

From: David Culp <david@fcnl.org>
To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
Subject: RE: Monday Lobby Phonebook
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001 15:52:02 -0500
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0)

> Would you or Lydia please mail me a copy of the new addition. The
> format never seems to come out right when I try to down load it.

Sorry, I'm not willing to take on mailing out the Monday Lobby phonebook.
If you have Windows, on the Start button, go to Programs, then Accessories,
then WordPad. If you want to print it out, out would have to format the
page length.

Over and out,

David

From: Rina.Radov@CliffordChance.com
To: mupj@igc.org
Subject: Nuclear Disarmament
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001 21:50:34 -0000
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)

Thank you for the information about the Interfaith Committee. I would very much like to be added to your e-mail list.

Guy C. Quinlan
guy.quinlan@cliffordchance.com

This message and any attachment are confidential and may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other person.

For further information about Clifford Chance please see our website at <http://www.cliffordchance.com> or refer to any Clifford Chance office.

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.2
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2001 08:42:42 -0600
From: "Greg Laszakovits" <glaszakovits_gb@brethren.org>
To: mupj@igc.org
Subject: Re: Senate staff visits on Thursday

Howard,

I would like to go on those visits, especially Spector, but it won't fit in my schedule.

On another note, I'm getting inquiries from a couple of state contacts who are curious about the timing of their visits to state offices with the larger delegation. When will this happen? The inquiries are coming out of Indiana and PA.

Greg

Greg Laszakovits
Director, Church of the Brethren Washington Office
337 North Carolina Avenue
Washington, DC 20003
202.546.3202

>>> "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org> 01/23/01 10:36AM >>>
Dear Colleagues:

I am looking for one or two persons to join me on Thursday morning, January 25 for the following appointments to talk about nuclear disarmament issues:

10:00 a.m. Karen Rogers, office of Senator Specter, 711 Hart
11:00 a.m. Lori Schultz-Heim, office of Senator Jeffords, 728 Hart

Please e-mail or call me at 301 896-0013 if you are willing to do this.

Thanks,
Howard

Howard W. Hallman, Chair
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013 E-mail: mupj@igc.org

January 17, 2001

To: Senator Sam Nunn, Mr. Ted Turner,
Co-Chairs, Nuclear Threat Initiative

From: Howard W. Hallman
Chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice
Chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Re: Involvement of Faith Community

Gentlemen:

We are quite pleased to learn of the establishment of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the allocation of substantial funds for this endeavor. It is a very worthy task. We hope you achieve great success.

We believe that this Initiative would be greatly strengthened by bringing in full participation of the faith community in the United States. Therefore, we urge you to establish a working relationship with the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, and to provide financial support so that we can expand our grassroots educational and advocacy activities.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age religious bodies and religious leaders have expressed their concern about nuclear weapons. Faith-based groups have consistently pressed for the end of nuclear weapon testing, reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals. A collection of policy statements on nuclear weapons is attached.

Furthermore, the faith community has by far the most extensive grassroots network of persons active on issues of nuclear weapons. While the membership of civil-sector organizations dealing with nuclear issue numbers in the tens of thousands, religious membership is in the tens of millions. Although not all of these persons are active on this issue, the potential activists exceed by far the total number of civil-sector activists. Moreover, religious organizations are found in virtually every county of the United States and every congressional districts whereas civil-sector activists tend to be concentrated on the east and west coasts and in metropolitan areas of the Midwest.

We are already engaged in work on a number of issues that you will be dealing with. In keeping with the magnitude of your Initiative, we ask you to consider grants of \$1 million a year for five years, to be spent as described in the attached proposal.

We note that in your statements of announcement that Senator Nunn's emphasis in the Nuclear Threat Initiative will be on "pragmatic and effective steps to reduce the threat of weapons of

mass destruction as comprehensively and as urgently as is feasible." You indicated that Mr. Turner will pursue through other venues his interest in the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. But you also indicated that you would involve the full range of organizations in the Nuclear Threat Initiative, including both those who want to contain nuclear weapons within a deterrence framework as well as those who are interested in both threat reduction and abolition.

The faith community clearly belongs in the latter group. We function at two levels: prophetic advocacy of nuclear abolition and pragmatic pursuit of short-term objectives leading to that goal. We suggest that you may want to bring faith-based organizations into your work on specific steps of nuclear threat reduction, for which we are fully committed, with the realization that we will also be working on longer-range objectives. Thus, perhaps it would be possible to fund our activities in a combination of grants from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and parallel support from other funds that Mr. Turner would allocate.

Beyond that, we aren't certain where threat reduction leaves off and disarmament begins. There is a spectrum that includes:

- Nunn-Lugar Program (Cooperative Threat Reduction)
- Integrated non-proliferation activities (note General Shalikhvili's recent report)
- Nuclear testing moratorium
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- De-alerting
- Support for increased transparency and better monitoring and verification
- Strategic arms reduction (treaties, reciprocal executive initiatives)
 - Bilateral
 - Multilateral
- Nuclear weapons convention
- Fissile material control

One can argue that virtually all of these measures reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. The faith community is engaged in the whole continuum without making a clear distinction between threat reduction and disarmament. We hope that our extensive nationwide network can be involved in the Threat Reduction Initiative even while we are working on other issues that you consider beyond the scope of this particular Initiative.

Who we are and what we want to do is spelled out in the enclosed proposal. I would welcome an opportunity to meet with you or your representative to discuss more fully how the faith community can become involved in the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Chair

Please address reply by letter to me at 6508 Wilmet Road, Bethesda, MD 20817, by e-mail to mupj@igc.org, or by phone at 301 896-0013.

January 24, 2001

The Honorable Sam Nunn
King and Spalding
191 Peachtree Street, NE, #4900
Atlanta, GA 30303

Mr. Ted Turner
Cable News Network
100 International Blvd, NW
Atlanta, GA 30303

Gentlemen:

I am writing as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament to you as co-chairs of the new Nuclear Threat Initiative. We are pleased to learn of this endeavor and hope that you achieve great success.

We believe that this Initiative would be greatly strengthened by bringing in full participation of the faith community in the United States. Therefore, the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament would like to establish a working relationship with your operation. We also ask you to consider financial support for our faith-based activities in an amount of \$1 million a year. As described in the enclosed proposal, we would use this support for a combination of national advocacy and grassroots mobilization.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age religious bodies and religious leaders have expressed their concern about nuclear weapons. Faith-based groups have consistently pressed for the end of nuclear weapon testing, reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, ways to assure nuclear safety, and the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The faith community has by far the most extensive grassroots network of persons active on issues of nuclear weapons. While the membership of civil-sector organizations dealing with nuclear issues numbers in the tens of thousands, religious membership is in the tens of millions. Although not all of these persons are active on this issue, the potential activists exceed by far the total number of civil-sector activists. Moreover, religious organizations are found in virtually every county of the United States and every congressional district whereas civil-sector activists tend to be concentrated on the east and west coasts and in metropolitan areas of the Midwest. In addition, faith-based organizations work on a nonpartisan basis and promote a bipartisan approach to nuclear disarmament.

We note that in your statements of announcement that Senator Nunn's emphasis in the Nuclear Threat Initiative will be on "pragmatic and effective

The Honorable Sam Nunn, Mr. Ted Turner
January 24, 2001
Page two.

steps to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction as comprehensively and as urgently as is feasible." You indicate that Mr. Turner will pursue through other venues his interest in the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. But you also indicate that you would involve the full range of organizations in the Nuclear Threat Initiative, including both those who want to contain nuclear weapons within a deterrence framework as well as those who are interested in both threat reduction and abolition.

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Who we are and what we want to do is spelled out in the enclosed proposal. I would welcome an opportunity to meet with you or your representative to discuss more fully how the faith community can become involved in the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Chair

Please address reply by letter to 6508 Wilmet Road, Bethesda, MD 20817, by e-mail to mupj@igc.org, or by phone at 301 896-0013.

January 27, 2001

Larry Hayes
5405 South Wayne Avenue
Fort Wayne, IN 46807

Dear Larry:

Thanks for offering to help us get a delegation of religious leaders to talk with Senator Lugar on nuclear disarmament issues. I will go into that in greater detail via e-mail. Here I am sending you some background material. This includes:

- Excerpts from a campaign speech by President Bush
- Talking points on de-alerting
- Background on strategic arms reduction
- General Shalkashvili's views on how to get the CTBT ratified
- A letter from religious leaders on national missile defense

I'll keep in touch with you.

Shalom,

Howard W. Hallman
Chair

Dear Larry,

Thank you for our willingness to organize a delegation of faith leaders in northeastern Indiana for a visit with Senator Lugar on nuclear disarmament issues. In addition to your contacts, I am asking persons from the national offices of several denominations for suggestions of peace activists in your area who might be invited to join this group. I'll share these names with you.

I am attaching as text some suggested questions for Senator Lugar. You, of course, can use your discretion on how to phrase such questions and what other matters to bring up. I have mailed you some backup material that goes with these questions.

Please keep me informed on how you are progressing with this task. If you need further information, please let me know.

Shalom,
Howard

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Questions on nuclear disarmament for Senator Lugar

Nunn-Lugar Program

Senator, we thank you for the sponsorship of the Cooperative Treat Reduction program, also known as Nunn-Lugar. How do you think this program is working? What can we do to bolster support for it?

De-alerting and strategic arms reduction

What are the prospects for completion of the ratification process for START II? Do you think there should be a START III agreement for further reductions?

Last May in a campaign speech President Bush said that "the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status." He said, "It should be possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II without compromising our security in any way." He further stated that de-alerting and strategic arms reduction could come about through executive leadership without waiting for years of treaty negotiations. What do you think of these ideas?

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Recently General John Shalikashvili proposed that the Senate reconsider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ratify it. He suggested that the treaty be reviewed after ten years by a commission set up by the president and Congress. He suggested a more integrated approach to non-proliferation. He offered several other ideas. What do you think of General Shalikashvili's recommendations?

National Missile Defense

Persons in the faith community have grave doubts about National Missile Defense (NMD). They believe that the threat of attack on the United States by long-range missiles is greatly exaggerated, that deployment of NMD by the United States would risk a renewed nuclear arms race with Russia and China, that it wouldn't guard against more likely means of attack by terrorists and small nations, that the cost of NMD is wasteful and takes money away from other needs. What are your views on National Missile Defense?

Dear Linda,

It's taken me longer than I expected to get back to you about organizing an interfaith delegation to talk with Senator Lugar or his staff about nuclear disarmament issues. Now we're ready to move forward.

Larry Hayes, a Church of the Brethren leader in Fort Wayne, is organizing a group from northeastern Indiana to seek an appointment with Lugar. Would you be willing to facilitate a similar delegation for the Indianapolis area? You indicated that you know a number of people there. I am asking national denominational staff for their suggestions that might supplement your contacts.

Our purpose is to let Senator Lugar know that the faith community in Indiana is concerned about these issues and want him to exercise positive leadership. Attached below as text is a sample set of questions. I am sending further background information as Word attachments. This information can be shared with others in your local delegation.

If you need clarification, please reply by e-mail or call me at 301 896-0013.

Thanks for your assistance,

Howard

(I have no honorific title. My wife is the ordained minister in our family.)

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Questions on nuclear disarmament for Senator Lugar

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Dear Marilyn,

As I indicated in our telephone conversation, the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is starting to contact key senators on nuclear disarmament issues that may be coming before the new Congress. Senator Hagel is one of them because of his membership on the Foreign Relations Committee and his strong interest in these issues. Therefore, we would like to encourage an interfaith delegation in Nebraska to call on him or his staff to discuss these matters.

Among the issues to be considered are (1) de-alerting to take the nuclear arsenal off hair-trigger alert, (2) START II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that needs final action by the Senate to go into effect, (3) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), defeated in 1999, not likely to come up in 2001 but possibly in 2002, (4) the Nunn-Lugar program that provides financial assistance to Russia to dismantle nuclear weapons, and (5) national missile defense (NMD). I am sending several attachments that provide background material on these issues.

Below is a sample set of questions that might be used in talking with Senator Hagel or his staff. If it would be helpful, we could arrange a conference call to brief persons from your delegation.

I appreciate your willingness to help. Please let me know if you need further information.

Shalom,
Howard

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Questions on nuclear disarmament for Senator Hagel

Senator, we thank you for your leadership on foreign policy issues. Many faith groups have a strong interest in nuclear disarmament issues. We would like to discuss some of them with you.

De-alerting and strategic arms reduction

What are the prospects for completion of the ratification process for START II? Do you think there should be a START III agreement for further reductions?

Last May in a campaign speech President Bush said that "the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status." He said, "It should be possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II without compromising our security in any way." He further stated that de-alerting and strategic arms reduction could come about through executive leadership without waiting for years of treaty negotiations. What do you think of these ideas?

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non-proliferation. He offered several other ideas. What do you think of General Shalikashvili's recommendations?

Nunn-Lugar Program

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program seems to be an important endeavor. How do you think this program is working? What can we do to bolster support for it?

National Missile Defense

Persons in the faith community have grave doubts about National Missile Defense (NMD). They believe that the threat of attack on the United States by long-range missiles by small nations is greatly exaggerated, that deployment of NMD by the United States would risk a renewed nuclear arms race with Russia and China, that it wouldn't guard against more likely means of attack by terrorists and small nations, that the cost of NMD is wasteful and takes money away from other needs. What are your views on National Missile Defense?

February 15, 2001

The Honorable Sam Nunn
King and Spalding
191 Peacetrete Street, NE, #4900
Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Senator Nunn:

I wrote you on January 24 about the work of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, and how it might relate to the newly formed Nuclear Threat Initiative. This committee had its monthly meeting this week and sharpened its focus on current issues and our work program.

We will be working on five matters that are on the active policy agenda in Washington: de-alerting, strategic arms reduction, the Nunn-Lugar program, national missile defense, and nuclear posture review. We are keeping our eye on the CTBT and also on mini-nukes, which some persons are advocating. Working with quite modest resources, squeezed in among other assignments, we are engaged in a number of activities. Among other things we are laying out our positions in a series of sign-on letters and statements. These will form the basis for grassroots education and advocacy.

On de-alerting the Friends Committee for National Legislation took the leadership in a letter to President Bush with more than 60 interfaith signers, urging him to move forward on this issue (copy enclosed). A couple dozen religious organizations encouraged their grassroots members to call the White House in support of de-alerting on February 5 and 6, national call-in days organized by Back from the Brink Campaign.

We have drafted a letter to President Bush and members of Congress on national missile defense, offering reasons why we believe the rush to a decision to deploy is unwise. We expect to send this letter with interfaith signatures in early March.

We have started work on a statement by religious leaders on the nuclear posture review. We want to make the case that the practical steps toward nuclear disarmament adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference should be incorporated into the nuclear posture of the United States.

The Honorable Sam Nunn
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Page two.

We have invited Ken Meyers of Senator Lugar's staff to our March meeting to discuss the Nunn-Lugar program and where and how we can provide support for it, both in Washington and through our grassroots networks. This should lead to follow-up activities.

We will be prepared to act when strategic arms reduction issues arise. One way might be Senate consideration of the START II date extension protocol. Another will be an effort to remove restrictions on de-alerting and strategic reductions from defense authorization legislation.

We realize that the CTBT will not come up for ratification in 2001. Nonetheless, having worked hard for its ratification from 1997 to 1999, we will keep mentioning its importance.

We are deeply committed to developing bipartisan support for nuclear threat reduction and disarmament. Realizing that in recent years Republicans have been less supportive of these measures than Democrats, we are concentrating on making contact with Republican senators and key House Republicans. So far interfaith delegations have met with the staff of nine Republican senators in key positions, and we have another dozen on our list for a first round of visits. We are starting to get a feel of who to see in the House. (My impression is that we are far ahead of civil-sector organizations in outreach to Republicans.)

The 21 Republican senators on our list come from 16 states. We want to form interfaith delegations in each state to visit with the senators and staff on our issues. Initially we have focused on Indiana, Nebraska, and Oregon. We are exploring possibilities in Maine, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico. We will add other states later. Here we are hampered by lack of resources. We need a full-time field coordinator, and denomination offices need additional staff for outreach to their networks. This is one of the major concentrations in the budget we present to you.

We have made a good beginning, but we could do much more with greater resources. Therefore, we hope you will give favorable consideration to our proposal.

As your Washington staff settles in, I would welcome an opportunity to talk with them about our work.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Chair

Back From the Brink

A Campaign to Take Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger Alert

TALKING POINTS ON DE-ALERTING

Introduction: The threat of nuclear war is still with us, though the Cold War ended ten years ago.

- The United States and Russia have 4,500 nuclear weapons aimed at each other -- the equivalent of 100,000 Hiroshima bombs -- on hair-trigger alert, ready to launch within minutes.
- The danger of an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon has increased dramatically in the last six years.
- The reason is that the Russian early warning and command-in-control systems are deteriorating, increasing the likelihood of an accident or an unintended launch.
- The United States has had its own difficulty with nuclear missile silos -- with a fire that occurred December 1, 2000 in North Dakota.
- The Russian nuclear arsenal remains the only significant threat today to the survival of the United States.
- A Russian nuclear warhead can reach an American city 25 minutes after launch, creating almost unimaginable damage.
- Russia is far more dependent on its nuclear weapons than the United States because it cannot afford to maintain its conventional forces, which are more expensive than its nuclear arsenal.
- And the Russians feel defensive. The expansion of NATO right to its borders, the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya, and U.S. plans for a missile defense have added to Russian fears of attack or encirclement.
- In fact, Russian military leaders are so worried about an attack and a warning-systems failure that they have shortened their “launch” decision-making process to six minutes.
- Accordingly, there is a growing concern on the part of U.S. lawmakers and military officials that high-alert status is a dangerous posture.

- The de-alerting of our nuclear weapons -- by removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately or by locking their triggers -- is a way of increasing the time it would take to launch a nuclear weapon.
- While our arms control treaties aim to decrease the size of our mutual nuclear arsenals, we must also address the readiness of our nuclear arsenals. And both efforts must go forward simultaneously.
- The de-alerting of all, or even a portion, of U.S. and Russian high-alert weapons would reduce dangers immediately.
- It would also set the stage for further reductions in nuclear arsenals by signaling confidence.
- Congressional approval isn't required to de-alert our nuclear weapons: it can be done by presidential initiative. Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev did it in 1991.
- What is needed to de-alert is public pressure, especially on the new president during his first 100 days in office.

These talking points were developed in cooperation with Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR).

For further information, consult www.backfromthebrink.org; www.psr.org; www.cdi.org.

December 2000

Achieving Strategic Arms Reduction

Background Information

The reduction of strategic nuclear weapons will be an important issue with the next presidential administration and the next two Congresses. Results will depend upon achieving substantial bipartisan support. Here is some background information on this topic.

The Arsenal

Military experts make a distinction between strategic and tactical (or non-strategic) nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are designed to attack an adversary's homeland from afar. They included submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs), and bombs carried on long-range bombers. Tactical weapons are intended primarily for battlefield use or to attack military installations from short- to mid-range.

The Center for Defense Information estimates the global nuclear arsenal to be as follows:

Country	Strategic	Non-strategic	Total
United States	7,300	4,700-11,700	12,000-19,000
Russia	6,000	6,000-13,000	12,000-19,000
France	482	0	482
China	290	120	410
United Kingdom	100	100	200

In addition, Israel possesses 100 or more nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and may have built some. For more details, consult www.cdi.org.

Treaties

Over the years the United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia, have entered into treaties to limit and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. In the United States this has been a bipartisan process, sometimes led by a Republican president, at other times by a Democratic president and with broad support in Congress. In 1987 President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) to eliminate an entire class of weapons. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 93 to 5. In 1991 the Bush Administration negotiated the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and the Senate gave its approval, 93 to 6. Under START I the United States and Russia agreed to a reduction in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to about 8,500 for the United States and about 6,500 for Russia.

The Bush Administration followed through with START II, signed in January 1993. The treaty requires each side to cut its deployed strategic forces to 3,000-3,500 warheads and bans deployment of land-based missiles with more than one warhead. The U.S. Senate ratified START II in January 1996 by a vote of 87 to 4. The Russian Duma ratified the treaty in April 2000 by a vote of 288 to 131. Russian approval was contingent on U.S. ratification of a 1997 protocol that extends the time period for the completion of START II reductions from 2003 to 2007 and some Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty related agreements. The Clinton Administration didn't submit the protocol and ABM agreements to the Senate because they have become intertwined with the debate on deployment of national missile defense (NMD).

At a 1997 meeting in Helsinki President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a START III agreement that would further reduce the nuclear arsenal to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warheads on each side. Subsequently the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has proposed a level of 1,500. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, doesn't support this lower level because of the targeting needs of the current U.S. nuclear posture. Moreover, the Clinton Administration wanted to link START III with changes in the ABM treaty to permit limited national missile defense, but Russia is reluctant to accept ABM modifications. Consequently START III negotiations haven't commenced.

Reciprocal Initiatives

Another approach to strategic arms reduction is through executive initiative by one side with reciprocal response by the other. President George Bush (the elder) used this approach in September 1991 when he ordered a stand-down of U.S strategic bombers and removal and storage of their nuclear bombs. He also ended alert status for strategic missiles destined for elimination by START I: 450 silo-based rockets and missiles on 10 submarines. Soviet President Gorbachev responded by ordering deactivation of more than 500 land-based rockets and six strategic submarines, by placing strategic bombers in a low level of readiness, and by putting rail-based missiles in garrison. In the next several months both nations withdrew large numbers of tactical nuclear warheads deployed with their armies and navies and placed them in central storage depots.

During the 2000 presidential campaign Governor George W. Bush cited the 1991 experience and indicated that the United States should lead by example to reduce strategic nuclear weapons significantly below the START II level and to remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status. He coupled this proposal with advocacy of layered national missile defense.

Other Considerations

In the presidential campaign George W. Bush conditioned his proposed action for strategic nuclear reductions on a thorough review of U.S. nuclear policy. This process occurs periodically, and Congress has mandated that the next nuclear posture review be completed by December 2001. This will include a review of targeting, number and types of nuclear weapons required, and arms control objectives.

Meanwhile Congress through language in the Defense Authorization Act has prohibited deactivation of strategic nuclear weapons below the START I level until START II final ratification is completed. There are also restrictions on reducing the alert status of the nuclear arsenal. These restrictions would have to be removed before the kind of initiatives proposed by President-elect Bush could take place.

Further information on this subject is available from the Arms Control Association (www.armscontrol.org), Union of Concerned Scientists (www.ucsusa.org), and the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers (www.clw.org/coalition). The latter has linkages to other sites.

January 16, 2001

Prepared by Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Questions for U.S. Senators on De-alerting and Strategic Arms Reduction

In 2001 it is expected that de-alerting the nuclear arsenal and strategic arms reduction will be on the agenda of the new president and the 107th Congress. Therefore, persons from faith-based organizations around the country are encouraged to get in touch with their senators, to explore their thinking on these issues, and to encourage bipartisan action. This can start as an inquiry rather than strong advocacy of a particular position.

The following questions are offered as a point of departure for conversation with senators and their staffs. They are written as if speaking directly to the senator, but they can be rephrased to say "what is the senator's thinking on?", etc. Separate material on de-alerting and strategic arms reduction is available as background for the questions.

De-alerting. With the cold war over for ten years many retired generals and admirals, former civilian national security officials, scientists, physicians and other professionals, and religious organizations are calling for substantial reduction in nuclear weapons. Some are advocating complete elimination. Many believe that a desirable first step would be to take strategic nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.

- What do you think of this idea?
- During the recent presidential election campaign Governor [President-elect?] George W. Bush spoke favorably of his father's experience in 1991 when he took bombers off alert and also land- and submarine based missiles scheduled for elimination under START I, then Soviet President Gorbachev reciprocated with similar action. Do you believe that there should be similar executive initiative for de-alerting in 2001?
- What concerns do you have? What safeguards would be necessary?
- Would you be willing to be a public advocate of de-alerting?

Strategic arms reduction. During the last 20 years the United States has entered into arms reduction treaties with Russia (formerly with the Soviet Union) initiated by Republican presidents and ratified by the U.S. Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support. They include the INF Treaty, START I, and START II. Senate ratification of a START II protocol is pending before the treaty can go into effect. At Helsinki in 1997 President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to seek a START III agreement for further reductions, but formal negotiations never began.

- Do you favor ratification of the START II protocol and some pending ABM-related agreements?
- What do you think about negotiating a START III agreement to achieve further strategic arms reduction?
- During the presidential campaign George W. Bush suggested that rather than engaging in prolonged treaty negotiations, substantial strategic arms reduction could occur by United States taking the lead in cutting out excessive forces with the expectation that Russia would follow. What do you think of this approach?

- Would you be willing to talk with your Senate colleagues and speak out publicly in favor of further strategic arms reductions?

National missile defense. Although the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament isn't stressing national missile defense (NMD) in this round of conversations with senators, the topic is likely to come up. By and large the faith community is opposed to deployment of national missile defense, as expressed in a letter to President Clinton last summer. Many of the senators we will be talking to are on record in favor of national missile defense. Furthermore, strategic arms reduction is partly tied to NMD because the Clinton Administration has asked Russia to accept changes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (AMB) Treaty to permit the United States to deploy a limited missile defense. So far Russia has not agreed, and this has held up START III negotiations.

At the moment we don't need to press our opposition to NMD on the senators. If the topic comes up, we can make our position clear and indicated that this is a matter where we will respectfully disagree with NMD advocates.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The faith community worked hard in 1998-99 to build support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Al Gore favors ratification. George W. Bush has said that he would continue the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing but opposes CTBT ratification. If Bush is president, the CTBT won't be in play this year, but the treaty may come up in conversations with senators. If so, you can inquire what it would take to achieve enough Senate support to achieve ratification.

Governor George W. Bush
New Leadership on National Security
Washington, D.C.
May 23, 2000

Today, I am here with some of our nation's leading statesmen and defense experts. And there is broad agreement that our nation needs a new approach to nuclear security that matches a new era.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, the world has changed faster than U.S. policy. The emerging security threats to the United States, its friends and allies, and even to Russia, now come from rogue states, terrorist groups and other adversaries seeking weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. Threats also come from insecure nuclear stockpiles and the proliferation of dangerous technologies. Russia itself is no longer our enemy. The Cold War logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles on both sides is now outdated. Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of terror.

While deterrence remains the first line of defense against nuclear attack, the standoff of the Cold War was born of a different time. That was a time when our arsenal also served to check the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Then, the Soviet Union's power reached deep into the heart of Europe - to Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague. Today, these are the capitals of NATO countries. Yet almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, our nuclear policy still resides in that already distant past. The Clinton-Gore administration has had over seven years to bring the U.S. force posture into the post-Cold War world. Instead, they remain locked in a Cold War mentality.

It is time to leave the Cold War behind, and defend against the new threats of the 21st century.

America must build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date. Our missile defense must be designed to protect all 50 states – and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas – from missile attacks by rogue nations, or accidental launches.

The Clinton administration at first denied the need for a national missile defense system. Then it delayed. Now the approach it proposes is flawed – a system initially based on a single site, when experts say that more is needed. A missile defense system should not only defend our country, it should defend our allies, with whom I will consult as we develop our plans. And any change in the ABM treaty must allow the technologies and experiments required to deploy adequate missile defenses. The administration is driving toward a hasty decision, on a political timetable. No decision would be better than a flawed agreement that ties the hands of the next President and prevents America from defending itself.

Yet there are positive, practical ways to demonstrate to Russia that we are no longer enemies. Russia, our allies and the world need to understand our intentions. America's development of missile defenses is a search for security, not a search for advantage.

America should rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence in a new security environment. The premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal. As president, I will ask the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of our nuclear force posture and determine how best to meet our security needs. While the exact number of weapons can come only from such an assessment, I will pursue the lowest possible number consistent with our national security. It should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II, without compromising our security in any way. We should not keep weapons that our military planners do not need. These unneeded weapons are the expensive relics of dead conflicts. And they do nothing to make us more secure.

In addition, the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation. Preparation for quick launch – within minutes after warning of an attack – was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry. But today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. So, as president, I will ask for an assessment of what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.

These changes to our forces should not require years and years of detailed arms control negotiations. There is a precedent that proves the power of leadership. In 1991, the United States invited the Soviet Union to join it in removing tactical nuclear weapons from the arsenal. Huge reductions were achieved in a matter of months, making the world much safer, more quickly.

Similarly, in the area of strategic nuclear weapons, we should invite the Russian government to accept the new vision I have outlined, and act on it. But the United States should be prepared to lead by example, because it is in our best interest and the best interest of the world. This would be an act of principled leadership – a chance to seize the moment and begin a new era of nuclear security. A new era of cooperation on proliferation and nuclear safety.

The Cold War era is history. Our nation must recognize new threats, not fixate on old ones. On the issue of nuclear weapons, the United States has an opportunity to lead to a safer world – both to defend against nuclear threats and reduce nuclear tensions. It is possible to build a missile defense, *and* defuse confrontation with Russia. America should do both.

General Colin Powell on Nuclear Weapons

In a Commencement Address, Harvard University, June 10, 1993

At the direction of President Clinton and Secretary Aspin we are giving new emphasis to combating the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

And we've been drastically rolling back our own nuclear arsenal.

Under agreements we have negotiated just over the past few years, and that will come into effect by the end of the decade, we are bringing the number of our nuclear warheads down from over 20,000 when I became Chairman four years ago to just over 5,000.

Today -- on what happens to be the 30th anniversary of the talks that led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- I can declare my hope that we will eventually see the time when the number is down to zero, and the world is a much better place.

Remarks at a Breakfast Meeting with the Defense Writers' Group, September 23, 1993

With respect to nuclear weapons, I think their principal purpose remains deterrence against a major nuclear attack against the United States, however remote that might be, and thank God it's becoming more and more and more remote.

The second part of that, though, has to do with the fact that there are a number of nations in the Third World who think that they will gain some political or military utility through the possession of nuclear weapons. Every time I get a chance to talk to them, I try to dissuade them of that. And I make the point that I think that it's a wasted investment in a military capability that is limited in political or military utility, and that we have ways of responding and punishing conventionally that you would not wish to see us use. And at the end of the day, we have far more nuclear weapons than you do, so what's the utility that you get out of this?

I have not been faced with a military situation in the several conflicts we've been involved in over the last four years where I thought there was going to be a need to resort to such weapons, and I'm glad that turned out to be the case. We've had two wars [in Panama and the Persian Gulf], six rescues and 22 other major events in the last four years for these reluctant warriors in the Pentagon.

Proposed Nuclear Posture of the United States of America An Outline of Major Points

1. In the years following World War II the United States developed a powerful nuclear arsenal to deter military aggression by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union countered by developing its own nuclear arsenal. The United Kingdom, France, and China also developed and deployed nuclear weapons.

2. Even though the five nuclear-weapon states were heavily armed, they recognized the need for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which went into effect in 1970, they agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Subsequently several arms control and reduction treaties have entered into force as implementation of this provision.

3. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended symbolically in November 1989 with the demolition of the Berlin Wall. After that all Soviet forces withdrew from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union dissolved. Three of the four successor states with nuclear weapons on their soil -- Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan -- turned these weapons over Russia.

4. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the United States and the nuclear-weapon states subscribed to the Final Document in which they made a commitment to "an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

5. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon states are in a period of transition between (a) full and widespread deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and (b) the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons on Earth.

6. In recognition of its NPT obligations and to promote long-range national security, the United States through executive action, reciprocal responses from other nuclear-weapon states, and treaty negotiations will work to achieve mutual deactivation of all nuclear weapons and mutual dismantlement with adequate safeguards and verification.

7. In this transition period the United States commits itself to no first use of nuclear weapons against any adversary under any circumstance. However, the United States reserves the option of responding to biological and chemical weapons by other means.

8. To enhance nuclear safety and reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons, the United States will take its total nuclear arsenal off high alert and will seek to have other nuclear-weapon states achieve the same status for their nuclear arsenal.

9. The United States will not develop any new nuclear weapons and will not conduct any nuclear test explosions. The United States will use other means to assure the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile as long as it exists.

10. The United States will work with other nations to develop and implement an international system of fissile material control with international accounting and monitoring.

**STATEMENT OF SAM NUNN
ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE**

JANUARY 8, 2001

I want to thank Ted Turner for taking on this important mission, and for the trust he has placed in me. I can think of no private undertaking of greater importance to future generations than the one we are launching today.

I have great admiration for Ted's tremendous accomplishments in the private sector and for his unique leadership in philanthropy. Ted is a visionary and a genuine catalyst for change. His leadership in communications has made the world smaller. He now challenges us to make the world safer.

The Initiative Ted has asked me to lead, which we are calling the Nuclear Threat Initiative, is committed to the mission of strengthening global security by reducing the risk of use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and by preventing their spread. We will also work to help build the trust, transparency and security that are preconditions to the fulfillment of the Nonproliferation Treaty's goals and ambitions.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world has faced a challenge without precedent in history – the collapse of an empire containing thousands of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and thousands of tons of the materials needed to make additional such weapons. In addition, tens of thousands of scientists and engineers with the know-how to make these weapons can no longer provide for their families.

The U.S. Government, more than any other government by far, has responded to these threats with a program -- the Cooperative Threat Reduction program -- designed to help the

Former Soviet States, including Russia, secure and safely dismantle their weapons and know-how. But after 10 years of hard work, and some significant progress in removing and dismantling some 4,000 nuclear weapons and building better safeguard systems, it is clear that our response, and the world's response, has not been proportionate to the threat, nor to the opportunity.

What we face today, ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is a situation that, despite our efforts, may in fact be more dangerous. The Soviet successor state of Russia faces dire economic conditions that have forced a severe cutback in the government's maintenance of its nuclear infrastructure – including its nuclear warning, surveillance, and control systems. Nuclear workers – whether they be soldiers attending nuclear weapons deployed in the field, or the scientists who designed and built those weapons – often go months between paychecks, and without basic necessities like heat, food, and proper clothing. The cumulative effect of this deterioration has greatly increased the risk of a nuclear accident, or a dangerous and deadly miscalculation, or the prospect that a nuclear worker will compromise nuclear materials or sell know-how across borders or to a terrorist group out of economic desperation. Moreover, elsewhere in the world, after a nearly thirty-four gap, two new states entered the nuclear arena with the tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998.

Contrary to what many people believe, the threat posed by these weapons to our security, and the world's security, remains high. It is time for us, in cooperation with our friends and allies, to take the responsibility to address these urgent security threats in a renewed and invigorated way.

As our name implies, we intend to focus on the nuclear threat, which by scale and scope is the greatest of the threats posed by WMD. But as our mission statement provides, we intend also to address the biological and chemical weapons threat. Our work will be organized into

three principal geographic program areas: the US, Russia and the Former Soviet States, and other regional areas of proliferation concern such as Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.

In the US, we will work to generate greater public support, understanding and governmental attention to the subject of threat reduction, and to bring greater resources to bear both domestically, and internationally to meet these challenges. In Russia and the Former Soviet States, the Initiative will concentrate on projects to improve the safety, security, accountability, and transparency of WMD weapons, materials, and know-how. In the regional arena, we will help build international awareness about the dangers posed by WMD, by strengthening international NGOs and by promoting international dialogue on ways to reduce WMD dangers.

Education will also form an important component of the Initiative and is essential for our regional efforts. In this regard, we plan to support educational activities that inform and engage students, the public, and governmental leaders on issues related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The emphasis of this Initiative will be on *action* – making real and significant progress on the most urgent threats. We intend to be a catalyst and encourage change -- in reducing the pressure on the nuclear trigger and increasing warning time for leadership decisionmaking, in stemming proliferation, in enhancing the safety, security and accountability of weapons and materials, and in reducing the chances of intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We plan to focus on direct action activities, and not limit our role to making grants for studies, education or advocacy.

Over the last six months, we conducted a Scoping Study to examine the question of whether and how a well-funded private organization could contribute to threat reduction. We

concluded that a private organization *can* make a difference in reducing threats from weapons of mass destruction, and we also identified a number of promising projects for early funding. Completing due diligence reviews on the opportunities, the obstacles, and the contribution to risk reduction of these action programs will be at the top of our priority list.

No private effort can be a substitute for the strong role of government nor can the private sector provide substitute funding for activities that are the proper role of governments. Only by working with the U.S. and other governments, other nonprofits, and the private sector can we make meaningful progress toward mutual assured safety. We hope to add significantly to the existing resource base and bring additional actors and new thinking to this urgent task in a way that supplements -- not supplants -- the strong efforts already ongoing by organizations and foundations in the arena of peace and security.

I've just described to you some of the major conclusions of our six month Scoping Study effort. I would be remiss if I didn't take this opportunity to thank a few of the terrific supporters we had in that effort -- in particular I want to express my gratitude to John Hamre and Michele Flournoy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who supported our work by providing space and dedicating staff to the effort, as well as for their expert analysis. I also want to acknowledge the excellent assistance provided by Dr. Arnold Kanter of the Scowcroft Group for his role in helping to guide our efforts along the way, as well as Joan Rohlfing and Samantha Ravich, who led our great staff. My special thanks to the experts who wrote papers and participated in our discussions, sharpening our focus and helping to shape our recommendations.

Let me also mention here another matter of interest to the media -- on Wednesday the independent Task Force led by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler will hold a press conference to release their findings on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. I

believe the recommendations of this group to Secretary Richardson and the DOE will be of great assistance to the incoming Bush Administration, and we intend to use this work as a point of reference for our initiative.

Finally, I would like to make clear that this Initiative has not taken on the responsibility for achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. We recognize that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the long-range goal of the Nonproliferation Treaty – which, with over 185 states parties, including the U.S., is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in history. I have great respect for Ted’s ambition to see the elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe, however, that the feasibility of the ultimate end-state goal of the Treaty cannot be resolved until much greater progress has first been made in addressing the current dangers of nuclear use and proliferation, and in transforming the world by building transparency, trust and new means of verification and security. I therefore believe that we have an obligation to focus our efforts on reducing the clear and present dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction -- Ted has agreed.

This objective is so compelling that it should unite people who are not unanimous on the feasibility or desirability of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. We also recognize that our work on building trust, transparency and security will not only make the world a safer place, it will also make progress along the path to the fulfillment of the Nonproliferation Treaty’s goals and ambitions. It is this recognition that allows Ted and me to move down the same road together in the years ahead.

Today, as we launch this Initiative, the timing is promising. Reducing the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction is not the agenda of only one political party. I know that it is a deeply held desire by leaders of vision and courage of every political stripe. We are acutely aware that there are widely divergent and intensely held opinions where the subject of Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD) is concerned. We also recognize that it is easy for these issues to become polarized across ideological lines. However, just as Ted and I have come together to embark on this mission of great importance, we hope that others of good will who are concerned about these issues will work with us on the large area of common ground that exists to find ways to reduce the risks associated with weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, Ted is committed to an initiative that is Board governed, and I agree. We intend to enlist the best creative minds from both the public and the private sectors as we take up the challenges ahead. We also recognize that the Board must have international participation if it is to have a global impact, and two of our new Board Members are international leaders. We intend to add additional international Board members in the months ahead.

Today I am proud to announce a group of outstanding individuals who have agreed to become members of our initial Board and who will help guide and shape this Initiative. I am particularly pleased to introduce several of the members of the Board who were able to join us today. Each of these individuals has the expertise, vision and experience to make a major contribution to this important mission and to guide the Initiative toward achieving real results. Because all of our Board Members are distinguished, I am going to introduce them in alphabetical order.

Let me start by introducing Charles Curtis. Charlie has served with me as the co-director of the Scoping Study that laid the groundwork for launching this Initiative today, and I am pleased to announce that he will be serving as the President of the Initiative, and its Chief Operating Officer. As a former Deputy Secretary of Energy, and a former member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, Charlie is very familiar with issues related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and he and I worked closely together in these matters when we both last served in government. Charlie has a long and distinguished career in public service.

Senator Pete Domenici does not need an introduction. He is one of our nation's primary champions for reducing the threats of weapons of mass destruction, and a strong leader in the Senate in creating and sustaining programs focused on this important mission. Pete has been a sponsor of virtually all the important legislation on these issues, and was a partner with Dick Lugar and me in writing both the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1991 and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996 which provided the framework for homeland protection against weapons of mass destruction. Senator Domenici, as a leader on the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committees, has led the way in providing crucial funding for some of the most significant projects our government has undertaken, including the purchase of 500 tons of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, and the disposal of excess plutonium.

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, who could not be with us today, will also be joining our Board. Ambassador Ekeus has a long and distinguished career in working to make the world safer. From 1991-1997 he headed the UN Special Commission on Iraq which was responsible for elimination of the Iraqi infrastructure for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Ambassador Ekeus has also served as Ambassador to the United States, and is currently serving as the Chairman of the Board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Susan Eisenhower, who is with us today, is currently the President of the Eisenhower Group, Inc., a Washington based consulting firm that provides political, economic, trade, and marketing analysis. Susan has concentrated almost fourteen years of her career on US-soviet and then US-Russian relations, and will be a valuable partner in helping us develop our relationships and projects in Russia and the FSU. Susan also serves on the DOE Task Force on Russia that I mentioned earlier, and was a tremendous help in formulating recommendations because of her extensive knowledge of Russia.

We are proud to be joined by General Eugene Habiger. As a former Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, General Habiger was responsible for all US strategic nuclear forces, and as such brings a unique in-depth understanding of nuclear policy and operations. General Habiger will be invaluable in bringing his insight and experience from the actual world of nuclear operations to our deliberations and decisionmaking. General Habiger, while in command of our nations nuclear forces at Strategic Command, had unprecedented exchanges with his counterpart in Russia and gained much insight into Russian strategic thinking.

We will also be joined on the Board by Dr. Andrei Kokoshin of Russia. Dr. Kokoshin was not able to join us today. Andrei Kokoshin brings to us an extensive and broad background in international security, technology, industry and political affairs. He has served as First Deputy Minister of Defense in Russia, a member of the Russia's Security Council, and is currently serving as a member of the Russian parliament. Dr. Kokoshin served with former Defense Secretary Bill Perry as a co-chairman of the Russian-American Committee of Defense Industry Conversion. He is also a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

I also have the great honor of introducing Senator Richard Lugar – an outstanding leader on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees. Dick Lugar is one of the Senate's most effective leaders in reducing threats of weapons of mass destruction. Dick and I co-sponsored the 1991 Threat Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar), which has provided the framework in our efforts to safely dismantle and destroy nuclear weapons, as well as secure nuclear materials and know-how in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Dick has worked tirelessly since that time to champion and strengthen this national security cause, and has been a leader in every aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Dick and Pete and I were partners in the Senate, and I am thrilled that we can now continue this partnership.

Jessica Mathews, is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an international research organization with offices in Washington and Moscow. Dr. Mathews, who holds a Ph.D. in molecular biology, brings a broad range of experience to this endeavor from previous service in senior positions at the White House, the State Department, and the Congress. She has been an active leader in the world of ideas and research in foreign policy, science and environmental policy, and is also a prodigious writer. Jessica knows Russia well and will make a great contribution to our deliberations and decisions.

Finally, I am pleased to say that William Perry, former Secretary of Defense will also be joining our Board. Dr. Perry is a well-recognized and accomplished leader in the national security and high technology fields. He is currently the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Technology Strategies and Alliances, and is also associated with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Among his many other accomplishments, Bill has long been a champion of nonproliferation. He accompanied Dick Lugar and me to Russia immediately after passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and made the successful implementation of this legislation one of his top priorities as Secretary of Defense.

We are very proud of this initial Board. I want to thank Ted again for the tremendous opportunity to serve in the creation of this new Organization, and for the trust he has placed in me. I'm looking forward to the challenge. Thank you all for coming today. We are pleased to now take a few questions.

**STATEMENT BY TED TURNER
ANNOUNCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
JANUARY 8, 2001**

It is with great hope and anticipation that we address you about the initiative Senator Nunn and I are launching today. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the product of months of discussions and consultations with some of the world's most respected security experts.

The threat we face from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is real. It is even more urgent now since it seems to have fallen off of most people's "radar screens" during the past ten years.

Like everyone else, we thought that when the cold war ended, we no longer had to worry about nuclear annihilation. Yet, the progress we have made in the last ten years has been marginal at best. Despite the fact we are no longer enemies, the U.S. and Russia still maintain nearly 3,000 nuclear weapons each on high alert.

Our technologies are not infallible. Two examples are the explosion of the Concorde and the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk. An accidental nuclear exchange is not out of the question.

In many ways, the threat has become more complex and dangerous. In addition to the risk of a nuclear exchange, we now have serious and urgent concerns about the security of weapons and bomb-making materials. We are threatened by the risk of proliferation of weapons expertise from laboratories, the deterioration of command control systems, the proliferation of missile technology, etc.

Furthermore, maintaining our nuclear arsenals is not cheap. It has been estimated that the U.S. spends \$30 billion every year maintaining its 10,000+ nuclear weapons and their launchers – a number that makes "overkill" an understatement. This money could be used more efficiently elsewhere in the budget. The same can be said for Russia and the other nuclear weapons states.

In October 2000, CNN independently produced a special report, "Rehearsing Doomsday," which put some of these issues into perspective. [If you did not have the opportunity to see it, we will provide you with a copy.] This report, as well as all of the consultations and discussions, brought home a key fact: we have lived virtually our entire lives under the threat of nuclear war. If there had ever been any logical reason for that state of affairs, it no longer exists. We have therefore decided to do what we can to work toward decreasing that threat. There is no greater legacy we could leave our children and grandchildren than a peaceful and safer world.

Too little attention has been paid to these issues over the last ten years. If we are to reduce the nuclear threat in all its forms, we need to raise public awareness and to inspire leadership and cooperation in this country and throughout the world. These efforts must also include biological and chemical weapons.

Senator Nunn has agreed to join me in these efforts, and we are proud to announce that he has accepted the position of Co-chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. We can think of no better person to lead this effort. Senator Nunn is one of the world's most respected security experts.

As we launch this effort, I would like to state that I, personally, advocate the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as quickly as possible. If fewer is better, then zero is best.

Every U.S. President since Johnson has pledged to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, as dictated by the Nonproliferation Treaty. And as recently as last May, all of the declared nuclear weapons states reaffirmed their "unequivocal undertaking" toward that end. Great nations keep their word. And I, for one, will continue to push the U.S. to fulfill this pledge.

Nevertheless, this is not the charge I have asked Sam to accept. Instead, his purpose will be devoted to a more limited objective: to take pragmatic and effective steps to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction as comprehensively and as urgently as is feasible. For that

undertaking, there should be the broadest possible support. We do not need to develop consensus on weapons elimination to develop a common purpose to make step-by-step progress to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The Initiative's efforts aim to be a catalyst for action both in the U.S. and around the world. We should not miss this opportunity to make this a safer world.

Thank you.

Views of George W. Bush on De-alerting and Strategic Arms Reduction

America should rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence in a new security environment. The premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal. As president, I will ask the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of our nuclear force posture and determine how best to meet our security needs. While the exact number of weapons can come only from such an assessment, I will pursue the lowest possible number consistent with our national security. It should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II, without compromising our security in any way. We should not keep weapons that our military planners do not need. These unneeded weapons are the expensive relics of dead conflicts. And they do nothing to make us more secure.

In addition, the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation. Preparation for quick launch – within minutes after warning of an attack – was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry. But today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. So, as president, I will ask for an assessment of what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.

These changes to our forces should not require years and years of detailed arms control negotiations. There is a precedent that proves the power of leadership. In 1991, the United States invited the Soviet Union to join it in removing tactical nuclear weapons from the arsenal. Huge reductions were achieved in a matter of months, making the world much safer, more quickly.

Similarly, in the area of strategic nuclear weapons, we should invite the Russian government to accept the new vision I have outlined, and act on it. But the United States should be prepared to lead by example, because it is in our best interest and the best interest of the world. This would be an act of principled leadership – a chance to seize the moment and begin a new era of nuclear security. A new era of cooperation on proliferation and nuclear safety.

Source: Speech on "New Leadership on National Security" at National Press Club, Washington, D.C.. May 23, 2000. In this same speech Governor Bush also advocated a strong, layered national missile defense.

"The Test Ban Solution" by John M. Shalikashvili
The Washington Post, January 6, 2001

After the Senate voted against the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October 1999, I was asked to recommend steps to build bipartisan support for U.S. ratification. After nearly a year as a special adviser to the president and the secretary of state, I am impressed by how much common ground can be found through quiet, nonpartisan discussions. There is broad bipartisan agreement that nuclear proliferation ranks among the gravest threats to national security.

The test ban treaty is no panacea for this problem, but I believe it can contribute to a comprehensive solution. Banning nuclear explosions places significant technical constraints on nuclear weapon development, especially of advanced designs that are more efficient and easier to deliver. The test ban treaty is also an integral part of the political bargain that the United States made in 1995 to gain permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons requires a web of restraints. If one component is damaged, others will be weakened. Our credibility, our leadership in any nonproliferation effort, and the long-term viability of the non-proliferation treaty itself would be strengthened by our ratification of the test ban treaty, and weakened without it.

As a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is my considered view that we should not reverse the policy instituted in 1992 and resume testing new nuclear weapon designs. Given our overwhelming conventional superiority, assigning a broader role to nuclear weapons would cause far more problems than it would solve.

My intensive review of the test ban treaty strengthened my earlier judgment that this treaty is compatible with keeping a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent and is an essential part of an effective nonproliferation strategy. Recommendations I have made would help answer legitimate questions about the treaty's nonproliferation value, its verifiability, its impact on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and its indefinite duration. None of these recommendations requires renegotiating the treaty; all would improve our position under it. Most should have broad bipartisan support.

In any event, the recommendations can and should be implemented without delay simply because they are important for our national security in their own right. They are:

- That our government adopt a more integrated approach to nonproliferation, appoint a deputy national security adviser for nonproliferation to oversee it, and work more closely with like-minded countries.
- That the United States strengthen its capability to detect and deter nuclear testing, as well as its ability to monitor the many steps proliferators must take before they can test a nuclear device.
- That we make improvements to the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program to minimize any potential risks to the long-term reliability or safety of our nuclear deterrent.

Implementing these three recommendations would have the added benefit of mitigating most concerns that have been voiced about the test ban treaty.

I urge the new administration and the Senate to reexamine the test ban treaty in light of the contributions it can make to strengthened U.S. leadership of a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. We do not need nuclear test explosions now, and we do not want others conducting them. We have a wealth of knowledge gained from more than a thousand tests. Our nuclear arsenal is safe, reliable and effective.

The president-elect has endorsed continuing the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium. Other countries, however, are more likely to continue their own voluntary test moratoriums if they are considered steps toward a verifiable, legally binding ban, not end-points in themselves.

Russia has ratified the test ban treaty, along with 68 other countries. China, which has signed but not yet ratified, as well as India and Pakistan, which have made provisional promises to sign and ratify, are watching to see what the next administration will do.

In response to concerns about the test ban treaty's indefinite duration, I am recommending that the Senate and the executive branch conduct a joint review of the treaty's overall impact on national security 10 years after ratification. If serious concerns cannot be resolved, the president would exercise our right to withdraw.

High-level reconsideration of the test ban treaty and a sustained interagency effort to work toward ratification would also increase congressional support for other important aspects of U.S. defense policy. For example, a bipartisan commitment to a stronger stockpile stewardship program is more likely if the program remains closely linked to U.S. support for the test ban treaty.

Progress on ratification is also important for U.S. leadership of global nonproliferation efforts. All our NATO allies and most of our other security partners have ratified the test ban treaty. They are likely to cooperate more closely with us on other nonproliferation initiatives -- such as tougher safeguards on civilian nuclear programs and tighter controls over exports related to weapons of mass destruction -- if we don't close the door on a nonproliferation tool that they value highly.

One thing is clear: A successful U.S. nonproliferation strategy must be based on a broad international consensus. We cannot manage this problem on our own. And that means we must find a way to move forward with the test ban treaty.

The writer, a retired Army general, was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997.

Questions for Senate Defense Aides on Nuclear Disarmament Issues

Participants in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament are conducting visits with defense aides of senators to get a feel of the senators' thinking on several nuclear disarmament issues. The intent is to establish a relationship and get information. Although we may make our views known, the visit is not meant to push for specific action or commitment.

De-alerting and Strategic Arms Reduction

Last May in a speech at the National Press Club President-elect George W. Bush offered his ideas on nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear arms reduction. He said:

"It should be possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons significantly further than what has already been agreed to under START II without compromising our security in any way."

"In addition, the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status."

"These changes to our forces should not require years and years of detailed arms negotiation." He cited the 1991 experience when his father took action on de-alerting and deactivating certain nuclear weapons and Soviet President Gorbachev reciprocated.

"We should invite the Russian government to accept the new vision I have outlined and act on it. But the United States should be prepared to lead by example because it is in our best interest and the best interest of the world."

What does Senator _____ think of these ideas of President-elect Bush?

Shalikashvili Report

What does Senator _____ think of ideas presented in the report of General John Shalikashvili on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? Specifically, General Shalikashvili suggested:

- * That the Senate should reexamine the treaty and ratify it.
- * That the Senate and the executive branch conduct a joint review of the treaty's overall impact on national security 10 years after ratification.
- * That our government adopt a more integrated approach to nonproliferation and appoint a deputy national security adviser for nonproliferation.
- * That the United States strengthen its capability to detect and deter nuclear testing.

Would Senator _____ likely to be receptive to reconsideration of the CTBT and General Shalikashvili's other recommendations?

National Missile Defense

We do not intend to bring up national missile defense. However, if the senator's aide brings up the subject, we can express our concern and provide a copy of the religious leaders' letter to President Clinton on the subject.

January 17, 2001 Written by Howard W. Hallman

Participation of Religious Bodies in the United States in Nuclear Disarmament Activities

Key

Bold face: participating

Plain text: not participating so far, except: * have signed statements or letters

Italic: unofficial associations

Membership refers to full communicants or confirmed members

Religious Body	Membership
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CHRISTIAN

Roman Catholic Church	62,018,436
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U.S. Catholic Conference, Office of International Justice & Peace

Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Pax Christi USA

Sisters of Saint Joseph of Peace

Sisters of Mercy of the Americas

*NETWORK: A Catholic Social Justice Lobby**

Protestant/Orthodox

National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Washington Office

Church World Service

Church Women United

Baptist

Southern Baptist Convention	15,729,356
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Cooperative Baptist Fellowship ("moderates")

Black Baptists

National Baptist Convention, USA	8,200,000
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National Baptist Convention of America	3,500,000
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National Missionary Baptist Convention *	2,500,000
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Progressive National Baptist Convention *	2,500,000
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Other Baptists

American Baptists Church in the U.S.A.	1,507,400
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Baptist Bible Fellowship International	1,200,000
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Many small Baptist denominations

Alliance of Baptists

Baptist Peace Fellowship

Methodist

United Methodist Church	8,400,000
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General Board of Church and Society

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Religious Body	Membership
Methodists (cont.)	
African Methodist Episcopal Church *	2,500,000
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church *	1,035,983
Christian Methodist Church *	718,922
Lutheran	
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	3,840,136
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs	
Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod	1,952,020
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod	315,355
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)	2,587,674
Peace Making Program (Louisville)	
Washington Office	
<i>Presbyterian Peace Fellowship</i>	
Episcopal Church	1,593,413
Office of Peace and Justice Ministries (New York)	
Washington Office	
<i>Episcopal Peace Fellowship</i>	
United Church of Christ	1,421,088
Justice and Witness Ministries	
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) *	568,921
<i>Disciples Peace Fellowship</i>	
Reform Church in America *	179,085
Moravian Church in America, Northern Province *	20,746
Moravian Church in America, Southern Province *	n.a.
Orthodox	
Greek Orthodox Church in America *	1,954,500
Orthodox Church in America *	1,000,000
Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch *	32,500
Peace Churches	
Church of the Brethren	141,400
Office for Brethren Witness (Elgin,IL)	
Washington Office	
Mennonite Church *	92,161
Mennonite Church, General Conference *	36,600
Mennonite Central Committee, Washington Office	
Friends United Meeting *	41,614
Friends General Conference *	32,000
Evangelical Friends International - North American Region *	8,600
American Friends Service Committee	
Friends Committee for National Legislation	

Religious Bodies

Membership

Non-denominational

Fellowship of Reconciliation

World Peacemakers

Evangelical/ Pentecostal

National Association of Evangelicals

Church of God in Christ

Other Churches of God (combined total)

Assemblies of God

Churches of Christ

Jehovah's Witness

Pentecostal Assemblies of the World

Seventh-day Adventists

Church of the Nazarene

Evangelicals for Social Action

Sojourners Peace Ministry

5,499,875

1,105,264

1,453,907

1,071,616

1,040,283

1,000,000

790,731

623,028

Mormon

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints

4,417,700

140,018

JEWISH

Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations

United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism

Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform)

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations

Central Conference of American Rabbis *

The Rabbinical Assembly *

The Shalom Center *

OTHER RELIGIONS

Unitarian Universalist Association

Buddhist

Buddhist Peace Fellowship

Muslim

Muslim Peace Fellowship

Islamic Society of North America *

Islamic Supreme Council of America *

Baha'i Faith

Ethical Cultural Movement

Sikh

Vedanta Societies

Source: *Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches, 2000*. Edited by Eileen W. Lindner for National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. Nashville: Abingdon Press.

Notes on Conversations with Senators' Defense Aides

Ken Meyers of Senator Lugar's Office with Howard Hallman, Larry Egbert, Gregg Laszakovits on January 17, 2001

Meyers has concerns about unilateral but parallel action because of lack of verification. He cites backsliding on tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn in 1991 and now allegedly transferred to Kalliningrad.

Alternatives? Nunn-Lugar program: doing dismantlement....START III bilateral, then multilateral. But problems: changing unit of measurement from missiles to warheads (he simulated putting a warhead in a briefcase); strategic vs tactical; containing fissile material.

Other efforts: (1) Nuclear Cities Initiative (10 locales); developed by Rose Gottemuller at DOE and supported by Senator Domenici; (2) Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) at DOE; (2) International Technology Center at State Department dealing with individual scientists. Bush and Powell are supportive of Nunn-Lugar and these other measures.

De-alerting, a fine process but doesn't know of a process that works and will be accepted. Russia doesn't like de-mating because it would take them longer to re-mate. Covering silo lids with dirt; Russia thinks it would take them longer than U.S. to clear away. Disabling guidance systems: hard to verify except by having someone there to watch.

START II: thinks it will be ratified without the ABM protocols. But nothing likely to happen for nine months.

What should we support and try to enable? START III, nonproliferation measures.

Bush and Powell support Nunn-Lugar. Rumsfeld uncertain because he thinks money may be transferred to pay for new weapons development. Meyers knows of no evidence. Program staff at Pentagon haven't sent up any danger signals.

Need to support money for chemical weapons elimination under Nunn-Lugar. Russia has seven storage depots but no money to build elimination facility. One possibility at Shchuchye but House opposition to funding. Last year Senator Roberts worked out a compromise in conference committee but House Armed Service members balked, thinking it not in U.S. interest. It is. Construction is ready to begin by Parsons Co., a U.S. firm. We should give attention to this in defense authorization, educate House Republicans and their staff. A supportive leader is Rep. Mack Thorberry (R-TX), chair of Nuclear Caucus (Pantex is in his district); also Rep. John Pratt (D-SC). We should deal with House Armed Services Committee ranking members.

CTBT and Shalikhshvili report. Lugar's concerns on CTBT: (1) stockpile stewardship might not work; (2) verification, national capability not as good as for chemical weapons convention; (3) enforcement, weak sanctions. Shalikhshvili dealt with first two. Re ten year review proposal: perplexing, either Senate or Executive Branch could do on its own at any time. Also, he was concerned that the Shalikhshvili report was given to a Washington Post reporter before senators saw it.

Strong Nunn-Lugar supporters include Democrats Levin, Bingaman, Lieberman; Republicans Domenici, Hagel, Gordon Smith.

I invited Ken to come to the March 13 meeting of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament to talk about Nunn-Lugar and how we can be supportive.

Mike Coulter from Senator Hagel's office with Howard Hallman and Gregg Laszakovits on January 18, 2001.

Hagel-Lieberman working group on CTBT, non-proliferation (13 members?). Hagel and Lieberman have published one op-ed, another is coming out soon. Push support for funding of non-proliferation measures.

Re de-alerting: Still studying. Taking in information from various sources, conflicting advice. Senator Hagel keeps in touch with Admiral Mitz (sp?), head of U.S. Strategic Command, based in Nebraska; relies on his views. Mitz says we need to retain the capability to retaliate.

Hagel may get Foreign Relations Committee to deal with this subject. Hopes the new Administration will study and provide information.

There is a need to start reducing offensive arsenal and shifting to defensive. Favors national missile defense. Wants to move away from mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Re Bush executive initiative: could be sympathetic. Need to shift from offensive to defensive. (He said this several times.)

Defense authorization restrictions: in there because Congress didn't trust Clinton; will change with Bush.

Hagel led delegation to Munich and Moscow last February and discussed building NMD with cooperation of allies.

Re CTBT: Powell said at confirmation hearing that it won't be submitted this year. Hagel and Lieberman agree. But can move on other parts of Shalkashvili report, such as stockpile stewardship.

Hagel is a strong supporter of Nunn-Lugar. Foreign policy is his number one priority.

Tom Vecchiolla from Senator Snowe's office with Howard Hallman and Gregg Laszakovits, January 18, 2001

Senator Snowe is now on Finance Committee and is therefore less interested in defense. (True for Vecchiolla, too.)

CTBT: she voted against it because of concerns with verification, validation of stockpile by labs. Needs convincing to change her mind. Shalikashvili talked with her. Will look at new information.

De-alerting. For information, rely on those closest to issues. If Joint Chiefs support, she will.

Defense authorization restrictions. Political concerns with Clinton administration. Administration sent signals of concern but didn't talk with Hill.

National missile defense. Took to heart Tenet's testimony on threats, also Rumsfeld Commission. But she cosponsored Landrieu amendment to reduce number of missiles. Favors serious negotiations for arms reductions. On NMD would prefer other types of investments, such as sea-based. Land based is rather limited in coverage and inflexible. Cost is a concern. Surplus is going away. Need healthy economy. Cost trade-offs.

Vecchiolla was formerly on Senator Warner's staff.

John Seggerman of Senator's Chafee's staff with Howard Hallman, Lisa Wright, and Daryl Byler on January 19, 2001.

He hasn't talked with Chafee on de-alerting. Thinks he likely would defer to what President Bush wants to do.

CTBT. Won't come back this year. Chafee supports ratification and other things in Shalikashvili report. He met with Shalikashvili along with others from the Lieberman-Hagel study group.

Last session Helms was generally cooperative except for CTBT. Helms and Biden could work things out.

NMD. Chafee is likely to yield to the Bush Administration. Senator John Chafee believed that the ABM treaty is in force and stood up for it. Lincoln Chafee probably will, too. We noted that he raised the effect of NMD on U.S. allies at the Powell confirmation hearings.

Overall impression: hasn't focused on these issues much in the new Congress.

Sam Patten of Senator Collin's office with Howard Hallman and Daryl Byler, January 22, 2001.

CTBT. Senator Collins voted against CTBT because of unanswered questions about verification and stockpile stewardship and because of political maneuvering (such as Dorgan's stance). Presumably she is open to persuasion if she can get appropriated answers.

Re unilateral initiatives. Intrigued by possibilities. Depends on how it fits in with arms control. Since Bush is moving ahead with NMD and will probably gain some Russian acceptance, these other initiatives (de-alerting, strategic reductions) can be a good faith gesture to the Russians.

He asked what we want. Answer: de-alerting, START III or executive-initiated reductions, another look at CTBT. He asked our views on NMD. We offered our concerns. Do we have a position on theater missile defense? No. He is favorable.

Collins is for NMD of some kind. Likes sea-based; Aegis built in Maine. Would support arms reduction measures. Will follow Bush's lead.

Patten was in Kazakstan four years; took a class from Tom Graham.

He mentioned the RAND report. (I'm not sure what this is.)

Have Bruce Blair send me material on details of de-alerting.

Elizabeth Turpin of Senator Domenici's staff with Howard Hallman and Rachel LaBush, January 22, 2001.

NMD is chest-thumping. It remains to be seen how it will play out. As a trade off with Russia, U.S. cut strategic weapons, reduce target list, achieve compromise on strategic reductions. But effect on China a concern.

Dealing with Russian/Iran deals. A hard line could undermine Nunn-Lugar. Why shoot self in foot? Domenici wouldn't want that. To watch: how Powell and Rice will handle this.

Shalikashvili talked with Domenici two days before he released his report. Some meeting of minds, such as on stockpile stewardship. Domenici wants to secure adequate funding.

De-alerting? This could go somewhere though doesn't know all the answers on verification. Domenici might be supportive. Defense authorization restrictions could be removed; are there because of distrust of Clinton.

Re Domenici's CTBT speech reference to need for broader strategy. He was concerned that Clinton was putting all eggs in one basket. But recognizes progress with Russia in transparency, verification procedures, on-site seismologists. Need to bring in China

History

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament builds upon the experience of two previous campaigns. The first was support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the spring of 1997. In that case Howard Hallman brought about a dozen faith-based organization into the CWC ratification that was coordinated by the Poison Gas Task Force.

The second campaign was for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate. This stemmed from a meeting Hallman called in June 1997 that led to the formation of the Interfaith Group for the CTBT with 22 participating organization. As the attached activities report indicates, the Interfaith Group carried out an extensive grassroots campaign in 30 states. Although the CTBT was defeated in October 1999 in a highly partisan vote, the faith community had an impact. For instance, during the two days of Senate debate 62 senators signed a letter asking for postponement of the decision. Of the 20 signers who nevertheless voted against the treaty, 19 were from states where the Interfaith Group for the CTBT had an active grassroots campaign. We don't claim full credit for their vote, but persons on Capitol Hill tell us that many senators were nervous about voting against the CTBT because of grassroots pressure for ratification and sought postponement as a way out.

Following the defeat of the CTBT we began exploring what we should do next. This led to the establishment of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in May 2000. So far 36 faith-based organizations have agreed to participate in this undertaking. The number is growing (more on this below).

Initial Activities

At a planning meeting on May 22 we decided to give immediate attention to halting deployment of a U.S. national missile defense and eventually to terminating the program. The Interfaith Committee also agreed to develop public support for arms control treaties as they come before the U.S. Senate, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), START II protocol, a future START III agreement, and other treaties of this nature. The Interfaith Committee also agreed to work on other nuclear disarmament issue as they arise, such as de-alerting, other means of promoting nuclear safety (such as the Nunn-Lugar program), halting all new weapon development, non-proliferation measures, negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention, and instituting an international regime of fissile material control.

The immediate result as a post card alert to get our constituents around the country to write President Clinton in opposition of deployment of national missile defense. This was done in collaboration with 20/20 Vision. In July 28 faith-based organizations distributed more than 40,000 cards, and some organizations also used electronic means to transmit the message to grassroots networks. In September we got some of our state and local contacts participate in a 20/20 conference call on NMD.

In November we adopted the following work program for November 2000 to June 2001.

Objectives

- 1) Develop bipartisan support for de-alerting the nuclear arsenal and for strategic arms reduction.
- 2) Seek to remove statutory obstacles to these measures.
- 3) Be prepared to deal with other issues as they arise, such as "mini-nukes" and national missile defense.

Work Schedule

November -December

- Develop talking points and other resources on de-alerting and strategic arms reduction (assistance from Bank from the Brink Campaign and Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers).
- Complete and circulate for signatures a religious leaders' letter on de-alerting to president-elect (FCNL).
- Identify key senators for dialogue.
- Identify interfaith contacts in key states; obtain their commitment to talk with the key senators on de-alerting and strategic arms reduction; provide them briefing material.
- Make contact with transition team of president-elect.

January

- Briefing for Washington-based staff on de-alerting and strategic arms reduction.
- Conference call briefing for state interfaith contacts.
- Commence visits with senators and staff in D.C. and in home states.
- Religious leaders letter on de-alerting to president-elect (FCNL).
- Seek meetings with top officials of new presidential administration.

February

- Continue meetings with senators.
- February 5-6: national call-in days on de-alerting (Back from the Brink).

February-June

- Grassroots mobilization in support of legislation to remove statutory obstacles to de-alerting and strategic arms reduction.
- Contacts with representatives as well as senators.
- Deal with other nuclear disarmament issues as they arise.

In implementation of this work plan we have selected ten key senators from nine states to begin dialogue on these issues. We are making the rounds of their offices in Washington to their staffs, and we are organizing interfaith delegations in their states to make contact with them there. We will follow this by selecting ten more for the same purpose, and then ten more after that. We will also turn our attention to the House of Representatives.

We are prepared to add other issues to our agenda, such as the Nunn-Lugar Program and other issues to be promoted by the Nuclear Threat Initiative if we received resources for this task.

Strategies and Tactics

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will use a variety of tactics for achieving its goals. Drawing upon the experience of the CTBT campaign, activities will include the following.

Grassroots mobilization

- Use of grassroots networks of denominations and religious associations
- State and local interfaith organizing
- Information dissemination
- Action alerts
 - By participating organizations
 - Jointly
- Petitions
- National call-in days
- Regional training workshops
- Conference calls
- Home state meetings with members of Congress
- Worship and celebration

Public policy advocacy in Washington

- Sign-on letters
- Lobby days
- Meetings with congressional staff
- Meetings with Executive Branch officials
- News conferences
- Newspaper ads
- Rallies
- Ceremonies

Collaboration with civil-sector organizations

During the past three years 22 faith-based organizations worked together to develop public support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate. They included the Washington Office of the Unitarian Universalist Association. The organizational base for joint activities was the Interfaith Group for the CTBT. As the attached history indicates, it organized in June 1997 and carried out an extensive grassroots campaign in 30 states. Although the CTBT was defeated in October 1999 in a highly partisan vote, the faith community had an impact. For instance, during the two days of Senate debate 62 senators signed a letter asking for postponement of the decision. Of the 20 signers who nevertheless voted against the treaty, 19 were from states where the Interfaith Group for the CTBT had an active grassroots campaign. We believe that this provides a base for further work to get the CTBT ratified in 2001.

Public Policy Objectives

The long-range public policy goal we will seek is the elimination of nuclear weapons. We realize that this is most likely to occur through a sequence of steps rather than in one fell swoop. These steps have been defined during the last decade by a variety of study commissions, retired military leaders, and civilian experts. Drawing on these recommendations, we will work to achieve or make substantial progress on the following steps during 2001 to 2004.

- Ratification and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- De-alerting the world's nuclear arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles and other means.
- Deep cuts in the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenal on an interim basis until they go to zero (say, to 1,000 de-alerted warheads on each side and then to 200 or fewer).
- Curtailing the development of new nuclear weapons.
- Halting efforts to establish ballistic missile defense ("Star Wars").
- Support for and enhancement of the international nonproliferation regime.
- Negotiation and adoption of a global Nuclear Weapons Convention that outlaws and abolishes all nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control.
- Achievement of an international system of fissile material control.

Modes of Operation

Because all nuclear weapons (as far as is known) are in the control of governments, it is governments which will decide whether to adopt and carry out the steps toward nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the focus of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will be upon influencing governmental officials who determine public policies on nuclear weapons. This will be achieved through three modes of operation: (i) education and mobilization of regional and local religious bodies and people of faith so that they can contact public officials, (ii) direct contact with public officials in Washington, and (iii) efforts to shape public opinion through the media and other avenues.

Grassroots education and mobilization will occur through regional and local networks of denominations and religious associations. The main objective is to have numerous persons from the faith community engaged in continual dialogue with public officials on nuclear disarmament issues. To help this process staff of participating organizations and the Interfaith Committee will produce and disseminate issue briefs, sample letters to the editor, op-ed pieces,

and worship material. We will vigorously promote interfaith cooperation at the state and local level. Organizers will go into the field. We will utilize conference calls and state and regional training workshops to develop greater local capacity.

In Washington participants in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will make **direct contact** with members of Congress, their staff, and key persons in the Executive Branch. There will be sign-on letters, public statements, news conferences, and public forums. We will work closely with secular organizations working for nuclear disarmament, such as the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, Council for a Livable World, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Union of Concerned Scientists, Center for Defense Information, 20/20 Vision, Peace Action, and Women's Action for New Directions (WAND).

We will use **public media** to influence public opinion by bringing the views of the faith community on nuclear disarmament before the general public. This will be achieved through direct contact with reporters, editors, and television and radio news producers. We will utilize denominational publications, both national and regional, to gain fuller coverage of nuclear disarmament issues.

Faith-based Networks

A major strength of this project will be our ability to tap into nationwide networks of denominations and religious associations. This will enable us to tie into existing communication systems, reach state and local units whose mission encompasses a concern for peace and justice issues, and mobilize members of churches, synagogues, mosques, and other local religious institutions. Such outreach will encourage interfaith cooperation.

In this respect we have capacity to reach people in every state in the nation. We have demonstrated this in the CTBT campaign where we developed active participation in 30 states. This included such states as Alaska, New Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Indiana where secular peace organizations are less active. In our new endeavor we will encompass all 50 states.

Although denominations differ in structure and the extent of centralization or decentralization, most of them have a national headquarters as a base for their officers and support staff. A few of the national units are located in Washington, D.C., but most are based elsewhere around the country. Of the latter, some of the larger ones maintain an office for public policy advocacy in Washington, D.C. So do historic peace churches. These form the base for the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, but we will seek to include other denominations that lack a Washington office.

Most denominations have regional units known variously as diocese, synod, conference, presbytery, convention, and district with a presiding officer known as bishop, conference minister, president, and other titles. These dioceses and conferences often have staff and committees, including one on social action. The staff and committees of dioceses and conferences are in touch with local churches, their pastors and members. These intermediate units will be an important part of our outreach network.

National offices often communicate with their regional units and have them pass the messages and material on to local churches. National offices also have lists of key contacts on various issues, increasingly on the internet, and they communicate with them directly. Thus, we will be able tap into these established means of communication to reach the grassroots on issues of nuclear disarmament.

Within each denomination are unofficial associations that bring together persons with common interests, such as Episcopal Peace Fellowship, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, Pax Christi, Presbyterian Peace Fellowship, Unitarian Universalist Peace Fellowship, and associations drawn from Catholic religious orders. There are also organizations cutting across denominational lines, such as Evangelicals for Social Action, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Sojourners. All of them have individual members located around the country who are strongly committed to working on peace and justice issues. Some of them have state and local chapters. There are also interfaith associations in many states with a concern for peace and justice issues. All of them will be valuable participants in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, as they have been in the CTBT campaign.

Hallman

Howard Hallman will serve as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. He has long experience with interfaith activities, going back to his college days (see vita). As was the case with the CTBT group, his role will be that of a catalyst and facilitator. The leadership style will be that taught by Lao-tzu: "Of a good leader, who talks little, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, the people will say, 'we did this ourselves.' "

Strategies and Tactics

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Public policy advocacy in Washington

Sign-on letters
Lobby days
Meetings with congressional staff
Meetings with Executive Branch officials
News conferences
Newspaper ads
Rallies
Ceremonies

Collaboration with civil-sector organizations

A Proposal for Financial Support for Interfaith Activities on Nuclear Threat Reduction and Disarmament

This proposal requests that consideration be given to directing substantial funds to the faith community in the United States so that religious denominations and religious associations can make important contributions to the Nuclear Threat Initiative being established by Senator Sam Nunn and Mr. Ted Turner. This would build upon (a) the long-standing goal of religious organizations to eliminate nuclear weapons and (b) the current involvement of a coalition of religious organizations to achieve concrete steps leading to this goal. This represents both the prophetic and the pragmatic approaches of the faith community.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age religious bodies and religious leaders have expressed their concern about nuclear weapons. Faith-based groups have consistently pressed for the end of nuclear weapon testing, reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals. A collection of policy statements on nuclear weapons is presented in Attachment 1.

At the same time a wide variety of denominational units and unofficial religious organizations have engaged in public policy advocacy in behalf of specific measures that contribute to nuclear threat reduction and nuclear disarmament. In doing so they tap into grassroots networks that reach virtually every county in the United States and every congressional district.

Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

Currently the work of the faith community on this issue comes to focus in the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. This group is a loose-knit coalition of representatives of denominational offices and unofficial religious associations who work together in educational and public advocacy activities on specific steps that lead toward nuclear disarmament. Howard W. Hallman, chair of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, serves as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament.

The following 35 organizations are now involved in activities initiated by the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (the number is growing from month to month). Where they fit in the total perspective of religious organizations in the United States is shown in Attachment 2.

Denominational Units

- American Baptists Churches, USA
- Church of the Brethren
- Church World Service
- Cooperative Baptist Fellowship
- Episcopal Church
- Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
- Mennonite Central Committee
- National Council of Churches

Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
Unitarian Universalist Association
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church
U.S. Catholic Conference

Unofficial Associations

Alliance of Baptists
American Friends Service Committee
Baptist Peace Fellowship
Buddhist Peace Fellowship
Church Women United
Conference of Major Superiors of Men
Disciples Peace Fellowship
Episcopal Peace Fellowship
Evangelicals for Social Action
Fellowship of Reconciliation
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jewish Peace Fellowship
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
Muslim Peace Fellowship
Pax Christi USA
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship
Sisters of Saint Joseph of Peace
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
Sojourners Peace Ministry
World Peacemakers

In addition, in recent years representatives of another 22 denominations have signed statements and letters on nuclear disarmament issues although they are not engaged in regular public advocacy activities on this matter (see Attachment 2). We will seek to involve them and others more fully in nuclear threat reduction and disarmament issues if we are able to expand our resources. More on this latter.

Previous Activities

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament builds upon the experience of two previous campaigns. The first was support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the spring of 1997. About a dozen faith-based organization were involved in efforts along with a number of civil-sector organizations, coordinated by the Poison Gas Task Force

The second campaign was for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate. Starting in June 1997, 22 faith-based organizations participated in the Interfaith Group for the CTBT. We were strictly nonpartisan, but we recognized that the big challenge was to develop Republican support for the treaty. Therefore, we carried out an

extensive grassroots campaign directed toward 35 Republican senators in 30 states. Our activities in support of the CTBT are described in Attachment 3. Although the CTBT was defeated in October 1999 in a highly partisan vote, the faith community had an impact. For instance, during the two days of Senate debate 62 senators signed a letter initiated by Senators Warner and Moynihan asking for postponement of the decision. Of the 20 signers who nevertheless voted against the treaty, 19 were from states where the Interfaith Group for the CTBT had an active grassroots campaign. We don't claim full credit for their signature, but persons on Capitol Hill told us that many senators were nervous about voting against the CTBT because of grassroots pressure for ratification and they sought postponement as a way out.

Following the defeat of the CTBT we began exploring what we should do next. This led to the establishment of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in May 2000.

Initial Activities

At a planning meeting in May 2000 we decided that we would concentrate on issues on the current political agenda and on practical steps that lead toward nuclear disarmament. We decided to give immediate attention to halting deployment of a U.S. national missile defense (NMD) and eventually to terminating the program. Beyond that we committed ourselves to developing public support for arms control treaties as they come before the U.S. Senate, including CTBT, START II protocol, a future START III agreement, and other treaties of this nature. We also agreed to work on other nuclear disarmament issues as they arise, such as de-alerting, the Nunn-Lugar program, halting new weapon development, non-proliferation measures, negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention, and instituting an international regime of fissile material control.

We moved into action in June and July. The Friends Committee for National Legislation took the initiative to get a sign-on letter from religious leaders to President Clinton opposing deployment of national missile defense. In collaboration with 20/20 Vision, 28 faith-based organizations distributed more than 40,000 postcards to get our constituents around the country to write the president in opposition to NMD. Some organizations also used electronic means to transmit the message to grassroots networks. Thus, we became another source of pressure on President Clinton.

In November we decided to prepare for the next presidential administration and the next Congress by making contact with key Republican senators who can help build a strong bipartisan majority for reducing nuclear threats and achieving nuclear arms reduction. In particular, we agreed to focus on possibilities for de-alerting and U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction through START III or reciprocal executive initiatives. We are now in the process of organizing interfaith groups in nine states to meet with ten key senators, and we are also talking with their staffs in Washington. After this is underway we will add another ten senators to our list and may eventually reach 30 or more. Later we will turn our attention to the House of Representatives, especially the Armed Services Security Committee. We are also seeking to contact key officials in the Bush Administration.

At the same time we are working with Back from the Brink Campaign to develop grassroots support for de-alerting. In early January, 11 faith groups joined with 11 civil-sector organizations in co-sponsoring a 20/20 postcard asking their members to writing incoming

President Bush in support of de-alerting. A variety of faith organizations are publicizing call-in days to the White House on de-alerting scheduled for February 5 and 6.

During 2001 we will deal with other issues as they arise, such as national missile defense, nuclear posture review, development of mini-nukes, and the Nunn-Lugar program. On the latter we have invited Senator Lugar's staff to meet with the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament at one of our monthly meetings. In this case we may go somewhat beyond the nuclear field and support U.S. funding of the proposed Russian chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuchye.

Faith-based Networks

Although the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament is based in Washington, much of our work occurs through outreach to faith-based grassroots networks located all around the United States.

Denominations differ in structure and the extent of centralization or decentralization, but most of them have a national headquarters for their officers and support staff. A few of the national units are located in Washington, D.C., but most are based elsewhere around the country. Of the latter, some of the larger ones maintain an office for public policy advocacy in Washington, D.C. So do historic peace churches. These form the base for the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, but we seek to include denominations that lack Washington offices

Most denominations have regional units known variously as diocese, synod, conference, presbytery, convention, and district with a presiding officer known as bishop, conference minister, president, and other titles. These dioceses and conferences often have staff and working committees, including one on social action. The staff and committees of dioceses and conferences are in touch with local churches, their pastors and members. These intermediate units are an important part of our outreach network.

National offices often communicate with their regional units and have them pass the messages and material on to local churches. National offices also have lists of key contacts on various issues, increasingly on the internet, and they communicate with them directly. Thus, we are able to tap into these established means of communication and reach grassroots activists throughout the country on issues of nuclear disarmament.

Within each denomination are unofficial associations that bring together persons with common interests, such as Episcopal Peace Fellowship, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, Pax Christi, Presbyterian Peace Fellowship, Jewish Peace Fellowship, and associations drawn from Catholic religious orders. There are also organizations cutting across denominational lines, such as Evangelicals for Social Action, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Sojourners. All of them have individual members located around the country who are strongly committed to working on peace and justice issues. Some of them have state and local chapters. There are also interfaith associations in many states with a concern for peace and justice issues. All of them will be valuable participants in outreach activities of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, as they were in the CTBT campaign. In total the denominational and association networks can reach hundreds of thousands of peace activists.

Strategies and Tactics

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament uses a variety of tactics for achieving its goals. We combine education and public advocacy activities. Foundation support goes for activities permitted for 501(c)(3) organizations under the Internal Revenue Code. Activities considered direct lobbying and legislative alerts to grassroots networks are paid by denominational offices from their own funds. We are careful to make that distinction.

In outline the activities we undertake include the following.

Grassroots mobilization

- Use of grassroots networks of denominations and religious associations
- State and local interfaith organizing
- Information dissemination (study guides, fact sheets, bulletin inserts)
- Action alerts (via U.S. mail, e-mail, fax)
 - By participating organizations
 - Jointly
- Letters, phone calls, e-mail to public officials
- Home state meetings with members of Congress
- Petitions
- National call-in days
- Regional training workshops
- Conference calls
- Worship and celebration

Public policy advocacy in Washington

- Sign-on letters
- Lobby days
- Meetings with members of Congress and their staff
- Meetings with Executive Branch officials
- News conferences
- Newspaper ads
- Rallies
- Ceremonies

Collaboration with Civil-sector Organizations

As noted, we work closely with civil-sector organizations. We have an informal corps of advisers who attend our monthly meetings, including staff from 20/20 Vision, Bank from the Brink Campaign, and others involved in grassroots activities. In January we had a briefing session on de-alerting and strategic arms reduction led by Dr. Bruce Blair, president, Center for Defense Information, and Daryl Kimball, executive director, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.

Members of the faith community participate in various working groups organized by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Coming out a recent meeting of the Deep Cuts/NMD Working Group, we will be involved in an effort to reach European and Canadian contacts to encourage opposition to national missile defense. We will also work with several civil-sector

organizations to develop a report showing the total nuclear threat to United States (Russian and Chinese missiles, unsecured fissile material, possible future possession of nuclear weapons by a few new nations and terrorist groups, delivery by a variety of means) and the most appropriate responses to these threats (of which national missile defense seems a low priority of doubtful technological feasibility and questionable cost effectiveness). We are also in touch with a group of organizations reviewing the U.S. nuclear posture, a topic we are considering.

International Contacts

We maintain contact with the international faith community. For the 1998 meeting of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Geneva, Howard Hallman worked with Pax Christi USA to develop a statement transmitted to the delegates by Dr. Konrad Reiser, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, and Godfried Cardinal Danneels, president, Pax Christi International. Hallman also drafted an NGO statement on "A Spiritual, Ethical, and Humanitarian Perspective on Nuclear Weapons" that was read to the delegates by U.S. Catholic Bishop Thomas Gumbleton.

In October 2000 Hallman attended a consultation of church representatives from Europe, Canada, and the United States in Brussels to consider ways to encourage NATO to lessen its dependence on nuclear weapons. He is in touch with efforts (a) by the World Council of Churches to have its Central Committee issue a fresh statement on nuclear disarmament toward the end of January and (b) by Pax Christi International to issue a similar statement in April, signed by leading Catholic bishops from different continents from around the globe. He also maintains contact with representatives of the Holy See in Rome and at the United Nations.

Request for Support

Given the experience of the faith community and our extensive grassroots network, we believe that the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament would be a natural partner for the new Nuclear Threat Initiative. Therefore, we ask you to consider allotting \$1 million a year for five years to obtain full participation of the faith community. This would enable us to convert what is now a shoestring operation, squeezed out of fairly meager resources, into a much fuller endeavor. This amount would be spent as follows.

Core support. The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament functions as a loose-knit coalition of faith-based organizations. This works better than attempting to form a separate corporation with a formal board of directors and staff. That's because denominational offices can be involved without going through elaborate approval mechanisms they would need if they were to have formal affiliation with a legal entity. Furthermore, the relaxed nature of the Interfaith Committee enables participating organizations to choose which precise issues they want to work on and how they will approach these issues within their networks. This eliminates the need to seek unanimity on every issue and every activity.

First, given this situation, the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament needs catalytic leadership to keep it together and to move it along. This is provided by its chair, Howard Hallman, who has been chosen by consensus. His role is similar to that described in the report on CTBT activities.

As chair of the Interfaith Group for the CTBT, Hallman has functioned primarily as a catalyst and mobilizer of co-equal organizations, not as a director in a hierarchical sense or as a coordinator in a formal administrative sense. The Interfaith Group is a cooperative endeavor. Different participants volunteer to take the lead in particular activities. Hallman's role is to preside at meetings, keep in touch with participants, facilitate cooperative relationships, fill gaps as necessary, and serve as liaison with peace and disarmament organizations.

Some of the requested funds will therefore go to the Methodists United Peace/Justice Education Fund, a 501(c)(3) entity, in support of Hallman's half-time service as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. Information about his qualifications is provided below.

Second, there is need for a field coordinator to facilitate interfaith cooperation at the state and local levels. Participating organizations reach out to their own grassroots networks to get them to act on issues of nuclear threat reduction and disarmament. State and local groups can be more effective if they join with other faith groups in their state and congressional district in making contact with their senators and representatives. For this to come about there needs to be persons in states and districts responsible for pulling groups together. This might be somebody from any of the participating denominations, encouraged by denominational headquarters. Achieving this requires a field coordinator working with the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament to orchestrate state and local cooperation.

Third, the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament needs a common web site to serve as a central source of faith-based information on nuclear threat reduction and disarmament and to provide linkages with web sites of denominations, civil-sector organizations, and governmental agencies.

Fourth, occasionally the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will want to publish reports developed collectively by its participating organizations. By and large distribution will be handled by these organizations themselves.

Outreach. Core support will account for less than one-fourth of the requested grant of \$1 million. The remainder will be spent to broaden the base of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament and to enable participating organizations to increase their outreach capacity. This will be achieved through a series of grants to entities dealing with particular segments and to particular denominational offices.

The highest priority will be given to bringing in segments of the faith community that are not now fully involved in disarmament activities. These gaps are shown in Attachment 2. Although leaders of African American denominations, Methodist and Baptist, sometimes sign statements and letters to public officials on nuclear disarmament, their networks are not involved. We believe that a way to break through would be to give a grant to a black church consortium to hire a staff person who would work on nuclear disarmament issues and seek involvement of their grassroots networks. A similar grant should be given to an entity representative of the Evangelical community. This possibility also needs to be explored for the Orthodox Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faith communities.

The second priority is to bolster the staff of major Protestant and Catholic denominations working for nuclear disarmament. As it is, denominational staff cover an amazing number of issues and don't always make meetings of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament because they are attending meetings on other subjects, such as Latin America, Africa, Middle East, debt relief, the world AIDS crisis, human rights, and others matters. It would be desirable, therefore, to provide a series of small grants so that they can add staff, such as an intern, who will work full time on nuclear disarmament and participate fully in grassroots outreach.

These organizational grants combined with the facilitating work of the chair and field coordinator will leverage substantial resources from participating denominations and religious associations.

Annual Budget

I. Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

A. Leadership

Chair -- ½ time	\$ 36,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>5,400</u>
	41,400
Non-personal	<u>18,600</u>
	60,000

B. Outreach

Field coordinator -- full time	\$ 50,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>7,500</u>
	57,500
Non-personal	<u>32,500</u>
	90,000

C. Communications

Program assistant	\$ 30,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>4,500</u>
	34,500
Non-personal (including web site contractual)	<u>25,500</u>
	60,000

D. Joint Publications \$ 25,000

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\$ 235,000

II. Mobilizing grants to denominational units and other entities \$ 765,000

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Total requested per year \$1,000,000

Background of Howard W. Hallman

Professional Career

Howard W. Hallman is a graduate of the University of Kansas in Lawrence, where he earned B.A. and M.A. degrees (1950, 1951) and worked for the Bureau of Government Research (1949-52).

Hallman worked in Philadelphia from 1952 to 1958, first for the Philadelphia Housing Association, an advocacy organization, and then as a consultant to citizen organizations. From 1959 to 1965 he worked in New Haven, Connecticut, first as director of the city's neighborhood improvement program and then as deputy director of Community Progress, Inc., a private non-profit corporation set up to run community action and anti-poverty programs. In 1964 he was on loan part time to the War on Poverty Task Force in Washington, D.C.

Hallman moved to Washington in 1965 and served as a consultant to city governments and community action agencies around the country, helping them set up employment training and community action programs. In 1967 he directed a study of the Poverty Program for a U.S. Senate subcommittee.

In 1969 Hallman organized the Center for Governmental Studies, later renamed Civic Action Institute. For the next seven years the Center conducted studies of municipal decentralization, citizen participation, and employment and training programs and conducted workshops for local officials and citizen leaders. In 1976 he was founder of a national organization now known as Neighborhoods, USA, which in May 2000 had its 25th annual conference where Hallman was presented the founder's award. In 1977 Hallman served as a full-time consultant to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development on citizen participation policies. From 1978 to 1983 the Civic Action Institute under his leadership provided training and technical assistance around the United States to local officials and citizen leaders on citizen participation and neighborhood action.

In 1984 Hallman switched his primary attention to public advocacy on peace and justice issues but also performed occasional consulting on matters of citizen participation and neighborhood organizing. In 1990s hosted a Polish delegation to the United States in a study of citizen participation practices, spent a week in Turkey speaking to local officials and citizen organization leaders on democratic participation, and presented a paper on citizen participation at an international conference in Tokyo. He has conducted studies on community development matters in Sweden, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Israel.

Hallman is author of more than 250 articles, pamphlets, and reports and nine books, including *The Organization and Operation of Neighborhood Councils*, *Small and Large Together: Governing the Metropolis*, and *Neighborhoods: Their Place in Urban Life*.

Peace Activities

Howard Hallman has long experience working for world peace. While in college he became a Christian pacifist. He requested selective service classification as a conscientious

objector and performed alternative civilian service during the Korean War. Subsequently he engaged in a variety of peace activities as a volunteer, mostly through the Fellowship of Reconciliation and local churches.

In 1984 Hallman decided to focus his attention on the need for nuclear disarmament. He studied the topic, wrote and circulated a variety of papers, especially on the fallacy of nuclear deterrence. He became active in the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of Montgomery County, Maryland, where he lives, and as a volunteer served as coordinator for three years through the period when the Freeze Campaign merged with SANE. In 1986 Hallman drafted, circulated, revised, and got signatures from a wide range of people around the country for "A Citizens' Declaration on Worldwide Nuclear Disarmament: Starting Now, Finishing Before the Year 2000". He staged a public signing ceremony in September 1986.

In 1987 Hallman helped establish Methodists United for Peace with Justice, which organized in response to the United Methodist bishops call for greater prayer and action for peace, set forth in their pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*. Since then he has filled several offices: issues chair, treasurer, executive director, and now chair of the board of directors. He has represented Methodists United in the Monday Lobby. At his initiative Methodists United was able to get resolutions on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 United Methodist General Conferences. The current one is entitled "Nuclear Abolition".

In May 1991 Hallman had an insight that nuclear disarmament could come in two stages: first, deactivate the nuclear arsenal by bringing strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, taking warheads off ICBMs, and removing nuclear weapons from strategic bombers; second, dismantlement of these weapons through balanced stages. This idea was incorporated into a policy statement of Methodists United for Peace with Justice in October 1991 and sent to political leaders in the United States, Soviet Union, and Russian Federation and to arms control advocates in the United States. In February 1992 Hallman got representatives of more than 30 national peace and arms control organizations in the United States to recommend the deactivation approach (now called de-alerting) to President Bush and President Boris Yeltsin.

In the summer of 1995 Hallman began exploring ways to mobilize the religious community in the United States to work together in a renewed push for nuclear abolition. He circulated among U.S. religious leaders a Citizen's Pledge to work for nuclear abolition, which the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation had initiated. In the fall and winter of 1995-96 Hallman participated in organizing meetings of the Abolition 2000 network. He became a co-convenor of a Religious Working Group for Nuclear Abolition. Through this vehicle he developed a statement by world religious leaders on nuclear abolition addressed to delegates of the 1998 session of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in Geneva. The Religious Working Group sponsored a reception for delegates and wrote a presentation on moral and spiritual values that was one of 13 statements by non-governmental organizations presented to the delegates. In October 2000 Hallman went to Brussels to participate in a consultation of church representatives from Europe, Canada, and the United States on NATO's nuclear policy.

Through his position as chair of Methodists United for Peace with Justice Hallman became heavily involved in the grassroots campaign to achieve U.S. Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the spring of 1997. This led to the formation of the Interfaith

Group for the CTBT, which he chaired, to build grassroots support for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to offer a unified, interfaith presence in Washington in support of the CTBT. To sustain interfaith activity on nuclear disarmament after Senate rejection of the CTBT, Hallman led exploratory discussions which led to the establishment of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in May 2000. Hallman is serving as chair of this new organization.

Interfaith Activities

Over the years Howard Hallman has been involved in a variety of interfaith activities, as follows:

During high school in Pittsburg, Kansas (1943-46): member, Hi-Y; president, junior year.

At University of Kansas (1946-51): Student Religious Council, vice president and chairperson of Religious Emphasis Week; chairperson, Civil Rights Coordinating Council; recipient of William Allen White Interfaith Fellowship Award. Joined Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR).

Philadelphia (1952-58): Member, Board of Directors, Community Service Department of Philadelphia Council of Churches. Chairperson (two years), Philadelphia Chapter, Fellowship of Reconciliation.

New Haven (1959-65): Member, Board of Directors, Wider City Parish (an inner-city ministry). Active in local FOR.

Washington, D.C. (1965-71): Member, Coalition of Conscience (a civil rights organization).

Montgomery County, Maryland (1971 to present): Chairperson, Interfaith Forum on Peace and Justice (1986-90). Active in Community Ministries of Montgomery County (1996 to present). Member, Commission on Social and Economic Justice, Interfaith Conference of Metropolitan Washington (1999 to present).

On national scene: Co-Chair, Religious Working Group, Abolition 2000 (1996-98); Chair, Interfaith Group for the CTBT (1997-99); Chair, Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (2000 to present). For details of his interfaith activities on nuclear disarmament, see description of under "Peace Activities" above.

Personal

Howard Hallman is married to Rev. Carlee Hallman, a retired United Methodist minister. They live in Bethesda, Maryland and have two adult daughters and one grandson. He is a volunteer for inner city service programs. For recreation Hallman plays senior softball and plays viola with chamber music groups and his church's praise band. He has had a play produced by an amateur theater group. He is currently trying his hand at writing children's stories and screenplays but has made no sales yet.

References for Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

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Notes on Conversation with Senate Defense Aides

Laurie Schultz Heim and Jonathan E. Farnham, office of Senator Jeffords with Howard Hallman and Ron Stief, January 25, 2001.

CTBT: not likely to come up this year. Laurie says it has to come back because of global nonproliferation concerns. Maybe next year. Need to keep on the list of demands. Jeffords will continue to support CTBT.

National missile defense. Jeffords supports research but not deployment. Biggest threat to national security is school performance. Concern for ABM treaty preservation. Seggerman on Chafee's staff is expert on ABM treaty. Laurie doesn't understand why U.S. NMD matters to Europeans. (I said leadership concern for maintaining global security structure.) The North Korean menace has lessened, but concern about other rogues getting nukes continues. Public opinion on NMD: (1) why do it? we don't need it or (2) if we can do it, we should for future safety; an obligation. Concern about price tag, priorities.

De-alerting. Regarding chart with time chart for short response: response would be tempered by more peaceful times now compared to Cold War. So wouldn't have to respond so quickly to an unexpected attack. She hasn't thought much about de-alerting, doesn't know much about it. Needs more information.

Our issues? De-alerting, START II or executive action, NMD

Laurie wondered whether there might be a letter from Republican senators to Bush, urging action on such matter as strategic reductions, de-alerting. Perhaps Lugar (Ken Meyers) would take the lead.

What about a briefing for senate aides on de-alerting? Not many attend. Maybe could get it into an established forum, such as the biweekly luncheons of the Council on Foreign Relations, or the OCED presentations (I don't know what that is).

Others to see: Fieldhouse on Senator Levin's staff; Ed Levine on Biden's staff. Key Republicans: Hagel (Ken Peel; Hagel's interest in Central Asia), Frist, McCain (Ann Sauer).

Laurie wants us to keep her informed, share information with her.

Karin L. Rodgers of Senator Specter's office with Howard Hallman and Ron Stief on January 25, 2001

Specter is just back from India and Pakistan and presented his findings in yesterday's Congressional Record including nonproliferation matters. Otherwise he hasn't focused on nuclear weapons issues yet, what he might take up. He certainly will continue to support the CTBT. The Shalkashvili report is helpful. Will need to address the stockpile stewardship issue. Doesn't have a position on de-alerting, strategic arms reduction. She wants to be kept informed on these matters, what we hear. NMD: Specter voted for Cochran-Inouye bill. When it comes up again, he'll consider the issues. Send in constituent letters.

The U.S. Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century **A Statement by Religious Leaders**

In accordance with a mandate from Congress, the U.S. Secretary of Defense is now conducting "a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." This is a significant endeavor because the way the United States handles nuclear weapons affects the security of our nation and the well-being of its inhabitants. It determines how the United States deals with other nations and peoples of Earth. In a democracy citizens should have a role in determining such an important policy. Therefore, we offer for consideration our ideas on an appropriate U.S. nuclear posture for the first decade of the 21st century.

For decades religious organizations in the United States have challenged the morality of nuclear weapons and have called for steps leading toward their total elimination. In June 2000 a statement signed by 21 religious leaders, mostly heads of communion, joined by 18 retired admirals and generals, and issued at the Washington National Cathedral, indicated:

We deeply believe that the long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, and the ever-present danger of their acquisition by others is morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. They constitute a threat to the security of our nation, a peril to world peace, a danger to the whole human family.

These religious and military leaders propounded two truths:

first, that the most commonly postulated threats to our national security are not susceptible to nuclear deterrence; second, that our nation's efforts to provide effective leadership in opposing the growing threat of nuclear proliferation will be credible only if our policies and those of the other nuclear powers demonstrate a commitment to the universal outlawing of these weapons.

They further stated:

It is past time for a great national and international discussion and examination of the true and full implications of reliance on nuclear weapons, to be followed by action leading to the international prohibition of these weapons.

We the signers of this present statement share this perspective. We therefore propose that the current nuclear posture review encompass not only consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in military strategy but also steps that can be taken during the next five to ten years toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be in keeping with a requirement of Congress that the nuclear posture review give consideration to arms control objectives.

Accordingly, the nuclear posture review should take into account Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in which the United States and other nuclear-weapon states agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." The United States and the other nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed this commitment in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in which they promised "an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

This Final Document, agreed upon last May, contained a set of practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT. In December these steps were included in a resolution adopted by United Nations General Assembly with U.S. concurrence. In the same month NATO defense ministers, including the U.S. Secretary of Defense, reaffirmed the commitment to "an unequivocal undertaking" and endorsed the practical steps. Among the steps are the following:

- ❖ Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- ❖ A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that treaty.
- ❖ Negotiation of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material.
- ❖ Early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- ❖ Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- ❖ Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- ❖ Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- ❖ A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- ❖ The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

We propose that these steps leading toward nuclear disarmament should now be incorporated into the U.S. nuclear posture. We suggest that the concept of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons should serve as a guiding principle for the next five to ten years. This time span would thereby serve as a transitional period between (i) full and widespread deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and (ii) the future time when the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is achieved.

In order to obtain full public participation in the nuclear posture review we call for public hearings by the Department of Defense and by appropriate committees of Congress. We ask that a draft nuclear posture statement be published for public discussion with provision for feedback before it is finally adopted.

Signers

Draft of February 13, 2001
Written by Howard W. Hallman

Nuclear Security for the United States Dangers and Responses

I. Real and Present Danger: Existing Nuclear Weapons

A. Russia

1. Scope of nuclear arsenal
 - a. Deployed and reserve nuclear weapons
 - b. Fissile material (what and where)
2. Dangers
 - a. Launching nuclear weapons
 - i. Intentionally
 - ii. Accidentally
 - iii. Getting in wrong hands
 - b. Fissile material
 - i. Deteriorating infrastructure
 - ii. Getting in wrong hands
3. Remedies
 - a. Mutual disarmament
 - i. Practical steps from Final Document of 2000 NPT Review Conference
 - ii. Preservation of ABM treaty
 - iii. National missile defense as counterproductive
 - b. Fissile material control
 - i. Nunn-Lugar and related programs
 - ii. Baker-Cutler report
 - c. Financial cost for U.S.

B. China (minimal threat, to be developed)

C. United Kingdom and France (no threat)

D. United States

1. Scope of nuclear arsenal
2. Possible actions with grave consequences
 - a. Accidental launch
 - b. Provocation of new weapon development
 - c. Increased role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy
 - d. Renewal of nuclear arms race as NMD side effect
3. Remedies
 - a. Mutual disarmament (see above)
 - b. Cease new weapon development
 - c. Policy of diminishing role of nuclear weapons
 - d. Preserve ABM treaty

E. Regional use of nuclear weapons with global consequences

1. Danger spots
 - a. Israel and Middle East
 - b. South Asia: India and Pakistan
2. Remedies
 - a. Israel/Palestine peace accord
 - b. Middle East weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone
 - c. India and Pakistan reconciliation
 - d. U.S. ratification of CTBT to encourage India and Pakistan

II. Speculative Dangers: Nuclear Ambitions

A. The Ambitious (intelligence estimates)

1. North Korea
2. Iran
3. Iraq
4. Other small nations
5. Terrorists groups

B. Possible modes of attack on U.S.

1. Aircraft
2. Ships
3. Cruise missiles
4. Trucks crossing U.S. borders
5. ICBM (least likely)

C. Responses

1. Prevention
 - a. Diplomacy
 - b. Financial assistance for dismantlement
 - c. Economic sanctions
 - d. Fissile material control
 - e. Missile technology control
 - f. Deal with underlying causes of terrorism
2. Defense
 - a. Against terrorists
 - b. Against close-in attack
 - c. National missile defense (low priority)

III. A Deeper Danger: Misdirected Resources

A. "Unwarranted influence by the military-industrial complex" -- President Eisenhower

1. Expenditures on national missile defense since Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative
 - a. By year and major categories
 - b. Results (minimal)
2. Current beneficiaries (big four and others)
3. Lobbyists for NMD

B. "Every gun that is made...a theft" -- President Eisenhower

1. Unfunded elements of "Leave No Child Behind"
2. Other unmet needs that undermine true national security

IV. Summary of Conclusions

Draft by Howard W. Hallman

February 1, 2001

Denominational Statements on Nuclear Disarmament

AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES

"We call on all nations to abolish their nuclear weapons and to dispose of such weapons in a manner that is not harmful to either the physical or political environment." *Policy Statement on Peace, General Board, American Baptist Churches, 1985.*

CATHOLIC CHURCH

While significant progress has been made in recent years, we believe additional steps are needed if nuclear policies and priorities are to keep up with the dramatic changes in world politics and if our nation is to move away from relying on nuclear deterrence as a basis for its security. Present challenges include the following:

The Role of Nuclear Weapons. We must continue to say **No** to the very idea of nuclear war....Indeed, we abhor any use of nuclear weapons.

Arms Control and Disarmament. Nuclear deterrence may be justified only as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament....The eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is more moral idea; it should be a policy goal. *From The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace, National Council of Catholic Bishops, 1994.*

EPISCOPAL CHURCH

Resolved, That the 72 General Convention of the Episcopal Church support the goal of total nuclear disarmament....

Resolved, That the General Convention of the United States to exercise leadership among the nations, especially the nuclear weapons states, by immediately initiating negotiations for an International Treaty on Comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament in all its aspects to include a deadline for the completion of nuclear disarmament. *Resolution on Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, 1997.*

EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA

We particularly urge a sharp reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction. We call for arms control agreements that are substantial, equitable, verifiable, and progressive. We support mutual confidence-building measures to improve mutually assured security. In particular, we give priority to:

agreements among the leading nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and to decrease the possibility of nuclear confrontation or accident;

the successful negotiation of a renewed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the strengthening of mechanisms to monitor and enforce nuclear treaties, and efforts that

move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. *Statement on For Peace in God's World, Fourth Churchwide Assembly, 1995.*

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)

The 212th General Assembly (2000) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) reaffirms its long-standing call to end the arms race, and urges:

ratification of and adherence by the United States to...the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Land Mines;

adherence to and implementation of...the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II;

termination of efforts to build and deploy a Missile Defense System because of its unnecessary and destabilizing military character. *Policy Statement on The Challenges of Security in the 21st Century, 2000.*

UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION

The Unitarian Universalist Association affirms its belief in total universal disarmament under controls and urges, as an initial step, that the United States Government proceed with sincere, conscientious and continuing negotiations for a treaty to effectively ban the development and testing of nuclear weapons. (1961)

The only hope for human survival is the religious method of taking risk instead of threatening harm.... The Unitarian Universalist Association calls upon the United States to lead the world toward safety by its own unconditional nuclear disarmament and calls upon the rest of the nations to follow that lead. (1977)

The Unitarian Universalist Association in General Assembly urges the United States to enter into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty with the USSR and all other countries of the world." (1985)

A peaceful world requires the abolition of nuclear weapons and a new approach to international relations based on common security for all countries rather than dangerous attempts at military superiority. (1989)

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

The Twelfth General Synod of the United Church of Christ

Calls upon our government and all governments of the world to work together to reduce the danger of nuclear holocaust by limiting and eliminating such forms of warfare. *Pronouncement on Reversing the Arms Race, 1997.*

UNITED METHODIST CHURCH

We say a clear and unconditional *No* to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons. We conclude that nuclear deterrence is a position that cannot receive the church's blessing. *In Defense of Creation, United Methodist Council of Bishops, 1986.*

Now is the time to exercise the zero option: to eliminate all nuclear weapons throughout the globe. *Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option, United Methodist General Conference, 1992.*

We reaffirm the goal of total abolition of all nuclear weapons throughout Earth and space. *Resolution on Nuclear Abolition, United Methodist General Conference, 2000.*

INDIAN AND PAKISTANI REACTIONS TO SENATE CTBT VOTE

As the U.S. dithers on the CTBT, India and Pakistan will not likely sign or ratify the treaty, worsening prospects for nuclear restraint in the region, according to Senator Arlen Specter's (R-PA) recent report on his trip to the region. Specter said, in part, that "It was apparent by comments in both India and Pakistan that the Senate's 1999 vote against ratifying the CTBT was closely watched and that the vote diluted our power to persuade nations like India and Pakistan to support the CTBT. In my discussions with officials, it became evident that securing compliance with the CTBT by these two nations without U.S. ratification would be problematic."

See the longer excerpt of Specter's report from the Congressional Record excerpt (below) for more details).

3. A REPORT ON FOREIGN TRAVEL

Congressional Record
January 24, 2001
Pages S510-S515

Mr. SPECTER "... I think this would be an appropriate time to report on some foreign travel which I recently undertook for a 2-week period in late December and early January ...

My first meeting that morning [January 3, 2001] was with Foreign Secretary Lalit Mansingh ... On the issue of the CTBT, the Foreign Secretary expressed his sentiment that the U.S. should not expect India to sign a Treaty that the U.S. itself perceives as flawed. He went on to state that the Indian neighborhood was getting more dangerous and that India had no choice but to "go nuclear" to protect itself against both China and Pakistan "but we want to convince you that India is a responsible country." I then posed the question to him of what his assessment was of the likelihood was that a nation, excepting those classified as so-called rogue nations, would launch an attack against another country. The foreign secretary promptly responded that unless there was an "act of madness", one does not anticipate nuclear attacks from democratic regime ...

The Foreign Secretary stressed that India shared the United States commitment to reducing nuclear weapons, but have not always agreed in how to reach this common goal. The United States believes that India should forego nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, he said, India would be prepared to work with the U.S. to build upon the bilateral dialogue already underway ...

The following day ... I met with Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. We discussed India signing the CTBT, FMCT--Fissile Material Production Treaty

which would end the production of nuclear materials--India's nuclear weapons program, Kashmir, the problems in Afghanistan with the Taliban. He told me that India was committed towards any hostility in the region and that the CTBT was a meaningless Treaty in their eyes because they have already taken on a voluntary moratorium. He went on to stress that India recently signed a treaty with Pakistan that recently no aggressive use of nuclear weapons ...

It was apparent by comments in both India and Pakistan that the Senate's 1999 vote against ratifying the CTBT was closely watched and that the vote diluted our power to persuade nations like India and Pakistan to support the CTBT. In my discussions with officials, it became evident that securing compliance with the CTBT by these two nations without U.S. ratification would be problematic.

We departed New Delhi on the morning of January 7 traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan ... Our first meeting was with the Foreign Secretary, Inam ul-Haq. Secretary Ul-Haq is Pakistan's highest-ranking career diplomat having previously been posted as Pakistan's Ambassador to the United Nations and as Pakistan's Ambassador to China. Our meeting began with a discussion of Pakistan's nuclear tests and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Foreign Secretary told me that General Musharraf and the current government was in favor of ratification of the CTBT. However, I was told that there was a very vocal group in Pakistan which was opposed to Pakistan's ratification of the Treaty and that the Foreign Minister was personally working on persuading opponents of the Treaty and its benefits. The foreign secretary informed me that the Pakistani government closely followed the limited debate and vote in the U.S. Senate regarding the CTBT and that ratification by the U.S. would be very helpful in Pakistan's internal debate on the issue "

NUCLEAR DANGERS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

How many nuclear weapons are there in the world and which countries possess them?

Estimates vary between 24,000 and 33,000. These include both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. More than 95 percent of all nuclear arms are in the arsenals of the United States (10,500) and Russia (13,000). The other countries with nuclear weapons are China (400), France (500), UK (200), India (85), Pakistan (20) and Israel (100). Some other countries, such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, are thought to be trying to obtain nuclear weapons. For additional information, visit www.nuclearfiles.org.

How can nuclear weapons be delivered?

Most people are not aware of the size and mobility of nuclear weapons. The destructive part of a nuclear weapon is the warhead itself. Terrorists or criminals might try to smuggle a small warhead into a country in a car, truck or ship. Nuclear weapons can also be delivered by means of missiles launched from land, sea or air. They can also be delivered as bombs dropped from airplanes such as occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

What is the destructive power of today's nuclear weapons?

An average size nuclear weapon would immediately kill everything within a radius of several square miles. The radiation exposure would continue to injure and kill people over a longer period of time and over a greater area. The area of radiation exposure would depend upon prevailing winds, and could spread across continents and beyond. Nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the major nuclear weapons states today have on average a destructive force equal to 25 to 40 times the power of the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some nuclear weapons have even greater destructive force.

What is Nuclear Winter and how many nuclear weapons would it take to create one?

A nuclear winter, which could kill billions of people, would occur when enough dust and debris entered the atmosphere to block the sunlight over the world. Astronomer Carl Sagan and his scientific colleagues estimated that the detonation of the equivalent in explosive force of some 100 million tons of dynamite (100 megatons) could create a Nuclear Winter. Thus, it would require the detonation of only some 400 nuclear weapons to create a Nuclear Winter.

Are there still nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert?

Yes. It is widely acknowledged that the US and Russia each have about 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched in minutes. Both countries also maintain policies of launch-on-warning, which means that they are prepared to launch their nuclear-armed missiles before the missiles from the other side land on their territory. Keeping nuclear weapons on high alert and using launch-on-warning strategies increase the risks of accidental nuclear war.

Is nuclear disarmament required under international law?

Yes. It is required by the terms of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was confirmed by the World Court decision in 1996 which stated: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states agreed to an "unequivocal undertaking...to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Their policies, however, do not yet conform to this obligation.

But doesn't the US need nuclear weapons to defend against China?

Right now, China, by US estimates, has only about 20 nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching US territory, while the US has thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying China. In total China has only some 400 nuclear weapons and their nuclear warheads are all separated from the delivery vehicles. China also has a policy of No-First-Use of its nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to go to zero nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states will do so. China has stated, however, that it will considerably strengthen its nuclear arsenal if the United States deploys missile defenses that would undermine China's current deterrent force.

Doesn't the US also need nuclear weapons to defend against rogue states or terrorists?

Unfortunately, nuclear weapons probably would not deter a terrorist group or rogue state from attacking the US with a nuclear weapon, particularly if they thought their attack could not be traced back to them. It would be unlikely that a nuclear attack by means of a suitcase bomb would be traceable. Such an attack would also not be preventable by missile defenses. The best way to approach this problem is to assure that nuclear weapons do not fall into such hands by inventorying and assuring the control of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials. This will require a high degree of international cooperation, and can only be accomplished by such cooperation. Building a more equitable world will also contribute to creating a safer world.

Are there important military leaders who strongly favor nuclear disarmament?

Admiral Noel Gayler, a former commander-in-chief of the US Pacific has stated, "Does nuclear disarmament imperil our security? No. It enhances it." General Lee Butler, a former commander-in-chief of the US Strategic Command, has stated, "By what

authority do succeeding generations of leaders in the nuclear weapons states usurp the power to dictate the odds of continue life on our planet? Most urgently, why does such breathtaking audacity persist at a moment when we should stand trembling in the face of our folly and united in our commitment to abolish its most deadly manifestation?"

Will missile defenses make us more secure?

No. They will only provide a false sense of security, and actually make us less secure. First, it is questionable whether missile defenses can ever be made effective. Second, missile defenses are easily overcome by building stronger offensive forces or by adding decoys. Third, missile defenses will undermine the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which many experts consider to be the foundation of international stability. Fourth, missile defenses will undermine the progress we have made on nuclear disarmament with the Russians, and will spur both the Russians and the Chinese to increase the size and strength of their nuclear arsenals. Fifth, missile defenses will likely ignite new nuclear arms races across the globe. French president Jacques Chirac has warned that a US missile defense "cannot fail to re-launch an arms race in the world."

Even if we do decide to eliminate our nuclear arsenal, shouldn't we keep some nuclear weapons in case someone tries to cheat or to defend against a potential aggressor?

The important thing to keep in mind is that we will not go from thousands of nuclear weapons to zero overnight. We should reduce our nuclear arsenal in a series of agreed-upon phases that are set forth in a negotiated Nuclear Weapons Convention. At each stage of nuclear weapon reductions, there should be ways of verifying that all parties are keeping their end of the bargain. As we continue with nuclear disarmament, we will also build confidence and greater trust in the other disarming powers and they will develop greater trust in us.

Since Hiroshima apparently recovered so soon after the atomic bombing in 1945, aren't we excessively concerned about the dangers of nuclear weapons?

Many people thought Hiroshima's environment might never recover after the city suffered a nuclear attack. Today Hiroshima has again become a thriving city, but more than 200,000 people there have died as a result of the bombing and many continue to suffer from the radiation effects of the bomb. Only a small portion of plutonium in the bomb was released in the partial detonation that occurred at Hiroshima. This plutonium will continue to cause cancers and leukemia, even in future generations. The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be considered to be Ambassadors of the Nuclear Age. Their powerful message is "Never Again!" They do not want others to suffer their fate or that of their cities.

What is the most important reason to abolish nuclear weapons?

It is the responsibility of each generation to pass the Earth on intact to the next generation. Ours is the first generation that could fail in this critical task, a task far too important to be left to the world's politicians and military leaders. It demands the involvement of each of us. We need to remember the children of the world, and their children and all generations to follow us.

Annual Budget

I. Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament

A. Leadership

Chair -- ½ time	\$ 36,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>5,400</u>
	41,400
Non-personal	<u>18,600</u>
	60,000

B. Outreach

Field coordinator -- full time	\$ 50,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>7,500</u>
	57,500
Non-personal	<u>32,500</u>
	90,000

C. Communications

Program assistant	\$ 30,000
Fringe benefits (15%)	<u>4,500</u>
	34,500
Non-personal (including web site contractual)	<u>25,500</u>
	60,000

D. Joint Publications

\$ 25,000

=====

\$ 235,000

II. Mobilizing grants to denominational units and other entities

\$ 765,000

Total requested per year

=====

\$1,000,000

Achieving Strategic Arms Reduction

Although the Cold War has been over for ten years, the United States and Russia remain heavily armed with nuclear weapons developed during the Cold War rivalry. The United Kingdom, France, and China have smaller nuclear arsenals, Israel has a secret arsenal, and India and Pakistan are developing nuclear weapons.. Little progress has been made in nuclear arms reduction in the last eight years. It is now time to demand substantial reduction and to develop bipartisan support for action.

The Arsenal

Military experts make a distinction between strategic and tactical (or non-strategic) nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are designed to attack an adversary's homeland from afar. They included submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs), and bombs carried on long-range bombers. Tactical weapons are intended primarily for battlefield use or to attack military installations from short- to mid-range.

The Center for Defense Information estimates the global nuclear arsenal to be as follows:

Country	Strategic	Non-strategic	Total
United States	7,300	4,700-11,700	12,000-19,000
Russia	6,000	6,000-13,000	12,000-19,000
France	482	0	482
China	290	120	410
United Kingdom	100	100	200

In addition, Israel possesses 100 or more nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and may have built some. For more details, consult www.cdi.org.

Treaties

Over the years the United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia, have entered into treaties to limit and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. In the United States this has been a bipartisan process, sometimes led by a Republican president, at other times by a Democratic president and with broad support in Congress. In 1987 President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) to eliminate an entire class of weapons. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 93 to 5. In 1991 the administration of President George Bush (the elder) negotiated the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and the Senate gave its approval, 93 to 6. Under START I the United States and Russia agreed to a reduction in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to about 8,500 for the United States and about 6,500 for Russia

The two sides followed with START II, signed by President Bush (the elder) in January 1993. The treaty requires each side to cut its deployed strategic forces to 3,000-3,500 warheads and bans deployment of land-based missiles with more than one warhead. The U.S. Senate ratified START II in January 1996 by a vote of 87 to 4. The Russian Duma ratified the treaty in April 2000. Russian approval was contingent on U.S. ratification of a 1997 protocol that extends the time period for the completion of START II reductions from 2003 to 2007 and some Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty related agreements. The Clinton Administration never submitted the protocol and ABM agreements to the Senate because they became intertwined with the debate on national missile defense.

At a 1997 meeting in Helsinki President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a START III agreement that would further reduce the nuclear arsenal to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic warheads on each side. Subsequently the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has proposed a level of 1,500. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, doesn't support this lower level because of the targeting needs of the current U.S. nuclear posture. Moreover, the Clinton Administration wanted to link START III with changes in the ABM treaty to permit limited national missile defense, but Russia is reluctant to accept ABM modifications. Consequently START III negotiations haven't commenced. During the presidential campaign President George W. Bush (the younger) expressed skepticism about negotiating another treaty.

Reciprocal Initiatives

Instead President Bush has expressed an interest in achieving strategic arms reduction through executive initiative by one side with reciprocal response by the other. His father used this approach in September 1991 when he ordered a stand-down of U.S strategic bombers and removal and storage of their nuclear bombs. He also ended alert status for strategic missiles destined for elimination by START I: 450 silo-based rockets and missiles on 10 submarines. Soviet President Gorbachev responded by ordering deactivation of more than 500 land-based rockets and six strategic submarines, by placing strategic bombers in a low level of readiness, and by putting rail-based missiles in garrison. In the next several months both nations withdrew large numbers of tactical nuclear warheads deployed with their armies and navies and placed them in central storage depots.

During the 2000 presidential campaign George W. Bush indicated that the United States should lead by example to reduce strategic nuclear weapons significantly below the START II level and to remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status. As of this date he hasn't taken such action. Also, Bush coupled his proposal for de-alerting with vigorous advocacy of layered national missile defense. Russia has reacted strongly against this idea and may instead retain multi-warhead missiles scheduled for elimination under START II.

Another obstacle is language that Congress put in the Defense Authorization Act to prohibit deactivation of strategic nuclear weapons below the START I level until START II final ratification is completed. There are also restrictions on reducing the alert status of the nuclear arsenal. These restrictions would have to be removed before the kind of executive initiatives proposed by President-elect Bush could take place.

What You Can Do

It is important to develop bipartisan support for strategic arms reduction. Ask your U.S. representatives and senators to remove legislative obstacles to de-alerting and deactivation of nuclear weapons. Ask them to become forceful advocates of de-alerting to take the nuclear arsenal off hair-trigger alert. Ask your senators to press for ratification of the START II protocol. Write President Bush and urge him to move ahead with executive initiatives for de-alerting and arms reduction through executive initiative.

Adopted

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, NATO POLICY AND THE CHURCHES

The global threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. The May 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference ended with an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Many other developments of recent years however - the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the US Senate, the nuclearization of South Asia, the retention of Cold War-era nuclear postures by the United States and Russia - have tended in the opposite direction: towards the indefinite retention and even the spread of nuclear capabilities. The looming prospect of missile defense deployment threatens further damage to nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The opportunity that now exists to make dramatic advances toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is at risk of being lost. Partly due to the significant new agreements on nuclear disarmament after 1987, but more particularly as a result of pressing new challenges posed by non-nuclear conflicts since 1991, nuclear arms have been given comparatively low priority on the churches' disarmament priorities in the last decade of the twentieth century. It is again important that the voice of the churches be heard on this question at a decisive moment.

The nuclear disarmament agenda

Among the most positive disarmament developments of recent years has been the renewed attention given to the desirability and feasibility of abolishing nuclear weapons. The debate over the future of nuclear weapons is far from resolved, and the Nuclear Weapon States are still far from committed to immediate action towards abolition. But the broad outlines of the global nuclear disarmament agenda are now widely accepted.

The Final Document of the recent NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus, incorporated a substantive set of principles and measures to guide future nuclear disarmament activities. These included "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" (though without specifying when that might be accomplished), and support for a number of interim steps such as "concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems" (commonly known as "de-alerting"), and "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination."

The "New Agenda" resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the last session of the UN General Assembly (2000) was directly based on the NPT Final Document. Countries that voted in favor of the resolution included China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and

every NATO member except France, which abstained. Only three countries, Israel, India, and Pakistan - the three nuclear-armed countries that are not signatories of the NPT - voted against the resolution. A handful of others abstained.

These decisions demonstrate that a near-consensus now exists on the outlines of the global nuclear disarmament agenda. It remains to be seen, however, how rapidly and completely that agenda will be translated into action.

NATO nuclear policy

Crucial decisions being taken individually and collectively by the member states of NATO will do much to determine the future success or failure of the nuclear disarmament agenda.

In its new Strategic Concept in 1999 NATO formally restated its position that nuclear weapons are "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies," pledging to retain them "for the foreseeable future." The Alliance also agreed, however, to conduct an internal review of its nuclear policies, including "options for confidence and security-building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament."

The results of this review were presented to the North Atlantic Council in December 2000. The report maintained the status quo with respect to nuclear weapons policy, reiterating that NATO deems nuclear weapons to be "essential" to Alliance security, and asserting the need to retain them "for the foreseeable future." The report also says that "There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much more limited, presence of substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe." Significantly, however, the report states that "Alliance nations reaffirm their commitment under Art. VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." It also declares NATO's support for the thirteen action items agreed during the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reiterated in the "New Agenda" resolution. These are positive steps.

Unfortunately, however, the report gives no indication of how NATO intends to go about implementing these commitments, or how the decision to retain its present nuclear policies can be reconciled with such steps. There is no specific provision for the review process to continue, yet it is crucial to the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts that NATO's nuclear policies be revised to conform to the global nuclear disarmament agenda.

The report takes no position on the US National Missile Defense (NMD) program, though other NATO members have protested vigorously against it and are known to be consulting now on its implications. President Clinton's decision in September 2000 to delay deployment of the system has been reversed by the new US Administration that has declared its intention to proceed with it. Such an action could inflict serious damage on the existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Up to now NATO discussions on nuclear policy have been conducted mainly behind closed doors. The recent report now acknowledges that there is a need for greater openness and transparency, promising that "the Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement with

interested non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the general public and will contribute actively to discussion and debate regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control and disarmament issues."

The voice of the churches

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The Councils called on the governments of all NATO members to ensure that NATO policy:

- affirms NATO's support for the rapid global elimination of nuclear weapons and commits the Alliance to take programmatic action to advance this goal;
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- to recommend to the ecumenical community that it should engage directly with the current NATO review process with a view to encouraging NATO states and NATO itself to conform to the obligations undertaken in the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
- to impress upon churches the need to re-energize their peace witness and, within the framework of the Decade to Overcome Violence, to undertake education, public

awareness activity, and advocacy regarding the continuing threat of nuclear weapons.

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Renewed debates now on the future of nuclear power plants and on the health effects on civilian populations and military personnel of the use of depleted uranium weapons stir public opinion again, raising new, serious questions. The collective efforts of the churches are needed now, and could make an important contribution to raise public awareness of the crucial nuclear-related decisions facing NATO countries, to encourage greater transparency in NATO's decision-making processes, and to reinforce public demands for real progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

One means for the ecumenical community to engage directly with the NATO review process would be to send a delegation of church leaders from representative WCC churches to meet with government ministers and officials in key non-nuclear NATO states. The purpose of these coordinated visits would be to encourage those states to work to ensure that NATO nuclear policies conform to the nuclear disarmament obligations undertaken in the Non Proliferation Treaty and reaffirmed and elaborated upon in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and in the recent "New Agenda" resolution in the UN General Assembly. These meetings could also be used to encourage greater transparency and public access to NATO's decision-making processes on nuclear issues. In addition, such a tour could help to raise public consciousness of the continuing importance of nuclear disarmament both within the ecumenical community and beyond it.

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The nuclear disarmament agenda

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The results of this review were presented to the North Atlantic Council in December 2000. The report maintained the status quo with respect to nuclear weapons policy, reiterating that NATO deems nuclear weapons to be "essential" to Alliance security, and asserting the need to retain them "for the foreseeable future." The report also says that "There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much more limited, presence of substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe." Significantly, however, the report states that "Alliance nations reaffirm their commitment under Art. VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." It also declares NATO's support for the thirteen action items agreed during the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reiterated in the "New Agenda" resolution. These are positive steps.

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World Council of Churches
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Potsdam, Germany
29 January - 6 February 2001
Document No. PI 5

Adopted

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The U.S. Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century A Statement by Religious Leaders

"We deeply believe that the long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, and the ever-present danger of their acquisition by others is morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. They constitute a threat to the security of our nation, a peril to world peace, a danger to the whole human family."

Thus spoke 21 national religious leaders and 18 retired generals in a joint statement issued at the Washington National Cathedral in June 2000. They continued by propounding two truths:

"first, that the most commonly postulated threats to our national security are not susceptible to nuclear deterrence;

"second, that our nation's efforts to provide effective leadership in opposing the growing threat of nuclear proliferation will be credible only if our policies and those of the other nuclear powers demonstrate a commitment to the universal outlawing of these weapons."

They further stated:

It is...time for a great national and international discussion and examination of the true and full implications of reliance on nuclear weapons, to be followed by action leading to the international prohibition of these weapons."

We the signers of this present statement share this perspective. We affirm that nuclear weapons are morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. We agree that time has arrived for the American people to engage in public discussion on nuclear weapons and on how to achieve their elimination. We note that an excellent opportunity for such discussion now exists as part of the nuclear posture review that is now underway.

Mandated by Congress, the Secretary of Defense is now conducting "a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." Among other requirements this review is supposed to consider "the relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting, and arms control objectives."

What are the arms control objectives of the United States? Legally they are defined by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which the U.S. Senate ratified in 1969 by a bipartisan vote of 83 to 15. In Article VI the United States and other nuclear-weapon states agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." They reaffirmed this commitment in May 2000 in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which contains a promise to "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

To convert this promise into action, the Final Document specifies a series of "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI." They include:

- ❖ Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- ❖ A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that treaty.
- ❖ Negotiation of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material.
- ❖ Early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
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We propose that these steps leading toward nuclear disarmament should now be incorporated into the U.S. nuclear posture. We suggest that the concept of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons should serve as a guiding principle for the next five to ten years. This time span would thereby serve as a transitional period between (i) full and widespread deployment of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and (ii) the future time when the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is achieved.

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Signers

Draft of March 3, 2001
Written by Howard W. Hallman

Commentary on Star Wars National Missile Defense, public radio station WVPE, Elkhart, Indiana
by Project Abolition Director Kevin Martin

Supporters of a Star Wars National Missile Defense (NMD) system often frame their argument in appealing terms, stating that missile defense would offer us freedom from the threat of a nuclear missile attack. Proponents paint missile defense as an antidote to the immoral, outmoded Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction or MAD, which holds that nuclear-armed adversaries will be deterred from launching a nuclear strike by the threat of certain retaliation and annihilation.

For example, conservative Christian political activist Chuck Colson, whose daily BreakPoint commentary is carried by over 1,000 radio stations around the country, opined on January 19 that deploying a national missile defense "...can restore sanity to our national security policies and deliver us from the moral insanity imposed by a forty-year relic of the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)." On the moral insanity of continuing to base our security on the threat to incinerate millions of people, politely called "nuclear deterrence", Colson was silent.

If we raise morality in the context of nuclear weapons, as we must, then we are "in for a dime, in for a dollar", and have to realize that no religious, moral or ethical code can justify the use, threat to use, or even existence of nuclear weapons. Far from posing a more moral policy, missile defense advocates shrink from moral leadership by accepting the continued existence of these horrific weapons that could end life on Earth as we know it.

It is unfair and inaccurate to allege that opponents of Star Wars seek to maintain MAD, or what has more appropriately been called the nuclear balance of terror. Advocates of the only real solution to the nuclear threat – the total, verifiable, enduring elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth – are not defenders of MAD. We oppose Star Wars because, while supporters say it will make us more secure, it in fact will do the opposite by starting a new nuclear arms race with Russia and China, which will then likely spread to India and Pakistan.

There are the other important reasons to oppose Star Wars. Independent scientists including 50 Noble Prize laureates say it won't work. Star Wars will rob tens or more likely hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars from education, health care, and the environment. The alleged threats NMD is supposed to counter, an attack by a "rogue" state or an accidental missile launch by Russia, are overstated. None of the "states of concern" as they are now called, North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, has ever flight-tested a missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear warhead, and while U.S. relations with Iraq remain adversarial, remarkable steps toward rapprochement with Iran and particularly North Korea have occurred in the last few years. The threat of an accidental launch by Russia, while real and a cause for serious concern, is better addressed by working with Russia to improve its security, command and control over its nuclear arsenal, and by striving to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

Add it all up and it looks like the Star Wars' real role is not to defend the United States, but rather the interests of the weapons contractors who pumped over \$13 billion in campaign cash into election campaigns over the last two years to make sure Star Wars and other exorbitant Cold War dinosaurs get funded by your tax dollars and mine. Dr. Nira Schwartz, a former TRW senior engineer who blew the whistle on the contractor's fraudulent reporting of Star Wars radar test results, said it best: "It's not a defense of the United States. It's a conspiracy to allow them to milk the government. They are creating for themselves a job for life." Dr. Schwarz is suing TRW and lead Star Wars contractor Boeing for violation of the False Claims Act and wrongful employment retaliation. Boeing recently had its contract renewed by the Pentagon for \$6 billion. With options, the amount could balloon to \$13.7 billion by 2007.

Predictably, supporters of missile defense scoff at the notion of abolishing nuclear weapons worldwide. “You can’t put the genie back in the bottle,” they say. The knowledge of how to build nuclear arms is widely available and can never be wiped from the collective human memory, so we are doomed to live with nuclear weapons forever.

Eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide, while not a simple matter, is much more realistic, and would make the U.S. and the world more secure, than an illusory and ultimately fruitless pursuit of security through the provocative, unproven, so far failed technology of missile defense. Cheaper, too, by far. The land-, sea-, and space-based version of Star Wars favored by the Bush Administration would likely cost at least \$100 billion, maybe several times that, on top of the \$60 billion we’ve spent on missile defense schemes since Ronald Reagan proposed Star Wars in 1983, with absolutely nothing to show for it. That’s your tax dollars and mine that could be better used for education, health care, affordable housing and the environment.

Nobody believes nuclear weapons can be eliminated tomorrow. But serious, thoughtful people including former heads of state like Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev and former admirals and generals who had their fingers on nuclear triggers have come out for the global abolition of nuclear weapons. High-level commissions have outlined the necessary steps toward total nuclear disarmament, including measures for verification and control of nuclear materials. A draft model treaty on eliminating nuclear weapons, similar to the treaty that outlawed chemical weapons, has been circulated for discussion at the United Nations. Abolishing nuclear weapons would be a process; nations would negotiate the steps, work together to verify progress, agree on how to deal with potential violators. Confidence would be built along the way; we’d be building the path by walking it.

There’s no such thing as a risk-free world, especially because the nuclear genie is out of the bottle. So there are two choices: work to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide, understanding the risks and benefits involved, or pursue security through missile defense, with our eyes wide open that it will spur nuclear proliferation and a new arms race. It seems to me there’s only one moral option here.

Kevin Martin is the Director of Project Abolition, a coalition of seven national peace and disarmament groups advocating worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons, based in Goshen. More information on Star Wars, particularly the main weapons contractors, is available at www.projectabolition.org

The U.S. Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century **A Statement by Religious Leaders**

Under a mandate from the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of Defense is conducting "a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." It will be the first such review in the 21st century. This is appropriate, for it is time to consider how to eliminate the threat to human existence posed by nuclear weapons during the second half of the 20th century.

Voices of Religion

Throughout this period religious organizations and religious leaders have pondered the morality of nuclear weapons have called for their elimination.

From a global perspective the Sixth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1983 stated:

We believe that the time has come when the churches must unequivocally declare that the production and deployment as well as the use of nuclear weapons are a crime against humanity and that such activities must be condemned on ethnical and theological grounds. Furthermore, we appeal for the institution of a universal covenant to this effect so that nuclear weapons and warfare are delegitimized and condemned as violation of international law.

In January the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches reiterated "its deep and long-standing concern at the continued risk of Creation posed by the existence of nuclear weapons."

Speaking for the Holy See at the United Nations in 1997, Archbishop Renato Martinon, the Holy See's Permanent Observer at the UN, stated:

Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition....The world must move to the abolition of nuclear weapons through a universal, non-discriminatory ban with intensive inspection by a universal authority.

In a message on January 1, 2000 His Holiness the Dalai Lama called for a step-by-step approach to external disarmament. He stated, "We must first work for the total abolishment of nuclear weapons and gradually work up to total demilitarization throughout the world."

[Add statement of world Jewish and Muslim leaders if possible.]

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has stated: [to be added]

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1983 indicated that "today, the moral task is to proceed with deep cuts and ultimately to abolish these nuclear weapons entirely."

Furthermore, they stated, "The eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is more than a moral ideal; it should be a policy goal."

In 1986 the United Methodist Council of Bishops stated unequivocally that "we say a clear and unconditional *No* to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons. We conclude that nuclear deterrence is a position that cannot receive the church's blessing." The 2000 General Conference of the United Methodist Church reaffirmed "the goal of the total abolition of all nuclear weapons throughout Earth and space."

In a resolution entitled "Abolition of Nuclear Weapons", the 1997 General Convention of the Episcopal Church supported "the goal of total nuclear disarmament". Baptist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Unitarian denominations and United Church of Christ likewise support the elimination of nuclear weapons.

[Add a Jewish statement.]

In June 2000 21 national religious leaders and 18 retired generals issued a joint statement at the Washington National Cathedral in which they said:

"We deeply believe that the long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, and the ever-present danger of their acquisition by others is morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. They constitute a threat to the security of our nation, a peril to world peace, a danger to the whole human family."

They further stated:

It is...time for a great national and international discussion and examination of the true and full implications of reliance on nuclear weapons, to be followed by action leading to the international prohibition of these weapons."

We the signers of this present statement share this perspective. We affirm that nuclear weapons are morally untenable and militarily unjustifiable. We agree that time has arrived for the American people to engage in public discussion on nuclear weapons and on how to achieve their elimination.

Treaty Obligation

Voices of religion are not alone in calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This goal is incorporated into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which went to effect in 1970. The U.S. Senate ratified this treaty in 1969 by a bipartisan vote of 83 to 15. In Article VI the United States and other nuclear-weapon states agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Furthermore, they reaffirmed this commitment in May 2000 in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which contains a promise to "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

Practical Steps

Thus, the voices of religion and the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agree on the long-range goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The question is: how do we achieve that goal in a practicable manner. The 2000 NPT Review Conference provided the answer by specifying in its Final Document a series of "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI." These steps include:

- ❖ Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- ❖ A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that treaty.
- ❖ Negotiation of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material.
- ❖ Early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
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Nuclear Posture Review

[to be completed]

Among other requirements this review is supposed to consider "the relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting, and arms control objectives."

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