made offers that go way beyond the benchmark of last September in each case.

Those three propositions are, first, the question of whether U.S. participation and leadership in this treaty regime should be held hostage to some other state or some other group of states joining the treaty first, whether that state is Russia or Libya. Second, the issue of whether the assurances and certifications that the President has made in this agreed package, which are binding, legally binding conditions on the President, whether those assurances, as they relate to two specific parts of the treaty, Article X and Article XI, which have to do with various kinds of assistance that might be provided to other states, whether those assurances are sufficient to meet the concerns or whether, as we believe Senator Helms will insist, the Senate vote on a proposition to reopen the treaty, reopen the negotiation, go back and actually try to renegotiate Article X and Article XI of the treaty, a proposition that we don't think is realistic or feasible.

And then, finally, a vote on a proposition that the treaty only enter into force, in terms of U.S. participation, if the President certifies a standard of verification that we know the Director of Central Intelligence cannot support, and thus the President could not make.

We have offered in this negotiation to certify a very high standard of verification effectiveness indeed, the capability to detect a systematic effort by an adversary to equip across the ranks his army with an offensive CW capability. But the Senate will vote on whether that is a sufficient level of verification under the treaty or whether it will insist on a standard that we couldn't meet.

Now, we're confident, when these issues come to a vote next week, if we can get it to a vote, that when the full Senate works its will on these issues, which, after all, is the procedure envisioned and called for under the Constitution, that the Senate will make the right choice and will not adopt amendments that would have the effect of killing the treaty by preventing us from joining it.

Q Did they make any promises? What was their quid pro quo? What do they get -- the so-called negotiation?

MR. BELL: Well, Helen, I think the negotiation of the treaty in Geneva is a lot like a negotiation in Congress between the House and Senate.

Q I meant the conditions that --

MR. BELL: I was going to come to that. You go into negotiation, and a lot of countries come to the negotiation and they want a lot of things. This is a treaty, as Secretary Albright has said, that was negotiated with a "Made in USA" stamp on it. This is a treaty that we took the leadership in negotiating. Most of the key provisions are provisions that were agreed to at American initiative. But like in any negotiation you'll find some language in a treaty that was necessary to be put in there to sort of get out of the negotiation and let countries have a way of receding to the U.S. position in the talks.

What's happened in the ratification phase is that critics have focused on some fairly general language and presented some worst-case concerns about how it might be interpreted. What we've done through these assurances in most cases is to make clear that we don't interpret it that way, and that we would make a maximum effort, do everything within our power, to make sure no one else interprets it that way.

Just one example, some critics have said that under Article XI of the treaty there is a requirement for us to take down the Australia group multilateral export controls on certain types of chemicals that an outlaw state might find valuable in making weapons of mass destruction. We have now agreed with Senator Helms on a condition in which the President not only certifies that we don't read it that way, but he certifies that we have sent instructions to our ambassadors in all 30 countries that belong to the Australia group -- they have gone in to see the host country, and at the highest diplomatic levels have received assurances back that none of the states of the Australia group read the treaty that way, that none of them are going to claim that the Chemical Weapons Convention supersedes the Australia group restraints.

And there is a mechanism beyond that, on a year-by-year basis, where we'll report to the Senate on our success in keeping the Australia group restraints in place. That's indicative, I think, of the kinds of conditions that we've been able to work out.

Q Do you acknowledge that the critics of the treaty identified deficiencies in the absence of these 25 agreements? Or was it simply a matter of clarifying what the administration's intent was?

MR. BELL: It's a very complex treaty. I doubt that anyone in the room has read it. When you do read it, it's almost overwhelming in terms of level of detail. There are formulations in here, as I said, that were arrived at to be able to conclude the

negotiation. If read in isolation or out of context, there is a sentence here, a sentence there that can raise concerns.

The senators are totally within their rights -- it's the prerogative of the Senate to ask these kinds of questions. It's the intention of the Constitution by giving the treaty partnership role to the Senate and requiring a two-thirds vote to ensure that there's an extraordinary level of scrutiny and questioning about treaties because, after all, the Founding Fathers knew that treaties were forever. So this has been a perfectly legitimate and appropriate process that we've gone through. It's taken us to now, I think, through this package, to get all the clarifications and all of the conditions communicated in a way that we think should be compelling. We had hoped that we had done that in the hearings over the last three years.

But, as you know, senators are busy, they can't go to all the hearings. There was a lot of testimony, a lot of assurances that were given in the hearings that were perhaps missed. I think this focuses everyone's attention now on the exact terms under which we had entered the treaty.

Q Has it been the administration's position that much of the criticism of this was politically motivated? That was the line last fall when the passage fell apart.

MR. BELL: I believe what we said last fall was that the letter that Senator Dole wrote to his colleagues the night before the vote that the treaty was due to come up just created an impossible political situation because the environment by then was so super-charged with the presidential campaign that an objective review by the Senate of the treaty was not necessarily guaranteed, and that it would be better to just let things calm down and put this over until after the election, which is what we did.

Q Bob, are you now assured of a vote next week, or is that still in some doubt?

MR. BELL: The Majority Leader will have to address that himself. He has certainly, on a number of occasions over the last week, in an informal way, assured Senator Daschle that this is coming to a vote. We take the assurances of the Majority Leader explicitly; he's a man of honor and we respect that. At the end of the day, of course, the floor debate is governed by a unanimous consent agreement in most cases, and as Richard Perle once said, the devil's in the detail. So working out that last bit of detail and unanimous consent agreement --

Q -- employee of this administration.

MR. BELL: Sorry, I think that was back when Richard was a Democrat. But -- (laughter) -- and was working for Senator Jackson. At any rate, I think they're still right on the cusp of

getting the unanimous consent agreement nailed down, and once that's promulgated and you have that delicious moment of silence where no one objects, then we know that we've got the treaty coming up and the terms of reference agreed.

Q Just to follow up on John's question, do you now accept the reservations and concerns and objections that have still been raised of this treaty as substantive and not political?

MR. BELL: It's just not my role to characterize the motive of any senator. I worked up there too many years to get into that. But we do acknowledge that very valid concerns and questions have been raised about this treaty and we, in good faith, as Sandy said, have worked very hard, through 60 hours of hard negotiation --not just general discussion, but 60 hours of negotiation on the text of these conditions -- to make sure that we've addressed those concerns.

Q On another subject since you're here, is the U.S. government aware that Russia has broken its promise not to send advance conventional weapons to Iran?

MR. BELL: I'm going to pass on that if I could. I came in this morning and went right to work on the Chemical Weapons Convention and vaguely aware that there's a story on that. I've not had a chance to look into it myself. There might be others that can address it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:03 P.M. EDT

I. Tomorrow's floor action on S.495

At the close of Senate business today, it was announced that S. 495 will be taken up tomorrow. The schedule on S.495 and the CWC is liable to run as follows:

S.495 raised Thursday and disposed off --unknown in what fashion--on Thursday or Friday. The CWC could be raised on Friday for senate procedural purposes and set aside for debate on Wednesday, April 23rd, after Passover. A vote on the CWC would then be held on Thursday, April 24th.

II. Unanimous Consent agreement

Senators Lott and Daschle continue to make progress on coming up with a Unanimous Consent agreement that may set the terms of debate and a vote on both S. 495 and the CWC. The negotiation of this Unanimous Consent agreement has many hopeful watchers who claim that the document is getting better all the time. When it is finished, some say there will be only 3 or 4 conditions to the CWC resolution of ratification that are still in dispute.

III. The Executive Branch

The President is hosting a dinner this evening at Blair House for congressional leaders to discuss the Administration's foreign policy objectives. Many believe that CWC will figure prominently in the discussion.

III. Hearings on CWC

Most people believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee still plans to hold open hearings tomorrow, Thursday, April 17 on the CWC and verification issues. It is believed that the Committee is trying to get Acting CIA Director George Tenet to testify. No one can confirm this information.

It is believed that the Committee held closed hearings today with intelligence officials on CWC verification.

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

There are reports that mail to the senators from Colorado on the CWC is running 60% against and 40% for. Any suggestions on how to elevate the public education debate in Colorado?

Today's edition of the Omaha World Herald has an interview with Senator Hegel in which he indicates that he is leaning against the CWC unless conditions are laid down that improve the accord. Once again, additional in- state public education activities may be useful.

1. "Clinton Works Phones to Push Chemical Treaty," Washington Post, 4/17
2. Washington Post Editorial, "The Real Chemical Treaty Issue," 4/17
3. "Clinton Hosts Dinner to Woo Congress on Foreign Policy," New York Times, 4/17

Clinton Works Phones to Push Chemical Treaty Majority Leader Anticipates Deal For Senate to Vote Before April 29

By John F. Harris and Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, April 17 1997; Page A04
The Washington Post

President Clinton worked the phones yesterday urging senators to approve a treaty banning chemical weapons, while the White House announced agreement with congressional leaders on some two dozen accords designed to make the treaty more palatable to Republicans.

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) said he anticipates striking a deal today on a plan to vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention before it goes into effect around the world on April 29. The administration has warned that if the United States does not ratify the treaty by then, it will be subject to sanctions and join the undesirable company of states like Iraq and Libya.

Senior administration officials called the signs encouraging, but stopped short of predicting victory on the treaty, which over the past few weeks has been the subject of an intense White House lobbying campaign. "I think it is really a jump ball at this point," said White House national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger.

Clinton pressed for passage in person at a bipartisan meeting on foreign policy with 37 lawmakers from the House and Senate and a host of senior administration officials. The agenda, White House officials said afterward, was dominated by broad discussions of Clinton's foreign policy goals, particularly the expansion of the NATO alliance and his desire to work cooperatively with Republicans. The meeting did not involve bargaining over the treaty, but Clinton did make a "very strong stand" on behalf of passage, said White House spokesman David Johnson.

The White House was doing its best to create good will regarding the chemical weapons treaty. Robert Bell, a senior National Security Council aide, lavished praise on Lott for his help in getting the issue to the Senate floor. Bell said Republicans have raised "perfectly legitimate and appropriate" questions about the treaty.

That is a stark contrast from last fall, when an expected vote on the treaty fell apart in the midst of the presidential campaign.

White House aides said then that treaty opponents were inventing objections to create an election issue, and Clinton said they were playing "partisan politics with America's security."

To bring the chemical weapons treaty to the Senate floor, Lott must get a green light from Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), the pact's most prominent and implacable foe. Helms has been blocking action in hopes of winning concessions on an array of issues, ranging from State Department reorganization and U.N. reforms to a long list of treaty conditions, some of which the Clinton administration regards as "killers."

But prospects have improved recently as administration and congressional negotiators have reached agreements on 23 of 33 conditions demanded by Helms and other treaty skeptics. One of these is a concession by the administration that any future amendments to the treaty would have to be ratified by the Senate.

Both White House and congressional officials said they expect similar agreements soon on two other priorities of treaty

skeptics -- that tear gas could be used for riot control and that international inspectors enforcing the treaty would need to obtain court warrants before conducting searches.

Yet important hurdles remain. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations panel, who has been negotiating with Helms, said four of the remaining issues in dispute are killers that would put the United States in violation of the convention even if Congress approves it.

One would hold up U.S. participation until "rogue states" sign the pact. Another would raise the standards for verification of compliance. A third would link U.S. ratification to approval of the pact by Russia. The fourth -- and most important to some treaty critics -- would require renegotiation of treaty provisions that require signatory countries to exchange information about anti-chemical weapons defenses and chemical technology.

Helms remains a critical voice. Getting the issue to the floor requires the unanimous consent of the Senate, meaning even one member could block a vote.

Asked Tuesday how he was dealing with Helms on these issues, Lott grinned and said, "Gingerly."

Helms conveyed a somewhat grumpy mood. He complained that treaty proponents were "backing and filling" in working out details but added, "I think if both sides exert a bit of good faith, prospects are fair" that an agreement can be reached.

Clinton expected to call about 10 senators by the end of the day yesterday. Among those he called was Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.).

According to an administration official, some of the wavering senators sounded receptive to the treaty, but several told Clinton they were waiting to see how Lott, who has questioned key elements of the treaty but has not taken a formal stand, votes before deciding what they will do.

Helms did not attend Clinton's foreign policy gathering, and White House officials said he told them he had a scheduling conflict. One Republican lawmaker said the meeting, which included a dinner of grilled rack of spring lamb with roasted eggplant, was useful even though it dealt mostly in broad foreign policy themes rather than specifics.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said there should be more bipartisanship in foreign policy. "We all agree it's necessary," he said. "I think the president and vice president were reaching out to all of us."

@CAPTION: Robert Bell of the NSC lavished praise on Sen. Trent Lott and called Republicans' questions "legitimate."

The Real Chemical Treaty Issue

Thursday, April 17 1997; Page A22

The Washington Post

Editorial

THE ISSUE underlying the debate on the chemical weapons treaty has only now been accurately identified. It is not whether the treaty awaiting Senate ratification is a fully serviceable instrument that states can rely on to restrain chemical proliferation. The agreement's warmer advocates concede that in the best circumstances it will remain difficult to ensure that the beast does not escape the bo

x. That work cannot be done simply by a treaty, even one such as this, which incorporates degrees of authority and techniques of inspection quite beyond earlier arms-control measures. The work of chemical nonproliferation finally will be done by the power and will of treaty-abiding governments. If those states -- of which the United States is a natural leader -- do not deter or, in the event, capably defend against chemical attack, then the treaty will be a sham. The consensus on this point is greater than the

rhetoric of the treaty debate lets on.

No, the issue underlying the treaty debate is quite different. As stated precisely in an op-ed piece April 13 by David Kay, Ronald Lehman and James Woolsey, it is first about the political psychology of post-Cold War arms control. Do treaties lull us into ignoring threats? Do governments hesitate to enforce treaty obligations in a world disposed not to rock the boat? Those who see arms control as politically disarming oppose ratification not merely for some of the treaty's terms but in fear that ratification will incline peoples and governments to ignore real threats. Those who believe arms control still has a role in mustering public and official vigilance favor ratification -- for the terms of the treaty and for the contribution it can make to reducing real dangers.

Philosophically, the arms-control skeptics have a point. Democracies do sometimes get careless about security. They need to be kept on their toes. Practically, however, the skeptics are on weak ground. They preach a useful vigilance, but they have no better plan. What is the United States supposed to do after trashing this treaty: go around the world solo looking for chemical predators to bash? Would it not be better to have a set of agreed rules and all the available technologies and the company of other nations to bolster the treaty's purposes? Can it conceivably be in the American interest to perform this critical mission on its own? The Reagan-Bush pedigree of this treaty and the Clinton embrace of it do not make it foolproof and certainly not self-enforcing. But it has been drafted conscientiously, and if it is enforced conscientiously, it will serve.

The New York Times
April 17, 1997

Clinton Hosts Dinner to Woo Congress on Foreign Policy

By JAMES BENNET

WASHINGTON -- Facing a series of legislative roadblocks to his foreign policy, President Clinton held a dinner Wednesday night for more than three dozen Democratic and Republican members of Congress at Blair House, pressing them to support his goals in Europe, with China and at the United Nations.

Clinton's also lobbied the legislators heavily on the most immediate test of a bipartisan foreign policy -- a treaty banning chemical weapons, which appears headed for a ratification vote in the Senate next week.

But despite the White House's stated goal of a bipartisan meeting, the crowd appeared to be weighted toward the Democrats.

The most important Republican critic of the chemical weapons ban, Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, stayed away, reportedly because his granddaughter was in town. Further undermining bipartisanship, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich also pleaded a conflicting engagement.

Administration officials said Wednesday that they were uncertain whether the treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, would be ratified before the deadline of April 29, when it is scheduled to take effect.

"I think it is really a jump ball at this point," said Samuel Berger, Clinton's national security adviser. He said there remained "a lot of undecided senators," adding, "The stakes are enormously high."

Susan Irby, a spokeswoman for the Senate majority leader, Trent Lott, said he hoped to hold a vote on the treaty next Wednesday or Thursday but was trying to get unanimous consent from the Senate to schedule it.

Administration officials emphasized that Wednesday night's meeting was a broad effort to enlist congressional support.

"This is part of a larger process and a way of doing business that I think we've tried very hard since January to engage in," Berger said Wednesday afternoon.

A number of prominent Republicans did attend, including Lott and Sens. Richard Lugar and John Warner. Republican Reps. Robert Livingston and Benjamin Gilman also attended the dinner.

"We think it's quite an extraordinary cross section," an administration official said.

He added that he would not read anything into Helms' absence. "We're certainly not adopting a confrontational stance toward him," the official said.

But Marc Thiessen, a spokesman for Helms, said, "It's not exactly an opportune time to be talking about a bipartisan foreign policy summit when they're trying to ram an objectionable treaty down the Senate's throat."

This was the first such meeting Clinton has had. His aides said it reflected his growing awareness of his need for congressional support on issues like China's status as a trade partner and also his belief that Republicans will cooperate if consulted fully.

Besides Clinton, more than a dozen officers from his Cabinet and other top officials came Wednesday night, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen, Bill Richardson, the chief delegate to the United Nations, and Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Clinton's aides said they believed they had made great progress in addressing worries about the treaty.

But the administration has not been able to satisfy critics on some proposed changes -- what Berger called "killer amendments." They include a demand that other countries known to have chemical weapons, like Libya and Russia, ratify the treaty first.

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Luxembourg and Tunisia have just become the 73rd and 74th ratifiers to the CWC.

**** ACTION ALERT **** ACTION ALERT **** ACTION ALERT ****

HELP BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

CALL YOUR SENATOR --NOW--

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), scheduled to go into effect on April 29, will ban the production, possession and use of poison gas weapons worldwide.

But the U.S. Senate still has not ratified it.

PSR and other arms control supporters are working to ensure that the Senate will endorse this historic ban on poison gas by April 29. Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) said he intends to schedule a vote, but your help is essential to securing Senate support for the CWC, where a two-thirds majority (67) vote is needed for ratification.

The CWC is one of the most important arms control treaties yet. Every Senator's vote will count.

***** WHAT YOU CAN DO *****

* Fax or phone your Senators (see list below). Tell them to:

- 1) schedule a vote on the CWC,
- 2) vote Yes on the CWC, and
- 3) oppose killer amendments, substitutes & alternatives to the treaty.

* Make your position, and your Senator's, known publicly: write a letter to the editor of your local paper.

For more information, see the talking points below or contact Lisa Ledwidge at PSR 202-898-0150 x222 or <ledwidge@psr.org>.

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Partial List of Senators

Senator	Phone	Fax
Abraham, MI	(202) 224-4822	(202)224-8834
Allard, CO	(202) 224-5941	(202) 224-6471
Bennett, UT	(202) 224-5444	(202) 224-6717
Bond, MO	(202) 224-5721	(202) 224-8149
Brownback, KS	(202) 224-6521	unpublished
Burns, MT	(202) 224-2644	(202) 224-8594
Campbell, CO	(202) 224-5852	(202) 224-1933
Coats, IN	(202) 224-5623	(202) 224-3924
Cochran, MS	(202) 224-5054	(202) 224-9450
D'Amato, NY	(202) 224-6542	(202) 224-5871

DeWine, OH (202) 224-2315 (202) 224-6519
Domenici, NM (202) 224-6621 (202) 224-7371
Enzi, WY (202) 224-3424 unpublished
Frist, TN (202) 224-3344 (202) 228-1264
Gorton, WA (202) 224-3441 (202) 224-9393
Grams, MN (202) 224-3244 (202) 228-0956
Grassley, IA (202) 224-3744 (202) 224-6020
Gregg, NH (202) 224-3324 (202) 224-4952
Hagel, NE (202) 224-4224 (202) 224-5213
Hatch, UT (202) 224-5251 (202) 224-6331
Hutchison, TX (202) 224-5922 (202) 224-0776
Hutchinson, AR (202) 224-2353 unpublished
Mack, FL (202) 224-5274 (202) 224-8022
McConnell, KY (202) 224-2541 (202) 224-2499
Roberts, KS (202) 224-4774 unpublished
Roth, DE (202) 224-2441 (202) 228-0354
Sessions, AL (202) 224-4124 unpublished
Smith, OR (202) 224-3753 (202) 228-3997
Thomas, WY (202) 224-6441 (202) 224-1724
Thurmond, SC (202) 224-5972 (202) 224-1300
Thompson, TN (202) 224-4944 (202) 228-3679

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Why support the Chemical Weapons Convention?

- * The CWC will establish an international norm against the possession of poison gas weapons and a means for verifying their prohibition.
- * The CWC has been ratified by more than 70 countries, enough to put it into effect April 29 with or without U.S. participation. If the Senate has not ratified the CWC by that time, the U.S. will be excluded from the treaty's enforcement system and stand isolated from the broader international community.
- * Ratification of the CWC is vital to a broad range of arms control agreements, particularly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- * If the U.S. fails to ratify the CWC, domestic chemical companies stand to lose an estimated \$600 million per year in export sales and jobs because of penalizing trade restrictions.
- * The CWC is supported by:
 - . World leaders (Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, Bush, and Reagan)
 - . Military leaders (Gen. Colin Powell, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Defense Secretaries Bill Cohen, Dick Cheney and William Perry)
 - . U.S. chemical companies and industry organizations (Dow, Monsanto, Chemical Manufacturers Association, American Chemical Society)
 - . Veterans, religious, environmental, and public interest

groups
. 84% of Americans

.end.

>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk
>Date: Thu, 17 Apr 1997 14:22:47 GMT
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 17 Apr
>To: nfzpsc@gn.apc.org
>
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY
>
>Thurs 17 Apr 1997
>
>97-8441 Nirex's failure to win permission to build underground
> laboratory at Sellafield could undermine Britain's future in
> reprocessing, says former director of BNFL and Nirex. NewSc 19
>97-8442 EU resents demands by IAEA that it should face same checks to
> prevent covert construction of n/weapons as other countries.

> NewSc 19
>97-8443 A former US n/weapons expert argues that the US's \$4bn-a-year
> programme for management of its n/weapon stockpile is
> unnecessary, wasteful and misguided. G
>97-8444 Pipe discharging radioactive waste into the sea from France's
> La Hague reprocessing plant has been exposed twice by low
> tides recently: radiation levels up to 3,500 times normal are
> feared. NewSc 19
>97-8445 False information in report about fire at Tokaimura
> n/reprocessing plant in Japan could bring about abolition of
> its nuclear corporation DONEN. NewSc 19
>97-8446 US split on how to handle Iran: hawkish stance might drive
> Tehran into Moscow's arms, writes Bruce Clark. FT
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>Weds 16 Apr 1997 - nil -
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>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.
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Stewart Kemp (nfzpsc@gn.apc.org)

April 18, 1997 NPT Briefing 6: NGO ideas on the NPT

Rebecca Johnson

Following intensive consultations, a group of key States Parties to the 1997 NPT Review PrepCom had by Wednesday evening resolved most of their disagreements over how to report on their deliberations and recommendations. Only one issue remained outstanding: whether and how to recommend further progress on security assurances, the Middle East resolution and a fissile materials ban. Despite closure of the United Nations on Thursday because of an Islamic Holy Day, the United States, Egypt and relevant others are expected to continue their attempts to find agreed language in time for the draft report to be discussed (and accepted) by all the NPT parties before the PrepCom closes on Friday April 18. The outcome will be covered in NPT Briefing # 7.

NAM Working Paper

The NAM working paper introduced on April 10 by Indonesia (see NPT Briefing # 3) was finally issued. It made general statements on universality, calling for all states possessing nuclear capabilities to accede to the treaty. On non-proliferation the NAM called for all possible efforts to prevent proliferation without hampering the 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy. The NAM wanted NPT parties to recommend establishment of a nuclear disarmament committee in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), to 'commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention'. The statement said that 'negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material' for nuclear weapons and devices should be commenced and a 'universal and legally binding multilateral agreement' committing all states to eliminate nuclear weapons should be concluded. This appears to be a softened form of the linkage exerted by some NAM states in the CD, since the measures are mentioned in the same sentence but without insisting that negotiations must be concurrent (which led two NAM countries to oppose the programme of action endorsed by 28 NAM states in August 1996). The NAM document also confirms that the omission of stockpiles from the statement by Indonesia on April 10, on which I commented in NPT Briefing # 3, was not significant: the NAM countries continue to call for a fissban that includes stocks.

The NAM encouraged step-by-step reduction of nuclear arsenals as well as effective nuclear disarmament measures.

The NAM called for a legally binding security assurances regime to be 'urgently concluded', referred to 'a protocol annexed' to the NPT, and urged NPT parties to negotiate such an instrument in the NPT PrepCom meetings leading up to the 2000 Review Conference. Acceptance of fullscope safeguards were to be made a condition of new supply arrangements. Nuclear material transferred from military uses should be put under IAEA safeguards. In a reference to export controls, the NAM called for 'unilaterally enforced restrictive measures' to be removed. They backed the nuclear weapon free zone treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba and welcomed the Central Asian NWFZ initiative undertaken by states in that region. Five paragraphs were devoted to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, noting

that 'no progress has been achieved' and calling for its full implementation. The NAM emphasised their view that the depositary states of the NPT (Britain, Russia and the United States) 'have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors' of the 1995 resolution, which 'constitutes part and parcel of the package of the outcome' of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

On organisational issues, the NAM wanted the 1995 decisions to be taken 'as the yardsticks in determining the objectives to be achieved by the Review Conference' in the year 2000. They also called for negotiations to begin in the first PrepCom 'on a rolling text', but there are some differences of view about what was meant by rolling text, with as many NAM countries as Western states opposed to negotiating on bracketed proposals this early in the PrepCom process. Finally, the NAM welcomed the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 'which could also make a positive contribution towards the attainment of these objectives.'

NGO statements on the NPT

As part of this positive contribution, a small number of NGO presentations were made to an informal meeting chaired by Pasi Patokallio during the NPT PrepCom. Most NGO speakers stressed that their presentations were not on behalf of any individual person, organisation or perspective, but instead had been written by various groups of participants in order to share relevant information and a range of ideas and arguments, representing the diversity of approach and opinion within the NGO community on implementation of the treaty. This was difficult enough in the process leading up to and including the two hours of presentations, and I cannot hope to do justice to the wealth of ideas and information in this short briefing either. Statements were given to the delegations and it is understood that they will be available on the internet as well.

Future responsibility

The opening and closing speeches focused on the threats, risks and actual harm which nuclear weapons inflict on the earth and all living things, from the mining of uranium, through every part of the nuclear fuel cycle, up to the testing and use of nuclear weapons and the unsolved problems of disposing of the radioactive wastes. Reminding delegates that the original inhabitants of what is now New York State believed that the consequences of actions should be considered 'up to the seventh generation', the NGO presentations concluded with a direct quote from the July 8, 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ, which made clear the judges' opinion that nuclear weapons violated such precautionary principles and endangered the future of all of us.

Regional Security

Addressing articles I and II, some European NGOs raised concerns about the planned enlargement of NATO and about Franco-British nuclear weapons cooperation and the proposed Europeanisation of French nuclear forces. They argued that NATO nuclear programmes were 'a form of horizontal proliferation' and said that the problem of nuclear deployments within NATO had not been fully resolved during negotiation of the NPT and 'could constitute a breach of articles I and II'. Instead of following French proposals for 'concerted deterrence' in the EU, European nations should build a policy of 'concerted disarmament'. To this end, the NGOs who had

prepared the statement emphasised the importance of enhancing the role of the OSCE in building security for a 'Europe whole and free'. Supporting progress under article VII on NWFZs, they strongly supported the initiative of a Central Asian NWFZ and called for renewed backing for NWFZs in Scandinavia and Central Europe.

Safety controls on nuclear materials

Looking at the control of weapons-usable nuclear materials, concerns were raised about IAEA safeguards and the effectiveness of article III.

Considerable information on the military and commercial stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) was provided, noting the broad consensus among NGOs that 'the possession of these materials, especially in large quantities and in direct-usable form, present continuous proliferation concerns.' The technical and political pros and cons of different approaches on a fissile material production ban and methods for disposing of weapons-usable materials were discussed, concluding that 'there is an urgent need to reduce access to weapons-usable nuclear materials.'

Energy

The participating NGOs addressed the article IV provision with a detailed examination of the claim of nuclear power to be clean, cheap or safe, questioning how this short-lived and dangerous technology could possibly be described as an 'inalienable right'. The facts and figures piled up into a damning indictment of the subsidies which have distorted the high investment and running costs of the 495 nuclear plants (in only 33 countries), their safety record and the continued failure of the industry to find safe means of storing its radioactive products. Concerns were also raised about shipments of nuclear materials and liability. It was noted that reprocessing at present rates would create stockpiles of separated plutonium 'which may well exceed military stockpiles within the next decade.' Since article IV actually benefits fewer than one-sixth of NNWS parties, it was suggested that research, technology transfer and assistance in a range of energy choices should be offered as a more appropriate fulfilment of the legitimate desire of developing states to have reliable energy production in their own hands. Providing such alternatives would give practical meaning to the original intentions of article IV and be consistent with the commitments on sustainable development made in Agenda 21 adopted in 1992 in Rio.

Indigenous People

A powerful statement was made on behalf of the indigenous people whose homes and livelihoods had been devastated by nuclear production and testing, including the Western Shoshone, Kazaks and Uighurs, as well as the Micronesians, Maohi and Australian aboriginal peoples in the 'liquid continent' of the Pacific. Linking the nuclear abuse of these peoples with deprivation of their liberty by economic and military colonialism, a direct appeal was made for peace and justice so that the indigenous peoples could give their children a future free of colonialism and nuclear weapons.

Testing

Since there is no relevance in addressing article V, a detailed analysis of various planned programmes for nuclear testing under the CTBT was provided instead. Covering the 'safety and reliability' programmes of the NWS, the statement provided information on subcritical tests, laboratory testing, inertial confinement fusion, pulsed power thermonuclear tests, and

cooperation among certain NWS on 'theoretical, numerical, and experimental simulation methods'. The speaker noted that the B61-11 earth-penetrating nuclear bomb was recently certified in the USA without underground nuclear testing and urged the NPT parties 'to seek binding commitments by the NWS not to deploy new-design nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons modified to have new or improved military characteristics or capabilities or to perform new military missions.' They were also urged to redefine stockpile stewardship as: 'passive caretaking of existing arsenals under safe conditions and international safeguards, while they await disablement and dismantlement pursuant to article VI of the NPT.'

Deep Cuts

Three challenging approaches were made on article VI, which could be viewed as alternatives or as complementary. One proposed a 'deep cuts' programme, to 'reduce the nuclear forces of the weapon states to immobilised, multilaterally monitored arsenals of 100-200 warheads each as a final trial stage before complete elimination.' The main steps were 'no increase commitments'; dealerting of nuclear weapons; exchange of data on nuclear forces, including holdings of warheads and missiles; verified fissile materials production ban; 'direct immobilisation' (sequestration and storage) of the entire operational nuclear forces of all the weapon states; the dismantlement of all warheads covered by reduction agreements, with transfer of the fissile materials to internationally monitored storage, precluding reuse for weapons; and the inclusion of reserve and substrategic warheads in dismantlements, so that 'a process of genuine downward moving disarmament can take place.'

Nuclear Weapons Convention

The group of international lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts which had launched a model nuclear weapons convention on April 7 presented an overview of its concepts and provisions. Emphasising that the draft convention was to invite thinking about the 'coordination across state boundaries, political bodies and various industries' necessary for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the drafters outlined their 'comprehensive, incremental approach, including concrete step by step measures'. Brief explanations were made on the negative and positive obligations, definitions, verification provisions and implementing organisation, underlining that 'nuclear disarmament may take many steps but will need to include a convention or conventions on total elimination.' The drafters offered their model convention, saying that 'when one undertakes a journey it helps to have some idea of the nature of the final destination.'

Amendment for Universality

Another speaker said it was the responsibility of all the states which had supported resolutions on nuclear disarmament in the UN or CD to 'force negotiations upon those who will not negotiate'. Pointing out the power of one third of the NPT parties to call an amendment conference, the statement challenged NPT parties to make good their demands for nuclear disarmament and universality by confronting the declared _and_ undeclared nuclear powers with an amendment converting the NPT into a nuclear weapon convention. 'The countries that are not in the NPT, especially those like India, Pakistan and Israel, who hide their nuclear weapons behind demands for global or regional disarmament, would be faced with a simple choice.' This could 'push the lever' that would start the negotiating process for everyone; and 'with the

whole world watching the closing scenes of the nuclear age, no country would be prepared to go it alone.'

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To members of Abolition 2000:

Please review, comment, participate, and hopefully actively promote the 'Missiles to Sunflowers' Campaign. Explanation follows - This is a international communications petition campaign that is focused on declared and non-declared nuclear powers. This is an attempt, over the next two and a half years, to create a stream of petitions, by the means indicated, to the appropriate nuclear powers.

What exists is the following:

Hard copy petition; faxes; post cards; and a 10 min. video.

Mediums of communication utilized: 'snail' mail; 10 min. video; 800 telephone system; internet site; and hi-tech portable tabling.

Results: Approximately 3,000 names and addresses and growing...

The wording of the two petitions:

National -

To President Clinton & the Majority & Minority Leaders of Congress:
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty commit the United States to the abolition of all nuclear weaponry. Therefore, we call on all of you to:

1. Immediately initiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.
2. Halt and prohibit the continuing U.S. research, design, and testing of nuclear weaponry through laboratory-based facilities and experiments, including the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
3. Stop the "subcritical" underground nuclear tests planned for the Nevada Test Site.

Name and Address:

International -

To the Leaders of Declared and Non-Declared Nuclear Weapons Nations:
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty commit the declared nuclear weapons countries to the abolition of all nuclear weaponry, therefore, we call on all of you to:

1. Support a permanent end to all nuclear testing both underground and in laboratories.
2. Ratify and commit to achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
3. Immediately initiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

Name and Address:

All petitions, from whatever source, will be periodically copied, batched, and then forwarded to the appropriate leaders and the press.

Pertinent information: 'Snail' mail address: Abolish Nukes P.O. Box 30996 Oakland, CA 94604; 800 tel. #: 1-800-3NO-NUKE; e-mail address:

abolishnukes@igc.org Internet:www.abolition2000.org Please check all of this information. we truly believe no one will be disappointed. A lot of time and money has gone into creating high quality content and all of it is now ready to be aggressively put out into reality.

Future Plans: By Monday of next week - the 10 min. video will be on the internet site in 'real' time. There also will be a beautiful banner that includes a missile fading into a sunflower...

Within one month: The internet site will be translated into six different languages for appropriate networks.

If anyone wants hard copy information, please e-mail:

abolishnukes@igc.org and it will be forwarded to you. Copies of the video are available at \$14.95 each plus postage. This video is moderated by former California Governor Jerry Brown. \$5.00 from each sale will be donated to Abolition 2000. This video can be utilized for outreach to organization members and the general public...

Sincerely, Robert L. Manning

Conditions 24-28 and the Killer Conditions, 29-33

24. Treaty interpretation
25. Further arms reduction obligations
26. Riot Control Agents
27. Chemical weapons destruction
28. Constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure

29. Russian elimination of chemical weapons
30. Chemical weapons in other states
31. Exercise of right to bar certain inspectors
32. Stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons
33. Effective verification

SENATE EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION 75--RELATIVE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (Senate - April 17, 1997)

(24) Treaty interpretation: The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term `INF Treaty' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

(25) Further arms reductions obligations: The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.

(26) Riot control agents:

(A) Permitted uses: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, including the use against combatants who are parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases:

(i) United States not a party: The conduct of peacetime military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, and Ruanda).

(ii) Consensual peacekeeping: Consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

(iii) Chapter VII peacekeeping: Peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

(B) Implementation: The President shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.

(C) Definition: In this paragraph, the term `riot control agent' has the meaning given the term in Article II(7) of the Convention.

(27) Chemical weapons destruction: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) Exploration of alternative technologies: The President has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention for the destruction of chemical weapons.

(B) Convention extends destruction deadline: The requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the United States by the deadline required by the Convention of April 29, 2007.

(C) Authority to employ a different destruction technology: The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force with respect to that Party, on general plans of the State Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different than that declared under that Article.

(D) Procedures for extension of deadline: The President will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a result of the program of alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.

(28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure:

(A) In general: In order to protect United States citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--

(I) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent has been withheld, the United States National Authority will first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and

(ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility under the Convention that is conducted on an involuntary basis on the territory of the United States, the United States National Authority first will obtain an administrative search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.

(B) Definition: For purposes of this resolution, the term `National Authority' means the agency or office of the United States Government designated by the United States pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.

(29) Russian elimination of chemical weapons: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that--

(A) Russia is making reasonable progress in the implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990 (in this resolution referred to as the `1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement');

(B) the United States and Russia have resolved, to the satisfaction of the United States, outstanding compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989, also known as the '1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding', and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement;

(C) Russia has deposited the Russian instrument of ratification for the Convention and is in compliance with its obligations under the Convention; and

(D) Russia is committed to forgoing any chemical weapons capability, chemical weapons modernization program, production mobilization capability, or any other activity contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.

(30) Chemical weapons in other states:

(A) Certification requirement: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification the President, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the Congress that countries which have been determined to have offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, and all other countries determined to be state sponsors of international terrorism, have ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention.

(31) Exercise of right to bar certain inspectors:

(I) In general: The President shall exercise United States rights under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Part II of the Verification Annex to indicate United States non-acceptance of all inspectors and inspection assistants who are nationals of countries designated by the Secretary of State as supporters of international terrorism under section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, or nationals of countries that have been determined by the President, in the last five years, to have violated United States nonproliferation law, including--

(I) chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the Arms Export Control Act;

(II) sections 821 and 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994;

(III) sections 11b and 11c of the Export Administration Act of 1979;

(IV) the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and

(V) sections 1604 and 1605 of the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992.

(ii) Other grounds of exclusion: The President shall also bar such nationals from entering United States territory for the purpose of conducting any activity associated with the Convention, notwithstanding paragraph 7 of Part II of the Verification Annex.

(32) Stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--

(A) the State Parties have concluded an agreement amending the Convention--

(i) by striking Article X; and

(ii) by amending Article XI to strike any provision that states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions in the field of chemical activities, including paragraphs 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e); and

(B) no provision has been added to the Convention or to any of its annexes, and no statement, written or oral, has been

issued by the Organization, stating or implying the right or obligation of States Parties to share or facilitate the exchange among themselves of chemical weapons defense technology, chemicals, equipment, or scientific and technical information.

(33) Effective verification:

(A) Certification: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that compliance with the Convention is effectively verifiable.

(B) Definitions: In this paragraph:

(i) Effectively verifiable: The term `effectively verifiable' means that the Director of Central Intelligence has certified to the President that the United States intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) has a high degree of confidence in its ability to detect militarily significant violations of the Convention, including the production, possession, or storage of militarily significant quantities of lethal chemicals, in a timely fashion, and to detect patterns of marginal violation over time.

(ii) Militarily significant: The term `militarily significant' means one metric ton or more of chemical weapons agent.

(iii) Timely fashion: The term `timely fashion' means detection within one year of the violation having occurred.

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"NEWSCOPE" by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on July 21, 1993 at 21:36 Eastern, about SUBSCRIPTION-ONLY WEEKLY NEWS SOURCE (322 notes).

Note 322 by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on April 29, 1997 at 13:43 Eastern (16627 characters).

Newscope

A Newsletter for United Methodist Leaders

Vol. 25, No. 18/May 2, 1997

Clergy Session Cannot Ratify Church Trial Decision, Says Council

The Judicial Council, meeting April 23-25 in Madison, N.J., declared unconstitutional the requirement for the clergy session of an annual conference to ratify action of a trial court (1992 Discipline Para. 2626) when the verdict affects a clergy member's conference relationship.

Four docket items, relating to 11 questions asked at Iowa Conference, were combined in the complex decision. All related to treatment of three different members of the conference. Also part of the same decision was the ruling that any questions of law submitted to a bishop about procedures, processes, or actions in completed trials are moot. Questions of law must be submitted properly and must pertain to the business of the conference, the council declared.

As a part of considering the Iowa cases, the council prepared a list of guidelines for bishop's rulings during conference sessions. In general, the rulings of Bishop Charles Wesley Jordan (Iowa) were upheld, although some were modified. This case also prompted the council to reiterate a previously established decision that "all clergy qualified as appointable by the annual conference must be appointed."

The West Ohio Conference initiated the only oral hearing during the three-day session as it sought reconsideration of a case that was decided first at the council's fall 1996 session. The conference chancellor, Philip R. Moots argued in support of the resolution "Confidentiality and Responsibility for Addressing Sexual Misconduct and Harassment" April 24 at Drew University. In the fall 1996 session, a part of West Ohio's resolution that required reporting confidences relating to sexual misconduct or harassment to the district superintendent or bishop was declared to be in violation of the Discipline. After reconsideration at this session, the Judicial Council remanded the resolution to the West Ohio Conference, instructing the conference "to modify the language of its resolution to reflect the language" in the Discipline and an earlier decision of the council from April, 1995. The council declared the West Ohio policy as presently worded null and told the conference to return its revised wording to the council for review. The council's objection to the original wording was on the basis that West Ohio Conference, in its resolution, was in effect amending the Discipline's

statement on the clergy's obligation "to maintain all confidences inviolate" to add an exception not found in the Discipline.

The clergy sexual ethics policy of the California-Pacific Conference also was remanded to the conference for revision to bring it into conformity with the current Discipline and the decision. In this case, the conference was told that the revision in 1997 is preferred but that it is to be completed not later than the 1998 annual conference session.

California-Pacific Conference also requested the council's opinion on the meaning of the word "expelled" in the Discipline. The word appears in a paragraph on withdrawal found in a section on investigations, trials, and appeals.

The council said that word commonly means dismissed or put out. In the case referred to by the conference, the council said the person who withdrew under complaint was clergy and therefore was withdrawing from membership in the annual conference.

A membership policy in Southwest Texas Conference was overturned, and the bishop's ruling that a question about the policy was hypothetical was not upheld by the council. However, two council members indicated an intention to file a dissent in the future. The bishop's ruling had been considered in the fall 1996 council session and remanded to the bishop at that time. In the interim between sessions, the bishop responded that he still considered the question to be hypothetical.

The council's memorandum on the case charges that the Southwest Texas policy as instituted at the 1996 annual conference session violates the Discipline and quotes that authority but changes words in the quotation. "An annual conference may not paraphrase, incorrectly quote nor summarize sections of the Discipline in its own policy and procedure documents," the council repeated, citing several earlier council decisions.

Bishop Susan Morrison's (Albany) earlier ruling that a question on "mission area ministries" in a Peninsula-Delaware Conference resolution titled "A Call to Change" was never properly presented was affirmed by the council. -- UM News Service

Common Vision Sought for Church Agencies, Groups

How can the 14 general agencies of the UMC, its bishops, and annual conferences move into the 21st Century with a common vision and purpose that will revitalize the denomination? That question emerged as the central issue for the 76-member General Council on Ministries at its semi-annual meeting April 18-22 in Birmingham, Ala.

After considering all options, the group agreed to use their Oct. 24-28 meeting to work on these issues. They will invite representatives of the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits, the General Council on Finance and Administration, the Council of Bishops, the Connectional Process Team, and other agency members to sit at a "common table" in order to identify ways to

engage in mutual planning, coordination, evaluation, program development, budgeting, etc. -- UM News Service

Teleconference Focuses on End-of-Life Decisions

Some 4,000 viewers at 160 downlink sites across the U.S. participated in an April 17 teleconference on Living Well, Dying Well, Facing End-of-Life Decisions. Panelists included Donald Messer, president of Iliff School of Theology; Sally Brown Geis, former director of the Iliff Institute; Joretta Marshall, Iliff assistant professor of pastoral care; Cornish Rogers, associate dean at Claremont (Calif.) School of Theology; J. Philip Wogaman, pastor of Foundry UMC, Washington, D.C.; Janet Jones, director of Catholic Hospice, Miami, Fla.; William Orr, a geriatrician in Denver; and Richard Zaner, professor of medical ethics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville. M. Garlinda Burton, editor of the Interpreter, was the moderator.

According to Sue Calvin, Iliff director of public information, audience response to the four-hour event has been extremely positive. "Written evaluations indicate that people were particularly pleased with the balance of the program, including information on medical and hospice care, an ethical and theological framework for end-of-life decision making, and suggestions concerning pastoral care in pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis circumstances," Calvin said.

Health and Welfare Association Honors Several

The UM Association of Health and Welfare Ministries honored several individuals and groups: Chicago Temple -- First UMC were named "Local Congregation Partnership of the Year." UM Women of the Illinois Great Rivers Conference was named "Volunteer Group of the Year."

Other awards: Distinguished Service Award -- John W. Caddey, director, Berea (Ohio) Children's Home; Hall of Fame in Philanthropy -- Fred M. Keller, Grand Rapids, Mich.; Trustee of the Year -- Bernice Kilgore Giddings, San Jacinto Methodist Hospital, Baytown, Texas, and Methodist Hospital, Houston; Administrator of the Year for Hospitals and Health Care Systems -- Gary S. Shorb, president of Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, Tenn.; Administrator of the Year for Children, Youth, Family Services -- Charles W. Nelson, president of Gateway-Longview, Williamsville, N.Y.; Administrator of the Year for Older Adult Ministries -- Edward Kester, president of Wesley Affiliated Services, Mechanicsburg, Pa.; and Bruce Lenich, administrator of Heritage Towers, Doylestown, Pa.; Annual Conference Lay Leader of the Year -- Mary Carolyn Tindall, a member of the Mississippi Conference Health and Welfare Ministries Committee; Public Relations/Development/Marketing Director of the Year -- Jessie K. Forney, vice president, Gateway-Longview, Williamsville, N.Y.; Chaplain of the Year -- John A. Wilcher, Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, Tenn.; Individual Volunteer of the Year -- Faith Callahan, Wesley Homes, Des Moines, Wash.; and Nieves Graham, Evangelical Manor, Philadelphia; President's Citation -- Larry M. Curtis, an Indianapolis district superintendent; President's Citation -- Howard and Virginia Longmire, 26-year staff members at

Otterbein Homes, Lebanon, Ohio.

Short Takes

Approximately 150 of the 307 undergraduate students at UM-related Africa University initiated a boycott of classes on April 4, following a decision by the school's board of directors to raise student 1997-98 fees from \$3,000 to \$3,500. The \$500 increase was approved by the board April 1-5 in response to a steady rise in operating expenses. This is the first student fee increase at the Zimbabwe school since its doors were opened in 1992. While noting that students pay on average only 40% of the total costs, the board made a commitment to seek additional scholarship and aid funds for needy students. On April 14, the university suspended all boycotting students. Those who wanted to return to classes were asked to obtain permission from John Kurewa, university president. As of April 22, more than 100 students had been readmitted. -- Kelly Holton, UMNS

Thom White Wolf Fassett, general secretary of the General Board of Church and Society, is encouraging UMs to support proposed legislation that would require U.S. minimum wages to be paid to workers in U.S. territories in the northwest Pacific Ocean. The proposed bill, The Insular Wage and Human Rights Act of 1997, sponsored by Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), would raise minimum wages, place immigration policies under federal control, and require that products with the "Made in the USA" label adhere to U.S. labor laws. Foreign workers now work on the island for \$2.90 an hour. Fassett said the legislation would help ensure a safe working environment, adequate compensation, and the right to organize. -- Shanta Bryant

Bishop Kenneth Carder (Nashville) joined seven representatives of five denominations to speak April 23 at the Tennessee State Legislative Plaza in opposition to the death penalty. The bishop read portions of the UM statement (1996 Book of Resolutions, pp. 502-504) and mock executions by others challenged current myths about capital punishment. For the past 12 years, Carder has routinely visited with Bill Groseclose, a death row inmate at the River Bend Maximum Security Facility in Nashville. Coincidentally, a hearing on the case of Groseclose was held the following day in Cincinnati. A Nashville judge had ordered a new trial for Groseclose and the state had appealed that ruling. A final ruling from the Cincinnati-based court of appeals is not expected for several weeks.

An Iliff School of Theology effort to raise \$6 million exceeded its mark by nearly \$2 million. The Denver UM seminary raised \$7,840,086 in 22 months from foundations and 1,443 individual pledges.

An effort by Chicago police to eliminate a 1981 decree that prohibits them from amassing computer files and videotapes on citizens is being opposed by Martin Deppe, pastor of Irving Park UMC, Chicago. "I want no return to this invasion of my rights as a taxpaying, law-abiding American citizen," Deppe wrote in the Chicago Sun Times. "The Daley gang can misrepresent the consent decree all they want, but the citizens of Chicago know this is the ghost of former Mayor Richard J. Daley come back to bug us."

Some 120 pastors from seven Wesleyan denominations meeting at St. Simons Island, Ga., April 7-11 were challenged to break out of the "church manager" mold and to "face the world" as evangelists. The event was sponsored by the Order of the FLAME (Faithful Leaders As Mission Evangelists) of the World Methodist Council. Eddie Fox, council evangelism director, said the event was especially important for UMs, because persons in this denomination are the least likely of all faiths in North America to share their beliefs. Fox said the sessions were designed to help the clergy with less than five years of experience to "change their self-image from being maintenance ministers to missionary pastors." -- Kelly Holton, Wesleyan Christian Advocate

A 300-word statement released at the end of an international, ecumenical consultation on native people April 19 in Oklahoma City says the Gospel of Jesus Christ demands that the American Indian Christian community "be freed from the yoke and mantle of traditions and structures that ... contribute to the disintegration of our cultural heritage, communal harmony and the God-given right to self determination..." 20The statement asserts. "We will no longer tolerate the colonial imposition of European church structures and doctrine on indigenous communities." UMs comprised about a third of the 91 participants. -- UM News Service

The General Council on Ministries allocated World Service Contingency funds of \$20,000 to a task force reviewing recent developments in genetic engineering and \$55,000 to an "Emphasis of Concern for the Worker," authorized by the 1996 General Conference.

While receiving an award at the University of Dubuque (Iowa), John Sumwalt, pastor of Wauwatosa Ave. UMC in Milwaukee, preached a sermon in which he reported that in 1969 he and his brother had been sexually abused by his pastor and asked by church authorities to "keep this quiet." Sumwalt accused Circuit Rider of contributing to a "pattern of irresponsible confidentiality" by not including the name of the author of an article in the March 1997 issue about sexual abuse by a church youth director and forgiveness.

Positions Available

Youth director. Contact Youth Ministry Search, First UMC, P.O. Box 2285, Wenatchee, WA 98807.....Minister of music and worship ministries. Contact Howard P. Hunter, First UMC, 2800 4th Ave., N, Billings, MT 59101 (406-245-3001)..... Treasurer/business manager, Florida Conference. Contact CFA Search Committee, P.O. Box 3767, Lakeland FL 33802 by July 15.....College students needed for eight-week summer urban ministry program in St. Louis. Contact Roger Jespersen, 8000 Natural Bridge Rd., St. Louis, MO 63121 (314-391-0747).

Personalia

Robert G. Cagel, 56, former director of camping for the General Board of Discipleship (1979-85), was killed April 20 in Dahlonaga, Ga. when he accidentally discharged a rifle in a sheath while searching in a closet for another item.....Julia Kuhn Wallace, director of Christian education and program ministries for Centenary UMC in Virginia, has been named director of small-membership church ministry for the General Board of Discipleship, effective June 30.....Luther Henry, Fort Worth, Texas, will succeed the late William Kirkwood of Bluffton, S.C., as chair of the Corporate and Fiduciary Responsibility Committee of the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits.....New appointments in the Western New York Conference: D. Gregory VanDussen, pastor of Albion UMC to the Batavia District; Lawrence E. Lundgren, coordinating pastor of Covenant UMC in Rochester, to the Buffalo District; and Roy L. Miller, pastor of Wellsville First UMC, to the Jamestown District. David A. Gerr, North Central New York Conference superintendent, will serve as assistant to Bishop Hae-Jong Kim.....Kirbyjon Caldwell, 43, pastor of Windsor Village UMC, Houston, was included in Newsweek's (April 21) list of "100 people to watch as America enters the new millennium.....Paul W. Chilcote, professor at Methodist Theological School in Ohio, has been awarded the 1997 \$1,000 Women in UM History Research Award by the General Commission on Archives and History.....John F. Fiedler, pastor of First UMC, Hurst, Texas, will be appointed pastor of the 3,500-member First UMC, Dallas. He follows Hal Brady, who moved to St. Luke UMC, Columbus, Ga..... Bishop Michael J. Coyner (Dakotas), whose own home was threatened by flood waters, paid tribute in an April 21 letter to the "faith, resilience, and generosity of the UM people in the Dakotas."

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1. Whiskey a Chemical Weapon? San Francisco Examiner, 4/10
2. Helms Blocks Chemical Weapon Treaty, AP 4/10

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The San Francisco Examiner  
April 10, 1997

Whiskey a chemical weapon?  
Booze, fake sweetener makers pop up on chemical weapons treaty

Lisa Hoffman  
SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE  
Examiner news services contributed to this report.

WASHINGTON - Jim Beam whiskey may classify as a dangerous substance to some, but hardly anyone would call it a weapon of mass destruction. But under the Chemical Weapons Convention, a global treaty debated Tuesday in a Senate committee, the company that makes Jim Beam bourbon - along with those that manufacture Nutrasweet artificial sweetener and Dial soap - might fall under the pact's reporting and inspection requirements.

That doesn't mean those companies are in any way linked to, or suspected of, the production of deadly weapons. Yet because their manufacturing processes may create a particular category of chemical that conceivably could be misused to arm such devices, they could be required to notify the U.S. government and possibly be subject to arms control inspections.

All this emerged Tuesday in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the long-delayed ratification of the treaty, during which Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., the committee chairman, lined up witnesses to oppose U.S. ratification of the treaty.

In a hastily arranged rebuttal, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright appealed to Helms' committee for help in passing the treaty.

"If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must begin by making not only their use, but also their development, production, acquisition and stockpiling illegal," she said.

"As long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too," Helms told Albright. He insisted that the Clinton administration is still ignoring his concerns.

In a day of politicking over bringing the treaty to the Senate floor, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., declined Tuesday to set an exact date for the ratification vote by the full Senate, but assured Democrats it would come before the April 29 deadline.

Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., lifted a threat to stall Senate action on all legislation after Lott agreed to schedule a vote.

An existing international treaty has banned since 1925 the use of chemical weapons in war. The new pact goes further, prohibiting their manufacture, sale or export, and imposing trade sanctions and other penalties through an agency based in the Netherlands.

It also requires countries to destroy existing stockpiles, a provision that applies mainly to the United States and Russia, since they possess most of the world's known chemical arsenals.

Under terms of the treaty, any company that creates a certain amount of "discreet organic chemicals" each year

through its manufacturing processes must fill out a disclosure form.

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## Helms Blocks Chemical Weapon Treaty

By DAVID BRISCOE

Associated Press Writer

Thursday, April 10, 1997 3:50 am EDT

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Declaring that "they're not going to push me around," Sen. Jesse Helms is stalling efforts to ratify the chemical weapons treaty as time runs out for U.S. participation.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman has been negotiating with administration officials and his own party's leaders over a treaty that takes effect April 29 with or without U.S. ratification.

President Clinton, concerned that lack of formal Senate acceptance will prevent Americans from participating in the treaty's implementation, called several Senators to his White House residence late Wednesday to rally support for the pact.

The treaty bans all development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons and provides for inspections.

Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., lifted a threat to block all Senate action after he said he received assurances from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott that he would work to schedule a vote next week. A two-thirds majority vote is required for ratification.

Lott, who had yet to convince Helms to allow a vote, later said he had made no specific promise. Helms said he had been meeting with Lott on the issue. He and his staff were also negotiating with administration officials over several proposed amendments to ratification legislation.

Democrats released a list of what Daschle called "egregious conditions" or "killer amendments" proposed by Helms. They would:

--Require that Clinton certify that the convention is "effectively verifiable." The administration says it has high confidence that it can detect any violations of military significance but could not make such a blanket certification because monitoring capabilities are limited.

--Amend treaty articles to eliminate a provision for sharing chemical weapons defense technology and restricting trade in chemicals. The administration rejects anything that requires amendments to the treaty, which took years to negotiate.

--Require treaty ratification by Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea and China before U.S. ratification takes effect. The administration says that would give those countries veto power over U.S. participation in the important treaty.

Helms, in an interview after he held three hours of hearings Wednesday, said he planned more hearings next week, accusing the administration of "stonewalling" on his efforts to correct problems with the treaty.

"In its present form," he said, it "is not good for the American people."

Asked about pressure from his own party and the Clinton administration to schedule a vote next week, Helms said that is not likely, adding, "They're not going to push me around."

The administration says the Chemical Weapons Convention itself cannot be amended because 161 countries have signed it and 70 of those have ratified it.

Wednesday's hearing featured two panels of former military and political officials -- one group for and one against.

Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said the makeup of the treaty's governing board needs to be changed because it does not guarantee a seat for the United States or other countries that have the most chemical weapons technology.

Retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, former Republican national security adviser, said U.S. interests would be best served by ratifying the treaty and working within it to correct flaws. He also said he'd talked earlier in the day with former President Bush who reiterated his support for the pact.

\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$

John Holum will be discussing the CWC at a press event on Monday. Cameras from Fox, C-Span, and CBS will be in attendance.

We have been invited to attend the event. If you would like to participate, please notify, either myself or Cathy Dale at ACDA Public Affairs (647-5320) as soon as possible. Please include your date of birth and social security number for clearance.

The formal announcement of the event is below.

Thanks,

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U.S. State Department

The Secretary's Open Forum Presents:

The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Topic: The Chemical Weapons Convention

Date: Monday, April 21, 1997

Time: 12:30-1:30

Place: The Dean Acheson Auditorium

CWC Excerpts from Clinton's press conference.

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April 18, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN PRESS AVAILABILITY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

April 18, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
IN PRESS AVAILABILITY

The Briefing Room

3:40 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Less than two weeks from today, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into effect, with or without the United States. The bottom line is this: Will the United States join a treaty we helped to shape, or will we go from leading the fight against poison gas to joining the company of pariah nations this treaty seeks to isolate?

With this treaty, other nations will follow the lead we set years ago by giving up chemical weapons. Our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battle field. Rogue states and terrorists will have a harder time acquiring or making chemical weapons, and we'll have new tools to prevent and punish them if they try.

But if we fail to ratify, other countries could back out as well. We won't be able to enforce the treaty's rules or use its tools, and our companies will face trade sanctions aimed at countries that refuse to join.

As the Senate prepares to vote next week I'm encouraged by the great progress we have made, but mindful of its hurdles we still must overcome in order to gain approval of the CWC. I welcome yesterday's unanimous agreement by the Senate to bring the treaty to a vote, and I thank Majority Leader Lott, Senator Daschle, Senator Helms and Senator Biden, and all the members of the Senate from both parties for their efforts. By going the extra mile we've reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification -- for example, maintaining strong defenses against chemical attacks; toughening enforcement; allowing the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and requiring search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business.

These agreed-upon conditions resolve virtually all of the issues that have been raised about this treaty. But there are still a handful of issues on which we fundamentally disagree. They will be voted on by the full Senate as it takes up the treaty next week. We should all understand what's at stake. A vote for any of these killer amendments will prevent our participation in the treaty.

Let me quickly address four of them. The first would prohibit the United States from joining the treaty until Russia does. That is precisely backwards. The best way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves. Failure to do so will only give hard-liners in Russia an excuse to hold out and hold on to their chemical weapons.

A second killer condition would prohibit us from becoming a party until rogue states like Iraq and Libya join. The result is we'd be weaker, not stronger, in our fight to prevent these rogue states from developing chemical weapons because we would lose the ability to use and enforce the treaty's tough trade restrictions and inspection tools. No country, especially an outlaw state, should have a veto over our national security.

A third killer condition would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification. There is no such thing as perfect verifiability in a treaty, but this treaty's tough monitoring, reporting, and on-site inspection requirements will enable us to detect militarily significant cheating. Our soldiers on the battlefield will be safer. That, clearly, is an advance over no treaty at all.

Finally, the opponents would force us to reopen negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention to try to fix two concerns that have already been resolved. First, they claim that a treaty expressly devoted to eliminating chemical weapons somehow would force its parties to facilitate the spread of chemical weapons. This interpretation is totally at odds with the plain language of the treaty. I have committed to the Senate that neither the United States nor our allies share this interpretation, and that we will reaffirm that fact annually.

The opponents also misread the treaty to require that we share our most advanced chemical defensive technology with countries like Iran and Cuba, should they join the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have committed to the Senate that in the event such countries are threatened by chemical attack we would limit our assistance to providing nothing more than emergency medical supplies

America took the lead in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, first the Reagan administration, then the Bush administration. Every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past 20 years supports it, as do the overwhelming majority of our veterans, the chemical industry and arms control experts. Now we must lead in bringing this bipartisan treaty to life and enforcing its rules. America should stand with those who want to destroy chemical weapons, not with those who would defy the international community. I urge every member of the Senate to support the Convention when it comes to a vote next week.

\*\*\*\*\*

Q Mr. President, what is your outlook for ratification of the treaty? And how much of a quid pro quo was there with Senator Helms on reorganizing the State Department? Will the Voice of America still have its autonomy? All of these things are kind of worrisome.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, yes, the Voice of America will still have its independent voice. It will still be the voice of America. There was no linkage.

Senator Helms came to see me personally at the White House last year sometime -- I don't remember when -- and we met up in my office in the residence for an extended period of time, with just a few of his staff members, a few of mine. He was going over his plan for reorganization of the agencies and why he thought it was right. I promised him that I would seriously consider the issue, that I thought there ought to be some reorganization. I had a slightly different take on it. And, actually, since that time, but especially in the last few weeks, we have been working very, very hard to reach a consensus within the administration on an alternative proposal. I think it is warranted and I think it's good on the merits.

I can tell you that there was no linkage between these two issues. I do not expect Senator Helms to vote for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I would be elated if he did. We have, as I said, resolved I think 20 -- to his satisfaction, 27 of the 30 issues that we made.

Q All of this were concessions on your part, weren't they, all the conditions?

THE PRESIDENT: No, all -- well, they were -- I didn't consider them concessions because I agree with them. There is nothing in any of these conditions that I think is bad for the treaty, bad for the system, or bad for the national security. But they do clarify questions that Senator Helms and other senators had about the meaning of the treaty. But they all can be attached to the treaty without in any way undermining its integrity, its fundamental meaning, or its rules of enforcement and inspection -- and that is the critical thing.

So I consider that the things that we've agreed to in good faith are really a tribute to the work that Senator Lott and Senator Helms and Senator Biden and a number of others did to really clarify what this Convention will mean. I think it's a positive thing.

\*\*\*\*\*

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Dear Abolitioners

This piece in "The Scotsman" looks interesting. Does anyone know of the outcome of the New Delhi Meeting - and whether it has any relationship to the NPT PrepComm?

George Farebrother

.....

The Scotsman, Tuesday 8 April

## CALL FOR A BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Sonali Verma

In New Delhi

MORE than 100 non-aligned countries vowed yesterday to press for complete nuclear disarmament and expressed concern over slow progress in pushing through a ban on chemical weapons, an official spokesman said. "It has been agreed that a very strong statement on nuclear disarmament will come out from the New Delhi conference that will focus on the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework," a spokesman for the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) foreign ministers' conference said.

The spokesman, Rakesh Sood, said NAM ministers, who started meeting yesterday in sessions closed to the media, had also called for the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention to be implemented swiftly. "The two countries in the world [the United States and Russia] who have declared that they possess chemical weapons have yet to ratify the treaty," he said.

President Bill Clinton, who signed the pact in 1993, last week launched a drive to steer it through the US senate.

NAM was founded in 1961 as a platform for neutral countries that were not sheltered by military alliances with either superpower.

Last year eight non-aligned nations did not vote in favour of a United Nations treaty aimed at banning nuclear test blasts, saying it was discriminatory and did not commit the nuclear powers - Britain, China, France, Russia and the US - to complete disarmament by a specific deadline.

India and Pakistan say they have no nuclear weapons, but experts say either could quickly assemble the bomb.

This year, arms control talks in Geneva have been deadlocked since the NAM, led by India and Pakistan, demanded the nuclear powers agree to negotiate nuclear disarmament by the year 2020 as a prerequisite to discussions on fissile material production and

land-mines.

NAM's 113 member nations were also pressing for an end to controls over technology exports, curbs which they said were discriminatory and not transparent, Mr Sood said.

The movement is to issue a final statement today when the conference ends. - Reuter

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The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

World Court Project UK George Farebrother, UK Secretary 67,  
Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR Phone & Fax 01323 844  
269, Email [geowcpuk@gn.apc.org](mailto:geowcpuk@gn.apc.org)

Dear Abolitioners

If anyone is interested in setting up Citizens' Roundtables, I am sending two reports, one from Vancouver's experience last year, and one more recent one from Edinburgh. Activists in several towns and cities in the UK are planning Roundtables for later this year. It seems to us an excellent method of taking discussion of the ICJ Advisory Opinion in particular, and nuclear weapons in general, out of the peace movement and into the community. If you want to know more, please contact me.

George Farebrother

## REPORT ON THE ROUNDTABLE ON THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH DOUGLAS ROCHE VANCOUVER, SEPTEMBER 11TH 1996

This report covers the Vancouver meeting of Douglas Roche's 18 city cross-Canada tour sponsored by Project Ploughshares to discuss the abolition of nuclear weapons and the campaign of Abolition 2000. The meeting was convened by End the Arms Race, B.C.'s coordinating peace organization, and was held at Simon Fraser University at Harbour Centre on the afternoon of September 11th, 1996.

### Abstract

The meeting had 25 representatives from a variety of sectors who all shared a commitment to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Key obstacles to nuclear abolition were identified as being Canada's membership in NATO and subordination to U.S. foreign policy, government promotion of the arms trade, and the influence of the nuclear mining and research industries. As well, public complacency, the assault on civil society, and the erosion of the influence of social movements' influence are obstacles to meeting our goal. Public education leading to action was seen as essential to the campaign. Local organizing is needed to educate people and challenge the power structures which maintain authority through militarism and structural violence. The resulting democratization of creating policy of true security will result in the rejection of military based security in favour of security. The abolition of nuclear weapons will logically follow.

### Participants

The organizers targeted community leaders in a variety of sectors to attend the meeting. To this end, nearly 50 invitations were extended to leaders in the sectors of labour, church, education, youth, community organizations, non-governmental organizations with an interest in foreign affairs and/or peace issues, as well as to MPS; MLAS, and City Councillors. About 25 participants from all sectors attended the meeting. Notably, all of the participants had either current or previous involvement in the peace movement, or similar experience working for social justice. It was also noted that while the group was roughly equal in gender, visible

minorities were under represented.

## Level of Discussion

The participants background knowledge of disarmament issues was very high. The briefing on the latest developments in disarmament initiatives was useful, and the discussion quickly moved to strategy development.

. There was some concern expressed, however, that equal participation could be impeded by too much use of special terminology and initials.

## Obstacles to Nuclear Abolition

Participants identified several key Canadian Government policies which need to be addressed: .

**\*\*Membership in nuclear war-fighting alliances such as NATO and NORAD. NATO membership has been consistently cited by the Government as preventing it from taking initiatives on nuclear disarmament and positions independent of U.S. foreign policy. The nuclear war-fighting alliance integrates Canadas military into the U.S.A's military-industrial complex, which subjugates Canadian foreign policy objectives to what the Pentagon considers the U.S.s national security interests.**

**\*\*Government promotion of the arms trade. As an exporter of technologically advanced weapons, Canada contributes to the conventional arms race; This feeds the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and the notion that its a dangerous world, which in turn rationalizes Canadas policy of reliance upon the United States nuclear umbrella**

**\*\*Uranium and nuclear technology exports. This powerful special interest of the mining and nuclear research industries continues to undermine the denuclearization of Canada.**

Other obstacles included: .

**\*\*A lack of awareness or complacency by the public on the nuclear issue since the end of the Cold War.**

**\*\*The putting on the back burner of disarmament issues by social movements.**

**\*\*The weakening of social movements through cutbacks to government programs which are designed to facilitate public participation.**

**\*\*Increase(I poverty, insecurity, and structural violence against individuals to prevent them from working for what are perceived as non-survival issues.**

**\*\*The need for peace and disarmament groups to address the issue of nuclear power and its close relationship with nuclear weapons.**

**\*\*The loss of peace-building mechanisms (e.g. Walk for Peace) and the rollback of government policy gains made during the 1980s.**

### The Need for Public Education

The creation of a body of public opinion which supports the elimination of nuclear weapons was seen as a vital step in the campaign. Public education is seen as essential to creating this body of opinion. Furthermore, it was agreed that educational efforts cannot be solely directed to the unconverted, but should be directed at activists inside and peripheral to the peace movement.

Suggestions for tools for public education included.

**\*\*School speakers**

**\*\*Youth peace conferences**

**\*\*Living-room meeting organizing kits with videos and discussion guides**

**\*\*Lesson aids for teachers.**

The material should present the issue in concrete terms. Where possible, the issue of militarism should be connected with the daily experience of everyday people. It should link other issues of public concern, e.g. the fact that the deficit was created through years of wasteful and unproductive military spending. Further to public education and the creation of a body of supportive public opinion, the public must be encouraged to act upon that knowledge. Subsequent action can take many forms depending upon each individuals circumstances (e.g. letter-writing).

### Challenging Power Structures

Since one of the goals of the Abolition 2000 campaign is to move governments to take measures toward nuclear abolition, the means to influence government policy is obviously central to the campaign. Participants considered the expression of public opinion to government representatives a key means to changing government policy.

However, it was clearly articulated that the current political system, both domestically and internationally, maintains its authority through militarism and other forms of structural violence. Nuclear weapons are the icons of political power and prestige, and are the ultimate expression of militarism. Therefore, the power structures themselves must be challenged in order to achieve nuclear abolition.

For example, Lloyd Axworthy, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was seen by participants to exemplify the ability of power structures to co-opt forces of resistance. Participants consider Lloyd Axworthy, the person, as someone who shares many of their values. However, they consider Lloyd Axworthy, the member of government, as betraying his values through his role in the weakening and elimination of key social programs, his support for recent U.S. cruise missile attacks against Iraq, his silence on nuclear submarine testing at Nanoose Bay, and his departments inability to take a position independent of the Pentagon.

Many participants advocated rebuilding the grassroots resistance to militarism through organizing on the local level. This could take the form of building coalitions between social movements to develop a broader agenda which would include nuclear abolition, or putting our our people iii positions of influence on the local level, such as city council.

### Future Action

The diversity of sectors represented by the various organizations present at the meeting indicates a broad commitment to nuclear abolition in many areas of civil society. While many groups acknowledged that within the past few years they have committed fewer resources to the issue, their commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament remains high.

Because of some of the obstacles faced by social movements[ levels of direct involvement will of course vary according to the ability of the groups. Groups which are directly working on issues of peace and disarmament are supportive of Abolition 2000, and are willing to devote what resources they can to the campaign.

Attendance at the meeting would also indicate that little time should be devoted to organizations, institutions, and individuals that do not hold an open or progressive view on peace and related issues of social justice. The organizational, educational, and political gains made in the 1980s must not be abandoned, nor should Abolition 2000 attempt to re-invent the wheel".

Efforts to educate the public must be continuing activity of the campaign Canadian citizens need to be made aware of the continued existence of huge nuclear arsenals and war fighting doctrine, and Canadas participation and complicity in nuclear militarism.

Furthermore, the goal of nuclear abolition needs to be linked to common experience where possible, as well as other issues where awareness in the public has already been developed. The high educational value of leading by example should be used to demonstrate how nuclear weapons can be resisted. This could point to undertaking public demonstrations of resistance to nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, this education should be focused on action. This can

be accomplished through organizing at the local and grassroots level. Pressure points can be identified, and organizing efforts can then be directed to achieving specific goals. Wherever possible, nuclear abolition should be linked to other social issues to allow supporting social movements to incorporate the issue into their campaigns.

Finally, our ultimate objective will be the democratization of foreign and defence (or security) policy. The resulting redefinition of threats to security will result in a broader public understanding of militarism and how it is the greatest threat to a human-based security. Nuclear abolition, and general disarmament, will be logical extensions of this understanding.

Steven Staples Coordinator End the Arms Race

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LESSONS LEARNT AT THE EDINBURGH ROUND TABLE 13 MARCH 1997

7 - 9.30 pm, Christine Soane

The Edinburgh Set-up

We invited 8 people to be "on" the Rountable. Of these, one was, by choice, the rapporteur, and ex-Clerk of a Quaker meeting, who chose to be only that. One was an invited speaker, an expert of Trident (strategic and tactical -Milan Rai) who was also familiar with the ICJ Advisory Opinion, though not a lawyer.

The occasion was a public meeting at which the first 45 minutes were a talk by Milan - straight information. The next 1= hours was intended to be RT discussion and the final 15 minutes was allocated to the Rapporteur to produce an agreed minute of the meeting.

In practice one RT member withdrew when he discovered the discussion was to be public. Two members failed to turn up because of personal last minute problems. One of the others had not received his briefing papers which had been sent out two weeks in advance! This left 2"informed" members apart from the speaker and the rapporteur. So it was decided to open the RT to the whole meeting and report their findings. The minute produced by the rapporteur is attached. The letter sent subsequently to leaders, political, military, etc is also attached.

The Problems.

Basically the problem is that most people need a lot of information on a) Trident b)the ICJ c) the Advisory Opinion and international law before they feel ready to make a judgment/statement that can carry signatures and influence. Written info beforehand is an option but it needs a lot of motivation to get informed about all these subjects.

Unless they A) understand about the importance of the subject matter and B) the RT process itself, as a new kind of democracy, they may not be prepared to spend the necessary time. So, if one is using this method, it needs careful explanation of these factors A) and B) - probably by personal contact (telephone) before sending the necessary literature.

Spoken info - (as in the Edinburgh RT). Very difficult to achieve all that and a proper discussion and conclusion in the 2= hours. Members who had read Milan Rai's book beforehand said they couldn't have coped with all the information if they hadn't.

A possible alternative would be to have one session (evening, morning of Saturday) on information and questions for a larger number of people than could be one RT, but they were all being briefed for several RTs (a different evening or Saturday afternoon)

We don't think an RT should have more than 15 people (2-3 hours); but they could be held at different times/places subsequently. The initial invitation would be for the double session (1) info, 2) RT).

Information supplied at Edinburgh

- 1) Booklet by WCP on the Implications of the Advisory Opinion.
- 2) Executive summary of the Canadian RT process
- 3) 3 papers by Rupert Ticehurst (lawyer friendly to WCP) written especially

for lay people - one on the legal status of nuclear weapons: one on the nature of Advisory opinions).

4) One A4 sheet summarising recent developments - ICJ; Generals, Canberra Commission, Canadian experience, etc.

5) Milan Rai's book "Tactical Trident" (#3 if not to everyone: discretionary: bought in bulk).

Conclusions

1) People were most impressed with the presentation. Although most of the audience were connected with "peace" issues, they didn't know most of what they were told. This is VERY IMPORTANT. People think they know what they don't know.

Although this didn't really work as an RT, people did realise the possibility of the process and probably wouldn't have done so any other way. We hope the process may snowball - especially after the election.

3) Avoid detailed legal discussion which can confuse and

disempower

The simple ridiculous situation of having a defence system that cannot be used or even threatened lawfully is the real issue. How to respond to such a situation is the real problem. It may need a humorous approach to make it credible and to find creative responses.

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The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

World Court Project UK George Farebrother, UK Secretary 67,  
Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR Phone & Fax 01323 844  
269, Email [geowcpuk@gn.apc.org](mailto:geowcpuk@gn.apc.org)

READ IT -- AND ACT!!!  
UNDERGROUND TESTS A GO

from Tri-Valley CAREs' newsletter "Citizen's Watch", April 1997  
by Marylia Kelley

Following a year's delay, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced it will conduct two "subcritical" underground nuclear tests this year at the Nevada Test Site. The first experiment, code-named Rebound and designed at Los Alamos, is scheduled this June. Holog, the second planned nuke test, is being designed by Livermore Lab and will be detonated in the Fall.

DOE had originally proposed to begin the tests in June 1996, but intense grassroots opposition and international diplomatic pressure stemming from the then-ongoing Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations forced a delay. Tri-Valley CAREs and its colleagues were in the forefront of groups pressing for cancellation of the tests. Our efforts are continuing.

During a phone-in press conference April 4, DOE officials took pains to say the "subcritical" tests are designed to avoid a sustained nuclear chain reaction, and thus are "consistent with the CTBT." At a minimum, these experiments violate the spirit of the treaty, which bans "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." In conjunction with other elements of the U.S. "Stockpile Stewardship" program-such as the National Ignition Facility-these underground tests threaten global acceptance of the treaty, which requires ratification by 44 named countries with nuclear reactors. Moreover, these tests establish the detonation of high explosives next to plutonium as a norm under the treaty.

Numerous groups had urged DOE to conduct independent reviews on two key questions before making a final decision: one review to look at the potential nuclear proliferation implications of the experiments, including their impact on the CTBT; the other on whether the data to be gathered from the tests are truly needed for maintenance of the existing arsenal under safe conditions.

Instead, DOE dodged the "big picture" issues and asked the JASONs, a group that periodically advises the Energy and Defense Departments, to review the much narrower question of whether either of the first two tests could breach criticality. The JASONs said they will not go critical, and volunteered that the experiments would "add valuable information to our database." The JASONs did not demonstrate any pressing necessity for carrying them out. Further, their report adds, "We are not satisfied that the (peer review) process is adequate as a model for future experiments."

During the press conference DOE officials repeatedly refused to say how many additional tests are planned. However, the Fiscal Year 1998 budget request, submitted to Congress last February, lists four more tests next year: Icebound, Ash, Boomerang and Beech. Each will cost upwards of \$15 to \$20 million, according to DOE.

The agency did disclose some details regarding the first two experiments. Rebound will include three simultaneous blasts each involving about a pound

of plutonium and up to 81 pounds of high explosives. The plutonium will be compressed to about 2.3 megabars (1 megabar is 1 million atmospheres). The designers dubbed these blasts Larry, Moe and Curly.

Holog will involve two simultaneous blasts. The amounts of plutonium and high explosives will be significantly less than Rebound as the data gathered will be for a different purpose. Rebound measures equation of state, Holog ejecta. In other words, Holog will provide detailed data on the ejection (e.g. shards) of plutonium in a bomb during detonation. So, are we really to believe that having ever more of this particular knowledge is required to passively caretake a weapon as it awaits dismantlement?

DOE press packet on request.

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More Chicanery ...

## COOKING THE NUMBERS FOR THE NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

from Tri-Valley CAREs' newsletter "Citizen's Watch", April 1997

by Paul Carroll and Marylia Kelley

To promote the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the DOE has made exaggerated technical claims and concocted spurious justifications for the \$1.2 billion machine. Now DOE is appealing to pocketbooks (and, by extension, politicians).

In two studies conducted for DOE-one by Argonne National Laboratory, itself a DOE facility-inaccuracies, flawed methods, and outright bias result in grossly exaggerated claims of new employment and regional economic growth. William Weida, a professor of economics at The Colorado College, has written a report critiquing the two studies, which are titled: "Impacts Assessment for the National Ignition Facility" (by Bay Area Economics) and "Technical Documentation in Support of the Draft-Specific Analysis for Construction and Operation of the National Ignition Facility" (the Argonne report).

The problems with both reports are numerous, but the bottom line is that estimates of job creation and the boosts to area economies in California are grossly overstated for the NIF. In fact, Weida calls the Bay Area Economics report "fatally flawed" and says the Argonne study "appear(s) to be designed to exaggerate NIF's regional economic impact on California and to depress the same impacts in New Mexico." The underlying purpose of cooking the books was to support the decision to site NIF at Livermore Lab rather than elsewhere (or nowhere).

The studies are essentially castles made in the sand. They base a variety of estimates and calculations on faulty baseline assumptions. One problem is that they base calculations on NIF budgets without first taking out the funds that will be spent outside of the country. The NIF program has been sold as an international effort and the fact that money will be spent overseas is often pointed out by its champions. Another problem is that the studies use arbitrary "economic impact regions" that have no relationship to the accepted economic Regions of Impact used by the Department of Commerce. In fact, the Argonne report attempts to predict impacts in areas hundreds of miles from the Livermore site, while- for the Los Alamos and Sandia Labs in New Mexico-the study cuts the other way, gerrymandering what would normally be areas associated with those Labs out of the economic impact equations. Lastly, inaccurate figures are used to calculate direct and "induced" employment. For example, the Argonne report counts workers from other labs as having an impact on the NIF's local economic area. As Weida points out, these short-term workers will be spending their pay in their home areas. By including workers in a regional impact model who do not live in the region the model inflates employment predictions.

When all is said and done, the errors in the two studies serve to inflate potential economic and employment benefits. It would be easy to argue against the two studies given their poor economics, but what is even more damning to NIF is the fact that DOE has to put forth dreamed-up economic

benefits as a reason to support what is supposedly an obviously essential project. Each successive argument seems to get weaker. . .

Marylia Kelley

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## Chemical Weapons Treaty In Peril, Democrats Fear Clinton Says U.S. Risks Joining 'Pariah Nations'

By John F. Harris and Helen Dewar  
Washington Post Staff Writers  
Saturday, April 19 1997; Page A01  
The Washington Post

President Clinton warned yesterday that the United States will be "joining the company of pariah nations" like Iraq and Libya if the Senate refuses next week to ratify a treaty banning chemical weapons. Democratic congressional leaders fretted that passage is in serious jeopardy.

After weeks of White House lobbying simply to assure the global treaty gets to the Senate floor Thursday for a vote, Democrats said there is a strong chance they and the administration will be thwarted in their effort to garner the two-thirds majority needed for ratification.

"My assessment is that there is a 50-50 chance we can pass the treaty next week -- no better than that," Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) told reporters. "Clearly this is not in the bag yet. We've got a long way to go, and I'm very concerned about it."

The Chemical Weapons Convention, already ratified by 72 nations, goes into effect on April 29 with or without U.S. approval. Clinton said if the United States doesn't pass the treaty by then it risks both sanctions and embarrassment on the world stage.

"The bottom line is this," Clinton told reporters in an impromptu afternoon appearance at the White House briefing room. "Will the United States join a treaty we helped to shape, or will we go from leading the fight against poison gas to joining the company of pariah nations this treaty seeks to isolate?"

Several Democrats and administration officials said Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) will be pivotal in the outcome. Many of the Republicans who have yet to take a public stand have told Clinton they are waiting to see how Lott votes, according to administration officials. He has not taken a side but has criticized parts of the pact.

The administration reached agreement with Lott and others on 28 conditions for ratification. They include key ones requiring search warrants before inspectors can demand entry to a U.S. facility, and preserving the right of U.S. troops to use tear gas in some situations.

But four other conditions sought by Republicans are regarded by the administration as "killers." One, favored by Lott, would require renegotiating the treaty to drop a provision aimed at expanding exchange of information on chemical weapons defenses and technology.

Many of Clinton's remarks were aimed at defeating the amendments -- included in the resolution of ratification -- that will be voted on next week prior to a final vote on the treaty.

The president said Lott and others "misread" the treaty if they think it requires the United States to share chemical defensive technology with U.S. foes such as Cuba and Iran if the latter join the Chemical Weapons Convention. If such nations are ever subject to chemical attack, Clinton said he has committed to the Senate that U.S. assistance would be limited to emergency medical supplies.

The president also took aim at Republican demands that the United States not join the treaty until certain other countries join including Russia and "rogue states" like Iraq and Libya. U.S. refusal to join the treaty would only embolden Moscow "hard-liners" who oppose the pact, and would limit U.S. ability to crack down on Iraq and Libya with trade restrictions.

Clinton pleaded with Republicans not to "impose an unrealistically high standard of verification" on the treaty.

Although all Democrats are considered likely to vote for the treaty, Republicans have estimated there are as many as 17 undecided GOP senators.

With Democrats providing 45 of the 67 votes needed for approval of the pact, at least 22 of the 55 Republicans will have to support the treaty for it to be passed. No reliable nose counts have yet been taken on the GOP side, senators have said.

Clinton on Thursday decided to reorganize the nation's foreign affairs bureaucracy by bringing three independent agencies -- the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- under the control of the Secretary of State. The USIA and the arms control agency eventually are to be merged into the State Department altogether.

Some administration officials have said this was done in part to streamline the bureaucracy, but also to accommodate a long-standing desire of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). Helms is the most influential opponent of the chemical weapons treaty, but he agreed this week not to block it from a vote on the floor.

Clinton said he discussed reorganization with Helms in a meeting last year in the White House residence but asserted there was "no linkage" between that and the chemical weapons treaty. Helms, he noted, is still virtually certain to vote against it.

The administration said it is targeting its campaign on Lott. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in a brief interview, said she met Thursday with Lott and he said to her, "Guess what? I got a call this morning at 7 o'clock from [George] Bush and [Gerald] Ford telling me that I should vote for it." That was exactly the message she asked the two Republican former presidents to deliver when she met them earlier this week in Grand Rapids, Mich.

Staff writer Thomas W. Lippman contributed to this report.

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\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT [igc.apc.org](http://igc.apc.org) \$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$

April 18, 1997

TO: friends and colleagues

FR: Daryl Kimball

RE: goodbye and hello

After having the privilege of working with you as a member of the staff of Physicians for Social Responsibility since 1989, I am moving on to become the Executive Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Beginning May 6, I can be reached at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 110 Maryland Avenue NE, #201, Washington, DC 20002 (Phone: 202-546-0795). The Coalition was formed in late 1995 and has been chaired by Joe Cirincione and has been hosted by the Henry L. Stimson Center. The Coalition is moving its offices this month and will now be hosted by the Council for a Livable World Education Fund.

In my new job, I will be responsible for coordinating and leading the work of the Coalition's 17 member organizations (including PSR) on the most immediate and pressing nuclear arms control and disarmament issues of the day, including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban, achieving deeper cuts in nuclear stockpiles leading to their elimination, stopping deployment of national ballistic missile defense ("Star Wars"), and securing "loose nukes" in Russia. For more info. about the Coalition, see our Website at < <http://www.stimson/coalition/index.html> >

I leave with enormous fondness, respect and appreciation for the many, many people with whom I have had the opportunity to work -- especially the many folks at PSR, IPPNW and the Military Production Network. Together we have accomplished many important successes that have made our planet a bit safer and more secure. To those of you who I will not (for now) have the chance to work as closely with as before, please keep up your excellent work and thank you for guidance and support.

Filling my position as Director of PSR's Security Programs will be Bob Tiller, who has worked for many years with the American Baptist Churches organization and has been an active member of the "Monday Lobby" community of peace, arms control, and social justice groups. Bob will begin work on April 21 and can be reached at 202-898-0150 x 220. Bob will be working with the program's Organizer/Research Assistant, Lisa Ledwidge (x222) who will remain here at PSR to continue her excellent work with the membership, chapters, coalition partners on our key nuclear weapons-related issues.

I look forward to continuing our work together in my new role.  
See you soon. DK

f:\users\daryl\goodbye.gen



PSR and other arms control supporters are working to ensure that the Senate will endorse this historic ban on poison gas by April 29, but your help is essential to securing Senate support for the CWC, where a two-thirds majority (67) vote is needed for ratification. PLEASE HELP NOW.

\*\*\* WHAT YOU CAN DO \*\*\*

\* Send a fax or telegram to your Senators to 1) schedule a vote and 2) vote Yes on the CWC. Tell them to oppose all killer amendments, substitutes or alternatives to the treaty.

\* Make your position-- and your Senator s-- known publicly: write a letter to the editor of your local paper. For more information contact Lisa at PSR.

<> Other Updates and Actions <>

Nuclear Waste Bill Passes Senate, 65-34

Bad news: Yesterday the U.S. Senate passed S.104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997, by a vote of 65-34. Good news: The margin is not sufficient to override a promised Presidential veto (in the event that similar legislation passes the House). Congratulations and thank you to all of you who helped secure the 34 votes needed to sustain a veto.

S.104 would allow construction and operation of a "temporary" nuclear waste storage facility adjacent to Yucca Mountain in Nevada and would open the door to unprecedented volumes of high-level nuclear waste transportation. PSR and other environmental and citizens groups strongly oppose S.104 because it would exempt nuclear waste from most environmental laws, set radiation release standards far higher than any other standard, and send nuclear waste on the nation s highways and railways with minimal protections for local communities.

Action is now shifting to the House of Representatives. Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI) last week introduced the House version of the bill, HR 1270. Last year, the House bill (then HR 1020) had some 180 cosponsors. So far this year, it has about 40. Hearings on the House bill are expected later this month.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

\* If your Senators voted against S.104 (reply to ledwidge@psr.org for the list), send them a note of thanks. If they voted for the bill, express to them your disappointment.

\* Write, call, fax and e-mail your Representative. Urge them to oppose HR 1270. Ask them to not sign up as a co-sponsor and to oppose the bill. For more information contact Lisa at PSR.

## Clinton and Yeltsin Make Progress on Further Nuclear Arms Cuts

At their March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin reached agreement on a number of nuclear arms reduction points, including beginning bilateral negotiations for deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals. The leaders agreed that START III, the third round of strategic arms reduction talks, would include reducing each side's strategic nuclear warheads to 2000-2500 by 2008 and new transparency measures relating to the destruction of warheads.

This is an important step for arms control and disarmament, made possible thanks to a strong grassroots effort. Your calls and letters to Congress, the White House, and the media created the political atmosphere necessary for the President to take the steps he did on a START III framework agreement. Rep. Elizabeth Furse (D-OR) and Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA) should also be applauded for generating Congressional support for START III.

But despite the apparent success of the summit, we must be cognizant of its challenges and pitfalls. Before START III progresses, the U.S. and Russia must break the current deadlock over Russian ratification of START II. They must resolve growing tension over NATO expansion. Also, further arms reductions and related issues-- ballistic missile defense and amending START II to allow the Duma more time to ratify, as examples-- may be challenged in the Republican-led U.S. Congress.

We must simultaneously support the President's important achievements reached during the Helsinki summit; work to ensure a good START III agreement; and press for negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons. PSR will send a letter to President Clinton calling for immediate action on START III. To ease tensions over NATO expansion, PSR will also press the U.S. to provide written guarantees that no nuclear weapons will be stationed in the proposed new NATO countries in Central or Eastern Europe.

### WHAT YOU CAN DO

\* If your Representative and/or Senators signed the Murray or Furse START III letter to Pres. Clinton (reply to [ledwidge@psr.org](mailto:ledwidge@psr.org) for a copy), thank them for their leadership and urge them to do whatever they can to expedite progress on START III.

\* Write a letter to the editor of your local paper. Thank Pres. Clinton for guiding the U.S. and Russia toward an agreement that will reduce the number of nuclear weapons and also destroy warheads.

\* Introduce a resolution to your state or local medical association endorsing the elimination of nuclear weapons. For how-to information, contact Trevor or Lisa at PSR.

\* Get a 'START Moving' Action Kit, a packet of post-Summit information and action steps. To order, email [disarmament@igc.org](mailto:disarmament@igc.org).

### PSR and Other Groups Notify DOE of Intent to Reopen Lawsuit

The national office of PSR and the Colorado, New Mexico, New York City and San Francisco Bay Area chapters have joined 27 other groups in notifying the Department of Energy of their intent to reopen a 1989 lawsuit which forced the DOE to pledge to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its plans to rebuild U.S. nuclear weapons facilities. DOE has proposed a robust \$40 billion "Stockpile Stewardship and Management" program, which involves rebuilding U.S. nuclear weapons facilities to ensure that U.S. nuclear weapons work as they are supposed to. However, the DOE has failed to properly evaluate alternatives to the proposed plan and inappropriately excludes analysis of many recently constructed facilities. This violates the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). For more information see the enclosed press release or contact Lisa at PSR.

### Subcritical Nuclear Experiments Announced

This week the U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE) announced it will conduct a series of underground, "subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments at the Nevada Test Site that have been strongly opposed by PSR. The first subcritical experiment is scheduled for June 1997 with a second experiment later this fall. Additional subcritical experiments are also planned. PSR strongly opposes the subcritical experiments because they are not necessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal and undermine the goal of implementing the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The announcement comes on the eve of an international meeting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that will convene in New York from April 7 to April 18. PSR is calling for the immediate cancellation of the experiments. The high international political and non-proliferation costs far outweigh the dubious technical utility of the experiments.

### Accident at Japanese Nuclear Waste Facility

On March 11, a fire and explosion struck Japan's only nuclear waste reprocessing plant. The accident occurred in Tokai, a Pacific coast town 70 miles northeast of Tokyo and was dubbed Japan's worst nuclear accident. 37 workers were exposed to radiation, although far below levels that would be harmful according to plant managers. Some radioactive materials, including plutonium, escaped into the atmosphere and were detected as far as 23 miles away, though at levels that the government insisted posed no danger. Schools and an old people's home are located two miles from the complex. The Tokai plant handles about 12% of Japan's spent fuel, with the rest sent to France or Britain for reprocessing. For more information, contact Lisa at PSR or Larry Yates of the Nuclear Waste Citizens

Coalition, 703-553-4440 or <lamaryates@igc.apc.org>. Now available: "Reprocessing," new in the 'Facing Reality' series. Contact PSR to order.

Brookhaven No Threat to Public Health, Say Authorities

Federal officials and the Suffolk County Health Department agree that a 68,000-gallon pool of highly radioactive water at Brookhaven National Laboratory is spreading tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, through the ground toward a nearby residential area. They also agree that the leak, up to 14 gallons of radioactive water a day, poses no foreseeable public health threat to residents near the Long Island NY nuclear facility. To stem the spread, the lab intends to pump the radioactive water into a basin near the center of the lab's property. However, officials say it will take another year to remove the spent fuel rods from the leaking pool during which time it will continue to leak. The U.S. government is expected to spend up to \$300 million in Superfund money to clean up widespread contamination at the site and more than \$10 million to provide public water hook-ups to 1,320 homes. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato and Rep. Michael Forbes have called for a congressional investigation of management practices at the lab.

Brookhaven's problems are not unique among U.S. nuclear weapons complex facilities. Leaky nuclear fuel pools, potentially explosive tanks, and contaminated groundwater are among the dangers at sites throughout the complex threatening public health and the environment. For more information contact Lisa at PSR or Herb Perr MD of PSR/Nassau County NY 516-766-4741.

Radioactive Water Spill at Savannah River Site

More than 20 gallons of plutonium-contaminated water spilled on the ground March 8 at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, S.C. No injuries were reported. Workers were filling a tank with a cement-like material when the water began flowing out the top. Workers had not used a rod to check for water and failed to use a kit designed to contain spills. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., which runs the complex for the Energy Department, covered the area with a plastic tarp until a cleanup decision can be made. For more info contact Lisa at PSR.

U.S. Settles With Radiation Test Victims

The White House announced last month it had reached settlements totaling \$6.5 million with families of 16 known victims who were injected with plutonium or uranium in Cold War government-sponsored experiments and moved to prevent people from being exploited again by government research. The White House ordered new rules for secret research that require scientists to obtain informed consent from potential subjects, disclose identities of the sponsoring agency, and tell subjects that the test is classified. The rules also require the head of an agency conducting secret human research to approve each project, and

require permanent records of the secret experiments. Sen. John Glenn (D-OH) intends to introduce similar legislation to the U.S. Senate requiring informed consent. The Clinton administration also said it will ask Congress for \$50 million over 15 years and changes in the law to compensate 600 uranium miners or their families eligible for compensation for exposure to cancer-causing radiation in the government's nuclear weapons program. In addition,

### Staff Changes at DOE

Federico Pena was confirmed on March 12 by a vote of 99 to 1. Sen. Rod Grams (R-MN) was the only Senator to vote against him because he felt Pena had not shown he would do enough to resolve the nuclear waste issue. Pena was sworn in as Energy Secretary March 21. . . Undersecretary Thomas Grumbly announced his resignation from the DOE to become the vice president of ICF Kaiser International Inc, an engineering, construction and environmental cleanup firm. PSR and other environmental and citizens groups will miss his presence in DOE as he was considered an ally on many of our issues. . . . Utilities are reportedly pushing for Charlie Curtis, Deputy Secretary, to stay on. It is possible that he will stay to ensure a smooth transition, and then leave. . . . Former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary has been appointed to chair the Keystone Energy Board, part of the non-profit Keystone Center scientific, public policy and educational organization. . . . Elwood (Elgie) Holstein will be Pena's Chief of Staff. He comes from the National Economic Council and has an extensive background on nuclear waste issues, including working for Nye County, Nevada in the past. He is reported to be somewhat of an ally on these issues. . . . Dan Reicher, former chief of staff, has stayed on as senior policy advisor. . . . Elizabeth Montoya, now in White House personnel, will be the Deputy Chief of Staff. She formerly worked at Los Alamos National Lab. . . . Brooke Anderson, formerly press secretary for David Skaggs (D-CO), will be director for public affairs. . . DOE aides Anna Pulido and Leigh Slaughter, formerly in the policy and general counsel's office, respectively, will move to Pena's personal staff. . . . John Angell and Tom Vellenga, ex-aides to former White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, will become senior policy advisors to Pena. . . . Madeline Creedon, Assoc. Deputy Secretary for National Security Programs, has returned to work for Congress as minority counsel for Senate Armed Services Committee. She previously worked for the Armed Services before coming to DOE.

### <> Opportunities <>

Come to D.C. Days 1997, April 27-30

Military Production Network's D.C. Days is one of the best opportunities to voice your views at the federal level and to network with people working on issues like nuclear testing,

disarmament, radiation safety, nuclear waste disposal and environmental cleanup. Come join activists from around the country April 27-30 in Washington, D.C. for training, networking, and meetings with Congressional and Administration officials on major national and global security issues. Your participation in D.C. Days will make a difference. A limited number of stipends are available (and going fast) to PSR members and chapters. For more information contact Lisa at PSR, 202-898-0150 x222 or <ledwidge@psr.org>. (P.S. Washington is beautiful in the springtime!)

### Bring a Special Public Education Event to Your Area!

The Military Production Network has developed an engaging and informative slide presentation, "Nuclear Weapons at the Crossroads: Which Path Will We Take?," to educate and activate citizens about key nuclear weapons issues. So far, PSR chapters in New Mexico, New York, Colorado and San Francisco have agreed to host or cohost the Roadshow in their community this summer or fall. The very first Roadshow presentation will be given April 19 at the Student PSR conference in Chicago. To find out how you can bring this interesting and action-oriented event to your community, contact Janna Rolland, 206-729-7957 or <jannarolland@igc.apc.org>. For information about PSR chapter stipends available to help bring the event to your community, contact Lisa at PSR, 202-898-0150 x222 or <ledwidge@psr.org>.

### Oppose U.S. Arms Trade to Dictators and Human Rights Abusers

Help keep U.S. weapons out of the hands of dictators and human rights abusers: join arms control, disarmament, human rights, labor, religious and veterans organizations in a national campaign to support the Arms Trade Code of Conduct. Cosponsored in the U.S. House of Representatives by Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), the Code of Conduct would bar arms sales to governments that are non-democratic, human rights abusers, or that do not comply with international arms control agreements. A vote on the Code is expected in the House International Relations Committee in mid-April.

Now is the time to press our leaders to actively support the Code. A 6-page **Activist Pack** is available to help you and your chapter elevate the Code of Conduct message with leaders in your state. Use it to educate your congressperson, community, and media about the Code of Conduct. If you would like to take action on this issue, contact Lisa at PSR.

### Military Budget Project Available to PSR Chapters and Activists

PSR member Harris Peck MD has collaborated with the Center for Defense Information to produce **The Military Budget and You**, a project for PSR members, chapters and activists designed to raise the level of public awareness on the impact of Congressional funding of unneeded weapons. Project materials include: an

outline of the project; information on conducting meetings that lead to social action; and, the CDI video *The Defense Budget and You*, to be aired on public TV stations throughout the country in late April. For more information on how you, your chapter and community can use this resource, contact Lisa at PSR or Dr. Peck at 914-235-7286.

◊ Grassroots News ◊

#### PSR/IPPNW Delegation Attends NPT Prep Com

Cathy Falvo MD of PSR/NYC, Ellen Barfield of PSR/Baltimore, and Lisa Ledwidge of the national office joined representatives of IPPNW in New York to meet with United Nations delegates to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee. They communicated PSR concerns and recommendations to NPT delegates. For more information, contact Lisa at PSR.

#### California Medical Association Adopts Resolution

Last month the California Medical Association House of Delegates adopted a resolution endorsing the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The resolution was modified from a nuclear weapons abolition resolution introduced by PSR/San Francisco Bay Area President Bob Gould MD. The CMA joins a growing number of local, state and national medical organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, the American Public Health Association, the Massachusetts Medical Association and others, that have officially endorsed the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction. For information on how to introduce a resolution in your medical society, contact Trevor or Lisa at PSR.

#### PSR Chapter To Co-Host Southeast Citizen Summit

Western N. Carolina PSR will co-sponsor a citizen summit April 25-27 in Black Mtn., N.C. on "The Nuclear Threat to Our Health, Environment, and Future." PSR past-president Helen Caldicott MD will be the keynote speaker. The conference will also feature plenaries and workshops on nuclear waste and transportation; nuclear power, safety and decommissioning; Dept. of Energy plans for the Savannah River and Oak Ridge sites; and the nuclearization of space. For more information, contact Lew Patrie MD, PSR/Western NC, 704-299-1242.

◊ Calendar ◊

Apr 18-20 Student PSR National Conference, Chicago

Apr 22 Earth Day

- Apr 24 Senate vote on Chemical Weapons Convention  
(estimate)
- Apr 25-27 PSR Southeast Regional Conference & Citizen  
Summit, near Asheville NC
- Apr 25-27 Earth Day Gathering at Ward Valley, CA, proposed  
low-level radioactive waste dump (For info contact  
Willard Osibin MD, PSR/San Luis Obispo 805-434-  
1421 <wosibin@igc.apc.org>)
- Apr 27-30 Military Production Network "D.C. Days." Call PSR  
to participate.
- Apr 29 Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force
- May 2-4 PSR Board of Directors meeting, Washington DC
- May 2-4 National Summit on People of Color &  
Disenfranchised Communities and Health Effects,  
Gulfport Mississippi (912-233-0907 for info)
- May 3 Midwest Conference on High Level Nuclear Waste  
Transport, South Bend IN (For info contact Nuclear  
Information Resource Service 202-328-0002)
- May 23-27 National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict  
Resolution, Pittsburgh PA. For more information  
contact Linda Baron at 703-993-2440.
- May 24-Jun 1 Congress Memorial Day recess
- Jun 20-22 Summit of the Eight (formerly G-7) Economic  
Summit, Denver
- Jun 20-22 The Other Economic Summit ("People's Summit"),  
Denver
- Jun 28-Jul 6 Congress July 4th recess
- Jul 8-9 NATO Summit, Madrid

<> Resources <>

(New or updated security program-related resources. Contact PSR  
for a complete list or refer to past Monthly Updates.)

- . PSR Press Release, 4/4/97: Arms Control Group Blasts Clinton  
Administration Decision to Conduct Underground Nuclear Weapons  
Experiments in Nevada
- . NEW! PSR Monitor: "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" (4/97)
- . IPPNW Statement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
Preparatory Committee Meeting (4/97)

. Helsinki Summit followup information, Disarmament Clearinghouse  
(4/97)

. Reprocessing: The US Dept. of Energy s Wasteful, Dangerous  
Scheme to Resume Plutonium Separation, latest in Facing Reality  
series. To order contact 805-962-1707. \$2 ea. (2/97)

. Military Spending Briefing Book, Council for a Livable World,  
et al (3/97)

. Arms Control Briefing Book, Council for a Livable World, et al  
(3/97)

<> HOW TO REACH US <>

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Excerpts from AP story on CWC 4/22. 17:51 EST

"Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-NY announced his support for the accord, calling it 'the most effective mechanism to assure control of chemical weapons and assure their destruction.' D'Amato said in an interview he had no idea how many Republicans would support the treaty, which requires two-thirds majority vote."

Full story tomorrow.

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1. "U.S. must support chemical-weapons treaty," Leonard Cole, letter to the Editor, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 4/22
2. "Five Amendments to Dominate Debate," Pat Towell, Congressional Quarterly, 4/21

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The Philadelphia Inquirer  
Tuesday, April 22, 1997  
Letters to the Editor

U.S. must support the chemical-weapons treaty

Charles Krauthammer's screed against the chemical-weapons treaty suffers from non sequiturs ("This treaty will do nothing to stop rogue states from producing chemical weapons," April 14).

First, he praises Rolf Ekeus for his work as head of the United Nations commission that has been destroying Iraq's poison weapons. Then he portrays Ekeus' work as a failure because Iraq may be hiding some chemicals. He follows with the leap that the United States should not support the chemical-weapons treaty because we will be lulled into a false sense of security about Iraq and other rogue states.

Contrary to Krauthammer's implication, Ekeus and most other observers judge the U.N. effort in Iraq on the whole a success. Nor could one guess from Krauthammer's article that Ekeus is also an unabashed supporter of the chemical-weapons treaty.

The U.N. commission's monitoring has ensured that if there is any cheating, it is so minimal as to be militarily insignificant. Indeed, no one now considers Iraq's chemicals a serious threat. The Iraqi experience has proven the value of a variety of verification measures provided in the treaty.

The paradox is that the United States is destroying its chemical weapons anyway, and the treaty would only get others to do the same. If we do not join, we will be sending a terrible message -- that we do not much care if others develop arsenals of poison gas.

Leonard A. Cole

Ridgewood

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Congressional Quarterly  
April 21, 1997  
Five Amendments To Dominate Debate

By Pat Towell, CQ Staff Writer

Five contentious amendments are likely to take up most of the Senate debate on a resolution approving the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The amendments are among 33 "understandings" that Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., has attached to the resolution. The treaty itself cannot be amended. Backers of the treaty vigorously oppose all five and insist that they either would keep the United States out of the treaty by making ratification contingent on conditions that could not be met, or would make the treaty unworkable. The Senate will vote on whether to remove each of the five.

Opponents of the treaty have emphasized one amendment in particular that would require the treaty to be renegotiated to change two provisions which, they say, would have the effect of fostering, rather than restraining, the spread of chemical weapons.

One of these provisions, Article X, gives countries that sign the treaty "the right to request and . . . to receive" from other signatories assistance against chemical attack, including anti-chemical defenses. Moreover, the provision obliges countries "to facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange" of chemical defense equipment and technologies.

Critics read that as a requirement that the United States turn over its most effective chemical defenses to potential foes such as Cuba or Iran, which then could figure out how to circumvent the defenses.

However, supporters of the pact insist that the obligation to provide assistance could be satisfied by providing medical help and humanitarian relief to countries that face a chemical weapons threat. Moreover, they argue, the requirement for the "fullest possible" exchange of technology is a big enough loophole to meet U.S. needs.

"We obviously will not find it 'possible' -- let alone legal -- to share technologies that could compromise our security," John D. Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in an April 7 speech.

A second debate surrounds the chemical treaty's Article XI, which prohibits "restrictions . . . which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes."

This provision, the critics insist, will be cited by other countries as a requirement to disband the so-called Australia Group, an organization through which the major chemical exporting countries coordinate their export control policies to make it harder for rogue states to assemble the wherewithal to develop chemical weapons.

But treaty advocates counter that, by Article XI's own terms, the prohibition on trade restraints is subordinated to the treaty's prohibition on assisting any country's chemical weapons program. While the government of Iran interprets the provision the same way as the U.S. treaty opponents, the governments of the United States and all other members of the Australia Group have declared that they see no conflict between the treaty and their export control policies.

On both issues, Helms and senior committee Democrat Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware have worked out compromise understandings.

The compromise dealing with Article X would prohibit any U.S. chemical defense assistance for hostile countries except medical antidotes. The Article XI understanding would stipulate that the governments of the United States and every other member of the Australia Group view that organization as consistent with the treaty provision.

Nevertheless, Helms is insisting on an additional understanding that would suspend U.S. ratification until the treaty is renegotiated to amend the two articles to reflect the Clinton administration's interpretation of them. Given the exigencies of getting agreement among the more than 162 countries that have signed the treaty, that would kill the pact, administration officials insist.

#### OTHER UNRESOLVED AMENDMENTS

The Senate also will vote on four other contested understandings. One of them would require that U.S. ratification not be formalized until the pact is ratified by certain states that are believed to have chemical weapons. A second would defer U.S. ratification until Russia has ratified the pact and complied with two U.S.-Russia chemical weapons reduction agreements signed during the Bush administration. Treaty critics believe a debate on these proposals would underscore their contention that the pact is not global, thus deflating what they see as the overblown claims made on its behalf.

On the other hand, supporters contend that the treaty will impede the chemical arms programs of non-signatory states by cutting them off from trade in certain chemicals and by reinforcing a global norm against chemical weapons which will make it easier to mobilize political and economic pressure against the hold-outs.

A third proposed understanding that will be voted on separately would require the president to certify that U.S. intelligence agencies have "high confidence" that they could detect within a year if a country acquired a metric ton or more of a chemical weapons agent, and that U.S. agencies also could detect a pattern of minor violations over time.

The administration concedes it cannot meet that standard but insists that the treaty will be valuable even if it can only be policed to the less exacting standard U.S. agencies say they can meet: that they can detect a systematic effort by an adversary to equip its army to wage chemical warfare.

The last contested understanding would oblige U.S. presidents always to object to the inclusion of anyone from certain pariah states in an inspection team bound for U.S. territory. The treaty already gives any country the right to bar any inspector on a case-by-case basis. Biden argues that a U.S. policy of objecting to inspectors from certain nations likely would provoke retaliatory black-listing, eliminating any chance of letting U.S. experts get a first-hand look at potential trouble spots.

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SEE WHERE THEY STAND: MAJOR CWC INFORMATION  
RESOURCE NOW AVAILABLE

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The Stimson Center has tallied the organizations that have taken sides concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is awaiting a Senate vote. This list of CWC supporters and opponents, and a wealth of other information about the convention, can be found at:

<http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/cwc/>.

This compilation shows a marked disparity between the large number of organizations backing the convention and the comparatively smaller number counseling against its ratification.

The convention-submitted for the Senate's consideration in November 1993-will outlaw the development, production, transfer, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) has stated his intent to schedule a vote on the Convention in April, but has not committed to a specific date. The treaty will enter into force on April 29th.

A handful of organizations have come out against the U.S.-designed accord, including the Heritage Foundation, the Wall Street Journal, and the Center for Security Policy. Individuals who have announced their opposition include former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, columnist George Will, and former Defense Secretaries Caspar Weinberger, Donald Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger, and Richard Cheney.

In contrast, dozens of newspapers, national organizations, and chemical companies have stated their support for the treaty. Among the Convention's champions are the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the New York Times, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the American Chemical Society, the Washington Post, Dow Chemical Company, the Anti-Defamation League, Ashland Chemical Company, the Vietnam Veterans of America, and USA Today.

George Bush and James A. Baker, III also headline the list of the Convention's advocates.

Additionally, a recent opinion poll conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide and the Mellman Group shows that 84% of Americans support the treaty, while 13% oppose it.

1. "Chemical Warfare Vote Is Key Test For Lott and GOP," Roll Call, Morton Kondracke, 4/21
2. "Close Senate Vote on CWC Treaty Expected," The Washington Times, Joyce Price 4/21
3. "Clinton Seeks Votes to Pass Arms Treaty," The New York Times, Steve Erlanger, 4/21
4. "Perspectives on Chemical Weapons, Op-ed," Admiral William Crowe, The Los Angeles Times, 4/21

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Roll Call  
Commentary  
April 21, 1997

Pennsylvania Avenue

## Chemical Warfare Vote Is Key Test For Lott and GOP

By Morton M. Kondracke

A huge ideological struggle is under way over the Chemical Weapons Convention that may decide whether superhawks or moderates dominate the Republican party's foreign policy -- and which group Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) will join.

Potential 2000 GOP presidential candidates are lining up on the issue, with Jack Kemp and Steve Forbes joining the hawks and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz) and former Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell helping lead the moderates.

The CWC is scheduled for a vote in the Senate this week, with a group of 33 undeclared Republicans -- led by Lott -- holding the balance in determining whether the US joins the rest of the civilized world in declaring a ban on chemical weapons.

All 45 Senate Democrats and eight Republicans are expected to support the treaty, leaving the Clinton Administration 14 votes short of the two-thirds necessary to pass the Senate.

With President Clinton making daily calls to Lott and others, Administration vote counters figured last week that 11 GOP Senators were leaning in favor of the treaty, 12 were genuinely undecided, and ten were leaning against, three of whom were considered persuadable.

The opposition is led by former Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, who is trying to convince Republicans that the CWC is to the late-1990s GOP what the Panama Canal Treaty was in the late 1970s for the party -- the key to victory for future presidential contenders as it was for Ronald Reagan.

Actually, a better parallel is a Democratic one. In the 1970s, extreme doves forced presidential candidates in the aftermath of the Vietnam War trauma to oppose nearly every new weapons system and military involvement and to support such wrong-headed ideas as the nuclear freeze.

As a consequence, the Democratic party came to be viewed as unreliable on defense and foreign policy issues, helping to doom such Democratic nominees as Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis.

Republicans now are in danger of reacting to the end of the Cold War in an extremist way that mirrors the Democrats after Vietnam. Superhawks want to sustain a sense of high-alert and are looking for new enemies to do so. That partly accounts for the tendency of hawk Republicans to make China, certainly a difficult country, into America's new strategic adversary. It is definitely behind the anti-CWC campaign.

Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) is the Congressional point man on superhawk politics, roughly equivalent to ex-Sen. George McGovern (SD) or ex-Sen. Alan Cranston (Calif) on the Democratic side.

On CWC, the hawks have gained the support of such luminaries as former United Nations Ambassador Jeane

Kirkpatrick and former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger, Dick Cheney, Cap Weinberger, and Don Rumsfeld.

The pro-CWC side is also impressively led, by former Presidents George Bush and Gerald Ford, all living former Secretaries of State, and all former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The 1996 GOP standard-bearer, Bob Dole, said during the campaign that he had "serious doubts" about the treaty, but hasn't spoken on it since. Former Vice President Dan Quayle, a contender for 2000, also has been silent.

The hawks basically contend that because the treaty cannot guarantee that a "rogue" nation will be prevented from manufacturing chemical weapons, it is "fatally flawed."

Supporters sensibly point out, however, that no arms control treaty is ever perfect, but that the CWC materially improves monitoring of chemical production and is vastly better than no controls at all.

Moreover, the supporters argue, 74 countries have already ratified the treaty -- and it is set to go into effect at the end of this month whether the US ratifies it or not -- and US refusal would deprive this country of a role in determining how the treaty is enforced.

Under a 1985 law signed by President Reagan, the US already is pledged to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal, so that refusal of the Senate to ratify would have no effect on US preparedness.

US refusal would put this country in company with Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, which will be subject to trade sanctions under the treaty.

The big US chemical manufacturers, represented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, support the treaty because they do not want to be hit with export controls. The CMA also refutes charges that international inspections will make it possible for enemies to steal American secrets.

The Clinton Administration is waging an all-out campaign to convince undecided Senators to support the treaty. Last week, it agreed to 28 stipulations to answer the concern of wavering Senators, including guarantees that the US will maintain strong anti-chemical defenses and that the US will not be required to furnish militarily useful devices to adversary nations such as Cuba and Iran, which have signed the treaty.

It's not clear how many Senators the guarantees convinced, but Administration officials say that, regardless of arguments, Lott is key.

As not only Majority Leader but also a potential 2000 presidential contender, Lott's decision on CWC -- and a later vote on granting most-favored-nation trade status to China -- could tell a lot about whether the GOP wants the US to be in or out of the world foreign policy consensus.

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#### TOP POLITICAL STORY

Close Senate vote on CWC treaty expected

By Joyce Price

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

April 21, 1997

Republican and Democratic Senate leaders yesterday said Thursday's vote could go either way, as administration officials stepped up calls for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

... On NBC's "Meet the Press," Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle called the chances of passage "no better than 50-50," even though he said all 45 Democratic senators will be voting to support it.

... "At this point, it's too close to call," Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott said on CNN's "Late Edition."

. . . . A two-thirds majority is needed to ratify the treaty, which imposes a global ban on the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Signed by 170 countries and already ratified by 72, the pact takes effect April 29, no matter what the Senate decides five days earlier.

. . . . Mr. Lott, seen by many as a key to ratification, opposes a provision requiring parties to "exchange equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons."

. . . . He called that provision "fundamentally flawed" and said it would have to be addressed before he could consider approval.

. . . . It could be "very dangerous" to share information and technology with a "rogue nation" such as Iran, which has signed, but not ratified the pact, the GOP leader said.

. . . . "If we don't find a way to deal with that, this convention could lead to more chemical weapons" and provide information to other countries as to "how we're going to defend against chemical weapons."

. . . . "We don't want to share that information. That is the critical point for me," said Mr. Lott.

. . . . "We're going to try to make sure that if this passes, it's passed in the right way. And if it's not changed, it may not pass," he added.

. . . . Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Defense Secretary William S. Cohen made a joint appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press" to advocate ratification.

. . . . "We are the superpower. We are the leader. This is a leadership question," Mrs. Albright said

. . . . . As for the reservations of Mr. Lott and some other Republicans about sharing information and technology, she said, "We have decided we'll only provide medical and humanitarian supplies."

. . . . Skeptics argue that such a decision by the United States would not be binding on other countries.

. . . . Mrs. Albright says that scenario makes it even more important that the United States ratify the treaty.

. . . . "By our not ratifying it, we will not have positions on the executive board that writes more-detailed rules or is able to have inspectors go into these countries," she said

. . . . . If the United States fails to endorse the pact, Mrs. Albright said, "We'll be on the side of Libya and Iraq, rather than our allies."

. . . . Sen. Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico Republican and chairman of the Budget Committee, was asked on Fox how he'll vote. "At this point, with a couple of addendums, I'll be for it," he said.

. . . . On the same show, Sen. Jon Kyl, Arizona Republican, said he believes the United States will be worse off with the treaty than without it: "The treaty is not verifiable. It doesn't cover most of the countries it needs to cover."

. . . . And because of its provisions, Mr. Kyl said, "Countries such as Iran and China, who have signed it, would get greater access to chemicals."

. . . . Mr. Cohen disagreed with those who said the United States would be worse off if the Senate ratifies the convention: "We won't have the opportunity to point to countries who refused to sign or who sign and seek to cheat, that we can call them on it and bring sanctions to bear."

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The New York Times  
April 21, 1997

## Clinton Seeks Votes to Pass Arms Treaty

By STEVEN ERLANGER

WASHINGTON -- With the Chemical Weapons Convention -- and a large chunk of his political credibility -- hanging in the balance, President Clinton dispatched his secretaries of state and defense to make a rare joint television appearance Sunday, where they tried to persuade wavering senators to back the treaty.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen conceded that it is uncertain whether the Senate will approve the treaty in a showdown vote Thursday. But in their appearance on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," they argued that passage had become a test of leadership, not only of Clinton.

"This does become a leadership question," Albright said. "And it is not just a leadership question for the current president, it is a leadership question for the United States."

Clinton made a personal appeal for the treaty in an abruptly scheduled news conference Friday, and has been making telephone calls to try to accumulate the votes of the 67 senators needed to pass the treaty.

Clinton and senior officials are concentrating on Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., whose vote is likely to sway most of the 10 to 15 Republican senators who are thought to remain undecided.

Consequently, administration officials believe that Lott can decide the fate of the treaty, and of an important test of Clinton at the outset of his second term.

"This is a test of Lott's leadership, too," said a senior administration official.

The treaty -- which President Ronald Reagan proposed, President George Bush negotiated and signed, and Clinton has supported, and which 70 nations have agreed to -- outlaws the manufacture, storage or use of chemical weapons.

Critics contend that the treaty does not provide enough verification or safeguards against abuse by "rogue" nations like Iraq and Iran, and would open up American plants to outside inspectors. Clinton and his aides say that these fears are overdrawn and that the entire issue of arms control is at stake.

They point out that the treaty will come into force on April 29 in any event, and if the United States does not ratify by then, it will be unable to guide the way the treaty is managed and to take part in inspections of other countries. American chemical companies will also suffer immediate sanctions and at least some loss of sales.

"If we don't get this passed, it's a lose-lose situation," Albright said Sunday. "We will be penalized."

Under American law, the United States is obligated to destroy all its chemical weapons, anyway. "Our way of making sure our national interests are protected is for us to be on that executive board making the rules," Albright said.

She went out of her way to praise Lott, calling him "very helpful and responsible" for bringing the treaty to a vote before April 29. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, bitterly opposes the treaty.

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The Los Angeles Times  
Monday, April 21, 1997

## PERSPECTIVES ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

### A Pact Critical to the Nation's Security

America will be weakened if the Senate doesn't act by April 29; opponents haven't made a persuasive case.

By WILLIAM CROWE

Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is in America's dearest national security interest. This is not a judgment I have come to lightly. But after 47 years in uniform and leadership of the U.S. military under Presidents Reagan and Bush, I consider this treaty's benefits--to our troops, our citizens and our global leadership--far too important to squander. I strongly believe

that this treaty is right for America and to reject it would be a serious mistake.

In judging an arms control agreement, the first question we in the military ask is, "What do we give up?" In this case, we give up nothing. After the Gulf War, the U.S. military determined that we did not need chemical weapons of our own to deter their use against us or our allies. Our overall strength is a much more credible and effective deterrent. That is why President Bush decided that America could renounce the possession and use of chemical weapons. Now that we are withdrawing from the chemical weapons business, it is in our interest to do everything in our power to encourage others to do the same.

The second question we ask ourselves is, "What do we gain?"

This treaty's rewards are impressive:

- \* Destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles around the world, which could threaten our troops and our citizens.
- \* New trade restrictions that will make it harder for rogue states and terrorists alike to acquire the materials they need to make chemical weapons and facilitate the tracking of such transactions.
- \* Greater access to information on foreign chemical weapons threats.
- \* Stronger authority to identify, investigate, apprehend and punish domestic groups attempting to make chemical weapons.

The third logical question is, "What will happen if we refuse to ratify?" The answer is, we'll go from leading the world to joining the company of pariah nations.

- \* Others will use our absence from the treaty as an excuse to retain their own chemical weapons.
- \* Our chemical companies will be hit with the very trade restrictions that we helped design to put pressure on holdout countries. The Chemical Manufacturers' Assn. estimates that this could result in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in sales and many jobs.
- \* Most important, our role on a host of international arms control and nonproliferation issues will be undermined. To opt out of this significant international agreement hardly befits the leader of the free world and the most powerful nation on the globe.

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf recently told the Senate that he supports the convention because "by not ratifying . . . we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular matter." I strongly agree, for military and moral reasons as well.

I have examined the case against the convention, and on balance, do not find it persuasive. Some say the treaty is unverifiable. I have heard that argument time and again from those who oppose every attempt to limit weapons. They are making the perfect the enemy of the good; no agreement would satisfy them. At present, chemical weapons are not illegal. By rendering clearly illegal their development and possession, the convention will strengthen our hand against chemical weapons outlaws; without it, we have no hand at all. Actually, the convention provides for unprecedented investigatory provisions, including short-notice inspections. Curiously, opponents want verifiability, but at the same time complain that the treaty allows too much access to private

producers.

Others declare that the treaty is worthless unless every rogue state signs on. That's like saying we shouldn't have laws against murder until every killer surrenders. It's the law abiders, not the law abusers, who should set the standards of civilized behavior. With the treaty, rogue states will face trade restrictions and, while not impossible, it will unquestionably be more difficult for them to acquire chemical weapons. More significant, the treaty will make any retaliatory steps we take more acceptable throughout the international community.

The Chemical Weapons Convention goes into effect on April 29. If we have not ratified by then, our nation will not have a seat on the treaty's governing council. We will not even be allowed to vote at the treaty organization's first meeting, at which decisions on the budget, key personnel issues and important implementation matters will be taken. Americans will not be able to serve as inspectors. In short, we will be denied a voice in the decisions likely to affect us most, as both a chemical weapons possessor and the country with the world's leading chemical industry.

The clock is ticking. I urge the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention now.

- - -

Adm. William Crowe, U. S. Ambassador to Britain, Served as  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff From 1985 to 1989

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT [igc.apc.org](http://igc.apc.org) \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

Late Edition with Frank Sesno, CNN  
CWC Excerpts

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott Joins Frank Sesno And Friends

Aired April 20, 1997 - 12:00 a.m. ET

FRANK SESNO, HOST (voice-over): He's top dog in the Senate, top Republican in the ranks and top thorn in the president's side. On taxes, the budget, the chemical weapons treaty -- all roads lead to Trent Lott. We'll speak to the Senate Majority Leader. Plus, decision day in Israel. Could the end be near for the government of Benjamin Netanyahu? All straight ahead on LATE EDITION.

MR. SENSO: To another subject of great international concern that is the Chemical Weapons Treaty that must be ratified by the United States Senate, obviously, where you serve. It's coming up this week.

Earlier today, the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, was out talking about this. Here's some of what she had to say. She invoked your name.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE: This treaty has "Made in America" written all over it. It was President Reagan's idea. President Bush negotiated it and signed it, and President Clinton has embraced it. And we need to ratify it so that we can be a part of the rules-making body that in fact, makes sure that the inspections are carried out properly and that American interests are really complied with.

Senator Lott has been very, very helpful and responsible in making sure that the treaty comes to a vote, and we just are very pleased with the way that the negotiations have been proceeding.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

SESNO: Will Senator Lott be very, very helpful in not only seeing that this treaty, which would ban chemical weapons, comes to a vote, but passes?

LOTT: Well, I think the most important point you should make right at the beginning is that none of us want chemical weapons. We want them destroyed. The United States is committed to doing that. We're in the process.

We also want to make sure that they are not used, and they are in fact destroyed all over the world. And that includes in Russia, or by China, or Libya, or Iran, Iraq, the rest of the world.

And therein is the difficulty because of what countries will be into agreement with this convention; they'll actually ratify it. What countries will be outside of that framework and what will they be doing. So it's -- it is a very important thing, and I think it's important that we ask some questions, though, along the lines of, will this treaty, as a matter of fact, reduce the proliferation of chemical weapons or will it in any way contribute to their spread? And that is the heart of the matter as we now stand.

And let me say this, too. I do think Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is doing an excellent job. I've enjoyed working with her. She has kept her word. I have kept my word in terms of working to, you know, allow for this major treaty to even be considered. Now, the substance will determine what the final result is.

SESNO: There are series of amendments, five of them, that will be voted on, one at a time, that deal with such things as whether Russia should ratify before the United States ratifies, and the rogue nations -- the Irans and the Iraqs -- whether they need to ratify in order for this thing to come into force. Absent those amendments -- which have been purposed by

Jesse Helms, Jon Kyl, conservative R  
epublicans -- would you support this treaty as written?

LOTT: I would support it the way it came out of the committee. And the way it's coming to the floor of the Senate, there will be an effort to strike out key components of the treaty that was reported out. I'll have to look at the final product.

Let me say that we have achieved a number of agreements that have improved the situation. We have gotten as many as 24 or 25 side conditions, plus some parallel issues that are very important to the Senate. Some treaties that this administration had improperly been holding back -- two of those three will be sent to the Senate.

Also State Department reorganization -- just late last week, the administration finally said: Yes, we agree. There should be an reorganization of the State Department. So all of those matters will come into play.

But unless we can find a way to deal with this question of sharing information, sharing equipment and technology with these rogue nations under the requirements of the treaty, that is a fundamental flaw in the treaty.

SESNO: So, you're saying you will not support the treaty unless these amendments are...

LOTT: I'm not going to say my final decision, because it will depend on what happens.

SESNO: Candy.

CROWLEY: Senator Lott, what specifically do you need in order to vote for this thing? You have been described here as the top dog in the Senate. The people are looking to you.

So what is it that will make you vote for this treaty?

LOTT: Well, the conditions that have been agreed to have improved it, and I acknowledge that. A couple of the issues that I really felt very strongly about, the ability of the United States to use tear gas in riot control or in war or in peace time, we have worked out language on that.

CROWLEY: What's the problem now?

LOTT: Well, I want to make sure I emphasize that we have improved it with the conditions some. The other one is how searches in the United States of U.S. companies is handled and warrants being required for those searches.

The key component now is the so-called Article 11. I don't want to get into, you know, the process. But dealing with the requirement of the treaty, that we have to share information with countries like, for instance, Iran, as to what technology and equipment we may have to defense against the use of chemical weapons, that is very dangerous.

And I think that that -- if we don't find a way to deal with that, this convention could lead to more chemical weapons and a greater ability to fend against, you know -- or them to know how we're going to defend against chemical weapons. We don't want to share that information.

That is the critical point for me. If we could work that out, we'll take a look at the whole thing.

SESNO: Senator -- Senator Lott, isn't it true that some moderate Republicans are openly worrying what would happen to them politically if they oppose this treaty and if the Republican Party is tied in any way with its not being ratified?

LOTT: I think, as a matter of fact, the Senate has been very responsible in how it's dealt with this. A number of senators have not said how they're going to vote until they see the final product.

SESNO: Aren't you caught between a rock and a hard place -- between the moderates on the one hand who say, we may pay a price here, and the conservatives on the other who say, this is a test for Trent Lott?

LOTT: This is very important for our country, our relationship with our allies and for the spirit of the American people. This is one of those occasions where you cannot just look at the politics or weigh it. It can be demagogued very easily. We're going to try to make sure that if this passes, it's passed in the right way. And if it's not changed, it may not pass.

SESNO: Want to make a prediction?

LOTT: Not at this point. I think it's really too close to call.

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NBC "MEET THE PRESS"  
APRIL 20, 1997

NBC TV

Interview With Albright/Cohen

MR. RUSSERT: But first, with us now, both the secretary of State and the secretary of Defense. Welcome.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Good morning.

SEC. COHEN: Nice to be here.

MR. RUSSERT: The last time this occurred, Madame Secretary Albright, 29 years ago, Dean Rusk, secretary of State, Robert McNamara, secretary of Defense, came on "Meet the Press" to argue on behalf of the Vietnam War. You are here today for a different purpose, to argue on behalf of this, the chemical weapons treaty. Most Americans don't have any idea what this is. What is it, and why should the Senate ratify it?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Tim, the greatest threat to our nation are weapons of mass destruction. The chemical weapons are obviously a part of those weapons of mass destruction, and, for the last 20 years, President Reagan, President Bush, and now President Clinton are arguing that it is essential for the countries of the world to give up production and use of chemical weapons. The United States decided some time ago that we would never produce or use chemical weapons, and this convention, this treaty has "made in America" written all over it. It was President Reagan's idea, President Bush negotiated it and signed it, and President Clinton has embraced it, and we need to ratify it so that we can be a part of the rules-making body that, in fact, makes sure that the inspections are carried out properly and that American interests are really complied with.

And if we don't, we will be on the side of Libya and Iraq, instead of on the side of our allies. Now, Secretary Cohen will tell you why this is important for American troops. I can tell you why it's important for the American people -- because, if you go back and think about the seron gas attack in Tokyo, where they poisoned people on the subway, this convention, treaty, will allow us to make sure that that kind of a horrible event cannot happen. It will give us the tools to help make sure that that doesn't happen in the United States.

MR. RUSSERT: Now, a vote is Thursday in the United States Senate. You need 67 votes, two-thirds of the Senate, to ratify a treaty. How many votes do you have today?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, we are moving in the right direction. I'm not going to give you a vote count, but we are here because we consider this so important and we hope very much that the senators will conceive -- see it that way, too --

MR. RUSSERT: But passage is uncertain at this point.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I would say that it is. We want very much to make sure that passage is certain, because if we don't get this passed, it is a lose-lose proposition. The treaty that we thought up, we will not be a part of, and, in fact, we will be penalized. Our chemical industry in the United States, people in America, will be penalized for not being a part of it.

MR. RUSSERT: Secretary of Defense Cohen, men who have sat at your desk, former secretaries of Defense -- Dick Cheney, Caspar Weinberger, Donald Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger -- all of them have said this is not in the national security interests of America. Let me show you what they said on the screen here. This is a graphic which summarizes their feelings. "The treaty would likely have the effect of leaving the United States and its allies more -- not less -- vulnerable to chemical attack. It could well serve to increase, not reduce, the spread of chemical-weapons manufacturing capabilities. Thus we would be better off not to be party to it." Why are all those secretaries of Defense wrong, and you're right?

SEC. COHEN: Well, first of all, let me point out we live in a democracy and, of course, we have a diversity of opinion, which we seek. Only in a totalitarian state would you have unanimity of thought and expression. So I respect these individuals and their opinions, but let me point out that the people that they served, the commanders-in-chief -- President Ford, President Carter, President

Bush, President Clinton, the commanders-in-chief who've been elected by the people of this country to protect our national security interests -- all favor it. Let me also point out that the war fighters -- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, former -- retired General Schwarzkopf, Admiral Zumwalt -- all of these individuals strongly support the treaty.

I just returned from South Korea, talking with General John Telilly (ph), the commander of our forces there, who is concerned about the level of weapons that are in the hands of the North Koreans, the chemical weapons. They are desperately concerned about what could happen to their troops. They all favor supporting this treaty, because they see this as a way of reducing the threat in the future

So, yes, you can point out individuals who disagree with the treaty itself with respect to will we be worse off. We are spending almost a half a billion dollars in terms of protecting our troops and developing systems that will allow us to defend ourselves against this. We're also committed to spending another quarter of a billion dollars over the next five years for even greater enhancement as far as our protective ability. So I disagree with the notion that this treaty puts us worse off. We're far worse off without the treaty, because we won't have the opportunity to point to countries who refused to sign or who sign and seek to cheat, that we can call them on it and bring those sanctions to bear. So I fundamentally disagree with that assessment.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, let's explore that, the whole issue of verification. Say Libya and Iraq sign this treaty, agree to abide by it. The former head of the CIA said that he has no high confidence we can verify this. When you were a senator, just two years ago, in 1994, you said, about this treaty, "We must verify before we can trust." Do you trust Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein to abide by anything they sign?

SEC. COHEN: I don't necessarily trust either of those two individuals. What I do trust is the capability of the United States, combining our intelligence assets, overhead and otherwise, inside information as such, to point us in the direction of those countries who might sign and cheat. Let me give you an example. There's an article written in "The Philadelphia Inquirer" by Mr. Bill Mirzoeff (ph), a former scientist in the chemical weapons department of the Soviet Union, Russia. For years, he was working on some projects and found out that they were developing five new types of chemical weapons. He called them on it. He spent a couple of years in prison on it before he was finally released and they said he was not guilty of betrayal. He is now in this country, in Princeton, wrote an article in "The Philadelphia Inquirer" saying initially he was opposed to the treaty. Now he understands how the treaty will, in fact, require the Russians, should they ratify this particular treaty, to open up their systems. He has given us the blueprints, so now he's strongly in favor.

This treaty allows us greater opportunity to go into countries who either sign it and seek to cheat or who don't sign it, where we can bring sanctions against them and help to isolate them as the rogue nations of the world, so --

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Tim, I think the thing that might not be clear is this treaty comes into effect whether we sign it or not, and by our not ratifying it, we will not have positions on the executive board that writes more detailed rules or is able to have inspectors go into these countries. So it isn't as if this is not going to happen. It will happen. We just won't be a part of it, and we will be in the same position as Iraq and Libya. That is what, to me, seems like such a ludicrous position. That is why we need to be a part of it. It's going to happen anyway.

MR. RUSSERT: But, Madame Secretary, Iraq signed the Geneva convention in 1925, promising never to use chemical weapons. They've used them. They used them against the Kurds in '88. They used them against Iran. So if the United Nations, for the last five years, crawling on their hands and knees throughout Iraq, looking for chemical weapons -- they've not been able to find them. What makes

you so confident that if Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qaddafi agree to this chemical treaty ban, that they're going to possibly abide by it?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me disagree with you. As a result of the United Nations actions and the commission that goes in there, we have, in fact, been able to find their chemical weapons, as well as their nuclear weapons. So the international way of doing things does work.

And by having this be an international treaty, it gives much greater pressure to all the other countries against the Libya and Iraqs. It is -- they are not -- you know, they are a problem. There is no question about it. But we cannot allow the rule breakers to make the rules. We are trying to get some control over this deadliest of all weapons of mass destruction, because it's so -- it speaks like the wind, and we have to try to get some control over it.

MR. RUSSERT: What would happen, Mr. Secretary Cohen, if a country signs up to this treaty, learns a lot of the technology and the know-how, and then 10 years from now decides to break away and use chemical weapons? What would we do if Libya and Iraq actually used chemical weapons?

SEC. COHEN: Obviously, we have the capability -- General Schwarzkopf talked about this, and General Powell and others, Shalickashvili as well. We have the capability of wreaking tremendous destruction on any country that would direct their chemical weapons against our troops.

Certainly if these countries were to use chemical weapons against any other nation, then the international communities would come down very hard in the way of sanctions, possibly other types of actions. So the fact that they might break away and use them -- they have to face a retaliation, as far as the United States is concerned, that would devastate their country. That was one of the messages that went out very clearly to Saddam Hussein: Do not even think about it. Don't think about using chemical weapons against our troops, because you're going to face a response from which you will not recover. That's the kind of message we can send.

MR. RUSSERT: And joining me in the questioning this morning, making her first appearance as a married woman on "Meet the Press," best wishes, Andrea Mitchell. Now, go get 'em! (Laughter.)

MS. MITCHELL: Take it from there, right? (Laughter.) Good morning to you both.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Good morning.

MS. MITCHELL: I want to focus on the chief argument of the treaty opponents, which is that this treaty will help to spread chemical weapons and technology, not to curb it, and this is basically what they are trying to fix in what you all call killer amendments. Let me show you one of the key provisions of this treaty that they object to. It says that, "Each state party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons." Now, basically, in plain English, that would require us to share our secrets of defending against chemicals with these other countries. The president said as recently as Friday that he would only authorize medical supplies. But that's not binding -- that's certainly not binding on other countries, is it, Madame Secretary?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, Andrea, first of all, we have a choice as to how we are going to fulfill that article of the treaty.

MS. MITCHELL: What about other countries? What about France and Germany providing more than just medical supplies, providing defensive equipment and technology to Iran?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: It is my belief that they will not do that, and in our case, we have decided very fully that we will only provide medical and humanitarian supplies, and if we are not on this rule-making body, it is much more likely that others will, in fact, provide more. The point here that I keep making is this treaty is going forward. Our way of making sure that our national interests are

re protected is for us to be on that executive board, making those kinds of rules. So I feel very confident that with our being present, we have a much better shot at preserving our national interests.

SEC. COHEN: Can I add a postscript to that?

MS. MITCHELL: Please.

SEC. COHEN: First of all, it would be inconsistent on the part of those who are signatories and ratifiers of this agreement to want to undercut it by providing the kind of technology that would make it easier for countries to use this technology against us. That's completely inconsistent. But, secondly, assuming that we don't have a ratified treaty, they could do it now. by being part of a treaty, we are at least in a position to encourage our allies not to engage in any kind of sharing of technology that would undercut the effect of the treaty itself.

MS. MITCHELL: Well, we have said that we have promises from our allies, but, first of all, those are not written. They are not binding. Second of all, they don't bind future governments of these allies, and, third of all, it would not stop Russia from trading with China and Iran, India -- any of these countries that are not part of this group of allies with whom we deal most effectively. So you've got a second set of countries that could be trading amongst each other, even if we don't.

SEC. COHEN: Sure. There are countries who may refuse to ratify this particular agreement. They will be isolated, as Secretary Albright has said --

MS. MITCHELL: But even ratifiers might trade amongst each other, because they interpret this provision differently than the president does.

SEC. COHEN: They may interpret it differently, but they will also be part of this council. The United States will now have a seat at the council that will give us an opportunity to urge our allies and those who are in this treaty not to do this thing, that we're trying to get people to cut back, not to expand it. So it's totally inconsistent.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Andrea, the thing that I have never quite understood is we make laws against drug smugglers because we want to prevent drug smuggling. It doesn't mean that we catch all the drug smugglers, but we at least make the rules and do what we can to catch as many people as we can. That is what this is about, and it is tightening the noose on those countries that continue to be interested in chemical weapons who are not signatories and making a very tight, international-rules system so that chemical weapons cannot be used or spread.

MS. MITCHELL: But part of this is inspection, so now we're going to have Iran signing the treaty and sending Iranian inspectors to root around in all of the secrets in our companies throughout this country? I mean, is that something that American manufacturers or the American people want to have?

SEC. COHEN: The American manufacturers, the chemical manufacturers endorse this treaty.

MS. MITCHELL: They do --

SEC. COHEN: They are not worried about this --

MS. MITCHELL: Well, the industry is split --

SEC. COHEN: The major companies are not worried about these inspections. Secondly, an agreement has been reached with the Senate that would set up a procedure whereby we would prohibit any arbitrary type of inspections, there would have to be a type of warrants that would be issued. This is not gendarmes banging on the door in the middle of the night saying, "Open your door, sir." This is very carefully crafted to make sure that our rights are protected, as such.

MS. MITCHELL: Let me give you an example, though. The nonproliferation treaty, the nuclear treaty is being used by Russia, the Atoms for Peace section, which is parallel to the sharing of chemical technology section of this treaty. Russia is using that Atoms for Peace section as an excuse for selling nuclear reactors to Iran, something we don't want.

We've got this wonderful relationship with Boris Yeltsin, we're told, yet we have not been able to stop them from selling nuclear reactors. How are we then going to be able to stop them from selling or sharing, you know, chemical information?

SEC. COHEN: Are we better off with this arrangement or better off without it? If it comes to the point you say we have no agreement, no opportunity to try to encourage them to -- or discourage them from doing this, are you better off in this environment or outside of it? It seems to me we are better off with this treaty than without it.

MR. RUSSERT: We are the world's last remaining superpower, yet China and Russia, Madame Secretary Albright, have not ratified this treaty. Why should the United States agree to something that China and Russia may not abide by?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I'll tell you, Tim, you've answered the question. We are the superpower. We are the leader. This is a leadership question, and the Russian Duma is waiting to ratify this treaty as soon as we do, and if we do not ratify it, we are giving cover to the hard-liners that are opposed to it.

I think this does become a leadership question, and it is not just a leadership question for the current president, it is a leadership question for the United States. This treaty has "made in America" written all over it, and, as I said, it will go into effect without us and those inspectors that Andrea was talking about, if we're not on this executive committee, we will have no say over the inspections.

MR. RUSSERT: Can you state this morning with certainty that China and Russia will ratify this treaty?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I am very hopeful that they will, but I can tell you with certainty that if we don't, they probably won't.

MR. RUSSERT: You've been courting Senator Trent Lott, Republican leader of the Senate. He is critical for this to pass. Do you have Senator Lott's vote?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, Senator Lott has been very, very helpful and responsible in making sure that the treaty comes to a vote. He and Senator Daschle and Senator Biden and Senator Helms have been all working on this. We are very hopeful that all the senators will understand the importance of this treaty to U.S. national interests, and we just are very pleased with the way the negotiations have been proceeding.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me ask you about a couple of related issues, Secretary Cohen. Colin Powell went before the Senate this week and was testifying about the United States during the Gulf War blowing up an Iraqi arms site and apparently released some chemical weapon vapors, which could have damaged and hurt our troops. Colin Powell said that if he was still at the Pentagon, he would be raping (sic) and pillaging through the intelligence community, trying to find out why the CIA did not tell the military about this danger to our troops.

Is anyone at the Pentagon rampaging, raping, and pillaging, trying to get an answer to this?

SEC. COHEN: I think to use that metaphor at this particular time with everything else that's going on is probably inappropriate for me, at least. I'd say we have a very intensive investigation under way. We have Dr. Rothgar (ph), who's conducting an investigation into, certainly, the Gulf War illness. We're trying to find out what the facts are in terms of who had information, what that information was.

It has not been a work of art, to say the least, in terms of what has happened in the past as far as the accumulation of information, the maintenance of records and logs.

So we have a lot of work to do, but we are undertaking an intensive investigation to find out exactly who knew what and when and why that information wasn't shared.

MR. RUSSERT: Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, you're here on behalf of the chemical weapons treaty. The vote is Thursday and we'll watch it carefully. Thanks for joining us.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much.

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Washington, D.C.  
Monday, April 21

This Thursday, April 24, the U.S. Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The treaty is in danger of being defeated. This will be a major defeat for arms control and disarmament in the U.S.

The treaty bans the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It goes into effect in one week, on April 29, with or without the United States.

The treaty was signed by President George Bush and has the support of the chemical industry, the Pentagon, veterans groups, and the arms control and disarmament community. Over 70 countries have ratified. The main opponent is Foreign Relations Committee chair Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).

All 45 Democratic Senators support the CWC, but it lacks the 22 Republican votes needed for treaty ratification. Republican Majority Leader Trent Lott currently opposes the treaty unless additional conditions are attached. If he votes against ratification, the treaty will probably either pass or be defeated by only a few votes.

Defeat of the CWC will doom prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and most other arms control measures for years. A CWC defeat would be the first defeat of a national security treaty since the Senate defeated the Treaty of Versailles in 1920.

**WHAT TO DO:** Most Republican Senators are undecided. Many are basing their decisions in part on the mail from their home states. The most effective message is a one-sentence fax or mailgram urging CWC support sent to the Washington, D.C. office. A letter, fax, or mailgram is worth about 20 telephone calls. Faxes or mailgrams must be sent by the end of the day Wednesday, April 23.

You can reach Senate offices to get their fax number by calling the Capitol switchboard at (202) 224-3121.

Thanks in advance for any help.

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Washington, D.C.  
Friday, April 25

Late last evening, the U.S. Senate adopted the Chemical Weapons Convention on a 74-26 vote. This major victory was due to the very hard work of many activists across the country. Congratulations and thanks to those that helped make the win possible.

Thank you's should go those Senators that voted right. Five Senators should be singled out for leadership: Biden (D-Del.), Bingaman (D-N.M.), Daschele (D-S.D.), Kerry (D-Mass.) and Lugar (R-Ind.). Also, the personal involvement of President Clinton was instrumental in the success.

All 45 Democratic Senators voted for the treaty. The Republicans voted as follows:

Republicans for:

Abraham (Mich.), Chafee (R.I.), Coats (Ind.), Cochran (Miss.), Collins (Maine), D'Amato (N.Y.), DeWine (Ohio), Domenici (N.M.), Enzi (Wyo.), Frist (Tenn.), Gorton (Wash.), Gregg (N.H.), Hagel (Neb.), Hatch (Utah), Jeffords (Vt.), Lott (Miss.), Lugar (Ind.), McCain (Ariz.), McConnell (Ky.), Murkowski (Alaska), Roberts (Kan.), Roth (Del.), Santorum (Pa.), Smith (Ore.), Snowe (Maine), Specter (Pa.), Stevens (Alaska), Thomas (Wyo.), and Warner (Va.).

Republicans against:

Allard (Colo.), Ashcroft (Mo.), Bennett (Utah), Bond (Mo.), Brownback (Kan.), Burns (Mont.), Campbell (Colo.), Coverdell (Ga.), Craig (Idaho), Faircloth (N.C.), Gramm (Texas), Grams (Minn.), Grassley (Iowa), Helms (N.C.), Hutchinson (Ark.), Hutchison (Texas), Inhofe (Okla.), Kempthorne (Idaho), Kyl (Ariz.), Mack (Fla.), Nickles (Okla.), Sessions (Ala.), Shelby (Ala.), Smith (N.H.), Thompson (Tenn.), and Thurmond (S.C.).

My apologies if you are receiving this email again, but I wanted to make sure everyone sees it.  
Melinda

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From: John Isaacs[SMTP:jdi@clw.org]  
Sent: Thursday, April 24, 1997 9:49 AM  
To: Javid Ali; aca@armscontrol.org; claude\_boudrias@mail.cmahq.com; Mary Brooks;  
scott\_bunton@kerry.senate.gov; Joe Cirincione; Leonard Cole; David Culp; cdavis@cl  
Subject: Lott's statement

Sen. Trent Lott today announced that he has received a letter from President Clinton that promises that the U.S. will withdraw from the Chemical Weapons Convention if:

1. The treaty weakens chemical defenses
2. The treaty weakens Australia group controls
3. The treaty causes proliferation to increase

Lott called the letter an iron-clad commitment from the President to the U.S. Senate which will have an impact on him and other Senators. He also called the letter unprecedented and that the letter "has affected my thinking." He called it a major and dramatic development. He pointed out that former Presidents have endorsed the treaty. He said the treaty is not fatally flawed any more. He did say he still has some concerns, although he pointed out that the process has worked to correct flaws and to pressure the Pentagon to stay alert to problems with the treaty.

He refused to commit to vote for the treaty, saying he will wait until the votes on the five killer conditions and he needs to review the letter first.

He said the treaty has moved toward passage over the past 48 hours.

Lott said that he and former Senator Robert Dole had discussed the treaty and the conditions the past weekend. Lott said he did not know that Dole would go to the White House yesterday.

Lott expects the final vote between 7:30 P.M. and 8:30 P.M.

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the panel. These events came to the attention of the press and PNC's coercive attempts to cover up the mishandling of the accident came to light. It quickly became obvious that a quite a number of officials at Tokai already knew that no visual confirmation had been made. On 16 April, STA filed a complaint against PNC and urged the police to investigate the falsification of the accident report after it conducted a raid of the Tokai facility on 14 April. This is the first time that the agency had filed such an accusation.

As a result of the accident operations at the Tokai facility have had to be suspended. The resulting backlog of spent fuel awaiting reprocessing will soon become a major problem. On 14 April news broke that the Fugen prototype advanced thermal reactor (ATR) in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, had experienced a leak of heavy water resulting in an increase in the amount of radioactive tritium detected in a vent at the facility. Once again PNC delayed informing STA, this time until thirty hours after the accident. So far, the accident has exposed eleven workers to contamination by tritium. Even more shocking is the news that the operators of the Fugen plant have, in the past three years, failed to report to the relevant authorities eleven other cases of tritium leaks. In addition to the problem of the leaks the Fugen reactor's spent fuel storage facility is at maximum capacity. With nowhere else to store its spent fuel, the suspension of operations at Tokai means that Fugen may be forced to close, or at least suspend operations for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, the news that the first shipment of spent fuel for storage at the Rokkasho facilities was expected sometime in June this year caused the prefectural government of Aomori to express its strong opposition to it. It seems unlikely that the shipment will now go ahead as scheduled.

PNC has repeatedly tried to avoid taking responsibility for its mistakes and as a result accidents keep happening. First, the sodium leak at the fast breeder reactor (FBR) Monju, then at Tokai and now Fugen. But the blame for these incidents does not lie only with PNC. STA is supposed to be the regulatory body that governs all nuclear matters in Japan and yet it is only now that STA has finally started to take serious action against PNC for its negligent and dangerous behavior. The reason for this is that STA does not maintain any objective distance from PNC. Both organizations are governmental and their relationship with each other is far too close. There are far too many interconnections between them, for STA to act as its supervisory body. A true review of PNC must be carried out by outside and independent investigators but if a review is to have any value representatives from academia and citizens' groups must be included. Also, those investigators must have the authority to disband PNC should they decide it is necessary.

In light of PNC's inability to conduct its business safely, CNIC calls for PNC to cease operations at all its facilities immediately, including; the fast breeder reactor (FBR) Monju and advanced thermal reactor (ATR) Fugen in Fukui Prefecture; the spent fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication and waste treatment facilities at Tokai in Ibaraki Prefecture; the experimental FBR Joyo at Oarai in Ibaraki Prefecture; the Ningyo-Toge uranium enrichment facility at Kamisaibara in Okayama Prefecture. Also PNC should cancel the construction and planning of new facilities until such time as a complete review of PNC can be made by independent and impartial

third party. CNIC also calls on STA to have a truly independent investigation carried out and to ensure that representatives of the Japanese public are included among those investigators.

The government's plutonium policy has stalled badly. Its existing reprocessing facility is now closed, the future of its planned facility is uncertain. ATR Fugen, seen as a vital step in the long term plan to use plutonium as an energy source, has repeatedly leaked radioactive tritium and has created fresh outrage among the people of Japan. The government's stop-gap plan to use up excess plutonium, in the form of MOX fuel, in light water reactors has also come to a stop due to the reluctance of the three prefectural governors in whose administration the most of Japan's reactors are situated, to take on the plan as it presently stands. All that has happened at Monju, Tokai and Fugen is as a direct result of the government's plutonium policy. It is CNIC opinion that the government must accept plutonium will never be a viable fuel choice, therefore it must develop new plans for the safe dispose of the plutonium that it presently controls and seek better solutions for dealing with spent nuclear fuel.

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There is a report that Democratic Senator Bob Graham has been under heavy pressure from the Cuban-American leader Jose Mas Canosa to oppose the CWC. Graham is up for re-election in 1998.

Any suggestions on how to act on this piece of information?

April 23, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

April 23, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Roosevelt Room

11:25 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Wallace, for your remarks and for your service; Mr. Vice President, General Shalikashvili. Thank you, General Scowcroft, for being here. Thank you, Admiral Zumwalt, for being here and for being on this issue for so long. General Jones, Admiral Arthur, to all the distinguished veterans and veterans groups who are with us today, and to the men and women in uniform who are here today. And I'd like to say a special word of thanks to General Powell and to Senator Dole for being here.

You have witnessed today, I believe, an example of America at its best, working as it should, putting the interests of the American people and the interests of the men and women of America in uniform first. And it is something for which I am very grateful.

This treaty will make our troops safer. It will make our nation more secure. It will at least reduce the likelihood that innocent civilians here and around the world will be exposed in the future to horrible chemical weapons. That is why every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the last 20 years and all the military leaders and political leaders and veterans you have heard today have supported it.

All the arguments have been made, so I would like to tell you a story. We now know that chemical weapons have bedeviled Americans in uniform from Belleau Wood in World War I to Baghdad in

the Gulf War. We know that thousands were injured or killed by chemical warfare in World War I. And I thought it would be a wonderful thing today to show what this treaty is all about, to have one remarkable American veteran of World War I who survived such an attack. And he is here with us today, Mr. George Clark. Thank you for coming sir. (Applause.) God bless you.

Mr. Clark was just in the Oval Office with all of us. And Senator Dole apparently asked him if he was a contemporary of Senator Thurmond -- (laughter) -- and he said he thought Senator Thurmond was a little young for the heavy responsibilities that he has enjoyed. (Laughter.)

As a 16-year-old Marine, almost 80 years ago, George Clark fought in the Battle of Soissons in July of 1918. Taking cover in a ditch during fierce fighting, his squad came under artillery attack by mustard gas. Every man except him was either killed or wounded as the poisonous fog settled on the ground. But Corporal Clark, who received the Purple Heart for what he endured that day -- and he's wearing it here today, 80 years later -- refused medical treatment even though, as he said, "it hurt my lungs bad." This man went on to serve our country in World War II and the Korean War in the Army and in the Air Force, retiring after 32 years of active duty.

Sir, I thank you for your extraordinary record of service and sacrifice to our nation. I thank you for caring about all the young people who will follow in your footsteps and for taking the effort and the trouble to be here today to support the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. God bless you, sir, and thank you. (Applause.)

All the arguments have been made and the vote is about to come in. But let me just restate a couple of points I think are very important that the opponents of this treaty cannot effectively rebut. We have decided -- as General Powell said, we have decided to give up our chemical weapons. We decided to do that a long time ago.

Now, as more and more nations eliminate their arsenals and they give up not only their arsenals, but they give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons, our troops will be less likely to face attack. But also as stockpiles are eliminated and as the transfer of dangerous chemicals, including chemicals which can be put together to form chemical weapons for that purpose, as that is controlled it will be more difficult for terrorists and for rogue states to get or make poison gas.

That is why it is not a good argument that we don't have some countries involved in this treaty. That's not an argument against ratification. This commits everybody else not to give them anything that they can use to make chemical weapons to use against our forces or innocent civilians.

We also have now tough new tools on short notice, on-site inspections; we create a worldwide intelligence and information sharing network; we strengthen the authority of our own law enforcement officials. That is also very important. That's one of the reasons the Japanese were so supportive of this, because of what they have endured in their country. All these things together are going to help us make America's men and women in uniform and American citizens safer.

During the last two months, as Senator Dole said so clearly, we have worked hard with Senate Majority Leader Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, Senator Biden and others. We've resolved virtually all the concerns that some senators have raised, and those resolutions will be embodied tomorrow in an amendment with the 28 understandings to which Senator Dole referred.

Now, we can't let the minor and relatively small number of disagreements that remain blind us to the overwhelming fact -- to use the words of Admiral Zumwalt, that at the bottom line our failure to ratify will substantially increase the risk of a chemical attack against American service personnel. None of us should be willing to take that. As Commander-in-Chief, I cannot in good conscience. I'm very proud of the work that's been done under the two predecessor administrations to mine of the opposite party. And I'm very proud that we're all standing here together today as Americans in support of a good and noble and tremendously significant endeavor. And all working together, maybe tomorrow it will come out all right.

Thank you and God bless you. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, at his briefing today, Senator Lott appeared to be leaning towards supporting this treaty -- that's sort of my analysis -- because of the so-called 28 conditionalities, as he says. If there are so many provisos -- if this passes with so many provisos, what is the rest of the world going to think of this treaty? And can we just -- the United States say, because we're putting so much in the bill -- can we just say, you accept it the way we like it?

THE PRESIDENT: If you read the provisos tomorrow, every one of them is consistent with the overall treaty and would clearly be a clarification of it. I think the rest of the world will applaud

what we have done. And I believe that in very important respects they will say, that's the way we read the treaty all along. So I believe it will be reinforcing it. And I think you'll see the differences over the debate tomorrow, where the line falls.

I think it will be clear that this will strengthen and enhance the meaning of the treaty, not only for ourselves, but for others all around the world.

Thank you. (Applause.)

END

11:33 A.M. EDT

>>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

>>

>>Tues 22 Apr 1997

>>

>>97-8465 US Senate debates tomorrow the Bill to ratify international  
>> convention on chemical weapons. Ind

>>

>>

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>

Stewart Kemp (nfzns@gn.apc.org)

>>Fri 18 Apr 1997

>>

>>97-8448 Report of nuclear disaster exercise for 27 countries, based on  
>> simulated meltdown in Finland. G

>>97-8449 Officials of Japan's state-run n/power company admit failing to  
>> report 11 radiation leaks at reprocessing plant near Tokyo.

>> G,FT,DT

>>97-8450 Yeltsin promises to sign new security charter with Nato on 27

>> May, though many differences still remain. G,Ind,FT,DT

>>

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>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 12:52:11 +0100 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 24 Apr  
>To: nfzpsc@gn.apc.org  
>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY  
>  
>Thurs 24 Apr 1997  
>  
>97-8475 Cash-strapped Scottish Environment Protection Agency unable to  
> continue monitoring levels of radioactivity in Holy Loch. Ind  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
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19.04.97

Dear Friends for Abolition 2000,

The programme for the Conference in Austria on "A Nuclear Weapons-Free Europe", June 13th to 15th 1997 in Burg Schlaining has been printed and is in the process of being distributed. European endorser organisations will be receiving a copy by post in the near future. If you do not receive a copy or if you wish to receive more copies, please send a message to this address or to Georg Schoefbaenker at [georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at](mailto:georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at).

You can also register for this conference online at <http://aspr.ac.at>

All the best,

Xanthe Hall  
(Co-Director)

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IPPNW is a member of Abolition 2000  
- a Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons -

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## CrossPoint v3.1 ##

Dear Abolitionists, I thought I should share with you some personal impressions of how NATO expansion is seen by Russians, gleaned during a recent visit to Moscow. My apologies for its length, but I hope you will agree that this is justified by its importance.

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

\* \* \*

## NATO EXPANSION VIEWED FROM MOSCOW

By Rob Green

With the help of a highly talented and experienced team from the Swedish branch of IPPNW, a two-day seminar was hosted by Russian IPPNW from 17-18 April 1997 in Moscow's Academy of Medical Sciences entitled "Perspectives of Nuclear Disarmament and a New Concept of European Security". I was the only British delegate, and spoke on behalf of Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll USN (Ret), who was unable to attend because of illness. In addition, meetings were arranged with military advisers to Yeltsin, and with politicians in the Duma.

This, my first visit to Russia, was a fascinating but disturbing experience. I returned to UK with a sharpened fear and anger at the effect on Russia of NATO's determination to expand eastward. Above all, Russians view it as a colossal humiliation having completed a huge withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and acquiesced in the reunification of Germany. It is reviving their ancient, deep, justified paranoia about the predations of a more advanced, militarily stronger, richer, exploitative West. More positively, this has re-energised me to do all I can to help mobilise Western public opinion to stop what George Kennan has said "could be America's biggest strategic blunder this century".

### Seminar Highlights

The first speaker was Academician Evgeniy Chasov, co-founder with Dr Bernard Lown of IPPNW. This was the first time for several years that he had spoken at an IPPNW event, because of political difficulties arising from his close association with Gorbachev. Indeed, he recalled that at IPPNW's 1987 World Congress in Moscow, Gorbachev had said: "Without your movement, START I would never have been signed." He was warmly welcomed back by the current Russian Co-President Sergei Kolesnikov and Asia-Pacific Vice-President Ron McCoy.

Chasov soon got round to NATO expansion - which proved to be the dominant theme of the seminar. He warned: "The Russian people don't understand why NATO is expanding. They understand the need

for economic expansion; but they don't believe Western statements designed to reassure them. The nuclear Sword of Damocles is back again. Trust has been lost. No Western politicians have voiced Russian anxieties. A new arms race is ready to start: modernising the arsenals of the new NATO member states will pressurise Russia to respond. This will divert resources desperately needed in civil society. NATO expansion is a delayed-action landmine; its leaders are still using old ideas; beware of humiliating Russia like Germany was after the First World War", recalling Hitler's rise. His solution was to "reawaken the people to the urgent need for nuclear and conventional disarmament" - especially the citizens in the comfortable, secure, more democratic West.

In discussion, NATO expansion was seen as a gift to the international military-industrial complex, which would be the only beneficiary. It was a substitute for transformed thinking on European security. Doubts were raised about NATO's reliability towards its new members. Hopes were voiced of stopping NATO expansion by getting the Parliaments of several member states to refuse to ratify it.

Academician Aleksander Zborovskiy added that NATO expansion would not bring economic help to the new members, only military - but at massive cost. Only action from within NATO member states could show the necessary example, by halting expansion.

Nikolai Isvekov, a retired diplomat with 40 years' experience in the USA, Berlin and Australia as well as Moscow, drew attention to the associated urgent need for a complete overhaul of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which had been based on a broad balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If NATO expansion went ahead, Russia would be outnumbered in conventional strength by 1 to 3. The inevitable consequence would be for Russia to resort to reliance on first use of nuclear weapons - especially with the growing crisis in her armed forces.

Major General Vladimir Byelous (Ret) added that NATO expansion could revive the role of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. A signatory of the Generals' and Admirals' statement of 5 December 1996, he had proposed in the draft the need for withdrawal of all nuclear weapons back to the possessor states' own territory; but this had been overruled by the US signatories as too radical.

In Rear Admiral Carroll's message to the seminar which I read out, he said: "A nuclear-armed NATO indefinitely facing a nuclear-armed Russia virtually guarantees ultimate failure of the NPT regime. If the nuclear states continue to rattle their nuclear sabres in violation of Article VI of the NPT, they send a signal that nuclear weapons are an essential component of military power."

For me, the star speaker was Vice Admiral Evgeny Chernov (Ret), Hero of the Soviet Union and former deputy Commander-in-Chief of

the Northern Fleet when he retired in 1988. A nuclear submariner for 26 years, he now represents an organisation based in St Petersburg campaigning for victims of radiation exposure in Russian submarines. One of them was his son, who died recently following an accident: now he is fearful for the health of his two grandchildren.

Having heard me speak first, he began by noting that he could well have been commanding the Russian nuclear submarine I tracked in my anti-submarine helicopter west of Ireland in 1973! He stressed how he had tried to keep his submarines safe; but now he believed that "nuclear weapons and energy both have to go, because they threaten the safety of the Earth."

On NATO expansion, he said: "Russia didn't look for an alternative military pact to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. She had relaxed her nuclear doctrine in the belief that NATO would reduce its arsenal, or even dissolve too. NATO is taking advantage of Russia's deplorable condition following 70 years of totalitarianism, as it struggles to make itself ready to be an integrated European state. NATO is not behaving properly." He advocated a nuclear weapon-free zone in Eastern Europe.

Konstantin Polyakov, Chief Physician of Kaliningrad Regional Hospital and a Deputy of the Regional Duma, reported on the absurdity of NATO expansion there: "At present, Kaliningrad is an economic free zone, with easy movement (no visa needed) to and from Poland." NATO expansion means a new 'Berlin Wall' will go up between them.

Dr Sergei Petrenko, from the Minsk Institute of Radiation Medicine, told how he was struggling with the legacy of Chernobyl - and he urged IPPNW to work to change the pro-nuclear attitude of the medical establishment in Belarus. Public opinion was becoming more anti-nuclear power; and there was almost unanimous hostility to NATO expansion, which affected them directly. Belarus had returned all nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia, and wanted a nuclear weapon-free zone as a way to stabilise its international relations.

#### Meeting With Yeltsin's Military Advisers

The morning after the seminar, I joined a delegation which met three Generals on the Defence Council of the President's Administration. Chief of Staff General Nikolai Klimenko was "ready to believe that NATO is not threatening us; but international policy must be based not on what you think: it is what you do. 17 years ago, WTO conventional forces were greater than NATO's - which was why NATO justified its nuclear weapon first use policy. Now the situation is about to be reversed. We don't want war - we can't wage it anyway. So now Russia will have to use its nuclear umbrella: it is determined to use nuclear deterrence."

However, he added that Russia was ready to cooperate in creating a European forum on security, preferably via OSCE. He urged us to push the line to Western taxpayers: "Why should we have to pay for such massive defences when there is no threat?" Also nuclear weapon-free zones, not just in Europe but in the Asia-Pacific region, "would save the world a lot of money."

In discussion, they warned that a nuclear weapon-free world would only be reached with a dramatic reduction in conventional weapons. However, they would welcome taking all nuclear forces off alert. They want an NPT for new technology weapons, fearing US plans to dominate this field by 2005. Overhaul of the CFE Treaty was a high priority: "As long as the conventional arms of NATO are so much stronger than those of Russia, we will not take any initiatives for the abolition of nuclear weapons."

They stressed that the most important aspect of NATO expansion was bringing NATO standard infrastructure to new members. Also, its strategic posture was unchanged - especially Article 5: "Defence against whom? We need concrete, precise steps of goodwill. We must see NATO restructuring before we can accept expansion."

So, let no-one say: "Why the need for Abolition 2000?"

ENDS

On the Senate floor after 11:45am, it was announced that former Senator Robert Dole feels that his concerns about the CWC have been addressed by the 28 conditions to the resolution of ratification. He now urges the Senate to approve the accord.

1. "GOP Senators Move to Support Ban on Chemical Arms," Adam Clymer, The New York Times, 4/24
2. "Chemical Arms Treaty, The Fine Print," The New York Times, 4/24 (The Washington Post has a similiar primer)
3. "Dole No Senator, but Might as Well Be," Francis X. Clines, New York Times, 4/24
4. "U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty," Bob Bell, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 4/22

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The New York Times

April 24, 1997

GOP Senators Move to Support Ban on Chemical Arms

By ADAM CLYMER

WASHINGTON -- A growing number of Republican senators, urged on by their former leader, Bob Dole, said on Wednesday that they were looking for reasons to support the Chemical Weapons Convention when it comes to a decisive vote on Thursday.

While the majority leader, Trent Lott of Mississippi, remained noncommittal on how he would vote on the treaty, which is designed to ban the production, stockpiling and use of poison gas, Dole shifted away from the opposition he abruptly voiced last fall in his presidential campaign.

Dole said on Wednesday that the treaty now had "adequate safeguards."

Lott began to sound as if he, too, was leaning toward approval, emphasizing how much progress had been made in recent weeks.

With all 45 Democrats apparently in favor of the treaty, Lott's final position is widely seen as critical in getting the 22 Republican votes needed to achieve the two-thirds majority required for treaty approval. With his support, the treaty could well exceed that total by a comfortable margin.

President Clinton re-emphasized the importance he attaches to the treaty at an event at the White House on Wednesday where he appeared with Dole, retired Gen. Colin Powell, supporters of the treaty from past administrations, and George Clark, a World War I veteran who was gassed by the Germans at Soissons in 1918.

Clinton, confronting the certainty that defeat on this treaty would gravely damage his prestige, has become increasingly involved in recent weeks. He told the audience at the White House on Wednesday: "This treaty will make our troops safer. It will make our nation more secure. It will at least reduce the likelihood that innocent civilians here and around the world will be exposed in the future to horrible chemical weapons."

As he was speaking, Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., was telling the Senate, "It should be obvious that our objective of combating the global threat of chemical weapons cannot be met without working in concert with other nations." Biden, the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said the treaty would isolate noncomplying nations and provide "a moral, if not legal, basis for taking military action."

But Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chairman of the committee, said the convention should be rejected because, "it is not global, it is not verifiable, and it will not work." He sneered at the argument that 74 nations had already ratified the treaty, saying, "We might as well go with the flow and sign up."

Lott told a news conference on Wednesday morning that last September he would have voted against the treaty, but that the administration's agreement to 28 conditions on ratification this year had made it a close question for him. He said he would not take a position until after votes are taken

on five more conditions on Thursday afternoon.

The conditions, backed by Helms, are considered "killer amendments" by the administration.

Lott also said he was hoping for further reassurances on such issues as whether the United States would be required to share technology, scientific information and equipment with "rogue" nations like Iran, which has signed the treaty, and North Korea, which has not.

But an indication of Lott's inclinations came in the fact that he singled out one of those five votes for special attention, and that was the one the administration is willing to lose.

The treaty already allows nations to reject individual inspectors, one by one. This condition would enable the United States to reject inspectors from nations the United States considers supporters of terrorism. Biden and Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the leading Republican supporter of the treaty, called that provision merely "bad policy."

Biden and Lugar said the other four conditions were worse. One would require the treaty to be renegotiated to curb the exchange of information; after the 10 years it took to agree on this version, supporters said that was impossible. Two more conditions make U.S. approval contingent on ratification by other nations.

The fourth would bar ratification until the president could certify the United States' ability to detect the illegal production or storage of a single ton of a chemical agent, a goal no authority considers attainable.

A majority vote will decide these five issues. Helms said that if all five of these conditions were included, then the treaty would at least "do no harm." Biden said the treaty's foes did not really care about its details. "At bottom they have a theological opposition to arms control."

Under the treaty, all nations ratifying it pledge never "to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone." They further pledge to destroy the weapons they possess, along with all factories to produce them.

It establishes procedures for monitoring the civilian chemical industry to insure that it is not making poison gas components and for systematic inspections of each ratifying nation.

It also provides for challenge inspections, in which suspect storage or production equipment must be opened to international inspection on demand.

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The New York Times  
April 24, 1997

Chemical Arms Treaty: The Fine Print

**CURRENT SIGNERS:** Signing began in Paris on Jan. 13, 1993, when 130 nations signed, including the United States and Russia. The total is now 163.

**CURRENT RATIFIERS:** 74 countries. Iran, China and Russia have signed but not ratified; Iraq and Libya have not signed.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** On Tuesday, 180 days after the 65th ratification. On May 6, a conference is to select members of the executive council, which sets rules for verification. Countries not party to the treaty get no seats.

**NATIONS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS:** Only the United States, Russia and Iraq report having such weapons. About 20 other countries have or are seeking the ability to make them, including North Korea, India, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, China and Israel.

## PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

- Bans development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons.
- Prohibits any party from helping any other country to do any of the above.
  
- Requires elimination of all chemical weapons and their production facilities by 2007, although the United States is already obligated by law to do so by 2004.
  
- Creates Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to conduct routine and unannounced inspections of companies using chemicals covered by the treaty. Intrusiveness of verification varies with the risk that a facility or its chemical products could be used for prohibited purposes.
  
- Requires parties to report location of chemical weapons storage sites, location and characteristics of chemical weapons production and research facilities, details of all chemical-weapons equipment transfers since 1946, plans for destroying chemical weapons and location and activities of any facility using or producing controlled chemicals.
  
- Takes into account dual-use chemicals that can be used for weapons production.
  
- Allows any party to the treaty to request a "challenge inspection" of any site in another nation. The request may be denied if three-quarters of the 41 countries on the executive council object; the council must act within 12 hours. Allows the country facing inspection to manage access to protect military secrets or companies' proprietary information.
  
- Establishes trade sanctions on chemical exports from countries not part of the treaty.

## AMENDMENTS PENDING IN THE SENATE

Before voting on the treaty (approval requires a two-thirds majority, or 67 votes), the United States Senate is to debate and vote by simple majority on five amendments that the White House says would destroy the treaty:

- A bar to U.S. ratification until Russia ratifies the treaty and fulfills an earlier agreement to destroy stocks of poison gas.
  
- A bar to U.S. ratification until "rogue states" like Iraq, Iran and Libya ratify the treaty.
  
- Higher standards for verification against cheating, requiring the ability to detect as little as one metric ton of a chemical weapons agent.
  
- A bar to inspectors from countries that Washington labels supporters of international terrorism.
  
- The elimination or renegotiation of provisions requiring the exchange of information between countries about chemical weapons and how to protect against such weapons. This amendment has been the focus of the strongest complaints by opponents.

## THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE

The administration says U.S. participation should not be held hostage to Russia or rogue states; that it is impossible to detect very small amounts of chemical weapons, but that preparations to use such quantities can be detected; that banning inspectors from terrorist nations would effectively ban American inspectors from the very countries Washington wants to inspect, and that exchange of information with terrorist or rogue countries will be very limited.

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The New York Times

April 24, 1997

Dole No Senator, but Might as Well Be

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

WASHINGTON -- The Senate debate over the chemical weapons treaty was in its second hour, waxing slow and grave as only the Senate treaty process can, when the scene was suddenly interrupted by Sen. John McCain, looking wide-eyed as a newsboy about to shout, "Extra!" He rushed in, grabbed a microphone and took the floor with a deep breath.

"Is the senator aware Senator Bob Dole, the former majority leader, has just announced his support for the treaty?" he asked Joseph Biden Jr., the Delaware Democrat who had been ascending through a riff of oratory. Biden stood alone across the aisle, charged with the task of steering the treaty through a two-day thicket of political and procedural objections led by the Senate's most redoubtable conservative, Jesse Helms, R-N.C.

At the interruption, Biden was handed a hurried note with the same news -- that Dole, who by now was supposed to be resting somewhere between Russell, Kan., and oblivion, was once again proving to be the most dynamic force in the environs of the feckless 105th Congress.

Just as he proved to have deep pockets a week ago for House Speaker Newt Gingrich, lending him the \$300,000 for an ethics fine, Dole smilingly butted into the Senate debate with an endorsement of the chemical weapons treaty that could not have been better timed to steal the debate floor. Once more, the political demise of Bob Dole was proving to be grossly exaggerated.

Biden offered an enormous grin, as if delivered from the very fear he described at the outset -- that, while the treaty was entirely the product of the Reagan and Bush administrations, Republican critics in the Senate would be trying to demonize President Clinton to turn the issue from one of national security to partisan politics.

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The news put fresh sting in the debate, catching everybody short, possibly even Dole's successor as Republican majority leader, Trent Lott of Mississippi. "We have to see the final product and evaluate whether it is over all in our best interest to be a party to it or not," the senator said, carefully noncommittal at a Capitol news conference about the same time Citizen Dole was endorsing the treaty with more headline-making power than he had commanded on a typical day as presidential nominee or majority leader.

Before Dole's action, this first day of debate seemed designed to soothe the objections of Helms, highlighting 28 concessions to him specified in the resolution language to help get the treaty to the

floor. The administration had even agreed to a pet goal of Helms to make some changes in the structure of the State Department.

"The immortal words of Yogi Berra come to mind," Helms declared, opening the debate. "Everybody remembers it: 'It's deja vu all over again,'" he said, noting that the same treaty was pulled back from the floor after Dole, two months before Election Day, voiced reservations.

While Dole said the concessions won by Helms were key to his endorsement on Wednesday, Helms, grumbling about merely "adding sweetener to hemlock," firmly vowed to fight on during the next two days over five more contentious points. These are labeled "killer amendments" by Biden and the administration because they would require renegotiation of the treaty, which has already been approved by 74 nations and is scheduled to take effect Tuesday, with or without the United States.

"This treaty is worse than nothing," even with the 28 concessions, Helms declared. He warned it would deliver a false sense of security while rogue nations not signed up would develop chemical weapons.

McCain, R-Ariz., and other supporters stressed that the United States had unilaterally renounced chemical weapons in 1991 and that the treaty was mainly an opportunity to help lead the new multinational monitoring process. "This is first and foremost a treaty about limiting other countries' chemical weapons, because we're already doing away with our own," he said.

Helms promised to fight on toward the final vote on Thursday night, amendment by amendment. As soon as the news of Dole's endorsement arrived, Helms had the record researched so he could carefully cite the concerns the Republican presidential candidate articulated last September, that the treaty was not "effectively verifiable and genuinely global."

Heading deeper into the debate, with the outcome still not clear, Helms dismissed Dole's surprise return to the business of the Senate: "The administration has reassured him incorrectly that all his concerns have been taken care of."

\*\*\*\*\*

April 24, 1997

The New York Times

Letters to the Editor

U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty

To the Editor:

Re A. M. Rosenthal's "Matter of Character" (column, April 22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate will vote on April 24:

Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be a "deal breaker" because it allegedly would give "terrorist nations" access to defensive technology that would help them evade the defenses of responsible states.

Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request defensive assistance -- and then only if they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further, President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding condition that the United States will limit our assistance to countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba -- should they ratify and comply with the treaty -- to emergency medical supplies.

And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons

Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons.

ROBERT G. BELL

Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control National Security Council Washington, April 22, 1997

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

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>We, as citizens of a planet under threat of irreparable damage  
>from the illegal threat of nuclear weapons, and acting in  
>accordance with our obligation under the Nuremberg Principles to  
>uphold the law, hereby give you notice that unless you take  
>immediate action to review NATO's illegal nuclear policy, we  
>shall use all means in our power, including

taking part in, advocating individual and mass participation in, and  
conspiring with others to organize for

>direct non-violent  
>resistance, to intervene against all preparations for nuclear war  
>at the places where they are carried out.  
>

Looks great, I'd love to help present this! Might we add a bit of mustard  
such as suggested above?

Jack

---

the Nuclear Resister  
"a chronicle of hope"  
P.O. Box 43383  
Tucson AZ 85733  
Felice & Jack Cohen-Joppa, editors  
520-323-8697/nukeresister@igc.org

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1. "GOP Senators Move to Support Ban on Chemical Arms," Adam Clymer, The New York Times, 4/24
2. "Chemical Arms Treaty, The Fine Print," The New York Times, 4/24 (The Washington Post has a similiar primer)
3. "Dole No Senator, but Might as Well Be," Francis X. Clines, New York Times, 4/24
4. "U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty," Bob Bell, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 4/22

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The New York Times

April 24, 1997

GOP Senators Move to Support Ban on Chemical Arms

By ADAM CLYMER

WASHINGTON -- A growing number of Republican senators, urged on by their former leader, Bob Dole, said on Wednesday that they were looking for reasons to support the Chemical Weapons Convention when it comes to a decisive vote on Thursday.

While the majority leader, Trent Lott of Mississippi, remained noncommittal on how he would vote on the treaty, which is designed to ban the production, stockpiling and use of poison gas, Dole shifted away from the opposition he abruptly voiced last fall in his presidential campaign.

Dole said on Wednesday that the treaty now had "adequate safeguards."

Lott began to sound as if he, too, was leaning toward approval, emphasizing how much progress had been made in recent weeks.

With all 45 Democrats apparently in favor of the treaty, Lott's final position is widely seen as critical in getting the 22 Republican votes needed to achieve the two-thirds majority required for treaty approval. With his support, the treaty could well exceed that total by a comfortable margin.

President Clinton re-emphasized the importance he attaches to the treaty at an event at the White House on Wednesday where he appeared with Dole, retired Gen. Colin Powell, supporters of the treaty from past administrations, and George Clark, a World War I veteran who was gassed by the Germans at Soissons in 1918.

Clinton, confronting the certainty that defeat on this treaty would gravely damage his prestige, has become increasingly involved in recent weeks. He told the audience at the White House on Wednesday: "This treaty will make our troops safer. It will make our nation more secure. It will at least reduce the likelihood that innocent civilians here and around the world will be exposed in the future to horrible chemical weapons."

As he was speaking, Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., was telling the Senate, "It should be obvious that our objective of combating the global threat of chemical weapons cannot be met without working in concert with other nations." Biden, the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said the treaty would isolate noncomplying nations and provide "a moral, if not legal, basis for taking military action."

But Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chairman of the committee, said the convention should be rejected because, "it is not global, it is not verifiable, and it will not work." He sneered at the argument that 74 nations had already ratified the treaty, saying, "We might as well go with the flow and sign up."

Lott told a news conference on Wednesday morning that last September he would have voted against the treaty, but that the administration's agreement to 28 conditions on ratification this year had made it a close question for him. He said he would not take a position until after votes are taken

on five more conditions on Thursday afternoon.

The conditions, backed by Helms, are considered "killer amendments" by the administration.

Lott also said he was hoping for further reassurances on such issues as whether the United States would be required to share technology, scientific information and equipment with "rogue" nations like Iran, which has signed the treaty, and North Korea, which has not.

But an indication of Lott's inclinations came in the fact that he singled out one of those five votes for special attention, and that was the one the administration is willing to lose.

The treaty already allows nations to reject individual inspectors, one by one. This condition would enable the United States to reject inspectors from nations the United States considers supporters of terrorism. Biden and Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the leading Republican supporter of the treaty, called that provision merely "bad policy."

Biden and Lugar said the other four conditions were worse. One would require the treaty to be renegotiated to curb the exchange of information; after the 10 years it took to agree on this version, supporters said that was impossible. Two more conditions make U.S. approval contingent on ratification by other nations.

The fourth would bar ratification until the president could certify the United States' ability to detect the illegal production or storage of a single ton of a chemical agent, a goal no authority considers attainable.

A majority vote will decide these five issues. Helms said that if all five of these conditions were included, then the treaty would at least "do no harm." Biden said the treaty's foes did not really care about its details. "At bottom they have a theological opposition to arms control."

Under the treaty, all nations ratifying it pledge never "to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone." They further pledge to destroy the weapons they possess, along with all factories to produce them.

It establishes procedures for monitoring the civilian chemical industry to insure that it is not making poison gas components and for systematic inspections of each ratifying nation.

It also provides for challenge inspections, in which suspect storage or production equipment must be opened to international inspection on demand.

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The New York Times  
April 24, 1997

Chemical Arms Treaty: The Fine Print

**CURRENT SIGNERS:** Signing began in Paris on Jan. 13, 1993, when 130 nations signed, including the United States and Russia. The total is now 163.

**CURRENT RATIFIERS:** 74 countries. Iran, China and Russia have signed but not ratified; Iraq and Libya have not signed.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** On Tuesday, 180 days after the 65th ratification. On May 6, a conference is to select members of the executive council, which sets rules for verification. Countries not party to the treaty get no seats.

**NATIONS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS:** Only the United States, Russia and Iraq report having such weapons. About 20 other countries have or are seeking the ability to make them, including North Korea, India, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, China and Israel.

## PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

- Bans development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons.
- Prohibits any party from helping any other country to do any of the above.
  
- Requires elimination of all chemical weapons and their production facilities by 2007, although the United States is already obligated by law to do so by 2004.
  
- Creates Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to conduct routine and unannounced inspections of companies using chemicals covered by the treaty. Intrusiveness of verification varies with the risk that a facility or its chemical products could be used for prohibited purposes.
  
- Requires parties to report location of chemical weapons storage sites, location and characteristics of chemical weapons production and research facilities, details of all chemical-weapons equipment transfers since 1946, plans for destroying chemical weapons and location and activities of any facility using or producing controlled chemicals.
  
- Takes into account dual-use chemicals that can be used for weapons production.
  
- Allows any party to the treaty to request a "challenge inspection" of any site in another nation. The request may be denied if three-quarters of the 41 countries on the executive council object; the council must act within 12 hours. Allows the country facing inspection to manage access to protect military secrets or companies' proprietary information.
  
- Establishes trade sanctions on chemical exports from countries not part of the treaty.

## AMENDMENTS PENDING IN THE SENATE

Before voting on the treaty (approval requires a two-thirds majority, or 67 votes), the United States Senate is to debate and vote by simple majority on five amendments that the White House says would destroy the treaty:

- A bar to U.S. ratification until Russia ratifies the treaty and fulfills an earlier agreement to destroy stocks of poison gas.
  
- A bar to U.S. ratification until "rogue states" like Iraq, Iran and Libya ratify the treaty.
  
- Higher standards for verification against cheating, requiring the ability to detect as little as one metric ton of a chemical weapons agent.
  
- A bar to inspectors from countries that Washington labels supporters of international terrorism.
  
- The elimination or renegotiation of provisions requiring the exchange of information between countries about chemical weapons and how to protect against such weapons. This amendment has been the focus of the strongest complaints by opponents.

## THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE

The administration says U.S. participation should not be held hostage to Russia or rogue states; that it is impossible to detect very small amounts of chemical weapons, but that preparations to use such quantities can be detected; that banning inspectors from terrorist nations would effectively ban American inspectors from the very countries Washington wants to inspect, and that exchange of information with terrorist or rogue countries will be very limited.

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The New York Times

April 24, 1997

Dole No Senator, but Might as Well Be

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

WASHINGTON -- The Senate debate over the chemical weapons treaty was in its second hour, waxing slow and grave as only the Senate treaty process can, when the scene was suddenly interrupted by Sen. John McCain, looking wide-eyed as a newsboy about to shout, "Extra!" He rushed in, grabbed a microphone and took the floor with a deep breath.

"Is the senator aware Senator Bob Dole, the former majority leader, has just announced his support for the treaty?" he asked Joseph Biden Jr., the Delaware Democrat who had been ascending through a riff of oratory. Biden stood alone across the aisle, charged with the task of steering the treaty through a two-day thicket of political and procedural objections led by the Senate's most redoubtable conservative, Jesse Helms, R-N.C.

At the interruption, Biden was handed a hurried note with the same news -- that Dole, who by now was supposed to be resting somewhere between Russell, Kan., and oblivion, was once again proving to be the most dynamic force in the environs of the feckless 105th Congress.

Just as he proved to have deep pockets a week ago for House Speaker Newt Gingrich, lending him the \$300,000 for an ethics fine, Dole smilingly butted into the Senate debate with an endorsement of the chemical weapons treaty that could not have been better timed to steal the debate floor. Once more, the political demise of Bob Dole was proving to be grossly exaggerated.

Biden offered an enormous grin, as if delivered from the very fear he described at the outset -- that, while the treaty was entirely the product of the Reagan and Bush administrations, Republican critics in the Senate would be trying to demonize President Clinton to turn the issue from one of national security to partisan politics.

"You'll hear, 'This liberal president did this liberal thing, got sucked in,'" Biden told the gallery of rainy-day visitors. "Malarkey!" he countered in his straw man mini-debate, clearly bracing for two rugged days of holding the rhetorical fort. "This president had nothing to do with it. Zero. Nothing," said the senator, soon before the news rolled down Pennsylvania Avenue of Dole's surprise endorsement side by side with the president he had challenged and failed to defeat.

The news put fresh sting in the debate, catching everybody short, possibly even Dole's successor as Republican majority leader, Trent Lott of Mississippi. "We have to see the final product and evaluate whether it is over all in our best interest to be a party to it or not," the senator said, carefully noncommittal at a Capitol news conference about the same time Citizen Dole was endorsing the treaty with more headline-making power than he had commanded on a typical day as presidential nominee or majority leader.

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"The immortal words of Yogi Berra come to mind," Helms declared, opening the debate. "Everybody remembers it: 'It's deja vu all over again,'" he said, noting that the same treaty was pulled back from the floor after Dole, two months before Election Day, voiced reservations.

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April 24, 1997

The New York Times

Letters to the Editor

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And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure other parties to the Chemical Weapons

Convention do the same if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of chemical weapons.

ROBERT G. BELL

Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control National Security Council Washington, April 22, 1997

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Dear Abolitionists, While we await the outcome of the US vote tomorrow on ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, please could anyone among the US Abolition 2000 team summarise and promulgate all the excellent arguments made by Clinton for ratification? When I watched him on CNN TV last week at a press conference, I was struck by how usefully his pitch could be transferred to support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Next, I hope we will make the most of the read-across when the CWC comes into force next Tuesday 29 April, with or without US and Russian ratification. I believe this is a prime media peg for us.

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Senate passage of a chemical weapons treaty was President Clinton's first big foreign policy victory of his second term, one he hopes will create momentum for other battles looming ahead.

Ratification of the treaty banning chemical weapons was only the first in a series of contentious issues that Democrat Clinton will ask the Republican-controlled Congress to act upon in coming months.

Working the phones, capitalizing on support from Republicans like former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and retired Gen. Colin Powell, Clinton was able to convince enough moderate Republicans to his side to win Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by a 74-26 vote.

A senior White House official said the favorable outcome was "enormously important because it demonstrates that there is a bipartisan centrist coalition that can hold together on sensitive foreign policy issues."

"This bodes well for some of the other foreign policy issues that will come up down the way," he said. "We have tough issues down the line."

Clinton's victory was seen by some as an important show of strength at a time when he has been under fire by the same Congress for 1996 campaign fund-raising practices that will be the subject of congressional hearings.

It also meant the United States did not have to suffer the international embarrassment it would have received if, as an originator of the treaty, it refused to ratify it.

"That would've been hard to explain," said one official.

Heading the list of looming issues is expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include former Soviet satellites. To expand NATO requires amending the North Atlantic treaty. The Senate would have to approve it, and any decision of that magnitude would prompt a lively debate.

Congress this summer will have to decide whether to accept Clinton's expected decision to renew Most Favored Nation trading status for China.

Some in Congress would like to punish China for what they consider a poor record on human rights, nuclear technology sales and allegations that Beijing tried to influence U.S. elections through illegal campaign contributions.

A fight just as difficult as the chemical weapons treaty is predicted for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that Clinton signed last year. It would ban nuclear test explosions, but many military people feel the blasts are needed to maintain the U.S. atomic arsenal properly.

Clinton wants Congress to give him authority to negotiate a speedy agreement to include Chile in the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada. He also wants a bigger budget for the State Department, and congressional approval for a State Department reorganization.

White House officials said that even though Clinton won this

one, he will not necessarily win the others.

"This is a success, but we want to keep it in perspective. Each and every one of these issues will require a lot of hard work and a lot of consultation with the majority and the minority in both houses of Congress," said one senior official.

Analysts agreed that Clinton needed the victory of the chemical treaty for what he faces ahead.

"Were it not ratified, it would be perceived as a resounding defeat for him and his foreign policy," said Doug Johnston of the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. "And that's a much weaker position to be coming from when you're making additional demands of the Congress."

Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace think tank said the outcome showed that "on balance, the president is not enfeebled."

"He is a powerful political force who can get what he needs when the issue is joined," he said.

White House officials were careful to dole out praise to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the Mississippi Republican whose support for the treaty was crucial in its passage. They were also careful not to criticize Sen. Jesse Helms, the conservative North Carolina who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and who led the opposition.

"A lot of tribute has to go to Lott," said one senior official. "He was a square shooter and he established a process that helped us deal with Helms. It was one of his first trials under fire as majority leader and he sailed through it with flying colors."

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RTw 04/24 1718 U.S. denies seeking world domination

(adds details, quotes, background)

By Carol Giacomo

WASHINGTON, April 24 (Reuter) - The United States on Thursday welcomed a growing closeness between Russia and China and denied their suggestions that Washington sought "domination or a unipolar world."

But State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns also asserted that the U.S. wielded a special power and influence around the globe.

"The United States welcomes the agreement signed between Russia and China, because we hope that Russia and China will fully normalise their bilateral relationship and take efforts to make sure that the long border between those countries is stable and peaceful," he told a news briefing.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed a treaty on Thursday in Moscow on troop reductions along the former Sino-Soviet border. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also participated.

On Wednesday, Yeltsin and Jiang issued a declaration outlining their vision of the post-Cold War world and voicing opposition to claims by any country for world leadership.

Burns said he was surprised the media characterised the meeting as a kind of face-off with the United States.

That may have been true in the 1970s, when then Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger and other American officials pursued a "triangular diplomacy" that played Russia and China off against each other, Burns said.

But he argued that in the 1990s things had changed, with rivalry between Washington and Moscow replaced by "friendship and partnership" leading to a decreased nuclear threat.

Also now, "we have a policy of engagement with China and all of this improves stability, security, and the chances for peace in Europe and Asia. So I was surprised at a lot of the press commentary ... that somehow this was a bad thing for the United States," Burns said of the Yeltsin-Jiang meeting.

Yeltsin and Jiang said in their declaration that "no country should seek hegemony, practise power politics or monopolise international affairs." They did not mention any specific country but clearly had the United States in mind.

Moscow and Beijing see both the treaty and the declaration as part of their new relationship of "partnership aimed at strategic cooperation in the 21st century," but both sides ruled out any closer union.

Burns said it was "difficult for any group of countries to get together and diagram, as if you were in a political science class, what structure the world's going to be. Power and influence in the world are governed by interests, by economic power, military power, political influence and values.

"I think it's very clear that the only country in the world that has all those things together and moving forward is the United States," he said.

"That does not mean that we seek any kind of domination or a unipolar world. We want to have very close relationships with Russia, China and a number of the other great powers in the world. And that's the basis of our foreign policy."

Russia turned to China after its honeymoon with the West ended over NATO's decision to expand into eastern Europe, which Moscow sees as a security threat.

The United States, leader of the controversial effort to expand NATO, has also played a major role in negotiating with Russia a charter outlining ties and a formal cooperation between Moscow and the alliance into the next century.

Yeltsin, in an apparent attempt to win more concessions from the West, has publicly declared his willingness to sign the charter in Paris on May 27.

But Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on Wednesday took a hard line and ruled out compromise on key Russian demands. She is to visit Moscow next week to try to resolve the problem.

Also next week, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen plans to visit Washington for talks with Albright and President Bill Clinton. The two countries are trying to arrange exchange summits for later this year and early next year.

REUTER

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>From: GMR@MCR1.poptel.org.uk  
>Date: Wed, 23 Apr 1997 11:01:30 +0100 GMT  
>Subject: NPU Bulletin 23 Apr  
>To: nfznc@gn.apc.org  
>  
>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY  
>  
>Weds 23 Apr 1997  
>  
>97-8471 Bungling of accident at Japan's nuclear reprocessing facility  
> at Tokai last month deals serious blow to Japan's n/power.  
> Gwen Robinson reports. FT  
>97-8472 Container of radioactive waste found to be damaged and emitting  
> excessive radiation en route by road from Trawsfynydd to Drigg  
> in Cumbria. Ind  
>  
>  
>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.  
>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.  
>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk  
>  
>

Stewart Kemp (nfznc@gn.apc.org)

forwarded

Hi!

I hope none of you are offended at my first-time use of this email list. I am using it to announce a Cassini related, very time-sensitive item. I will not email you again as a group. If you wish to get on my new Cassini newsletter, please email me separately.

I have written a draft of a response to NASA's just-published DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CASSINI MISSION. NASA has opened the door for comment on the CASSINI mission Environmental Impact. I believe NASA's science is poorly done and poorly reported.

My response is titled "Laugh, Cry, Be Angry, Do Something" and subtitled "I.Q. Test for Space Cadets."

Since the review process only goes until May 27th, 1997 at 4:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time, it is imperative that EVERYONE opposed to CASSINI comment on the Draft Supplement before that time. I hope that you will want to use some of my 36 points -- or all of them -- to demand reasonable, logical, sensible, honest answers from NASA. Answers I do not think they give.

The NASA address to request a copy of the supplement for yourself, or to contact NASA, is contained in the article. There are 36 points of contention. If anyone who reads the document can think of any others, or if anyone thinks I should remove some before forwarding a final copy to NASA, please contact me as quickly as possible so I can consider your suggestions. THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR ANY SUGGESTIONS.

Here is the URL of the article:  
<http://www.animatedsoftware.com/cassini/dsei9704.htm>

If you do not have Internet Web capabilities and would like a copy of the article, please email me and I will email you a copy of the file (you'll still need a HTML browser, but it can be offline).

I cannot thank KARL GROSSMAN enough for his encouragement, contacts, and test-listening not only for this article, but to others at my STOP CASSINI web site (which you can find, of course, linked to the DRAFT RESPONSE article.) You can also find a number of Karl's articles at the site as well, and links to still more.

Sincerely,  
Russell D. Hoffman, [rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com](mailto:rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com)  
\*\*\*\*\*

\*\* THE ANIMATED SOFTWARE COMPANY  
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\*\*\*\*\*

Hi, folks.

I'd like to invite everyone to check out the new French language version of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons' website:

Le Réseau canadien pour l'abolition des armes nucléaires  
<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/rcaan.html>

The English version can be found at:

<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html>

Comments, suggestions, etc. would be welcomed. Thanks go to Jacques Boucher of le Centre de ressources sur la non-violence for doing the translations; screw-ups are undoubtedly mine...

Bill Robinson, Project Ploughshares,  
Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G6  
Phone: 519 888-6541 x264 Fax: 519 885-0806  
E-mail: [plough@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca](mailto:plough@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca)  
<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough>

Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html>)

Dear Friends,

The following "Sunflower Statement" accompanied a live sunflower which was presented by Abolition Networkers to each of the NPT delegates as they entered the conference room on the last day of the PrepCom.

To the Delegates to the April 1997 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting, United Nations, New York (April 18, 1997)

We, of the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, offer you this gift of sunflowers as an expression of our commitment to the urgent need for the world to become nuclear free, a commitment legally enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. We bring you these flowers and our views in good faith. All that we ask is that you respond in kind.

During the last two weeks we have been deeply frustrated at our exclusion from the PrepCom. It is not acceptable that delegates of non-governmental organizations representing millions of citizens around the globe be barred from the proceedings. Ambassador Dhanapala in his final speech to the NPT Review and Extension Conference emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations in ridding the world of the nuclear scourge.

As our founding statement says, "A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity." We urge the vast majority of delegates – whose governments we know genuinely share this aspiration – to ensure that the final report of the PrepCom includes a firm commitment to early and substantive NGO participation in the whole NPT Review Process. Anything less will be unacceptable. The fact that NGOs were excluded from virtually all proceedings, and were only able to present their views in a limited fashion, without access to full information, was unconscionable and contrary to democratic principles. The fact that the NGOs shared their information and expertise after the major work of this meeting has been completed was unfortunate and must not be repeated.

We plead with you to bring a sense of great urgency to your work. Even if we should be fortunate enough to escape the increasingly likely catastrophe of nuclear war or accident, toxic radioactive waste is accumulating all over the planet, seeping into our water, poisoning the air, fouling the earth, threatening all life for hundreds of thousands of years. The proliferation of nuclear technology, both military and commercial, continues unabated. In the heady days when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the expectation of all people was that we would move rapidly to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the transfer of resources to meet real human needs. Instead Cold War attitudes persist in plans to expand NATO and continue nuclear testing in the weapons laboratories – plans which threaten further opportunities for real progress on disarmament. Yet, at this PrepCom, only timid and paltry measures are sought, such as negative security assurances and fissile materials cut off, which further codify the status quo and reinforce the domination of the existing nuclear weapon states.

The majority of people in every land want to see an end to nuclear weapons,

nuclear power and nuclear contamination. The whole world desperately needs investment in toxic and nuclear clean up, solar energy and our young people. Even on this last day of the PrepCom it is not too late for courageous action to be taken.

It's time to stop the deadly dance and take the weapons off alert, separate the warheads from the missiles, and start negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons just as we have done for biological and chemical weapons.

The World Court has spoken.

The Generals and Admirals have spoken.

The leaders of the world are out of touch with their own majorities and military experts.

Abolition of nuclear weapons is an idea whose time has come. If you're not cooperating, you're collaborating. Join us!

Alice Slater

GRACE

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment

15 East 26 St., Room 915

New York, NY 10010

212-726-9161 (tel)

212-726-9160 (fax)

aslater@igc.apc.org <email>

forwarded message

>From Abraham Behar MD, Vice-President Europe

Dear Friends,

Here is the Report and Statement of the International Seminar which was held in Moscow, Russia from April 17 - 18 1997, just after Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed in Helsinki the project of extending NATO to include former Eastern Block countries. This project should be signed at the end of May and will be submitted to the Russian Parliament before being adopted by NATO members in Madrid.

The present Nato agreement includes the implantation of nuclear weapons in member countries. The extending of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries thus brings about a dissemination of nuclear arms to countries around Russia. As was obvious from our meetings in Moscow, this extension is perceived as a danger to Russia, since the present state of Russian conventional weapons makes nuclear arms appear an essential element of their means of defence. This constitutes a regression to the situation which existed during the Cold War.

The physicians of IPPNW, who consider prevention to be the best means of avoiding conflicts, must draw attention to the new danger which the extension of NATO to Eastern Block countries represents and prone a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe as an essential element of security and peace within Europe.

Please keep us informed of your activities for peace in Europe. Good luck to you all!

Kind regards,

Abraham Behar  
IPPNW European Vice-President

+++++

Report and Statement of the International Seminar  
PERSPECTIVES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT  
AND A NEW CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY  
Moscow, Russia, April 17-18, 1997

As for diseases, physicians consider PREVENTION to be the most effective medical principle. That is the reason why physicians intervene in strategic debates and also propose solutions on social and global concerns that might reflect on the human health. The negative medical consequences of nuclear weapons production, and the risks for nuclear weapons states to escalate into nuclear warfare during international conflicts, has called upon the international medical society for appropriate prescriptions. In this spirit 28 Physicians, Military Experts and Political Councillors from seven countries, according to the enclosed list, have met in Moscow to discuss nuclear weapons and European security issues.

The meeting was arranged by the Russian IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) in cooperation with Swedish IPPNW (SLMK), and took place at the Academy of Medical Sciences and at the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

The following topics were covered during the seminar

The 1996 decision of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal according to international law.

The 1996 report from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from September 1996 voted for by 158 states and already signed by all five official nuclear weapons possessing states.

The 60 Generals and Admirals Statement of 5 December 1996 on the necessity of nuclear weapons abolition.

The Russian defense doctrine, and public reactions to the recent planning of a NATO expansion into eastern Europe.

The concepts of National Security, Common Security and Global Security.

The role of Physicians and IPPNW in international security matters.

## Conclusions

A security concept for Europe should be a common security, taking into account all people and all states in the region. After the cold war, it is evident that such a common security shall have a wide perspective, including economic, environmental, educational and legal dimensions. This new security thinking includes a specific nuclear weapons disarmament programme aiming at a nuclear weapons abolition. A treaty for a nuclear weapons free zone in eastern Europe should be considered as an early step in such a programme.

The recent proposal and concrete planning of NATO expansion up to the Russian border has created deep disappointment and mistrust within the Russian population as well as within all Russian political parties. NATO is today considered the same military alliance as during the cold war, with unchanged constitution.

NATO expansion, planned for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, will create walls in Europe. It will also lead to nuclear weapons proliferation, violating the Non Proliferation Treaty from 1995, specifically the crucial Article VI.

NATO expansion will be very expensive, particularly for the European NATO-partners, and will undermine social development so urgently needed for the benefit of health and education in the region.

The deep mistrust and a feeling of humiliation in Russia, expressed repeatedly during this seminar, could lead to a down-ward spiral in international relations, similar to the tragic experiences during the early cold war 50 years ago.

The 1996 four documents discussed at this seminar logically rule out nuclear weapons as way to safeguard health, as well as confining that they are military useless. The reasons for the nuclear weapons states neither to dismiss these annihilating devices immediately, nor to abandon the deterrence doctrine, relate to national prestige, psychological defence mechanisms and most of all, mistrust and fear. The seminar also touched upon the possibility of a nuclear weapons addictive mechanism in analogy

with drug addiction. Actions to counteract mistrust and fear in eastern Europe and in the NATO affiliated states, must be given highest priority at all diplomatic and public levels.

Some concrete suggestions and plans for the future IPPNW members in NATO states will be alerted in order to mobilise public opinion against NATO expansion.

The four 1996 documents on nuclear weapons, discussed at this seminar, will be further discussed and made public at similar seminars in Paris and London during 1997.

The Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in the US will specifically be informed about this seminar and the results, in order to mobilise US public and political opinion against NATO expansion.

IPPNW affiliates in the candidate countries for entering the NATO, will also be specifically contacted.

The delegates of this seminar strongly advocate that all nuclear weapons states take all nuclear forces off alert. This would be an important step in order to shape trust, and could be undertaken by any of the five states.

It would also lower the risk for nuclear weapons explosion by mistake, a reality witnessed by high militaries formerly in charge of these systems.

Symbolic actions in favour of nuclear weapons disarmament, like the "Sunflower project" initiated by the Russian, Ukrainian and US Ministers for Defence meeting in Ukraina, will be promoted.

International "Youth Positive Thinking" and "School-Twinning programmes" like the Life-Link project will be promoted by several of the seminar delegates, bringing these projects to their children and grand-children.

Such school-twinning and youth projects will shape confidence and trust across old borders. We must avoid today's fears and adverseries to be the legacy for future generations.

Cooperation with other organisations aiming at nuclear weapons abolition and conventional weapons disarmament and peace will continue.

The OSCE (Organisation for Security and Confidence in Europe) role for a comprehensive European security, based on law and early conflict resolution will be stressed at future IPPNW seminars and conferences.

Annual IPPNW initiated seminars in Russia will have high priority.

Delegates of the Moscow Seminar, 19 April 1997

List of participants

Foreign:

1. Ron McCoy, M.D., IPPNW Co-Chairman, IPPNW Vice-President for the Asia Pacific Region, member of Canberra Commission, Malaysia
2. Abraham Behar, M.D., PHD., IPPNW Vice President for Europe, France
3. Jacques Mongnet, AMFPGN (IPPNW-France) General Secretary, France
4. Prof. Raymond Galinsky, AMFPGN, France
5. Jacob Obbekjaer, M.D., IPPNW-Denmark, Denmark
6. Gunnar Westberg, M.D., Chairman of SLMK (IPPNW-Sweden), Sweden
7. Klas Lundius, SLMK Executive Director, Sweden
8. Hans Levander, M.D., SLMK, Sweden
9. Christina Lundius, M.D., SLMK, Sweden
10. Vendela Englund-Burnett, M.D., SLMK, Sweden
11. Commander Robert Green, RN (Ret.), World Court Project UK, Chair,

Great Britain

RUSSIA/CIS:

1. Academician Evgeniy Chasov, Co-founder of IPPNW, Moscow
2. Academician Sergei I. Kolesnikov, M.D., IPPNW Co-President, IPPNW-Russia Chairman, Irkutsk
3. Academician Aleksander B. Zborovskiy, M.D., Russian Academy of Medical Scs., Branch of the Institute of Reumatology, professor, Volgograd
4. Major General Vladimir S. Byelous, (Ret.), "Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament", Moscow
5. Vice Admiral Evgeny D. Chernov, (Ret.), Hero of the Soviet Union, St.Petersburg
6. Nikolai N. Izvekov, Councillor to the Foriegn Politics Association, Moscow
7. Aleksander I. Nikitin, Director of the Center of International Politics Research, Moscow
8. Vladimir Popov, M.D., IPPNW Vice-President for CIS, Moscow
9. Grigory M. Lokshin, Secretary of the the International Association of Peace Funds, Moscow
10. Prof. Mira M. Kosenko, M.D., Chelyabinsk
11. Igor Korneev, M.D., St.Petersburg
12. Mikhail I. Rylov, St.Petersburg
13. Vladimir Konin, M.D., Arkhangelsk Oncological Center, Arkhangelsk
14. Vladimir I. Vaschenko, M.D., Chief Sanitary Physician, Severodvinsk
15. Konstantin I. Polyakov, M.D., Chief Physician of Kaliningrad Regional Hospital, Deputy of Regional Duma, Chairman of the Committee for Ecology of the North-Western Parliamentary Assembly, Kaliningrad
16. Albert Andreev, M.D., Head of the Physicians of Russia Association, Rostov
17. Sergei Petrenko, M.D., Byelarus

Summaries of meetings Friday 19 April within the Seminar  
PERSPECTIVES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT  
AND A NEW CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY  
Moscow 18-19 April 1997

Meeting between the Russian Defence Council of the resident, Chief of Staff General N. Klimenko with the assistance of General Lieutenant Viktor Esin and Dr Vladimir Lebedev, Department of strategic assesment, and representatives for IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) and Commander ret. British Navy Robert Green. General Klimenko emphasised that the conventional forces of the NATO were so much stronger, maybe ten times stronger, than the Russian forces; that the only defence for Russia rests with the nuclear forces. Certainly the NATO is at the time not aggressive, but maybe in 10-30 years it may have developed into a serious threat to Russia. The enormous natural resources of Russia will be of very importance for Europe and the US. As military men we must be prepared for the worst case scenario. In the 1960s-1970s, NATO used the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons against an attack with conventional weapons. Today Russia must have the option to use nuclear weapons in the same way. As long as the conventional arms of NATO are so much stronger that those of

Russia, our country will not take any initiatives for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

To take the nuclear weapons "off alert" may however be negotiated  
A cut in nuclear arms according to the START3 agreement is possible.

Meeting at the Duma with Dr Tamara Zlotnikova, Committee on Ecology

Discussions about the nuclear accident at Tomsk in 1954

The IPPNW concerns will not today be promoted through the Committee on Ecology.

Some general discussions about a future international peace conference in the Hague took place.

Meeting with Dr Nicolai Grasimenko, Surgeon, Head of the Committee on Health Care, the Duma Discussions on the nuclear weapons security in Russia.

Dr Grasimenko assured the security of the Russian nuclear weapons.

positive to a nuclear abolition "step by step"

positive to a future discussion on taking the nuclear weapons off alert

pointing out that "everything does not depend on Physicians"

interested to have the final document from this seminar, the IPPNW view on a NATO extension eastwards is important recommending the seminar to send a statement to the Russian President Yeltsin

Moscow 19 April 1997

(H Levander SLMK Sweden)

Unofficial translation of Mikhail Gorbachev's letter to the participants of the Seminar:

International foundation for social, economic and political studies

Gorbachev-Foundation

To the participants of the international meeting

"Perspectives of Nuclear Disarmament and a New Concept of European Security":

I cordially greet the participants of the Moscow meeting of the leaders of the international movement "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War". Your aspiration to gather at a round table with politicians, legislators, military men and representatives of prominent non-governmental organizations to discuss the new realities of European security speaks for a high civic and moral responsibility of the professionals who better than anyone appreciate the true value of human life.

My own political experience says that it was, to a great extent, due to the mutual efforts of the public all over the world, that we managed to bear down a seemingly insuperable phenomenon - to put an end to the nuclear arms race and start negotiations on their true reduction. Credit for that should among other be given to Your movement, the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize winner. Here I cannot but point out Academician Chasov and Dr. Lown's initiatives.

As You remember, the hardest to resolve were the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but in the long run a mutually acceptable consensus was reached. Peoples of Europe had a sigh of relief when the treaty on the elimination of mid-range missiles - the most dangerous category of nuclear weapons - was signed. The verdict of the UN General Assembly on the NPT's indefinite prolongation and CTBT open for signing in Autumn 1996, did reinforce hopes of people standing for a nuclear-free world.

Unfortunately, the recent intentions to extend the military North Atlantic Alliance to the East question integration processes going on in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and undermine the atmosphere of trust and good-will neighbourhood. Already now we see to what extent apostles of deterrent policy are inspired, how their hard-die fallacies are being repeated by top-level officials from high podiums, how openly the idea to revise the earlier adopted international treaties on nuclear weapons is brought up now and then.

It would be a fatal mistake to put up with this. On the contrary, it is highly important to activate democartic-minded public, peoples' diplomacy in order not to let new barriers grow in Europe, to stave off the reanimation of the Cold War. Nuclear disarmament policy and practice must be continued. The Earth being on the edge of the third millenium expects reasonable and amenable actions.

I wish all the participants of this meeting to gain new creative power, perform fruitful work and make constructive decisions.

Signed:

Mikhail Gorbachev

1997

Jacques Mongnet  
Secrétaire general  
AMFPGN  
e-mail : amfpgn@calva.net  
Web : <http://myweb.worldnet.fr/a-behar/>

Dear Abolitionists:

A Los Angeles physician, Dr. Wing Mar, called Senator Trent Lott's office, thanking him for supporting the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Staff told him that he was the first person to do so, and that hundreds of angry constituents had already called claiming that the Senator had gone soft.

Dr. Mar correctly believes that we need to counterbalance such accusations, and call to thank Lott if we are to make progress in arms reductions in the 105th Congress as it is controlled by Republicans.

Breathe deep. Bite your tongue and dial: 202-224-6253  
or fax: 202-224-2262.

Thanks.

---

Jonathan Parfrey  
Executive Director  
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Los Angeles  
1316 Third Street Promenade, Suite B1  
Santa Monica, California 90401  
310.458.2694 phone \* 310.458.7925 fax \* psrsm@psr.org \* <http://www.labridge.com/PSR/>

abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Dear Fellow Abolitioners.

Following is a draft for the "summons" to be presented on behalf of Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days to each NATO head of state at the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997, the anniversary of the ICJ decision. At the moment I am thinking of printing it on Abolition 2000 headed paper and so it is important to listen to your comments. This example is to President Clinton, but there will be a document addressed to each head of state.

George Farebrother

.....  
TO PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON REPRESENTING THE USA AT  
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO) MEETING  
IN MADRID: 8 JULY 1997

Whereas on 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or World Court, issued its Advisory Opinion on the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons which concluded that:

the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally contrary to international humanitarian law;

no circumstance had been identified in which the use of nuclear weapons would not violate humanitarian law;

there is no distinction in law between threat and use of nuclear weapons;

the limited use of low-yield nuclear weapons would tend to escalate to all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons;

the Nuremberg Principles apply to nuclear weapons. Thus it is the duty of citizens to uphold the law relating to nuclear weapons and of military personnel to obey it even if given a contrary order by a superior or by his or her national government;

the use of a nuclear weapon by a State to protect another State is illegal;

there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion (our emphasis) negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

And whereas on 10 December 1996 the United Nations General Assembly, in response to the ICJ Advisory Opinion, called for negotiations in 1997 leading to the early conclusion of a Nuclear

Weapons Convention;

And whereas NATO is therefore acting illegally by:

retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first in future conflicts;

making plans for its member nuclear weapon States to use nuclear weapons on behalf of other member States: and compounding this violation of international law by a stated intention to apply this doctrine to new member States;

issuing orders to its military personnel to prepare for the illegal use of nuclear weapons;

making conditional plans to use, through its member nuclear weapon States, a stockpile of nuclear weapons which, because of their yield, would necessarily violate international humanitarian law;

condoning the consistent opposition by its member nuclear weapon States to moves towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

We, as citizens of a planet under threat of irreparable damage from the illegal threat of nuclear weapons, and acting in accordance with our obligation under the Nuremberg Principles to uphold the law, hereby give you notice that unless you take immediate action to review NATO's illegal nuclear policy, we shall use all means in our power, including direct non-violent resistance, to intervene against all preparations for nuclear war at the places where they are carried out.

SIGNED.

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The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

World Court Project UK George Farebrother, UK Secretary 67, Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR Phone & Fax 01323 844 269, Email geowcpuk@gn.apc.org

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Forwarded message:

From: cndscot@dial.pipex.com (Scottish CND)

To: NABbasic@aol.com, SWYBasic@aol.com, acronym@gn.apc.org, johnpike@fas.org, katie@chch.planet.co.nz, nukeresister@igc.apc.org, shundahai@saltmine.radix.net, antiatom@twics.com

Date: 97-04-25 09:09:16 EDT

Argyll and Bute Council decided in Lochgilphead on Thursday 24th April to take steps to evict Faslane Peace Camp. Three van loads of police had been brought in to protect the meeting but there were no arrests. The minibus bringing protesters to Lochgilphead had been stopped briefly by police before they reached the town. There was a lively presence as protesters played drums and juggled on the steps outside the council building.

Twenty five supporters of the Camp were present at the Finance Committee meeting and argued that the issue should be discussed in public. Protesters refused to leave the Council Chamber. The councillors then left and held their debate in private behind closed doors. Our views were represented by SNP and Labour councillors on the committee but they were outvoted by the right-wing "independents".

The press release saying that they would evict the Peace Camp had been written before the meeting. It had a time on it of 11.30 am, although the matter was not discussed until 1 pm. It was clear that the issue had been decided in advance by two or three councillors and then rubber-stamped by the committee.

Speaking to the press later, Councillor Billy Petrie said that they were evicting the peace camp because of complaints from locals. He referred to a petition from 900 people. However that petition was one which Councillor Petrie had organised himself 10 years ago. It was signed largely by sailors, workers at the nuclear submarine base, and their families. It was not addressed to Argyll and Bute Council. While some local people do oppose the peace camp others are supportive.

Please send message of support to:

Faslane Peace Camp, Shandon, Helensburgh, G84 8NT, tel (+44) 1436 820901  
By e-mail send message to cndscot@dial.pipex.com and we will forward.

Send letters objecting to the decision to:

James McLellan, Chief Executive, Argyll and Bute Council, Kilmory,  
Lochgilphead,  
PA31 8RT, Scotland, Great Britain.

The next step is the full council meeting in Lochgilphead on 8th May. We will try to have the issue raised there and to present our case.

John Ainslie, Administrator, Scottish CND.



I'm forwarding on to you John Isaacs' summary of last night's success. I apologize if you are receiving this for the second time.

Melinda

From: John Isaacs[SMTP:jdi@clw.org]

Sent: Friday, April 25, 1997 9:55 AM

As you know, we scored a terrific victory last evening with passage of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It took four months (and 20 years) of hard slogging. Substantial credit should go to the Clinton Administration, which organized itself well, the arms control community, which united and worked hard on a treaty which originally was not a priority, and a few key Senators such as Biden, Lugar, Daschle, Kerry and Bingaman.

One of the key lessons we learned is that it will take a massive effort from the Administration, Congress and our community to win passage of treaties over the opposition of Jesse Helms and his friends. Needless to say, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is next on the treaty ratification agenda, will take at least as massive an effort. Winning 67 votes in a Republican-controlled Senate will remain a major hurdle for the up to 13 treaties and treaty modifications headed to the Senate over the next years and a half.

The final vote was 74 - 26. There were also five votes on the "killer conditions." Each was defeated by margins ranging from 56 - 44 to 71 - 29. The roll call on final passage follows. For those living in states of Republicans who voted for the treaty, the Senators should be congratulated. For Republicans who votes with the far right -- such as Grassley (Iowa), Thompson (Tenn.) and Campbell (Colorado) -- they too should hear from constituents for voting against the treaty negotiated and supported by Reagan, Bush, Dole and Lott.

#### DEMOCRATS FOR

Akaka (Hawaii)  
Baucus (Mont.)  
Biden (Del.)  
Bingaman (N.M.)  
Boxer (Calif.)  
Breaux (La.)  
Bryan (Nev.),  
Bumpers (Ark.)  
Byrd (W.Va.)  
Cleland (Ga.)  
Conrad (N.D.)  
Daschle (S.D.)  
Dodd (Conn.)  
Dorgan (N.D.)  
Durbin (Ill.)  
Feingold (Wis.)  
Feinstein (Calif.)  
Ford (Ky.)  
Glenn (Ohio)

Graham (Fla.)  
Harkin (Iowa)  
Hollings (S.C.)  
Inouye (Hawaii),  
Johnson (S.D.)  
Kennedy (Mass.)  
Kerrey (Neb.)  
Kerry (Mass.)  
Kohl (Wis.)  
Landrieu (La.)  
Lautenberg (N.J.)  
Leahy (Vt.)  
Levin (Mich.)  
Lieberman (Conn.)  
Mikulski (Md.)  
Moseley-Braun (Ill.)  
Moynihan (N.Y.)  
Murray (Wash.)  
Reed (R.I.)  
Reid (Nev.)  
Robb (Va.),  
Rockefeller (W.Va.)  
Sarbanes (Md.)  
Torricelli (N.J.)  
Wellstone (Minn.)  
Wyden (Ore.)

REPUBLICANS FOR

Abraham (Mich.)  
Chafee (R.I.)  
Coats (Ind.)  
Cochran (Miss.)  
Collins (Maine)  
D'Amato (N.Y.)  
DeWine (Ohio)  
Domenici (N.M.)  
Enzi (Wyo.)  
Frist (Tenn.)  
Gorton (Wash.)  
Gregg (N.H.)  
Hagel (Neb.)  
Hatch (Utah)  
Jeffords (Vt.)  
Lott (Miss.)  
Lugar (Ind.)  
McCain (Ariz.)  
McConnell (Ky.)  
Murkowski (Alaska)  
Roberts (Kan.)  
Roth (Del.)  
Santorum (Pa.)  
Smith (Ore.)  
Snowe (Maine)  
Specter (Pa.)

Stevens (Alaska)  
Thomas (Wyo.)  
Warner (Va.)

DEMOCRATS AGAINST  
None

REPUBLICANS AGAINST

Allard (Colo.)  
Ashcroft (Mo.)  
Bennett (Utah)  
Bond (Mo.)  
Brownback (Kan.)  
Burns (Mont.)  
Campbell (Colo.)  
Coverdell (Ga.)  
Craig (Idaho)  
Faircloth (N.C.)  
Gramm (Texas)  
Grams (Minn.)  
Grassley (Iowa)  
Helms (N.C.)  
Hutchinson (Ark.)  
Hutchison (Texas)  
Inhofe (Okla.)  
Kempthorne (Idaho)  
Kyl (Ariz.)  
Mack (Fla.)  
Nickles (Okla.)  
Sessions (Ala.)  
Shelby (Ala.)  
Smith (N.H.),  
Thompson (Tenn.)  
Thurmond (S.C.)

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John Isaacs  
President  
Council for a Livable World  
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Washington, DC 20002

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April 24, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER THE VOTE ON RATIFICATION OF THE  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

April 24, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
AFTER THE VOTE ON RATIFICATION OF  
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Briefing Room

10:51 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, the United States Senate has served America well tonight. Because they have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield, our hand will be strengthened in the fight against terrorists and rogue states. We will end a century that began with the horror of chemical weapons in World War I much closer to the elimination of those kinds of weapons. And once again, America has displayed the leadership that we must demonstrate as we build a safer world for the 21st century.

Two and a half months ago, Majority Leader Lott and I put together a process to work through the concerns that some senators had about the treaty. Our negotiating teams held 30 hours of meetings. So did groups led by Senator Biden and Senator Helms. At the end of the day, because we went the extra mile, we resolved the problems that had been raised by the vast majority of the senators.

I thank the Majority Leader for guiding these efforts so successfully. I applaud the efforts of senators on both sides of the aisle, including Minority Leader Daschle, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and Senator McCain. And I've been so gratified that in these past few weeks so many have put politics aside to join together behind this treaty, as we saw yesterday when Senator Dole and General

Powell, Brent Scowcroft and other Republicans joined me, as they had previously.

I thank the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so many of our military leaders, past and present, who also came out strongly in support of this treaty.

This vote is an example of America working as it should, Democrats and Republicans together, putting our country first, reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good. This vote is vivid proof that we are stronger as a nation when we work together. It's true when it comes to our leadership in the world; it's also true when it comes to dealing with our challenges here at home -- strengthening our education system, finishing the job of reforming welfare, fighting crime, defending the environment, and finishing the job of balancing the budget.

The Chemical Weapons Convention truly was made in America, under two of my predecessors. It is right for America. Now it has been ratified in America, and it will make our future more secure. For that, on behalf of the American people, I am profoundly grateful to the United States Senate.

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers  
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Rob Green wrote:

Dear Abolitionists, I thought I should share with you some personal impressions of how NATO expansion is seen by Russians, gleaned during a recent visit to Moscow. My apologies for its length, but I hope you will agree that this is justified by its importance.

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

## NATO EXPANSION VIEWED FROM MOSCOW

Green

\*\*\*\*\*Dear Rob,

Your article, besides being an excellent recording of your interaction in Russia, is very timely for the Abolition logic. Most important is that the NGOs in the west are being exposed to what the public and the decision makers that matter - across the fence - view the security environment and their perceptions that it is the Western Governments' actions that debilitate this environment.

A greater exposure of such a nature, from countries that have reservations on nuclear policies being instituted by the West - is well over due. Western media, may find these entities irrelevant to their domestic audience. But a failure to appreciate the deep rooted collective sentiments of the larger portion of mankind leaves decision makers in the West bereft of meaningful inputs on which to develop policies that would genuinely create a stable and secure global environment.

Maybe the Abolition Caucus would do well to study the perceptions of the "others" and develop a route to resolve the conflict of interests in the hope of creating a new and more amenable political environment - one that would facilitate acceptance of the "idea" of "doing without nuclear deterrence." This is essential because the reservations being voiced in Russia have been echoed [not necessarily for the same reasons] among a wide range of other nations. This must not be allowed to SNOWBALL beyond control.

Warm regards

Vijai Nair

## Lott Endorses Chemical Weapons Pact

By DAVID BRISCOE  
Associated Press Writer  
Thursday, April 24, 1997 4:58 pm EDT

WASHINGTON (AP) -- In an initial test vote for the chemical weapons treaty, the Senate today overwhelmingly rejected the first of five changes that backers called "killer amendments." Majority Leader Trent Lott followed the vote with a long-withheld endorsement of the treaty.

The vote and Lott's decision came after last-minute assurances from President Clinton to meet key concerns of Lott and other senators as they prepared to vote on the treaty tonight.

The 71-29 vote removed a provision that would have conditioned U.S. ratification on acceptance of the treaty by nations that have refused to join, including Libya, North Korea and Iraq.

Although only a simple majority was needed to reject the amendment, the margin exceeded the two-thirds needed for ratification of the treaty.

Lott voted in the minority on the issue, but immediately after the vote announced his support. The Republican leader's earlier lack of commitment had left passage in doubt.

"I have decided to vote in support of the Senate giving its advice and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention," Lott said. The United States will be "marginally better off with than without it," he told the Senate.

Hours before the vote, Clinton sent a letter to Lott saying he would withdraw the United States from the treaty if it inadvertently resulted in the proliferation of chemical weapons, as opponents maintain it could.

Lott earlier told reporters he regarded the assurance as an "ironclad commitment from the president of the United States to the Senate."

The treaty "has probably moved toward passage in the last 48 hours," Lott said, adding, "I'm not dragging it out for drama."

A previously uncommitted Republican, Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, said today he plans to vote for the treaty. He said it would protect "our young men and women in uniform who may someday face an adversary armed with chemical weapons."

Clinton, in a letter to Lott, said he has received "official confirmations from the highest diplomatic levels" that 30 nations that have signed the pact are committed to maintain export controls under the treaty.

Treaty opponents have submitted an amendment to the pact that the White House says would kill U.S. ratification.

Vice President Al Gore, in his role as Senate president, was prepared to come to Capitol Hill for votes on amendments. In the event of a tie, he would cast the deciding vote. But he has no vote on treaty ratification, since it requires a two-thirds majority.

Early in the day, the White House was optimistic about the vote, but a senior official said Lott's vote, the key to ratification, is still a "jump ball" too close to call.

White House spokesman Mike McCurry said Clinton had called 25 senators to push ratification and was making more calls today.

Lott said Clinton's new assurances had "affected my thinking" and predicted it would have an impact on other undecided lawmakers.

The treaty bans the development, production or stockpiling of all chemical warfare agents and requires destruction of existing stockpiles over the next decade. It will take effect next week, whether or not the United States ratifies it.

Lott told reporters he expected a vote by nightfall.

In advance of that, lawmakers convened an unusual closed session in the Old Senate Chamber to "receive an intelligence briefing with regard to chemical weapons and how they are being developed around the world."

In his letter, Clinton said he is "prepared to withdraw from the treaty" if other countries use it to transfer materials that could be used to develop chemical weapons or if it undermines the 30-nation pact known as the Australia Group, which imposes export controls and other measures against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

His assurances were designed to win the support of wavering lawmakers who say the treaty could inadvertently result in "rogue states" such as Iraq or Libya obtaining access to American technology through third countries.

At his news conference, Lott said, "This commitment is unprecedented." The treaty itself provides for any country to withdraw on 90-days notice.

Clinton's letter marked the latest step in a campaign for ratification for a treaty that was negotiated under former Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

Earlier concessions gained Clinton the endorsement on Wednesday of Bob Dole, the 1996 GOP presidential candidate, who had helped sidetrack the pact during last year's campaign for the White House.

Under the terms of debate, treaty backers will attempt to strike from the legislation five proposed changes the White House has called killer amendments. A package of 28 other changes worked out in weeks of negotiations between Republicans and the White House was accepted by voice vote Wednesday.

The treaty, already ratified by 74 nations and signed by more than 160, also sets up inspections and strict sanctions.

Opponents said the treaty would not do what it claims to.

"No supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how this treaty will actually accomplish its intended goal," said Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.

"The debate we are commencing is not only about a global treaty which addresses the chemical weapons threat," responded Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del. "It is about nothing less than America's leadership role in the post-Cold War era."



Dear Friends,

As the convenor of the NPT Working Group I thought I'd share my impressions of the PrepComm as I am off tomorrow to participate with the Military Production Network's "DC Days" in Washington and at their triannual conference in which over 40 grassroots organizations living in the shadows of US nuclear facilities gather to figure out strategies for shutting down weapons production and cleaning up the US nuclear complex.

(Our most pressing issues in the US will be to cancel the sub-critical tests scheduled to begin in June at the Nevada test site, hold up the construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and other monstrous technological playthings of the "stockpile stewardship" program, get monies transferred from weapons programs to cleanup of the toxic radioactive disaster sites across the country, stop the planned MOX fuel program and start up of reprocessing which has been halted since 1970 in the USA, and get funding for health studies.)

The Abolition Caucus was well attended each morning from 8:00 to 9:00 AM (Insomniacs for Peace) by up to 60 visitors from abroad and across the US who traveled, in many instances, long distances to NY only to stand outside the locked doors of the proceedings trying to buttonhole delegates in the hallway to plead our case. (See Sunflower Statement posted today) We were admitted to only one brief session at the opening, and two other short sessions, in the middle of the week and at the closing. Our NGO presentations were given on the day before the conference closed--we were kept to a rigid format -- only 8 speakers permitted-- and it was not an official session of the PrepCom so less than a third of the delegates were in attendance. (Roger Smith of the NGO Committee on Disarmament is posting the NGO talks)

#### MEXICO'S PRINCIPLED STANCE

On the final day, only Mexico held out magnificently from rubber stamping the Chairman's report which contained virtually nothing which would forward our agenda. Their Minister, Sra. Angelica Arce de Jeannet insisted that the draft recommendations of specific issues enumerated for consideration at the next PrepComm include "nuclear disarmament" in addition to South Africa's paltry proposal that we negotiate a treaty by the year 2000 for negative security assurances (promise you won't bomb me by the year 2000 if I am a non-nuclear weapon country who signed the NPT) and the meaningless fissban as well as the repetition of the 1995 Extension Conference resolution on the Middle East. The enumeration of "nuclear disarmament" was unacceptable to the nuke powers who thought that subject was already mentioned elsewhere. It was quite a sight to see 20 to 30 men in suits towering over the seated Mexican representative trying to work out a compromise. It was finally decided at about 9:30 PM of the final session that the list of specific measures for future consideration would be deleted, to be orally read into the record by the Chair "without prejudice to the importance of other issues". Mexico reiterated a reservation about the need for nuclear disarmament and cited the World Court decision. It also insisted that the Chair's paper not be the "basis" for future negotiation at the 1998 PrepCom but only considered as one document to be considered among the others submitted.

After the meeting was adjourned, Sra. Jeannet told some of us who stayed to the bitter end and thanked her for her efforts, that she was following in the tradition of Mexico. After consulting with Bill Epstein I learned that the Mexican leaders of that country's anti-nuclear tradition included Padillo Nervo, who took a leading role in securing the Partial Test Ban, Alfonso Garcia Robles who led the effort to secure the Treaty of Tlateloco and the battle for the amendment conference to the PTBT as well as the extraordinary leader Juan Marin Bosch (now posted in Barcelona) who was so helpful in the negotiations of the CTBT and who extended to abolitionists such excellent moral support and encouragement during the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. As a woman, I was particularly moved by the courage of our new angel, Angelica Arce de Jeannet, who stood alone without one other country to support her brave stance in the Mexican tradition.

Despite the disgraceful lack of access, the good news was that Abolition 2000 and other NGOs were running a parallel program -- airing our issues at panels, roundtables, etc., which were sporadically attended by some of the delegates. The kick-off was the launching of our Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention, shepherded by Jurgen Scheffran, convenor of the Convention Working Group, and drafted by the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy under the leadership of Peter Weiss, Alyn Ware and Merav Datan. All the nuclear weapons countries except the USA were in attendance at this seminar on "how to do it" -- step by step to eliminate nuclear weapons. Copies of the treaty can be obtained from Alyn (lcnp@aol.com) and this is a key tool for abolitionists to show that abolition is not a pipe dream -- it really is possible.

WE STILL NEED TO ENROLL A COUNTRY WHICH WILL INTRODUCE THE DRAFT TREATY AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF A UN BODY, ie, General Assembly, CD, NPT PrepComm, etc.

Contact Alyn if you have some leads.

Other successful panels: the NATO Expansion discussion organized by Cora Weiss with Solange Fernex (Convenor of Abolition 2000 Working Group on the OSCE), Sharon Riggles, David Cortwright, and Douglas Roche, attended by about 200 people who brainstormed on strategies for halting this rusty cold war program which is threatening all further progress on nuclear disarmament. To join an email list on strategies to halt NATO, contact Karina Woods at Panukes@igc.apc.org.

The Health and Waste panel had stunning presentations by Gabriel Tetriahari, leader of the Polynesian group that stopped the French nuclear testing and host of our recent Abolition 2000 conference last winter as well as Karl Grossman who let us in on the horrors contemplated this October with the USA launch of the Cassini space probe, powered by 73 pounds of plutonium which could be lethal to hundreds of thousands of us should anything go amiss (Abolition 2000 adopted position papers against the nuclearization and militarization of space and against colonialism at our Moorea conference in Polynesia.) They were joined by Deborah Katz of the Citizens Awareness Network and Pam Ransom of Women's Environment and Development Organization which laid out some of the chilling health statistics and data from the nuclear age. (in Moorea we formed a health caucus and Pamela Meidell is the contact person. <pmeidell@igc.apc.org>)

Mary Olson of the Nuclear Information Resource Service took on the IAEA as a discussant in their presentation in which they continued to play havoc with the truth about nuclear power and its "benefits". The abolition caucus adopted a position calling for a halt to the construction of new nuclear power plants. (See posting by Pol Huyvetter and Claire Greensfelder) and we formed links with the Commission on Sustainable Development which was having its PrepComm for an evaluation of the Rio Meeting simultaneously with the NPT meetings. A joint panel with the Solar Energy Caucus of the CSD with Mary Olsen, Mark Kapner of the New York State Power Authority and Selma Brackman of the War and Peace Foundation was most enlightening and laid out the possibilities for benign solar energy. (contact Pol and/or Claire to participate on this issue)

**WE NEED A PRESENTATION AND MATERIALS ON THE ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR POWER TO BRING TO MISSIONS AND GOVERNMENTS WHO MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED NUCLEAR POWER. WE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE DOWNSIDE OF TOXIC NUCLEAR POWER AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOLAR ENERGY, ETC. (Contact Pol and/or Claire)**

Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, put on a whole day of all the technical information you need to know to get to zero with speakers from INESAP, Western States Legal Foundation, Center for Arms Control and Environmental Studies and the Nuclear Control Institute. At the afternoon session, Zia Mian a Pakistani physicist currently in Boston at the Union of Concerned Scientists, suggested a creative path to beginning talks on a treaty by amending the NPT. (Check out article VIII which requires that only one party needs to request a conference to amend the treaty before it must be put to a vote. If one third of the signatories vote to convene such an amendment conference it must be held. Any amendment would have to be approved by the nuclear powers and the Board of Trustees of the IAEA. Zia suggested that if such an amendment conference were convened, it could be used to negotiate the nuclear weapons convention, and that India, Pakistan, and Israel would feel compelled to join the NPT in order to be in on the negotiations. Then the ball would be in the court of the nuke powers and their lackeys at the IAEA) Contact Zia if you think this is a good plan to work on. **REMEMBER, IT ONLY TAKES ONE COUNTRY TO START THE BALL ROLLING!**

Martin Kalinowski of INESAP presented a panel on verification and laboratory testing with Johan Swahn from Sweden talking about the intractability of the waste problem, Jackie Cabasso giving the lowdown on lab testing, and Greg Mello letting us know what was going on at Los Alamos.

Jackie Cabasso, convenor of the Abolition 2000 working group, Beyond the CTB, organized a panel with Natalia Meronova from Russia, Nicola Butler of BASIC in the UK, John Burroughs of Western States Legal Foundation in California and discussants Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, India (both physicists) which gave a broad ranging view of weapons modernization and computer simulation programs in the laboratories which are undermining disarmament efforts.

**THIS PANEL WAS ORGANIZED BY THE MALAYSIAN MISSION AT THE UN UNLIKE ALL THE OTHER PANELS WHICH WERE ARRANGED THROUGH THE NGO COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT WHICH REFUSED TO RESERVE A ROOM FOR A PANEL ON LAB TESTING BECAUSE IT WAS TOO CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED!!! (At a subsequent evaluation meeting we discussed these issues with the NGO Committee on Disarmament but**

someone present will have to say what actually occurred and what was resolved at that meeting. I was outside waiting for the truck to arrive with the sunflowers.)

## MEDIA

We had a media committee spearheaded by Janet Bloomfield which issued press releases and did it's best to engage the press. Some of us were interviewed on several radio shows. The most success we had was the week before when a professional pr firm did a poll of USA public opinion and found that 87% favored a treaty like the chemical and biological bans for nuclear weapons as well and 84% said they would feel safer if no country including the USA had nuclear weapons. The Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor carried stories on Abolition 2000 and the poll.

## STRATEGY FOR THE 1998 PREPCOM

Nelson Mandela-- We need to reach him and see if we can convince him to "do the right thing". In 1995 South Africa broke up the Bandung conference, blocking consensus and then presented its wishy washy "principles and objectives" during the Extension conference which prevented any meaningful conditions for disarmament being extracted from the nuke powers in return for the extension.

At this 1997 PrepComm, South Africa and Chile blocked consensus among the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and we were told on a visit to the US mission that the US didn't feel any obligation to take further steps towards disarmament because of the weakness of the NAM position. Then South Africa came in with its paper requesting a treaty by the year 2000 to negotiate negative security assurances. Big Deal!

Those of us who have been doing this work over time have many connections to the grassroots in South Africa. Already meetings have been arranged for some of us at the South African mission in Washington DC with the future leaders. A number of us agree that if the whole Abolition Network focusses on getting to Mandela to take a stand for negotiations to begin in 1998 on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, with every path and connection we have, we may turn the tide on this third round. Only Nelson Mandela has the world stature at this time to lead the world into treaty negotiations. If you think this is a good idea and have ideas about how to proceed, please contact me.

At a meeting at the South African mission with Jackie Cabasso, John Burroughs and myself, we were introduced to the President of the International Association of University Presidents, at the UN who is planning a conference on nuclear disarmament in South Africa in either January or March of 1998. I will follow up with her and keep you posted.

## NEXT PREPCOM

The next meeting in April 1998 will be held in Geneva.

## FACILITATORS GROUP

The old Interim Management Group met and reconstituted itself as a Facilitators Group, acknowledging our gratitude and appreciation for the incredible job performed by Pamela Meidell as our sole facilitator who saw the Abolition 2000 Network grow beyond our wildest dreams since 1995 and

beyond the ability of any one person to continue to facilitate the work. We provided Pamela with about 25 additional facilitators to share the workload. Draft minutes of this group's meeting are being posted to a facilitators e-mail conference and will be posted to the caucus after review. At the current time there is a transition team consisting of Pamela, Janet Bloomfield, Jackie Cabasso, Zia Mian, and Alice Slater. The approximately 26 facilitators include the old Interim Management Group, the people added in Polynesia, and some new people who volunteered in NY. I will leave it to Pamela and others to provide an accurate list. David Krieger at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 123, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; 805-965-3443 (tel); 805-568-0466 (fax); <wagingpeace@napf.org>, volunteered to keep our computer list up to date and to be the banker for the Abolition 2000 Network during the transition. Donations would be gratefully appreciated and checks should be made out to Nuclear Age Peace Foundation/Abolition 2000. If each of our 700 organizations contributed only \$35 we would have enough money to hire an administrative assistant to improve our communications with those of us don't have e-mail. While \$35 might be a steep sum for some of us, for others, a larger contribution would be appropriate. Please search your conscience and help to support out network with an amount that seems right to you.

Alice Slater  
GRACE  
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212-726-9161 (tel)  
212-726-9160 (fax)  
aslater@igc.apc.org <email>

George Farebrother wrote:

>  
> Dear Abolitioners  
>  
> This piece in "The Scotsman" looks interesting. Does anyone know  
> of the outcome of the New Delhi Meeting - and whether it has any  
> relationship to the NPT PrepComm?  
>  
> George Farebrother

\*\*\*\*\*Vijai Nair wrote:

Dear George,  
I have a copy of the NAM Draft Final Document. Its all of 102 pages. I am  
studying it and shall shortly send you (a) relevant extracts (b) my views if  
considered necessary.  
Please bear with the delay, there is a lot on my plate.  
Warm regards - Vijai

Dear Abolitionists,

Here comes my first attempt at a press release for Tuesday.  
Comments please!

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

\* \* \*

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS BANNED - NOW WHY NOT NUCLEAR?

On 24 April 1997, the US Senate voted to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Next Tuesday 29 April, this global treaty comes into force, having been signed by 163 countries and now ratified by 75.

For the first time, complete prohibition and elimination of a weapon of mass destruction is enforceable. Each signatory state has undertaken to enforce the treaty within its jurisdiction. To do this, those states must enact legislation: Australia, a leading advocate of the treaty, was the first to place a Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act on its statute book, early in 1994.

Verification is difficult, because some of the chemicals used in weapons have widespread peaceful use, like in fertilisers and weedkillers. However, the chemical industry has cooperated with governments to find workable solutions, because it does not want its image tarnished. A new international authority, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), has been established in The Hague to oversee compliance with the treaty.

President Clinton, in his lobbying to secure the two-thirds majority needed in the Senate, was strongly supported by several top military leaders, including former US Chief of Staff General Colin Powell and the current incumbent General John Shalikashvili. Clinton argued that, among other benefits, ratification would:

- \* pave the way to progress on a similar ban against biological weapons, which are a greater threat;
- \* align the USA with the overwhelming majority of responsible states who uphold international law, rather than be branded as one of the few "rogue" states who oppose the treaty;
- \* make it less likely that US troops would face chemical weapons on the battlefield.

What this historic achievement shows is that, although chemical weapons cannot be disinvented, it is possible "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to (chemical

weapon) disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

That quotation is from the 8 July 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons - except that the bracketed words were replaced by the word "nuclear". The Court unanimously agreed that there exists an obligation by all states to work towards this. This was because it had found no legal circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Also it had confirmed that nuclear weapons are worse than chemical or biological weapons. Paradoxically, however, the unique nature of radiation would make verification of a Nuclear Weapons Convention easier than for chemical weapons.

All that is needed now is to apply the same arguments as President Clinton did to secure that US Senate vote, and begin negotiations using the Chemical Weapons Convention as a guide. In fact, a team of experts has already drafted a model Nuclear Weapons Convention to demonstrate what it might look like. Public opinion is massively supportive: in a US poll conducted between 27-30 March 1997, 87% agreed that the US should negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Before a "rogue" regime or terrorist group obtains even a crude nuclear device, the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council must respond to a yearning to rid the planet of what the President of the International Court of Justice called "the ultimate evil". So far, China has consistently supported negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Worldwide gratitude and a secure place in history awaits the leader with the vision and courage to move civilisation into the post-nuclear era with the new millenium.

ENDS

DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

Fri 25 Apr 1997

97-8478 World peace threatened by cruise missiles and chemical weapons, says IISS. DT 97-8479 Iraq has still not disclosed the full extent of its biological weapons programme, says UN inspection team. FT 97-8480 US Senate set to pass chemical weapons treaty. G,Ind,T

GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD. Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736. Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

Stewart Kemp (nfzns@gn.apc.org)

Dear Rob, many thanks for this draft. I think it is important that we all do everything we can to raise the clear connection with CWC and NWC. On first reading this is not so much as press release as a statement or even a personal op-ed piece from you. On reflection I think the best way to go with this is for ideas for media to be circulated and for different A2000 groups in different regions to put their own "spin" on it. Your emphasis may be better for UK/France than non-nuclear countries. Personally I do have concerns about re-inforcing the "rogue states"/terrorist angle, the real "rogues" are the nwstates who refuse to abide by the law and heed public opinion in my view. Overall, however, this is an excellent initiative. AS convenor of the media working group I would ask as many groups as possible to do something on Tuesday.

See you soon,  
Love,  
Janet.

Aloha from Honolulu, Hawai'i,

Thank you Alice, and thank you all for your help in the NPT PrepCom meetings at the U.N. Upon returning to Honolulu, we had Gabby Tetiarahi of Tahiti NGO Hiti Tau speak at the University of Hawai'i and at the nearby A.F.S.C. Friends House. These were to further educate the Honolulu community about the struggles of Tahiti's nuclear test site workers, the planned release of their Health Study, indigenous peoples' struggles, etc. Gabby was also interviewed by our local Fox TV affiliate, Channel 2 and images of clashes between Tahitians (Te Ao Maohi people) and the French military police in Papeete were shown during demonstrations against French nuclear testing in Mururoa and Fangataufa. Gabby did great. He also gave good presentations, and I tried to share a little of the work we all did in cold New York.

I wanted first, to thank Alice for her report of our work, and secondly, to offer appreciation for each one of you who helped me and Gabby in New York. As you know, Gabby had to address the radiation victims in Washington while I stayed back to further lobby our Pacific leaders in New York. I finally was able to address their official meeting. This would not have been possible had it not been for the kind donations of money the A2000 morning caucus attendees gave. Even though a small amount (I did not complain, but was grateful instead), it allowed me to stay several more days to further do our work and to assure that Gabby spoke at the plenary meeting. Mine and Gabby's participation was important for us in the Pacific, and we were both humbled by the fact that we somehow were speaking on behalf of the countless communities of indigenous peoples around the world who had been exposed to the dangers of nuclear weapons development, at various stages of their production and testing. Democracy, in this instance, may be an expensive affair; ultimately however, our survival may be assured by taking time to listen to the always silent, marginalized voices that cry out from time to time as "civilization" advances.

We want further to work in bringing representatives from indigenous communities who have been systematically exposed to nuclear radioactivity and are currently dealing with the complex ordeals of the "aftermath" to share their plight, and to continue to lobby for a permanent cessation of the production of weapons of mass destruction. As we understood in New York, we expressed a desire to expand the frontiers of an emergent democraticization as currently and popularly expressed in the international civil society. Toward the end of the final day, after I was gone, I heard that the Marshall Island Ambassador Laurence Edwards expressed a desire to keep the Prep-Com meetings in New York or something to that effect. The only consideration was financial resources (and their ability) of many Pacific Island nations to travel all the way to Geneva. But while the meetings are scheduled to take place in Geneva, the Pacific NGO peoples who much more poorer than their Government people may be put in a dilemma. We have appreciated each of your support previously and ask further that you continue to do so. And when the next PrepCom comes around, we will again be begging you. This is an embarrassing situation for us, but what can we do? We rely on each of your good will to bring peoples from Tahiti, Marshall Islands/Bikini people, Belau (Palau), other

Pacific Islanders to the Geneva meetings.

It would be most unfortunate as well as ironic if Pacific Islanders who have been exposed to nuclear radioactivity were not able to come to Geneva to join an international community of good and progressive peoples in seeking to put an end to nuclearization and militarization. We will try to do our part in compelling the Island Governments to take a lead in introducing/tabling the Nuclear Weapons Convention for formal discussion.

Again, from Hawai'i, from Belau, the Marshall Islands, on behalf of the displaced Bikini peoples all over, and from the Pacific region, I would like to extend our most sincere appreciation for each of your work, your donations of time and resources, and your commitment and devotion to a global peace agenda.

Mahalo anui loa, maruru, mesulang, and many thanks.

A colleague of yours, and an Indigenous Peoples' advocate,

Richard Salvador  
[from Belau (Palau)], based  
University of Hawai'i at Manoa  
Honolulu, Hawai'i

2424 Maile Way  
Porteus 640  
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96822  
tel (808) 956-8141  
fax (808) 956-6877

Dear Abolitionists, The following open letter will be delivered to "The Scotsman" newspaper tomorrow, and to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as he struggles to keep his Parliamentary seat in Edinburgh on Thursday. Should not the Foreign Minister in every NATO government be sent a similar one? Especially in Canada which is reviewing its NATO policy; and Denmark, Iceland and Norway, which abstained in the UNGA vote on 10 December.

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

\* \* \*

## AN OPEN LETTER TO MALCOLM RIFKIND

Dear Mr Rifkind,

On 8 July 1997 in Madrid, NATO leaders plan to rubber-stamp its eastward expansion and invite the first wave of new members to join by 1999. With Russia applying the universal rule of basing her policies on the capabilities of potential adversaries not their professed intentions, this decision will trigger another Cold War in which the only beneficiary will be the arms trade. George Kennan warns that it would be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era."

On 8 July last year, the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory Opinion - which is the most authoritative clarification of the law on an issue - on nuclear weapons. It decided that the threat or use of nuclear weapons, such as NATO policy involves, is unlawful. Therefore, NATO extension of its nuclear "umbrella" is in defiance of international law, as well as dangerously provoking Russia to revive its reliance on nuclear weapons for its security.

Who has made these irresponsible decisions? Is our sovereign foreign policy being driven by reckless US ethnic electoral considerations and arms traders? Apparently, NATO works by consensus: so any member can halt this foolishness. According to NATO officials, NATO only represents the wishes of its member governments. There must, therefore, be full debates in all member Parliaments before 8 July. When is the British one planned to take place? The brief airing in the House of Commons at the end of February, and the House of Lords' debate on 14 March - both initiated by backbenchers - were clearly inadequate. Yet Lord Chesham, the Government's spokesman, stated: "No issue has higher priority in Britain's foreign policy."

We are addressing these questions to you because your recent experience as Secretary of State for Defence and then Foreign Affairs makes you best qualified to answer them.

You wrote in an article in 'The Times' on 10 March this year that if NATO were not extended:

- "the countries of Central Europe would fear that Russia was able to reassert its hegemony over them." The same, if true, would apply still more strongly to the Baltic states. Why are they not seen as initial candidates for admission?
- "new regional alliances might spring up." What would be wrong with that, especially if, as you suggested, NATO "will develop a dynamic partnership with countries to its east for practical co-operation and political consultation"?

You argued that enlarging NATO is necessary to make "the whole of Europe as secure as Western Europe". What is the whole of Europe? Should this not include Russia? Why should the present members of NATO be any more secure? Will it not create more problems than it solves? How much will it cost? Who pays?

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office does not even know if the matter has been discussed in other parliaments. Is not NATO supposed to defend democracy?

ENDS

Dear Monday Lobby Colleagues,

Congratulations and thank you for your work on perhaps the biggest arms control victory to date -- ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Inspired in part by the message below from LA PSR, I encourage all your organizations to send thank you letters to the Senators who voted Yes on the CWC. As a movement, we are wise to give praise and positive reinforcement at this moment-- notes of thanks will help to secure future support on the CTBT and other important arms control issues.

Thank you, Lisa Ledwidge, PSR

>From majordomo Fri Apr 25 13:27:22 1997

Return-Path: <owner-abolition-caucus>

Received: from igc3.igc.apc.org (igc3.igc.apc.org [192.82.108.33])

by igc7.igc.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id KAA04930;

Fri, 25 Apr 1997 10:52:53 -0700 (PDT)

X-Authentication-Warning: igc7.igc.org: Processed from queue /var/spool/mqueue-maj

Received: from ppp3.igc.org (psrsm@ppp3.igc.org [198.94.6.3])

by igc3.igc.apc.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id KAA26644

for <abolition-caucus>; Fri, 25 Apr 1997 10:51:55 -0700 (PDT)

Date: Fri, 25 Apr 1997 10:30:44 +0000

From: "Jonathan Parfrey" <psrsm@igc.apc.org>

Message-Id: <199704251751.KAA26644@igc3.igc.apc.org>

Organization: Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los

Priority: normal

Reply-to: psrsm@igc.apc.org

Subject: Thank 'em

To: abolition-caucus@igc.org

X-Old-Sender: <psrsm@pop.igc.apc.org>

X-mailer: Pegasus Mail/Windows (v1.22)

Sender: owner-abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org

Precedence: bulk

Dear Abolitionists:

A Los Angeles physician, Dr. Wing Mar, called Senator Trent Lott's office, thanking him for supporting the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Staff told him that he was the first person to do so, and that hundreds of angry constituents had already called claiming that the Senator had gone soft.

Dr. Mar correctly believes that we need to counterbalance such accusations, and call to thank Lott if we are to make progress in arms reductions in the 105th Congress as it is controlled by Republicans.

Breathe deep. Bite your tongue and dial: 202-224-6253  
or fax: 202-224-2262.

Thanks.

-----  
Jonathan Parfrey  
Executive Director  
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Los Angeles  
1316 Third Street Promenade, Suite B1  
Santa Monica, California 90401  
310.458.2694 phone \* 310.458.7925 fax \* psrsm@psr.org \* <http://www.labridge.com/PSR/>

forwarded

>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 20:13:03 +0930 (CST)  
>From: Ron Gray <grayle@adelaide.dialix.com.au>  
>To: Jackie Cabasso <wslf@igc.apc.org>  
>cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>Subject: A2000 Resolution for cities

>

>Dear Jackie,

>

>Do you have a listing of all those cities around the world who have, to  
>date, signed the Local Authorities Abolition 2000 Resolution?

>

>How can we obtain such a listing?

>

>I think you have been informed that the Australian Local Government  
>Association's Annual General Meeting of 1996 resolved to support the  
>Resolution and to circulate the Resolution to Australian Local  
>Authorities asking them to support it.

>

>I believe, too, that you have been informed that the Randwick City  
>Council, in New South Wales also resolved to endorse the Resolution.

>

>Since we are approaching local authorities in South Australia, it would  
>be very helpful to be able to show them the complete list of world-wide  
>authorities who have already endorsed the Resolution.

>

>Last August we informed you of the 15 authorities in Sth.Aust. who  
>endorsed the Abolition 2000 Statement. We will ask them to further  
>endorse the Resolution.

>

>I hope you can send us the information available at present, to:

><grayle@adelaide.DIALix.oz.au>

>

>Thanks,

>

>Yours for Peace,

>

>Irene Gale, State Sect. Australian Peace Committee (Sth. Aust. Branch)

>

>Ph: (+61-8) 8212 7138 Fax: (+61-8) 8364 2291 Email:

><grayle@adelaide.DIALix.oz.au> Snail: 11 South Terrace, Adelaide SA5000

>Australia.

>

>

forwarded

>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 17:20:18 GMT  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org, disarmament@igc.apc.org,  
>From: cnd@gn.apc.org (The CND staff team)  
>Subject: FASLANE PEACE CAMP TO BE EVICTED

>  
>FASLANE PEACE CAMP ACTIVISTS VOW TO FIGHT EVICTION

>  
>Issued: 24 April 1997.

>  
>Residents of Faslane Peace Camp, the longest running legal protest camp in  
>Britain today (24th April) vowed to fight on as Argyll and Bute District  
>Council announced their intention to evict them.[TCST1]The Peace Camp was  
>originally set up in 1982 to bear witness and protest against the production  
>of Polaris missiles at Clyde Submarine base, Faslane. Protesters stayed to  
>oppose the Trident missiles that replaced Polaris and Faslane has developed  
>as a centre for protest actions against the UK's nuclear weapons programme.

>  
>The camp, which is based near the remote Scottish village of Shandon, has  
>two full time residents, but is the ongoing focus for a network of hundreds  
>of anti-nuclear protesters who regularly launch actions against Trident from  
>there.

>  
>The camp is a legally recognised camp site, which has paid a nominal rental  
>fee to the council since 1982 and has full running water, a sewage system  
>and telephones.

>  
>A peace garden has been created by protesters and international visitors and  
>one promise made by the Council is that cherry trees planted by Hiroshima  
>survivors in the 1980's will be saved from destruction.

>  
>  
>Page 1 of 2/more follows.

>Page 2 of 2

>  
>"This decision will be resisted vigorously and the peace camp residents are  
>at present taking legal advice", said Dave Knight, CND Chair,

>  
>"The camp is a powerful symbol for the peace movement and crucial in the  
>ongoing campaign to get rid of Trident,

>  
>"Activists across the country will be outraged at this decision and CND will  
>be considering over the weekend what action to take to ensure the continued  
>survival of Faslane Peace Camp".

>  
>The move to evict protesters follows boundary changes which have transferred  
>responsibility for the Faslane area from Dumbarton District and Strathclyde  
>Regional Council, who supported the camp, to Argyll and Bute District Council.

>  
>ENDS  
>Editor's Notes

>The eviction plans were announced by Argyll and Bute Council on Thursday  
>24th April at 1pm.

>The eviction notice can only be served at the end of a month; so it will  
>either be served over the next six days or at the end of May.

>For further information contact the CND Press Office on 0171 700 2350.

>

>The CND staff team (cnd@gn.apc.org)

>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

>162 Holloway Road

>LONDON

>N7 8DQ

>tel: (uk)171 700 2393

>fax: (uk)171 700 2357

>

>Web Site <http://www.cnduk.org/cnd>

>visit the CND General Election site via the 'Press & Parliamentary' page

>

>CND is part of ABOLITION 2000 - A global network to eliminate nuclear weapons

>

>

In case you are still wondering what you can do to help the campaign to ensure the survival of Faslane Peace Camp because you live outside of Argyll and Bute can you please before May 8 write, AS A TOURIST/POTENTIAL TOURIST who has visited the area or may in the future visit to:

James McLellan  
Chief Executive  
Argyll and Bute Council  
Kilmory  
Lochgilphead  
PA31 8RT  
Scotland  
United Kingdom

Expressing your full support for the Camp, what it stands for and why it should stay etc.

And don't forget to send messages of support to the Camp via Scottish CND at [cnscot@dial.pipex.com](mailto:cnscot@dial.pipex.com).

Let's drown them in letters of support for the camp by May 8, please.

CND Campaigns Team

The CND staff team ([cnd@gn.apc.org](mailto:cnd@gn.apc.org))  
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
162 Holloway Road  
LONDON  
N7 8DQ  
tel: (uk)171 700 2393  
fax: (uk)171 700 2357

Web Site <http://www.cnduk.org/cnd>  
visit the CND General Election site via the 'Press & Parliamentary' page

CND is part of ABOLITION 2000 - A global network to eliminate nuclear weapons

1. "Lott's stance on treaty enrages GOP right," Chicago Sun Times, Robert Novak, 4/28
2. "Praise for Passage / Chemical weapons treaty is shared political victory," New York Newsday, Roy Gutman, 4/28
3. "Clinton-Lott chemistry could be a catalyst," USA Today, Richard Benedetto, 4/28
4. "Russia Refuses to Ratify Chemical Weapons Ban Moscow Parliament Pleads Poverty but Suggests It Will Approve Treaty in the Fall," The Washington Post, 4/26

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Chicago Sun-Times  
April 28, 1997  
Robert Novak

Lott's stance on treaty enrages GOP right

The gap Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott opened between himself and the Republican Party's conservative base by supporting the chemical weapons treaty was widened by his private claim that he could not possibly have stopped the treaty. In truth, with 26 Republicans voting no, Lott easily could have led seven more senators to prevent ratification.

Why didn't he? Like many senators, Lott's interest in the chemical weapons ban is minimal. But from the start, he wanted to support it, and weeks of hand-wringing were a sham. He viewed the issue as transactional--a bargaining chip in dealmaking, especially to facilitate budget negotiations where massive GOP surrender seems imminent.

This is a bitter pill for conservatives who celebrated when Lott became majority leader. They remembered Lott's past battles for principle and expected him to fill the leadership vacuum left by the political incapacitation of Speaker Newt Gingrich. Instead, he is compared even by non-Republicans with the Senate GOP leader who supported President Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal Treaty against President Ronald Reagan. "He's got galloping Howard Bakeritis," Democratic campaign consultant Bob Shrum told me.

Lott, in turn, is infuriated that the right is trashing the Senate's most conservative leader ever. The level of mutual hostility can scarcely be exaggerated.

All this is reminiscent of the 1952 motion picture "Viva Zapata!" which opens with a delegation of Mexican peasants pleading with President Diaz to return their confiscated lands. The dictator brushes them off, but one peasant insists, and Diaz menacingly notes his name. That launches the dissident, Zapata, on a revolutionary career. Later in the movie, an empowered Zapata in the presidential palace imitates Diaz by dismissing a peasant delegation and taking down a lone dissenter's name.

This tableau was re-enacted in real life April 10 when about 40 conservatives crowded into a Capitol office, pleading with Lott to oppose the treaty. Arriving 45 minutes late, Lott seemed offended by social conservatives involving themselves with national security. An aide belittled the petitioners as representing "a collection of fringe groups." Lott was particularly dismayed that Mike Farris, a leading home-schooling advocate, dared to discuss chemical weapons.

Majority leaders seldom get deeply involved in issues, and Lott was no exception here. He repeated the Clinton mantra that 28 out of 33 disagreements had been resolved. ``Those 28 agreements are not worth the paper they are written on," Reagan's assistant defense secretary, Richard Perle, told me. Not resolved were treaty provisions requiring the supply of U.S. chemicals to countries that request them.

Lott addressed this by getting a letter from President Clinton that dances around the problem. He won further cover by asking his predecessor, Bob Dole, to join in dropping opposition. Lott's Senate speech announcing his support was lukewarm at best, conceding ``serious problems" with a treaty he implied is not verifiable.

The overriding consideration is a budget deal with the president. Dick Morris, confidant of both Clinton and Lott, is reported by Senate sources as making this clear to the majority leader: no chemical weapons treaty, no budget.

Robert Novak is a nationally syndicated columnist of the Chicago Sun-Times.

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New York Newsday  
April 28, 1997  
Praise for Passage / Chemical weapons treaty is shared political victory

By Roy Gutman. WASHINGTON BUREAU

Washington - Like any triumph in politics, the Senate's endorsement of the chemical weapons treaty Thursday can be claimed by many participants as their victory - but on this occasion, it may just be the case.

No evidence has yet emerged of any back-room deals or circumvention of the normal procedures, and there are many signs of a revival of a long-dormant consultative process between the White House and Congress for foreign policy goals.

President Bill Clinton can take credit for making passage of the treaty a top priority and for staging several public events supporting it with his predecessor, George Bush, who signed the treaty banning production, stockpiling or use of poison gas, along with his defeated Republican opponent in 1996, Bob Dole, and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell.

But State Department officials credit Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), ranking minority member on the Foreign Relations Committee, with the strategy for winning the treaty and going after two other main goals - payment of U.S. arrears to the United Nations and passage of State Department and foreign aid funding.

Biden's confidential memo to Clinton in late February stated the need to provide Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) "with something he wants" and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) "with something he wants."

"I could be wrong about this proposed approach, boss, but I think it is our best shot to achieve several policy goals that we all share," he wrote.

The "something" was not defense contracts or obscure trade-offs, but other foreign policy priorities that Helms and Lott had insisted on.

Helms, miffed that the administration had refused to combine the many foreign policy agencies under one roof

during Clinton's first term, insisted on State Department reorganization. But most of all, what he wanted was respect for his role as committee chairman.

The courtly conservative, consistently an outspoken opponent of arms-control agreements, needed "to re-establish the primacy of his committee," said an aide to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who spoke on condition of anonymity. "This was necessary to allow him to lose with dignity."

Albright offered more than respect, honoring Helms by visiting North Carolina, stopping at the Helms Center, where his memorabilia are being collected, and delivering a public address at Wingate University, his alma mater. Helms praised Albright as a "great and courageous lady," they clasped hands and embraced, and a friendship was cemented. Helms used the occasion to announce he would allow the treaty, long bottled-up in his committee, to come to the floor of the Senate.

Albright adopted an approach that amounted to saying, "If we will work with him and deal with him, we don't have to agree with him." And when Clinton made his decision to reorganize the State Department, Albright traveled to Capitol Hill and briefed Helms in person.

Biden, for his part, met Helms on eight occasions for a total of 28 hours to negotiate the conditions added to the treaty, which many Republicans used as a basis for voting for it. He credited Sandy Berger, the national security adviser, and Robert Bell, a top Berger aide, for supporting the unannounced negotiations by working out acceptable language.

Meanwhile, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the second-ranking Republican on the committee and an outspoken treaty supporter, canvassed his fellow Republicans. His party was deeply split, but in the end more than half voted for the treaty. He and Biden worked together to orchestrate the floor debate.

Lott's requirements were more modest, according to Biden - the year, perhaps even this week.

This is not to say a budget deal is certain. But having navigated the tricky give-and-take required to pass the controversial Chemical Weapons Convention, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) must know that each side will have to make significant concessions on spending and taxes to reach a budget pact.

The challenge for both leaders will be appeasing recalcitrant wings of their own parties. Clinton must deal with his liberal left, Lott with his conservative right. At times both have seemed bent on having their own way.

Liberal Democrats want deeper defense cuts and more spending for social programs. Conservative Republicans want major tax cuts and slashes in domestic spending.

The president, in an interview Thursday with USA TODAY, alluded to the problem he and Lott face. "We could get an agreement, all of us leaders could be for it, and it still couldn't produce a majority in one or both houses" of Congress, he said.

But Clinton and Lott, in hard bargaining on the weapons treaty, built a high degree of respect and trust that could help them find the common ground needed to swing a budget deal all can live with.

"On this my first endeavor of working with Trent Lott, where we have worked literally exhaustively together on the Chemical Weapons Convention, he shot straight with me. And that's all you can ask," Clinton said.

Lott faced pressure to oppose the treaty from the GOP hard right, which saw it as a sellout of U.S. security. But after several assurances from Clinton, most notably a pledge to back out if the pact isn't working to U.S. advantage, he lent his support.

After the vote, Lott called on Clinton to "show similar courage" in standing up to liberal Democrats on the budget. Clinton expressed cautious optimism in Thursday's interview about a budget deal. But he didn't want to raise false hopes.

The president said some Democrats fear that reaching an early agreement without prolonged public debate makes it harder to score political points.

"If we make an agreement, they still want people to know 'OK, maybe I signed this agreement, but I wish the tax (cuts) hadn't been this much and I fought like crazy for education and health care and the environment,' " Clinton said.

On the GOP side, hard-liners are resisting Lott's willingness to trim the Republican tax-cut package and make concessions on what's achievable in Medicare savings. House Speaker Newt Gingrich's trial balloon to set aside tax cuts until a spending agreement was reached raised a firestorm among conservative Republicans.

But the leaders showed they can bargain in good faith and get the job done on chemical weapons. The American people expect more of the same on the budget. What they value most is bold, honest leadership in bringing issues to closure, not partisan excuses.

\*\*\*\*\*

Russia Refuses to Ratify Chemical Weapons Ban  
Moscow Parliament Pleads Poverty but Suggests It Will Approve Treaty in the Fall

By Lee Hockstader  
Washington Post Foreign Service  
Saturday, April 26 1997; Page A22  
The Washington Post

MOSCOW, April 25 -- The Russian parliament, pleading poverty, refused today to ratify on time a major international treaty banning production and use of chemical weapons, casting doubt on the treaty's future. The vote, a slap in the face for the both the Clinton and Yeltsin administrations, came a day after the U.S. Senate approved the ban by a greater than expected margin.

Although the Communist-dominated parliament suggested it will approve the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention this fall, today's vote means the weapons ban -- the product of years of arduous negotiations -- may go into effect next Tuesday without the participation of one of its two major signatories.

The vote today further highlights what Moscow's own Russian experts characterize as a ticking time bomb on Russian soil: a vast and aging stock of chemical weapons -- some 40,000 tons stored in conditions described as rapidly deteriorating and increasingly unsafe. But lawmakers said Russia would be hard-pressed to pay even a fraction of the more than

\$5 billion needed to destroy the arsenal without large infusions of Western aid.

"It's simple: There's a lack of cash," said Vladimir Lukin, former ambassador to Washington and head of the foreign affairs committee of the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament. "We have one of the largest amounts of chemical weapons so we have to have understanding" from the West.

Before the U.S. Senate's vote endorsing the ban Thursday, U.S. officials had said the American ratification of the treaty would clear the way for approval by the Russians. The United States was the 75th country to ratify the convention signed by 164 states, which obliges member states to destroy all chemical weapons and production facilities by 2007.

President Boris Yeltsin also has suggested that Russia was prepared to adopt the treaty, which was negotiated during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said the United States is "extremely disappointed" by the Duma decision to postpone debate on the treaty. "We would hope that the Russian government and Duma could work out whatever concerns that the Duma has," he said.

"It's going to do damage to Russia, because Russia won't be in on the ground floor in implementation," Burns said, adding that the Russian government had shown "good faith" and that the problem lay with the Communist-dominated parliament.

The Duma did agree to send a statement to signatories of the convention. The statement pledges the Duma's intent to endorse the accord later this year, asks for a "significant increase" in international financial help to implement the treaty and requests that Russia not be excluded from the administrative bodies that will be created to monitor implementation.

"The State Duma . . . has begun the process of ratifying the convention and intends to complete it if possible this fall if the necessary conditions are met," said the statement, which passed with 331 votes and one abstention. There were no votes against, although nearly 120 deputies were absent.

The semiofficial Russian Tass news agency reported that some lawmakers grumbled that ratifying the convention would be "one more concession to the West," which they are ill-disposed to make, given its plans for the eastward expansion of NATO, which Russian politicians bitterly oppose.

The Tass report angrily condemned the parliament's decision, which it said had shot Russia in the foot.

The report, blasting parliament for its "unforgivable sluggishness," said the Duma's action "will automatically strip Russian experts of the right to inspect chemical enterprises in other countries and to influence the processes of chemical disarmament."

In U.S. budgetary terms, and especially defense terms, \$5 billion may not sound like an overwhelming bill for the destruction of a chemical weapons stock as large as Russia's. But Russia is in the midst of a colossal financial crisis that has left at least half the government's budget unfunded this year.

To put it in perspective, \$5 billion is nearly five times more than the Russian military spent on science research and development last year, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think tank.

Despite the cost, Russian officials have warned that the country's ability to continue maintaining its enormous caches of chemical weapons is eroding rapidly.

Staff writer Michael Dobbs in Washington contributed to this report.

\*\*\*\*\*

Melinda Lamont-Havers  
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers  
21 Dupont Circle, 5th Floor  
Washington, DC 20036  
Phone: 202-223-5956  
Fax: 202-785-9034  
[www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/poison/](http://www.stimson.org/pub/stimson/poison/)

forwarded

>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 12:30:48 -0400 (EDT)  
>From: Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice <fcpj@afn.org>  
>To: sAbolition 2000 Network <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>,  
>Subject: Cassini postcards (fwd)

>  
>----- Forwarded message -----  
>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 16:06:10 GMT  
>From: Yorkshire CND <cndyorks@gn.apc.org>  
>To: Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice <fcpj@afn.org>  
>Subject: Cassini postcards

>Dear Bruce,

>Thanks for the Cassini postcard text. I am still exploring the possibility  
>of (and funding for) getting postcards printed.

>What we are doing in the meantime is encouraging people to send the same or  
>similar message on a picture postcard of their local area. Receiving lots of  
>picture postcards from all over Britain with handwritten messages may have  
>more influence on the White House than postcards with a standard printed  
>message (though these are of course easier for people to do).

>Have you thought of using the picture postcard idea in conjunction with the  
>mass postcard campaign?

>Below is some information about Tracy.

>In peace,

>John

>  
>  
>LEEDS PEACE CAMPAIGNER SENTENCED BY HIGH COURT TO 42 DAYS IN HOLLOWAY PRISON

>Leeds peace campaigner Tracy Hart was this morning, Wednesday 23rd April,  
>sentenced by the High Court in London to 42 days in Holloway Prison for  
>breaking an injunction banning her from the top secret United States spy  
base at  
>Menwith Hill, near Harrogate.

>  
>The injunction, imposed in March 1996, bans Tracy from crossing an invisible  
>line

>surrounding the Menwith Hill base. Tracy has trespassed onto the base at  
>Menwith Hill  
>over 300 times in the last 2 years and is only the second peace campaigner  
>in five years  
>to have been served with a restraining order following protests at this, the  
>world's  
>largest spy base. Menwith Hill is run by the American National Security  
>Agency, which

>recent reports have revealed, is spending \$1 million per minute spying on the  
>communications of the United Kingdom, French and German governments.  
>  
>Tracy from Chapeltown in Leeds was found by the court to have broken the  
>injunction  
>when she was investigating what she believed was new lighting structures on  
>the base  
>for which no planning permission had been sought from Harrogate Council.  
>  
>Tracy Hart said:  
>"Menwith Hill is undemocratic and unaccountable. Its spying activities,  
>including  
>economic espionage, violate British and International Law but our MPs are  
>powerless  
>to do anything to stop it. How long will Menwith Hill be allowed to continue  
>spying  
>on European governments, companies and individuals with complete impunity?"  
>  
>ENDS  
>  
>DETAILS: John Brierley, Yorkshire CND: 01274-730795  
>  
>Messages can be sent to Tracy Hart c/o HMP Holloway, Parkhurst Rd, London,  
>N7 0NU.  
>  
>  
>Yorkshire CND (cndyorks@gn.apc.org)  
>  
>  
>

forwarded

>Date: Sat, 26 Apr 1997 22:04:04 -0700 (PDT)  
>Message-Id: <199704270504.WAA21603@igc4.igc.org>  
>From: John Burroughs <jburroughs@igc.apc.org>  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.org  
>Subject: NPT recommendations

>  
>What follows are recommendations developed by the abolition caucus  
>meeting daily at the NPT PrepCom April 1997. This was made  
>available to all delegations, and also to NGOs for use in briefing  
>delegates. It also sparked some useful discussions, especially re  
>fissile materials (how to overcome the current impasse) and  
>nuclear power. David Krieger, Jackie Cabasso, myself, Martin  
>Kalinowski, Pol Huttger (sp?), Claire Greensfelder, and others  
>were involved in drafting. - John Burroughs

>>From jburroughs Tue Apr 22 18:08:07 1997

>Return-Path: <jburroughs>

>Received: (from jburroughs)

> by igc4.igc.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id SAA06830;

> Tue, 22 Apr 1997 18:08:07 -0700 (PDT)

>Date: Tue, 22 Apr 1997 18:08:07 -0700 (PDT)

>Message-Id: <199704230108.SAA06830@igc4.igc.org>

>From: John Burroughs <jburroughs@igc.apc.org>

>To: wslf@igc.org

>Subject: tlkg pts

>Cc: jburroughs@igc.org

>Status: RO

>  
>Abolition 2000 Recommendations to Delegations to the Preparatory  
>Committee Meeting of the NPT Review Conference

>  
>April 1997, United Nations, New York

>  
>To strengthen the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty  
>and achieve its universality, we call upon this Preparatory  
>Committee Meeting to issue a final statement that includes the  
>following recommendations, consistent with the April 1995  
>Abolition 2000 Statement.

>  
>1) Commencement of negotiations in 1997 for a Nuclear Weapons  
>Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons, in  
>accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M, adopted  
>10 December 1996, and the Article VI obligation, as  
>authoritatively interpreted by the International Court of Justice,  
>to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear  
>disarmament in all its aspects;

>  
>2) Immediate implementation of measures to reduce the nuclear  
>threat, including those identified by the Canberra Commission on  
>the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: taking nuclear forces off  
>alert status, removal of warheads from delivery vehicles, ending  
>deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, ending nuclear

>testing, initiating negotiations to further reduce U.S. and  
>Russian nuclear arsenals, and agreement among the nuclear weapon  
>states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use  
>undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapons  
>states;  
>  
>3) Removal of all nuclear weapons from foreign states, in  
>accordance with Articles I and II of the NPT, and from  
>international oceanic waters;  
>  
>4) Cancellation of subcritical nuclear tests; closure of all  
>nuclear test sites in consultation with the affected indigenous  
>peoples; and redress of the human suffering and environmental  
>degradation that is the legacy of more than 50 years of nuclear  
>testing;  
>  
>5) A halt and reversal of deployment of new-design, modified or  
>newly produced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including the  
>U.S. B61 Mod 11 earth penetrating warhead and B61 guided glide  
>bomb and France's Triomphant submarine, and the U.K. and U.S.  
>Trident submarines;  
>  
>6) A halt to expansion of the virtual testing infrastructure,  
>including construction of the Megajoule Laser in France, and the  
>National Ignition Facility, Advanced Strategic Computing  
>Initiative, and Advanced Hydrotest Facility in the United States;  
>  
>7) Facilitation of the establishment of an International  
>Sustainable Energy Agency, committed to development of  
>sustainable, environmentally safe, and proliferation-resistant  
>energy sources; and a moratorium on the building of new nuclear  
>power plants and transfer of non-medical nuclear technology until  
>the proliferation and waste storage issues have been adequately  
>resolved;  
>  
>8) Initiate negotiations on prohibition of the military and  
>commercial production, reprocessing, and reuse of all  
>weapons-usable radioactive materials, including tritium; creation  
>of a complete public inventory, updated annually, of all such  
>materials, past and present; and reduction and elimination of  
>existing stocks, taking into account materials in warheads. The  
>current impasse regarding a fissile materials cutoff can only be  
>overcome if disarmament measures are linked to non-proliferation  
>measures;  
>  
>9) Expansion of the existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones to create  
>a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, encompassing  
>ocean space as well as land masses;  
>  
>10) Establishment of an intersessional working group on nuclear  
>disarmament; and  
>  
>11) Greater inclusion of NGOs in the NPT review process - NGOs in  
>disarmament fora under UN auspices should have the same rights of

>access and participation as NGOs in other UN fora (such as human  
>rights and environment).

>

>

>April 10, 1997

>

>

---

Brett Feldman                    Program Assistant  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St.                    tel. (617)868-5050 x. 280  
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org            <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

forwarded

>Date: Thu, 24 Apr 1997 11:04:34 -0400 (EDT)  
>From: Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice <fcpj@afn.org>  
>To: Abolition 2000 Network <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>,  
>Subject: Space Nuclear Thermionic Contracts - General Atomics & INERTEK (fwd)

>  
>----- Forwarded message -----

>Date: Wed, 23 Apr 1997 22:03:57 -0400  
>From: John Pike <johnpike@fas.org>  
>To: johnpike@mail.clark.net  
>Subject: Space Nuclear Thermionic Contracts - General Atomics & INERTEK

>  
>!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

>  
>The Defense Department's space nuclear power program may  
>not be quite what it used to be, but it has not completely gone  
>away entirely. These two recent Defense Department contract  
>announcements provide at least a little insight into current  
>activities, I and though they might be of interest ....

>  
>!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

>  
>DOD Contracts News Release: No. 194-97 April 23, 1997

>  
>General Atomics, San Diego, Calif., is being awarded a  
>\$5,401,936 cost plus fixed fee contract for the research,  
>development, test and evaluation of advanced in-core  
>thermionic technologies to support long duration space missions  
>for national security purposes. Focus is on the advancement of  
>thermionic performance rather than an overall system design  
>improvement since no specific mission has yet been identified on  
>which to base detailed system requirements. The objectives of  
>the Advanced Thermionic Program (ATP) are to advance the  
>state of the art of thermionic power conversion in the United  
>States, develop high performance and highly reliable thermionic  
>converters that provide high output power per unit of system  
>mass, demonstrate the capabilities of these thermionic  
>converters, show their feasibility for use in thermionic systems,  
>and develop corresponding system level conceptual designs.  
>Work will be performed in San Diego, Calif. (91%); and  
>Auburn, Ala. (9%), and is expected to be completed by August  
>14, 1999. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the  
>current fiscal year. There were 32 bids solicited on Oct. 18,  
>1996, and three bids were received. The contracting activity is  
>the Defense Special Weapons Agency, Alexandria, Va.  
>(DSWA01-97-C-0088).

>  
>@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

>  
>[Commerce Business Daily: Posted March 7, 1997]

>  
>PART: U.S. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENTS

>SUBPART: SERVICES  
>CLASSCOD: A--Research and Development  
>OFFADD: Defense Special Weapons Agency, 6801 Telegraph Rd., Alexandria,  
> VA 22310-3398  
>SUBJECT: A--THERMIONICS AND SPACE BASED NUCLEAR POWER  
>SOL N/A  
>POC Tanya Stasiuk, Negotiator, (703) 325-5029, Scott G. Morton,  
> Contracting Officer, (703) 325-1200.  
>DESC: The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) plans to explore  
>potential areas of interest with International Energy Technologies  
>(INERTEK) in space based nuclear power and thermionics. DSWA  
>plans to award sole source contracts to INERTEK which include;  
>but are not limited to the following: Advanced Fuels Characterization,  
>Emitter Specific Post Irradiation Examination of 5 TFEs from  
>Ya-81; Post Test Analysis of the SC-320 TFE; Closed Spaced  
>Thermionic Converter with Isothermal Electrodes; Investigation  
>of Compatibility and Stability of Tungsten and Molybdenum Monocrystals  
>with coating of Scandia, Ytria, and Alumina; Prolonged Life  
>Bellows for Thermionic Fuel Element Applications; Production  
>of Collector Assembly Samples with Multi-Layer Insulation;  
>Refractory Metal to Non-Refractory Metals Joining Process;  
>Investigation of the Effect of Oxygen on Emission and Absorption  
>Properties of Electrodes and Thermionic Converter Characteristics;  
>Fabrication of Single Crystal Emitter Specimens with Surface  
>Subjected to Selective Electrochemical Etching; Optimization  
>of High-Voltage Metal-Ceramic Insulators; Results of In-Pile  
>Tests of Multi-Cell TFEs' Post Irradiation Examination of Multi-Cell  
>TFEs; Investigations of Tungsten Mass Transfer into the Interelectrode  
>Gap; Production of Scandia Ceramic Spacers with Heightened  
>Vibration Strength; Design of a Multi-Cell TFE MCD-800; Tungsten  
>Single Crystal Emitter for a Single Cell TFE; and Advanced  
>Collectors of High Efficiency TIC with Reflective Coatings.  
>DSWA believes that INERTEK is the only source able to fill  
>these requirements because of their unique expertise and knowledge  
>of thermionics and space based nuclear power. Any other firm  
>desiring consideration must fully identify its capability to  
>perform the requirements. See Note 22. POC is Tanya Stasiuk  
>at (703) 325-5029. Information on DSWA solicitations, already  
>released, can be obtained by calling the DSWA Hotline at (703)  
>325-1173. As of 31 May 96, Acquisition Management has added  
>"Procurement Opportunities: to the DSWA Home Page available  
>on the World Wide Web. Information will include this synopsis  
>and more. Please check us out at [www.dswa.mil](http://www.dswa.mil). Reference Synopsis  
>No. 97-54  
>CITE: (I-066 SN040016)  
>  
>  
>@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@  
>  
>John Pike  
>Director, Space Policy Project  
>Federation of American Scientists  
>307 Massachusetts Ave. NE  
>Washington, DC 20002

>V 202-675-1023, F 202-675-1024, <http://www.fas.org/spp/>

>

>

On 28 April 1997, the CND Staff Team wrote this:

>In case you are still wondering what you can do to help the campaign to ensure the survival of Faslane Peace Camp because you live outside of Argyll and Bute can you please before May 8 write, AS A TOURIST/POTENTIAL TOURIST who has visited the area or may in the future visit to:

>James McLellan  
>Chief Executive  
>Argyll and Bute Council  
>Kilmory  
>Lochgilphead  
>PA31 8RT  
>Scotland  
>United Kingdom

>Expressing your full support for the Camp, what it stands for and why it should stay etc.

>And don't forget to send messages of support to the Camp via Scottish CND at [cndscot@dial.pipex.com](mailto:cndscot@dial.pipex.com).

>Let's drown them in letters of support for the camp by May 8, please.

>CND Campaigns Team

To anyone who may be in any doubt about the importance of supporting Faslane Peace Camp, please take the time now to write a quick letter or fax to James McLellan (fax +44 1546 604349).

Situated at the gates of the Clyde Submarine Base Faslane, the UK's Trident base, just down the road from Glasgow, Faslane Peace Camp has played a key role in the campaign against Trident and against nuclear weapons in general over the last decade. If you are one of the US members of Abolition 2000, you may be interested to know that US TRIDENT SUBMARINES ALSO DOCK AT FASLANE.

During my six years at CND, the Camp provided vital information on developments in the UK's nuclear weapons programme, alerting the public, parliamentarians and the media. In recent years, working closely with Scottish CND and local campaigners, Faslane Peace Camp has (amongst other things):

- \* Alerted us to the first patrols by UK Trident submarines, HMS Vanguard and HMS Victorious.
- \* Monitored and protested against the movements of UK Trident, Polaris and hunter killer submarines.
- \* Monitored and stopped hundreds of lorries carrying nuclear warheads for Trident and Polaris.
- \* Organised regular demonstrations against Trident, including the UK part of the forthcoming demonstrations against NATO nuclear weapons in Europe.

Faslane Peace Camp plays a vital role in the campaign against Trident and for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Campers and their supporters spend long hours campaigning against the base at Faslane and exposing its activities. Please take a few minutes now to write a letter on their behalf.

Best wishes

Nicola Butler

RTna 04/28 1112 Russia says NATO fails to keep pace with history  
BRATISLAVA, Slovakia 9Reuter) - Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin Monday criticized NATO enlargement plans, saying the alliance had failed to keep pace with history.

Chernomyrdin, on the first day of a three-day visit to the Slovak capital, met his Slovak counterpart Vladimir Meciar and President Michal Kovac, talking mostly of further economic cooperation between the two nations.

But Kovac's spokesman Vladimir Stefko said that in talks with the president, the Russian prime minister criticized the alliance for not accepting the situation in Europe after the fall of communism.

"Mr. Chernomyrdin repeated Russia's categorical opposition to NATO expansion, saying this is not the way to solve the defense situation in Europe," Stefko said.

Russia has demanded that NATO should not station nuclear and other weapons in new member states and wants a binding treaty on relations between Russia and the alliance.

Chernomyrdin made no comments on the matter after meeting Meciar, saying he would answer journalists' questions Tuesday.

Stefko added that Chernomyrdin said that in his view NATO had not been reformed enough since the fall of communism as it was still "too much strategically oriented to the East."

Kovac said Slovakia's desire to join NATO remained a top international policy priority, Stefko said.

"President Kovac told him (Chernomyrdin) the ambition of Slovakia remains to join NATO and no way aims against any political or economic relations with Russia," Stefko said, adding Kovac does not see NATO as being aimed at Russia or its people.

\*\*\*\*\*

APO 04/27 1225 Russia Dismantling Nuclear Arsenal

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia has dismantled almost 50 percent of its nuclear arsenal in compliance with international agreements, Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov said today.

A report by the Interfax news agency of his remarks cited no numbers for dismantled weaponry.

Russia has an estimated 8,000 to 9,000 nuclear warheads, to be reduced to no more than 3,500 under the START II treaty between the United States and Russia. Russia's hard-line parliament has refused to ratify the treaty despite President Boris Yeltsin's urgings.

Mikhailov told Interfax that nearly 400 tons of highly enriched uranium has been removed from nuclear warheads and a significant amount already sold to the United States.

Under an agreement between the two countries, Russia is to sell the United States 500 metric tons of the weapons-grade uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads -- 40 percent of its stores. The uranium is then processed and used as fuel in nuclear power stations.

Mikhailov said his ministry plans to boost Russia's nuclear exports, which were \$2 billion last year, by 20 percent by

selling uranium abroad and constructing nuclear power stations in Iran, China and India.

\*\*\*\*\*

APn 04/26 0112 Treaty Fights

By TOM RAUM

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Clinton went all-out to win Senate ratification of the chemical weapons treaty, and now the costs of his concessions could begin showing up in other areas -- Olike the budget.

Clinton's effort followed a historical pattern in which presidents, especially those in second terms, expend enormous amounts of political capital to win treaty fights.

"It's one of the things that gets you into the history books," said Fred Greenstein, a political scientist at Princeton University.

The Senate's ratification of the treaty to ban the production of chemical and biological weapons was an important and hard-fought victory for Clinton.

But, in exchange for enhancing his prestige on the world stage, Clinton may find that he has relinquished some of his options for dealing with the GOP-led Congress.

Mounting a major lobbying campaign, Clinton sent teams of Cabinet members to the Hill, made direct appeals to wavering senators, showcased former President Bush's support for the treaty and won the support of 1996 GOP rival Bob Dole and of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.

"He was on the phone with individual senators," said Lott, whose final-day support for the treaty helped push it over the top. "I wish he'd get on the phone each day and work with individual senators on the budget."

Lott's words signaled that he now expects budget concessions from Clinton.

"It's going to cost him something," said Steven Wayne, a political scientist at Georgetown University. "You don't get anything for free. The support of Dole and Lott will come at some cost, probably in the budget negotiations."

Even though Lott has denied any direct linkage, he told reporters Friday, "I hope he (Clinton) will make some really bold move on the budget."

Pressure is now on Clinton to move more in the direction of tax cuts favored by Republicans.

At a White House news conference Friday, Clinton called the treaty vote "an indication of what we can do" when working together in the national interest, and said he was hopeful a similar coming-together could occur on a balanced-budget plan.

Apart from how the treaty debate might impact the budget talks, administration allies also are concerned that Senate conservatives who voted for the treaty may try to make amends with the right by opposing the president's renewal of trade benefits for China.

The Senate's 74-26 treaty vote Thursday sounds like a wide margin. But it was only seven votes more than the two-thirds needed for treaties.

"Considering that not only former Republican presidents but many key figures in the Republican Party had come out in support of it, I thought it was alarming there were still 26 votes against it," said Spurgeon Keeny, president of the Arms Control Association, a private group supporting disarmament.

"That does not bode well for further treaties."

Furthermore, Keeny suggested that Clinton has already played his best card -- agreeing to a reorganization of the State Department along lines suggested by Sen. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The move to appease Helms may have helped get the chemical weapons treaty to the Senate floor but it didn't soften Helms' opposition.

A series of arms-control agreements are headed for Senate action, including a controversial nuclear-test ban treaty, a measure on conventional military forces in Europe and a plan for nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific and Africa.

Clinton will also have to get the Senate to vote on any expansion of NATO.

There is something about a major treaty that transcends ordinary congressional votes and on which presidents expend enormous amounts of political capital.

Woodrow Wilson saw his second term undermined by his failure to win Senate ratification for his League of Nations Treaty and one-termer Jimmy Carter paid a large political cost for his hard-fought victory on the Panama Canal Treaties.

Ronald Reagan devoted considerable time and energy in his second term to nuclear-weapons reduction treaties with the Soviet Union.

Why do battles for treaties often take on heroic proportions?

"Sometimes treaties are just more important than other things that come before Congress," said Stephen Hess, a presidential scholar at the Brookings Institution. "They are part of an administration's historical legacy. Presidents care about such things, particularly presidents in their second terms."

And the Senate jealously guards its treaty-ratification prerogative, said Richard A. Baker, historian of the Senate.

"Along with constitutional amendments, treaties require a two-thirds majority. And senators take that very seriously, and usually make sure presidents know just how seriously."

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

April 25, 1997

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the Senate of the United States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify that:

In connection with Condition (1), Effect of Article XXII, the United States has informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.

In connection with Condition (7), Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export Controls: (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national export controls; (ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical production technology is fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States; (iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export controls on chemicals and related chemical production technology for foreign policy or national security reasons, notwithstanding Article XI(2); and (iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the United States Government its understanding and agreement that export control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of

Advanced Biotechnology, the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on chemicals.

In connection with Condition (15), Assistance Under Article X, the United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X, and, for any State Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided to the State Party; and (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the State Party.

In connection with Condition (18), Laboratory Sample Analysis, no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.

In connection with Condition (26), Riot Control Agents, the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, including the use against combatants who are parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases: (i) the conduct of peacetime military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda); (ii) consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter; and (iii) peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

In connection with Condition (27), Chemical Weapons Destruction, all the following conditions are satisfied: (A) I have agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations under the convention for the destruction of chemical weapons; (B) the requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the United States by the deadline required by the Convention of April 29, 2007; (C) the

requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force with respect to that Party, on general plans of the State Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different than that declared under that Article; and (D) I will consult with the Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a result of the program of alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208), I determine that alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.

In connection with Condition (28), Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure: (i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent has been withheld, the United States National Authority will first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility under the Convention that is conducted on an involuntary basis on the territory of the United States, the United States National Authority first will obtain an administrative search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.

In accordance with Condition (26) on Riot Control Agents, I have certified that the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control agents in various peacetime and peacekeeping operations. These are situations in which the United States is not engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect to U.S. forces.

In connection with Condition (4)(A), Cost Sharing Arrangements, which calls for a report identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization, I hereby report that because the Organization is not yet established and will not be until after entry into force of the Convention, as of this date there are no cost-sharing arrangements between the United States and the Organization to identify. However, we will be working with the Organization upon its establishment to

develop such arrangements with it and will provide additional information to the Congress in the annual reports contemplated by this Condition.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 25, 1997.

# # #

ippnwbos@igc.apc.org wrote:

Dear Vijai,

I am the owner of the abolition-caucus. I received your message to Rob Green and Richard Salvador, which was 'cc'd' to the abolition-caucus, as an error message, because the document did not properly translate. Do you wish to send it again? Is there another way you could attach the document?

Sincerely,  
Brett Feldman

-----  
Brett Feldman                    Program Assistant  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St.                    tel. (617)868-5050 x. 280  
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA        fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org            <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>  
IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear  
Weapons

\*\*\*\*\*

Vijai wrote:

Dear Brett,

Sorry for the problem I have caused you. Even though I have been at this internet for a year, I am still finding my way around. In my explorations I found that the attachment device would be handy. Obviously I am doing it wrong.

I am copying my last transmission as a part of this missive and containing my self in the future to my known competence levels!

Happy reading.

Warm regards

Vijai

\*\*\*\*\*Vijai K Nair had written:

Dear George And Richard

As promised I am attaching Extracts from the Draft Final Document [NAC/FM 12/Doc.1/Rev.3] of the XII Ministerial Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries.

Happy reading

Warm regards

\*\*\*\*\*Vijai K Nair

Executive Director  
Forum for Strategic & Security Studies  
Room 2 Administrative Building

Safdarjung Airport  
New Delhi 110 003  
India

Tele: 091 118 55411 & 091 11 462 8336 - Fax: 091 118 523119

E-mail: magoo@giasd101.vsnl.net.in

\*\*\*\*\*

XII

MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE  
OF THE  
MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

New Delhi, April 4-8,1997

Draft Final Document - NAC/FM 12/Doc.1/Rev.3, 8 April 1997 - 10.20 p.m.

RELEVANT EXTRACTS

\*\*\*\*\*

INTRODUCTION

The Ministers discussed political & economic developments since the Caratenga Summit, and reached the following conclusions, recommendations and decisions.

\*\*\*\*\*

CHAPTER I: GLOBAL ISSUES

A. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SINCE THE CARATENGA SUMMIT

1. The Ministers reviewed ..... and discussed the opportunities, challenges and problems facing the Movement as it approached the 21st century. Chief among them were the tasks of founding a just & equitable world order based on the principles & purposes of the UN Charter.

2. .... though the peace dividend which had been expected from the end of the Cold war had not materialised, the global community had to collectively strive towards a world order based on peace, justice, equity among nations, democracy & the rule of international law and observance of international humanitarian law. .... The Ministers were concerned that security structures and conceptions emerging in the developed countries & their implementation may lead to the build up of tensions which may have a global negative effect & may undermine the security of developing countries. The Ministers, therefore, urged their partners in the Movement and countries of the developed world to expeditiously resolve the long standing disputes, prevent old divisions being re-drawn and work towards the effective realisation of the principles of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter.

3. .... However, though there was now an opportunity of banning and eliminating nuclear weapons, the only WMD still not banned, those who had them still lacked the political will to accept the overwhelming wish of the international community, led by the Movement, to see these weapons dismantled and destroyed. The Ministers believed that the courage which these countries had shown in abandoning old antagonisms and reaching out to former opponents should now be turned to this most pressing challenge of nuclear disarmament.

5. They noted with concern that entire regions were being by-passed by the development process, disparity and inequity were increasing among nations and that more than 1.3 billion people in today's world lived in absolute poverty and the number in the Non-Aligned and other developing countries was rising at an alarming rate.

8. That the Movement had always stood for is collective self reliance; what it expects from its partners in the developed world in meeting the challenges of modernisation is the co-operation of equals. The assumption by some developed countries that they had the unique privilege of prescribing norms or values for developing countries, which the Movement rejects, betrays a colonial mind-set.

## B. THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

## C. STRENGTHENING, RESTRUCTURING, REVITALISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

## D. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

## E. FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

## F. AGENDA FOR PEACE

## G. REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

44. While reaffirming that the primary responsibility for international peace and security rests with the UN, the Ministers stressed that the role of regional arrangements or agencies, in that regard, should not in any way substitute the role of the UN, or circumvent the full application of the guiding principles of the UN and International law.

## H. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND DECOLONISATION

## I. MERCENARIES

## J. DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

54. The Ministers noted that with the end of the Cold War, there was no justification for nuclear arsenals, or concepts of international security based on promoting military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. While the end of the Cold War had created unprecedented opportunities to promote this objective, regrettably there had been assertions which sought to justify continued reliance on nuclear doctrines, in certain cases against non-nuclear-weapon states. The Ministers recalled that the Caratgena Summit had called for the adoption of an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound frame work. They called upon the international community to join them in negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence building measures.

55. The Ministers noted and welcomed the various international initiatives which stress that the opportunity now exists for the international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest priority. They also noted that our present situation whereby nuclear weapon states insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet monopolise the right to own them is highly discriminatory, unstable and cannot be sustained.

56. The declarations that nuclear weapons continue to offer security to the nuclear weapon states could contribute to the escalation of the nuclear threat and were contrary to the undertaking to fulfil nuclear disarmament obligations. Nuclear weapons continue to exist in massive numbers and in a state of operational readiness. It was imperative that security in the post Cold War era should be promoted through drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. They called for a series of agreed measures forming part of a programme for nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapon free world.

57. The Ministers welcomed the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” They noted and welcomed the growing body of authoritative international opinion which stressed that nuclear disarmament should be pursued by the international community as a matter of the highest priority. They recalled that a number of NAM countries had taken collective initiatives at the 50th and 51st UNGA Sessions to underscore the need for urgent action in the field of nuclear disarmament, as mandated at the Cartage Summit. The Ministers welcomed the useful work that had been done by a number of NAM countries, members of the CD, in developing an Action Plan for nuclear disarmament within a time bound framework.

58. The Ministers:

- \* Called on the CD to establish, on priority, an Adhoc Committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multi-lateral agreement should be concluded committing all states to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- \* Urged nuclear-weapon-states to agree to commence the negotiations in the CD on a legally binding international instrument to provide unconditional assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon- states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- \* Urged nuclear-weapon-states to agree to commence negotiations in the CD on a legally binding international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- \* Supported the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UNGA devoted to disarmament;
- \* And, expressed satisfaction at the work of the Working Group on disarmament established by the NAM co-ordinating bureau in New York..

59. The Ministers noted with concern that, though the Chemical Weapons Convention will enter into force on 29 April 1997, the two declared possessors of Chemical Weapons have still not ratified it, which jeopardises both the necessary universal and disarmament character of the Convention as originally conceived, which has been the guiding principle during the protracted negotiations through which the Convention was achieved. The Ministers emphasised that the first conference of States Parties should adopt the appropriate measures towards ensuring that the Convention is operationalised in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner that

safeguards the principle of universality and the disarmament character integral to the Convention. The Ministers further emphasised that the outstanding issues before the Preparatory Commission needed to be satisfactorily resolved in order to ensure effective implementation of the Convention. In this context, they called on the developed countries to promote international co-operation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all existing multilateral as well as national discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.

60. In the context of ongoing deliberations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] the Ministers emphasised that given the importance of bio-technology for economic development, any verification regime for the BWC should contain specific provisions to safeguard the security and economic interests of the developing countries, parties to the BWC.

..... In this connection the Ministers noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Article 1 of the Title of the Convention to include the prohibition of use of biological weapons and urged an early reply from the States signatories to the enquiries by the depositaries on this proposal.

61. The Ministers reaffirmed that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complimentary and could be pursued simultaneously. They urged states in various regions of the world to negotiate agreements to promote greater balance in conventional armament and restraint in the production and acquisition of conventional arms and, where necessary, for their progressive and balanced reduction, with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security. They stressed that the peaceful resolution of regional and interstate disputes is essential for the creation of conditions which would enable states to divert their resources from armaments to economic growth and development. Regional disarmament initiatives, to be practical, need to take into account the special characteristics of each region and enhance the security of every state of the region. The question of accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirement of states for self defence should also be addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region.

62. The Ministers considered the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones [NWFZs] as a positive step towards obtaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. They urged states to conclude agreements with a view to creating NWFZs in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the final document of SSOD-I. In this context, they welcomed the establishment of NWFZs established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The Ministers considered the question of the establishment of NWFZs in other parts of the world and agreed that this should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned and in conformity with the provisions of the final document of SSOD-I. The Ministers welcomed the efforts of Mongolia to institutionalise its status as a NWFZ.

63. The Ministers reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all WMDs. To this end, the Ministers reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly Resolution adopted by

consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the NPT without delay and to place promptly all nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards. They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other states and they condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenal. Stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. They further welcomed the initiative by HE Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the establishment of a zone free from WMDs in the Middle East. They stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

64. The Ministers welcomed the signing of “the African NWFZ Treaty” [Treaty of Pelindaba] in Cairo on 11 April 1996 and affirmed that this further Treaty will further consolidate global efforts toward non-proliferation and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. The ministers further affirmed the establishment of NWFZs especially in the Middle East would enhance the security of Africa.

65. Consistent with the decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Ministers of States Parties to the NPT called upon all states, particularly the nuclear-weapon-states, to fulfil their commitments particularly those related to Article VI of the Treaty. They also emphasised the need to ensure and facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Undertaking to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. In this context, the Ministers to the States Parties to the NPT called upon the Preparatory Commissions up to and including the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to engage immediately in substantive work for the meaningful obligations of the obligation under the Treaty and the Commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives Document.

66. The Ministers of States signatories to the CTBT took note of the opening of the CTBT for signature in 1996. They agreed that if the implications of the Treaty are to be fully realised, the continued commitment of all states signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament will be essential.

67. The Ministers Stated that in order to enhance international security and stability, all states parties to non-proliferation, arms limitations and disarmament treaties should comply with and implement all provisions of such

treaties. They emphasised that questions of non-compliance by states parties should be resolved in a manner consistent with such treaties and international law. They further emphasised that any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the UN Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress of violations of their provisions. Such deviations would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the CD. They underlined that circumventing or undermining the provisions of existing treaties will seriously prejudice the role of the Conference.

68. [Illicit transfer of small arms].....

69. [Landmines].....

70. [Landmines].....

71. The Ministers noted with concern that undue restrictions on export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persists. The Ministers emphasised that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-Proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all states and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.

## K. INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

## L. TERRORISM

## M. INTERNATIONAL LAW

82. The Ministers emphasised that international law should become the instrument for promoting justice in international relations.

83. The Ministers concurred that peace and harmony among nations and peoples require states to respect and promote the rule of law. For this reason they committed themselves to conduct their external affairs based upon the obligations of international law. They agreed that only an international society governed by law could assure peace and security for all its members.

85. The Charter refers to the ICJ as the Organisation's principal judicial organ. The Security Council should make greater use of the World Court as a source of Advisory Opinions, and in controversial instances, use the World Court as a source of interpreting relevant international law and consider decisions to review by the World Court.

88. With the conclusion of the Cold War, many new areas of concern have emerged which warrant a renewal of the commitment of the international community to uphold and defend the principles of the UN Charter and international law as well as a fuller utilisation of the mechanisms and means

for the pacific settlement of disputes, as envisaged in the UN Charter.

89. The Ministers called upon all states to refrain from adopting or implementing extra-territorial or unilateral measures of coercion as means of exerting pressure on non-aligned and developing countries. They noted that measures such as Helms-Burton and Kennedy-D'Amato Acts constitute violations of international law and the Charter of the UN, and called upon the international community to take effective action in order to arrest this trend.

90. The ministers reiterated their concern for the insistence of certain States to resort to one-sided qualifications of the policies of other States, thus serving interests of their own. They rejected the continued use of unilateral mechanisms of evaluation, qualification and certification, as they are inconsistent with the principles of sovereign equality of States and of non-intervention and undermine multilateral instruments and mechanisms established for this purpose.

91. The ministers reiterated the commitment expressed by Heads of State or Government at the Eleventh Summit held at Cartage to jointly oppose all kinds of conditionalities and coercive unilateral measures, rules and policies that are attempted to be imposed on Member States.

## N. LAW OF THE SEA

## O. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

|                                         |              |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------|
| *****                                   | CHAPTER II:  |
| ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION |              |
| *****                                   | CHAPTER III: |
| ECONOMIC ISSUES                         |              |
| *****                                   | CHAPTER IV:  |
| SOCIAL ISSUES                           |              |
| *****                                   | [Ends]       |

ipnwbos@igc.apc.org wrote:

>

> forwarded

>

>>Date: Sat, 26 Apr 1997 22:04:04 -0700 (PDT)

>>Message-Id: <199704270504.WAA21603@igc4.igc.org>

>>From: John Burroughs <jburroughs@igc.apc.org>

>>To: abolition-caucus@igc.org

>>Subject: NPT recommendations

>>

>>What follows are recommendations developed by the abolition caucus

>>meeting daily at the NPT PrepCom April 1997. This was made

>>available to all delegations, and also to NGOs for use in briefing

>>delegates. It also sparked some useful discussions, especially re

>>fissile materials (how to overcome the current impasse) and

>>nuclear power. David Krieger, Jackie Cabasso, myself, Martin

>>Kalinowski, Pol Huttger (sp?), Claire Greensfelder, and others

>>were involved in drafting. - John Burroughs

>>>From jburroughs Tue Apr 22 18:08:07 1997

>>Return-Path: <jburroughs>

>>Received: (from jburroughs)

>> by igc4.igc.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id SAA06830;

>> Tue, 22 Apr 1997 18:08:07 -0700 (PDT)

>>Date: Tue, 22 Apr 1997 18:08:07 -0700 (PDT)

>>Message-Id: <199704230108.SAA06830@igc4.igc.org>

>>From: John Burroughs <jburroughs@igc.apc.org>

>>To: wslf@igc.org

>>Subject: tlkg pts

>>Cc: jburroughs@igc.org

>>Status: RO

>>

>>Abolition 2000 Recommendations to Delegations to the Preparatory

>>Committee Meeting of the NPT Review Conference

>>

>>April 1997, United Nations, New

York\*\*\*\*\*Vijai Nair wrote:

I would like to place myself on record that the recommendations developed by the abolition caucus and listed in the above missive are indicative of the deep thought that has led to excellent deductions demonstrating that the Abolition Caucus is indeed on the right path. However, I have to qualify this remark with a few observations that you may wish to crank into the comprehensive analysis, that is being so ably done, so that we arrive at a WORKABLE FORMULATION.

[A] The recommendations go beyond the horizons of the Canberra Commission and the Statement by The Admirals & Generals - and, therefore, comprise the true objectives for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The ability to adhere to the final objective is necessary. But these recommendations must be backed up by a comprehensive strategy that would engender their fulfillment. Governments are unlikely to be swayed with just the enunciation of ends. They have to be pushed with articulated methodology that would lead to a more benign political atmosphere within which resistance to the concept of

elimination would no longer be politically expedient.

[B] I am composing this missive located in the Indian Capital - operating off my personal generator - as there is an unscheduled power shut down. This will occur again and again today, as it has done for some time.

Recommendation 7 - "Facilitation of the establishment of an International Sustainable Energy Agency, committed to development of sustainable, environmentally safe, and proliferation-resistant energy sources; and a moratorium on the building of new nuclear power plants and transfer of non-medical nuclear technology until the proliferation and waste storage issues have been adequately resolved;" needs careful consideration.

Undoubtedly this is an issue that has to be addressed. However, would it be politically sustainable in a country like India where the per capita energy capacities are negating growth? An easier way to get this across would be for those in the West to appreciate their plight if all nuclear power generating sources are shut down IN TOTALITY in all countries at 23.59 pm on 30 April 1997! May I suggest that the recommendations were made with a view "To strengthen the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and achieve its universality." The second part, to come about, needs the accession of India. If that is the objective, then you may want to reconsider the question of "a moratorium on the building of new nuclear power plants and transfer of non-medical nuclear technology until the proliferation and waste storage issues have been adequately resolved." I for one, am not ready to give my vote to a political organisation that cannot provide a basic amenity such as electric power in the year 1997. Semantics apart, I don't see many others doing so either - irrespective of what well meaning NGOs in other parts of the world suggest!!

[C] Recommendation 8. As long as developing countries with a comprehensive and technologically advanced civil nuclear programme banks heavily on the output of this programme - prohibition of "commercial production of radioactive material" may not be an attainable objective. The same is true for the developed nations whose dependence levels on civil nuclear programmes in their day to day life, though not visible, is high. We may consider safeguards instead of prohibiting production.

[D] Recommendation 9. May I suggest that this can be facilitated only once the lead is given by nuclear weapon states? For example, instead of targeting the "Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, encompassing ocean space as well as land masses" the Abolition Caucus needs to look more carefully at the proposal of a NWFZ in Europe. The logic developed through such an occurrence would have a salutary effect on the Middle East and South Asian political environment/logic thus facilitating negotiations in those regions.

Please read following report of the latest non-violent direct action using the International Court of Justice decision concerning nuclear weapons.

FORWARDED MAIL -----

From: monika.painke@student.uni-tuebingen.de (Monika Painke)

Date: 29 Apr 97

Originally To: "Pol D'Huyvetter" <int@fme.knooppunt.be>

Hi Pol, here is the text Uwe Painke wrote for the next issue of the " Nuclear Resister" - you asked as well about some legal points we can refer to:

### German Laws

Article 25 of our constitution, saying that international laws are more binding for us than our country laws and that they give us rights and duties (I understand it the way that the international laws give us the human rights and now the IC saying about nuclear weapons and that it is our right and duty to see them obeyed)

Paragraph 10 Absatz 4 German Military Law: a soldier is only allowed to give and to take orders when the orders respect international law

(this law was made in Germany after World War II and the experience with the nazis- they always said that they were just obeying orders- to take away this "hiding argument" from the soldiers, and to remind them their responsibility this law was made)

now there is a last very interesting article in our constitution (I just forgot the number) saying that if in a trial it is possible that international laws are touched the judge has to give away the case to our highest court (this point can save us a lot of money because we do not have to pay lawyers and can go directly after a nonviolent action from a first court to our constitutional court)

I guess you are as well informed as me (or surely even better) about the international laws we can use- it was very nice of the judges who spoke about nuclear weapons on July 8th to put them all in their explanation how they came to their conclusion that the threat and use of nuclear Weapons must be illegal.

hope this helps! Uwe and I think seriously about coming to the international camp to Brussels in August- perhaps we get to know each other there Love and Peace Monika Painke

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

>From Uwe Painke, Tubingen / Germany

## Honorary Marshals of the World Court

Citizen's Inspection at Buechel AFB to implement the World Court's decision to outlaw nuclear deterrence

After the World Court's Advisory Opinion on July 8, 1996, which generally outlawed the threat or use of nuclear weapons it became pretty clear to us quickly: The World Court's statement will be useless unless a movement will form to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states.

Although we had a large movement to stop the nuclear arms race in the eighties, the prospects to form such a new movement seemed rather dim. Only very few people even realize that there are still nuclear bombs in Germany - Even among those peace groups that had survived a decade of shrinking in numbers. Our government did not react very promising to our letters which we wrote to remind them that NATO's nuclear weapons first use policy was simply illegal and that comprehensive nuclear disarmament should be on their agenda now. We got a letter from our state department claiming that "The federal government sees itself confirmed in its opinion that in case of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (...) the rules of reasonability as well as the rules of humanitarian international law have to be observed." Since our group couldn't imagine how nuclear bombs could be used in a "reasonable" (not to mention "humanitarian") way and since we believed that this answer was merely a blunt rejection of the spirit and the words of the World Court's ruling, we decided to call to action. We had a good ally: Our constitution which directly binds every inhabitant of our country to take care of international law. It further states that international law has a higher authority than our domestic laws.

We figured that the first step to nuclear disarmament had to be an inspection of the nuclear weapons bases. There are at least four bases with more than 100 B-61 nuclear bombs located in Germany: At Ramstein AFB (near Kaiserslautern), at Spangdahlem AFB (near Trier), at Brueggen in Northrhine-Westfalia (where the British RAF hosts at least 10 bombs) and at Buechel AFB (near Koblenz). Our decision to chose Buechel AFB as the site for our first concerned citizen's inspection was unanimous: Buechel AFB is a base of the German air force and in case of a war it will be German soldiers who will fly the US-nuclear bombs to their destinations and throw nuclear weapons onto their targets. At Buechel the German army is illegally putting its finger on the trigger of nuclear weapons - a clear violation against the nonproliferation treaty. At Buechel the German government violates international law in conspiracy with the U.S. government which prefers to steer Germany's nuclear ambitions by offering its own nuclear arsenal "for loan".

So we announced to the commander of Buechel AFB that we would come to inspect his base to report to the World Court whether

international law is respected or violated on his base. In our letter we explained to the commander that our inspection might save him from later legal persecution at the World Court, since military or government officials are not justified to violate international law on the grounds of obedience to domestic laws or military orders. We concluded: "Therefore we expect Your full cooperation with our work on the grounds of the binding international law."

On the weekend of April 18 -20, a little crowd of 100 people joined to prepare and perform the inspection. The police was nervously watching our activities since we had announced publicly that it was our constitutional duty to perform the inspection of the base even without the consent of the military officials. We decided ahead of time to organize a public meeting with a senior police official to inform the police too. It turned out that they weren't heavily opposed to our goals but they informed us that they would try to keep us off the military base although they also seemed a little irritated by our argumentation on the grounds of international law.

A last attempt to enter the nuclear weapons base with the consent of the military officials failed on the same day, when we sent a delegation including a retired nuclear weapons base commander to the main gate asking permission to enter for inspection.

So 22 people decided to enter Buechel AFB the next morning during an announced demonstration at the main gate. Five small affinity groups (or inspection teams) formed and consensed to split up to increase the chance of at least one of the teams to get into the base. But all but one of these groups were apprehended by strong helicopter-supported police forces before they managed to climb the fence with their specially constructed ten foot high ladders. Once apprehended by the police it seemed pretty hopeless to pass the fence. Then luckily the fifth group managed to find another way into the base: Unnoticed by the massive surveillance, they entered underground through the drainage system of the base and managed to walk around and inspect the military base for more than 20 minutes before being detected. The confusion caused by this among police and military led to the successful entry of nearly all the other inspection teams. Finally 18 people managed to enter the base - four of them even did so at the main gate right under the very noses of the surprised police. Most interestingly the military police which apprehended and searched the inspection teams formally denied that any participant of the inspection was arrested. Maybe because it is a legal risk for the military too to get the case into court: It is possible that the court would not only review the military's right to withhold trespassers but also the military's failure to obey the rules international law by actively upholding the illegal nuclear threat. We consider this a sign that we have entered a promising road to actively promote the international law's obligation of nuclear disarmament. And we will go on to be "honorary marshals" of the World Court until the nuclear nations obey to its ruling and disarm all existing nuclear weapons.

Our next action will be in the first week of August in commemoration of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 9 (Nagasaki-Day) we will conclude a weeklong bicycle-tour at Buechel AFB. The route of this bike tour will connect some of the main sites of the nuclear weapons complex in Germany: It will start at the nuclear power plant at Biblis and will lead via Ramstein AFB (The storage site of 58 nuclear warheads) to our second inspection of the base. There's no doubt about it that we will still have a long way to go, but: Together we can prevail and overcome the era of the nuclear threat that endangers all life on this planet.

end

RTw 04/29 0857 Russia steps up anti-NATO rhetoric before talks  
By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW, April 29 (Reuter) - Russia has turned up the volume of its anti-NATO rhetoric, underlining the gulf dividing the former Cold War foes on the eve of new talks on forging a peaceful partnership for the next century.

President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais have all seized opportunities in the past few days to criticise NATO's plans to offer membership to countries that were once in the Soviet bloc.

The attacks have increased the pressure before a new round of talks in which Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov meets U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Moscow on Thursday and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in Luxembourg on May 6.

"I am convinced that NATO's expansion to the East is a gross political error by the West. It is not in the West's interests and it is certainly not in Russia's interests. It's in the interests of extremists," Chubais said in an interview published by the Kommersant Daily newspaper on Tuesday.

Making clear Moscow had a price for accepting NATO expansion, Chubais set out demands for Russian membership of international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the Paris Club of government creditors.

His reference to "extremists," by which he meant communists and nationalists, echoed remarks he made at the weekend as he headed for talks in Washington.

Yeltsin chimed in by criticising opposition to NATO expansion in a letter sent to British Prime Minister John Major on Monday from the Black Sea resort of Sochi, where he is on holiday.

Chernomyrdin took his cue in Slovakia on Monday by saying NATO had failed to keep pace with history.

Russia has stepped up criticism of NATO before previous rounds of talks, but then allowed progress at the negotiations.

Political experts in Moscow say Moscow's tactic is to set out a tough position before talks in the hope of winning as many concessions as possible.

Yeltsin is also obliged to take a tough line because of hostility towards NATO among opposition communists and nationalists, ready to leap at any sign of submissiveness.

"There is little prospect for any real breakthrough in the talks with Albright," Pavel Felgengauer, a defence analyst for the newspaper Sevodnya, told Reuters.

"Yeltsin is on holiday and Primakov has just come out of hospital after a gallstone operation. All that can be expected for now is a clarification of the two sides' positions."

Yeltsin signalled at a summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Helsinki last month that he had accepted the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's expansion was inevitable, although he still regards it as a security threat.

He said during a visit to Germany this month that he hoped to sign an agreement with NATO in Paris on May 27. Many Russian political analysts expect some kind of accord to be reached,

though possibly not by then.

But NATO diplomats say Russia has taken a tough line behind the scenes by seeking firmer guarantees that the alliance will not station nuclear weapons in new member states and move its military infrastructure onto their territory.

Western diplomats in Moscow say progress is vital at the new talks if an accord is to be signed by the target date or before a NATO summit in Madrid in July, at which the first invitations will go out to new members.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are front-runners to join the Western alliance.

"The talks are another important step towards solving the problem," said one diplomat.

He added that terms would probably have to be agreed by mid-May if the accord was to be signed on May 27 because "otherwise time would run out."

REUTER

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## White House Begins Drive To Gain NATO Expansion

Albright, Cohen Take Case to Senate Committee

By Michael Dobbs

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, April 24 1997; Page A29 The Washington Post

The Clinton administration yesterday launched what could be a year-long campaign to persuade Congress to agree to expand NATO to boundaries of the former Soviet Union.

Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright took a tough line on Russian calls to ban the extension of NATO's military infrastructure to former Soviet satellites. She will visit Moscow next week to try to overcome remaining obstacles to a NATO-Russia charter, tentatively scheduled to be signed in Paris May 27.

Albright and Cohen told senators the United States would continue to resist Russian demands to bar NATO from stationing conventional and nuclear weapons in new member states. "We will not compromise on this issue," Albright said.

Yesterday's unusual joint appearance on Capitol Hill by President Clinton's top national security advisers was designed to shore up support in the Senate for NATO enlargement. Last July, the Senate voted 81 to 16 for legislation to permit expansion of the alliance. But administration officials fear senators could reassess their positions when confronted with the need to make hard decisions about committing American "blood and treasure" to a new region of Europe.

A NATO summit has been scheduled in Madrid July 8 to announce the countries qualifying for membership of the alliance, established in 1949 to defend Western Europe from Communist expansion.

Negotiations with the candidate countries may last until the end of the year, to be followed by a Senate debate on ratifying changes in the NATO treaty, probably early next year. A two-thirds Senate majority is required for ratification.

Albright and Cohen were subjected to sometimes skeptical questioning by Armed Services Committee members, suggesting Senate ratification is not a foregone conclusion. Senators asked about the economic burden of defending new countries and the risk of diluting the military effectiveness of one of the most successful alliances in history.

"I come from the school that if it's not broken, why try and fix it?" said Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), suggesting U.S. troops could become bogged down in military quagmires in "remote countries" akin to the 1993 operation in Somalia. Cohen observed there was a "stark difference" between Somalia and NATO enlargement. "Somalia was not in our vital national security interest. Europe is," he said.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) suggested the administration had priorities wrong and was putting too much effort into NATO expansion while playing down the much greater danger of the lack of control over 30,000 nuclear weapons in Russia. He asked for assurances that NATO enlargement would not exacerbate the problem of nuclear terrorism "by complicating our relations with Russia even more."

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who has taken the lead in negotiations with Russia, will travel to Moscow at the beginning of next week to prepare for Albright's visit. She is to hold talks with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov May 1. U.S. and NATO officials said significant work remained on the proposed NATO-Russia charter, and it is unclear whether the document will be ready for signing by May 27. An additional uncertainty has been injected by the continuing illness of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, which has led some Western analysts to conclude he is not in complete control of the Kremlin bureaucracy.

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Chicago Sun Times  
04/28/97  
Editorial Page Columnists

Robert Novak is a nationally syndicated columnist of the Chicago Sun-Times

Lott's stance on treaty enrages GOP right (4/28/97)

The gap Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott opened between himself and the Republican Party's conservative base by supporting the chemical weapons treaty was widened by his private claim that he could not possibly have stopped the treaty. In truth, with 26

Republicans voting no, Lott easily could have led seven more senators to prevent ratification.

Why didn't he? Like many senators, Lott's interest in the chemical weapons ban is minimal. But from the start, he wanted to support it, and weeks of hand-wringing were a sham. He viewed the issue as transactional--a bargaining chip in dealmaking, especially to facilitate budget negotiations where massive GOP surrender seems imminent.

This is a bitter pill for conservatives who celebrated when Lott became majority leader. They remembered Lott's past battles for principle and expected him to fill the leadership vacuum left by the political incapacitation of Speaker Newt Gingrich. Instead, he is compared even by non-Republicans with the Senate GOP leader who supported President Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal Treaty against President Ronald Reagan. "He's got galloping Howard Bakeritis," Democratic campaign consultant Bob Shrum told me.

Lott, in turn, is infuriated that the right is trashing the Senate's most conservative leader ever. The level of mutual hostility can scarcely be exaggerated.

All this is reminiscent of the 1952 motion picture "Viva Zapata!" which opens with a delegation of Mexican peasants pleading with President Diaz to return their confiscated lands. The dictator brushes them off, but one peasant insists, and Diaz menacingly notes his name. That launches the dissident, Zapata, on a revolutionary career. Later in the movie, an empowered Zapata in the presidential palace imitates Diaz by dismissing a peasant delegation and taking down a lone dissenter's name.

This tableau was re-enacted in real life April 10 when about 40 conservatives crowded into a Capitol office, pleading with Lott to oppose the treaty. Arriving 45 minutes late, Lott seemed offended by social conservatives involving themselves with national security. An aide belittled the petitioners as representing "a collection of fringe groups." Lott was particularly dismayed that Mike Farris, a leading home-schooling advocate, dared to discuss chemical weapons.

Majority leaders seldom get deeply involved in issues, and Lott was no exception here. He repeated the Clinton mantra that 28 out of 33 disagreements had been resolved. "Those 28 agreements are not worth the paper they are written on," Reagan's assistant defense secretary, Richard Perle, told me. Not resolved were treaty provisions requiring the supply of U.S. chemicals to countries that request them.

Lott addressed this by getting a letter from President Clinton that dances around the problem. He won further cover by asking his predecessor, Bob Dole, to join in dropping opposition. Lott's Senate speech announcing his support was lukewarm at best, conceding "serious problems" with a treaty he implied is not

verifiable.

The overriding consideration is a budget deal with the president. Dick Morris, confidant of both Clinton and Lott, is reported by Senate sources as making this clear to the majority leader: no chemical weapons treaty, no budget.

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On the subject of city resolutions supporting the Abolition Treaty 2000 Campaign: Princeton Township passed a resolution (3 yes, 1 abstention) on April 14. We did a press advisory, had 10 members present, and had Dr. Ted Taylor (a former nuclear weapons designer) testify in favor, but the local media still chose to ignore it. The co-chair of our Committee for Political Action wrote a letter to the editor to correct the omission, which to date has been published in one of the three papers to which she sent it.

Earlier Princeton Borough and Roosevelt, NJ had passed resolutions unanimously. Cherry Hill, Camden, Trenton, Hoboken, and Jersey City are still in process.

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From: ICRC Geneva[SMTP:adminpress@icrc.org]  
Sent: mercredi, 9. avril 1997 11:44  
To: Multiple recipients of list  
Subject: ICRC on ICJ Opinion - important publication

## INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS

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Here's Doug Roche's report on the NPT PrepComm...

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Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish  
Nuclear Weapons (<http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html>)

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE  
FIRST PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING  
FOR THE 2000 REVIEW OF THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

New York, April 7-18, 1997

By Douglas Roche, O.C.

Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament

Summary. The first PrepComm, preparing for the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, took a step back from 1995 when the NPT was indefinitely extended. The Western Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS), insisting on regional stability as a precondition of nuclear disarmament, made clear they have no intention, in the foreseeable future, of negotiating nuclear disarmament. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), once again calling for negotiations for the "complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time," was in considerable disarray and did not press its case effectively. Canada tried to strengthen the NPT Review process and explicitly rejected the NWS contention that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only when general and complete disarmament is accomplished, but found itself in a minority position in the Western group, dominated by the U.S., U.K. and France. In the end, a prolonged final meeting softened references to nuclear disarmament. The very process of an annual PrepComm (the second one will be in Geneva April 27-May 8, 1998) cannot be dismissed

as an accomplishment; at the same time, the inaugural PrepComm cannot be said to have "strengthened" the NPT review process. NGO presentations, made during an unofficial meeting of the PrepComm, were rich in quality and stood out sharply against the bland governmental interventions. A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, drafted by an international ad hoc committee of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts, was presented at an NGO meeting on the first day of the PrepComm but was not formally introduced by any country into the PrepComm.

1. In 1995, the 25-year-old NPT was indefinitely extended with a politically-binding package of resolutions which set up an annual PrepComm process in between each five-year formal review; a set of Principles and Objectives specified a programme of action which included: "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Since 1995, eight States have joined the NPT; the total number is now 186, of which 149 participated in the PrepComm. The principal hold-outs are Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba and Brazil. The Chairman was Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland.

2. The structure of the "strengthened review process" consisted of a general debate (38 speeches) and examination of the three elements (called "clusters") of the NPT: nuclear disarmament (including non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances); safeguards; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A Chairman's Working Paper emerged, which was essentially a reaffirmation of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. A list of specific proposals was put forward by delegations for future consideration on the basis that the PrepComm was not committed to them.

The PrepComm report, as drafted, contained a recommendation that the second PrepComm in 1998 give special attention to three items: security assurances; the 1995 resolution aimed at getting Israel to join the NPT; and progress on getting negotiations started for a global ban on the production of fissile material. Mexico insisted on adding nuclear disarmament to this list because of the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally contravene international and humanitarian law. The NWS resisted giving nuclear disarmament extra attention beyond its regular place in the first cluster of the Treaty. A stand-off occurred. Finally, the recommendation to discuss the three items was dropped from the report, and the Chairman unilaterally declared that time would be given at the second PrepComm for the three items. There was no objection to this statement, but Mexico registered a reservation.

There was puzzlement in the hall as to why Mexico was taking such a strong stand. Many seemed to have forgotten that, in its testimony before the ICJ, Mexico said that if the nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT are not met, "we would need to revise our continuation as party to the Treaty." Mexico warned:

"As a country we are not prepared under any circumstances to accept a monopoly in the possession of nuclear weapons or to allow the modernization of these devices through tests whose legality we also respectfully question."

3. What the PrepComm could agree on was summed up in the Chairman's working paper, which now goes forward to the second PrepComm. Some said the paper represented the highest common factor existing among the NPT parties at this stage; others saw it as the lowest common denominator. The paper:

urged the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty;  
reaffirmed the necessity of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons;  
stressed the importance of achieving the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;  
urged immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a ban on the production of fissile material;  
recognized the progress made by the U.S. and Russia under the START process, and  
reaffirmed the commitment of the NWS to "the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of the commitment by all States to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control";  
welcomed the spread of nuclear-weapon-free zones;  
called for further steps, "which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument," of assurances to non-nuclear States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of nuclear weapons;  
welcomed the strengthening of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (called the "93+2 program"), and reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements;  
reaffirmed that all States have the "inalienable right" to peaceful use of nuclear energy,  
and stressed that attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety.

4. The continuing tension between the NWS and the non-nuclear-weapon States was illustrated by an exchange between Ireland and the United States. Expressing appreciation for the progress made in nuclear disarmament, Ireland said that the PrepComm should not ignore "external opinion" to expedite nuclear disarmament negotiations, citing the ICJ Advisory Opinion; the Canberra Commission's call to the NWS to commit themselves immediately and unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons; the March 13, 1997 resolution of the European Parliament urging

the commencement of negotiations in 1997 on the abolition of nuclear weapons; the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention; and the Programme of Action tabled by a group of 28 nations calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. Following such calls and "fixing their sights" on such long-term programmes would enable the NWS to "signal" that "ultimate" nuclear disarmament had real meaning.

The United States rejoined that non-nuclear-weapon States were sometimes too quick to dismiss the "historic progress" made to date in nuclear disarmament and should remain realistic about the pace of progress in the near-term. Progress could only be made step-by-step, carefully calibrated to maintain stability and ensure verification and enforceability. The Canberra report was "tantalizing," but could not be imposed on the NWS; nuclear disarmament will not take place on demand, but could only come about as a consequence of conventional disarmament and regional stability. This does not mean that non-nuclear-weapon States have no role to play in implementing Article VI of the NPT. All must help to create the conditions of enhanced stability that will make regional disarmament possible.

This rejoinder followed on from the principal U.S. address which emphasized the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament: "The United States has already eliminated nearly 10,000 strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads, and will continue to do so at a safe and effective rate. At this point in time, the U.S. has reduced from its cold War peak 90 percent of its non-strategic nuclear stockpile and 47 percent of its strategic nuclear stockpile. In addition, the United States has unilaterally removed more than 225 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and has voluntarily offered to place this excess material under IAEA safeguards. Twelve tons of HEU and PU are already under IAEA safeguards." However, a Fact Sheet attached to the U.S. address pointed out that "the basic premise" of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 1994 is that "nuclear weapons play a role." (In fact, on February 12, 1997, U.S. Department of Defence testimony before Congress stated: "Nuclear weapons remain essential to deter against the gravest threats, actual and foreseeable.")

5. Canada (in a speech supported, inter alia, by Japan, China, South Africa and New Zealand) spoke against the idea that going to zero nuclear weapons depends on general disarmament first. "We do not accept any explicit or implicate linkage, or interpretation of Article VI, that nuclear disarmament will be achieved only when general and complete disarmament has been achieved, or when every last bow and arrow or Swiss Army knife is gone."

But this seminal point did not take hold in the Western group. The European Union, as the largest bloc in the Western group, continues to be dominated by the U.K. and France whose status in the U.N. Security Council (and continued veto power) is clearly dependent on their possession of nuclear weapons. On October 30, 1995 (after the NPT Review and Extension Conference), the U.K. and France issued a Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation, in which for the first time two nuclear weapon States announced convergence of national deterrence policies. Moreover, France has proposed a policy of "concerted deterrence" between EU member States; the possibility of a European nuclear force raises questions of a breach of Article I of the NPT.

6. The contrast between the positions of the NWS and NAM was also seen in their respective papers. France, on behalf of the NWS, underscored the important and tangible progress achieved so far in nuclear disarmament and, repeating the Principles and Objectives of 1995, pledged to continue "systematic and progressive efforts." This statement followed a sentence which said: "It is the responsibility of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security." The NAM paper called for the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to an ad hoc committee "to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention."

7. The Irish mention of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention referred to a set of documents released on the first day of the PrepComm. In February 1996, the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York, established a committee of lawyers, academics, scientists, disarmament experts and diplomats to begin the drafting of a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), which would prohibit the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination. The aim of the model NWC is to demonstrate the feasibility of the elimination of nuclear weapons through such an international agreement. It is intended to stimulate negotiations by States on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to provide guidance and focus for such negotiations. In addition, establishing a framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons, will assist in achieving steps towards that goal.

A large number of citizens' organizations are supportive of, or participating in this effort, including the Abolition 2000 Network, comprised of over 700 organizations worldwide, which calls for the negotiation and conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000.

The documents discuss the rationale for nuclear abolition, the desirability of a comprehensive approach, alternative processes for negotiation of a NWC and the necessity of developing political will for such negotiations. A draft Preamble and an Outline of the draft model NWC are included.

The documents are now circulating informally but have yet to be introduced into any governmental disarmament forum.

8. More than 100 NGOs attended the PrepComm, although they were barred from most of the sessions. Consequently, they spent most of their time in forums organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament. Abolition 2000 members convened every day at 8:00 a.m. to plan lobbying measures and long-range education campaigns. On Wednesday morning of the second week, 10 NGOs made presentations at an informal meeting of the NPT PrepComm. The following is a selection of comments:

Clayton Rannie, Fellowship of Reconciliation: The maintenance of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era is unconscionable and contrary to every

moral standard.

Zia Mian, Sustainable Development Institute, Pakistan: The challenge and responsibility to begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention could be taken up by the NPT PrepComm. Under Article VIII of the NPT, it requires only one party to submit an amendment to the Treaty, and only one third of the parties to support it, for a conference of all the parties to be convened to consider the amendment. This amendment could transform the NPT into a negotiation on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Peter Weiss, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy: The ICJ President's assessment that nuclear weapons are "the ultimate evil" is correct. The NWS siren song of "ultimately" sounds suspiciously like "never."

Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists: Continuing pressures for time-based commitments are essential; they keep the urgency of the task and the existence of the unfulfilled commitment before world opinion. In successive PrepComms, the NWS should be asked to describe the specific circumstances under which they will be prepared to carry out their obligation. The answers they present should be discussed and analyzed as to whether they have some substance or are excuses for maintaining the status quo. Where NWS answers are shown to be excuses, they can be refuted and the debate over elimination of nuclear weapons will be simplified. If some of the circumstances that the NWS cite are found to have objective justification -- for example, assured transparency, improved peacekeeping capability of the U.N. and of regional security organizations, or improved verification measures -- they could become common goals of all NPT member States.

Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation: Each of the NWS has a formidable program to maintain the "safety and reliability" of its nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, with or without underground tests. Further, the U.S. and France have publicly proclaimed that their programs are intended to preserve the capability to make militarily significant modifications of existing weapons and design new ones. The U.S. plans to invest \$40 billion over the next ten years in the "Stockpile Stewardship" program, which encompasses dozens of existing and planned high-tech laboratory facilities.

The NPT PrepComm should seek commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to carry out subcritical test explosions, hydrodynamic test explosions, miniature thermonuclear test explosions using inertial confinement fusion or pulsed power or other technology, or like test explosions, as inconsistent with good faith fulfillment of the Article VI obligation, and contrary to the purposed of the CTBT. We further urge this Committee to seek closure of all nuclear test sites, in consultation with the affected indigenous peoples.

Mary Olson, Nuclear Information and Resource Service: When the NPT was negotiated, nuclear power was a new technology, and there was widespread optimism in the possibilities of this largely untried energy source. It was expected to be "clean", "cheap" and "safe". The experience over the following decades has proven otherwise, with nuclear programmes running up enormous debts, ever-accumulating quantities of radioactive waste and a

legacy of health and environmental problems. As the "nuclear age" has lengthened, our knowledge of the delayed and serious consequences of some of the problems of the nuclear power technology has grown and it is clear that the risks were gravely underestimated.

Today, an estimated 2 billion people world-wide lack access to modern energy services. The recent report of the United Nations Development Programme ("Energy after Rio"), emphasized the critical importance for people in these countries of attaining both development and environmental goals of increasing investment in developing renewable energy resources and improving the efficiency with which energy is used. The report concluded that "a revival of nuclear power is not a necessary component of the energy supply system in a world where emphasis is given to the efficient use of energy and innovation in energy supply technologies".

George Bunn, Lawyers Alliance for World Security: It has been estimated that at the end of 1996 there were 1300 tonnes of plutonium and 1770 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium in existence. The vast majority of plutonium is in civilian spend fuel while almost all of the highly-enriched uranium is in military stocks in the United States and Russia. Virtually all of this uranium is unsafeguarded while almost one third of all plutonium is under safeguards. World stocks of highly enriched uranium are expected to decline due to the blending down of excess material resulting from disarmament measures in the United States and Russia.

However, the stocks of civil plutonium continue to grow at a rate of about 70 tonnes annually. In the next decade separated civil plutonium stocks are expected to grow from 140 tonnes at the end of 1995 to 250 tonnes due to increased reprocessing, primarily in Europe and Japan. Ten years from now, under existing plans, the separated plutonium inventory will be as high as the current military plutonium stockpiles.

It is important to note that reactor-grade plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons, though it requires more material, greater expertise and the weapons may be less reliable. While there is some debate within the scientific community as to the scale of the proliferation threat posed by such material, there is consensus that this proliferation threat is not zero.

The task of making plutonium inaccessible is of the greatest importance and urgency. However, the solutions of how to achieve this are not clear cut. All possible solutions have technical and political drawbacks. There is an urgent need to reduce access to weapons-usable nuclear materials. This may be achieved by unilateral steps or by agreements between states. Measures that could be taken in pursuit of these goals in the near future could include formal statements by States that their production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium has ceased. Transparency in inventories and capacities should be enhanced by publication of detailed balances of plutonium and HEU and this information should be updated regularly.

Complimenting the NGOs at the end of their presentations, Chairman Patokallio said the comments were "valuable, interesting, knowledgeable and passionate." Mexico thanked the NGOs for their "technical, specialized information." The NAM paper said NGOs could make "a positive contribution"

to the attainment of NPT objectives.

\* \* \*

Author's Postscript: The 1997 NPT PrepComm pointed up the nuclear weapons dilemma. The NWS are holding onto nuclear weapons as the currency of power, using as an excuse that world conditions are not stable enough to go to zero. Since the NWS plus Germany are the world's biggest arms merchants, they are directly contributing to the de-stabilization. The leading non-nuclear weapons States along with the de facto NWS (India, Pakistan, Israel) will not allow this two-class world to continue. Mexico has already formally warned it will withdraw from the Treaty unless nuclear disarmament occurs. Three days after the close of the NPT PrepComm, India warned the U.N.: "The stubborn position of nuclear-weapon States has paralyzed the debate on nuclear disarmament. The window of opportunity opened at the end of the Cold War is closing."

While the U.S.-Russian reductions lull the media and the public into complacency, the present situation is alarming. The NPT is in jeopardy. Continuing the status quo into the 21st century will lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Proliferation will lead to use, either by accident, terrorism or a rogue political decision. Use anywhere would be a human catastrophe, potentially repeating itself to unimaginable proportions. In his *An Agenda for Peace*, former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the need for preventive diplomacy to head off security problems. No issue so demands preventive diplomacy today as nuclear weapons. The ICJ, Canberra, the Generals and the Group of 28 nations are right: the NWS must make an unequivocal commitment to move to zero as soon as possible. That would be an exercise in preventive diplomacy.

Far from helping to fulfill the NPT (or even staying in neutral), the Western NWS are actively working to impede discussions and negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is their outright rejection of the ICJ Advisory Opinion that is the most stunning manifestation of their disregard for world opinion against nuclear weapons, expressed today by high legal, political, military, academic and spiritual leaders, buttressed by a gathering public opinion channeled through the Abolition 2000 movement. The continuation of the status quo, in which the most powerful countries rank their outmoded military doctrine over the development of international law, poses the gravest consequences for humankind. The Western NWS use every diplomatic trick to stifle discussions and inhibit even those governments that want to move forward. It is not too strong to state that the U.S., the U.K. and France are bullying the non-nuclear weapons States, which are themselves not united and give every appearance of being fearful of the economic consequences of pushing the NWS too hard.

In the governmental discussion in the uni-polar post-Cold War era, there is virtually no significant leadership to move to nuclear zero. A new coalition of like-minded States must be formed that breaks out of the old West-East-NAM ideologies. Canada, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Mexico, Malaysia, Sweden, Egypt and a few others would be prime members of such a coalition.

The strongest hope for moving to nuclear zero lies in the NGO community which has demonstrated, once again, that it is ahead of governments and possesses the expertise to command respect. Abolition 2000 is beginning to make its mark. This is not a time for NGO disillusionment (let alone passivity) but for aggressive lobbying of governments, and not accepting rebuffs from either politicians or bureaucrats who don't know any better.

The Canadian NGO community in disarmament is stronger than generally recognized. Chairman Bill Graham said the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee had received more mail on the government-requested nuclear weapons study than any other subject. He said, "The Canadian public is very interested in the issue of nuclear disarmament." The Project Ploughshares-sponsored Roundtables in 18 cities in Canada showed that people do express concern -- after the issue, ignored by the media, is explained to them. Canada is going into a federal election. Candidates should be challenged on the nuclear abolition issue, which cuts to the heart of Canadian values.

As Canada tries to figure out what to do before the second NPT PrepComm in 1998, Canadian NGOs should write to Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, making at least these points:

1. Why is Canada not demanding that NATO review its nuclear weapons policy in the light of the ICJ, the highest legal authority in the world?
2. Why is Canada not implementing the ICJ decision by voting at the U.N. for negotiations to begin on a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
3. Has the Canadian government examined the model Nuclear Weapons Convention and, if so, what precisely is in it that Canada objects to?
4. Could Canadian diplomats actively work with their counterparts in like-minded countries to move the international community forward to nuclear zero?

-----  
From: Teemu Matinpuro[SMTP:teemu@kaapeli.fi]  
Sent: lundi, 21. avril 1997 09:55  
To: International Peace Bureau  
Subject: Come to Warsaw OSCE/NGO conf July

Dear friends all over Europe! April 17th, 1997

Europe is going through a period of great change. NATO is planning a strategic enlargement towards the east. The Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) of the European Union could lead to a deepening of the EU into a federation with a common defence based on nuclear deterrence. The development towards an ecologically sustainable Europe has been very slow despite many years of hard work by environmental movements and organisations.

In order to discuss these matters, and more importantly to debate which institutions should be coordinating European issues of security and safety in the future, we call on all sections of peace and environmental movements, activists and others interested in shaping the future of Europe to attend a conference to be held in Warsaw on July 4th - 8th 1997.

It will be a shadow conference to the OSCE parliamentary assembly being held in Warsaw between July 5th - 9th since we think it would be useful to discuss the role and importance of this institution as a common framework for cooperation in Europe.

A preliminary plan for the event is enclosed. The final programme, as well as final information regarding participation fees and accomodation costs, will be available in a few weeks time. We also enclose a form which we kindly ask you to fill in and return to the stated adress if you would like to participate in the Warsaw event.

We would be grateful if you would distribute this material to other interested organisations and persons in your country.

Europe is changing - we want to take part in the process of shaping a more democratic, environmentally sustainable, nuclear free Euorope.

We hope to see you in Warsaw!

On behalf of the organisations that have taken the initiative for the event,

Ulla Klötzer  
chairperson of Alternative to EU and activist within the movement Women for Peace - Finland and the Finnish Peace Committee

Polish contact persons: Dr. Boleslaw Rok and Jarema Dubiel

Alternative to EU - Finland

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Women for Peace - Finland  
Austrian Neutrality Movement - Austria  
No to EU - Sweden  
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Women for Peace - Sweden  
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Women for Peace - Denmark  
The Peoples Movement Against the European Union - Denmark  
June Movement ( against the Maastricht Treaty) - Denmark  
Helsinki Citizens Assembly - Danish section - Denmark

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Helsinki Citizens Assembly  
Danish Section  
c/o Toni Liversage  
Morlenesvej 26

2840 Holte, DENMARK

phone: +45-42-42 10 89

WARSAW OSCE SHADOW CONFERENCE FOR NGO:S JULY 4th - 8th, 1997

Please fill in this form if you want to participate in the conference.

Final documents will be mailed to you after receipt of your form.

Participation fee will be appr. 40-50 USD (including 2 x lunch and coffee) to cover the costs for translation and other facilities etc. We will make the preliminary reservations for the accomodation to be confirmed later on.

Conference laguages will be english and polish

Name:

Address:

Country:

Phone:

Fax:

Name of organisation:

Address:

Country:

Phone:

Fax:

Accomodation needs:  (x)

\*camping (own tent) (appr. 3-4 USD/night)  ( )

\*Youth hostel (appr. 15-20 USD/night)  ( )

\*Hotel (Medium class): single room (appr. 30-40 USD/night)  ( )

double room (appr. 30-40 USD/night)  ( )

( )

(please inform with whom you share the room)

Please let us know if you are interested in:

\*to join the bustrip starting from Helsinki july 1st through Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ending in Warsaw july 4th  ( )

\*taking part in street theater in Warsaw

( )

Special wishes:

Please return the form SOONEST (latest 20.5.) to

Alternative to EU

(Warsaw conference)

PB 42

00211 Helsinki

FINLAND

phone: +358-9-682 3422 & fax: +358-9-682 3544

PRELIMINARY PROGRAMME:

NGO SHADOW CONFERENCE TO THE OSCE PARLAMENTARY ASSEMBLY WARSAW JULY 4TH - 8TH, 1997

OSCE: Organisation for Common Security and Cooperation in Europe

Members: all European states and USA and Canada

Themes at the parliamentary assembly:

- main theme: Implementation of the OSCE commitments
- committee II: Freedom of speech
- committee III: Economic development of Eastern Europe

NGO CONFERENCE:

Invitation: sent to peace, environmental and other NGOs in all OSCE countries

Themes: OSCE - EU - NATO as security and cooperation institutions in Europe

JULY 4th:

Evening: get-together party

JULY 5th:

International demonstration for peace, sustainable development, democracy and cooperation.

Distribution of flyers about the event and the themes to be discussed.

Youth tent and street theater.

JULY 6th:

Opening of the assembly by our Polish hosts

OSCE AS THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONCEPT FOR SECURITY

- Maj Britt Theorin

Swedish member of the European Parliament, former Swedish Ambassador for Disarmament, President of the International Peace Bureau, Chairman of the UN Study on Military and the Environment (1990-1991), etc

EU - FEDERATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT STATES?

- Jens-Peter Bonde

Danish member of the European Parliament, group of Independence for Europe of Nations, member of the European Parliament since 1979

## NATO EXPANSION - RISKS AND COSTS

- Rae Street

Chair - CND International Advisory Group (CND= Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)

long time anti-nuclear and peace activist

## COOPERATION FOR ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY IN EUROPE

- Per Gahrton

Swedish member of the European Parliament, green group, former member of the Swedish Parliament, author of several books and reports about the European Union, environmental questions, etc

Lunch-brake

## ENVIRONMENTAL THEME

- Polish speaker

## DEVELOPING OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS - THE EUROBOMB?

- Agneta Norberg

Women for Peace Sweden, long- time peace activist, writer of many report and articles

## NUCLEAR FREE ZONES IN EUROPE

- Willy Karlslund

Chair - Swedish Peace Committee, coordinator of a report (april 1997) about a nuclear free zone in the Nordic countries, long-time peace activist, writer of many articles and reports

## NEUTRALITY AS A SECURITY CONCEPT

- Austrian speaker

## PRACTICAL WORK FOR NEUTRALITY

- Bulgarian speaker

## GOING TO COURT NOT WAR

- Rob Green

Commander of the British Royal Navy 1962-82. Flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike aircraft 1968-72. He is now full-time campaigner for non-nuclear defence and energy policies.

JULY 7th:

Workshops:

\* Cooperation for the environment  
chaired by polish organisers

\* The role of EU

chaired by: Drude Dahlerup, Danish June Movement (against the Maastricht Treaty)

\*EMU - effects on the Nordic welfare model

chaired by Kai Lemberg, professor, Peoples Movement Against the EU - Denmark

Nuclear free zones

chaired by: Teemu Matinpuro, Finnish Peace Committee

\* Neutrality

chaired by: Thomas Roithner, Austrian Neutrality Movement

\* OSCE

chaired by: Ingela Mårtensson, No to EU - Sweden

\* Referendums as tools for democracy

chaired by: (Hungary)

\* NATO - effects on the public sector

chaired by: Bibbi Steinertz, Women for Peace - Sweden

\* NGO cooperation

chaired by: Pirkko Lindberg, author, ecological around-the-world-traveller,  
Women for Peace - Finland

JULY 8th:

Workshop reports and evaluation

Departure

Teemu Matinpuro

Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat ry - Fredskämparna i Finland rf

Finnish Peace Committee - Comité por la Paz de Finlandia

Hämeentie 62 B 16, 00500 Helsinki, Finland

tel. +358-9-773 2499, fax +358-9-7732328, e-mail: pulut@kaapeli.fi

Dear Abolition Friends, Scittish CND, CND, NPC

This is a copy of a fax I have sent, on behalf of World Court Project UK, to the Chief Executive of Argyll and Bute Council

George Farebrother

Dear James McLellan

Would you be kind enough to put the following evidence before the members of Argyll and Bute Council before they make any final decision about the continued existence of the Faslane Peace Camp.

Councillors may not be fully aware that the permanent campers at Faslane, and the activists who join them from time to time, are in no sense breaking the law. In fact, they are upholding international law.

This has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which gave its Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons on 8 July 1996.

The judges, whose views carry supreme weight in international law, could find no circumstance in which the use of nuclear weapons would not violate international humanitarian law. The Trident submarines based at Faslane carry warheads which exceed the destructive capacity of the weapons used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You will therefore realise that they are incapable of discriminating between military targets and civilian populations. They thus violate international humanitarian law.

It is not a valid defence to say that UK government policy supports the deployment of these weapons. As you will know, there have been several cases in recent years where government policy has been found to be illegal. Furthermore, international law is incorporated into UK Law. The Court confirmed that the the Nuremberg Principles apply to nuclear weapons. Thus it is the duty of citizens to uphold the law relating to nuclear weapons, which is exactly what the Faslane campers are doing, and of military personnel to obey it even if given a contrary order by a superior or by his or her national government.

I am sure that councillors, like most of us, regard the rule of law as the basic foundation of our society. I would therefore ask them to consider the very special status of the Faslane Camp before taking any action to evict them. I have only given a brief outline of this complex issue. The World Court Project is willing to make specialised and prestigious legal advice available to the Council. As the matter is urgent, I would appreciate your early reply

Yours Sincerely

George Farebrother (UK Secretary)

\*\*\*\*\*

The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

World Court Project UK  
George Farebrother, UK Secretary  
67, Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR  
Phone & Fax 01323 844 269, Email [geowcpuk@gn.apc.org](mailto:geowcpuk@gn.apc.org)

>>DAILY INFORMATION BULLETIN - NUCLEAR POLICY

>>

>>Mon 21 Apr 1997

>>

>>97-8461 Two drunken Russian workmen stole n/warheads from a factory as  
>> a prank in 1993, German newspaper claims. G

>>

>>Sun 20 Apr 1997

>>

>>97-8458 Small doses of radiation can actually improve health, latest  
>> research suggests. STimes

>>

>>Sat 19 Apr 1997

>>

>>97-8452 Defence Secretary hits at 'loony left' Scottish National Party  
> policy of abandoning n/weapons and withdrawing from Nato. Ind,DT

>>

>>

>>GM Research, Metropolitan House, Hobson Street, Oldham, OL1 1QD.

>>Tel: 0161-911 4179. Fax: 0161-627 1736.

>>Internet: gmr@mcr1.poptel.org.uk

>

Stewart Kemp (nfznc@gn.apc.org)

forwarded

>Date: Mon, 28 Apr 1997 17:53:49 GMT  
>Message-Id: <199704281753.RAA12532@mail.gn.apc.org>  
>X-Sender: cnd@gn.apc.org  
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4  
>Mime-Version: 1.0  
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"  
>To: redpepper@online.rednet.co.uk, ipb@gn.apc.org, robwcpuk@gn.apc.org,  
>From: cnd@gn.apc.org (The CND staff team)  
>Subject: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

>  
>Dear All,  
>  
>This went out today along with a Briefing Sheet, also attached.  
>  
>Chemical Weapons Banned - Nuclear Next?  
>  
>Issued: 28th April, 1997.  
>  
>  
>The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament today (28th April) welcomed the entry  
>into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and called for an immediate  
>start to negotiations to outlaw nuclear weapons.  
>  
>The Chemical Weapons Convention includes several historic precedents:  
>  
>\* It is the first international agreement to outlaw an entire class of  
>weapons of mass destruction.  
>  
>\* It is the first time that an international verification system has been  
>agreed for a whole class of weapon of mass destruction and a group (The  
>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) established to ensure  
>compliance.  
>  
>\* It is the first time that an international fund has been created to assist  
>poorer countries in implementing an agreement.  
>  
>"What this historic achievement shows is although weapons of mass cannot be  
>disinvented, if countries co-operate they can be outlawed,  
>  
>said Dave Knight, CND Chair,  
>  
>"This agreement is fantastic news for groups like CND. For years this  
>question of verification has been a major obstacle in negotiations to ban  
>nuclear weapons".  
>  
>The fact is that nuclear weapons are easier to outlaw and verify than  
>chemical weapons, as some of the constituents of chemical weapons have a  
>wide range of day to day uses. In contrast, the unique nature of certain  
>nuclear weapons components makes verification of a Nuclear Weapons  
>Convention that much simpler."

>

>

>ENDS

>

>EDITOR'S NOTES

>

>For more information contact the CND Press Office on 0171 700 2350.

>

>

>

>THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

> A BACKGROUND BRIEFING

> 26 April 1997

>

>Over four years after it was agreed and opened up for signature, the  
>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,  
>Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction -  
>the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - will enter into force on  
>29 April 1997.

>

>Britain finally ratified the CWC on 13 May, 1996. The Department of  
>Trade and Industry is the designated 'national authority' that will  
>ensure Britain's compliance with all the terms of the CWC.

>

>The CWC is important because it is the first multilaterally agreed  
>treaty that outlaws one whole class of weapon of mass destruction  
>under a universally applied, comprehensive verification regime.

>

>Entry-into-Force of the CWC and its successful implementation will  
>make it that much easier to agree further treaties ensuring the  
>worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons.

>

>The CWC prohibits all development, production, acquisition,  
>retention, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It  
>requires each State Party to destroy all chemical weapons and their  
>production facilities, as well as any they may have abandoned on  
>another nation's territory. State Parties are also not allowed to use riot  
>control agents as a method of warfare, are not allowed to train or  
>prepare for the use of chemical weapons or to assist or encourage  
>anyone else to engage in any of the outlawed activities.

>

>Because chemical weapons are relatively easy to manufacture and are  
>often referred to as "the poor man's nuclear bomb", the verification  
>regime for the CWC is extensive.

>

>The Verification Regime

>

>Verification measures include the need for transparency by signatory  
>states, routine on-site inspections, short-notice challenge inspections  
>and investigations of alleged use.

>

>Routine inspections will be conducted at declared chemical weapon  
>storage, production and destruction facilities, as well as at chemical  
>plants that produce, process or consume chemicals above certain

>specified thresholds.

>

>

>Challenge inspections of any site under the control or jurisdiction of any State Party can be requested by any other State Party, in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance. No State Party can refuse access to CWC inspectors.

>

>State Parties who fail to comply fully with the CWC will be open to sanctions being imposed upon them. Situations of particular gravity can be referred to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council for action.

>

>How it will be implemented

>

>All aspects of the CWC and compliance by State Parties will be implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW comprises several bodies.

>

>(1) The Conference of the State Parties - the principal organ of the OPCW. They can consider any matter within the scope of the CWC, including the power and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat (see below). The Conference will meet annually and will be based upon 'one member, one vote'. Its main role will be to oversee implementation and review compliance.

>

>(2) The Executive Council - the executive organ of the OPCW. It will meet as often as required. A total of forty-one State Parties will participate, split up between the five regional groupings of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean and Western Europe and other states.

>

>(3) The Technical Secretariat - the operational arm of OPCW. It will comprise a Director General and the Inspectors themselves, who will oversee the day-to-day implementation and compliance of the CWC.

>

>Which countries have so far not signed and/or ratified the CWC

>

>Seventy-four countries have so far deposited their instruments of ratification with the United Nations i.e. have now fulfilled all their national and international obligations and are legally bound by the contents of the CWC. Only thirty-one countries have so far failed to sign the CWC.

>

>Signatories of CWC who have ratified

>Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,

>Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
>United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan  
>  
>  
>Signatories of CWC who have not yet ratified  
>Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,  
>Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central  
>African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus,  
>Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Gabon,  
>Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,  
>Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya,  
>Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi,  
>Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Federated States of  
>Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,  
>Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis,  
>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  
>Singapore, Slovenia, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab  
>Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire,  
>Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
>  
>CWC Non-Signatory States  
>Andorra, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana,  
>Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Libya, Niue, North  
>Korea, Mozambique, Palau, Sao Tome & Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia,  
>Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, Trinidad & Tobago, Vanuatu  
>  
>States that fail to ratify by the 29 April will lose out. They will not be  
>able to participate in the decision making structure. There will be  
>restrictions on the ability to purchase, manufacture and export key  
>chemicals on non-Party States. Their nationals will not be employable as  
>inspectors or for any of the other jobs created by the Convention.  
>  
>  
>The CND staff team (cnd@gn.apc.org)  
>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
>162 Holloway Road  
>LONDON  
>N7 8DQ  
>tel: (uk)171 700 2393  
>fax: (uk)171 700 2357  
>  
>Web Site <http://www.cnduk.org/cnd>  
>visit the CND General Election site via the 'Press & Parliamentary' page  
>  
>CND is part of ABOLITION 2000 - A global network to eliminate nuclear weapons  
>  
>

## UPDATE!

A bulletin of nuclear disarmament news, activities, and resources.

### Disarmament Clearinghouse

A Project Of: Greenpeace, Peace Action, Physicians For Social Responsibility, Plutonium Challenge and Women's Action for New Directions.

\*\*\*\*\*

### In This UPDATE!

Summit Progress

Summit Implementation

Abolition 2000 Poll

What You Can Do - the START Moving Campaign

Other Nuclear Weapons News

(PrepCom, Subcriticals, CTBT, B61-11)

Resources

Calendar

\*\*\*\*\*

April 30, 1997

### START Moving!

>From the Helsinki Summit . . .

To a Nuclear Weapons-Free 21st Century

Efforts from activists nationwide to persuade President Clinton to START Talking! made a difference. At the Helsinki Summit, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a broad outline for what could become a sweeping set of further reductions in superpower nuclear arsenals - a third Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START III).

It is now time for the two presidents to START Moving to implement the Summit agreements. The United States and Russia must also commit to continued progress with deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, and immediate concrete steps toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century. Recent polling shows that an overwhelming majority of Americans favor the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

\*\*\*\*\*

"There's an unprecedented reduction of nuclear weapons, . . . START III . . . This is a very principled issue, and it encompasses the interests of not only our two countries, but of the entire European continent and the whole world." President Yeltsin, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

START TALKING! - SUMMIT PROGRESS

\*\*\*\*\*

## START TIMLINE

"Promptly" >>> Russia Ratifies START II

December 31, 2003 >>>

START II Ceiling of 3,000-3,500 strategic nuclear weapons.  
(Extends current START II deadline to the end of the year)

December 31, 2007 >>>

START III ceiling of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons

\*\*\*\*\*

"The United States is prepared to open negotiations on further strategic arms cuts with Russia under a START III immediately after the Duma ratifies START II. President Yeltsin and I agreed on guidelines for START III negotiations that will cap at 2,000 to 2,500 the number of strategic nuclear warheads each of our countries would retain and to finish the reductions of START III by the year 2007." President Clinton, March 21, 1997 Helsinki, Finland.

## START TALKING - SIGNS OF PROGRESS

Disarmament advocates pushed President Clinton to START Talking! at the Summit, and here are some of the disarmament progress results.

### START III- Strategic Nuclear Weapons Ceiling:

2,000 - 2,500 U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons by the year 2007.

### Transparency & Destruction of Warheads:

For the first time ever, some nuclear warheads will be destroyed rather than placed in reserve. Transparency measures will be developed and strengthened to monitor the process of nuclear weapons reductions and will also be considered for nuclear materials.

### Sea-Based and Tactical Weapons:

Separate from, but in the context of START III negotiations, reductions in long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons will be considered.

### Permanence of START Treaties:

The Presidents "agreed to the goal" of making the START Treaties unlimited in duration.

\*\*\*\*\*

## START MOVING - FUTURE STEPS

Disarmament advocates will urge these future steps as we START Moving! to a nuclear weapons-free century.

#### Deeper Cuts:

At 2,000-2,500 nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States would still have thousands, while the stockpiles of other nuclear weapons states are in the hundreds. (France - 482, China - 434, U.K. - 392.) Bolder cuts are needed now to create a climate for other nuclear weapons states to engage in the process of completely eliminating nuclear weapons.

#### Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers:

- ⌋ Take Nuclear Forces Off Alert
- ⌋ Remove All Warheads From Delivery Vehicles
- ⌋ Destroy All Warheads on Reserve
- ⌋ Stop production of nuclear weapons material, including tritium and plutonium pit production.

#### Tactical Nuclear Weapons:

Eliminate non-strategic (battlefield) weapons.  
End deployment of nuclear weapons outside of national borders.

#### Set a Framework for The Next Reduction Treaties:

Commit to, and expedite, the process of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

\*\*\*\*\*

#### START MOVING! - IMPLEMENT HELSINKI

Implementing the START II and III process to which Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed will be challenging. The first challenge will be to achieve prompt Russian ratification of START II. While Yeltsin said in Helsinki, "As far as Russia is concerned, I expect that the State Duma will make a decision based on my advice," the Russian Duma's response has been less encouraging due largely to strong objections of many in the Russian Duma to NATO expansion.

#### NATO & NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Many disarmament advocates worldwide oppose NATO expansion. Newspapers across the country are editorializing on the dangers of expanding NATO, isolating Russia and possibly creating a new Cold War. This is likely to make Russian ratification of START II more difficult. Rather than furthering this outdated alliance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should be the forum for defining new policy directions in Europe. (For more information on NATO and nuclear weapons, see Resources.)

\*\*\*\*\*

## DUMA ON START & SUMMIT

Communist Chief Gennady Zyuganov charged that Yeltsin was "guilty of completely betraying the national interests of the country." Associated Press, "Communists Knock Summit Deals," March 22, 1997.

The Communist Paper Sovetskaya Rossiya claimed "The meeting was a capitulation by the current traitorous Russian regime before the United States and Russia." March 22, 1997

Galina Shohkhin, vice-speaker of the Duma and a Yeltsin supporter, said the accords laid a foundation for a "new structure of European security." Associated Press, "Communists Knock Summit Deals," March 22, 1997.

"What we will really need is a real promotional campaign. Until now we haven't had this kind of campaign," said Vladimir Averchev, a legislator from the Centrist Yabloko block on the Foreign Affairs committee, in Washington Post, "Summit Brings no Praise from Russians," March 23, 1997.

Summit progress may also face implementation challenges in the U.S. Senate

"Now, since our Congress ratified START II based on different target dates for the deactivation of the warheads, on the one hand, and the destruction - ultimate destruction of missiles, on the other, we will have to go back to them, either separately or in the context of a START III agreement, and ask them to ratify that. And they will have a full opportunity to debate and discuss this. . . . So yes, I've got to go back to the Congress. I believe they will, once they have a chance to fully review this, support the decision I have made today. President Clinton, March 21, 1997, Helsinki, Finland.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin must START Moving! to overcome these challenges to implement the agreements that they made in Helsinki and to make further progress on nuclear disarmament. President Yeltsin should urge the Russian Duma to immediately ratify START II. President Clinton should show his commitment to START III by beginning now to work on details of the agreement with Russia.

Both the United States and Russia should commit to moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with concrete disarmament steps beyond the Summit agreements. (See Above, "START Moving - Future Steps.")

\*\*\*\*\*

## AMERICANS WANT ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A nationwide survey of 1,006 Americans found that eighty-four percent would feel safer in a world in which no country,

including the United States,

Abolition 2000, a global network of 720 non-governmental organizations working for the elimination of nuclear weapons, released a nationwide poll on April 3, 1997. The poll, conducted by Lake Sosin Snell & Associates on the topic of American attitudes on nuclear weapons, found that Americans strongly favor eliminating nuclear weapons.

Unlike defense-related surveys conducted in earlier years, there is no significant gender gap nor regional variation in these findings. Republicans and Democrats also are in broad agreement. Opposition to maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile - and support for an international treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons - is shared across the board by men and women, Democrats and Republicans, and throughout every region of the country. (More results are available. See Resources)

## AMERICANS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLL RESULTS

### Americans Feel Unsafe With Current Nuclear Arsenal & Want Elimination:

Compared to the current nuclear status in which the U.S. and other countries have nuclear weapons, 84% of Americans polled said they would feel safer knowing for sure that no country, including the U.S., had nuclear weapons. 77% favor eliminating all nuclear weapons.

### Too Many Tax \$\$ Spent on Nuclear Stockpile:

Nearly 8 in 10 Americans - 77% - believe that the U.S. budget for nuclear weapons is too high. When informed that more tax dollars are spent on building and maintaining nuclear weapons than on Head Start, fighting illiteracy and providing college scholarships combined, 74% disagreed with this spending priority.

### Strong Support for International Treaty:

87% of Americans want the U.S. to negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons (68% say they strongly agree).

\*\*\*\*\*

Lake's firm conducted the survey from March 27 to 30th, 1997. The survey was conducted by paid, trained and professionally supervised interviewers using a replicated, stratified random digit dial process. These results include complete responses from 1006 households. The maximum margin of error for this sample is +/- 3.1 percent.

\*\*\*\*\*

**START Moving! From the Helsinki Summit To . . . A Nuclear Weapons-Free 21st Century**

The Disarmament Clearinghouse will be coordinating a START Moving! Campaign (from the Helsinki Summit To A Nuclear Weapons-Free 21st Century), and producing a START Moving! Activist Packet.

Activists nationwide urged President Clinton to START Talking at the Summit, and this resulted in progress toward nuclear disarmament - a commitment to START III (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty). Now its time for Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to take action to implement START II & III and move toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century.

The START Moving! Activist Packet will include:

Fact Sheets and Briefing Materials - on the results of the Summit, START III, Abolition 2000 Poll, and more.

Action Tools - sample letters-to-the-editor, tips on effective communication with your Senators and Representatives, sample letters to the President, and more.

To participate in the START Moving! Campaign contact:

Kathy Crandall, Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
e-mail: [disarmament@igc.apc.org](mailto:disarmament@igc.apc.org)

- The START Moving! Activist Packet will be available The First Week in May, 1997®

Order your copies today - fax or mail to the Disarmament Clearinghouse:

NAME: \_\_\_\_\_ ORGANIZATION: \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS: \_\_\_\_\_ CITY: \_\_\_\_\_ STATE \_\_\_\_\_  
ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_ FAX: \_\_\_\_\_ E-MAIL \_\_\_\_\_

. . . MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEWS

NOTE: More information is available about all of these issues.

See Resources, p. 7, and contact the Disarmament Clearinghouse.

#### NPT PREPCOM

The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the year 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met in New York from April 7-18. At these PrepCom meetings, with a supposedly strengthened review process, disarmament advocates urged NPT Delegates to formulate specific steps toward their governments' fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT, which calls for general and complete disarmament.

The five nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) made a statement defensively stressing their disarmament progress over the past two years and declaring their "strong and continuing support for the NPT" and "determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the treaty." Nevertheless, so far no concrete steps have been offered.

#### SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPERIMENTS

The Department of Energy (DOE) announced on April 4, 1997 that it intends to conduct the first in a series of subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in June 1997. A second experiment is scheduled for September.

A review by the JASON scientists panel reported that while the first two experiments would not reach criticality, and would "add valuable scientific information" about nuclear weapons, "future experiments could pose more complex problems." Despite this, DOE plans four more experiments in 1998, and more in later years.

Disarmament advocates continue to oppose all subcritical experiments asserting that subcriticals:

- (1) Violate the spirit of the test ban and its goals to end the development of new nuclear weapons, and
- (2) Undermine Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty implementation and verification.

#### B61-11

The United States is deploying the B61-11 earth-penetrating warhead to be loaded on to the radar-evading B-2 "stealth" bomber that was officially put into the U.S. nuclear force April 1, 1997.

Although the United States has proclaimed nationally and internationally that it has no intention of designing or building new nuclear weapons, the B61-11 has a new capability - it's designed to be used against underground bunkers. Its use has already been threatened against a non-nuclear weapon state (Libya in 1996). The B61-11 was produced through stockpile stewardship computer simulations, not nuclear test explosions.

## RESOURCES

**\*\*START Moving! Activist Packet available May - Disarmament Clearinghouse\*\***

Subcritical Experiments: Greenpeace Fact Sheet and Press  
Release - April 4, 1997

Nuclear Weapons Department of Energy Announcement -  
April 4, 1997

Physicians for Social Responsibility Press  
Release & Issue Brief -April 4, 1997  
JASON - Scientists Review of Subcriticals

B-61 mod. 11 Greenpeace Fact Sheet  
Press Reports

NPT PrepCom Speeches, NGO Press Releases & Press Reports  
Disarmament Intelligence Review - Rebecca  
Johnson Reports

Abolition 2000 Abolition 2000 Press Release April 3,1997  
Lake Sosin Snell & Memo from the Pollsters (April 3, 1997)  
Associates Poll Graphic Bar Charts of Poll

CTBT Physicians for Social Responsibility  
Monitor -CTBT

Letter to Senators from a Broad Coalition of Test Ban Advocates

To Sign Letter Contact the Disarmament Clearinghouse Immediately

NATO & A new e-mail group and conference. For more  
Nuclear Weapons contact Karina Wood at Peace Action  
Education Fund <panukes@igc.apc.org>

Statement of Opposition to NATO Expansion -  
Contact Peace Action Education Fund at 1 202 862 9740 ext. 3044

For these resources and more information on issues in this  
UPDATE!, contact:

Kathy Crandall, Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
1101 14th Street NW #700, Washington DC 20005

fax: 202 898 0172

E-Mail <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

202 898 0150 ext. 232

Disarmament Clearinghouse Internet News Conferences & E-mail  
Lists:

alt.activism.nuclear-test.news read only conference

alt.activism.nuclear-test.d interactive conference

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alt.activism.nuclear-test.news directly to your  
e-mail - contact <disarmament@igc.apc.org>

ctb-followers receive the latest news on disarmament issues  
directly to your e-mail - contact  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

ctb-discuss receive materials posted to  
alt.activism.nuclear-test.d directly to your  
e-mail - contact  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

## CALENDAR

April 1997

April 7-18 First Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting  
for the 2000 nuclear  
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review  
Conference, U.N., New York

April 24 Senate CWC Ratification

April 29 CWC goes into effect

April 30 Military Production Network's D.C. Days

May 1997

START Moving! Activist Packets available

May 27 NATO-Russia Charter Signing, Paris, France

May 28 Groundbreaking for the National Ignition  
Facility Expected, Livermore, CA

May 24-June 1 Congressional Memorial Day Recess

May 28-29 U.S.-European Union Summit, The Hague,  
Netherlands

June 1997 Subcritical experiment, "Rebound" at Nevada  
Test Site

June 20-22 Summit of The Eight (formerly G-7), Denver,  
CO

June 28 - July 6 Congressional July 4 Recess

July 1997 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in Moscow  
(expected)

July 8-9 NATO Summit Madrid, Spain

August 1997

August 2 - Sep. 2 Congressional Summer Recess

August 6 Hiroshima Commemoration  
August 9 Nagasaki Commemoration

Use and distribution of the UPDATE! is encouraged.

Please let us know what you like about the UPDATE!, and how it can be improved,

contact: Kathy Crandall, Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
1101 14th Street #700, Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
e-mail: [disarmament@igc.apc.org](mailto:disarmament@igc.apc.org)

If you appreciate the free, timely and accurate information that you receive from the Disarmament Clearinghouse, your contribution of \$35, \$50, \$100, or more will help to ensure the project's continuing work.

\*\*\*\*\*

## APO 04/30 1917 Nuke Test Program Comes Under Fire

By H. JOSEF HEBERT

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A coalition of anti-nuclear and environmental groups said Wednesday it would file a lawsuit to halt a \$40 billion, 10-year program the Clinton administration says is needed to ensure future readiness of America's nuclear arsenal.

The suit, which claims the Energy Department failed to take adequate steps to ensure environmental protection, asks the court to immediately halt government plans to conduct two underground explosions using nuclear materials scheduled for later this year.

Barbara Finamore, a lawyer for the Natural Resources Defense Council, one of 39 organizations bringing the action, said the suit would be filed Thursday in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The action asks that the department halt construction of a \$1.2 billion high-tech laser laboratory in California that the departments says it needs to simulate future atomic explosions, replacing actual underground detonations.

The Energy Department declined comment on the impending lawsuit. "You can't comment on something that hasn't been filed," said department spokesman Patrick Dorinson.

The lawsuit was being brought by the Washington-based NRDC, a leading environmental group, and 38 other organizations, many of them grassroots groups that have been active near federal nuclear weapons production and storage facilities around the country.

The suit alleges that the Energy Department has developed the broad \$40 billion strategy for maintaining the country's nuclear weapons stockpile without developing adequate environmental impact assessments and considering reasonable alternatives as required by a 1989 federal court ruling.

And in cases where environmental assessments were made, it did not adequately analyze alternatives while exempting many programs from environmental assessments altogether, said Finamore.

In 1989, in a case prompted by another NRDC lawsuit, the Energy Department was directed to make detailed environmental impact assessments as part of its programs to clean up nuclear wastes at weapons sites and maintain the reduced number of nuclear warheads.

"The department still hasn't complied with its commitments," said Finamore.

Many of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit are ardent advocates of phasing out nuclear weapons and believe that the Energy Department strategy is aimed at developing more sophisticated weapons in the future.

"Instead of scaling back its nuclear weapons capabilities, the United States is undertaking a massive new program to upgrade and expand its nuclear weapons infrastructure," complained Jacqueline Cabasso, executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation, at a news conference.

Tom Cochran, a nuclear weapons expert for the NRDC, said a much cheaper, scaled-back program aimed at remanufacturing current warheads would be adequate to meet U.S. defense needs. He called the current strategy "a gold-plated program ... to give the United States the

capability to design and certify new weapons."

While the suit would require broad areas of the nuclear stockpile program to be re-examined on environmental grounds, it also asks the court to block two planned underground explosions, using nuclear materials, at the Nevada Test Site later this year.

The DOE says the chemical explosions are aimed at providing nuclear scientists with information for simulating actual nuclear explosions in the laboratory.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

\*\*\*\*\*  
Call from UN to collect information from non-governmental  
organizations on the use of nuclear weapons, ...  
\*\*\*\*\*

FORWARDED MAIL -----

From: iitc@igc.apc.org (Alberto Saldamando  
-International Indian Treaty Council)

Date: 30 Apr 97

Originally To: induran@knooppunt.be, fme@knooppunt.be

Please circulate this announcement as widely as possible. Due to the so-called reorganization of the UN, the announcement was not circulated by the UN until very recently.

Pursuant to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities resolution 1996/16 of 29 August, 1996, entitled "International Peace and Security as an essential condition for the enjoyment of human rights, above all, the right to life," (published as E/CN.4/1997/2), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Ayala Lasso, is directed to:

- (a) To collect information from Governments, the competent United Nations bodies and agencies and non-governmental organizations on the use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium, on their consequential and cumulative effects, and on the danger they represent to life, physical security and other human rights;
- (b) To submit a report on the information gathered to the Sub-Commission at its forty-ninth session, together with any recommendations and views which he may have received on the effective ways of eliminating such weapons.

The High Commissioner has requested comments from NGOs ON OR BEFORE MAY 8, 1997;

Submissions should refer to the title of the resolution "International Peace and Security as an essential condition for the enjoyment of human rights, above all, the right to life," and the number, "1996/16."

Interested NGOs/Indigenous Peoples and their organizations may mail or fax their submission to:

High Commissioner for Human Rights  
c/o Mr. Alexander Ovsyak, Human Rights officer  
Centre for Human Rights  
United Nations Office at Geneva  
CH-1211 Geneva  
Switzerland  
tel: 41-22-917-3417  
fax: 41-22-917-0212

Copies should also be sent to  
Mme. Fatma Ksentini, UN Rapporteur on Toxics  
Commission on Human Rights  
c/o Ms. Giorgia Passarelli



Thought the caucus might be interested in the following article -- a little late, but interesting -- from FINANCIAL TIMES, MARCH 10 1997,

"FT GUIDE TO: NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL" :

-----  
What is at issue in the confrontations between anti-nuclear demonstrators and police in Germany?

Thousands of demonstrators tried and failed <in early March> to stop six 100-tonne containers reaching the nuclear storage facility at Gorleben in Lower Saxony, northern Germany. They hold highly radioactive waste from two German nuclear power stations and from the reprocessing plant at Cap de la Hague in France.

-----  
Why is anti-nuclear Germany taking radioactive waste from pro-nuclear France?

The French consignment originated in Germany. Spent nuclear fuel rods from German reactors go to Cap de la Hague and to the British Nuclear Fuels plant at Sellafield for reprocessing - the separation of re-usable nuclear fuel from useless waste. But the contracts call for the radioactive waste to be returned to Germany afterwards.

-----  
Anyway, the waste got through to Gorleben so the German nuclear authorities must be pleased.

Their victory may be pyrrhic. The green movement believes the televised sight of Germany's biggest post-war security operation, involving 30,000 police and security guards, will turn public opinion further against nuclear power. And the state of Lower Saxony is objecting not only to the disruption but also to meeting policing costs estimated at DM100m (E35m). Two similar operations to defend shipments in 1995 and 1990 were almost as costly. State officials hint that they would not allow further nuclear convoys to Gorleben.

-----  
What would happen to Germany's nuclear waste in that case?

Newly produced waste would have to be stored where it is produced: in expensive facilities at individual power stations. That is already done in many countries. But on-site storage would not solve the problem of the waste that Germany is obliged to take back from France and the UK.

Politicians in northern Germany say that specialized nuclear storage facilities should be built in the south, which is richer and more pro-nuclear -or less anti-nuclear - than the north. The German government says waste shipments are inevitable if the country is to continue with nuclear power, while the green movement wants to make the shipments so difficult and expensive that Germany has to phase out nuclear electricity.

-----

Have other countries been more successful than Germany in dealing with their nuclear waste?

Germany has the worst record of violent confrontations because its anti-nuclear movement is so strong. But no country has come up with a satisfactory solution to the problem of radioactive waste, now the biggest obstacle the nuclear industry's hopes of a revival in the next century. Even in the most pro-nuclear countries, people object to plans for a dump in their backyard.

-----

What would a satisfactory solution be?

>From the industry's point of view, it would be to bury the radioactive wastes permanently deep inside geological strata that will remain stable and dry for tens of thousands of years. Anti-nuclear campaigners oppose permanent disposal. They say it would be impossible to guarantee the long-term safety of any depository, so wastes should be kept securely in temporary storage facilities where they can be monitored.

-----

Have any permanent disposal sites been identified?

There are candidates in several countries, including salt mines near Gorleben, but all are highly controversial. The UK industry wants to build a permanent underground depository for intermediate-level wastes close to Sellafield as soon as possible. The most dangerous high-level wastes would be "vitrified" - turned into glass blocks - and stored at Sellafield for at least 50 years until they had cooled down enough for permanent burial. But a more serious nuclear waste crisis is developing in the US.

-----

Why is that?

Because the US has no central facility for handling, processing, storing or disposing of nuclear waste. More than 20,000 tons of spent fuel are in temporary storage in pools or steel and concrete casks at 109 reactors across the US, and some plants may have to shut down as their storage facilities fill up during the next few years. The federal government is

supposed to be providing a central disposal site, but some scientists have challenged the safety of the only candidate, Yucca mountain in the Nevada desert. Even the industry's optimists accept that it is unlikely to be operational before 2010-2015.

-----  
Nuclear technology created the waste in the first place. Couldn't it help to destroy it?

In principle yes, by the process of transmutation. Long-lived and highly radioactive elements can be converted into shorter-lived and less dangerous materials by bombarding them with neutrons from a reactor or particle accelerator. Experiments in transmutation are being carried out at the French Superphenix fast reactor and at the Los Alamos and Brookhaven national laboratories in the US. But few believe that is an affordable or practical solution for the tens of thousands of tons of radioactive waste piling up around the world."

by Clive Cookson  
Financial Times of London  
March 10, 1997

forwarded

>Date: Wed, 30 Apr 1997 04:35:31 +0200  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>From: edibal@iprolink.ch (Edith Ballantyne)  
>Subject: NPT PrepCom98 - attention Pamella Meidell  
>Cc: aslater@igc.apc.org

>  
>Dear Pamella,  
>  
>You people did a great job during the NPT PrepCom in New York in April.  
>Those of us who have worked for disarmament for a very long time, and since  
>1945 for nuclear disarmament, are grateful to you all.  
>  
>With the 1998 NPT PrepCom to be held in Geneva next April/May we in the  
>Geneva-based Special NGO Committee for Disarmament want to begin work now  
>to secure facilities needed for a strong popular presence at that time. It  
>would be good to work together from the start to avoid duplication of  
>effort and confusion. Let me know how we can cooperate and how we can help.  
>  
> With best regards, edith ballantyne (secretary of the Committee).  
>  
>  
>

-----  
Michael Christ            Program Director  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St.            tel. (617)868-5050 x.207  
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org      <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

forwarded

>Date: Tue, 29 Apr 1997 17:06:51 -0400 (EDT)  
>From: Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice <fcpj@afn.org>  
>To: Abolition 2000 Network <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>,  
>Subject: the whole ball of wax (fwd)

>  
>----- Forwarded message -----  
>Date: Tue, 29 Apr 1997 16:42:03 -0400

>From: "GEC, Inc." <gec@g-e-c.com>  
>To: fcpj@afn.org  
>Subject: the whole ball of wax

>  
>talked to ed erikson today...he tipped me off about the attached  
>article...notice how casually it mentions that a nuclear power plant  
>will be put on mars...and this just after a weekedn telling folks this  
>is EXACTLY where the nuclear power industry is headed next...it is  
>sickening...anyways, here is the article...

>  
>Plan exists to put humans on Mars

>  
> By Seth  
> Borenstein  
> of The Sentinel  
> Staff

>  
> Fifteen years from  
> now, six astronauts could be halfway to Mars. And  
> when the first human stepped on Mars on July 4, 2012,  
> their homes, a power plant and a return ship would be  
> waiting there.

>  
> For 600 days, home for the international crew would be  
> twin habitats shaped like tuna cans. Parked outside  
> would be a Winnebago-like van for the astronauts to  
> explore the planet and look for signs of life. When it

>was  
> time to leave, the crew would convert Mars' thick air  
> into rocket fuel and blast back to Earth, passing their  
> replacements in midflight.

>  
> What sounds like science fiction is a real NASA plan.

>  
> This isn't a dream memo from bored rocket scientists.

>It  
> is a 228-page government blueprint to the Red Planet  
> that experts say is the most comprehensive and  
> promising plan to date.

>  
> "It is an important step because what it suggests is

>that  
> NASA is clearly working on this, and I think the work  
> has clearly accelerated," said Richard Berendzen, an

astronomer at American University in Washington.  
"Sending humans to Mars will be the most ambitious and  
challenging effort since wartime. Apollo may actually  
pale in comparison."

After four years of study, the National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration has come up with an internal plan  
outlining not just why people should be sent to Mars,

but  
how they'll get there, what they'll do and even what  
they  
should wear.

The blueprint, obtained by The Orlando Sentinel, puts a  
priority on holding down costs. In 1989, when President  
Bush said he wanted to send people to Mars, NASA  
officials came up with a quick sketch of a plan and a  
\$200 billion price tag. It was too expensive, and the

idea  
died.

This time around NASA has come up with a more  
detailed plan to send three crews to Mars for a total

of  
\$25 billion to \$50 billion over 12 years. NASA  
Administrator Dan Goldin wants the price below \$25  
billion.

Goldin has not signed off on the draft blueprint. And if

it  
is accepted, the space agency still is several years

away  
from asking Congress and the White House for the  
money. But the blueprint represents a major commitment  
to the idea.

"We have the first tangible evidence that something is  
happening," said NASA engineer John Connolly,  
co-author of the blueprint. "This is really the first

Mars  
reference mission document that we've ever published.  
That in itself is a bold step."

## GETTING THE WEIGHT OFF

Some NASA  
officials warn that  
this plan is not yet  
technically or  
economically  
doable.

The plan keeps  
evolving as 12

> engineers at Johnson Space Center in Houston find  
> newer methods to accomplish the mission. For example,  
> parts of the blueprint, dated March 1997, already are  
> out of date. Since it was pulled together for

>publication

> several months ago, the exploration team has changed  
> the type of rockets astronauts would use to leave Earth  
> and moved the launch of the first crew from November  
> 2009 to January 2012.

> The underlying idea behind the plan is to minimize the  
> most costly part of the trip: weight.

> Fuel and weight form a vicious cycle. Breaking free of  
> Earth's gravity and making a round trip to Mars require  
> enormous amounts of fuel, which in turn adds weight.

> To cut down on the need for so much fuel, the plan  
> envisions using the Martian atmosphere to make fuel for  
> part of the return trip. Mars' carbon dioxide

>atmosphere

> should be able to be converted into methane, a rocket  
> fuel.

> Before any astronauts left Earth, three cargo ships

>would

> be launched, taking a slow but fuel-efficient route to  
> Mars. The first rocket, launched in the fall of 2009,  
> would park a fully fueled spaceship in Mars' orbit for

>the

> astronauts' return home.

> The second ship would deposit an unfueled rocket on  
> the ground for astronauts to use to leave the Martian  
> surface. It would be attached to an automated lab  
> designed to convert the atmosphere into rocket fuel.

> The third rocket would drop off the living quarters,  
> laboratory and a nuclear power plant.

> Astronauts would  
> head to Mars in  
> 2012, the next time  
> the Red Planet and  
> Earth are close  
> enough to shorten  
> the trip. Afterward,  
> an unmanned  
> rocket would send  
> another return ship  
> to orbit Mars, while a second unmanned ship would  
> deliver another rocket and fuel-making lab to the

>planet's

> surface. They would serve as backups and return ships

> for a second crew.

>  
> The astronauts would find the trip long and  
>complicated.

> They would use a crew-only space taxi to get tens of  
> thousands of miles above Earth, where another  
> spaceship would be waiting in orbit. The waiting ship  
> would be used for the six-month trip to Mars.

## > GETTING THERE AND BACK

> Once they arrived on  
> Mars, astronauts would  
> hook up their ship to the  
> living quarters already  
> there, forming the  
> beginning of a space  
> colony.

> They would use a  
> pressurized van to travel  
> around for up to a  
> month at a time, studying Martian geology and looking  
> for signs of life.

> The international crew would require at least one  
>doctor,  
> a chief engineer, a geologist and a biologist. The  
> commander -- and first person to step on Mars -- could  
> be a woman, NASA chief Goldin has said in previous  
> speeches.

> After 600 days on the Martian surface, the crew would  
> leave using the rocket powered by the converted  
> atmosphere. That rocket would meet up with the  
> spaceship already parked in Martian orbit, and the  
> astronauts would use that capsule to land at Kennedy  
> Space Center.

> Before this plan can become reality, however, many  
> advances in technology are needed. Each improvement  
> in technology will lower weight and costs, said Doug  
> Cooke, head of the exploration team. And the closer the  
> cost gets to \$25 billion, the more likely the Martian  
>plan  
> will become reality.

> That cost is still too high, particularly considering  
> NASA's history of projects running way over budget,  
> said Ralph DeGennaro, director of Citizens for Common  
> Sense, a Washington fiscal watchdog group.

> "Sending people to Mars is lunacy," DeGennaro said.  
> "Because of the expense, which they are low-balling,

> and the hostile climate, this is not a place where  
>people  
> should go."  
>  
> Convincing the public thatpeople should make the trip  
>is  
> a key part of this plan and its future, said Chris  
>McKay,  
> a scientist at NASA's Ames Research Center and plan  
> co-author.  
>  
> "The reason we're going is to search for early life,  
>search  
> for early climate," McKay said. "If the really big  
>job is to  
> search for life, search for fossils, people are better  
>at that  
> than machines. There's no arguing that."  
>  
> But even in this blueprint, the first step of the Mars  
>plan  
> is sending a robot there to test whether rocket fuel  
> actually can be made from the Martian atmosphere.  
>  
> Last month,NASA approved that mission, slated for  
> 2001.That shows NASA is serious about Mars,  
> engineers said.  
>  
> "If you were a marathon runner, you would say at this  
> moment the starter's gun has fired," said David  
>Kaplan,  
> one of two engineers who compiled the blueprint.  
>  
> [Posted 04/26/97 10:29 p.m. EST]  
>  
>  
>--  
>MZ  
>  
>

-----  
Michael Christ            Program Director  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St.            tel. (617)868-5050 x.207  
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org      <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

APO 05/01 1648 U.S., Ukraine Agree on Weapons

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Defense Secretary William Cohen and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksander Kuzmuk signed an agreement Thursday providing \$47 million to help the former Soviet-bloc nation destroy SS-19 missiles, silos and launch sites.

The money, provided by Congress under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat

Reduction program, will also help Ukraine start work on destroying its arsenal of SS-24 missiles.

Under Nunn-Lugar, Ukraine has received \$450 million. The program provides equipment, technical assistance, support and training to Russia and other former Soviet-bloc nations to assist in reducing or eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

At the signing, Cohen lauded Ukraine for making a bold decision in 1993 when it decided to turn its nuclear arsenal over to Russia. He praised the nation as an "example to the world of peaceful disarmament."

Cohen said he had accepted Kuzmuk's invitation to visit Ukraine this summer.

Kuzmuk, a general-colonel in the Ukrainian armed forces, thanked Americans "for their warmth and hospitality" shown during his three-day visit.

"We have had a chance to talk with average Americans ... to live the life of the Marines, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force," he said, adding that the impressions he and his delegation had formed of America during their days as part of the Soviet bloc "are gone with the wind."

Both countries, he said, are now "a force for betterment in the world."

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AAP 05/02 0200 FED: BUTLER NEW HEAD OF UN ARMS WATCH ON IRAQ

By Mark Lever, AAP Diplomatic Correspondent

CANBERRA, May 2 AAP - High-profile Australian diplomat Richard Butler was today named as the new head of the United Nations team probing Iraq's secret arsenals.

Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer welcomed Mr Butler's appointment as executive chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) responsible for eliminating Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons stockpiles and research.

"The appointment of an Australian to head this important UN disarmament body is testimony to Australia's international standing in the field of arms control and non-proliferation," Mr Downer said in a statement.

Sanctions against Iraq imposed after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait cannot be lifted until UNSCOM confirms the elimination of all capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Currently Australia's ambassador to the UN in New York, Mr Butler has been a key figure in the global disarmament movement since his appointment as a roving ambassador for disarmament by the newly-elected Labor government in 1983.

He played a central role in Australia's decisive action in the UN general assembly last year to break a deadlock in negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.

He was also the driving force behind the Canberra Commission report on the elimination of nuclear weapons presented to the UN late last year.

More recently, his reputation suffered a setback when Australia unexpectedly suffered a heavy defeat in a UN ballot for a two-year term on the UN security council.

No stranger to controversy, his career has also seen him fight off allegations of sexual harassment while posted to Bangkok and claims of excessive expenses when based in Geneva.

AAP mgl/gm/de

\*\*\*\*\*

RTw 05/01 1246 U.S., Russia see hard talks to agree NATO charter  
(Adds end of meeting, Albright, Primakov comments)

By Patrick Worsnip

MOSCOW, May 1 (Reuter) - Russia and the United States said on Thursday they had made progress in narrowing gaps over NATO expansion plans but that tough issues still had to be resolved to meet a May 27 target for signing a NATO-Russia charter.

"We may have somewhat narrowed the differences," U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told reporters after talks with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. "We still have some way to go."

Primakov took a similar line. "Our talks I believe were successful and they will be continued," he said. Neither official spelled out what progress had been made.

Albright's 24-hour visit to Moscow was aimed at pushing forward talks on the proposed charter, which is aimed at compensating Russia over NATO's plans to invite some former Warsaw Pact members in July to join the alliance.

The document would give Moscow, which strongly opposes the expansion plan, the right to close consultations with the Western alliance on European security questions.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who is seeking a commitment from the alliance not to move its infrastructure on to the territory of new members, has said he wants to sign the charter with NATO on May 27 in Paris.

"Our goal today was not to get it done but to make sure we got it done right," Albright said.

Primakov said the two sides were still divided by military questions, which he did not specify. "There are some outstanding issues...these include mainly military questions," he said.

During the talks Yeltsin spoke to Albright and Primakov by telephone from his dacha (country house) near Moscow for at least 40 minutes, and encouraged them to pursue their efforts, both sides said.

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said later that "there are some very tough issues that remain undecided -- very tough. There are some tough negotiations ahead. These negotiations are by no means near the finishing point."

Other officials said that completing the charter by May 27 -- a time when U.S. President Bill Clinton is expected to be in Europe -- would be far from easy but that the two sides would have said so if they thought it impossible.

U.S. officials said that one of the key obstacles was the failure so far of 30-nation talks in Vienna to agree on ways of updating the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to accommodate post-Cold

War political changes.

One goal of those talks is to ensure that no build-up of forces occurs near Russia's borders. Officials said a U.S.-Russian working group was set up Thursday to see how the charter could look forward to a possible CFE accord.

Another problem has been Russia's demand for binding assurances that NATO will not station nuclear weapons or move troops into the territory of new members.

NATO has said it has "no plan, no need and no intention" to place nuclear weapons in new member countries or permanently station substantial combat forces there. But Western leaders will not subscribe to a commitment never to do so.

"It's still an open question whether what the (Western) alliance can or will do to contribute to this is enough for the Russians," a senior U.S. official said.

Albright arrived in Moscow vowing no concessions over the charter and saying that "basically, we are at our bottom line."

Primakov, asked about her statement, responded in relaxed fashion. "I think that neither side has yet stated its final position on the details, and in general there is nothing final in our world," he said.

NATO says it plans to go ahead with its invitation to East European states -- widely expected to be the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland -- at a Madrid summit July 8-9, with or without an agreement on the charter with Russia. REU

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RTna 04/30 1937 Green groups sue Energy Dept over nuclear weapons

By Vicki Allen

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Environmental and anti-nuclear groups sued the Energy Department Wednesday to try to block its \$40 billion program to maintain and modernize the nuclear arsenal.

The lawsuit said the department failed to evaluate environmental effects of its program to clean up and manage radioactive wastes from the weapons program, and failed to explore alternatives to its costly, high-tech plan to keep weapons ready for use without violating testing bans.

About 40 groups including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace and Peace Action asked the Federal District Court here to halt new construction for the weapons maintenance program, which includes building a stadium-size laser facility and developing the fastest computer.

They said they feared that the weapons maintenance program would drain resources from the 10-year program to clean up contaminated sites across the country that were used to develop and build nuclear bombs.

"Given all the information, would taxpayers choose to fund pork-barrel nuclear weapons programs or would they choose environmental programs which protect future generations? This is precisely the analysis of alternatives DOE failed to carry out," Jay Coghlan, of a New Mexico group called Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, said.

An Energy Department spokeswoman said the department would not comment on litigation.

The department has said that by using cutting-edge technology it could keep the nuclear arsenal safe and ready for use as a deterrent to

other nations, without underground testing.

But critics said the program would produce more radioactive waste and be a guide to other countries trying to develop nuclear weapons. They also said it mainly was a way to keep the Energy Department laboratories and weapons designers employed despite the reduced threat with the Cold War's end.

Tom Cochran, a senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the \$4 billion per year, 10-year weapons stewardship program allows new weapons to be developed, which undermines the purpose of the comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear testing.

REUTER

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
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Please publish this information in your next magazine.  
Photographs, flyers and posters can be send to you on request.  
Photographs can also be retrieved =><http://www.knooppunt.be/~fme>

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Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days (NWAD) 1997

An International Campaign to uphold International Law  
with Non-Violent Direct Actions of Civil Defence

July 8th - NATO Summit Madrid  
August 6th - NATO HQ Brussels  
August 9th at nuclear 'sites of crime'

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Dear friends,

Following is a comprehensive update of the news-release for the  
<Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days 1997> (NWAD).

Changes were made following a second succesful international  
planning meeting in New York.

To date we are also excited to share that non-violent direct  
actions (NVDA) are being planned at thirteen different nuclear  
'sites of crime' for Nagasaki-day, next August 9th.

And finally we also include a first list of endorsing organisations  
Please send us your endorsement if you want to be included.

We really hope you will have time to network this information.

A new update might be send to you next week, if we have  
significant updates after a third international meeting in Gent  
(Belgium) next May 3 - 4.

Sincerely,

Eirlys Rhiannon  
Janet Bloomfield  
Krista Van Velzen  
Pol D'Huyvetter  
for the Media working-group NWAD 1997

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Campaign of civil (dis)obedience to uphold  
international law to abolish nuclear weapons  
is gaining support around the globe

Earth, 1 May 1997 - An international meeting of nuclear weapons abolitionists from North-America, Europe and Asia meeting in New York City welcomed a new international campaign of civil (dis)obedience to uphold international law. This campaign was decided upon by European peace- and environmental activists who met last March 8 -9 in Gent (Belgium).

The first non-violent actions will start next July 8 on the first anniversary of the historic decision by the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) on how international law applies to nuclear weapons. The ICJ, asked for an advisory opinion by the United Nations General Assembly, decided that 'the threat with or use of nuclear weapons is generally contrary to the rules of international law' and could find no circumstance in which they could lawfully be used.

On this first anniversary of the ICJ-decision all of the NATO leaders, meeting in Madrid for the NATO Summit, will receive summons from a Spanish bailiff. As NATO, after one year, has given no indication of complying with the ICJ advisory opinion, non-violent direct actions will commence in Madrid to remind the NATO leaders of their obligations under international law.

### Hiroshima and Nagasaki

>From August 1 to 11 there will be an international peacecamp with non-violent direct action training and work-shops near NATO HQ in Belgium.

On August 6th, with the 52nd anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, there will be a non-violent direct action at NATO HQ in Brussels to condemn the nuclear policy of NATO which is in violation with the spirit of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Art I & II) as well as with international humanitarian law (i.e. NATO's first use policy).

On Saturday August 9th, the anniversary of Nagasaki, grass-roots peace and ecological groups are organising non-violent direct actions (NVDA) at different nuclear 'sites of crime' around the globe, i.e. nuclear weapon laboratories and depots. Up to today (1 May) activists are already planning thirteen different non-violent direct actions in Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Scotland and USA.

The activists are cooperating actively with members of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, the World Court Project and other members of Abolition 2000, the growing global network of over 720 NGO's which are working towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit testing, manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. This aim is supported by most governments, the public and the International Court of Justice which stated on July 8th 1996 that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading

to nuclear disarmament", referring to Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Last April 7th the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy presented a model of the Nuclear Weapons Convention to UN delegates during the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty PrepCom at the United Nations in New York.

'With this new campaign to uphold international law with civil resistance we want to put further pressure on the politicians of NATO members to start immediate multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention' states Pol D'Huyvetter, campaigner at For Mother Earth International in Belgium, and initiator of this campaign.

George Farebrother, Secretary of the World Court Project UK stated 'As citizens of a planet which already suffered irreparable damage from the illegal threat and use of nuclear weapons, and acting in accordance with our obligation under the Nuremberg Principles to uphold the law, have to take immediate action to review NATO's illegal nuclear policy. As the Nuremberg Principles were confirmed by the World Court, we have and shall use all means in our power, including taking part in, advocating individual and mass participation, and conspiring with others to organise for direct non-violent resistance, to intervene against all preparations for nuclear war at the places where they are carried out'.

Pol D'Huyvetter also said that 'The upcoming actions of non-violent civil defence are not only a means, they are also an aim. They are an example of active non-violent conflict resolution, of civilian defence, which we put forward as an alternative to military defence and doctrine. The latest example was practised succesfully in Gorleben last february when thousands of citizens blocked a rad-waste transport to protest the nuclear policy of the German government. We have to remind the politicians that we want to free the world of the madness of wars and money which dominates everything. Let the people work together towards more democracy and solidarity, and move into the new millenium with a convention to free the world of nuclear weapons'.

Stay informed - Strengthen the web

For up to date info, please send E-mail message to <majordomo@knooppunt.be>, with empty subject line, and <subscribe a-days (your account)> in the body of the message. This way you'll join the growing electronic web serving campaigners and activists preparing this campaign.

Endorsing organisations (1 May 1997):

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International organisations :  
For Mother Earth International (Belgium), International Peace Bureau (Switzerland), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

(USA)

National organisations :

Article Nine Hiroshima (Japan), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK), Center of Research and Action on Peace (Greece), EUCOMmunity (Germany), For Mother Earth France (France), Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance (Netherlands), Healing Global Wounds (USA), IANUS (Germany), Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (USA), Los Alamos Action Network (USA), Nederlandse Kernstop Coalitie (Netherlands), Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA), Prague International Anti-Nuclear Office (Czech Republic), Project Ploughshares (Canada), The Nuclear Resister (USA), NZ Foundation for Peace Studies (New Zealand), Quakers of New Zealand (New Zealand), Tribunaal voor de Vrede (Netherlands), Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada), War Resisters League (USA) & World Court Project (UK)

MEP :

Cecile Sillis-Verwimp (Belgium)

For more information/donations/registrations :

Contact : For Mother Earth International

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*       Postal account : 000-1618561-19              *
*****
* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace*
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *
*****
* For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, *
* Sri Lanka and USA, aswell as active members/groups in *
* Belarus, France, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Ukraine *
*****
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NGO PRESENTATIONS TO THE 1997 PREPARATORY  
COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE NUCLEAR  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) STATES PARTIES  
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK  
16 April, 1997

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INTRODUCTION

Presentation by Clayton Ramey

Coordinator, Peace and Disarmament Program

Fellowship of Reconciliation, USA

Ambassador Patokallio, distinguished delegates, members of the international nuclear abolition community, and friends of humanity:

In the name of the compassionate and merciful God:

My name is Clayton Ramey. And on behalf of my own organization, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the global network for nuclear abolition, we thank the NGO Committee on Disarmament and Ambassador Patokallio for their help in facilitating our invitation to address you today.

We welcome this opportunity to discuss with you our range of views concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Our network is composed of more than 700 local, national, and international organizations on six continents, and our representatives will attempt to present to you today an overview of the issues being discussed in non-governmental circles [\*\*\*NOTE: Not all the speakers represent a single organization or network.].

One common thread, however, that runs through all of our viewpoints is that of the sanctity of life. The weapons and weapons

materials that are the focus of our discussion today jeopardize all forms of life and present a real and immediate danger to the continuity of all life on this planet. Nuclear weapons threaten and destroy life from their very beginning stages, at the uranium mines, and continue to do so throughout their existence, up to and including their dismantling--without even being used.

Moreover, nuclear weapons are an unconscionable and immoral response to the security needs of the world's people. The production of nuclear weapons, and the threat of their use, is contrary to every ethical and faith tradition of our human community. Yet they continue to be produced and inflicted on societies around the world.

But nuclear weapons are not a result of a democratic and just system of decision-making. In fact, those who suffer most from the mining, production, and stockpiling of these materials and weapons--indigenous peoples, women, and impoverished communities-- are often those with the least power to impact the decision-making process.

Legally, we emphasize the decision of the World Court in 1996 that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons contravenes the spirit of international law. The devastation of a nuclear detonation is completely indiscriminate. It kills soldiers and non-combatants alike, obliterates cities and nations, and destroys all living things in its path--regardless of race, gender, ethnicity or species. And the argument against these weapons of mass destruction is supported on a purely practical level as well. The costs of researching, creating, maintaining, and cleaning up after these weapons has, since 1945, diverted trillions of dollars from the food, clothing, shelter, and health care desperately needed by humanity.

We heartily welcome the recent progress made on these issues in fora such as the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission, and in the statement against nuclear weapons made by 61 retired generals and admirals. The START process receives our support, and is strongly encouraged to move ahead with deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian Federation nuclear arsenals.

We reiterate, though, that while progress toward eventual nuclear disarmament is certainly welcomed, it is simply not enough. Bold, unselfish, and morally grounded actions must be undertaken not only for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren as well.

In conclusion, we should remember the culture of the Iroquois Confederation of Native American nations. When elders and leaders of the Iroquois would gather to consider and deliberate important matters, they would consider the impact of their decisions not only on the living, but also on the well-being of the next seven generations.

This is also the critical and inescapable responsibility of the United Nations member states and the non-governmental organizations committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Let us listen, reason, and work together. We have, literally, the very survival of our world at stake.

Thank you.

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## NGO STATEMENT ON THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Presentation by Zia Mian

Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan

Unlike government representatives, NGOs believe there is an enormous indignity in speaking for others. Those who speak and those who are silent are equally robbed of the dignity of speaking for themselves. Here, there is no choice between indignity and silence.

The historic role of NGOs in relation to states and governments has been to set the agenda as part of what has now come to be called civil society. As international relations play an ever greater part in setting the context for states to act, the role of NGOs has increasingly extended into inter-state issues. The one exception to this process has been the issue of nuclear weapons. From the very beginning, NGOs realised as the Nobel Prize winner George Wald, who died a few days ago, put it, "There is nothing worth having that can be obtained by nuclear war." They understood that they would have to play an active part in eliminating those weapons.

At the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 NGOs were already taking up their responsibility to set the agenda and thinking about what needed to come beyond the NPT. During the Review Conference, it was realized that this next step had to be nothing less than the elimination of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the indefinite extension of the Treaty would amount to an indefinite extension of the nuclear age.

With this in mind, a global NGO network called Abolition 2000 was set up. Its aim was to campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000, which now has the support of over 600 NGOs in six continents, called for the immediate initiation of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. What made it remarkable however was its absolute commitment to the urgency of this goal. Recognizing that negotiations can drag on for decades, because of a fundamental lack of good faith on the part of those doing the negotiating, Abolition 2000 called for the negotiations on such as a convention to be concluded by the year 2000.

Following the indefinite extension of the NPT, there has been increasing interest in these ideas. A growing number of states have expressed their desire to see immediate negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. There was, for example, last December's General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/51/45 M), introduced by Malaysia, that called on all states to begin "multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." This resolution was supported by 115 states.

Similarly, there was the resolution introduced by Myanmar (A/RES/51/45 O). This called specifically for the "Conference on Disarmament to establish on a priority bases, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1997 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual

elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework through a nuclear weapons convention." This was supported by 110 states. There have been similar appeals by the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-21 group of countries and the European parliament.

Unfortunately, these resolutions and appeals have remained nothing more than resolutions and appeals. Like all the earlier resolutions in the General Assembly, dating back to the very first resolution - which called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons" - they have become well meaning statements, expressions of hope rather than a way of initiating a process for the kind of negotiations that would be required to abolish nuclear weapons. They have been treated by the nuclear weapons states as an irritant, and by the larger international community as little more than a way of registering their opinion.

We believe it is time for these opinions to be acted upon. Words are cheap. It is the responsibility of all the states who have supported these resolutions in the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament to force negotiations upon those who will not negotiate. Otherwise they are doing no more than standing on the sidelines wringing their hands, they are providing cover for those countries who have no intention of negotiating.

It does not matter how these negotiations start, or where they are held. They can be started by the General Assembly, and held in New York, or by the C.D. and held in Geneva. They can be though a special conference, or an ad hoc group. What matters is that they start. The same people will turn up to do the talking wherever it is, and whatever it is called.

The challenge and responsibility to begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapon Convention could be taken up right here. This is, after all, where it rightfully belongs. This is a group where every member has agreed through Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to... nuclear disarmament."

You also have the power to do so. Under Article VIII of the NPT it requires only one party to submit an amendment to the Treaty, and only one third of the parties to support it, for a conference of all the parties to be convened to consider the amendment. If this amendment was written so as to transform the NPT into a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the conference that would be called would de facto become a conference to negotiate the Convention.

This process requires only one country to take a historic decision. It does not even require all countries who have voted again and again in the General Assembly for negotiations leading to a Convention to vote the same way within the NPT. Few more than half of them have to do so. They would however have pushed the lever that would start the negotiating process for everyone.

Every country would have to attend the conference. It would be universal. Which country that has signed the NPT would stay away? How would it justify staying away, especially when this would amount to a violation of its commitment under Article VI? How would such a country explain that it was not prepared to see nuclear disarmament?

The countries that are not in the NPT, especially those like India, Pakistan and Israel, who hide their nuclear weapons behind demands for global or regional disarmament, would be faced with a

simple choice. They would have to sign the NPT and join the conference to transform the NPT into a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Otherwise, they too would be exposed as never having had any intention of engaging in disarmament. With the whole world watching the closing scenes of the nuclear age, no country would be prepared to go it alone.

This is the challenge we put to you: begin work on the Convention now. We don't care if you do it in the CD, or do it through the General Assembly, or do it yourselves, just do it. Start now and with a little of the good faith that has been missing all these years, the next NPT Review Conference could be the Nuclear Weapons Convention Conference.

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## MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION: PURPOSES AND CONTENT

Presentation by Peter Weiss

President, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, USA

Co -President, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your fellow delegates to this very important conference. May I say, however, that if this Committee conducted its work with full transparency, it would make the input of NGOs more relevant.

My colleague Merav Datan and I will use our time to acquaint you with the Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention which we released to delegations and to the public on April 7.

A good part of your work so far has been taken up with the question of nuclear disarmament, with many of the non-nuclear states calling for the prompt commencement of negotiations to achieve this goal, while the nuclear states have argued that the goal is commendable but the time is not ripe. We are here to argue that not only is the time ripe, but the task is achievable. Furthermore, it is legally mandated.

The ICJ, in its momentous ruling of last July 8, has given lawyers and non-lawyers much to think, write and argue about. But whatever one may think of the Court's opinion on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, one thing is perfectly clear: The Court ruled unanimously that states had a solemn obligation to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

No sooner was this judgment, based both on Article VI of the NPT and on the court's analysis of the applicable norms of international law, handed down than a group of lawyers, scientists, arms control experts and diplomats set themselves the task of producing a draft convention which could serve as a model and inspiration to the governments which, in the court's words, must bring this all-important task to a conclusion.

It is not for me to say how this is to be done, but clearly there are many options. The CD in Geneva is the most obvious one, but work on such a Convention could also proceed in an intersessionary working group created by this body, or, as in the case of the Land Mines Convention, in a diplomatic conference outside of, but related

to, both the CD and the NPT.

We of civil society are here to urge you to think the unthinkable, expect the unexpected and set yourselves the goal of complying with the World Court's mandate by the time of the Review conference in the year 2000. President Bedjaoui of the ICJ called nuclear weapons "the ultimate evil". If this assessment is correct, as I believe it is, we must not compound it by yielding to the siren song of the nuclear weapon states telling us that they will do a way with this evil "ultimately", which, in the present juncture, sounds suspiciously like "never."

Let me close this brief intervention by quoting from the separate statement of Judge Vereshchetin of Russia in the ICJ case:

"If I may be allowed the comparison, the construction of a solid edifice for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. This, however, is not because of the lack of building materials, but rather because of the unwillingness and objections of a sizable number of the builders of the edifice. If this future edifice is to withstand the test of time and the vagaries of the international climate, it is the States themselves - rather than the court with its limited building resources - that must shoulder the burden of the construction to complete.

I will now pass the microphone to my colleague Merav Datan, who has shouldered the lion's share of the drafting of the Model Convention. With her academic background in both nuclear physics and international law, she has been eminently qualified to do so.

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Presentation by Merav Datan  
Staff Attorney, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, USA

On April 7, 1997, the LCNP released a first discussion draft of a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), written by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists, and disarmament experts. The model NWC has been referred to by Ireland in the NPT Prep Com proceedings. Before discussing the content of the NWC, it is appropriate to say a few words about the purposes of this draft.

First let me address the purposes of drafting a model NWC.

>From the drafters' perspective, an important question is why develop a draft NWC rather than simply focus on promoting negotiations at the State level? There were two primary purposes of drafting. The first was to inspire participation across all levels. It is hoped that developing this draft NWC will engage both governments and citizens in the political, legal, and technical considerations of eliminating nuclear weapons. The NWC deliberately builds on efforts of both governments and non-governmental organizations. Specifically, it draws on other treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control (CWC, START treaties, INF, CTBT, ABM, NWFZ treaties) as well as research by various policy and advocacy groups who have been studying the problem of verifiable nuclear disarmament.

This approach has implications for societal verification: By incorporating the efforts of experts throughout civil society, the NWC aims to increase the probability of societal participation in the implementation of such a convention once it is adopted. There are also implications for universality: Engaging a wide range of

governments at an early stage will enable the development of a treaty more likely to gain universal adherence.

The second reason for drafting the model convention was to demonstrate the feasibility of a comprehensive regime for nuclear disarmament. The complexity of eliminating nuclear weapons requires coordination across state boundaries, political bodies and various industries. The NWC is offered in an attempt to invite thinking on the requirements for such coordination. The process of drafting a comprehensive plan for nuclear disarmament also serves to identify potential obstacles to the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons and to identify measures whose immediate implementation might facilitate this goal. Thus, the attempt to design a comprehensive regime helps develop strategies today that are necessary for the final goal. We see this as a comprehensive-incremental approach, incorporating and coordinating concrete step-by-step measures toward elimination of nuclear weapons.

To say a few words about the content of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention: General obligations fall into two categories: negative obligations and affirmative obligations. States Parties undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; to engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear weapons; to research, develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain or transfer nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons; and never to produce, stockpile, retain, transfer or use nuclear weapons grade fissionable or fusionable material, with limited exceptions for defined quantities for medical, agricultural or research purposes. These obligations apply to States and to natural and legal persons such as corporations.

Under affirmative obligations, states parties would undertake to destroy their nuclear weapons and to destroy or convert facilities involved in the production, testing and research of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. There are also obligations to report violations of the Convention and to enact domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of the Convention, including criminal sanctions for violations and protection for persons reporting violations.

The Definitions section of the model draft is more extensive than in most disarmament treaties because of the scope of the NWC and because of the importance of avoiding ambiguity and potential loopholes, especially with respect to such a politically sensitive issue. To mention only a few key definitions: Special nuclear material is defined as weapons usable fissionable or fusionable material. This is to be prohibited and placed under international control until a safe method of disposition is found.

The draft also introduces a term called safety controls as an alternative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Safety Controls are broader than the IAEA safeguards, which focus primarily on detection of diversion. The Safety Controls proposed in the NWC would include prevention of diversion through international control, physical protection and limited or no national access to the extent this is possible.

The implementing agency is modelled on the CWC Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with a

Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat which oversees the operation of a Registry and International Monitoring System.

The NWC also suggests a series of phases for implementation. The purpose of proposing a phased plan for implementation is that it offers a comprehensive approach with a definite goal. The phases provide a way of coordinating the steps toward nuclear disarmament. This draft includes recommended deadlines for five phases of implementation based on technical feasibility according to scientific advisers. The drafters understand, of course, that these deadlines would be negotiated by the States themselves and therefore the recommended deadlines are bracketed. The model NWC also provides for extensions of the deadlines if necessary.

Some of the measures included in the phases for implementation are: an end to production of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material; taking all nuclear weapons off alert status; removing all warheads from delivery vehicles; disabling all nuclear weapons; closing of production, research and testing facilities (and destruction or conversion to purposes not prohibited under the Convention); and continuous proportionate reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the nuclear weapon states.

Verification measures in addition to those already mentioned include declarations of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material and nuclear facilities; monitoring; the use of National Technical Means; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. Many of these provisions could be implemented even before entry into force.

The NWC also recommends optional protocols to cover provisions related to but not essential for this Convention, such as compulsory dispute settlement, energy assistance in alternatives to nuclear energy, destruction of all nuclear capable delivery vehicles, disposition of special nuclear material, and cooperative law enforcement measures.

In conclusion, we have released the model NWC as a discussion document, not as a final product. We invite comments from delegations and other NGOs. We offer the model NWC as an idea of what the final goal--a regime for the elimination of nuclear weapons--might look like. The journey to nuclear disarmament may take many steps but will need to include a convention or conventions on total elimination. When one undertakes a journey, it helps to have some idea of the nature of the final destination. We hope that the model NWC will help in this respect.

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## NGO PERSPECTIVES ON ENERGY AND THE NPT

Presentation by Mary Olson

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Washington, USA

We have just heard about plutonium and its impacts on the global community. Every nuclear power reactor that utilizes uranium fuel produces plutonium in the process of fission. By the year 2000, the global inventory of high-level nuclear waste from nuclear power will reach 190,000 metric tons and of that almost 2,000 metric tons will be plutonium. This material will remain a hazard to the planet for hundreds of thousands of years, as will other radioactive elements from nuclear fission.

There are today 495 nuclear power reactors, operating in nearly 50 countries, generating less than 10% of the world's energy supply.

Nuclear power has been characterized as a solution to global climate change. However, this capital intensive approach would require a massive investment and many years to achieve, while compounding the threat of nuclear accidents, the problems of nuclear waste management and would divest resources from the development of energy efficiency and renewable technologies derived from the sun such as bio-mass, wind, solar and other possibilities such as fuel cells.

In the US, energy efficiency has the capacity to offset 6.75 times more carbon dioxide from nuclear power for each dollar spent.

Agenda 21 calls for nations to find more efficient systems for producing, distributing and consuming energy and for greater reliance on environmentally sound energy systems, with special emphasis on renewable energy.

A report by the United Nations Development Program called, "Energy After Rio" concluded: A revival of nuclear power is not a necessary component of the energy supply system in a world where emphasis is given to the efficient use of energy and innovation in energy supply technologies.

Efforts to expand nuclear power in developing countries will only pose new economic, environmental and infrastructure development burdens. No country has solved the problems of what to do with long-lasting nuclear wastes, and this carries an unknown price tag and not certain source of funding.

Nuclear power's true costs have often been hidden by ranging degrees of government subsidy. Even then, it is the most expensive of the already deployed energy sources. In the US where repayments of capital investments and accrual of decommissioning and waste management funds were based on an assumed 40 year operation period, reactors are closing before the mortgage is paid. Radiation related degradation and aging of key reactor components is the cause. It is not economical to replace integral components such as the reactor vessel. A number of reactors have closed 10 or more years ahead of schedule with others now slated for early retirement. Given these trade offs, sustainable development would best be achieved by strengthening international cooperation on development of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. For example through the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Environment Program.

When the Non Proliferation Treaty was negotiated, nuclear power was a new technology - there were high hopes and indeed some assumptions that it would be safe, cheap and clean. But it was also an experiment. Experience has now given us the data to say that these assessments cannot be supported. Indeed, the risks were gravely underestimated. At every step in the nuclear fuel chain, waste is generated, workers and the public are exposed to radiation, and radioactivity is released to the biosphere with the potential for causing mutagenic and teratogenic malformations and other disorders in new born children, as well as carcinogenic health effects.

Routine day to day nuclear fuel band operations are so radioactively polluting that national and international regulating bodies have set privileged standards for ionizing radiation. The International Committee on Radiological Protection recommendation of an annual dose limit to average members of the public of 1 millisevert translates to a life time risk of one fatal cancer in every 286 people exposed. Compared to other hazardous substances which some societies regulate at a risk level of one death in 100,000 or 1 in a million, this is a very permissive standard.

Chernobyl has taught us that no nation on earth is safe from the risks of nuclear power - including the vast majority of countries with no nuclear power reactors. Prior to this accident, the transboundary impacts were not understood.

Eleven years after the disaster, Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation are struggling to deal with the human, economic and social consequences. Chernobyl was the largest industrial accident in history. After 10 years, the official Ukrainian estimate was 32,000 deaths and 300 billion in damages. But an estimated 80% of the fallout was deposited across the border in Belarus.

It is essential to recognize the legitimate interests of States which may potentially be affected by a nuclear accident with transboundary consequences and to strengthen their participation in establishing criteria and provide greatly enhanced roles for them in the development planning process for instance in environmental impact statements.

Agenda 21 also stressed the growing importance of civil society in achieving sustainable development. The very limited degree of participation of the work of non-governmental organizations in the work of international bodies dealing with radiation protection and nuclear safety, specifically the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP), is regrettable. Efforts should be made for full and effective participation of NGOs in these bodies.

It is of concern to many non-governmental organizations that a disproportionate impact from uranium fuel production and wastes affects Indigenous people's. Efforts must be made to respect the rights, self determination and special interests of Indigenous Peoples from the range of threats created by nuclear activities. This concern is growing as the problem of nuclear waste threatens Indigenous lands.

Last week the IAEA's Standing Committee on nuclear liability closed a decade of work revising the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability. This effort resulted in a new international instrument to provide additional compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.

Early implementation of a strengthened international regime for liability and nuclear damage compensation is essential.

However, the revised Vienna Convention and Supplementary Funding Convention do not go far enough. Even if widely supported, the amounts of funding would not ensure that all damage from a major nuclear accident would be compensated.

Non-governmental organizations consider it inequitable and inadequate for victims of nuclear accidents to remain uncompensated and thus an adequate regime must provide for full compensation for all damages including damage to the environment this applies to both nuclear reactor accidents and incidents during the transport of material.

It goes without saying, but must be said that no amount of compensation can truly offset the irreversible impacts of nuclear releases on human health and the biosphere. The only cure is prevention.

Nuclear power is a proliferation issue as I told you, every power reactor needs uranium or mox fuel and makes additional plutonium. A 1 gigawatt light water reactor makes about 200 kgs of plutonium a year. Reprocessing of civilian fuel will result in separated plutonium which may exceed military stock piles.

This plutonium economy depends on the international transfer of nuclear materials and wastes, increasing the possibility of environmental releases of radioactivity.

There is a considerable increase in frequency and site of nuclear shipments and this is of concern to NGOs and some governments, particularly Coastal and Island states on transport routes. It is essential that the International Maritime Organization augment its code on the sea transport of irradiated fuel, high level waste and plutonium, particularly since there are a number of shipments planned for 1997. Indeed there may be one in progress as we speak.

The Atoms for Peace program and article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty were decisions. Decisions made when there were high hopes for nuclear power. It is inappropriate to define an activity that is limited to one or two generations in benefit but results in a liability that will persist for 12,000 human generations to come, as an "inalienable right."

Today, on the eve of a new century, a new millennium, we again have the opportunity to decide what we want our world to look like. It is a false construct that the market alone decides. These international agreements have been a dividing force. NGOs also have contributions to make. It is our chance to start in a new direction, to become the world that chooses efficiently and innovation in the energy technologies that are sustainable, renewable and truly safe, clean and affordable. Bottom line, we must meet today's energy needs and we must safeguard the earth for our children and future generations.

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FISSILE MATERIALS

Presentation by George Bunn

Lawyers Alliance for World Security, USA

This presentation is designed to illustrate the issues involved with weapons-usable nuclear materials. There is a large amount of valuable expertise that NGOs can offer regarding these materials, the problems involved with them and how these might possibly be addressed.

This presentation is not intended to indicate that there is consensus on any particular points raised and has been written in a form to illustrate the importance of this issue clearly while reflecting the range of views expressed by various NGOs that have been researching in this field.

Several organizations have contributed to this presentation and I have been chosen by luck as much as judgement to read it out. It follows that the views expressed here cannot be ascribed to any individual organization and that for the purposes of this presentation, I have no institutional affiliation.

## 1. Introduction to weapons-usable materials and their world-wide inventories

The best available estimates on worldwide inventories of these materials has been put together by NGOs.

It has been estimated that at the end of 1996 there were 1300 tonnes of plutonium and 1770 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium in existence. The vast majority of plutonium is in civilian spent fuel while almost all of the highly-enriched uranium is in military stocks in the United States and Russia. Virtually all of this uranium is unsafeguarded while almost one third of all plutonium is under safeguards.

World stocks of highly enriched uranium are expected to decline due to the blending down of excess materials resulting from disarmament measures in the United States and Russia. However, the stocks of civil plutonium continue to grow at a rate of about 70 tonnes annually. In the next decade separated civil plutonium stocks are expected to grow from 140 tonnes at the end of 1995 to 250 tonnes due to increased reprocessing, primarily in Europe and Japan. Ten years from now, under existing plans, the separated plutonium inventory will be as high as the current military plutonium stockpiles.

It is important to note that the margins of uncertainty are as high as 30% on some of these calculations. This clearly illustrates the need for a full accounting of world-wide nuclear materials before any agreements on reductions could be verified.

{The figures given here are drawn from the book "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies" by David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker. }

## 2. Concerns regarding weapons-usable materials

Nuclear disarmament can only be made irreversible if the materials required for their construction are put into non-weapons-usable form and under some system of international monitoring or control. The deeper the reductions in nuclear arsenals, the more significant the uncertainties in stocks of weapons-usable materials

will become.

Once the political situation is ready for nuclear-capable states which are not members of the NPT to get involved in nuclear disarmament this can be achieved by putting their weapons-usable materials under control.

It is important to note that reactor-grade plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons, though it requires more material, greater expertise and the weapons may be less reliable. While there is some debate within the scientific community as to the scale of the proliferation threat posed by such material, there is consensus that this proliferation threat is not zero.

The form that materials are held in is important for the levels of confidence that such materials are not being diverted for prohibited purposes.

For example, verification operations for fuel elements are comparatively easy - they are tagable to enable individual identification and sealable to deter tampering. However, any chemical process which involves dissolving the fuel and turning it into a continuous stream can lead to uncertainties in the knowledge of the location and form of all the material. It has been shown that at bulk handling facilities, in which large quantities of separated plutonium flow in continuous streams, IAEA safeguards calculations have contained large margins of error. The reasons for this are unreachable hold-ups of materials within the facility as well as the measurement errors inevitably involved in inventory activities. As a consequence, the amount of Material Unaccounted For (MUF) can reach several times the amount needed to construct one nuclear explosive device without the inspectors being able to decide whether this amount has been diverted or not.

Reprocessing policies continue through industrial inertia. The transition away from reprocessing is hindered by commitments to binding contracts with reprocessors and by the uncertainty faced by utilities in pursuing long-term spent fuel storage policies.

The 93+2 programme to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness of safeguards that has been developed by the IAEA over the past four years will considerably improve the ability of the Agency to detect prohibited activities. The most important of these improvements is with regard to the detection of undeclared facilities and activities. International safeguards are being developed through an evolutionary process which needs to continue. However, no safeguards improvements are able to get around the above mentioned inherent problems with continuous material flows.

Despite recent efforts, systems to protect and account for fissile materials in the former Soviet Union remain far below international standards, making these stocks possible targets of theft by terrorists, proliferant states, or criminal groups.

Progress in correcting this situation is hampered due to the economic problems that Russia currently faces. Even in countries in which accountancy systems have been well funded, such as the United States, there remain problems in solving discrepancies in materials balances.

3. Scientific-technical approaches how to deal with these materials

There is a broad consensus around the idea that the possession of these materials, especially in large quantities and in direct-usable form, present continuous proliferation concerns.

The related problems may be divided into two parts: technical issues, such as how should final disposal of materials be carried out, and political issues, such as what materials should be included in international control regimes. The technical problems will be addressed first.

The question of future separation of plutonium is technically simple. Military as well as civilian reprocessing can be ended and highly enriched uranium (HEU) need not be used for civilian reactors any more. The decision here is political.

Elimination of existing materials is relatively straightforward for HEU because it can be blended down and used as fuel for nuclear power reactors as long as they are operating. Though there is the theoretical concept of transmuting plutonium into other elements the technology for this is not yet on the horizon. There are no other technologies that could eliminate plutonium and even burning it in fuel will not significantly reduce the net amount of plutonium.

Therefore, one might think of direct final disposal of plutonium. Disposal locations and technologies are sufficiently controversial that the prospect for any final disposal facility being in operation in the near future is slim. Also there are concerns about future access to this material.

The task of making plutonium inaccessible is of the greatest importance and urgency. However, the solutions of how to achieve this are not clear cut. All possible solutions have technical and political drawbacks.

There are several techniques for making materials as inaccessible as they are in spent fuel. For example, material may be enclosed within some physical barrier, along the lines of encasing in glass or ceramics. This may be done with the pure material or after mixing it with some other substances, such as high-level wastes, so that it becomes difficult to extract from the resulting mixture. Another option is to put the plutonium into mixed oxide fuel, known as MOX, and burn it as fuel for power reactors.

One advantage of immobilization either in glass or in a ceramic is that it is the faster and cheaper solution. A disadvantage is the difficulty in finding locations suitable for depositing the resultant package.

An advantage of burning weapon-grade plutonium as MOX fuel is the degradation of its isotopic composition, if it is burned under the right conditions. One disadvantage of MOX is the limited number of reactors capable of burning this fuel and the consequent length of time to complete this process leading to the danger of ongoing handling of separated plutonium.

For some time to come the only technical solution for most of the material will be to store it. Storage of materials, with containment and surveillance, has a long history and is the basis of IAEA safeguards. However, it should not be considered a long-term solution.

#### 4. Proposals how to deal with these materials in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Having looked at the longer-term technical issues, what are the political proposals for control of fissile materials?

A fissile materials cut-off has long been the focus of activity in this area. However, its value will depend on its scope and on its place within a framework of other measures.

There is a variety of views within the NGO community on the significance of a fissile materials cut-off, based primarily on the question of whether existing stockpiles would be included.

Some groups consider a that cut-off which does not cover stockpiles to have some value, not least to reinforce and verify unilateral moratoriums on fissile materials production, to ease the task of those states that have yet to compile full inventories of their materials and to encourage a safeguards culture not already under full-scope safeguards.

Other groups consider that a cut-off without stockpiles would be, at best, a missed opportunity or, at worst, an irrelevance. Groups that are of these opinions conclude that a cut-off has to deal with stockpiles or else its impact on disarmament will be negligible and that it will merely freeze the current situation.

It is worth remembering that there is also a clear divergence of views between states on the scope of a fissile material cut-off. This divergence is clearest between the nuclear-weapon states and the states not party to the NPT with facilities outside of international safeguards. The current impasse at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva may be overcome if disarmament measures are clearly linked with non-proliferation measures.

There is an urgent need to reduce access to weapons-usable nuclear materials. This may be achieved by unilateral steps or by agreements between states.

Measures that could be taken in pursuit of these goals in the near future could include formal statements by states that their production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium has ceased. Transparency in inventories and capabilities should be enhanced by publication of detailed balances of plutonium and HEU and this information should be updated regularly. While some progress has been made in this regard, notably by individual states, there is much more that may be done.

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These statements were read orally at an informal meeting of the Preparatory Committee meeting of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at U.N. headquarters, on 16 April 1997. Statements compiled by:

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Roger K. Smith, Network Coordinator

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May 2, 1997

This letter is not for general distribution, but is written in considerable haste in response to your inquiry. For general distribution, I would want time to deepen and polish it and run it by the national office of AFSC. I am new to the caucus, and would appreciate your thoughts as to whether it would be worthwhile to do the necessary polishing and consulting before putting it up for global distribution.

While I see no harm in the recommendations you are making, and can see that they may help some people enter efforts for nuclear weapons abolition, I am inclined to differ with you on your reading of Clinton and more fundamentally about the nature of power of the nuclear and imperial state and our relationship to it. In one less sweeping respect, I agree with Jerry Grossman (Steve's Grossman's father, Steve being the head of the Democratic National Committee) regarding Clinton's likely preoccupations and primary commitment in the coming three and a half years. As Jerry said during a recent meeting with Oscar Arias, with Whitewater, Chinese money and a host of other corruption scandals coming at Clinton, during his second term, he'll be concentrating on his legal defense. This will require taking money from corporate power, and it will lead Clinton to be even more of a status quo politician than he was in his first term (and his budget commitments and cuts lead many to place him in the camp of the new right, more than among those committed to the status quo.) We'd do better to aim to influence Gore's mind, or better yet Gephardt's, but the truth seems to be that we won't move either of them to a commitment to nuclear weapons abolition until either the constellation of global power forces the US to commit to a policy of nuclear weapons abolition, or a popular US movement - working in tandem with international opinion - creates a new structure of power that leads/inspires/forces elected officials and those aspiring to replace them to commit themselves to a policy of nuclear weapons abolition (as during the Vietnam War and the Freeze era, when politicians who didn't share our commitments joined us because that was how they won elections and gained or maintained the "power" and privileges they sought.)

Further on Clinton, I knew him in college and have watched him closely over the years. To say that he is an idealist is more than stretching it. He will do whatever is necessary to achieve (and now remain in) power. Thus, my concurrence with Jerry Grossman's observations and my understanding of the context of his administration's response to General Butler: nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone of U.S. military policy. This is reflected in its approaches to the NPT and CTBT and the recent deployment of B61-II nuclear warheads, as well as in Secretary of Defense Cohen's statement that the U.S. doesn't aim to fight fair but to dominate across the entire spectrum of violence.

We at AFSC in New England, and many others with whom we've been talking, believe that the next major step in the campaign for nuclear weapons abolition should be building political power, movement, and force from below in our communities; institutions and organizations; town, city and state governments, and ultimately nationally. The circumstances today are much different than in the Freeze era, but we need to go back to organizing, with education at the grassroots level linked to organizing and

the action that reflects the moral imperatives for abolition and the growing popular will to achieve it. Ultimately, we need to demonstrate that elected officials will lose their jobs if they don't reflect the national will for a binding policy of nuclear weapons abolition. That national will, obviously, also remains to be built, but we're not being honest to and with ourselves and others, unless we do.

In this regard we are well into the process of organizing a New England Organizing Conference for Nuclear Weapons Abolition which will be held in the Boston area October 24-26. We are in the process of solidifying a number of co-sponsorships, which should include most New England grassroots peace/disarmament groups. Others like PSR, IPPNW, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Peace Studies programs have been involved in our planning and will likely be co-sponsors. We will also be making the nuclear power/nuclear weapons connection. Joseph Rotblat has agreed to be a keynote speaker. Several other major speakers have been confirmed, and a number of invitations remain to be made.

We've held off sending out word of the conference until the formal invitation/call was written, more speakers were in place, etc. Its focus will be on organizing, although it will obviously have important educational dimensions.

Along the way, it has been suggested to us that with annual international Abolition 2000 conferences having taken place in Europe and the Pacific, with local conferences having taken place in Connecticut, Colorado, California (and possibly elsewhere) and now the New England conference planned, we might be approaching the time for a national Abolition 2000 ORGANIZING conference. I hesitate to mention the possibility of a national conference, because I think the vision and will to confront and transform the structures of power essential to the nuclear state must exist within the leadership of such an effort, and I'm not sure that we're really there yet.

As we approach this work, I would strongly advise that we recall what we have learned from Reinhold Niebuhr's work on power, the lessons of the civil rights, Vietnam era peace, women's, and Freeze movements. We are contesting fundamental, global, and imperial (in the truest sense of the word - in the tradition of Greece, Rome and Britain before the US) structures of power. Lobbying and appeals to altruism are hardly enough in these circumstances. When linked to, and based on, a powerful people's movement from below and international pressure, they can be important aspects of essential, disturbing, and potentially dangerous (Recall the Nixon era COINTELPRO program among others,) nonviolent social/political/cultural transformation.

It is my firm belief, and with sincere respect for important initiatives like the World Court project and the Canberra Commission, that until we build/release a powerful nonviolent people's movement for nuclear weapons' abolition, we have a snowball's chance in ... of achieving nuclear weapons abolition.

For what it's worth, when Bill Clinton studied international relations at Georgetown, Professor Ello's first lecture began with the

statement that the study of international relations is akin to studying the rules of the game among Mafia families. There is much to dispute in that statement, but this - and going along to get along - were two of the important lessons that Bill learned back in those days.

Sincerely,

Joseph Gerson  
Regional Program Coordinator  
New England, American Friends Service Committee

At 08:16 AM 5/2/97 -0700, mupj@igc.apc.org wrote:

>To: Abolitionists

>

>In April we completed efforts centered on two important events for our  
>movement: the 1997 NPT Review PrepCom and U.S. Senate ratification of  
>Chemical Weapons Convention. What next? I would like to offer some ideas,  
>addressed primarily though not exclusively to the nuclear abolition movement  
>in the United States.

>

>We need to realize that many of our objectives require positive actions by  
>the president of the United States: gaining U.S. participation in drafting a  
>Nuclear Weapons Convention; submission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
>to the U.S. Senate; negotiations of deep cuts in strategic weapons as an  
>intermediate step toward abolition; zero alert; halting subcritical tests  
>and new weapon designs; dismantlement of out-of-service warheads.  
>Therefore, we should focus considerable attention on President Clinton.

>

>Like most us, President Clinton is both an idealist and a pragmatist. As an  
>idealist, he talks about the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus,  
>in his second inaugural address he spoke of a land of new promise where "our  
>children will sleep free from the threat of nuclear, chemical or biological  
>weapons." As a pragmatist, he is cautious about changing the Pentagon's  
>nuclear posture and he accepts the weapon labs' desire to develop new  
>designs. In a combination of the two, he and his administration worked hard  
>and effectively to achieve ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
>Our challenge is to bring out his idealism and to provide political support  
>for bold ventures, thereby counteracting forces which want nuclear weapons  
>forever.. I suggest several simultaneous approaches.

>

>(1) I suggest that on the 20th of each month numerous organizations and  
>individuals should write to President Clinton with a message something like  
>this (in abbreviated form): "You now have 45 months remaining in office to  
>set the course so that the children of the next century will sleep free from  
>the threat of nuclear weapons. To make that possible, we urge you to  
>promptly send the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the U.S. Senate for  
>ratification [if not yet done]; to halt all subcritical tests of nuclear  
>weapons and other kinds of weapons research; in START III negotiations to  
>seek deeper and faster cuts in strategic warheads than outlined in the  
>Helsinki framework; to work with other nuclear weapons states to achieve  
>zero alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles; to accelerate the  
>pace of dismantling nuclear warheads; and to commit the United States to

>negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention." Each of these points would  
>be elaborated. Each month the stated number would be reduced to reflect the  
>remaining months until President Clinton's term comes to an end on January  
>20, 2001.

>  
>We at Methodists United for Peace with Justice will write such a letter on  
>May 20 and each month thereafter. We'll send it through Samuel R. "Sandy"  
>Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs. We invite  
>other organizations to join us. Each organization can emphasize its  
>greatest current concerns within the overall quest for nuclear abolition.

>  
>(2) Let's expand the sunflower campaign by getting individuals all around  
>the country to send packets of sunflower seeds to President Clinton with the  
>abolition message. Let's regularly picket the White House with sunflowers  
>and such signs as "84% Favor Abolition", "Only [45] Months Remaining". We  
>could also try to plant sunflower seeds at the White House, Pentagon,  
>missile sites, and other places; this could take the form of civil  
>disobedience for those who feel called to do so.

>  
>This kind of campaign will require widespread participation to sustain.  
>Therefore, I hope that a number of membership organizations will take it up  
>and work together to carry it forward.

>  
>(3) As an extension of a White House focus, we could shadow President  
>Clinton wherever he goes with sunflowers and signs. This can be done in  
>various places in Washington, around the United States, and abroad. Let's  
>keep reminding him that he is in a position to move the world toward the  
>ideal he has espoused.

>  
>(4) As well as mass activities, we should encourage persons who have direct  
>access to President Clinton to make the case for nuclear abolition. This  
>includes members of Congress, leading scientists, professionals, clergy, and  
>other elite. Thus, we could help Representative Major Owens obtain more  
>co-signers for his letter to the president. We could promote a similar  
>letter from senators, state legislators, local elected officials. We could  
>encourage delegations of religious leaders, scientists, and others.

>  
>In sum, to achieve nuclear abolition we must not only have good ideas and  
>strong commitment, we must also influence decisions of government policy  
>makers who have the power to set the course toward nuclear abolition.

>  
>I will welcome your responses to my suggestions.

>  
>Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
>Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
>1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
>Phone/fax: 301 896-0013  
>E-mail: mupj@igc.apc.org

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>  
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Dear friends,

On April 21, Lambertville municipal council became the fourth municipal governing body to pass our Abolition Treaty 2000 resolution in New Jersey. Previously, Princeton Borough, Princeton Township, and Roosevelt had passed resolutions. Lambertville's resolution was the first to include putting the issue on the ballot in the next election as an advisory referendum.

We have materials available including our model resolution and guidelines on how to pass a resolution. We encourage any and all abolition and nuclear disarmament activists to work on passing them. They are a great tool to bring the issue to the grassroots!

If you want any of the materials mentioned above, or just want to talk, contact my office below.

Rev. Bob Moore  
Coalition for Peace Action  
40 Witherspoon St.  
Princeton, NJ 08542  
(609)924-5022

It might be worthwhile to contact environmental, civil rights, woman's groups etc. who have constituencies that agree with nuclear abolition and that seem to have a closer contact with the administration. It has seemed to me that if NOW and NAACP put abolition on their agenda it would get a hearing from the political wonks. Remember the democratic party has to satisfy these natural allies to raise money etc. Also, we should emphasize the importance of the ICJ opinion and challenge the administration not to flaunt international law but to lead the way in fulfilling it. Thanks. Jonathan Granoff

## Background of the HAARP Project

Prepared by Rosalie Bertell, PhD, GNSH  
November 5, 1996

Military interest in space became intense during and after World War II because of the introduction of rocket science, the companion to nuclear technology. The early versions include the buzz bomb and guided missiles. They were thought of as potential carriers of both nuclear and conventional bombs.

Rocket technology and nuclear weapon technology developed simultaneously between 1945 and 1963. During this time of intensive atmospheric nuclear testing, explosions at various levels above and below the surface of the earth were tried. Some of the now familiar descriptions of the earth's protective atmosphere, such as the existence of the Van Allen belts, were based on information gained through stratospheric and ionospheric experimentation.

The earth's atmosphere consists of the troposphere, from sea level to about 16 km above the earth's surface; the stratosphere (which contains the ozone level) which extends from about the 16 to 48 km above the earth; and the ionosphere which extends from 48 km to over 50,000 km above the surface of the earth.

The earth's protective atmosphere or "skin" extends beyond 3,200 km above sea level to the large magnetic fields, called the Van Allen Belts, which can capture the charged particles sprayed through the cosmos by the solar and galactic winds. These belts were discovered in 1958 during the first weeks of the operation of America's first satellite, Explorer I. They appear to contain charged particles trapped in the earth's gravity and magnetic fields. Primary galactic cosmic rays enter the solar system from interstellar space, and are made up of protons with energies above 100 MeV, extending up to astronomically high energies. They make up about 10% of the high energy rays. Solar rays are generally of lower energy, below 20 MeV (which is still high energy in earth terms). These high energy particles are affected by the earth's magnetic field and by geomagnetic latitude (distance above or below the geomagnetic equator). The flux density of low energy protons at the top of the atmosphere is normally greater at the

poles than at the equator.

The density also varies with solar activity, a minimum when solar flares are at a maximum.

The Van Allen belts capture charged particles (protons, electrons and alpha particles) and these spiral along the magnetic force lines toward the polar regions where the force lines converge.

They are reflected back and forth between the magnetic force lines near the poles. The lower Van

Allen Belt is about 7700 km above the earth's surface, and the outer Van Allen Belt is about

51,500 km above the surface. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Van Allen belts are

most intense along the equator, and effectively absent over the poles.

They dip to 400 km over

the South Atlantic Ocean, and are about 1,000 km high over the Central Pacific Ocean. In the

lower Van Allen Belt, the proton intensity is about 20,000 particles with energy above 30 MeV

per second per square centimetre. Electrons reach a maximum energy of 1 MeV, and their

intensity has a maximum of 100 million per second per square centimetre.

In the outer Belt,

proton energy averages only 1 MeV. For comparison, most charged particles discharged in a

nuclear explosion are range between 0.3 and 3 MeV, while diagnostic medical X-ray has peak

voltage around 0.5 MeV.

### Project Argus (1958)

Between August and September 1958, the US Navy exploded three fission type nuclear bombs

480 km above the South Atlantic Ocean, in the part of the lower Van Allen Belt closest to the

earth's surface. In addition, two hydrogen bombs were detonated 160 km over Johnston Island in

the Pacific. This was called, by the military, "the biggest scientific experiment ever undertaken".

It was designed by the US Department of Defence and the US Atomic Energy Commission, under

the code name Project Argus. The purpose appears to be to assess the impact of high altitude

nuclear explosions on radio transmission and radar operations because of the electro-magnetic

pulse (EMP), and to increase understanding of the geomagnetic field and the behaviour of the

charged particles in it.

This gigantic experiment created new (inner) magnetic radiation belts encompassing almost the

whole earth, and injected sufficient electrons and other energetic particles into the ionosphere to

cause world wide effects. The electrons travelled back and forth along magnetic force lines, causing an artificial "aurora" when striking the atmosphere near the North Pole.

US Military planned to create a "telecommunications shield" in the ionosphere, reported in 13-20 August 1961, Keesings Historisch Archief (K.H.A.). This shield would be created "in the ionosphere at 3,000 km height, by bringing into orbit 350,000 million copper needles, each 2-4 cm long (total weight 16 kg), forming a belt 10 km thick and 40 km wide, the needles spaced about 100 m apart." This was designed to replace the ionosphere "because telecommunications are impaired by magnetic storms and solar flares". The US planned to add to the number of copper needles if the experiment proved to be successful. This plan was strongly opposed by the International Union of Astronomers.

Project Starfish (1962):

On 9 July 1962, the US began a further series of experiments with the ionosphere. From their description: "one kiloton device, at a height of 60 km and one megaton and one multi-megaton, at several hundred kilometres height" (K.H.A., 29 June 1962). These tests seriously disturbed the lower Van Allen Belt, substantially altering its shape and intensity. "In this experiment the inner Van Allen Belt will be practically destroyed for a period of time; particles from the Belt will be transported to the atmosphere. It is anticipated that the earth's magnetic field will be disturbed over long distances for several hours, preventing radio communication. The explosion in the inner radiation belt will create an artificial dome of polar light that will be visible from Los Angeles." (K.H.A. 11 May 1962). A Fijian Sailor, present at this nuclear explosion told me that the whole sky was on fire and he thought it would be the end of the world. This was the experiment which called forth the strong protest of the Queen's Astronomer, Sir Martin Ryle in the UK.

"The ionosphere (according to the understanding at that time) that part of the atmosphere between 65 and 80 km and 280-320 km height, will be disrupted by mechanical forces caused by the pressure wave following the explosion. At the same time, large quantities of ionizing radiation will be released, further ionizing the gaseous components of the atmosphere

at this height. This ionization effect is strengthened by the radiation from the fission products..... The lower Van Allen Belt, consisting of charged particles that move along the geomagnetic field lines ... will similarly be disrupted. As a result of the explosion, this field will be locally destroyed, while countless new electrons will be introduced into the lower belt." (K.H.A. 11 May 1962)

"On 19 July.... NASA announced that as a consequence of the high altitude nuclear test of July 9, a new radiation belt had been formed, stretching from a height of about 400 km to 1600 km; it can be seen as a temporary extension of the lower Van Allen Belt." (K.H.A. 5 August 1962)

As explained in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: "... Starfish made a much wider belt (than Project Argus) that extends from low altitude out past  $L=3$  (i.e. three earth radiuses or about 13,000 km above the surface of the earth)" Later in 1962, the USSR undertook similar planetary experiments, creating three new radiation belts between 7,000 and 13,000 km above the earth.

According to the Encyclopaedia, the electron fluxes in the lower Van Allen Belt have changed markedly since the 1962 high-altitude nuclear explosions by the US and USSR, never returning to their former state. According to American scientists, it could take many hundreds of years for the Van Allen Belts to restabilise at their normal levels.

Research done by: Nigel Harle, Borderland Archives,  
Cortenbachstraat 32, 6136 CH Sittard, Netherlands.

SPS: Solar Power Satellite Project (1968):

In 1968 the US military proposed Solar Powered Satellites in geostationary orbit some 40,000 km above the earth, which would intercept solar radiation using solar cells on satellites and transmit it via a microwave beam to receiving antennas, called rectennas, on earth. The US Congress mandated the Department of Energy and NASA to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment on this project, to be completed by June 1980, and costing \$25 Million. This project was designed to construct 60 Solar Powered Satellites over a thirty year period at a cost between \$500 and \$800 thousand million (in 1968 dollars), providing 10% of the US energy needs in the year 2025 at a cost of \$3000 per kW. At that time, the project cost was two to three times larger

than the whole Department of Energy budget, and the projected cost of the electricity was well above the cost of most conventional energy sources. The rectenna sites on earth were expected to take up to 145 square kilometres of land, and would preclude habitation by any humans, animals or even vegetation. Each Satellite was to be the size of Manhattan Island.

#### Saturn V Rocket (1975):

Due to a malfunction, the Saturn V Rocket burned unusually high in the atmosphere, above 300 km. This burn produced "a large ionospheric hole" (Mendillo, M. Et al., Science 187,343, 1975). The disturbance reduced the total electron content more than 60% over an area 1,000 km in radius, and lasted for several hours. It prevented all telecommunications over a large area of the Atlantic Ocean. The phenomenon was apparently caused by a reaction between the exhaust gases and ionospheric oxygen ions. The reaction emitted a 6300 A airglow. Between 1975 and 1981 NASA and the US Military began to design ways to test this new phenomena through deliberate experimentation with the ionosphere.

#### SPS Military Implications (1978):

Early review of the Solar Powered Satellite Project began in around 1978, and I was on the review panel. Although this was proposed as an energy program, it had significant military implications. One of the most significant, first pointed out by Michael J. Ozeroff, was the possibility of developing a satellite borne beam weapon for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) use. The satellites were to be in geosynchronous orbits, each providing an excellent vantage point from which an entire hemisphere can be surveyed continuously. It was speculated that a high energy laser beam could function as a thermal weapon to disable or destroy enemy missiles. There was some discussion of electron weapon beams, through the use of a laser beam to preheat a path for the following electron beam.

The SPS was also described as a psychological and anti-personnel weapon, which could be directed toward an enemy. If the main microwave beam was redirected away from its rectenna, toward enemy personnel, it could use an infrared radiation wavelength (invisible) as an anti-personnel weapon. It might also be possible to transmit high enough energy to ignite combustible

materials. Laser beam power relays could be made from the SPS satellite to other satellites or platforms, for example aircraft, for military purposes. One application might be a laser powered turbofan engine which would receive the laser beam directly in its combustion chamber, producing the required high temperature gas for its cruising operation. This would allow unlimited on-station cruise time. As a psychological weapon, the SPS was capable of causing general panic.

The SPS would be able to transmit power to remote military operations anywhere needed on earth. The manned platform of the SPS would provide surveillance and early warning capability, and ELF linkage to submarines. It would also provide the capability of jamming enemy communications. The potential for jamming and creating communications is significant. The SPS was also capable of causing physical changes in the ionosphere

President Carter approved the SPS Project and gave it a go-ahead, in spite of the reservation which many reviewers, myself included, expressed. Fortunately, it was so expensive, exceeding the entire Department of Energy budget, that funding was denied by the Congress. I approached the United Nations Committee on Disarmament on this project, but was told that as long as the program was called Solar Energy by the United States, it could not be considered a weapons project. The same project resurfaced in the US under President Reagan, moved to the much larger budget of the Department of Defence, and called Star Wars. Since this is more recent history, I will not discuss the debate which raged over this phase of the plan.

By 1978, it was apparent to the US Military that communications in a nuclear hostile environment would not be possible using traditional methods of radio and television technology (Jane's Military Communications 1978). By 1982, GTE Sylvania (Needham Heights, Massachusetts), had developed a command control electronic sub-system for the US Air Force's Ground Launch Cruise Missiles (GLCM) that would enable military commanders to monitor and control the missile prior to launch both in hostile and non-hostile environments. The system contains six radio subsystems, created with visible light using a dark beam (not visible), resistant to the disruptions experienced by radio and television. Dark beams contribute to the formation of energetic plasma in the atmosphere. This plasma can become visible as smog or fog. Some has a different charge

than the sun's energy, and accumulates in places where the sun's energy is absent, like the polar regions in the winter. When the polar spring occurs, the sun appears and repels this plasma, contributing to holes in the ozone layer. This military system is called: Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN). (See The SECOM II Communication System, by Wayne Olsen, SAND 78-0391, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1978). This innovative emergency radio system was apparently never implemented in Europe, and exists only in North America.

#### Orbit Maneuvering System (1981):

Part of the plan to build the SPS space platforms was the demand for reusable space shuttles, since they could not afford to keep discarding rockets. The NASA Spacelab 3 Mission of the Space Shuttle made, in 1981, "a series of passes over a network of five ground based observatories" in order to study what happened to the ionosphere when the Shuttle injected gases into it from the Orbit Maneuvering System (OMS). They discovered that they could "induce ionospheric holes", and began to experiment with holes made in the day time, or at night over Millstone, Connecticut, and Arecibo, Puerto Rico. They experimented with the effects of "artificially induced ionospheric depletions on very low frequency wave lengths, on equatorial plasma instabilities, and on low frequency radio astronomical observations over Roberval, Quebec, Kwajalein, in the Marshall Islands and Hobart, Tasmania. (Advanced Space Research, Vol.8, No. 1, 1988)

#### Innovative Shuttle Experiments (1985):

An innovative use of the Space Shuttle to preform space physics experiments in earth orbit was launched, using the OMS injections of gases to "cause a sudden depletion in the local plasma concentration, the creation of a so-called ionospheric hole". This artificially induced plasma depletion can then be used to investigate other space phenomena, such as the growth of the plasma instabilities or the modification of radio propagation paths. The 47 second OMS burn of July 29,1985, produced the largest and most long-lived ionospheric hole to date, dumping some 830 kg of exhaust into the ionosphere at sunset. A 6 second, 68 km OMS release above Connecticut in August 1985, produced an airglow which covered over 400,000 square km.

During the 1980's rocket launches globally numbered about 500 to 600 a year, peaking at 1500 in 1989. There were many more during the Gulf War. The Shuttle is the largest of the solid fuel rockets, with twin 45 metre boosters. All solid fuel rockets release large amounts of hydrochloric acid in their exhaust, each Shuttle flight injecting about 75 tonnes of ozone destroying chlorine into the stratosphere. Those launched since 1992 inject even more ozone destroying chlorine, about 187 tonnes, into the stratosphere (which contains the ozone layer).

#### Mighty Oaks (1986):

In April 1986, just before the Chernobyl disaster, the US had a failed hydrogen test at the Nevada Test Site called Mighty Oaks. This test, conducted far underground, consisted of a hydrogen bomb explosion in one chamber, with a leaded steel door to the chamber, two metres thick, closing within milliseconds of the blast. The door was to allow only the first radioactive beam to escape into the "control room" in which expensive instrumentation was located. The radiation was to be captured as a weapon beam. The door failed to close as quickly as planned, causing the radioactive gases and debris to fill the control room, destroying millions of dollars worth of equipment. The experiment was part of a program to develop X-ray and particle beam weapons. The radioactive releases from Mighty Oaks were vented, under a "licensed venting", and were likely responsible for many of the North American nuclear fallout reports in May 1986, which were attributed to the Chernobyl disaster.

#### Desert Storm (1991):

According to Defence News, April 13 - 19, 1992, the US deployed an electromagnetic pulse weapon (EMP) in Desert Storm, designed to mimic the flash of electricity from a nuclear bomb. The Sandia National Laboratory had built a 23,000 square metre laboratory on the Kirkland Air Force Base, 1989, to house the Hermes III electron beam generator capable of producing 20 Trillion Watt pulses lasting 20 billionths to 25 billionths of a second. This X-ray simulator is called a Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator. A stream of electrons hitting a metal plate can produce a pulsed X-ray or gamma ray. Hermes II had produced electron beams since 1974. These devices were apparently tested during the Gulf War, although detailed information

on them is sparse.

### High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program HAARP (1993)

The HAARP Program is jointly managed by the US Air Force and the US Navy, and is based in

Gakona, Alaska. It is designed to "understand, simulate and control ionospheric processes that might alter the performance of communication and surveillance systems".

The HAARP system

intends to beam 3.6 Gigawatts of effective radiated power of high frequency radio energy into the ionosphere in order to:

- generate extremely low frequency (ELF) waves for communicating with submerged submarines,

- conduct geophysical probes to identify and characterize natural ionospheric processes so that techniques can be developed to mitigate or control them,

- generate ionospheric lenses to focus large amounts of high frequency (HF) energy, thus

- providing a means of triggering ionospheric processes that potentially could be exploited

- for Department of Defence purposes,

- electron acceleration for infrared (IR) and other optical emissions which could be used to control radio wave propagation properties,

- generate geomagnetic field aligned ionization to control the reflection\scattering properties of radio waves,

- use oblique heating to produce effects on radio wave propagation, thus broadening the potential military applications of ionospheric enhancement technology.

### Poker Flat Rocket Launch (1968 to Present):

The Pocker Flat Research Range is located about 50 km North of Fairbanks, Alaska, and it was

established in 1968. It is operated by the Geophysical Institute with the University of Alaska

Fairbanks, under NASA contract. About 250 major rocket launches have taken place from this

site, and in 1994, a 16 metre long rocket was launched to help NASA "understand chemical

reactions in the atmosphere associated with global climate change".

Similar experiments, but

using Chemical Release Modules (CRM) have been launched from Churchill, Manitoba. In 1980,

Brian Whelan's "Project Waterhole", disrupted an aurora borealis, bringing

it to a temporary halt.

In February 1983, the chemical released into the ionosphere caused an aurora borealis over Churchill. In March 1989, two Black Brant X's and two Nike Orions rockets were launched over Canada, releasing barium at high altitudes and creating artificial clouds. These Churchill artificial clouds were observed from as far away as Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The US Navy has also been carrying on High Power Auroral Stimulation (HIPAS) research in Alaska. Through a series of wires and a 15 metre antenna, they have beamed high intensity signals into the upper atmosphere, generating a controlled disturbance in the ionosphere. As early as 1992, the Navy talked of creating 10 kilometre long antennas in the sky to generate extremely low frequency (ELF) waves needed for communicating with submarines. Another purpose of these experiments is to study the Aurora Borealis, called by some an outdoor plasma lab for studying the principles of fusion. Shuttle flights are now able to generate auroras with an electron beam. On November 10, 1991, an aurora borealis appeared in the Texas sky for the first time ever recorded, and it was seen by people as far away as Ohio and Utah, Nebraska and Missouri. The sky was "Christmas colours", and various scientists were quick to blame it on solar activity. However, when pressed most would admit that the ionosphere must have been weakened at the time, so that the electrically charged particle hitting the earth's atmosphere created the highly visible light called airglow. These charged particles are normally pulled northwards by the earth's magnetic forces, to the magnetic north pole. The Northern Lights, as the aurora borealis is called, normally occurs in the vortex at the pole where the energetic particles, directed by the magnetic force lines, are directed.

## Conclusions

It would be rash to assume that HAARP is an isolated experiment which would not be expanded. It is related to fifty years of intensive and increasingly destructive programs to understand and control the upper atmosphere.

It would be rash not to associate HAARP with the space laboratory construction which is separately being planned by the United States. HAARP is an integral part of a long history of space research and development of a deliberate military nature.

The military implications of combining these projects is alarming.

Basic to this project is control of communications, both disruption and reliability in hostile environments. The power wielded by such control is obvious.

The ability of the HAARP / Spacelab/ rocket combination to delivered very large amount of energy, comparable to a nuclear bomb, anywhere on earth via laser and particle beams, are frightening.

The project is likely to be "sold" to the public as a space shield against incoming weapons, or , for the more gullible, a devise for repairing the ozone layer.

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G. Metz and F.W. Perkins. "Ionospheric Modification Theory: Past Present and Future", Radio Science, Vol.9, No. 11, pp 885-888, November 1974.

Aloha from Hawai'i,

Thank you Felicity for the informative article by Dr. Bertell. I notice that the date of the article is November 1996. For your information, if you don't already know, a new book by Nicholas Bekich, PhD exposes the HAARP Project's objectives. Dr. Bekich only recently came upon the story of HAARP when it was revealed a couple of years ago for the first time in the public media as one of the top 10 censored stories. Him and Jeanne Manning co-authored the book, *Angels Don't Play this HAARP: Advances in Tesla Technology*, (1995?, 1996?). I cannot remember the company that publishes it, but it is published in Alaska. (Sorry not too much help).

Dr. Bekich, as many of you may know, has been interviewed on radio and TV all over, and visited Honolulu last year. He is a pleasant young guy who passionately goes about sharing the message of this new weapon system (despite what the Pentagon might say about it). He is based in Alaska, and if I recall, his training was nuclear physics(?).

According to him, efforts were made in the 1940's(?) to enlarge a bay in Anchorage, and the plan was to explode a nuclear bomb in order to expand the bay. Sounds extremely insane, but supposedly back in those days, we hadn't begun to understand the deadly force of these things.

The hydrogen bombs that were exploded over Kalama Island (Johnston Atoll) were so powerful they took out street lights in Honolulu. Kalama is located approx. 800 miles southwest of the Island of O'ahu where Honolulu is located. There are some writings about these hydrogen bombs, and their effects here and elsewhere, although I cannot remember where.

Dr. Bekich concludes that the amount of atmospheric bomb explosions combined with what Bertell has described have consistently and significantly impacted the distance (increasing the distance) between the ionosphere and earth's surface. The resulting drag that gets created between the two apparently creates, in turn, instabilities in weather patterns which cause erratic weather all over the globe.

As I said, Dr. Bekich and his organization are very passionate about what they are exposing. He believes apparently that his is a crusading mission to inform the American public about the potential undermining of American peoples' fundamental rights, under the guise of "national security." In the first issue of his monthly publication, he ambitiously begins to write about politics and the re-envisioning of a new political revitalization of America. In a way, I compare his ambition and great humanistic concern with our colleague Merav Datan's training in both international law and nuclear physics, impressive qualities for which Peter Weiss refer to her as "eminently qualified" to speak not only about the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (having had a hand in its creation), but the larger legal and political dynamics of a global nuclear abolition movement. I believe Dr. Bekich can readily identify and sympathize with the goals and objectives of the Abolition 2000 Network, noting the linkages of an out-of-control military-industrial complex.

If he does not already know of the Network, I strongly suggest that he

should be invited to become a member of Abolition 2000 Network. He is a potential ally in this great movement to halt nuclear weapons development, and use.

Thank you "Flick" for forwarding Dr. Bertell's article (was it published? where?).

Aloha, and greetings to all from Hawai'i.

Richard Salvador  
University of Hawai'i at Manoa  
Honolulu, Hawai'i

Dear Abolition friends,

I am pleased to announce that the NGO Presentations to the 1997 NPT PrepCom are now available on two websites:

NGO Committee on Disarmament (<http://www.peacenet.org/disarm/>)

IPPNW (<http://www.healthnet.org/ippnw>)

Thanks to Roger Smith for initiating this important effort. Also, we would be interested in posting the comments of the Mexican Ambassador at the meeting if anyone has the text.

Peace,

Brett Feldman

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IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

Dear Abolitioners

Concerning South Africa's future role in Abolition, a friend has suggested to write to Desmond Tutu, now retired, asking him to use his influence with the S African government. He was one of the individuals who endorsed the World Court Project. If anyone thinks this is a good idea, his address is: The Most Revd D M B Tutu, Bishops Court, Claremont, The Cape, S Africa

George Farebrother

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The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

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Dear Abolitioners

Again, thank you for your thoughts on the "Summons" to be presented to the NATO heads of state in Madrid in July. It outlines how NATO's nuclear activity is illegal under the ICJ Opinion and announces that NVDA will be used to uphold the law. There has been some discussion as to whether we can present under an A200 heading. Some people have suggested that it can be carried out by an entity that endorses A2000. This seems to me to be the best way ahead. Thank you all for your help.

George Farebrother

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APO 05/02 1024 Albright, Primakov Report Progress

By BARRY SCHWEID

AP Diplomatic Writer

MOSCOW (AP) -- In two fast-paced hours of meetings, Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright inched forward with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov today on a charter to link Russia to an expanded NATO alliance.

The aim is to have the charter ready for signing May 27 in Paris. "Some needed progress was made," State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said on Albright's U.S.-bound jet.

If all 16 NATO countries agree, there could be a freeze on conventional weapons and troops in six Central European countries.

Three of the countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are leading prospects for membership in NATO. The three others are Slovakia, Ukraine and Belarus.

In addition, the charter would include country-by-country caps on five categories of weapons throughout the alliance.

While NATO has promised there would be no "substantial" deployment in new NATO countries, the two sides today considered "some permanent stationing of foreign forces" in Central Europe, a senior U.S. official said.

This could mean deploying U.S., British, French or other Western foreign troops close to Russia's western border.

From the U.S. standpoint, the most significant development was Russia's abandonment of its demand for an overall freeze on NATO weapons and troops. This will mean each country, including new members, will have some flexibility on troops and weapons, except for the freeze in the six Central European countries.

NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana will continue the discussions with Primakov in Luxembourg next Tuesday.

"We hope the progress today will further our efforts to reach an agreement by May 27," Burns said.

Albright, assisted by Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis, an arms expert, held three meetings with Primakov over two hours. Additionally, Albright and Primakov dwelled on NATO expansion at their dinner Thursday night, abandoning plans to talk about China, the Middle East and other areas.

Today's hastily arranged meetings delayed Albright's departure for home. They were set up after American and Russian arms experts reviewed the impact on European security of adding Central and Eastern European countries to the transatlantic alliance.

A positive atmosphere developed overnight. "The Russians are moving closer to saying yes," a U.S. official told The Associated Press.

Albright, before seeing Primakov, assured a think-tank roundtable of Russian academics and other intellectuals that no NATO member, old or new, would become "a staging ground for potential attack against Russia."

Albright also said if Russia felt it had reason to fear that NATO was adopting a threatening stance, it would be able to consult with NATO "in an open and timely and cooperative fashion."

Russian President Boris Yeltsin urged Albright on Thursday to give

"concrete meaning" to pledges by President Clinton and NATO not to threaten Russia with the planned expansion to Russia's western border.

The administration signaled that room for bargaining remained before Clinton and leaders of the 15 other NATO countries meet in July and invite former allies of Russia to join the alliance.

Much of the negotiating until then will be in NATO member Luxembourg and Vienna, capital of neutral Austria, which is among the 30 countries, including Russia and the United States, that are debating troop concentrations.

Albright, true to her prediction, was unable in talks with Primakov on Thursday to close the gaps on a charter to give Russia a link to, but no military voice in, the Atlantic alliance. Their 2 1/2-hour discussion included a 20-minute telephone conversation with Yeltsin, who was vacationing at his dacha outside Moscow.

"We still have some ways to go," Albright said at a joint news conference with Primakov in a foreign ministry guest house. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and other U.S. negotiators met with their counterparts Wednesday, and arms experts met again after the Albright-Primakov sessions.

Yeltsin has expressed hope that Clinton and other leaders can sign the charter in Paris on May 27. Even if it is not signed, Albright has pledged that expansion will go ahead in any event, although she said Thursday, "We would very much like to have a NATO-Russia charter signed."

The Russians were described by U.S. officials as having a deep-seated fear that an expanded NATO may be even more hostile than the military bloc that confronted the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in the Cold War.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are expected to be invited to join at a NATO summit meeting in Madrid, Spain, on July 9. Their membership would add to NATO's arsenal about 2,500 tanks, 700 combat aircraft and about 2,000 artillery pieces, widening an already huge advantage over Russian forces.

NATO promised this year not to deploy "substantial" numbers of troops on the territory of former Soviet allies and not to have nuclear weapons there.

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
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Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172  
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To: Abolitionists

In April we completed efforts centered on two important events for our movement: the 1997 NPT Review PrepCom and U.S. Senate ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention. What next? I would like to offer some ideas, addressed primarily though not exclusively to the nuclear abolition movement in the United States.

We need to realize that many of our objectives require positive actions by the president of the United States: gaining U.S. participation in drafting a Nuclear Weapons Convention; submission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the U.S. Senate; negotiations of deep cuts in strategic weapons as an intermediate step toward abolition; zero alert; halting subcritical tests and new weapon designs; dismantlement of out-of-service warheads. Therefore, we should focus considerable attention on President Clinton.

Like most us, President Clinton is both an idealist and a pragmatist. As an idealist, he talks about the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, in his second inaugural address he spoke of a land of new promise where "our children will sleep free from the threat of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons." As a pragmatist, he is cautious about changing the Pentagon's nuclear posture and he accepts the weapon labs' desire to develop new designs. In a combination of the two, he and his administration worked hard and effectively to achieve ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our challenge is to bring out his idealism and to provide political support for bold ventures, thereby counteracting forces which want nuclear weapons forever.. I suggest several simultaneous approaches.

(1) I suggest that on the 20th of each month numerous organizations and individuals should write to President Clinton with a message something like this (in abbreviated form): "You now have 45 months remaining in office to set the course so that the children of the next century will sleep free from the threat of nuclear weapons. To make that possible, we urge you to promptly send the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification [if not yet done]; to halt all subcritical tests of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons research; in START III negotiations to seek deeper and faster cuts in strategic warheads than outlined in the Helsinki framework; to work with other nuclear weapons states to achieve zero alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles; to accelerate the pace of dismantling nuclear warheads; and to commit the United States to negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention." Each of these points would be elaborated. Each month the stated number would be reduced to reflect the remaining months until President Clinton's term comes to an end on January 20, 2001.

We at Methodists United for Peace with Justice will write such a letter on May 20 and each month thereafter. We'll send it through Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs. We invite other organizations to join us. Each organization can emphasize its greatest current concerns within the overall quest for nuclear abolition.

(2) Let's expand the sunflower campaign by getting individuals all around the country to send packets of sunflower seeds to President Clinton with the

abolition message. Let's regularly picket the White House with sunflowers and such signs as "84% Favor Abolition", "Only [45] Months Remaining". We could also try to plant sunflower seeds at the White House, Pentagon, missile sites, and other places; this could take the form of civil disobedience for those who feel called to do so.

This kind of campaign will require widespread participation to sustain. Therefore, I hope that a number of membership organizations will take it up and work together to carry it forward.

(3) As an extension of a White House focus, we could shadow President Clinton wherever he goes with sunflowers and signs. This can be done in various places in Washington, around the United States, and abroad. Let's keep reminding him that he is in a position to move the world toward the ideal he has espoused.

(4) As well as mass activities, we should encourage persons who have direct access to President Clinton to make the case for nuclear abolition. This includes members of Congress, leading scientists, professionals, clergy, and other elite. Thus, we could help Representative Major Owens obtain more co-signers for his letter to the president. We could promote a similar letter from senators, state legislators, local elected officials. We could encourage delegations of religious leaders, scientists, and others.

In sum, to achieve nuclear abolition we must not only have good ideas and strong commitment, we must also influence decisions of government policy makers who have the power to set the course toward nuclear abolition.

I will welcome your responses to my suggestions.

Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
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## NGO STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Presentation by Jacqueline Cabasso

Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation, USA

My name is Jacqueline Cabasso. I am the Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation in California, USA. While I appreciate the opportunity to address you today, my NGO colleagues and I are deeply troubled that, having traveled great distances to attend this Preparatory Committee meeting in anticipation of a strengthened review process fortified by increased NGO participation, we have been virtually shut out of the proceedings. I urge the States parties to include provisions in the final PrepCom document specifying a greatly expanded role for NGOs at succeeding NPT PrepComs and Review Conferences. Make no mistake. As we approach the year 2000 the eyes of the world will increasingly and intensely be upon you.

In the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted in conjunction with the NPT extension decision taken May 11, 1995, the nuclear weapon States "reaffirme[d] their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament" (emphasis added). The nuclear disarmament section delineated a "programme of action" specifying measures "important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI." These included: "The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996;" and "The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons..." Further, the programme of action requires the nuclear weapon States to "exercise utmost restraint," pending entry into force of the CTBT.

As everyone here knows, a CTBT was completed in September 1996 and has been signed by the five declared nuclear weapon States and more than 100 other nations, meeting one goal of the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995. Completion of a CTBT represents an important achievement for arms control and disarmament advocates -- both governments and NGOs -- who have worked for nearly five decades to end nuclear testing. However, the CTBT conspicuously fails to define a nuclear test, and the nuclear weapon states -- separately and in cooperation with each other -- have undertaken major new programs to replace underground nuclear test explosions through advanced technological means. These programs, which are expressly intended to preserve the capacity to maintain, test, modify, design and produce nuclear weapons, with or without underground testing, are profoundly incompatible with another, more fundamental, requirement of the Principles and Objectives: "determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." And, they demonstrate the nuclear weapon states lack of "good faith" in negotiating cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as required by Article VI. The nuclear arms race here refers to weapons development and testing activities.

Moreover, a serious question has arisen whether nuclear weapon states that have signed the CTBT may test nuclear weapons pending entry into force of the CTBT, which might take years. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties precludes signatories of a treaty from taking any step prior to entry into force that is inconsistent with the "object and purpose" of the treaty as long as they intend to be bound by the treaty when it comes into force for them. The rules of the Vienna Convention are so widely accepted that it has become customary international law applicable to every state. According to the NPT's preamble and that of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the purpose of the CTBT is to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." This is to satisfy the object of NPT's Article VI to achieve "measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date..." Thus, the nuclear-weapon states are legally bound not to test as long as they intend to bring the CTBT into force for themselves. Yet, none of the nuclear weapon NPT parties has yet taken as position at this conference that it is bound by its signature to the CTBT and by the Vienna Convention not to test pending entry into force of the CTBT. We urge this Committee to recommend to the nuclear weapon states that they declare their acceptance before the next session of this Committee of the legal obligation not to test so long as they intend to adhere to the CTBT when it goes into force.

Each of the declared nuclear weapon states has a formidable program to maintain the "safety and reliability" of its nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, with or without underground tests. Further, the U.S. and France have publicly proclaimed that their programs are intended to preserve the capability to make militarily significant modifications of existing weapons and design new ones. The U.S. plans to invest \$40 billion over the next ten years in the so-called "Stockpile Stewardship" program, which encompasses dozens of existing and planned high-tech laboratory facilities, and includes explosive testing structures as large as sports stadiums, extensive new manufacturing capabilities and the world's fastest supercomputers. Nuclear weapons science will be advanced through computer simulations coupled with archived data from more than 1000 past tests and new diagnostic information obtained from inertial confinement fusion and pulsed power fusion experiments, above-ground hydrodynamic explosions, and subcritical "zero yield" underground tests. A refurbished U.S. nuclear weapons design and manufacturing complex will be capable of turning out 150 weapons or more a year. In current dollars, over the next decade the U.S. will pour more than twice as much into Stockpile Stewardship as it spent on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bombs in the 1940s; more than the Cold War annual spending average for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, production and disassembly.

"Safety" and "reliability" rationales must be separated. Safety refers to a weapon's resistance to unauthorized or unintentional detonation. Reliability refers to the likelihood of explosion at a precise given yield -- not, simply whether the weapon will go off -- and is sufficient now, and will remain so for the foreseeable future, to deter first use by another state. Expansion of laboratory capabilities is unnecessary to maintenance of either safety or reliability. If the nuclear weapon states truly believe that additional

high technology research is needed regarding safety, it should be carried out on an internationalized and transparent basis. The truth is, however, that expanded laboratory testing is the price exacted by research establishments for the CTBT. The weaponeers depict laboratory testing as the new signal, replacing underground testing, of commitment to nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), by allowing expansion of nuclear weapons capabilities through underground testing, represented a lost opportunity to stem vertical proliferation, and strengthened a driving force in the arms race -- the weapons labs. We fear that the substitution of laboratory-based testing for underground testing will recapitulate the profound failure of the PTBT to end the nuclear arms race. As stockpile sizes and military production of fissile materials are being capped or decreased, laboratory-based nuclear weapons infrastructures are being massively expanded. This trend is absolutely incompatible, both practically and symbolically, with sustaining an irreversible process of disarmament.

We often hear general references to "simulated" testing and "non-explosive" tests. These terms are misleading. For example, the U.S. has recently announced plans to conduct so-called "subcritical" tests at the Nevada Test Site starting in June. These tests will be explosions in underground tunnels, generated by 50 - 500 pounds of chemical high explosive, involving weapons grade plutonium. The tests are designed to produce neutrons but not to attain criticality (at least not intentionally). Subcritical tests can but will not necessarily involve components placed in a weapons configuration. They could also be conducted in above-ground containment vessels.

In "hydrodynamic" tests, high explosives are used to implode simulated pits (the plutonium cores of nuclear weapons) made of non-fissile nuclear materials such as plutonium-242 or depleted uranium. The Big Explosions Experimental Facility, or "BEEF" is already operating at the Nevada Test Site as part of the Stockpile Stewardship program. Anchored by a reinforced concrete camera bunker built in the early 1950's for atmospheric testing, this facility has recently been renovated for conducting hydrodynamic tests using conventional high explosives with charges up to 70,000 pounds.

Unlike "hydronuclear tests," which are barred by the zero yield understanding of the CTBT prohibition, subcritical and hydrodynamic tests are not intended to produce a nuclear yield. But, as explosions used to model nuclear weapons behavior, they resemble a "nuclear weapon test explosion" prohibited by the CTBT, and are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty. The subcritical tests also are part of the U.S. program to ensure readiness to resume full-scale underground testing, if the U.S. should withdraw from the CTBT under the "supreme national interests" clause.

Another kind of technology, known as inertial confinement fusion, is being developed using the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a huge laser complex to be built at the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory in California. The NIF's objective is to focus nearly 200 powerful laser beams onto a pea-sized capsule containing tritium and deuterium, forcing the two heavy isotopes of hydrogen to combine through compression, and causing a tiny thermonuclear explosion that will create extremely high temperatures approaching

those found in full scale underground nuclear tests. If successful, energy gain will be achieved, producing a self-sustaining fusion reaction. The NIF's principal mission is to increase understanding of nuclear weapons physics (including training new nuclear weapons scientists) and to provide an aboveground simulation capability for testing nuclear weapon effects. NIF-like facilities could be useful in designing new kinds of nuclear weapons in which radiation and energy are controlled and directed by changing the character of the explosion, or even pure fusion weapons, not requiring plutonium or uranium. The French Department of Military Applications, which has worked with the Livermore Lab since 1981 on cooperative laser fusion programs is now collaborating with Livermore to build the "Megajoule" laser facility, a twin of the NIF, in Bordeaux. The March 1997 edition of the U.S. Department of Energy's monthly magazine features a photograph of French and U.S. nuclear scientists drinking champagne at the dedication of a new laboratory where prototype parts for the NIF will be assembled and tested.

Moreover, on June 4, 1996, U.S. and French officials signed a memorandum of agreement extending the range of nuclear weapon information they can share. The new memorandum is far more explicit than previous U.S.-French agreements. A section on Stockpile Stewardship authorizes cooperation on "theoretical, numerical, and experimental simulation methods." Another section, titled "Nuclear Safety and Security," permits information exchanges on research, development, testing, fabrication, transportation, and disassembly of both nuclear and explosive components. U.S. and French scientists will also have extensive access to each other's laboratories. The agreement provides for cooperative use of facilities (including presumably the Nevada Test Site), and "long term visits or assignments or technical personnel to participate in joint projects."

Cooperation on Stockpile Stewardship-type programs is actively taking place among all of the nuclear weapon states. In April 1996, the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, the site of the original Manhattan Project, hosted an international meeting entitled "Securing the Nuclear Future," involving prominent nuclear weapons designers, government and military officials, and industry leaders from the U.S., Russia, France and Britain. Workshops on "Nuclear Weapons and Stewardship Issues" included a presentation on "Strategic Relationships Among Nuclear Weapons Infrastructures" which compared the Stockpile Stewardship programs of the five declared nuclear weapon states and presented a plan for "cooperative stewardship" arrangements.

U.S. and British weapons labs have for many years enjoyed a close relationship, even sharing testing facilities in Nevada. Joint working groups have been established to discuss nuclear warhead physics, nuclear weapons engineering, nuclear weapon code development, computational technology, and other related subjects. Now, UK Ministry of Defence spokespeople state that they are "talking very actively with the Americans, and the French for that matter" on above ground experiments and computer simulation and that "recently there have been a number of technical discussions between Britain and France on a number of aspects including" hydrodynamic experiments; laser plasma physics; computer simulation; possible arrangements for peer review." In recent years,

nuclear cooperation between France and Britain has reached an unprecedented level. At the 1995 Anglo-French summit, a joint statement was issued, noting, "the considerable convergence between our two countries on nuclear doctrine and policy."

Collaboration between the U.S. and Russian weapons labs pre-dates the end of the Cold War. More recently, joint controlled-fusion experiments have been conducted at both the U.S. and Russian laboratories. Reportedly, China has bought U.S. computers to support its Stockpile Stewardship program.

Miniature thermonuclear explosions, planned to be produced by inertial confinement fusion technology at the Megajoule laser facility in France and the NIF in the U.S. involve actual, though minuscule nuclear explosions, and appear to be barred by the CTBT prohibition of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion." But, because the CTBT includes no definition, the scope of the prohibition remains open to interpretation by state practice, including statements in international forums. However, like subcritical and hydrodynamic test explosions, inertial confinement fusion and pulsed power thermonuclear tests certainly are contrary to the spirit of the CTBT.

We urge this Committee to seek commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to carry out subcritical test explosions, hydrodynamic test explosions, miniature thermonuclear test explosions using inertial confinement fusion or pulsed power or other technology, or like test explosions, as inconsistent with good faith fulfillment of the Article VI obligation, and contrary to the purposes of the CTBT. We further urge this Committee to seek closure of all nuclear test sites, in consultation with the affected indigenous peoples.

Article VI requires the nuclear weapon states to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Remarkably, four of the five declared nuclear weapon states (not including China) in an April 6, 1995 declaration adopted at the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, proclaimed that the nuclear arms race has ceased. Therefore, any activity supporting the development of nuclear weapons is out of bounds. In addition, the preamble of the CTBT recognizes that the "cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects." Subcritical test explosions, hydrodynamic test explosions, miniature thermonuclear explosions produced by inertial confinement fusion or pulsed power technology, and other experimental explosions are contrary to good faith fulfillment of Article VI and in particular its requirement of cessation of the nuclear arms race, and also are contrary to the purposes of the CTBT.

One nuclear weapon state has recently deployed the first "new" nuclear weapon since the end of the Cold War. The B61-11 nuclear bomb has unique earth-penetrating capabilities and a wide range of yields. Its new military capability was certified without underground nuclear testing, using an existing above-ground facility with capabilities much less than those under construction and

planned. It has already been used to threaten a non-nuclear country. The weapon was developed and deployed in secret, contrary to public assurances that no new nuclear weapons were being developed. When the existence of the B61-11 became known, it was explained as a "safety" modification to an existing warhead, meant to replace the aging B-53 gravity bomb (with a mind-numbing 9-megaton yield). But just last month, a senior government official explained in a capital city not too far from here: "Operational considerations clearly favor the B61-11 over the B53... The B61-11 produces far less collateral damage and has the same effectiveness against deeply buried targets as the B53 with less than one twentieth the yield... The B61-11 is an outstanding example of using an existing weapons in a new way to hold at risk robustly defended, deeply buried targets." Other new or "modified" nuclear weapons are planned. Across the Atlantic, another nuclear weapon state is currently upgrading its submarine launched missiles and warheads.

We call on this Committee to seek binding commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to deploy new-design nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons modified to have new or "improved" military characteristics or capabilities or to perform new military missions.

Less than one month ago, a senior U.S. official testified before the Senate that the Department of Energy will "ensure the safety, security and reliability of the enduring stockpile, without nuclear testing... through the vigorous implementation of the integrated Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a scientific and technical challenge perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project." Fifty one and a half years into the nuclear age, it's past time to end the Manhattan Project. We urge this Committee to call on the nuclear weapon states to redefine Stockpile Stewardship as "passive caretaking of existing arsenals under safe conditions and international safeguards, while they await disablement and dismantlement pursuant to Article VI of the NPT."

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#### NGO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' PRESENTATION

Statement by Mr. Gabriel Tetiarahi

Chair of Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organizations,  
and President of the Tahitian NGO network, Hiti Tau

As an indigenous person and a citizen of the world, I am convinced that there are some very important dialogues with indigenous people that the international community must recognize. Undeniably, the process of discussion on the NPT that involves NGO's is a great opportunity for you, the international community to demonstrate your capacity to develop, with indigenous people, relations of another nature than those that these populations have known since the end of the Second World War.

Mr. Chairman, it is, I believe, appropriate to recall that the lands of native peoples, the island peoples, the landlocked peoples, have been used, without these people having been consulted, as the nuclear test sites of the large nations. The Western Shoshone in the Nevada desert, the Kazakhs in the former Soviet Union, the Aborigines in Australia, the Maohi of Polynesia, have not had the

right to express their opinion through a vote on the atomic tests that were imposed on them. In the Pacific, the Micronesians of the Marshall Islands and we, the Maohi of Polynesia, have fought colonialism and nuclear racism so that our political and human rights would be respected.

If today the colonial powers have liberated their lands and islands from nuclear testing, it has been because of the enormous efforts of consciousness-raising and education of public opinion about their suffering, that the governments, the military lobbies, the states and the community have been forced to do so. Too many human lives, too many human tragedies, too much damage to their health and environment, too many violations of universal rights and public liberties have been perpetuated against these populations.

The native people are still at a crossroads. We appreciate the efforts displayed by the United Nations and its agencies, as well as the governments in arriving at an international nuclear test ban treaty. Our communities joined in the general satisfaction in the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice in the Hague on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. The native populations have also told the Canberra Commission, the European Parliament and the governments that have sought to abolish nuclear weapons, that they cannot stay indifferent to the improvement of our living conditions, to the promotion of our indigenous rights -- whether these have a political, economic or social character, whether individual or collective -- if our initiatives were to be taken into account by the processes of the CTBT and NPT.

A lot remains to be done to improve the situation of indigenous peoples, and despite the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which they commend, the indigenous nations and peoples call upon the international community, governments and states to respect their rights of access to and restoration of their land, including the nuclear sites, to the reparation of damages caused to their environment, and to financial compensation in favor of the victims.

Since you have given me the floor, Mr. Chairman, I would like to draw your attention to the situation of native peoples of the Pacific, this liquid continent made up of islands which have for more than fifty years served as military bases, as nuclear testing sites for the English, American and French in Maralinga, in the Marshall Islands, in Moruroa and Fangataufa. And I would like to say here that these same peoples have made enormous sacrifices to liberate their lands from colonial forces, both economic and military, to prevent them from being delivered to the nuclear waste industry.

Many of these territories remain colonies under the domination of the large nations who are impeding the realization of their right to self-determination, to decolonisation and political independence which the international community has recognized in several resolutions of the General Assembly. I refer here to resolutions 1540 and 1415 calling for the eradication of colonialism.

It's appropriate to say here that the countries under French domination, particularly Tahiti and its islands, have long expressed their legitimate aspiration to reinstate French Polynesia on the list of countries remaining to be decolonized. The Ambassador of the Marshall Islands and our political leaders are counting on your

solidarity for support in the Pacific Forum which will soon be held in the Cook Islands. Representatives of the official missions of the Pacific States, you have a responsibility to discharge in the U.N. Committee of 24 for the reinstatement of my country, French Polynesia, on that list. It is a question of peace and justice for an indigenous people of the Pacific who aspire to become full members of the international community and of the United Nations and who aspire, like you, to leave to the generations of tomorrow a nuclear weapon free world.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Contact the Florida Coalition on Peace & Justice at [fcpj@afn.org](mailto:fcpj@afn.org) They are leading the opposition to Cassini.

Michael Mariotte  
NIRS

At 01:05 PM 5/5/97 +0800, WILPF wrote:

>Anyone out there have info on Cassini. I need more documentation  
>and some help with argumentative points. Thank you in advance  
>for your help.

>

>Love and Peace, Hazel Tamano

>

>Internet ProLink User

>

>

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forwarded

>Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 13:18:44 -1000 (HST)  
>To: kanakamaoliallies-l@hawaii.edu  
>From: kekula@aloha.net (Ho`okele Hawai`i)  
>Subject: UN Commissioner on Human Rights, Request for Information  
>Cc: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>  
>Mailinglist Indigenous Peoples vs. Uranium Mining  
>-----  
>Please circulate this announcement as widely as possible. Due to the  
>so-called reorganization of the UN, the announcement was not circulated by  
>the UN until very recently.  
>  
>Pursuant to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and  
>Protection of Minorities resolution 1996/16 of 29 August, 1996, entitled  
>"International Peace and Security as an essential condition for the  
>enjoyment of human rights, above all, the right to life," (published as  
>E/CN.4/1997/2), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr.  
>Ayala Lasso, is directed to:  
>  
>(a) To collect information from Governments, the competent United Nations  
>bodies and agencies and non-governmental organizations on the use of nuclear  
>weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological  
>weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium, on their consequential  
>and cumulative effects, and on the danger they represent to life, physical  
>security and other human rights;  
>  
>(b) To submit a report on the information gathered to the Sub-Commission at  
>its forty-ninth session, together with any recommendations and views which  
>he may have received on the effective ways of eliminating such weapons.  
>  
>The High Commissioner has requested comments from NGOs ON OR BEFORE MAY 8,  
>1997;  
>  
>Submissions should refer to the title of the resolution "International Peace  
>and Security as an essential condition for the enjoyment of human rights,  
>above all, the right to life," and the number, "1996/16."  
>  
>Interested NGOs/Indigenous Peoples and their organizations may mail or fax  
>their submission to:  
>High Commissioner for Human Rights  
>c/o Mr. Alexander Ovsiak, Human Rights officer  
>Centre for Human Rights  
>United Nations Office at Geneva  
>CH-1211 Geneva  
>Switzerland  
>tel: 41-22-917-3417  
>fax: 41-22-917-0212  
>  
>Copies should also be sent to  
>Mme. Fatma Ksentini, UN Rapporteur on Toxics  
>Commission on Human Rights



forwarded

>Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 19:46:06 -1000 (HST)  
>Message-Id: <af9295e6160210042505@[204.94.118.64]>  
>Mime-Version: 1.0  
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"  
>To: abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org  
>From: kekula@aloha.net (Ho`okele Hawai`i)  
>Subject: INDIGENOUS NEED

>  
>Dear Abolitionist:

>  
>Earlier this week I sent a notice that has only recently been circulated  
>regarding reports etc from States and NGOs to the High Commission of the SC  
>on weapons and related matters. If there is anyone there with information  
>that could serve this report on behalf of indigenous peoples please contact  
>Alberto Salamando in San Francisco at the IITC office. He is compiling a  
>report and recommendations.

>  
>Jackie this is something Corbin and you should be sending to, if you have  
>not already been on top of this situation. The Pacific needs help,  
>Marshalls and Belau. I have notified Gaby again today by e-mail and still  
>no word, it is a good if not great launch for the health study where it  
>will be submitted into official record especially through an NGO like IITC  
>with a Category II ECOSOC status. I know you are off to Japan Pamela - I  
>am off to Antigua for the C24 session and Kilali assisting by replacing me  
>in Spain on Technology/UNESCO. So, we need help.

>  
>Please if we could put some energy into this it would be helpful I have  
>reposted the alert below. I may be off and you may be all have taken care  
>of this already - if not Abolitionists- you have a couple days... good  
>luck.

>  
>Mahalo and Aloha to all.... ~k

>  
>PLEASE NOTE THIS IS AN OFFICIAL UN REQUEST TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER LOGO  
>NOT INCLUDED...

>  
>Pursuant to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and  
>Protection of Minorities resolution 1996/16 of 29 August, 1996, entitled  
>"International Peace and Security as an essential condition for the  
>enjoyment of human rights, above all, the right to life," (published as  
>E/CN.4/1997/2), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr.  
>Ayala Lasso, is directed to:

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>(a) To collect information from Governments, the competent United Nations  
>bodies and agencies and non-governmental organizations on the use of nuclear  
>weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological  
>weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium, on their consequential  
>and cumulative effects, and on the danger they represent to life, physical  
>security and other human rights;

>  
>(b) To submit a report on the information gathered to the Sub-Commission at





APn 05/04 0000 Nuclear Warriors

To: ctb-followers

X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0 (Win16; I)

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

GROVER, Colo. (AP) -- In a sealed capsule 100 feet beneath the flat, barren plain in north-central Colorado, Air Force Capt. Xavier Chavez stands ready for war. His weapons: 10 nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles whose awesome killing power can be unleashed with a flick of the wrist.

Nuclear warriors? These days?

Much has been made of the demise of the Cold War and, with it, the end of a decades-long U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff. Less noticed is the fact that the U.S. Air Force still has its missiles cocked and ready for a potential nuclear conflict.

The Pentagon also is quietly investing billions to modernize the missile force even as some say the time is fast approaching to eliminate the entire ICBM arsenal.

"It's a big deal, because it's our national security," Chavez says as he and his partner, 2nd Lt. Jerome White, wind up a 24-hour subterranean shift monitoring the electronic pulse of triple-warhead Minuteman III nuclear missiles.

"Some people may find that kind of corny, but we have to take it seriously," says Chavez, 32, looking all business in his blue Air Force jump suit.

To watch Chavez and White at their launch control panels is to know they take their work seriously. Although no nuclear missile has ever been launched other than for testing, it is their duty to ensure their weapons are ready should the call ever come. They make clear they dearly hope it never does.

"Sometimes when it gets quiet in here you think about that," Chavez says. "You ask yourself, could you do it? It's something in every crew member's mind. He quickly adds that he is sure he could flip the switch if ordered.

Under a 1994 U.S.-Russian agreement the two nations no longer aim their long-range nuclear missiles at each other. America's missiles are set on a trajectory that ends in the ocean, but that is not as comforting as it may sound. Pre-programmed wartime targets are kept in the missiles' memory banks and can be swapped for the ocean targets in 10 seconds. Same for the Russian missiles.

To actually launch an ICBM, a "hot time," or launch time, must be entered by computer and the missile then "enabled" -- akin to cocking a revolver before squeezing its trigger. In the final step, Chavez and the crewmate seated beside him would turn their dual keys in unison, as would two officers from a second capsule. Once all four had done so, there would be no stopping the launch.

Keeping the most powerful weapons ever devised at the razor's edge of readiness is not cheap. The Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, D.C., calculates from Defense Department budget data that it costs more than \$800 million a year to operate and maintain the full fleet of ICBMs.

The Pentagon is investing \$5 billion on a missile modernization

program to extend the Minuteman IIIs' useful lives to 2020. It already has spent \$650 million to install a new computer system inside the launch capsules, and it intends to replace the Minuteman III guidance and propulsion systems over the next several years.

Chavez and the 280 other ICBM crewmembers of the 90th Missile Wing don't think of themselves as merely babysitters of these weapons of mass destruction.

On a recent morning at their weapons stations inside the buried capsule that Chavez likens to a "hollowed-out watermelon," he and White were in almost constant motion, using their newly modernized computer consoles to conduct routine checks of the alarms and sensors that keep the site secure. They also were in contact with other capsule crews and with security police topside.

"There is no room for complacency," Chavez says.

Inside the climate-controlled launch capsule there is no sense that these military personnel are anticipating nuclear war. Far from it. In the calm professionalism of Chavez and other missileers -- as they call themselves -- there is a quiet confidence, a practiced precision, a work-a-day approach they believe will keep nuclear war at bay.

"We're the biggest kid on the block," says Capt. Scott Sanders, a soft-spoken launch control officer who has been operating ICBMs in the 90th Missile Wing for 3 1/2 years. "Its a deterrent -- you hope nobody wants to mess with us."

Nuclear war may be less likely now than during the Cold War, but the Air Force sees no sense in scrapping the 550 ICBMs it operates from underground silos in Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska. Two hundred of those are operated by Chavez's unit, the 90th Missile Wing based at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.

The ICBMs form one leg of the military's "triad" of nuclear forces. The other legs are Air Force B-52 and B-2 bombers and the Navy's Trident nuclear submarines.

Bruce Blair, a former missileer and now a nuclear expert at the Brookings Institution, says that as arms control treaties further reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal the favored weapon to keep will be the Navy's sub-based missiles.

"The ICBM will come under increasing pressure to go away," Blair says.

The Air Force's arsenal already is shrinking. As a result of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty the ICBM force was reduced from 1,000 missiles and 2,450 warheads to today's total of about 550 missiles with 2,000 warheads.

If the 1993 START II accord is ratified by the Russian parliament, the Air Force will eliminate its most modern ICBM, the 10-warhead Peacekeeper, and convert the three-warhead Minuteman III missiles to single-warhead missiles. The end result would be a force of 500 missiles and 500 warheads.

Even more of the missiles might be eliminated if, as proposed by President Clinton and President Boris Yelstin at their Helsinki summit in March, a third START agreement is negotiated and put into effect early in the 21st century.

Not surprisingly, the Air Force officers who manage the missile force argue that it makes a unique and critical contribution to the nation's security.

"There is still in Russia the (nuclear) capability to destroy the

United States," says Col. Tucker Fagan, vice commander of the 20th Air Force, which oversees the entire ICBM force.

Fagan says missileers like Chavez are regularly reminded of this and told that ICBMs are a kind of insurance policy against the possibility that Russia's experiment in democracy goes bad. Yet he acknowledges that the missile crews also understand that the days of the ICBM force may be numbered.

"Does that play on their brains? I'm sure it does," Fagan says.

Yet morale is high, says Col. Roger Burg, commander of the 90th Operations Group at F.E. Warren. He tells his troops that although their work is sometimes mundane and rarely rewarded with public attention, they should see themselves as warriors, as the ultimately defenders of the American homeland.

Burg bristles at the suggestion he and his crews are removed from the risk of combat.

"Me, I'm either here or somebody is inhaling my ashes in Minneapolis," he says.

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RTos 05/02 1635 Russia, US See Progress Toward NATO Treaty

MOSCOW (Reuter) - U.S. and Russian officials reported progress Friday in talks aimed at overcoming obstacles to a treaty binding Russia and NATO into a new relationship following the end of the Cold War.

The comments after a second meeting in two days between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov appeared to raise hopes that a charter might be signed by a target date later this month.

But as Albright flew back to Washington, the chances of narrowing differences over the expansion of the Western defense pact into Eastern Europe by a May 27 deadline remained unclear.

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns described the outcome of the latest talks as "needed progress," putting a more positive slant on the meeting than after talks Thursday, when officials spoke of tough negotiations being required.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's chief spokesman, Gennady Tarasov, said: "Certain progress has emerged in the discussion of issues related to the preparation of the document setting up relations between Russia and NATO."

Burns said it was "desirable, possible, but not certain" that the document could be signed May 27, as President Boris Yeltsin proposed last month.

Tarasov said Primakov had briefed Yeltsin, who spoke to Albright by telephone Thursday, on the results of the second round of negotiations. Yeltsin wants to sign a deal in Paris.

Burns told reporters that Albright and Primakov had discussed "new ideas" on the charter itself and how it would be linked to still uncompleted 30-nation talks on amending the 1990 Conventional Forces in

Europe (CFE) treaty.

"Needed progress was made on how to discuss CFE issues in the charter and which military issues would be included in it," Burns said.

He and other officials refused to give further details, saying they had to be agreed with NATO's 15 other members. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana heads alliance talks with Russia on the charter and will meet Primakov in Luxembourg May 6.

"What we are aiming for is that, when Primakov meets Solana, they have language they can agree to and can get working on a text," said a senior U.S. official who asked not to be named.

Western officials say the charter would set up a joint council with the Russians, who vigorously oppose NATO plans to admit East European states. This would give Moscow a voice in key decisions affecting its security interests in Europe.

But Russia is demanding binding guarantees from NATO that it will not move nuclear or conventional forces into the territory of the new members to be announced at a July summit in Madrid.

NATO says it has no plans to put nuclear arms or "substantial" conventional forces on new members' territory, but is reluctant to be tied down legally.

The other key problem is the inconclusive state of the CFE talks in Vienna, one of whose aims is to prevent a buildup of forces on Russia's borders as part of a treaty amendment to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era.

NATO wants to scrap group ceilings for force levels in favor of purely national ceilings, but Russia wants to retain them. NATO demands the right to station some foreign forces in other countries, but Russia rejects this.

Russia has insisted that its charter with NATO mention a future CFE accord because that will be legally binding.

Albright told an audience of Russian intellectuals and academics that NATO expansion would be in Russia's interests, and painted a disastrous scenario of what would happen if it did not take place.

NATO membership would give East European states confidence to pursue arms control and bolster ties with Russia, she said.

"It is precisely because NATO is taking in new members that we can now avert the threat of of a major military buildup in central Europe," Albright said at the Carnegie Center.

But if NATO did not enlarge, she said, old dividing lines would re-emerge, confidence would disintegrate in Eastern Europe "and a new destabilizing scramble for security would result," causing relations to crumble between Russia and its neighbors.

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31 RTw 05/02 1057 France worried over Russian tactical nukes -report

PARIS, May 2 (Reuter) - France's defence ministry is concerned at the number of Russian tactical nuclear missiles -- between 18,000 and 20,000 -- and doubts Russia knows their exact number or is destroying those it should, according to an official French report.

The document was given by the defence ministry to Socialist parliamentarian Bertrand Delanoe at his request and he made it available to reporters on Friday. Ministry confirmed its existence.

According to French experts, the number of tactical nuclear weapons at Russia's disposal was far higher than the number possessed by the

United States.

Many of the Russian weapons had been brought back from neighbouring republics but Russian authorities appeared to have lost count of how many there were, the report said.

Lack of funds meant many were being rendered temporarily inoperative rather than being destroyed, the report said. REUTER

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FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
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>Date: Fri, 02 May 1997 13:21:14

>To: abolition-caucus

>From: ippnwbos@igc.apc.org

>Subject: ngo presentations 2 of 4

>

>USING THE NPT REVIEW PROCESS TO ADVANCE

>NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

>Presentation by Jonathan Dean

>Adviser on International Security Issues

>Union of Concerned Scientists, USA

>

> I am Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues

>to the Union of Concerned Scientists.

> Together with other researchers, we are working on what we

>call "Deep Cuts" programs. These programs aim to reduce the nuclear

>forces of the five weapon states to immobilized,

>multilaterally-monitored arsenals of 100-200 warheads each as a

>final trial stage before complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

> The main steps in this process are no increase commitments;

>exchange of data on holdings of warheads and fissile material; and

>verified agreement to end production of fissile material for weapons.

>A key measure is agreement to dismantle all reduced warheads and

>missiles and to transfer the fissile material from the warheads to

>internationally monitored storage to preclude its reuse for weapons;

>and agreement to include reserve and tactical warheads in

>dismantling, so that a process of genuine downward moving

>disarmament can take place. I would be glad to make details available

>to interested delegates.

> I want to thank the chair and the delegations represented here

>for the opportunity to participate in this discussion today. It is an

>important innovation. This year, owing to circumstances, we NGOs

>have not had much time to prepare these presentations. But we hope

>that among them, there will be some innovative, helpful ideas, and

>that with more time for preparation, the number of these useful ideas

>will increase in future Prepcoms.

> Mr. Chairman,

> In our view, the new NPT review procedure can be developed

>into a powerful dynamic for nuclear disarmament. This can happen

>if groups of non-weapon treaty parties which have up to now

>competed with one another with divergent suggestions can join

>together in a common program, a common program that would

>include both proposals for complete elimination of nuclear weapons

>and proposals for specific incremental steps that weapon states would

>be urged to take in moving toward complete nuclear disarmament.

> For outside observers, the non-weapon states, who, if they

>acted together would form a very powerful force for disarmament,

>today appear split into several factions, dissipating their potential

>influence. It has been tried before, but we feel that still more effort is

>needed among these groups before the next Prepcom in order to try

>to create a common platform, extending over the whole spectrum

>from the industrialized states to the non-aligned countries. If the same

>proposals for moves toward disarmament can be advanced repeatedly

>in each successive Prepcom and given energetic sponsorship by a

>broad, informal coalition of Treaty parties, these proposals will be  
>heard and studied by governments. They will be taken up into the  
>active disarmament program of the wider arms control community,  
>including NGOs. And finally, they will be heeded by the nuclear  
>weapon states themselves.

> To illustrate, I would like to describe a few measures of this  
>kind which would be useful steps toward fulfilling the Article VI  
>commitment of the weapon states to complete disarmament:

> 1. A No-Increase Commitment: We believe all five nuclear  
>weapon states should be urged to undertake a commitment not to  
>increase the number of their operationally-deployed nuclear weapons.  
>Implementation by each weapon state could be checked by existing  
>national technical means of other weapon states. This is an obvious  
>step, but one of more than symbolic importance. If it could be  
>achieved, it would be a watershed event on the road to nuclear  
>disarmament.

> 2. De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons: As we know, the  
>operational deployment of large numbers of nuclear weapons on alert  
>status creates a considerable risk of large-scale rapid launch triggered  
>by faulty warning, accidental launch, or unauthorized launch. The  
>result could be catastrophe. These forces should be "de-alerted."

> As you know, this is a key recommendation of the Canberra  
>Commission. However, it is easier to call for de-alerting than to devise  
>mutually acceptable, verifiable ways of carrying it out. But the  
>weapon states themselves do have the knowledge to devise methods  
>of de-alerting that can cope with these difficulties. They should be  
>asked by this conference to consult among themselves to develop  
>mutually acceptable means of de-alerting operationally deployed  
>nuclear forces and to report on their progress later in the NPT review  
>process. The United States and Russia should take the lead in this  
>process.

> 3. Exchange of Information on Nuclear Forces. The U.S.  
>and Russia should be asked to accelerate their bilateral exchange of  
>information on holdings of warheads and fissile materials for  
>weapons and, having developed a system for doing so, to approach  
>the remaining three declared weapon states and engage them in a  
>mutual exchange of information, reporting their progress on this  
>project to the NPT review process. Such a data exchange is essential  
>for serious disarmament.

> Separate action on warhead dismantling and the transfer of  
>fissile material to monitored storage and on information exchange  
>could and should facilitate agreement on a fissile cut off treaty,  
>which remains necessary and cannot be postponed to a later stage.

> 4. Direct Immobilization. Once data has been exchanged and  
>checked, we could think of something more far-reaching which could  
>simplify the complicated task of negotiating deep cuts agreement to  
>immobilize the entire operational nuclear forces of all five weapon  
>states. To do this, all five would agree to separate warheads from  
>delivery systems and to place both in secure storage under  
>international monitoring. The owner states could still withdraw their  
>weapons from storage if threatened by unexpected emergency, but not  
>without giving warning. Carrying out this approach would rapidly  
>diminish the dangers from nuclear weapons. Then, further talks could  
>deal with dismantling and how far to go with it. They could also

>obtain the agreement of the threshold states to store their nuclear  
>materials under international monitoring.

> 5. Security Assurances. The weapon states are taking an  
>ambivalent position on this issue. On the one hand, they refer to the  
>qualified security assurances they extended in April 1995. On the  
>other hand, they speak to domestic audiences at home about possible  
>use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks with chemical or  
>biological weapons. The dissatisfaction of non-weapon states over  
>this situation is understandable. It should be resolved by clear and  
>legally binding commitments not to use nuclear weapons against any  
>non-nuclear state unless that state has used or threatened to use  
>nuclear weapons. The way to deal with chemical and biological  
>weapons is through an advance Security Council commitment to take  
>joint action against states or groups that use these weapons or threaten  
>to do so.

> 6. Discussing the Circumstances for Nuclear Disarmament.  
>We suggest that the Prepcoms and the review conference itself be  
>used to draw the weapon states into increasingly detailed discussion  
>of the specific circumstances in which the weapon states will in fact  
>be prepared to undertake definite commitments for complete nuclear  
>disarmament.

> The background for this suggestion is the fact that, although  
>Article VI of the NPT commits the weapon states to complete nuclear  
>disarmament, it does not include a specific time limit for carrying out  
>this obligation -- or a description of the specific circumstances in  
>which the weapon states should be prepared to make their final  
>decision to destroy their remaining weapons. Here, I am not  
>describing legal preconditions for eliminating weapons. The Treaty  
>contains none. Instead, I am referring to the circumstances or the  
>context that might have to prevail before the weapon states make their  
>final decisions.

> There are continuing efforts to make good the omission of a  
>specific date from the Treaty. In my view, continuing pressures for  
>time-based commitments are essential; they keep the urgency of the  
>task and the existence of the unfulfilled commitment before world  
>opinion. But the question of under what circumstances the weapon  
>states will be prepared for definitive action has not been tackled in a  
>repeated, systematic way. After the end of the cold war, it is time to  
>do so.

> Given the commitments contained in Article VI of the NPT  
>on elimination of nuclear arsenals, the NPT review process is a highly  
>appropriate forum for pursuing this inquiry. In successive Prepcoms,  
>weapon state governments should be reminded of their NPT  
>obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and asked to describe  
>the specific circumstances under which they will be prepared to carry  
>out this obligation. The answers they present should be discussed and  
>analyzed as to whether they have some substance or are excuses for  
>maintaining the status quo. Where weapon state answers are shown  
>to be excuses, they can be refuted and the debate over elimination of  
>nuclear weapons will be simplified. If some of the circumstances that  
>weapon states cite are found to have objective justification for  
>example, assured transparency, improved peacekeeping capability of  
>the UN and of regional security organizations, or improved  
>verification measures they could become common goals of all NPT

>member states.  
> Mr. Chairman,  
> Proposals of the kind I have described today could still be  
>discussed during this year's Prepcom. More plausibly, they can be  
>discussed among governments in preparing for next year's Prepcom.  
>If measures like these can as a result receive wide support from  
>non-weapon states in future meetings, there are good prospects that  
>the NPT review process can in fact become an effective engine of  
>nuclear disarmament.

>  
> \* \* \* \*

>NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES IN THE OSCE AREA

>Concerning NPT Articles I, II, VI and VII

>Presentation by Martin Butcher

>Director, Center for European Security and Disarmament, Belgium

>  
> Mr Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, on behalf of the  
>NGOs who have agreed this statement I would first like to thank you  
>for the honour of addressing this conference. We all greatly  
>appreciate your efforts to enable increased NGO involvement in this  
>PrepCom.

> I have been asked to present to you NGO concerns about  
>issues regarding Articles I, II, VI and VII of the NPT, specifically in  
>the Vancouver to Vladivostok area of the Organisation for Security  
>and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as our ideas for  
>contributing to disarmament and non-proliferation in that area. We  
>wish to draw your attention to:

>  
> Franco-British nuclear weapons co-operation;  
> the proposed Europeanisation of French nuclear forces;  
> NATO nuclear forces and planning, in the light of NATO  
> expansion;  
> the creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the OSCE  
> area.

>  
>In raising these subjects we bring before you concerns which some  
>delegations have raised during this meeting about the horizontal  
>proliferation of nuclear weapons on the European continent, and at  
>the same time potential solutions to some of these problems.

> Firstly, I will present our concerns about Franco-British  
>nuclear weapons co-operation and the proposed Europeanisation of  
>French nuclear forces.

> On 30 October 1995, the United Kingdom (UK) and France  
>issued a Joint Statement on Nuclear Co-operation, in which for the  
>first time two nuclear weapon states announced convergence of  
>national deterrence policies. They stated that "We do not see  
>situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the  
>United Kingdom could be threatened without the vital interests of the  
>other also being threatened.

> Within this political framework there is extensive practical  
>cooperation in the nuclear weapons field, including: rapprochement  
>in sub-strategic nuclear use doctrines; discussions on anti-missile  
>defences; proposals for combined or co-ordinated nuclear missile

>submarine patrols; a study on the utility of an air-launched nuclear  
>missile; and substantial co-operation between the nuclear weapons  
>scientists of the two countries.

> Such practical co-operation would be an essential pre-  
>requisite if the states of the European Union were to move towards a  
>joint deterrence policy. We believe that such a move would have  
>extremely negative consequences, both for the strategic situation in  
>Europe and globally, as well as for full NPT implementation.  
>Unfortunately, there are proposals for just such a move.

> On 9 December 1996, France and Germany agreed in a  
>Common Franco-German Security and Defence Concept that they  
>were "ready to engage in a bilateral dialogue on the future role of  
>nuclear deterrence in the context of a European Defence Policy". This  
>has raised fears that the European Union (EU) will move towards  
>becoming a nuclear power as its Common Foreign and Security  
>Policy (CFSP) is developed. France has explicitly supported such  
>moves, through Prime Minister Jupp's proposals for a policy of  
>"concerted deterrence" between EU member states.

> Furthermore, the Western European Union (WEU), the body  
>charged with implementation of EU defence decisions, regards  
>European nuclear forces as an essential contribution to nuclear  
>deterrence in European defence. Also Germany during the negotiation  
>and then its ratification of the NPT was eager to ensure that an  
>eventual European nuclear force was not ruled out. Western  
>interpretations of the NPT argue that this is possible.

> As NGOs supportive of efforts to prevent the spread of  
>nuclear weapons, and concerned that our governments build upon the  
>disarmament achievements of recent years, we consider that the  
>government of the United Kingdom was correct last year in  
>describing moves towards a European nuclear force as entailing a  
>breach of the NPT (Article I) until a full Federal Union is achieved.  
>This is also the stated opinion of the United States government.

> Rather than following Franco-British co-operation on nuclear  
>weapons and French proposals for "concerted deterrence" in the  
>European Union, European nations should enhance their co-operation  
>in the field of non-proliferation to build a policy of "concerted  
>disarmament". As part of this concerted disarmament, we call upon  
>the delegates to support measures including:

>

> urgent ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
> (CTBT), and we urge the EU to give momentum to this  
> process through a Joint Action under Article J.3 of the Treaty  
> on European Union, agreed by the end of 1997, for  
> ratification by all EU member states of the Comprehensive  
> Test Ban Treaty by the end of 1998;

>

> and, a declaration at the beginning of START III negotiations  
> by the UK and France of their willingness to associate  
> themselves with those negotiations, thereby providing a  
> formal link to the later entry of their own nuclear forces into  
> multilateral talks.

>

>We believe also that China should make a similar declaration.

> Next, I will address the issue of NATO expansion, NATO

>Nuclear Forces and Planning and Articles I and II of the NPT.

> During this meeting, several delegations have expressed their  
>concerns about nuclear weapons arrangements within NATO,  
>particularly as NATO's proposed expansion would increase the  
>number of non-nuclear-weapon states which participate in nuclear  
>planning, training, decision making, command and control, and which  
>have nuclear deterrence at the centre of their defence policies.

> Six non-nuclear-weapon state members of NATO - Turkey,  
>Greece, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium - have bilateral  
>Agreements for Cooperation in the field of Atomic Energy for Mutual  
>Defence Purposes. Under these agreements nuclear weapons are  
>deployed on the territory of the European allies and units of their  
>armed forces are trained and equipped in peacetime to carry out  
>nuclear missions in wartime.

> In addition six other NATO nations - Denmark, Canada,  
>Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain - participate in the work  
>of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the body which, in the words  
>of NATO's Strategic Concept, is responsible for "command, control  
>and consultation arrangements" in the Alliance.

> The NATO nuclear programmes are a form of horizontal  
>proliferation.

> NATO expansion would extend this proliferation problem still  
>further, since new members of NATO would sit in the Nuclear  
>Planning Group and eventually have the option of participating in  
>nuclear sharing.

> The question of NATO nuclear sharing was debated, but never  
>resolved, during the negotiation of the NPT. With the exception of  
>NATO members, none of the parties to the NPT has ever formally  
>agreed that the NATO interpretation, allowing nuclear sharing under  
>the NPT, is valid. We believe that these NATO arrangements could  
>constitute a breach of Articles I and II of the NPT. During the Cold  
>War it was politically impossible to question these arrangements. In  
>the new strategic situation, with the end of East-West confrontation,  
>such questions can now be raised. The proposed NATO expansion  
>makes this debate urgent. We urge this forum to request full  
>documentation from the states concerned to allow a thorough and  
>informed debate of these issues.

> As a more permanent solution to this NATO proliferation, we  
>also support the calls made in this forum by some non-nuclear-  
>weapon states for all the P5 to immediately withdraw tactical and  
>sub-strategic nuclear weapons to their own territory. This would be  
>the first step towards the swift negotiation of a treaty for the  
>elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. In the OSCE area this would  
>be a great contribution to the implementation of the statement in the  
>OSCE 1996 Lisbon Declaration where states promised to construct  
>their military capabilities "bearing in mind the legitimate security  
>concerns of other states".

> Mr Chairman, having raised concerns about breaches of the  
>treaty, I would like now to emphasise the positive role of nuclear-  
>weapon-free zones in implementing the NPT, in line with Article VII  
>of the treaty and also the NPT Principles and Objectives.

> We would like to place on record, our enthusiastic support for  
>the progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones which has been made  
>since 1995. NGOs welcome the Pelindaba Treaty, the Bangkok

>Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga and look forward to their full  
>implementation. We believe this progress contributes to non-  
>proliferation and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We  
>hope that those nuclear-weapon-states which have not yet signed and  
>ratified the appropriate protocols of the Bangkok Treaty will do so  
>without delay. We feel that these zones, as well as all existing  
>nuclear-weapon-free zones, would be greatly strengthened by the  
>addition of a protocol forbidding the transport of nuclear weapons  
>through the territory concerned. Only when such a protocol is added  
>will such zones become truly nuclear-weapon-free. Also, we regret  
>that, to date, no such zone has been negotiated in the OSCE area. In  
>this regard, we strongly support new proposals for a Central Asian  
>Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

> We feel that this initiative gives new impetus to proposals for  
>such zones within the OSCE area, which have been discussed for  
>many years. The idea of a Scandinavian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone  
>was prominent in the 1980s and we believe it is disappointing that the  
>end of the Cold War, which made such a zone possible, has also  
>removed the political force behind it. We call upon the states of the  
>region to make a renewed effort to negotiate such a zone, and on all  
>states parties to the NPT to support this initiative.

> In the light of proposed NATO expansion, we also believe  
>that the creation of a Central European Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,  
>already proposed during this PrepCom, needs serious consideration  
>as it would contribute greatly to stability and security in the OSCE  
>area. It could well play a vital role in preventing the re-emergence of  
>east-west tensions, reducing the threat that some states believe NATO  
>expansion poses to them.

> In conclusion, we affirm our support for the negotiations  
>within the OSCE of A Security Model for the Twenty-First Century.  
>We believe this will play a key role in promoting common security  
>and building, in the words of the 1980 European Nuclear  
>Disarmament Appeal, a "Europe whole and free". We urge the OSCE  
>states, also states parties to the NPT, to build on their 1993 Budapest  
>declaration on non-proliferation and make swift progress to creation  
>of these nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe as an essential step  
>towards the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

> Thank you, Mr Chairman.

>  
>

From: Joseph Cirincione[SMTP:joseph@stimson.org]  
Subject: Coalition Testimonials

I took a few notes at the wonderful reception the Coalition sponsored for the champions of the CWC at the Capitol April 30th. Senators Lugar, Kerry, Levin and Bingaman as well as ACDA Director Holum, NSC staff Robert Bell and Special Representative Lori Murray spoke.

Here are a few quick notes I took that may be useful to your organizations in your publications. If you have any others to share, please send them along.

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Sen Kerry:

"You all did a superlative job of rallying support across the country."

"Without your efforts it would not have been possible."

"We spend a lot of time living in frustration here--it is shared--it's bipartisan frustration."

"A wonderful, wonderful victory."

"A real team effort."

Senator Levin:

"Special thanks...through the organizations you represent--the grass roots--you were able to energize national support for the treaty. You were absolutely critical."

"A number of uniformed military have come up to me since the vote and simply said 'Thank you.'"

"We owe you a debt of thanks. You made it possible for us to win this victory."

Robert Bell:

"I have never seen in my experience a broader or deeper team effort."

John Holum:

"I remember a meeting late in November where you said the treaty was dead unless the Administration made it a high priority. We did--and you see the results."

"Things that should be easy are very hard."

Lori Esposito Murray:

"You should all be very, very proud of yourselves."

forwarded

>Subject: Honory Marshals of the world court in Buechel Military Airbase and  
>Date: 30 Apr 1997 18:26:00 +0100  
>From: marc\_wiemers@vlberlin.comlink.de  
>  
>  
>>From Uwe Painke, Tübingen / Germany  
>  
>Honorary Marshals of the World Court  
>  
>Citizen's Inspection at Buechel AFB to implement the World Court's decision  
> to outlaw nuclear deterrence  
>  
>After the World Court's Advisory Opinion on July 8, 1996, which generally o  
>utlawed the threat or use of nuclear weapons it became pretty clear to us q  
>uickly: The World Court's statement will be useless - - unless a moveme  
>nt will form to put pressure o  
>n the nuclear weapons states.  
>  
>Although we had a large movement to stop the nuclear arms race in the eight  
>ies, the prospects to form such a new movement seemed rather dim. only very  
> few people even realize that there are still nuclear bombs in Germany - Ev  
>en among those peace groups t  
>hat had survived a decade of shrinking in numbers.  
>  
>Our government did not react very promising to our letters which we wrote t  
>o remind them that NATO's nuclear weapons first use policy was simply illeg  
>al and that comprehensive nuclear disarmament should be on their agenda now  
>. We got a letter from our sta  
>te department claiming that "The federal government sees itself confirmed i  
>n its opinion that in case of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (...) th  
>e rules of reasonability as well as the rules of humanitarian international  
> law have to be observed." Si  
>nce our group couldn't imagine how nuclear bombs could be used in a "reason  
>able" (not to mention "humanitarian") way and since we believed that this a  
>nswer was merely a blunt rejection of the spirit and the words of the World  
> Court's ruling, we decided to  
> call to action. We had a good ally: Our constitution which directly  
>bindsevery inhabitant of our country to take care of international law.  
>It furth  
>er states that international law has a higher authority than our domestic l  
>aws.  
>  
>We figured that the first step to nuclear disarmament had to be an inspecti  
>on of the nuclear weapons bases. There are at least four bases with more th  
>an 100 B-61 nuclear bombs located in Germany: At Ramstein AFB (near Kaiser  
>slautern), at Spangdahlem AFB  
>(near Trier), at Brueggen in Northrhine-Westfalia (where the British RAF ho  
>sts at least 10 bombs) and at Buechel AFB (near Koblenz). Our decision to c  
>hose Buechel AFB as the site for our first concerned citizen's inspection w  
>as unanimous: Buechel AFB is a  
> base of the German air force and in case of a war it will be german soldie

>rs who will fly the US-nuclear bombs to their destinations and throw nuclea  
>r weapons onto their targets. At Buechel the German army is illegally puttin  
>g its finger on the trigger of  
> nuclear weapons - a clear violation against the nonproliferation treaty. A  
>t Buechel the German government violates international law in conspiracy wi  
>th the U.S. government which prefers to steer Germany's nuclear ambitions by  
> offering its own nuclear arse  
>nal "for loan".  
>  
>So we announced to the commander of Buechel AFB that we would come to inspe  
>ct his base to report to the World Court whether international law is respe  
>cted or violated on his base. In our letter we explained to the commander t  
>hat our inspection might save  
>him from later legal persecution at the World Court, since military or gove  
>rnment officials are not justified to violate international law on the grou  
>nds of obedience to domestic laws or military orders. We concluded: "Theref  
>ore we expect Your full cooper  
>ation with our work on the grounds of the binding international law."  
>  
>On the weekend of April 18 -20, a little crowd of 100 people joined to prep  
>are and perform the inspection. The police was nervously watching our activ  
>ities since we had announced publicly that it was our constitutional duty t  
>o perform the inspection of th  
>e base even without the consent of the military officials. We decided ahead  
> of time to organize a public meeting with a senior police official to info  
>rm the police too. It turned out that they weren't heavily opposed to our g  
>oals but they informed us that  
> they would try to keep us off the military base although they also  
>seemed a little irritated by our argumentation on the grounds of  
>international law  
>  
>  
>A last attempt to enter the nuclear weapons base with the consent of the mi  
>litary officials failed on the same day, when we sent a delegation includin  
>g a retired nuclear weapons base commander to the main gate asking permissi  
>on to enter for inspection.  
>  
>So 22 people decided to enter Buechel AFB the next morning during an announ  
>ced demonstration at the main gate. Five small affinity groups (or inspecti  
>on teams) formed and consensued to split up to increase the chance of at lea  
>st one of the teams to get int  
>o the base. But all but one of these groups were apprehended by strong hel  
>icopter-supported police forces before they managed to climb the fence with  
> their specially constructed ten foot high ladders. Once apprehended by the  
> police it seemed pretty hopel  
>ess to pass the fence. Then luckily the fifth group managed to find another  
> way into the base: Unnoticed by the massive surveillance, they entered und  
>erground through the drainage system of the base and managed to walk around  
> and inspect the military base  
> for more than 20 minutes before being detected. The confusion caused by th  
>is among police and military led to the successful entry of nearly all  
>the other inspection teams. Finally 18 people managed to enter the base -  
>four of them even did so at the mai  
>n gate right under the very noses of the surprised police. Most interesting

>ly the military police which apprehended and searched the inspection  
>teamsformally denied that any participant of the inspection was  
>arrested.- Maybe because it is a legal risk for the military too to get  
>the case int  
>o court: It is possible that the court would not only review the military's  
> right to withhold trespassers but also the military's failure to obey  
>therules international law by act  
>ively upholding the illegal nuclear threat. We consider this a sign that we  
> have entered a promising road to actively promote the international  
>law'sobligation of nuclear disarmament. And we will go on to be  
>"honorary marsha  
>ls" of the World Court until t  
>he nuclear nations obey to its ruling and disarm all existing nuclear weapo  
>ns.  
>  
>Our next action will be in the first week of August in commemoration of the  
> nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 9 (Nagasaki-Day) we  
> will conclude a weeklong bicycle-tour at Buechel AFB. The route of this bi  
>ke tour will connect some of t  
>he main sites of the nuclear weapons complex in Germany: It will start at t  
>he nuclear power plant at Biblis an will lead via Ramstein AFB (The storage  
> site of 58 nuclear warheads) to our second inspection of the base. There's  
> no doubt about it that we wil  
>I still have a long way to go, but: Together we can prevail and overcome th  
>e era of the nuclear threat that endangers all life on this planet.  
>  
>

---

Michael Christ                    Program Director  
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War  
126 Rogers St.                    tel. (617)868-5050 x.207  
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA fax. (617)868-2560  
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org            <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

mupj@igc.apc.org wrote:

>

> To: Abolitionists

>

> In April we completed efforts centered on two important events for our  
> movement: the 1997 NPT Review PrepCom and U.S. Senate ratification of  
> Chemical Weapons Convention. What next? I would like to offer some ideas,  
> addressed primarily though not exclusively to the nuclear abolition movement  
> in the United States.

>

> We need to realize that many of our objectives require positive actions by  
> the president of the United States: gaining U.S. participation in drafting a  
> Nuclear Weapons Convention; submission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  
> to the U.S. Senate; negotiations of deep cuts in strategic weapons as an  
> intermediate step toward abolition; zero alert; halting subcritical tests  
> and new weapon designs; dismantlement of out-of-service warheads.  
> Therefore, we should focus considerable attention on President Clinton.

>

> Like most us, President Clinton is both an idealist and a pragmatist. As an  
> idealist, he talks about the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus,  
> in his second inaugural address he spoke of a land of new promise where "our  
> children will sleep free from the threat of nuclear, chemical or biological  
> weapons." As a pragmatist, he is cautious about changing the Pentagon's  
> nuclear posture and he accepts the weapon labs' desire to develop new  
> designs. In a combination of the two, he and his administration worked hard  
> and effectively to achieve ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
> Our challenge is to bring out his idealism and to provide political support  
> for bold ventures, thereby counteracting forces which want nuclear weapons  
> forever.. I suggest several simultaneous approaches.

>

> (1) I suggest that on the 20th of each month numerous organizations and  
> individuals should write to President Clinton with a message something like  
> this (in abbreviated form): "You now have 45 months remaining in office to  
> set the course so that the children of the next century will sleep free from  
> the threat of nuclear weapons. To make that possible, we urge you to  
> promptly send the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the U.S. Senate for  
> ratification [if not yet done]; to halt all subcritical tests of nuclear  
> weapons and other kinds of weapons research; in START III negotiations to  
> seek deeper and faster cuts in strategic warheads than outlined in the  
> Helsinki framework; to work with other nuclear weapons states to achieve  
> zero alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles; to accelerate the  
> pace of dismantling nuclear warheads; and to commit the United States to  
> negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention." Each of these points would  
> be elaborated. Each month the stated number would be reduced to reflect the  
> remaining months until President Clinton's term comes to an end on January  
> 20, 2001.

>

> We at Methodists United for Peace with Justice will write such a letter on  
> May 20 and each month thereafter. We'll send it through Samuel R. "Sandy"  
> Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs. We invite  
> other organizations to join us. Each organization can emphasize its  
> greatest current concerns within the overall quest for nuclear abolition.

>

> (2) Let's expand the sunflower campaign by getting individuals all around  
> the country to send packets of sunflower seeds to President Clinton with the  
> abolition message. Let's regularly picket the White House with sunflowers  
> and such signs as "84% Favor Abolition", "Only [45] Months Remaining". We  
> could also try to plant sunflower seeds at the White House, Pentagon,  
> missile sites, and other places; this could take the form of civil  
> disobedience for those who feel called to do so.

>  
> This kind of campaign will require widespread participation to sustain.  
> Therefore, I hope that a number of membership organizations will take it up  
> and work together to carry it forward.

>  
> (3) As an extension of a White House focus, we could shadow President  
> Clinton wherever he goes with sunflowers and signs. This can be done in  
> various places in Washington, around the United States, and abroad. Let's  
> keep reminding him that he is in a position to move the world toward the  
> ideal he has espoused.

>  
> (4) As well as mass activities, we should encourage persons who have direct  
> access to President Clinton to make the case for nuclear abolition. This  
> includes members of Congress, leading scientists, professionals, clergy, and  
> other elite. Thus, we could help Representative Major Owens obtain more  
> co-signers for his letter to the president. We could promote a similar  
> letter from senators, state legislators, local elected officials. We could  
> encourage delegations of religious leaders, scientists, and others.

>  
> In sum, to achieve nuclear abolition we must not only have good ideas and  
> strong commitment, we must also influence decisions of government policy  
> makers who have the power to set the course toward nuclear abolition.

>  
> I will welcome your responses to my suggestions.

>  
> Howard W. Hallman, Chair  
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice  
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036  
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013  
> E-mail: mupj@igc.apc.org

Howard, Thank you for the cogent analysis and concrete practical action  
suggestions - much needed right now.

I also wanted to highlight that on June 20, the G-8 economic summit will  
begin in Denver. This can be a good measuring point for progress on  
implementing Helsinki, and other items on the agenda moving toward  
nuclear abolition, and provides a good tie-in or "hook" for your letter  
in June.

(Of course the scheduled subcriticals will also be an important event -  
Showing that the Clinton administration is moving in the wrong  
direction. We should have a date for the subcriticals later in May.)

Also, the Disarmament Clearinghouse will be putting out an activist  
packet this week that will include briefing materials on further  
reductions, the abolition 2000 poll, etc. and action suggestions and  
tips, including sample letters-to-the editor.

The centerpiece for action will be a sign-on letter to President Clinton, urging him to START Moving - to implement Helsinki Summit Agreements AND to move faster and further toward a nuclear weapons-free 21st century. Karina Wood at Peace Action and I will be drafting the letter and putting it out by the end of this week. We hope to get HUNDREDS of people nationwide to sign on and we will deliver the letter in mid-June prior to the G-8 Summit.

Folks who want to participate in the START Moving Campaign, Order a START Moving Activist Packet, or sign the forthcoming START Moving Letter to President Clinton should contact:

Kathy Crandall  
Disarmament Clearinghouse Coordinator  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232  
Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

Dear Abolitionists,

Risking accusations of naivety and premature enthusiasm, I thought you might like to know what I have gleaned so far on Britain's New Labour government's intentions regarding defence policy.

Yesterday in an interview in "The Observer" newspaper, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that Britain would press ahead to ban the export of anti-personnel landmines, and review the export of weapons to repressive and oppressive regimes.

In today's "Scotsman" newspaper, the new Defence Secretary, George Robertson - like Cook, a Scot - confirmed this. More significantly, he went on to reveal that his first task would be to fulfil a manifesto commitment to conduct a root and branch review of the United Kingdom's defence needs which would be completed in six months. He said: "We will look at it in a comprehensive way... It is a big thing. It will have to be driven by the defence and foreign policy needs of the country and not by the Treasury or cost-cutting."

Now for the tantalising bit. The article - having earlier commented that Robertson had spoken "with a frankness that may raise eyebrows in the new government" - continued:

"Mr Robertson, who came into politics through the protests against American nuclear weapons on the Holy Loch as a teenager in the 1960s, spoke of his hopes for reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. He said: 'We are at a historic moment when, if we take the right decisions, future generations will look back and thank us for making the world better for them. If we do not take the right decisions or do not take any decisions, we will stand condemned.'

"Speaking of his anti-nuclear past, which as a committed multi-lateralist he has been quite open about in his new ministry, Mr Robertson said: 'It could be that after all these years I could be able to fulfil that objective and make the world a safer place for my grandson's generation.' "

Best wishes,

Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

Dear friends,

On Wednesday May 14th we plan a meeting in Madrid with Spanish peace and ecological groups to prepare the non-violent action(s) (bailiff with the summons for the NATO leaders) during the NATO Summit on July 8th in Spain.

As For Mother Earth International has no solid contacts yet in Spain we would appreciate any suggestions/help.

Please do not hesitate to contact your colleagues in Spain to inform and encourage them to get involved in this international campaign, or sent us your contacts ASAP.

Thank you for your assistance,

Pol D'Huyvetter  
Contact Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days 1997

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*****
*       For Mother Earth International office           *
*****
*       Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium     *
*       Phone/fax +32-9-233 84 39                     *
*       Fax +32-9-233 73 02                           *
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*****
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*****
*       Postal account : 000-1618561-19               *
*****
* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global *
*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace*
* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) *
*****
* For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Romania, *
* Sri Lanka and USA, aswell as active members/groups in *
* Belarus, France, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Ukraine *
*****
```

Dear friends,

We had a third successful international meeting in Gent last weekend with people from Belgium, Britain, France, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands in preparation of the Non-Violent Direct Actions at the NATO Summit, and on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 'Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days 1997'.

\*\*\*\*\*

However, we regret that we had to make some technical and structural changes on the 'Statement of Purpose'. The essence did NOT change.

\*\*\*\*\*

To be correct we do have to share this updated version with you, and ask to :

1. IF YOU ALREADY ENDORSED PLEASE CONFIRM ENDORSEMENT

Please send a short E-mail note ASAP, so we avoid using the 'expensive' phone/fax.

2. IF YOU DIDN'T, PLEASE PROPOSE REVISED VERSION AT YOUR NEXT MEETING

Regards,

Pol D'Huyvetter

\*\*\*\*\*

Statement of Purpose Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days 1997

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All nuclear weapon states must comply with international law.

The Nuclear Weapon States should:

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- \* Take nuclear weapons off alert
- \* Separate nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.
- \* Create new nuclear weapons free zones
- \* Start multilateral negotiations for further dramatic arms reductions now and a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000.

In addition NATO as a nuclear alliance should:

-----

- \* Abandon its policy of first use of nuclear weapons.
- \* Relinquish its plans for expansion into Eastern Europe and act to

create a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.

\* Comply with Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.

All states should :

-----

\* Close down military industry and use the resources and money to invest in human and ecological needs.

\* Replace military doctrine with non-violent social defence

Failure to implement these aims swiftly would justify peaceful action by citizens to uphold international law.

\*\*\*\*\*

Following NGO's should confirm their endorsement :

Endorsing organisations (5 May 1997):

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International organisations :

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For Mother Earth International (Belgium), International Peace Bureau (Switzerland), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Switzerland)

National organisations :

-----

Article Nine Hiroshima (Japan), Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (Australia), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK), Center of Research and Action on Peace (Greece), Earth First! (Netherlands), EUCommunity (Germany), For Mother Earth France (France), Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance (Netherlands), Healing Global Wounds (USA), IANUS (Germany), Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (USA), Los Alamos Action Network (USA), Nederlandse Kernstop Coalitie (Netherlands), Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA), Prague International Anti-Nuclear Office (Czech Republic), Project Ploughshares (Canada), The Nuclear Resister (USA), NZ Foundation for Peace Studies (New Zealand), Quakers of New Zealand (New Zealand), Tribunaal voor de Vrede (Netherlands), Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada), War Resisters League (USA) & World Court Project (UK)

\*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\*

YES! I endorse the NWAD Statement of Purpose!

Name/Organisation: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact person : \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Code \_\_\_\_\_ Town : \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ Fax: \_\_\_\_\_

E-mail: \_\_\_\_\_

Your organisation will be added to endorsers list on flyer,  
newsreleases, etc. ...

\*\*\*\*\*

For more information/donations/registrations :

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Contact : For Mother Earth International

\*\*\*\*\*

\* For Mother Earth International office \*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* Lange Steenstraat 16/D, 9000 Gent, Belgium \*

\* Phone/fax +32-9-233 84 39 \*

\* Fax +32-9-233 73 02 \*

\* E-mail: int@fme.knooppunt.be \*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* WWW:http://www.knooppunt.be/~fme \*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* Postal account : 000-1618561-19 \*

\*\*\*\*\*

\* For Mother Earth is member of Abolition 2000 - a global \*  
\*network to eliminate nuclear weapons, the International Peace\*  
\* Bureau (IPB) and World Information Service on Energy (WISE) \*

\* For Mother Earth has offices in Belgium, Slovakia, Romania, \*  
\* Sri Lanka and USA, aswell as active members/groups in \*  
\* Belarus, France, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Ukraine \*

\*\*\*\*\*

STRASBOURG, France (Reuter) - Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said he hoped to complete a draft agreement on future partnership between NATO and Russia in talks with the alliance's secretary-general Tuesday.

Primakov told reporters in Strasbourg on the eve of his meeting with NATO chief Javier Solana in Luxembourg: "I want this meeting to be the last one and to enable us to sign on May 27. The possibility of signing the document will be totally cleared up tomorrow."

The minister spoke Monday after talks with the so-called troika of past, present and future holders of the European Union's rotating presidency, led by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo.

He repeated Moscow's ritual denunciation of NATO plans to admit former Soviet bloc Central European countries as "the most serious error since the end of the Cold War." But he added that a Russia-NATO document should minimize the repercussions on Russian security.

NATO sources in Brussels cautiously welcomed Primakov's comments, saying they could be interpreted as indicating Moscow realized that NATO had reached its final position in the negotiations and was ready to conclude a deal.

President Boris Yeltsin has agreed in principle to sign an agreement with leaders of the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris May 27 but U.S. and NATO officials have previously said they were not sure it would be ready in time.

The West has rejected Russian demands for commitments not to station nuclear or conventional forces on the territory of new NATO members or to build military infrastructure there. But it has said it has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons or permanently station forces there.

U.S. and Russian officials reported some progress after Secretary of State Madeleine Albright held two meetings with Primakov in Moscow last week.

"Mr. Primakov is a fine tactician and negotiator and he will probably try for some little final concession to save face and Russian honor, but I think he realizes that NATO is now close to its bottom line. The Russians have to substantially modify their position to get an agreement," a NATO source said.

"If he is indicating he is ready, that is very encouraging indeed," the source said.

Earlier Monday, a Russian Foreign Ministry source told the Interfax news agency that Moscow and NATO had resolved most of the problems blocking agreement on a post-Cold War partnership and progress now depends on the Western alliance.

The source said differences remained on military matters and the burden was on Solana to make a breakthrough in his talks with Primakov Tuesday.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary head the list of former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact expected to be offered

NATO membership at a summit in Madrid in July.

"The Russian side has shown its negotiating partners its cards and NATO has shown its cards," the Russian Foreign Ministry source told Interfax.

The source said Moscow was sticking to demands for a clear, binding agreement on military matters.

"The Russian side insists everything here is utterly clear and concrete. NATO would like to get off with passionate declarations saying they have no plans, or intentions or reasons, let's say, for stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states of this bloc," the official said.

He added: "An assertion has any sense only if it is set out in a legally binding document."

Yeltsin seemed to drop demands for a legally binding treaty at a Russia-U.S. summit in Helsinki in March but wants an accord to be signed by himself and NATO heads of state or government.

Western officials say the agreement would set up a joint council with Russia, giving Moscow a voice in important decisions affecting its security interests in Europe.

\*\*\*\*\*

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse  
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005  
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232  
Fax: 202 898 0172  
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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Dear Fellow Abolitionists:

Please help publicize this report through your own lists, newsletters and media publications. Thank you!

Wednesday, April 30, 1997

## SPRING GATHERING EVENTS BRING 500 TO THE NEVADA TEST SITE

Jennifer Olaranna Viereck

The Healing Global Wounds Spring Gathering and related events brought 500 protesters to the gates of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) over Easter weekend (March 27-31st) with demands to shut the Test Site down. Following the closure of the second of five nuclear test sites in the world, (the French site in French-Occupied Polynesia), participants from around the world demanded that the U.S. government take immediate steps to uphold the 1995 ruling of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons and permanently close and clean up the site. (The first site was closed by Russia following the overwhelming nonviolent uprising of indigenous Khazaks several years ago.)

A wide range of organizations this year staged a series of back-to-back educational and protest events that brought participants to the wide-open desert from as far away as South Africa, Taiwan, Tahiti, Japan and many European nations. The Council of Women to End the Nuclear Age, the Nevada Desert Experience's Holy Week Walk, religious services and direct actions, the Healing Global Wounds Spring Gathering, and Action for Nuclear Abolition's week-long series of demonstrations and direct actions united the broadest spectrum ever of citizen activism at the NTS. Demands were loud and clear to halt plans to resume nuclear weapons testing in June, and to stop all shipments, both high-level and low-level, onto Newe Sogobia, sovereign Western Shoshone lands.

Creative and positive interaction between participants from diverse backgrounds was enhanced this year with the addition of an all day Alliance Building training facilitated by professional trainers from Tools for Change, and the 'Atomic Cafe', housed in a carpeted army tent, and hosting nearly round-the-clock discussions, slide shows, talent shows, and various trainings. Excellent meals were provided by a coalition of California Food Not Bombs groups and other volunteers.

The Nuclear Waste workshop on Saturday featured speakers Corbin Harney, Western Shoshone spiritual leader, Lea Fouche from the Prairie Island Coalition in Minnesota, and Dallas Gudgell from the Snake River Alliance in Idaho. Members of nuclear watchdog groups from around the U.S. added observations and concerns about federal plans to ship high-level waste through 43 states to the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, now on a 'temporary' basis, since 'permanent' plans are being derailed with every new finding about the unsuitability of the site. Fouche told the audience of Dept. of Energy (DOE) documents obtained by the Prairie Island Tribe documenting routine and continuous radioactive leaks at all nuclear energy facilities in the United States. She also stated that the concept of Monitored Retrievable Storage is an absurd fallacy, as no known technology exists for safely removing spent fuel rods from cask storage once they are put in.

Fouche told the audience, "All of your worst nightmares, and I mean your

worst nightmares about the nuclear industry, are well-documented and completely true." The Prairie Island Coalition has obtained copies of 60,000 pages of DOE documents through their lawsuit against the Prairie Island nuclear reactor.

Indigenous delegates from the Taiwan Islands gave a rousing presentation featuring traditional song and dance as well as photos and facts about nuclear waste dumps from Westinghouse nuclear reactors in Taiwan. Explained to local villages as a fishing factory, one site now holds barrels stacked four high on a concrete pad well within the range of the next tropical storm.

Gaby Tetiarahi, accompanied by Kilali of the Hawai'ian Islands and Myrla Baldenado of the Philippines spoke eloquently of the legacy of 50 years of nuclear colonialism and military presence in the Pacific Islands and the devastating ethnocidal and environmental effects. Taka Nakayama, a Nagasaki bombing survivor, gave an eye witness account of his experiences of the horror and devastation as he escaped from the city from nearly the center of the bomb detonation.

Direct actions took place throughout the weekend, and during the week that followed. On Good Friday, 26 people were arrested for trespassing at the NTS, immediately following the Stations of the Nuclear Cross Service led by arriving Holy Week Walkers. Franciscan brother David Buer led walkers for the third year on a 60 mile desert pilgrimage from Las Vegas.

On Easter Sunday, following a colorful procession to the NTS gates and a Circle of Rebirth Ceremony, led by Corbin Harney and well-known author Starhawk, 66 people entered the Test Site and were arrested. Best dressed member of the parade was an enormous Quetzalcoatl puppet, operated by 5 people and accompanied by two 'nuclear angels' on stilts. The MADCOWS (Mothers & Daughters' Council of Women) led a spectacular die-in, blocking the gates. Hundreds of supporters kept vigil at the gates with music, dance and exchanges with private Wackenhut guards and Nye County Sheriff Deputies until those arrested were released.

The following day a vastly smaller but well-equipped group successfully blocked all entrances to the Nevada Test Site with tripods and various locking devices. In a cooperative effort between Healing Global Wounds and the Las Vegas-based Shundahai Network, the blockade prevented worker buses and several nuclear waste trucks from entering the Test Site for several hours. Due to extremely high winds, one tripod blew down, and a protester suffered substantial injury to her shoulder and heel. (Donations toward her hospital expenses can be made to Shundahai Network, 702-647-3505.)

Shundahai Network supporters braved high winds and even snow to continue their Action for Nuclear Abolition Campaign throughout the week with a spectacular Nuclear Fool's Day Parade through downtown Las Vegas on Tuesday, and a blockade of Interstate 95 leading to the NTS on Thursday, April 3rd. Sixteen arrests were made after protesters blockaded the freeway in both directions with a variety of devices and a disposable car from 5:30 to 9:30 am. Many buses of Test Site workers and one nuclear waste truck were held up in the blockade. Nukewatcher Bonnie Urfer took a RadAlert reading of 176 from a seam in the waste truck.

Efforts will continue to block federal plans to start 'subcritical' testing of nuclear weapons in June. Senate Bill 104, mandating transportation of used fuel rods from reactors to Yucca Mountain has passed the Senate, and continued pressure is needed to enforce Clinton's promised veto of the bill. The fall 'Call to the Desert' Gathering at the NTS is scheduled for October 10-13, 1997.

For more information, contact Healing Global Wounds at 408-338-0147 or hgw@scruznet.com, or Action for Nuclear Abolition at 702-647-3095 or shundahi@intermind.net.

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Healing Global Wounds, Coordinator

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PO Box 13, Boulder Creek, CA 95006, USA

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A member of the Abolition 2000 Network, A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

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"We think that if the powerful countries would reduce their weapons arsenals, we could have peace. But if we look deeply into the weapons, we see our own minds-- our prejudices, fears, and ignorances. Even if we transport all the bombs to the moon, the roots of war and the roots of bombs will still be here, in our bodies and our minds. Non-violence means we strive to act and speak with love and compassion."

Thik Nhat Hanh

Honor the elders;  
Protect the children;  
Protect the Earth;  
Don't be lazy!

Floyd 'Red Crow' Westerman

Dear Howard,

Thank you for your analysis and suggestions on an abolition strategy. Your ideas are good. I hope you will bring copies of your letter to share at the upcoming Plutonium Challenge meeting (Thursday May 15) and the next Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers meeting (not sure it is set yet).

In addition to your good suggestions, other ways that citizens can promote abolition is by passing resolutions in city councils, religious organizations, and other groups. Through our Abolition 2000 Campaign, PSR encourages members to introduce and pass nuclear abolition resolutions in medical societies. So far, the American Medical Assn, the American College of Physicians, and the Amer. Public Health Assn, as well as numerous other national, international and state medical organizations, have passed such resolutions. The list continues to grow.

PSR is also considering developing a slide show on nuclear weapons abolition which our members can use to educate colleagues and the public about the prospects and need for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I'd appreciate any suggestions and advice you may have on this.

Thanks again for your good work, Lisa

"NEWSCOPE" by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on July 21, 1993 at 21:36 Eastern, about SUBSCRIPTION-ONLY WEEKLY NEWS SOURCE (323 notes).

Note 323 by NEWSCOPE OFFICE on May 6, 1997 at 11:05 Eastern (17913 characters).

Newscope

A Newsletter for United Methodist Leaders

Vol. 25, No. 19/May 9, 1997

### UM Bishops Seek Review of U.S. Middle East Policies

The UM Council of Bishops approved a two-page pastoral letter to President Clinton May 1 expressing concern about Middle East peace and asking for a review of U.S. aid to Israel. Meeting in Des Moines, Iowa, the bishops said construction of Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian land is an "impediment to the peace process." Noting that U.S. assistance to Israel amounts to \$10 million a day, the largest amount given to any country, the bishops called for aid to be reviewed, monitored and reconsidered.

In other business, the bishops: 1) objected to prosecution of children in adult courts and urged defeat of "The Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997" (House Bill HR3); 2) supported the Hatch-Kennedy Child Bill and asked Congress to provide access to health insurance for all children; 3) asked the U.S. Senate to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child already adopted by 190 countries; and 4) asked staffers at the General Board of Church and Society to study issues surrounding The School of the Americas, located at Fort Benning, Ga. The bishops passed a resolution alleging that the school has "trained thousands of military personnel for Central and South American countries that have denied democratic principles and perpetrated violence upon the citizens of those countries, while denying them just recourse under law, thus contradicting the purpose" of the school. -- UM News Service

### Team Guiding UM \$3 Million Effort for Young People Identifies Issues

The major concerns of young people are identity, relationships, spirituality, sexuality, employment, education, and transitional stages of life, according to surveys taken by the 19-member team responsible for planning and administering "A Focus on Young People -- Walking Together in a Way that Leads to Life," a four-year churchwide initiative mandated by the 1996 General Conference.

Meeting May 2-4 in Philadelphia, the group tried to include concerns of the youth in all nations as they address the spiritual, social, and economic needs of people aged 12 to 30. Team members wrestled with a theological statement that affirms the diversity of young people in the UMC and a statement that

reflects where God is calling the youth initiative to be.

A final discussion revolved around criteria for making grants to mission programs that address the critical issues of young people. The grants are to enable congregations to design innovative strategies to address youth and young adult issues. -- Linda Bales, UMNS

### Mission Agency Promises to Recruit 7,500 Volunteers

The General Board of Global Ministries (GBGM) has promised to recruit 7,500 volunteers to serve on a regular basis in 75 national mission institutions with children and youth by the year 2000. The promise was given by Robert Walton, GBGM executive secretary of volunteer personnel, to the Presidents' Summit for America's Future, April 27-29 in Philadelphia.

The summit, attended by 2,000 leaders from 140 communities, included Bishop Sharon Brown Christopher (Illinois), who was part of a five-member Illinois state delegation.

At the summit, GBGM also pledged to establish 300 Communities of Shalom that will involve youth in assessing needs and developing programs of community outreach. The mission agency also plans to have 20,000 local congregations use the board's new planning handbook, *Putting Children and Their Families First*, to assess community needs and develop programs to meet those needs. At the same event, the National Council of Churches committed itself to increasing the number of full-time volunteers in its ecumenical programs from 1,700 to 7,000 by the year 2000.

### Short Takes

Leaders of the UM National Women's Caucus, meeting April 27-28 in Toledo, Ohio, set plans to raise funds in order to employ a paid staff member sometime after 2000. The 24-member unofficial UM group also agreed to: 1) provide quarterly distribution of *The Yellow Ribbon* to some 500 members; 2) support selected episcopal candidates and women who are in posts previously held by males; 3) conduct national meetings; 4) develop proposals for the 2000 General Conference; 5) respond immediately to issues impacting women; 6) promote and hold gatherings for women doing theology; and 7) provide single-sheet curriculum pieces focusing on the roles and images of women. -- Linda Ray Miller

On April 29, the UM Committee on Relief (UMCOR) opened a 13,500-square-foot warehouse and office facility in Minneapolis to facilitate response to flood victims. Items now needed include: cleaning supplies, buckets, mops, shovels, brooms, rakes, rubber boots, gloves, linens, toothbrushes, soap, shampoo, first aid supplies, baby items, nonperishable foods, canned juices,

bottled water, and paper goods. Donated items can be sent to the Minneapolis warehouse at 835 Hennepin Ave., Minneapolis, MN 55413 or the UMCOR Depot at 131 Sager Brown Rd., Baldwin, La. There is also a disaster relief depot in Frankfort, Ky. (141 Commerce Blvd., 800-952-7351). To volunteer, or for more information, call 800-918-3100 (Advance No. 901670-1 Upper Midwest Floods).

Tom Grey, top executive of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, says that three of the nine members of the newly appointed two-year federal gambling study commission are mouthpieces for Las Vegas casinos. He laments President Clinton's appointment of Bill Bible, chair of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, and congressional appointees: Terrance Lanni, chair of the MGM Grand Casino Company, and John Wilhelm, contract negotiator for the largest casino employee union in Las Vegas. "It's like appointing representatives of R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Liggett to a panel studying tobacco," said Grey. "It's just wrong." Other commission members are: Richard Leone, former treasurer of New Jersey; Robert Loescher, a Native American from Alaska, James Dobson, head of Focus on the Family; Kay James, dean at Regent University; Paul Moore, a radiologist from Mississippi; and Leo McCarthy, former lieutenant governor of California.

For the first time, the UM Committee on Relief (UMCOR) has signed an official agreement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In the "memorandum of understanding" FEMA agrees to provide office space for UMCOR personnel in disaster field offices and joint information centers, when appropriate; notify UMCOR of relevant changes in FEMA regulations and procedures and of training and educational opportunities; share information on disaster assessment and possible resources for long-term recovery; provide for the distribution of supplies through UMCOR, when appropriate, and possibly assign UMCOR to provide specific assistance to be reimbursed at cost. UMCOR agrees to keep FEMA "informed about its operation and projects and to look to FEMA for guidance if problems arise at the disaster locations."

A new record-keeping system will be available to annual conferences in October to help them administer the pension and other benefit plans offered by the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits. Called PARK (PARTicipant Record Keeping), the system will allow conferences to use a web browser to obtain participant data, receive reports, and get other information from the board. The board will provide a Pentium computer for each participating conference, with board-specific software, "Microsoft Office," "Windows 95," and a web browser.

A resource center for UM conferences in Third World countries was proposed April 30 in Des Moines, Iowa, during the semi-annual meeting of the Council of Bishops. The proposal came from Paul McCleary during a session on the bishops' initiative on children and poverty. McCleary, a former missionary to Bolivia, said such a center could provide information and link UMs in the

Third World to churchwide and international organizations that have money and expertise. Of the 130 million children born every year, 94% are born in Africa, Asia, and Latin America where there are UM or autonomous Methodist churches, he said. -- UM News Service

Nearly 1,000 people gathered April 24-27 in Peoria, Ill., to celebrate the 20th anniversary of "The Walk to Emmaus." They came to the city in which the UM version of a 52-year-old Roman Catholic spiritual renewal program was born. The walk is a 72-hour live-in experience in which participants study, sing, pray, worship, and examine how grace is expressed in the world. -- Pamela Crosby

An Abingdon Press book, "Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation," by Miroslav Volf was selected by Christianity Today as one of the top 26 titles published in 1996. Abingdon is an imprint of The UM Publishing House.

The General Board of Church and Society is calling UMs to urge President Clinton and Congress to enact legislation to reinstate SSI, Medicare, and food stamp benefits for immigrants. Without such action, children and elderly and disabled legal immigrants will lose welfare benefits beginning Aug. 1.

Thirty-five churches have been organized in Russia since 1990. For the present, all these congregations rent facilities, but purchase of property may be allowed soon. For information about "hands on" ministries in the Russia Initiative, contact Bruce Weaver (214-826-3797).

UM Action, a unit of the Institute on Religion and Democracy, opposes efforts by the General Board of Church and Society to release 15 political prisoners. Mark Tooley, editor of UM Action, says most of the 15 are affiliated with a Puerto Rican terrorist group responsible for over 100 bombings in the U.S. that caused five deaths, 80 injuries, and \$3.5 million in damage. The group is also concerned about remarks by Bishop C. Joseph Sprague (Chicago), who is alleged to have said that it was the Christian church, and not Jesus Himself, that elevated Him to the role of "messiah." Finally, Tooley generally praised a conference on evangelism, sponsored by the UM Council on Evangelism, but lamented remarks made at that Atlanta gathering by Juan Carlos Ortiz "who likened the drive for homosexual legitimization to earlier movements for the rights of Blacks and women."

Affirmation, an unofficial group of UMs for lesbian, gay, and bisexual concerns, is urging UMs to "dissent" from an action by the 1996 General

Conference that prohibits UM clergy from celebrating or hosting covenant services for lesbians and gay men (1996 Discipline 65c). Meeting April 25-27 in Cincinnati, the group said the law is illegal because "by description and Judicial Council decision, the Social Principles are intended to be persuasive, not coercive. The use of proscriptive 'shall not' language is out of character and ... is not enforceable." The group also says the provision is unjust as it "singles out one class of people and denies them the ministry of the church..."

Sixty UM Korean-American pastors serving non-Korean churches gathered April 20-22 in a consultation sponsored by the General Board of Higher Education and Ministry. In several sharing sessions, the group expressed concern about inequitable salaries, incidents of failure to provide them with health insurance, feelings of isolation, lack of clerical assistance with the time-consuming tasks of preparing sermons and newsletters in a second language, and blatant discrimination. To address these issues, the pastors established a caucus governed by a 12-member council based on distribution of the 113 Korean-American pastors in cross-cultural appointments: six from the West, four from the central U.S., and two from the East. Dong Soo Lee, Augusta, Wisc., was named chairperson.

Charges of threatening a police officer with a deadly weapon have been dropped against Lawrence M. Livingston, 40, pastor of Ezion-Mount Carmel UMC in Wilmington, Del. (Newscope, April 11). However, he will still go to trial June 11 on charges of disregarding a stop sign, a red light, resisting a police officer, and resisting arrest. -- Wendy K. Green

The Christian Coalition is a "900-pound gorilla." That's what a panelist said during a meeting of the Religion Newswriters Association. Christian Century editor James Wall said liberals created the gorilla. "We became so secular, so partisan, that we created a spiritual and moral void," said Wall. The UM clergyman said liberal churches "became so much a part of the Democratic Party and the radical-left camp that we had nothing to say on our own." -- Newsletter of Evangelicals Concerned

To order resources for the May 25 "Peace With Justice" Sunday, write UM Communications, P.O. Box 320, Nashville, TN 37202-0320

### Continuing Education Opportunities

A General Board of Global Ministries (GBGM)-sponsored symposium on building and rebuilding mission-based churches in African-American communities, May 15-17 in Chicago (\$239). Contact Ingrid Hall (212-870-3860)....A University of Hartford-sponsored conference for church musicians, July 6-11 at the

university. Contact Hartt School, 800-955-4278.....A Fellowship of UMs in Music, Worship, and Other Arts-sponsored conference at the University of Houston, July 14-19. Contact David Bone (615-749-6875).....A GBGM-sponsored Planned Giving School, July 28-Aug. 1, 1997, Colorado Springs. Contact Donald W. Joiner (615-340-7080).....A General Board of Discipleship (GBOD) and GBGM-sponsored conference on "New Church Development and Congregational Transformation, July 30-Aug. 6 at Boston University (\$245). Contact Office of Professional Education (617-353-3037).....A GBOD and Scarritt-Bennett Center-sponsored conference for leaders of older adult ministries, Oct. 1-4, Nashville (\$180). Scholarships are available. Call 615-340-7545..... A GBOD and Foundation for Evangelism-sponsored multi-lingual conference on evangelism, Oct. 9-11 at Holman UMC, Los Angeles (\$75). Contact Roger Swanson (615-340-7049).....Two GBOD-sponsored conferences on "Making Disciples in the 21st Century, Nov. 2-5 at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary (\$170) and Nov. 18-20 at Duke Divinity School (\$135). Contact Dan Benedict (615-340-7072).

### Positions Available

Director of admissions for Saint Paul School of Theology. Contact Executive Vice President, 5123 Truman Rd., Kansas City, MO 64127 (816-483-9600 ext. 313).....Associate general secretary, conference resourcing team. Contact Jaime Potter Miller, UM Communications, P.O. Box 320, Nashville, TN 37202 (615-742-5416).....Two positions at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary (GETS): Associate director of admissions; contact Adolf Hanson. Director of Development; Contact David Heetland, GETS, 2121 Sheridan Rd. Evanston, IL 60201 (847-866-3970).....Two positions at Union College: Assistant/associate professor of religion and philosophy and campus chaplain. Contact Paul S. Moore, Union College, 310 College St., Barbourville, KY 40906.....Assistant general secretary of resourcing congregational life for the General Board of Church and Society. Contact Martha S. Cline, GBCS, 100 Maryland Ave., NE #301, Washington, DC 20002 (202-488-5671).....Associate editor of The Link. Contact The Link, Rm. 112, 900 S. Arlington Ave., Harrisburg, PA 17109.....Associate council director of communications for Iowa Conference. Contact Anne (515-283-1996, ext. 114).....Four positions at Wiley College: director of college relations, director of financial aid, director of counseling, and residence hall manager. Contact Loretta Martin, Wiley College, 711 Wiley Ave., Marshall, TX 75617 (903-927-3252)

### Personalia

Wesley A. Hirsch, pastor of St. Luke's UMC, Kansas City, will be appointed superintendent of the Southwest District in the Missouri West Conference.....E. Herbert Franklin Sr., pastor of Mt. Hebron UMC in West Columbia, S.C., will be appointed superintendent of the Walterboro District in the South Carolina Conference.....William Anthony, pastor of Thrasher Memorial UMC, Roanoke, Va., will be appointed superintendent of the Petersburg (Va.) District in the Virginia Conference.....Bishop Felton E. May (Washington, D.C.) was among the speakers underlining the importance of anti-gambling efforts at a late April meeting of two national coalitions opposed to

gambling. Tom Grey was relected executive director of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling. Mark Harrison, General Board of Church and Society staffer, was elected vice-chair.....Mark T. Kurowski, pastor of Brookston (Ind.) UMC, received the \$200 John H. Ness first prize from the General Commission on Archives and History. Shaun C. Henson from Buena Vista, Va., received the \$100 second prize. Inelle Cox Bagwell and Jeanne Audrey Powers have been elected co-conveners of the National Women's Caucus.....Nora Kizer Bell, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Texas, has been named president of Georgia Wesleyan College. David Blackburn, former conference superintendent of the Alaska Missionary Conference and former Western Jurisdiction field representative for the General Board of Global Ministries, died May 16 at South Lake Tahoe, California.....Gene W. Patterson, senior vice president of a speciality insurance broker, has been named assistant risk manager for the General Council on Finance and Administration.

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This note sent to subscribers of the newscope list.
To unsubscribe DO NOT REPLY TO THIS NOTE! Instead,
create a new note to newscope-request@ecunet.org
containing just the word

unsubscribe

If you have trouble with the automated routine there, please send copies of error messages and other notes to owner-newscope@ecunet.org and a real person will assist. Here are links if your mailer supports that sort of thing.

unsubscribe notices: <mailto:newscope-request@ecunet.org>

human intervention: <mailto:owner-newscope@ecunet.org>

--

>>>> 0. IGC account: mupj

**** Command '0.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 00. Name of organization: Methodists United for Peace with Justice

**** Command '00.' not recognized.

>>>> Majordomo will serve Religious Working Group for Nuclear Abolition

**** Command 'majordomo' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 000. Mission: MUPJ statement on file with IGC.

**** Command '000.' not recognized.

>>>> Mission statement for Majordomo: The Religious Working Group for Nuclear

**** Command 'mission' not recognized.

>>>> Abolition is a network of religious organizations working together for the

**** Command 'abolition' not recognized.

>>>> global elimination of nuclear weapons. It is associated with Abolition 2000.

**** Command 'global' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 1. List name requested: abolition-religious

**** Command '1.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 2, 3. No conference requested.

**** Command '2,' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 4. Single user that owns list: mupj

**** Command '4.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 5. Password for list: trust

**** Command '5.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 6. The list should be CLOSED.

**** Command '6.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 7. The list should NOT be moderated.

**** Command '7.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 8. YES, people on the Internet should be able to see that IGC carries this

**** Command '8.' not recognized.

>>>> list by sending the "lists" command.

**** Command 'list' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 9. Description of list: "Serves Religious Working Group for Nuclear Abolition"

**** Command '9.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 10. NO, everyone in the world should NOT be able to find out who is

**** Command '10.' not recognized.

>>>> subscribed to this list.

**** Command 'subscribed' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 11. YES, people on the list should be allowed to find out who is on the list.

**** Command '11.' not recognized.

>>>>

>>>> 12. Please set the default for "reply_to sender".
**** Command '12.' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> 13. IGC UserID established: mupj
**** Command '13.' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> 14. Message for persons seeking information:
**** Command '14.' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> Majordomo list "abolition-religious" has been established by the Religious
**** Command 'majordomo' not recognized.

>>>> Working Group for Nuclear Abolition to facilitate communication among
**** Command 'working' not recognized.

>>>> religious organizations committed to the global elimination of nuclear
**** Command 'religious' not recognized.

>>>> weapons. Participation is open to organizations having a religious
**** Command 'weapons.' not recognized.

>>>> orientation or affiliation. The Religious Working Group is part of the
**** Command 'orientation' not recognized.

>>>> broader Abolition 2000 network and has created this list as a supplement to
**** Command 'broader' not recognized.

>>>> the "abolition-coalition" list.
**** Command 'the' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> Message to persons joining the list:
**** Command 'message' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> Welcome to the "abolition-religious" Majordomo list. This list has been
**** Command 'welcome' not recognized.

>>>> established by the Religious Working Group for Nuclear Abolition to
**** Command 'established' not recognized.

>>>> facilitate communication among religious organizations committed to the
**** Command 'facilitate' not recognized.

>>>> global elimination of nuclear weapons. We invite you to share your ideas
**** Command 'global' not recognized.

>>>> and to respond to ideas offered by others.
**** Command 'and' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> The Religious Working Group is part of the broader Abolition 2000 network
**** Command 'the' not recognized.

>>>> and has created this list as a supplement to the "abolition-coalition" list.
**** Command 'and' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>> For more details about the "abolition-religious" list and the Religious
**** Command 'for' not recognized.

>>>> Working Group, contact Howard W. Hallman, Methodists United for Peace with
**** Command 'working' not recognized.

>>>> Justice at mupj@igc.apc.org or phone/fax: 301 896-0013.
**** Command 'justice' not recognized.

>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> For the one-time set up fee, a check for \$50 is being sent by U.S. mail.
**** Command 'for' not recognized.

```
>>>>
>>>> Please let me know if you need further information about our application.
**** Command 'please' not recognized.
>>>>
>>>> Howard W. Hallman
**** Command 'howard' not recognized.
>>>> Methodists United for Peace with Justice
**** Command 'methodists' not recognized.
>>>> Mupj@igc.apc.org
**** Command 'mupj@igc.apc.org' not recognized.
>>>> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013
**** Command 'phone/fax:' not recognized.
>>>>
**** No valid commands found.
**** Commands must be in message BODY, not in HEADER.
```

**** Help for Majordomo@igc.org:

This is the "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.94.1.

In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. Items in angle brackets, such as <address>, are meta-symbols that should be replaced by appropriate text without the angle brackets.

It understands the following commands:

subscribe <list> [<address>]

Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>.

unsubscribe <list> [<address>]

Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>.

"unsubscribe *" will remove you (or <address>) from all lists. This
may not work if you have subscribed using multiple addresses.

get <list> <filename>

Get a file related to <list>.

index <list>

Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>.

who <list>

Find out who is on the named <list>.

info <list>

Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>.

intro <list>

Retrieve the introductory message sent to new users. Non-subscribers
may not be able to retrieve this.

lists

Show the lists served by this Majordomo server.

help

Retrieve this message.

end

Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature).

Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "Majordomo@igc.org". Multiple commands can be processed provided each occurs on a separate line.

Commands in the "Subject:" line are NOT processed.

The "which" command has been disabled.
This Majordomo server will not recognize it.

If you have any questions or problems, please contact "Majordomo-Owner@igc.org".

If you would like to create your own Majordomo mailing list at IGC, please contact "support@igc.org".

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - President Clinton's choice to lead the CIA into the 21st century, George Tenet, voiced concern Tuesday that the United States may have shifted too much of its espionage effort away from Russia.

In testimony on the first day of his U.S. Senate confirmation hearing, Tenet said he was committed to "closing the door on the Cold War" to focus more sharply on transnational threats such as narcotraffickers, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

But he said the United States "cannot afford complacency about the unfinished transformations under way in countries like China and Russia, as long as there is any question about their future direction or even the slightest doubt about the ultimate fate of the nuclear weapons they control."

"One of the things I've done in my 'hard-target' reviews (is that) I've requested we go back and look at the Russian target because my concern was that we have shifted too much resources away from it," he added in reply to a question from Sen. Jon Kyl, a Republican from Arizona.

Tenet, 44, has held the the intelligence community's second-ranking post since July 1995 and has served as acting chief U.S. spymaster since John Deutch left in December after 20 months in the job.

He told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will vote first on his nomination, that a key post-Cold War challenge was to revise the U.S. espionage apparatus, which devoted up to two-thirds of its resources to battling the old Soviet Union before its 1991 breakup.

"I would turn our gaze from the past, fix our attention on the future and target our investments on innovation," Tenet testified. He did not immediately spell out why he thought that Russia might bear closer watching by U.S. intelligence.

"We must be able to adjust our collection posture quickly, draw more heavily on outside expertise and ensure that we are not caught unaware in parts of the world that move quickly from backwater to front burner," he said.

Tenet said that if confirmed he would tap more private sector experts, such as academics, for a kind of "surge capacity" in areas that are not immediately a top target of intelligence gathering.

The son of a Greek immigrant father and a mother who fled Albania, Tenet would be the fifth director of central intelligence in six years and the third to serve under Clinton. He grew up in the New York City borough of Queens, where he once cleaned tables at his parents' diner.

Clinton tapped Tenet for the chief spymaster job after a bruising fight with Senate Republicans over the abortive nomination of Anthony Lake, the president's first-term national security adviser.

In withdrawing his name on March 17, Lake denounced the confirmation process, which he described in a letter to the

president as "nasty and brutish without being short."

Unlike Lake, an easy target for Clinton foreign policy critics, Tenet appeared a shoo-in to be confirmed as the 18th director of central intelligence since the modern U.S. espionage bureaucracy took shape 50 years ago.

Committee Chairman Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican, has called Tenet "a man of integrity and professionalism." The vice chairman, Bob Kerrey, a Democrat from Nebraska, said Tuesday that Tenet had been able "to demonstrate his merit."

Tenet is a former staff director of the Intelligence Committee who later became senior intelligence adviser on the White House National Security Council staff under Lake.

If confirmed, he would not only run the CIA but oversee the 12 other U.S. spy agencies that together employ tens of thousands of people and spend about \$30 billion a year.

APO 05/06 1606 Russia and NATO Negotiating

By JEFFREY ULBRICH

Associated Press Writer

LUXEMBOURG (AP) -- NATO and Russia entered negotiations Tuesday on the final details of their future relationship after the Western alliance begins its eastward expansion.

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said Monday he hoped these would be the last talks on a new NATO-Russia agreement, which the Russians say they would like to sign at a May 27 ceremony in Paris.

NATO was less confident that this -- the fifth meeting between Primakov and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana -- would be the last, although it agreed the two sides were moving closer to an accord.

Neither Primakov nor Solana spoke before entering the talks at a chateau near Luxembourg.

NATO wants to complete a deal with Russia before its July 8-9 summit in Madrid, Spain, where it will name its first new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are believed to be the leading candidates.

Most aspects of the document have been agreed on, including the creation of a new Russia-NATO council that will allow Moscow to have a direct voice -- but not a vote -- in decisions made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But a NATO official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said substantial differences remain on the military aspects of the agreement.

Russian fears that NATO's move into Central and Eastern Europe poses a military threat have not been resolved. NATO has said it has "no plan, no need and no intention" to move nuclear weapons or combat troops to the territories of new members, but it will not rule out such a move in the future.

Moscow wants stronger assurances. NATO says it can't make firm promises like that and still preserve its security guarantees to member states.

NATO also will not promise not to build military

infrastructure on the territory of new member states, including airfields, communications and air defense installations.

Separate negotiations in Vienna, Austria, are revising the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, setting out new country-by-country limits on troops and weapons.

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005

Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 Fax: 202 898 0172

<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

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Dear Bill:

This morning I attended a meeting of arms control and disarmament advocates on whether to push ahead for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Many views were expressed, and John Isaacs shared an e-mail communication from George Perkovich on the subject.

The discussion led to a consensus that we should initiate a joint campaign for ratification. It would first focus on getting the Clinton administration to submit the treaty to the Senate promptly and simultaneously sound out attitudes of key senators. In parallel a grassroots campaign would be generated.

The most likely schedule would be submission by President Clinton no later than September 1997 (though an earlier announcement of intent), public hearings by three Senate committees in September to November, and floor action in early 1998. Many factors would determine whether such a schedule would be fulfilled.

There was recognition that support by religious organizations would be a crucial element in obtaining ratification. Tom Graham of ACDA was particularly strong on this point. Therefore, the kind of activities outlined in our grant request to you would make major contributions to the ratification campaign.

I would stress that our involvement in this effort would be well within the regulations for 501(c)(3) organizations. I have spent most of my career working for tax-exempt organizations, and I thoroughly understand both the limitations and the opportunities.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman, Chair
Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Howard,

Please advise as to whether part or all of the phone bill should be assigned to the Rubin Grant. I would ordinarily pay it out of our General Fund.

Thanks.

Phil

Phil,

Most of the long distance calls related to board business this month, so pay it from the general fund. I'm keeping track of long distance calls and may assign some of future months to the Rubin Grant.

Howard

>

>

NATO and Nuclear Weapons - Screening times on your New York Public Access Cable T.V.

Everyone should be talking about NATO Expansion; it's going to break the bank and destabilize Europe. The 27 min. video representing highlights of the April 12, 1997 Public Forum on NATO and Nuclear Weapons featuring David Cortright, Cora Weiss, Professor Anatoli Diakov (Moscow), Amb. Doug Roche (Canada), Solange Fernex (France) and Sharon Riggle (Belgium) will be shown on your cable channels at the following times:

Monday May 12 10:30 pm Ch. 17

Wednesday May 21 1:30 pm Ch. 34

Thursday May 29 12:30 pm Ch. 69

Obtain copies for \$20. from the International Office of Peace Action, 866 UN Plaza, NYC, NY 10017, ph 212 750 5795, fax 212 750 5849, email paintl@igc.apc.org

Peace Release -- May, 1997

HI! Long time since we've updated folks. If you're far away, a reminder, nuclear disarmament and economic conversion have been re-introduced into Congress as HR-827. Additionally, Thomas recently won a case in court, and we're about to celebrate the 16th anniversary of the Peace Park Antinuclear Vigil in an increasingly police-infested environment. If you can, hope you will show your solidarity.....

COME -- Sunday, June 1, 1997 -- 3:00 p.m. till dark -- Lafayette (Peace) Park, Washington D.C. --

CELEBRATE the 16TH ANNIVERSARY of the Anti-Nuclear Vigil outside the White House with a family potluck --

SPEAK about freedom --

HEAR about recent encroachments on liberty --

LEARN about HR-827, the bill Congresswoman Norton has introduced this session (for the third time), the "Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act" --

PREPARE to lobby on behalf of HR-827 the upcoming week and/or later.

....more information at our website: <http://prop1.org> (see "Current Events")....

We APPRECIATE you!

Ellen Thomas

R.S.V.P. 202-462-0757 (phone) -- 202-265-5389 (fax) -- prop1@prop1.org
Peace Park Antinuclear Vigil - Proposition One Committee - POB 27217, DC 20038

First some general info in case any of you are interested - but this is mainly targeted at those of you who are into rock and roll, etc. (Not as weird as it sounds, read on).

General info, the Nonviolent Activist and War Resisters League are both "on the web" for those interested in info. WRL is:

<http://www.nonviolence.org/wrl/>

NVA is:

<http://www.nonviolence.org/wrl/nva/htm>

If there are errors in either address, contact WRL - see the cc address

Second . . .

We were working on a flyer today aimed at youth and the quotes we had were fine - one from Barbara Deming and one from Martin Luther King Jr. But my educated elderly hunch is that few youth know who Deming is, and far too many don't know who King is.

And that there are some damn good quotes wandering around on the issues of peace and war, justice, racism, that come from Henry Rollins (he is a rock guy isn't he?) et al that those of us past 25 have never heard of. So if you are the age of John Miller, Chris Faatz, Dorie Wilsnack, Bruce Cronin, Pam Owens, Ted Glick, Nancy Small, David Wilson, even Jo Becker, you know you don't know. But I'll bet there are some young Christians on the Sojourner net, or the Pax Christi net, and some young radicals, socialists, anarchists, on the other nets, who have "sign offs" on their own posts that are drawn from Dylan and (obviously!!) singers much younger. Younger than Sinead O'Connor, etc.

As we work on "A Day Without the Pentagon" coming October 24 we want slogans that will reach a hip hop generation, a rap generation (personally I hate rap, I will be honest - I like much weirder music). If any of you folks at Peace Action, FOR, AFSC, etc., are interested if we pick up any great quotes, let me know - I'll promise to forward them to you.

Obviously if you can forward this post to relevant nets (no, at 67 I am not in close touch with rock and roll, rap, and youth nets) would you do it? There are some great youth out there with quotes and favorite sayings we need.

Can you post this for them, pass it along to them,

Fraternally, sincerely, peace, in solidarity, in fellowship, as the case may be,

David McReynolds

(War Resisters League staff, NYC)

APO 05/08 0926 Yeltsin Warns on NATO Expansion

By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

Associated Press Writer

MOSCOW (AP) -- Plans for NATO's expansion are the most serious dispute between Russia and the United States since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President Boris Yeltsin warned today.

"Since the Cuban crisis, there hasn't been such a sharp issue in relations between Russia and the United States, which concern Russia's interests to the degree that everyone should think about it, including Americans and Europeans," Yeltsin said in remarks broadcast on Russian television.

Russia bitterly opposes including former Soviet allies in the Western alliance, but tacitly concedes it cannot stop the move. Yeltsin, under tough criticism from nationalist and communist opponents at home, has been trying to limit the NATO expansion.

NATO wants an agreement with Russia before its July 8-9 summit in Madrid, where it plans to name its first new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are believed to be the leading candidates.

"It's essential for us that we take part in all NATO's decision making," Yeltsin told reporters after putting flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin on the eve of the Victory Day, which marks the end of World War II.

"They also mustn't deploy weapons and military hardware, especially nuclear, in newly accepted NATO country-members," he said.

Negotiators have agreed to create a new Russia-NATO council that will allow Moscow to have a direct voice -- but not a vote -- in decisions made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But differences still remain on military aspects of the agreement. NATO says it has "no plan, no need and no intention" to move nuclear weapons or combat troops to the territories of new members, but doesn't rule out such a move in the future.

Moscow wants stronger assurances, but NATO say it can't make firm promises and still preserve its security guarantees to member states. The Western alliance also declines to promise that it won't build military infrastructure on the territory of new member states, including airfields, communications centers and air defense installations.

Yeltsin said that if Russian conditions are met, he will go to Paris on May 27 to sign an agreement with NATO.

At the latest round of talks this week, both sides reported progress, but acknowledged problems remained and the prospects of Russia and NATO signing a charter later this month remained shaky.

RTw 05/08 0855 NATO, confident of deal, to sugar pill for Russia

By Jonathan Clayton

BRUSSELS, May 8 (Reuter) - NATO, increasingly confident it will clinch an historic post-Cold War treaty with Russia next

week, is preparing a final package of "sweeteners" to help President Boris Yeltsin drop Moscow's remaining objections.

"We are very close to our bottom line, and we cannot offer significantly more, but there are a few things we can do," said one senior NATO official. He declined to be drawn on what final inducements NATO might offer.

Alliance Secretary-General Javier Solana is due in Moscow on Tuesday for a sixth round of talks with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, cautiously optimistic he will strike a deal that will allow NATO's planned expansion to proceed smoothly.

NATO's hopes of finally agreeing what will be called a "NATO-Russia Act," embracing all aspects of relations between the former enemies, were boosted on Thursday when Yeltsin said he might take part in the Moscow talks himself.

Yeltsin told reporters about "98 percent of the document is ready" and said he wanted the remaining problems sorted out next week so the document could be signed by NATO's 16 heads of government and state and himself in Paris, probably May 27.

"They must discuss the outstanding problems at their meeting on May 13, maybe with my participation, so as to have the document finally ready," he said after a wreath-laying ceremony at the Kremlin's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, part of ceremonies marking the allied victory over Nazi Germany in 1945.

NATO diplomats have always said the final decisions would have to be taken by the Russian president as they involve an acceptance that Moscow cannot halt the alliance's plan to grant membership to countries such as Poland and Hungary.

"This is good news, we are in the end-game, the Russians now have to make an important political decision," said one NATO official.

The deal with NATO gives Moscow a permanent consultative mechanism through a NATO-Russia council, to be set up in Brussels at NATO's headquarters with its own secretariat, and foresees an extensive exchange of military liaison officers.

Russia will be able to raise virtually any issue it wants, but the council's deliberations will not be binding on those of an enlarged NATO -- thereby fulfilling a basic condition of the West that new members enjoy the same rights as existing ones.

The Western allies see the deal as forming the centrepiece of a new European security order for the 21st century, but admit Russia failure to stop its former allies from the now-defunct Warsaw Pact from joining NATO is a bitter pill.

"We have had to convince the Russians that the best way to minimise the consequences of enlargement is to conclude the deal with NATO, it gives them an enormous amount unthinkable only a few years ago," said one diplomat.

NATO's Solana, 54, has painstakingly negotiated the new pact, tactfully making the Russians realise enlargement will go ahead whatever they say.

A summit in Madrid in July will invite at least three countries -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- to join the alliance that won the Cold War without a shot being fired and closer ties with a host of other applicants.

"Everyone realises it is tough for them (the Russians), we

want to help them as much as possible but they realise now we are at the wire," added the diplomat.

The alliance has said it will not place nuclear weapons or forces on the territory of the new members, but has refused to give in to Russian demands limiting improvements in military facilities in those countries. REUTER

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse
1101 14th Street NW #700 Washington DC 20005
TEL: 202 898 0150 ext. 232 FAX: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

.

This is such an outstanding and encouraging message that I decided to copy it to the list.

Ross Wilcock
rwilcock@web.net
<http://www.web.net/~pgs/>
<http://pgsc.polar.on.ca/>

-----Original Message-----

From: Ron Gray [SMTP:r-grayle@msn.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 08, 1997 2:09 AM
Subject: A2000 City endorsers

Dear Ross,

The list of South Australian cities who endorsed the Abolition 2000 Statement last August are as follows:

City of Adelaide, Town Hall, Adelaide, South Australia 5000, Australia

City of Salisbury, PO Box 8, Salisbury, South Australia 5108

City of Happy Valley, Civic Centre, The Hub, Aberfoyle Park, South Aust. 5159

City of Campbelltown, PO Box 1, Campbelltown, South Australia 5074

City of Port Adelaide Enfield, PO Box 110, Port Adelaide South Australia 5015

City of Unley, PO Box 1, Unley, South Australia 5061

District Council of East Torrens, 1 Crescent Drive, Norton Summit, South Aust. 5136

District Council of Clare, Gleeson Street, Clare, South Australia 5453

City of Prospect, PO Box 171, Prospect, South Australia 5082

City of Glenelg, PO Box 1, Glenelg, South Australia 5045

City of Brighton, 24 Jetty Road, Brighton, South Australia 5048

City of Port Lincoln, PO Box 1787, Port Lincoln, South Australia 5606

City of Marion, PO Box 21, Oaklands Park, South Australia 5046

City of Hindmarsh Woodville, PO Box 1, Woodville, South Australia 5011

City of Noarlunga, Municipal Offices, Noarlunga Centre, South Australia 5168

All of the above local authorities sent messages of greetings to the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who were present at the International Conference against A & H Bombs, held in Hiroshima and Nagasaki from 3 - 9th August 1996. The messages were faxed to them at the conference in Hiroshima before 6th August. Eight of the above cities sent representatives to speak to the Hiroshima Day Ceremony in Adelaide.

This year has seen a mass combining of council areas throughout South Australia, so that some of the above now have new names and cover new areas. We are approaching these new cities to ask them to endorse the A2000 Local Authorities Resolution. They have just had the 1997

election for members on 2 May, so we have had to wait until the new councils & members were in place before approaching them about the Resolution. We will forward information about any who agree to endorse the Resolution as soon as we receive it.

With best wishes, and thanks to all 3 of you for all your help.
Irene Gale and Ron Gray, for Aust. Peace C'tee.(SA Branch)
r-grayle@MSN.com

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your splendid work in Australia in obtaining these 15 Abolition 2000 Endorsements from 15 Australian Cities!

This is the best batch update I have received, and serves as an example to others to secure similar Endorsements.

There are now 732 Endorsing Organizations endorsing Abolition 2000 which include 20 Cities, 5 District and 1 County Councils.

Ross Wilcock
rwilcock@web.net
<http://www.web.net/~pgs/>
<http://pgsc.polar.on.ca/>

Introducing: Internet Forum: "Nuclear Arms and the Human Race"

Can the human race solve the nuclear problem? There are still about 40,000 nuclear warheads in the world, the legacy of the nuclear age begun in 1945. Instead of leaving the problem of their future up to politicians or "experts," this Internet forum hopes to obtain wisdom and understanding through free discussion by global citizens.

NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) started a home page called "Internet Forum: Nuclear Arms and the Human Race" (<http://www.nhk.or.jp/nuclear>) on April 1, where people from around the world are invited to discuss the issue of nuclear arms on the Internet. NHK is the sole public broadcasting station in Japan, serving programs over its 5 television channels to audiences of 35 million households. The results of this Internet Forum will become a television documentary broadcast in August.

This forum is not an open chat session. It is intended to be a place for thoughtful exchange of ideas based on shared information that will be made available on the Internet. The discussion will also be limited to certain themes in order to be compatible to traditional television format.

The current theme of the forum is "Contemplating the Origins of the Nuclear Age: Cyber Exhibit of the Smithsonian Institution's Canceled Enola Gay and Atomic Bomb Exhibition." NHK has introduced part of the canceled exhibition script on the Internet to enable people all over the world to have access to the contents of this canceled exhibition. See for yourself what it would have shown, and tell us what you think.

WE VALUE YOUR OPINION and INVITE YOU TO SHARE YOUR VIEWS

sign up at: <http://www.nhk.or.jp/nuclear> TODAY!!!

The issue of nuclear weapons is one that is characterized by an immense gap in understanding, resulting in disagreements over its future. NHK hopes that sharing information without the constraints of national interests or racial barriers may lead to better understanding by all. NHK also hopes that combining television with the Internet will open a door to a new medium of communication.

For questions and comments, contact:
nuclear-1@nep21.nhk-grp.co.jp, or by fax, 81-3-3468-8423.
Atsunori Kawamura: Executive Producer
Kenji Sato: Director
NHK Internet Forum Project
NHK Broadcasting Satellite No. 1 Station
NHK Hiroshima Broadcasting Station NHK Enterprises 21, Inc.

* Fredrik S. HEFFERMEHL *
* President, Norwegian Peace Alliance *
* Vice President, International Peace Bureau *
* Board/Directors, IA Lawyers Ag. Nuclar Arms *
* International Free Vanunu Committee *
* *
* N. Juels g, 28 A, N-0272 Oslo, Norway *
* Phone +47-2244 8003 (fax: +47-2244 7616) *
* E-mail: fredpax@sn.no *

Oslo, May 7, 1997

Dear Abolitionists

One of my "pets" is the idea that encouragement is more effective than criticism and complaints, - so grassroots should use any opportunity for being "nice".

So when I received Rob Green's orientation yesterday on hopeful signs for a new British nuclear policy, I immediately wrote our Norwegian Foreign Minister and cut-copied-pasted in Rob's orientation, which I thought would interest him (particularly in view of his belief in other means than military to build security - a position where he is at collision course with the defence minister).

This is the type of information our London ambassador should communicate back to Oslo - but you can't be sure*particularly since the nuclear review information was not in the London media - but picked from a Scottish paper* Note: Both the new Foreign and Defence Minister in the UK are from Scotland (where antinuclear sentiments are much stronger than in England).

And then - very important - I will also write letters to the two new Ministers and congratulate them with their new and important responsibilities - and praise the two

- for pressing ahead with landmines and review of the arms export to repressive and oppressive regimes, and above all that the new gvmt. will review UK defence needs - after years of serious concern and frustration over

Britain's

nuclear weapons policy
I do, indeed, hope a particular concern will be, like in a similar Canadian review, Britain's nuclear posture in view of the July 8, 1976, opinion of the ICJ in the Hague, including the legal obligation to start negotiations on a convention to ban nuclear weapons.

Addresses:

H.E. Mr. Robin Cook,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, King Charles st., London SW 1 A2AL, UK
Mr. George Robertson,

I recommend others to do the same, and

Here is Rob's text:

>Dear Abolitionists,
>
>Risking accusations of naivety and premature enthusiasm, I thought
>you might like to know what I have gleaned so far (deleted to For. Min)

take your quote from here:

on Britain's New

>Labour government's intentions regarding defence policy.
>
>Yesterday in an interview in "The Observer" newspaper, Foreign
>Secretary Robin Cook said that Britain would press ahead to ban
>the export of anti-personnel landmines, and review the export of
>weapons to repressive and oppressive regimes.
>
>In today's "Scotsman" newspaper, the new Defence Secretary, George
>Robertson - like Cook, a Scot - confirmed this. More
>significantly, he went on to reveal that his first task would be
>to fulfil a manifesto commitment to conduct a root and branch
>review of the United Kingdom's defence needs which would be
>completed in six months. He said: "We will look at it in a
>comprehensive way... It is a big thing. It will have to be driven
>by the defence and foreign policy needs of the country and not by
>the Treasury or cost-cutting."
>
>Now for the tantalising bit. The article - having earlier
>commented that Robertson had spoken "with a frankness that may
>raise eyebrows in the new government" - continued:
>
>"Mr Robertson, who came into politics through the protests against
>American nuclear weapons on the Holy Loch as a teenager in the
>1960s, spoke of his hopes for reducing the number of nuclear
>weapons in the world. He said: 'We are at a historic moment when,
>if we take the right decisions, future generations will look back
>and thank us for making the world better for them. If we do not
>take the right decisions or do not take any decisions, we will
>stand condemned.'
>
>"Speaking of his anti-nuclear past, which as a committed multi-
>lateralist he has been quite open about in his new ministry, Mr
>Robertson said: 'It could be that after all these years I could be
>able to fulfil that objective and make the world a safer place for
>my grandson's generation.' "
>
>Best wishes,

>
>Rob Green, UK Chair World Court Project

Dear Abolitioners

Here is yet another update of the Nuclear Illegality Document. Since the last one there have been important comments from Alyn Ware and John Burroughs. As a result there have been additions and one substantial deletion. With great regret we have had to cut the "Collective Defence" argument. Several people have pointed out that it is the weakest of our arguments against NATO and could detract from the strength of the rest. A pity - we've lived with it for several months. However, it is an important document which we intend to use extensively and so we must get it watertight.

Perhaps we've got it right this time - too optimistic I expect.

Thanks for readers' forbearance

George Farebrother

.....

THE ILLEGALITY OF NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

May 1997

The following notes summarise what we in the World Court Project (UK) believe are the strongest arguments flowing from the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which can be used in exposing the illegality of NATO's nuclear policy.

It is important to recognise that none of our arguments will guarantee success in court. However, we are convinced that what we have to say is plausible and carries conviction.

As a general point, it is important to emphasise that the ICJ found threat and use to be indivisible. Whatever is illegal about use is also illegal about threat. This relates directly to nuclear deterrence.

NATO's First Use Option

NATO retains the option of using nuclear weapons first. In paragraph 94 of the Opinion, the ICJ challenged the nuclear States that they had neither specified any legal circumstance for use, nor convinced it that "limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons." It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which using nuclear weapons first would not have such a tendency.

This is especially applicable to the most likely scenario for the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the NATO nuclear States. The US, UK and France have plans to threaten to use nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear "rogue" States to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to protect US/UK/French so-called "vital interests" anywhere in the world. For such so-called sub-strategic use, some of the missiles in the currently patrolling UK Trident submarine are fitted with a single, variable lower-yield warhead - because six 100 kiloton warheads on a missile are not a credible deterrent threat

to a “rogue” regime or terrorists.

These scenarios fall far short of those postulated in the ICJ’s only concession, that it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” We can therefore argue that NATO first use would be illegal, whatever the yield of nuclear weapon used.

Complying with Humanitarian Law

The ICJ concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal. Indeed, it found no circumstance in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not violate humanitarian law.

Even in extreme circumstances, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with international humanitarian law (paragraph 105D). Thus any use must, for example, discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, must not cause unnecessary or superfluous suffering, and must respect neutral States.

The NATO nuclear States deploy some, at least, of their nuclear warheads on behalf of the Alliance, and are willing to use them in collective self-defence. Although some of these warheads might be relatively small, the majority are far larger in their yield than the Hiroshima bomb.

For example, most UK Trident warheads are 100 kilotons - about 8 times larger than Hiroshima; moreover, most UK Trident missiles have six warheads. Such enormous destructive power, combined with the ability to cause untold human suffering and damage to generations to come from radiation effects, makes them incapable of complying with humanitarian law.

Francis Boyle, a US Professor of International Law who has specialized in nuclear weapon issues, advises that the best way to deal with this question is to apply the language of the Opinion to the specific nuclear weapons system under legal challenge.

The Nuremberg Connection

The ICJ’s confirmation that the Nuremberg Charter, as part of humanitarian law, applies to nuclear weapons has serious implications for all involved in implementing NATO’s nuclear policy. For example, military professionals need to be seen to be acting within the law if they are to be distinguished from hired killers or terrorists.

Military professionals shunned chemical and biological weapons before they were prohibited, because they were too indiscriminate and repulsive. NATO’s plans to use even low-yield nuclear weapons are vulnerable to the ICJ’s finding that the effects of nuclear weapons are unique, and more severe, widespread and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons. In so doing, the ICJ confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical

and biological weapons - only in many respects far worse.

Unanimous Call for Nuclear Disarmament

The judges' unanimous call in paragraph 105F for nuclear disarmament went further than Article VI of the NPT, by stating that negotiations should be concluded irrespective of any treaty on general and complete disarmament, behind which hitherto the nuclear States have hidden.

This challenges the current perception among NATO decision-makers that "nuclear might is right" and lawful, and that NATO nuclear policy is sustainable.

Although NATO's nuclear plans are secret, its post-Cold War posture shows that it has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons; it is determined to maintain a nuclear warfighting capability; and it is prepared to threaten to use low-yield warheads first, backed by massive nuclear strikes when its public stance is one of last-resort, so-called "minimal deterrence" in self-defence.

NATO as a Nuclear Alliance

NATO is an alliance which relies on nuclear deterrence doctrine. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group takes collective decisions. Therefore NATO, as an institution as well as its individual members, carries responsibility for its nuclear policy.

To date, there is no evidence that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has responded to the implications of the ICJ's Opinion. The onus is now on NATO to demonstrate that its nuclear plans would:

- 1) fit the criteria of extreme circumstance;
- 2) not violate the humanitarian laws of warfare.

Our foregoing assessment suggests that NATO should urgently review its nuclear policy in order to comply with the ICJ's opinion.

The Authority of the International Court of Justice

The UK government has consistently argued that the Opinion is not binding and changes nothing. However, on 24 September 1996 in the UN, the UK Foreign Secretary pledged "both moral and material support" to the ICJ, adding that "the more we accept that international law must be the foundation of international relations, the safer we shall all be."

The ICJ is the UN's Court. It can give Advisory Opinions on any question at the request of a UN agency, such as the General Assembly, in order to assist that agency in its duties. These Opinions clarify international law with the highest possible authority. An Advisory Opinion is only given after careful and lengthy deliberation by 15 judges after full hearings involving all interested States and UN agencies. In this case, 43 states - a record number, including the USA, UK and France - filed written submissions and 22 (again including the NATO nuclear

States) made oral statements.

The USA, UK and France have signed the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and have affirmed the Nuremberg Principles. They are therefore bound to abide by these. Thus, the ICJ's decision that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally violate the Law of War as codified in these conventions and principles means that the NATO nuclear States are under an obligation to respect this.

It is also worth pointing out that in December 1994, by a comfortable majority, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested the Court to deliver its Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On 10 December 1996, an even larger majority of the UNGA adopted Resolution 51/45M which "takes note of" the Opinion and "expresses its appreciation to the ICJ". The Resolution went on to call for "negotiations in 1997 leading to the early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention".

CONCLUSION

By ignoring the ICJ's decision, NATO is defying the most authoritative view of how international law applies to nuclear weapons; it is opposing the overwhelming majority of world opinion; and it is failing to heed what the UK Foreign Secretary said in the UN on 24 September 1996. This sets an irresponsible example, and augurs ill for the safety of the world.

ENDS

The World Court Project is an international citizens' network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

World Court Project UK
George Farebrother, UK Secretary
67, Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR
Phone & Fax 01323 844 269, Email geowcpuk@gn.apc.org

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$ 1 LINE REFORMATTED BY POPPER AT igc.apc.org \$\$\$\$\$\$\$

Dear Abolitionists,

As you are all aware, we are in the midst of an electoral campaign, with general elections coming up in two weeks. This makes it a little bit more difficult for us to fully mobilize people. nevertheless, here is what we are doing at the moment :

1) the following text is being distributed in its tens of thousands these days
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE :
"REDUCING MILITARY SPENDING
BUILDING A EUROPE OF PEACE"

The Mouvement de la Paix addresses candidates and public opinion.

- Will France spend over 100 billion francs in five years on nuclear weapons ? This is unacceptable when so many needs are not met in our society. This is unjustified ten years after the end of the cold war.
MPs elected on May 25 and June 1 will be responsible for these policies until after the year 2000.

We demand that the 5-year military programme be revised and laboratory testing stopped. Money spent on manufacturing new nuclear missiles and bombs should be used for civilian research and purposes.

- Will France continue to produce and design new nuclear weapons, while she has pledged to contribute to nuclear disarmament, through international agreements ?

Public opinion has mobilized in France and throughout the world and made important progress :

- 1995 : NPT article 6, signed by France, includes the commitment to move towards total nuclear disarmament
- 1996 : the international court of justice in The Hague declared "the threat and use of nuclear weapons illegal"
- 1996 : the French government had to close down the nuclear test site of Moruroa and withdraw missiles from Albion (south of France)
- 1996 : the CTBT was adopted, a new step towards nuclear disarmament.

We urge France to take initiatives in order to speed up nuclear disarmament and make it possible to sign in Paris, in January 2000, an international convention to abolish nuclear weapons, similar to the one banning chemical weapons since April 29, 1997.

- Will France strengthen military alliances in Europe and create intervention troops ? This would be the opposite of the Europe of peace which people on the continent want.

We urge France to act for the dissolution of NATO and to build a common security among all States in Europe.

We urge all citizens to refuse the waste of money and human resources due to these militarization policies and to strongly speak up during the electoral campaign.

Paris, April 25, 1997

2) On June 6, under the Eiffel tower in Paris, our local committees from Brittany will bring a wood and iron missile that they have built. It is five meter long. We will use it to inform people and mobilize against new nuclear weapons. This could be the first big action after the election !

3) French organizations member of Abolition 2000 met in Paris on April 23, to hear reports from Ben Cramer, Solange Fernex and myself about the prepcom. We then held a press conference. On May 6, we agreed on two texts :
- one to all political parties (except the extreme right) about the election
- one to public opinion about current security developments in Europe. (NATO expansion, nuclear weapons...) This will be delivered to heads of States in Paris if NATO countries and Russia meet there at the end of the month.

More to come later !

A bientôt,

Amities pacifistes
Lysiane Alezard

May 12, 1997

Mishaps put Russian missiles in 'combat mode'

By Bill Gertz

Recent malfunctions of equipment controlling Russia's vast nuclear arsenal have spontaneously switched nuclear missiles to "combat mode" on several occasions, increasing the risk of unauthorized attack on the United States, The Washington Times has learned.

These equipment failures are due to a "deteriorating" nuclear command and control system that is dangerously outdated and poorly maintained, according to a classified CIA report.

"Command and control equipment often malfunctions and on more than one occasion has switched spontaneously to combat mode," the CIA report, labeled "secret," says in quoting a former Russian officer in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the service in charge of nuclear missiles.

The report explained that switching the missiles to combat status "would not necessarily result in an unauthorized missile launch." Other required steps include using codes to release locks on weapons and supplying targeting data to the missile.

The nuclear-control problems were highlighted by the CIA following warnings from Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov in February that control of the Russian nuclear arsenal is breaking down due to lack of funding.

Disclosure of the CIA report comes as Mr. Rodionov is scheduled to meet for the first time with Defense Secretary William S. Cohen at the Pentagon tomorrow. The Russian minister is set to arrive in Washington today.

A CIA spokesman had no comment.

Experts say combat mode could involve such steps as activating guidance gyroscopes, components and on-board computers that may be capable of automatically loading targeting data from nearby fire-control computers in preparation for launch.

The report did not specify when the incidents occurred or how many missiles accidentally went on alert.

The 13-page report, "Rodionov's Concerns about Nuclear Command and Control," was produced in March by the CIA's Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis. It presents further proof of Moscow's declining nuclear control system that was first revealed in a similar "top-secret" CIA report of September 1996 on the prospects for unauthorized nuclear use in Russia.

However, like the September report, the CIA rates the chance of unauthorized nuclear missile launch as low under "normal circumstances" since "many safeguards" are still in place."

"However, if that system and its safeguards continue to degrade because of lack of funding and maintenance, our concern will increase, especially if a crisis arose that splintered the armed forces," the CIA report says.

The CIA believes there are serious problems that cause Mr. Rodionov to be "most worried about the ability of the command system, including its associated warning functions, to respond quickly in a crisis.

Other recent evidence outlined by the report relating to problems with nuclear command and control includes:

- * Sensitive strategic missile facilities have suffered repeated power cutoffs in recent months because electric bills were not paid. "In addition, during the autumn of 1996, thieves disrupted communications to operational SRF units on seven occasions by 'mining' copper and other nonferrous metals in communications cables," the report states.

- * A Russian strategic forces officer stated in March that "we could launch an accidental nuclear strike on the United States in seconds" and poorly treated SRF officers are psychologically weary and "potentially dangerous."

- * Troop reliability is in question. Mr. Rodionov is worried that a Russian pilot will steal a warplane and "launch a kamikaze attack against the Kremlin or otherwise do something stupid." "Russia's officer corps could be dangerous to Russia," the report notes. According to the report, one Russian officer recently remarked that "only God and a lot of effort by the current leadership could keep the army under control." "It was the good luck of Russia and the rest of the world that nothing had blown up and that nuclear materials had not been stolen," the unidentified officer said.

- * Command and control equipment is "unreliable", even when purchased new, and there is a lack of funds for replacing old equipment produced in Ukraine and Moldova.

- * Communications lines used by SRF forces are only slightly better than Russia's archaic and unreliable telephone system.

- * Russia's automated "Kazbek" nuclear warning and retaliation system, including the three "Cheget" nuclear suitcases held by Moscow leaders are operating four years beyond their 10-year service life. "Funding constraints prevent system upgrade and have driven out most of the civilian scientists who built and understood the existing system, making even simple repairs

problematical."

According to the CIA report, Mr. Rodionov is worried the Russian nuclear system, with some 30,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, will not work in a crisis. "He is also worried about unauthorized nuclear use, but this is of lesser concern," the report says.

"Fearing system decapitation, Soviet and Russian military leaders traditionally have been more concerned with maintaining a robust launch capability over negative control to exclude an accidental or unauthorized launch," the report says.

President Boris Yeltsin has promised to improve funding and food supplies for the military, the report says. "None of these proposals are likely to reassure hard-pressed military leaders," the report says, noting that "more outbursts [by Mr. Rodionov] are likely because the military's basic problems remain unresolved.

Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin ordered a "simulated nuclear strike in an exercise" and later said Russia's "nuclear missiles will not take off by themselves," the report states.

APO 05/12 1639 Russia Nuke Report Raises Concerns

By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER

AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Europe said Monday he is checking a report that recent malfunctions have switched Russian nuclear missiles to "combat mode" on several occasions.

"Reports we have seen up to this date have been that the nuclear warheads have been properly cared for," said U.S. Army Gen. George Joulwan. "But this brings another bit of information, and we are going to assess that and look into it."

The four-star general was queried about a Washington Times report that quoted a classified CIA study that said "command and control equipment often malfunctions and on more than one occasion has switched spontaneously to combat mode."

But, according to the Times, the CIA report said switching the missiles to combat status "would not necessarily result in an unauthorized missile launch" because of safeguards, including codes that control locks on weapons and supply target data to the missile.

Joulwan, who is slated to leave his post this summer, said NATO has "been watching with some concern the storage of nuclear warheads, and for the most part, we have positive feedback that it's been done correctly."

Joulwan spoke at the Pentagon on the eve of a visit by Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, who sounded the alarm earlier this year about the state of Russia's nuclear weaponry, saying the system could fall apart unless the government provided more money.

Equipment at the Soviet-era nuclear command centers already has served two or three times longer than expected, and missiles and other systems might no longer function properly, Rodionov warned.

The Times said the CIA report was produced in March after those warnings were issued by Rodionov.

At the CIA, spokeswoman Carolyn Osborn said the spy agency would have no comment on the Times report.

A senior Pentagon official, briefing reporters in advance of Rodionov's visit Tuesday with Defense Secretary William Cohen, said he would not comment directly on intelligence reports.

But he pointed out that the CIA report quotes a former officer in the strategic rocket forces, adding, "That is at best, hearsay."

"I've never seen any credible report from our intelligence services -- across the board -- that would indicate the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch has been raised," said the official, who is a specialist on nuclear matters and spoke on condition of anonymity.

"This is not something that's keeping me up at night," the official added at another point. He said he was far more concerned about the safety of the Russian's stockpile of chemical weapons and the failure of the Russian Parliament, or Duma, to ratify the chemical weapons treaty.

Another Clinton administration official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said, "We are confident that the Russian strategic rocket forces continue to maintain necessary levels of security and protection of nuclear weapons."

In Moscow, a Defense Ministry duty officer declined comment today except to note there have been similar news reports, including one today by the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda. The military publication carried an item signed by Maj. Gen. Vitaly Denisyuk, chief of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force's Central Command post.

"Since I became a duty officer at the Central Command post in 1985 ... there have been no cases of spontaneous switching to combat mode at any of the Strategic Nuclear Force command posts," Denisyuk wrote.

But, he added, "Recently, the funding of planned replacements of combat control systems at control stations has been disrupted. If this tendency continues, a moment will come when the combat control systems' reliability will stop to meet the requirements."

The CIA rated the chance of unauthorized nuclear missile launch as low under "normal circumstances" because "many safeguards" remain.

"However, if that system and its safeguards continue to degrade because of a lack of funding and maintenance, our concern will increase, especially if a crisis arose that splintered the armed forces," the report said.

FROM: Disarmament Clearinghouse

1101 14th Street NW #700
Washington DC 20005
Tel: 202 898 0150 ext. 232
Fax: 202 898 0172
<disarmament@igc.apc.org>

I hope that Howard (London) and Colin (Geneva) can both take a moment to read this, along with those of you here at various national offices in the U.S.. For WRI and IPB the real question is not whether you have time to work on this - you don't - but whether you can repost to the sections that have email addresses.

Last Thursday there was a luncheon meeting in NYC of some of the NGO's which had been working on the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) - generally they had met at breakfast, which is impossible for me (as some of you know), but lunch I can make, and am glad to did.

The issue is one which links those of us in the peace/disarmament movement and those of us in the socialist/social justice movements. Clinton is preparing to go ahead with a test at the Nevada Test Site this June in which high explosives, together with plutonium, will be exploded a thousand feet beneath the desert floor.

At the peace level, this test (called a "sub-critical test") probably violates the letter, and certainly the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) agreement. India and Pakistan - neither of which is angelic, and both of which have their own reasons for dodging out of the test ban - have made it clear they will not sign the CTB if the U.S. goes ahead. There have been NO underground explosions at Nevada desert since 1991 when the nuclear moratorium was put in place.

That part is the political/peace issue. Pressure needs to be brought on the U.S. - in the case of WRI and IPB at the various U.S. Missions and Embassies abroad - to stop this test. Fuller info and details can be gotten on these issues from Alice Slater or Tina Bell - note the addresses in the CC box.

The other part - and I find this utterly incredible at a time when we are going to bounce aging, legal aliens off of welfare because they aren't citizens, and they can't become citizens because they have Alzheimer's and cannot understand or take the oath (catch 22), at a time when Clinton rammed through the obscene welfare measures, when there isn't money for mass transit, improved railways, decent low cost public housing, etc. etc., that the tests are part of a \$40 BILLION DOLLAR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM which will simply permit the U.S. to continue to design new nuclear weapons.

Here is a chunk of the budget - I assume the 40 Billion isn't all in one year but spread out - that is waiting for us to pounce. There is much in the military budget which can be pounced on but this one stands out like an oak tree in a desert. Forty bloody billion bucks, the violation of a treaty, all as part of the process of keeping the Pentagon and the technical weapons designers in business and happy!

This IS an issue for those of us on the Left, not just the main stream peace groups.

I do not, personally, think writing letters to Bill Clinton does the least bit of good - spitting in the wind at 32 cents a shot. I am not even sure he weighs them by the pound. But members of Congress are up for election in just over a year - and they can be pressured. A third of the Senate is up for election, and they can be pressured. What is needed is a strong wind from the

grass roots.

It is easy, in the midst of each of our groups working on our own programs (as War Resisters League is working on its "Day Without the Pentagon") to miss the urgency of the small bits and pieces that go to make up the military machine. Here is a piece we might do something about this May and June - and those of us who want much more, as the War Resisters League does, can use it as one more reason to get rid of the Pentagon altogether.

Peace,
David McReynolds

EUROPEAN NGO-CONFERENCE
Nuclear Weapons Free Europe.
Visions for non-nuclear European Security.
June 13th - 15th 1997

HOST ORGANISATIONS

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAWYERS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS
(IALANA)

INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS (INES)

INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUREAU (IPB)

INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
WAR (IPPNW)

PEACE CENTER BURG SCHLAINING / AUSTRIA

PROJECT FOR EUROPEAN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (PENN)

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM
(WILPF)

PEACE CENTER BURG SCHLAINING

GOALS OF THE CONFERENCE:

To present and discuss topical information central to peace and security in
the OSCE region (and
surrounding area), especially:

the future role of nuclear weapons;
enlargement of NATO and WEU and their relation to CIS;
the future role of the OSCE;
alternative concepts and strategies for peace and security.

To establish the foundations for a NGO Network by the end of the
conference, active in the OSCE
region and linked to the global NGO Network |Abolition 2000 by:

discussing and drafting a common platform for goals,
strategies and campaign proposals;
establishing an informal working structure for further
communication and joint action.

To undertake substantial steps to attract media attention to such an NGO
Network.

Important steps

"First and foremost, is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold

War is in fact over. To break free of the attitudes, the habits and the practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, nuclear forces still standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aim-points."

>General Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command

"The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet ... Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations."

>From the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, July 8th 1996

FRIDAY 13th JUNE

Arrival and check-in

FRIDAY 13th JUNE, 6.00 - 7.00 pm

Dinner

FRIDAY, 7.00 - 9.30 pm

Vladimir Orlov, RUS (PIR Center, Moscow)

"Russian Nuclear Deterrence in the Light of NATO Expansion"

Mai-Britt Theorin, MEP, Sweden (IPB President)

"Alternative Security Structures for the 21st Century in Europe - the role of nuclear weapons"

Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK

"Why nuclear weapons are obsolete"

SATURDAY 14th JUNE, 9.00 - 11.30 am

Plenary background lectures:

Stephen Young, USA (BASIC)

"Nuclear arsenals and doctrines in Europe Including their "virtual" character"

Alexander Nikitin, RUS (Pugwash)

"The Russian nuclear posture - between dismantling and new emphasis on nuclear weapons"

Klaus Renoldner, A (OMEGA/IPPNW)

Prevention of renewed East/West Confrontation in the context of NATO Expansion

SATURDAY 14th JUNE, 1.30 pm - 3.30 pm

Working Groups, session 1: "Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

I.1. "Further Delegitimisation of Nuclear Weapons"

Evaluation of the legal and political implications of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons, of the legal status of nuclear weapons based in non-nuclear weapons states, and of the ,Eurobomb. Analysis of the legal problems of NATO expansion, especially concerning the nuclear status of new NATO member states.

Facilitators: Renate Reupke, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both IALANA)

Expert participants:

Phon van den Biesen, NL (IALANA), Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK (World Court Project, WCP) and Solange Fernex, F (WILPF, Greens, IPB)

I.2. "Nuclear non-proliferation. Can Europe take the next step?"

Examination of the opportunity for European states to take the next non-proliferation step by improving the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear technology. Identifying possibilities for reducing the availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Facilitator: Martin Kalinowski, D (IANUS/INESAP)

Expert participants: Frans Berkhout, UK (SPRU), Christian Kueppers, D and Michael Sailer, D (both Eco-Institute), Mycle Schneider D/F (WISE-Paris)

I.3. "A European nuclear option."

Discussion of a future European nuclear option, either within the context of so-called "concerted deterrence" or based upon the European security and defence identity (ESDI). Clarification of the role of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear states, especially new NATO members, and their role in possible future security concepts.

Facilitator: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg Schlaining)

Expert participants: Roland Kollert, D (Consultant)

I.4. "Russian and NATO nuclear planning"

Examination of the future role of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapon states, particularly in Russia and NATO. Evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in new East-West and North-South conflict scenarios. Analysis of the effect of NATO-enlargement on nuclear planning.

Facilitator: Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW)

Expert participants: Otfried Nassauer, D (BITS) and Vladimir Orlov, RUS (PIR Center)

I.5. "Denuclearise Europe"

Examination of the prospects of Russian ratification of START II and initiation of START III negotiations. Evaluation of progress a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Identification of strategies for achieving a nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) in Europe, and the unilateral return of nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory to their countries of origin.

Facilitator: Tobias Damjanov, D (INES)

Expert participants: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix), Janet Bloomfield, UK (Oxford Research Group)

SATURDAY 14th JUNE, 3.30 - 4.00 pm

Coffee Break

SATURDAY 14th JUNE, 4.00 - 6.00 pm

Working Groups, session 2: "Security Architecture in Europe"

II.1. "Further Delegitimisation of Nuclear Weapons - New Trends"

The legal and political obstacles to the European nuclear option and the NPT; NATO expansion and nuclear weapons. Visions for non-nuclear European security; legal and political means of implementation; proposals for a NGO programme of action.

Facilitator: Peter Becker, D, Francisca van Holthoon, NL (both IALANA)

Expert participants: Georg Schoefbaenker, A (Peace Centre Burg Schlaining), Dieter Deiseroth, D (IALANA)

II.2. "Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament"

Discussion of the prospects for, and content of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Creation of an agenda towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, including steps like no first-use treaty, START III, fissile material cut-off, unilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Facilitator: Lysiane Alezard, F (Mouvement de la Paix)

Expert participant: Juergen Scheffran, D (IANUS/INESAP)

II.3. "Collective Security Revisited"

Discussion of systems of collective security versus defence alliances. What role do nuclear weapons play and what problems do they pose on both types of architecture? Should the OSCE have a more prominent political value?

Facilitator: Solange Fernex, F (WILPF, Greens, IPB, France)

Expert participants: Jarmila Marsalkova, CZ (IPPNW)

II.4. "NATO-enlargement. New conflict constellations?"

Examination of the involved parties and their interests. Analysis of the role of Partnership for Peace. Probability of nuclear deployment in new NATO member states and their security interests. Possible effects on Russian nuclear doctrine.

Facilitator: Miklos Barabas, H (Hungarian Peace Association)

Expert Participant: Jiri Matousek, CZ (INES), Commander (ret.) Rob Green, UK (WCP)

II.5. "Campaigning for Nuclear Free Zones in Europe"

Creation of strategies for achieving nuclear-weapon free zones in Europe including: lobbying decision makers, and nuclear free local authorities. Work with OSCE and parliamentarians, especially on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Development of a media campaign.

Facilitator: Liz Waterston, UK (MEDACT)

Expert Participant: Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW)

SATURDAY 14th JUNE, 6.00 - 7.30 pm

Dinner and social event

SUNDAY 15th JUNE, 10.00 am - 1.00 pm

The result of the working groups will be displayed on wall charts

Plenary session "Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in Europe"

1. Report of the facilitators/rapporteurs on the following:
Proposals for a Joint resolution addressed to military and political leaders, developed by the working groups with special emphasis on:

Concepts for a nuclear weapon free Europe and alternative security structures strengthened future role of OSCE, new role for NATO and WEU

2. Improvement of NGO work on OSCE level:

NGO Campaign Proposals
Formation of Contribution to a European Abolition 2000 Network

Adoption of a joint resolution; Agreement on a list of common NGO strategies and activities

Rainer Braun, D (INES), Xanthe Hall, D/UK (IPPNW), Georg SchsfbSnker, A (Burg Schlaining), Chris Bross, USA/CH (IPB)

SUNDAY 15th JUNE, 1.00 pm

Lunch and Departure

"In my considered opinion, the unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons is not predicated on the circumstances in which the use takes place, but rather on the unique and established characteristics of those weapons which under any circumstance would violate international law by their use."

>Judge Koroma, International Court of Justice

"The risks of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to deterrence. The possession of nuclear weapons increases the possibility of a nuclear response in a crisis, encourages others to develop nuclear arsenals and provokes the rapid development of nuclear weapons by adversaries."

"What is clear, however, is that possession of nuclear weapons has not prevented wars, in various regions, which directly involve the major powers. They were deemed unsuitable for use even when those powers suffered humiliating military setbacks (as in Korea) and, ultimately, defeat (as in Vietnam and Afghanistan)."

"The nuclear weapon states should commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement. This commitment should be made at the highest political level."

>From the Report of the Canberra Commission, August 1996

"The international community should reaffirm its commitment to progressively eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from all nations, and should initiate a programme to make that goal a reality in ten to fifteen years."

>Mr. Jan Ellasson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, April 20 1995

"We believe that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons is zero."

>Mr. Dick Spring, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ireland, April 18 1995

"We urge rapid withdrawal from operational use of all the remaining tactical nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination."

>H.E. Ms. Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, April 19 1995

A shuttle service from Vienna air terminal is available from 1.00 pm, Vienna Hilton Hotel), 3rd district, (easily accesible by U3 - metro line or airport shuttle bus)

TO REGISTER FOR THIS CONFERENCE PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO:
Georg Schoefbaenker, Peace Center Burg Schlaining
georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at

I would like to register for the conference
"A Nuclear Weapons-Free Europe"

Name-----

Address-----

I need a single room for ----- nights

I need a double room for ----- nights

I am willing to share a double room

I need the shuttle service from Vienna Air Terminal

I will arrive on-----

I will leave on-----

Registration fee \$50; reduced rate \$20; Accommodation \$90 / \$70 per day
(those who have financial difficulties may apply to the conference hosts for support)

I will send a cheque-----
(Address: Georg Schoefbaenker, Peace Center Burg Schlaining, A-7461)

I will transfer the registration fee by banker's order-----
(PSK Bank Eisenstadt, Bank Acc. 7965 100, Bank Sorting Code No. 60 000)

You can also automatically register on the web page:

<http://www.aspr.ac.at/d14.html>

CrossPoint v3.1

forwarded

>Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 20:06:51 -0400 (EDT)
>From: Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice <fcpj@afn.org>
>To: Abolition 2000 Network <abolition-caucus@igc.apc.org>,
>Subject: Report from Germany about Cassini actions (fwd)

>
>----- Forwarded message -----
>Date: Sun, 11 May 1997 21:21:32 -0700
>From: Regina Hagen <regina.hagen@jugendstil.da.shuttle.de>
>To: fcpj@afn.org
>Subject: Report from Germany about Cassini actions

>
>Lieber Bruce,

>
>following you find the report from Germany. Please correct the grammar
>and spelling and other mistakes before you mail it to your list, will
>you!?!? If you have any questions or doubts about the report, do tell me!

>
>Deine Regina

>
>*****

>Report about Cassini activities in Germany, May 11, 1997

>
>Introduction: The Cassini mission has a specific European aspect: Cassini
>will carry Huygens to the Saturn moon Titan. The Huygens probe is a
>mission by the European Space Agency (ESA) with headquarters in Paris
>(France) and the European Space Operations Center (ESOC) in Darmstadt
>(Germany).

>
>Report: The Friedens- and Begegnungsstaette Mutlangen published a
>brochure about Plutonium in Space and Star Wars in 1996. That was the
>beginning of the German involvement against weapons and nuclear power in
>space. Along with the brochure Mutlangen started to collect signatures
>against the Cassini mission on signature lists. For the last seven
>months, signed lists have been returned to Mutlangen. The return rate has
>recently been increasing.

>
>In cooperation with the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power
>in Space, the INESAP (International Network of Engineers and Scientists
>against Proliferation), the Naturwissenschaftler-Initiative Verantwortung
>für den Frieden, and IANUS (an interdisciplinary group of scientists at
>the Technical University Darmstadt) who hosted the event, the Mutlangen
>group organized an international symposium on the "Ambivalence of Space
>Technology" in March 1997. In the course of the symposium, several
>activities were agreed upon with respect to Cassini. At the end of the
>event, an official declaration of the symposium organizers was released
>to the press.. A few days after the symposium, the Darmstaedter
>Friedensforum broadcasted a radio show to inform the listeners about the
>symposium and Cassini.

>
>Meanwhile, the Mutlangen group and the Darmstaedter Friedensforum

>designed a set of postcards to be sent to the US President Bill Clinton,
>to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, to the ESA in Paris, and a feedback
>card to Mutlangen. The postcards contain some information about Cassini
>as well as the request to stop the project. The two groups also wrote a
>leaflet to inform the public about the danger that may result from
>Cassini. Within a very short time, several thousand of the postcard sets
>and leaflets have been distributed. Both groups keep printing more of
>them to satisfy demand by the interested public, peace groups, ecology
>groups, etc. A nation-wide conference about nuclear weapon which took
>place in Munich in April was used to give the protests additional
>publicity.

>
>In the last four weeks, members from the Mutlangen and the Darmstadt
>groups wrote several articles about Cassini and about plutonium in space.
>An article by Karl Grossman which covers Cassini as well as Nukes in
>Space and the Star Wars topic was translated into German. These two
>articles were sent to many non-profit magazines and publishers of
>organization's newsletters with the request to publish one of them within
>the next few weeks. The postcard set will be attached to one of the
>German peace magazines, "Friedensforum". Another magazin, "Eltern für
>unbelastete Nahrung", agreed to attach the signature list to their next
>edition.

>
>All major German magazines were contacted and supplied with the relevant
>information. As a first result, one of the largest political magazines,
>"Focus", will cover the plutonium aspect of Cassini in its May 17
>edition. The magazine "Publik Forum", widely read by critical Christians,
>will also publish an article on Cassini in its next edition.

>
>Mutlangen contacted all German observatories and ask for support. This
>week, the first of them (Dresden) replied and said that they officially
>support the Declaration of the symposium organizers.

>
>A freelance journalist from the Mutlangen group attended the press
>conference which was held during the official release of the probe
>Huygens in Munich. He asked questions which were however not answered by
>the ESA and NASA representatives - but all the other journalists heard
>his reservations against the Cassini mission.

>
>Mutlangen used its international contacts to try to get peace and ecology
>groups from other European countries to participate in the protest.

>
>In the next few weeks the effort to "spread the word" will continue. The
>Darmstaedter Friedensforum will translate the script of Karl Grossman's
>video "Nukes in Space" and produce a dubbed version. If possible, the
>European conference "Nuclear Weapons Free Europe" which will take place
>in Austria by mid-June will be used to inform representatives of European
>groups about the Cassini mission, its dangers, and the world-wide
>protest. If funding allows, the postcard set will be attached to more
>magazines. The Mutlangen journalist will attend the share holder meeting
>of Daimler-Benz (who are part of the consortium that build the probe
>Huygens) and make Cassini an issue there.

>
>All German activites are carried out in close cooperation with the Global

>Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. Support from other
>German groups is most welcome!!!
>
>If you want to get into contact, you can do this by
>* writing to: Friedens- und Begegnungsstätte Mutlangen
> Forststraße 3
> D - 73557 Mutlangen, Germany
>* faxing or phoning Mutlangen: [49] (7171) 75661
>* sending e-mail to: regina.hagen@jugendstil.da.shuttle.de
>
>

Michael Christ Program Director
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
126 Rogers St. tel. (617)868-5050 x.207
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA fax. (617)868-2560
ippnwbos@igc.apc.org <http://www.healthnet.org/IPPNW>

IPPNW is part of Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

APn 05/13 0135 Pentagon-Russia

By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER

AP Military Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Russia's defense minister, Igor Rodionov, is being welcomed to the Pentagon to bolster a "very open, very constructive and very frank" relationship with Moscow's military, a senior Pentagon official says.

Although the relationship between Moscow and Washington has been clouded in recent months by NATO's plans to expand eastward, the Helsinki summit in March between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin has helped clear the air, the official said.

"Since Helsinki, we have seen what represents a change in the Russian attitude, for the positive," the official said, adding that the two sides intend to focus on "ways we could expand the military-to-military relationship" between the two former Cold War foes.

The official spoke with reporters about the visit on condition of anonymity.

Rodionov is bringing a high-powered military team with him, and will be gleaning information about how to run a military in a democracy; how to recruit volunteers for the military; how to run an officers' corps; and how to allocate resources among service branches and work with an independent defense industry, the official said.

Referring to a meeting held in April to prepare for the Rodionov visit, the official said, "That meeting was very open, very constructive and very frank, and it was not contentious at all. The Russians came to that meeting with positive ideas about the future direction of the relationship and we expect to pursue those with Rodionov."

Defense Secretary William Cohen was to treat Rodionov, his Russian counterpart, to a flag-bedecked arrival ceremony on the Pentagon parade grounds. The Russian minister was to spend nearly the entire day Tuesday meeting with Cohen and other Pentagon officials, returning Wednesday for a session with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During his Pentagon visit, Rodionov will meet Deputy Defense Secretary John White and the four undersecretaries of defense and attend a discussion of the Pentagon's budget process.

He is also scheduled to participate in a round table with Army officers who helped reform the service after the Vietnam War. It will be hosted by Gen. Dennis Reimer, the Army chief of staff.

Rodionov leaves Washington Wednesday for Hawaii, where he will be briefed at the U.S. Pacific Command and visit the 25th Infantry Division's noncommissioned officers' academy.

The visit is Rodionov's third to the United States, but his first as defense minister. He traveled to the United States as head of the military academy of the general staff, a position he held for more than six years before being selected last July as minister of defense.

It will be his first meeting with Cohen.

On the eve of the visit, officials played down a report that

recent malfunctions have switched Russian nuclear missiles to "combat mode" on several occasions.

"Reports we have seen up to this date have been that the nuclear warheads have been properly cared for," said Army Gen. George Joulwan, the NATO commander and head of U.S. forces in Europe. "But this brings another bit of information, and we are going to assess that and look into it."

Joulwan was queried by reporters about a Washington Times report that quoted a classified CIA study that said "command and control equipment often malfunctions and on more than one occasion has switched spontaneously to combat mode."

But, according to the Times, the CIA report said switching the missiles to combat status "would not necessarily result in an unauthorized missile launch" because of safeguards, including codes that control locks on weapons and supply target data to the missiles.

Joulwan, who is slated to leave his post this summer, said NATO has "been watching with some concern the storage of nuclear warheads, and for the most part, we have positive feedback that it's been done correctly."

RTw 05/13 0819 Russian experts warn Yeltsin over quick NATO deal

By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW, May 13 (Reuter) - A group of influential Russian foreign policy experts warned the Kremlin on Tuesday against signing a quick but imperfect deal with NATO, saying it might be wiser to prolong negotiations.

The declaration by the Advisory Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, headed by a leading Russian NATO expert, ran counter to the apparent determination of President Boris Yeltsin to sign a deal on a new relationship with NATO by May 27.

"Although steps have been taken in the right direction in the last few months, and the Russian president and foreign minister have obtained movement from the Western side, too much remains in the zone of uncertainty," said the declaration, published by the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

The council, an independent advisory body which broadly backs Yeltsin but has no direct influence on policy, said the best scenario would be to sign a deal as planned on May 27 if it meets Russia's needs.

If Russia's demands are not met, the Kremlin should continue talks after a NATO summit in Madrid in July which will offer invitations to new members from the former Soviet bloc, the council said.

"Continuing negotiations between Russia and NATO after Madrid right up to when a mutually acceptable document is worked out is, from our point of view, quite promising," it said.

The council voiced its concerns before talks between Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana which were expected to show whether differences can be narrowed in time to sign a deal this month.

Yeltsin has said he will sign an agreement with NATO only if

it meets Russia's interests. His demands include firm guarantees against a NATO force buildup in eastern Europe and progress on amending a 1990 treaty governing conventional arms in Europe.

But some Kremlin sources say he has already decided to sign an agreement outlining terms for a new partnership with NATO in Paris on May 27, apparently believing the alliance will be less ready to compromise once it has started expanding eastward.

The council said an imperfect deal would fail to satisfy Yeltsin's communist and nationalist opponents and would increase the risk of the Kremlin running into conflict with the opposition-dominated lower house of parliament.

It said opposition in parliament would reduce the chances of the State Duma, the lower house, ratifying the 1993 SALT-2 [SIC] strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty and other arms accords.

"In this case the whole system of agreements on strategic nuclear arms reached by Moscow and Washington in the last 10 years would look doubtful," the council said.

It said one advantage of continuing negotiations after the Madrid summit was that it might then be clearer which countries were likely to be in the second wave of NATO expansion, making it easier to determine what was at stake under enlargement.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are expected to be in the first wave, with Romania and Slovenia hoping to join them. Moscow fears the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might be in a second wave, despite opposition from Russia.

The council's declaration highlighted the concerns of some Russian politicians that Moscow may be rushing into a deal from which it gains little or nothing of substance.

The declaration was signed by experts including council head Sergei Karaganov, who is also a member of Yeltsin's loose advisory Presidential Council, Alexei Arbatov, deputy head of parliament's defence committee, and Vyacheslav Nikonov, who advised Yeltsin during his re-election campaign.

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES

May 13, 1997

Russian defense chief stalls START

By Bill Gertz

Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov continues to oppose ratification of the START II arms treaty even though the United States offered concessions at the recent Helsinki summit aimed at winning parliamentary approval, according to a report by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

"Rodionov continues to oppose ratifying START II, even after Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in Helsinki to compromise on the conditions for implementing the treaty," the DIA said in a May 6 report prepared for the U.S. visit of Mr. Rodionov, who arrived yesterday.

"Rodionov has not publicly endorsed this compromise," the DIA said. "Moreover, he has not been willing to lobby for the treaty in the legislature -- a key test of his support. Unless the military strongly supports the treaty, Russia probably will not ratify it."

A senior DIA official had no comment on the report. Russia's failure to ratify the treaty, which originally called for cutting U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals to less than 3,500 warheads by 2003, would be a major setback for the Clinton administration arms control agenda.

At the Helsinki summit, which ended April 23, Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin agreed to extend the deadline for dismantling strategic missiles and silos under START II to 2007 to accommodate Moscow's complaints it could not afford to pay for the weapons cuts by the original deadline.

The Senate ratified the treaty in January 1996 but ordered that no reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces begin until the Duma, Russia's parliament, approved the treaty.

Russian ratification of START II will be a key topic of discussion today when Defense Secretary William S. Cohen holds talks at the Pentagon with Mr. Rodionov. The Russian defense minister later is scheduled to meet National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright before visiting U.S. military bases. His visit ends Saturday.

The DIA report, labeled "secret," appears in the Pentagon's Military Intelligence Digest, an intelligence periodical.

The report, written by DIA analyst Robert Otto, says Mr. Rodionov has "maintained a studied public silence" on the agreement extending the START II deadline. "The absence of his endorsement suggests that the compromise on START II implementation -- extending the deadline for destroying the missiles -- has not lessened his opposition."

According to the report, Mr. Rodionov told U.S. Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering in August that his two concerns about START II are "the implementation time line and its focus on eliminating land-based MIRVs" -- as multiple-warhead missiles are called.

Under START II, Russia will be required to dismantle all 308 of its most potent nuclear missiles, the 10-warhead SS-18. "Rodionov's opposition to START II ratification clearly demonstrates that each U.S. arms-control concession to Moscow leads to a new Russian demand, whether it's START, chemical weapons, conventional forces, NATO, or missile defenses," said Sven Kraemer, director of arms control on the National Security Council staff during the Reagan administration.

Mr. Rodionov also opposes treaty ratification because of NATO's plan to add new members and opposes a second arms agreement, also reached in Helsinki, regarding clarification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty on regional anti-missile systems, the DIA report said.

According to DIA, "a close Rodionov ally" told U.S. officials START II ratification is closely linked to "adherence with the ABM treaty."

Since the two presidents reached the ABM side agreement in Helsinki, Russia's military chief of staff, Gen. Victor Samsonov, "has maintained much work needs to be done" before a final agreement is signed in Geneva, and Russia's Foreign Ministry "has challenged the U.S. interpretation of the ABM joint statement" reached at the summit, the DIA said.

"Rodionov quite likely shares the underlying Russian concern that the United States will develop the capability to build a nationwide ballistic missile defense," the report says. "This concern would reinforce his own long-standing reservations about START II."

On NATO expansion, Mr. Rodionov has taken a hard line. He believes that adding members from Central Europe adds a "strategic dimension" to NATO's tactical nuclear arms that threatens "START I, START II, and even a START III," the report says.

Clinton administration officials have said that they would consider an agreement to cut strategic arsenals to as low as 2,000 warheads, but that Moscow must first ratify START II.

The DIA report says it is significant that Mr. Rodionov has never lobbied for parliament ratification, did not testify on behalf of the treaty and has not worked behind the scenes to win approval. A Russian legislator who favors the treaty said Mr. Rodionov called START II a "criminal agreement" and "agreement of betrayal."

The report says Mr. Rodionov's key political ally, Lev Rokhlin, who was described by the DIA as "Rodionov's mouthpiece," has opposed treaty ratification even after the Helsinki concessions.

Mr. Yeltsin said during the Helsinki summit that he expected the Duma to approve the treaty, acting on his advice.

Mr. Rodionov may be receptive to a possible START III treaty, but has not stated specific preferences for any provisions of a follow-on accord, the DIA said. "In any cases, unless START II receives strong support from the military, the Duma will not ratify," the report said.

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<BASE HREF="file:///C:/My Documents/Abolition Treaty 2000/subcriticaltests.html">

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Date: Fri, 9 May 1997 14:59:29 -0700 (PDT)

Message-Id: <199705092159.OAA23094@igc4.igc.org>

From: Peace Action - National Office <panukes@igc.apc.org>

To: palist@igc.org

Subject: Protest the Subcriticals!

X-Mozilla-Status: 0001

Content-Length: 4584

To: All Peace Action affiliates and chapters

From: Karina Wood, Peace Action Education Fund

5/9/97

Peace Action Nuclear Abolition Agenda for the Summer
Proposals from the Nuclear Task Force

The Nuclear Task Force, as I hope you all know, is comprised of about 10 affiliate and chapter activists who take on extra responsibility for shaping and implementing the nukes campaign agenda between national organizing meetings. We talk once a month by phone conference.

On the April 30 Task Force call, we proposed that May and June should be a time for focused attention and action on the SUBCRITICAL TESTS, because, as you know, the DOE intends to conduct its first subcritical nuclear test in June. (No date has been announced as yet.)

CONTEXT: The public is unaware that a subcritical test is about to happen. Most members of Congress are not willing to oppose subcritical testing because the Administration has told them it's the price we had to pay to get the weapons labs and the Pentagon to agree to a zero yield CTBT, and that without a subcritical testing program the Republican controlled Senate will not ratify the treaty.

ACTION: The U.S. peace movement must build an opposition to subcritical testing and the DOE's \$40 billion Stockpile Stewardship

& Management program. President Clinton and his administration must suffer a political price for undermining the CTBT. We need:

- * A flood of letters to the White House protesting the HYPOCRISY of the President for planning an underground weapons test after signing a test ban.

- * Use the Abolition 2000 poll! The overwhelming majority of Americans favor want a nuclear weapon-free world!

- * Letters and op-eds in newspapers letting the public know what their government is doing in their name and with \$20 million of their tax dollars. The message: you are being ripped off by hypocritical tests. Quote the poll figures: the public wants to eliminate nukes, not test them.

- * Appeals to any celebrities, noted scientists, military officials, diplomats, ex-government types you have contacts with. Get them to write to the President and send their letter to a leading newspaper or journal to generate publicity.

- * Organize a protest. STREET THEATER is very effective when numbers of protesters are small, and attracts media attention -- good photo op.

 - Dress up as Dr. Strangeloves: wear white lab coats with "DOE weapons scientist" written on the back.

 - Throw play money around from a chest or pot marked "\$40 billion Nuclear Slush Fund courtesy of American tax payers".

 - You could have Dr. Strangeloves ripping up or setting light to the CTBT.

 - Hand out simple flyers to the public describing subcritical tests as hypocritical tests.

 - Use the sunflower symbol for nuclear abolition.

 - Call the DOE's Stockpile Stewardship Program the "Nuclear Weapons Forever" program.

- * If your town organizes a "Critical Mass" bike ride, jump on the publicity band-waggon by organizing a "Subcritical Mass" protest -- ask the bicyclists to join you!

- * Think of ways to reach YOUNG PEOPLE and STUDENTS. Ask teachers if you can give a talk to their class. Contact student peace and justice groups on college campuses.

- * A Congressional sign-on letter is being organized: I'll post it as soon as I get a copy.

CONTINGENCY PLAN: Plan an action and be ready to execute it the moment the DOE announces its test date. I want to compile a list describing the planned protests so I can put together a national PRESS ADVISORY listing protests all over the country. This advisory would be ready to send to the media the minute we hear from DOE the date they plan to test. Last year when the DOE announced the postponement of the June test, I got several media calls because

our press release was prepared in advance -- and consequently we had Peace Action quotes in an AP story that got a lot of European news coverage. The same journalists will be interested again this year -- so let's be ready!

IMPORTANT DATES:

* May 28: Official groundbreaking ceremony for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, California. Clinton has been invited. If he comes, it's a great opportunity for a high-profile protest!

* June ??: subcritical test -- UNLESS WE STOP IT!

* July 16: anniversary of the first U.S. nuclear test, the Trinity test of 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

**** I NEED YOUR CONTINGENCY PLANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE -- SO GET PLANNING A PROTEST! ****

THANK YOU.

David,

I participate through conference calls on the Nuclear Task Force of Peace Action, as well as the Disarmament Clearinghouse. Both are planning grass-roots responses to the sub-critical test in late June. There will be an action in Nevada, with decentralized protests all over the country in as many places as we can get them going. The general theme is "Subcritical Tests Are Hypocritical" emphasizing that Clinton will contradict the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty he just signed last September by going forward with this series of tests. It is hoped that if there is enough public protest it will drive up the political cost of continuing the series and force the administration to back off.

Separately, I'll be forwarding a memo from Karina Woods of Peace Action giving more details and suggested actions.

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