

Armageddon

Armageddon Theology and Presidential Decision-Making: Religious Leaders' Concern

<http://www.rumormillnews.com/ARMAGEDDON%20THEOLOGY.htm>
A 1984 about fundamentalists advising President Reagan.

James Robison, Jerry Falwell, Hal Lindsey, born-again fundamentalist and author of The Late, Great Planet Earth, George Otis, Harald Bredesen

Book of Revelation and Ezekiel: 38 and 39

CHRISTIAN ZIONISM:

CHRISTIAN SUPPORT FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL:

THE POLITICS AND THEOLOGY OF ARMAGEDDON

http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_isra.htm

Theological basis for Christian support for Israel in end-times:

Zechariah 12:3-5, 9-10; Revelation 4:4, 14:1-4

THE MILLENNIUM, AND END-OF-THE-WORLD PROPHECIES

http://www.religioustolerance.org/end_wrlld.htm

<http://www.religioustolerance.org/>

This is a large religious web site which promotes religious freedom, tolerance and diversity as positive cultural values. It contains over 2,630 essays and menus.

<http://www.peacepark.us/OldWebSite/week10.html>

John Swomley's article, "Fundamentalist Opposition to World Peace," in the July/August issue of Fellowship (1996?). " Throughout the Cold War and to this day, the religious right wing has strongly opposed any disarmament measures. According to their Armageddon theology, war is not only inevitable but foreordained by God. (Adherents) insisted that the Bible predicts the ending of the world in a fierce Battle of Armageddon."

Christian Zionism : Road Map to Armageddon?

<http://www.christchurch-virginiawater.co.uk/articles/phdcontents.htm>

Armageddon: Past of Future?

By John Noe, Ph.D.

http://www.preteristarchive.com/Preterism/noe-john_03_p_01.html

ten biblical reasons why the theology behind *Armageddon's* story line is biblically flawed.

THE PAROUSIA: The New Testament Doctrine of Christ's Second Coming

James Stuart Russell, 1887, 2003

The classic defense of the Preterist view. Written a century ago (1887), it examines each NT book, analyzes the doctrine of the second coming, and concludes that Christ returned in AD 70. Includes a survey and interpretation of the book of Revelation.

Armageddon In Politics

[Humanist](#), [Nov, 1999](#) by [John M. Swomley](#)

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1374/is_6_59/ai_57800240

World's Largest Bible Prophecy Bookstore

<http://www.armageddonbooks.com/alt.html>

Armageddon Anxiety

Evil on the Way

by WILLIAM COOK

<http://www.counterpunch.org/cook02222003.html>

Fundamentalists and world peace

By John M. Swomley

<http://www.buildingequality.us/ifas/fw/9611/peace.html>

Blessed Are The Meek:
The Roots of Christian Nonviolence
Thomas Merton

<http://www.forusa.org/nonviolence/40merton.html>

The Trappist monk, Thomas Merton, brought a special gift to American social struggles: contemplation. Faced with the burnout of so many young people, veterans of the civil rights and then the anti-Vietnam war efforts, people began looking for ways to replenish the supplies of love, passion, and energy. Merton, while not himself an activist, brought an uncanny appreciation of the spiritual hemorrhaging that endless interventions caused. His answer: prayer. From the invidious split between people who pray and people who act, was born a new, integral person, who prays and acts, with a harmonious balance between them. Along with the Vietnamese Buddhist monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, Merton left a lasting legacy of spirituality in situations of conflict. This groundbreaking article, written at the request of FOR's Hildegard Goss-Mayr and dedicated by Merton to Joan Baez, was first published as an FOR pamphlet. (*Fellowship* 33 [May 1967], 18-22)

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It would be a serious mistake to regard Christian nonviolence simply as a novel tactic which is at once efficacious and even edifying, and which enables the sensitive person to participate in the struggles of the world without being dirtied with blood. Nonviolence is not simply a way of proving one's point and getting what one wants without being involved in behavior that one considers ugly and evil. Nor is it, for that matter, a means which anyone legitimately can make use of according to his fancy for any purpose whatever. To practice nonviolence for a purely selfish or arbitrary end would in fact discredit and distort the truth of nonviolent resistance. Nonviolence is perhaps the most exacting of all forms of struggle, not only because it demands first of all that one be ready to suffer evil and even face the threat of death without violent retaliation, but because it excludes mere transient self-interest from its considerations. In a very real sense, those who practice nonviolent resistance must commit themselves not to the defense of their own interests or even those of a particular group: they must commit themselves to the defense of objective truth and right and above all of *human beings*. Their aim is then not simply to "prevail" or to prove that they are right and the adversary wrong, or to make the adversary give in and yield what is demanded of him.

Nor should nonviolent resisters be content to prove *to themselves* that they are virtuous and right, that *their* hands and heart are pure even though the adversary's may be evil and defiled. Still less should they seek for themselves the psychological gratification of upsetting the adversary's conscience and perhaps driving him to an act of bad faith and refusal of the truth. We know that our unconscious motives may, at times, make our nonviolence a form of moral aggression and even a subtle provocation designed (without our awareness) to bring out the evil we hope to find in the adversary, and thus to justify ourselves in our own eyes and in the eyes of "decent people." Christian nonviolence is not built on a presupposed division, but on the basic unity of humankind. It is not out for the conversion of the wicked to the ideas of the good, but for healing and reconciliation.

For this very reason, as Gandhi saw, the fully consistent practice of nonviolence demands a solid metaphysical and religious basis both in being and in God. This comes *before* subjective good intentions and sincerity. For the Hindu this metaphysical basis was provided by the Vedantist

doctrine of the Atman, the true transcendent Self which alone is absolutely real, and before which the empirical self of the individual must be effaced in the faithful practice of *dharma*. Now all these principles are fine and they accord with our Christian faith. But once we view the principles in the light of current *facts*, a practical difficulty confronts us. If the "gospel is preached to the poor;" if the Christian message is essentially a message of hope and redemption for the poor, the oppressed, the underprivileged and those who have no power humanly speaking, how are we to reconcile ourselves to the fact that Christians belong for the most part to the rich and powerful nations of the earth? Seventeen percent of the world's population control eighty percent of the world's wealth, and most of these seventeen percent are supposedly Christian. Admittedly those Christians who are interested in nonviolence are not ordinarily the wealthy ones. Nevertheless, like it or not, they share in the power and privilege of the most wealthy and mighty society the world has ever known. Even with the best subjective intentions in the world, how can they avoid a certain ambiguity in preaching nonviolence? Is this not a mystification? We must remember Marx's accusation that, "The social principles of Christianity encourage dullness, lack of self-respect, submissiveness, self-abasement, in short all the characteristics of the proletariat." We must frankly face the possibility that the nonviolence of the European or American preaching Christian meekness may conceivably be adulterated by bourgeois feelings and by an unconscious desire to preserve the status quo against violent upheaval. On the other hand, Marx's view of Christianity is obviously tendentious and distorted. A real understanding of Christian nonviolence (backed up by the evidence of history in the Apostolic Age) shows not only that it is a *power*, but that it remains perhaps the only really effective way of transforming human beings and human society. After nearly fifty years of communist revolution, we find little evidence that the world is improved by violence. Let us however seriously consider at least the *conditions* for relative honesty in the practice of Christian nonviolence.

1) Nonviolence must be aimed above all at the transformation of the present state of the world, and it must therefore be free from all occult, unconscious connivance with an unjust use of power. This poses enormous problems—for if nonviolence is too political it becomes drawn into the power struggle and identified with one side or another in that struggle, while if it is totally a-political it runs the risk of being ineffective or at best merely symbolic.

2) The non-violent resistance of the Christians who belong to one of the powerful nations and who are *themselves* in some sense privileged members of world society will have to be clearly not *for themselves* but *for others*, that is for the poor and underprivileged. (Obviously in the case of Negroes in the United States though they may be citizens of a privileged nation, their case is different. They are clearly entitled to wage a nonviolent struggle for their rights, but even for them this struggle should be primarily for *truth itself*—this being the source of their power.)

3) In the case of nonviolent struggle for peace—the threat of nuclear war abolishes all privileges. Under the bomb there is not much distinction between rich and poor. In fact the richest nations are usually the most threatened. Nonviolence must simply avoid the ambiguity of an unclear and *confusing protest* that hardens the warmakers in their self-righteous blindness. This means in fact that *in this case above all nonviolence must avoid a facile and fanatical self-righteousness*, and refrain from being satisfied with dramatic self-justifying gestures.

4) Perhaps the most insidious temptation to be avoided is one which is characteristic of the power structure itself: this fetishism of immediate visible results. Modern society understands "possibilities" and "results" in terms of a superficial and quantitative idea of efficacy. One of the missions of Christian nonviolence is to restore a different standard of practical judgment in social

conflicts. This means that the Christian humility of nonviolent action must establish itself in the minds and memories of modern people not only as *conceivable* and *possible*, but as *a desirable alternative* to what they now consider the only realistic possibility: namely political technique backed by force. Here the human dignity of nonviolence must manifest itself clearly in terms of a freedom and a nobility which are able to resist political manipulation and brute force and show them up as arbitrary, barbarous and irrational. This will not be easy. The temptation to get publicity and quick results by spectacular tricks or by forms of protest that are merely odd and provocative but whose human meaning is not clear, may defeat this purpose.

The realism of nonviolence must be made evident by humility and self-restraint which clearly show frankness and open-mindedness and invite the adversary to serious and reasonable discussion.

Instead of trying to use the adversary as leverage for one's own effort to realize an ideal, nonviolence seeks only to enter into a dialogue with them in order to attain, together with them, the common good of *everyone*. Nonviolence must be realistic and concrete. Like ordinary political action, it is no more than the "art of the possible." But precisely the advantage of nonviolence is that it has a *more Christian and more humane notion of what is possible*. Where the powerful believe that only power is efficacious, the nonviolent resister is persuaded of the superior efficacy of love, openness, peaceful negotiation and above all of truth. For power can guarantee the interests of *some* but it can never foster the good of all. Power always protects the good of some at the expense of all the others. Only love can attain and preserve the good of all. Any claim to build the security of *all* on force is a manifest imposture.

It is here that genuine humility is of the greatest importance. Such humility, united with true Christian courage (because it is based on trust in God and not in one's own ingenuity and tenacity), is itself a way of communicating the message that one is interested only in truth and in the genuine rights of others. Conversely, our authentic interest in the common good above all will help us to be humble, and to distrust our own hidden drive to self-assertion.

5) Christian nonviolence, therefore, is convinced that the manner in which the conflict for truth is waged will itself manifest or obscure the truth. To fight for truth by dishonest, violent, inhuman, or unreasonable means would simply betray the truth one is trying to vindicate. The absolute refusal of evil or suspect means is a necessary element in the witness of nonviolence.

6) A test of our sincerity in the practice of nonviolence is this: are we willing to *learn something from the adversary*? If a *new truth* is made known to us by them or through them, will we accept it? Are we willing to admit that they are not totally inhumane, wrong, unreasonable, cruel, etc.? This is important. If they see that we are completely incapable of listening to them with an open mind, our nonviolence will have nothing to say to them except that we distrust them and seek to outwit them. Our readiness to see some good in them and to agree with some of their ideas (though tactically this might look like a weakness on our part), actually gives us power: the power of sincerity and of truth. On the other hand, if we are obviously unwilling to accept any truth that we have not first discovered and declared ourselves, we show by that very fact that we are interested not in the truth so much as in "being right." Since the adversary is presumably interested in being right also, and in proving themselves right by what they consider the superior argument of force, we end up where we started. Nonviolence has great power, provided that it really witnesses to truth and not just to self-righteousness.

The dread of being open to the ideas of others generally comes from our hidden insecurity about our own convictions. We fear that we may be "converted"—or perverted—by a pernicious doctrine. On the other hand, if we are mature and objective in our open-mindedness, we may find that

viewing things from a basically different perspective—that of our adversary—we discover our own truth in a new light and are able to understand our own ideal more realistically.

Our willingness to take *an alternative approach* to a problem will perhaps relax the obsessive fixation of the adversary on their view, which they believe is the only reasonable possibility and which they are determined to impose on everyone else by coercion.

It is the refusal of alternatives—a compulsive state of mind which one might call the 'ultimatum complex'—which makes wars in order to force the unconditional acceptance of one over-simplified interpretation of reality. The mission of Christian humility in social life is not merely to edify, but to *keep minds open to many alternatives*. The rigidity of a certain type of Christian thought has seriously impaired this capacity, which nonviolence must recover.

Needless to say, Christian humility must not be confused with a mere desire to win approval and to find reassurance by conciliating others superficially.

7) Christian hope and Christian humility are inseparable. The quality of nonviolence is decided largely by the purity of the Christian hope behind it. The Christian knows that there are radically sound possibilities in everyone, and believes that love and grace always have the power to bring out those possibilities at the most unexpected moments. Therefore if one has hopes that God will grant peace to the world it is because one also trusts that humanity, God's creature, is not basically evil: that there is in us a potentiality for peace and order which can be realized provided the right conditions are there. Christians will do their part in creating these conditions by preferring love and trust to hate and suspiciousness. Obviously, once again, this 'hope in humankind' must not be naive. But experience itself has shown, in the last few years, how much an attitude of simplicity and openness can do to break down barriers of suspicion that had divided people for centuries.

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http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=action.election&item=confession_signers

Confessing Christ in a World of Violence

Our world is wracked with violence and war. But Jesus said: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God" (Matt. 5:9). Innocent people, at home and abroad, are increasingly threatened by terrorist attacks. But Jesus said: "Love your enemies, pray for those who persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). These words, which have never been easy, seem all the more difficult today.

Nevertheless, a time comes when silence is betrayal. How many churches have heard sermons on these texts since the terrorist atrocities of September 11? Where is the serious debate about what it means to confess Christ in a world of violence? Does Christian "realism" mean resigning ourselves to an endless future of "pre-emptive wars"? Does it mean turning a blind eye to torture and massive civilian casualties? Does it mean acting out of fear and resentment rather than intelligence and restraint?

Faithfully confessing Christ is the church's task, and never more so than when its confession is co-opted by militarism and nationalism.

- A "theology of war," emanating from the highest circles of American government, is seeping into our churches as well.

- The language of "righteous empire" is employed with growing frequency.

- The roles of God, church, and nation are confused by talk of an American "mission" and "divine appointment" to "rid the world of evil."

The security issues before our nation allow no easy solutions. No one has a monopoly on the truth. But a policy that rejects the wisdom of international consultation should not be baptized by religiosity. The danger today is political idolatry exacerbated by the politics of fear.

In this time of crisis, we need a new confession of Christ.

1. Jesus Christ, as attested in Holy Scripture, knows no national boundaries. Those who confess his name are found throughout the earth. Our allegiance to Christ takes priority over national identity. Whenever Christianity compromises with empire, the gospel of Christ is discredited. We reject the false teaching that any nation-state can ever be described with the words, "the light shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it." These words, used in scripture, apply only to Christ. No political or religious leader has the right to twist them in the service of war.

2. Christ commits Christians to a strong presumption against war. The wanton destructiveness of modern warfare strengthens this obligation. Standing in the shadow of the Cross, Christians have a responsibility to count the cost, speak out for the victims, and explore every alternative before a nation goes to war. We are committed to international cooperation rather than unilateral policies. We reject the false teaching that a war on terrorism takes precedence over ethical and legal norms. Some things ought never be done - torture, the deliberate bombing of civilians, the use of indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction - regardless of the consequences.

3. Christ commands us to see not only the splinter in our adversary's eye, but also the beam in our own. The distinction between good and evil does not run between one nation and another, or one group and another. It runs straight through every human heart.

We reject the false teaching that America is a "Christian nation," representing only virtue, while its adversaries are nothing but vicious. We reject the belief that America has nothing to repent of, even as we reject that it represents most of the world's evil. All have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God (Rom 3:23).

4. Christ shows us that enemy-love is the heart of the gospel. While we were yet enemies, Christ died for us (Rom. 5:8, 10). We are to show love to our enemies even as we believe God in Christ has shown love to us and the whole world. Enemy-love does not mean capitulating to hostile agendas or domination. It does mean refusing to demonize any human being created in God's image.

We reject the false teaching that any human being can be defined as outside the law's protection. We reject the demonization of perceived enemies, which only paves the way to abuse; and we reject the mistreatment of prisoners, regardless of supposed benefits to their captors.

5. Christ teaches us that humility is the virtue befitting forgiven sinners. It tempers all political disagreements, and it allows that our own political perceptions, in a complex world, may be wrong.

We reject the false teaching that those who are not for the United States politically are against it or that those who fundamentally question American policies must be with the "evil-doers." Such crude distinctions, especially when used by Christians, are expressions of the Manichaeian heresy, in which the world is divided into forces of absolute good and absolute evil.

The Lord Jesus Christ is either authoritative for Christians, or he is not. His Lordship cannot be set aside by any earthly power. His words may not be distorted for propagandistic purposes. No nation-state may usurp the place of God.

We believe that acknowledging these truths is indispensable for followers of Christ. We urge them to remember these principles in making their decisions as citizens. Peacemaking is central to our vocation in a troubled world where Christ is Lord.

Signers as of October 22, 2004. Institutions for identification only.

Dear Pastor/Friend:

One of the more valid criticism of our United Methodist community is that we do not take time to "do theology". We do not sit down, as a people, and take the time to prayerfully consider where we are being called by God to stand, move, and have our being. We do not take advantage of our wonderful quadrilateral formula of Scripture, Reason, Tradition, and Experience. Theological reflection and thinking is particularly needed on where United Methodists stand on war in these early days of the 21st century. This is made evident as we grappled with war in Iraq and the emerging doctrine of preemptive war.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy, wants to contribute to this theological reflection through a two-part process. We invite you and your congregation to join with us.

First, throughout 2005 we want to encourage local congregations to study the theology of war and peace, using the Wesleyan quadrilateral as a framework. We suggest starting with the study guide, "In Search of Security" written by a task force of the United Methodist Council of Bishops. To encourage conversation among congregations we will open a dialogue section on our website, www.mupwj.org, beginning January 2005. You will be able to post your views and read what others are saying.

We suggest continuing your reflection by using each element of the quadrilateral. What does scripture say about war and peace? What is the tradition of 2,000 years of Christianity? What are the theological doctrines, old and new? What does experience teach us, particularly about peaceable alternatives to war? To help you we will post reference material on our website. We will also have space for you to offer your conclusions and learn the views of others.

Second, in 2006 we will convene a national conference so that representatives of congregations, church leaders, and seminarians can come together for prayerful dialogue under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This will not be a legislative event with debate of hardened positions, resolutions, and pronouncements. Rather it will be open-ended to see where the Spirit leads us.

We are seeking local congregations to become partners in this endeavor by instituting their own study process and engaging in web-based dialogue. In particular we are looking for 100 congregations (at least) which will support this process financially through a contribution of \$100 (or \$200, \$300, \$500). This will help cover the costs of the website, preparation for the national conference, and project management. We invite you to be one of these congregations.

Rev. Schuyler Rhodes, pastor, Temple UMC in San Francisco is serving as conference coordinator. As chair of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, I will serve as facilitator of web-based dialogue. You can learn more about our organization at www.mupwj.org.

We look forward to hearing from you and learning that you will become a participating congregation. You can send your financial contribution to Methodists United for Peace with Justice, 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Shalom,
Howard W. Hallman

Gene Sharp

<http://www.aeinstein.org/>

There Are Realistic Alternatives
by Gene Sharp

There Are Realistic Alternatives is a short, serious introduction to nonviolent struggle, its applications, and strategic thinking. Based on pragmatic arguments, this piece presents nonviolent struggle as a realistic alternative to war and other violence in acute conflicts. It also contains a glossary of important terms and recommendations for further reading. For [more information click here](#). 54 pp. 2003

From Dictatorship to Democracy
by Gene Sharp

From Dictatorship to Democracy is a serious introduction to the use of nonviolent action to topple dictatorships. Originally published in 1993 in Thailand for distribution among Burmese dissidents, this booklet has since been translated into ten different languages and spread worldwide. This is the third US edition. For [more information click here](#). 88 pp. 2003

The Anti-Coup
by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins

As coups are one of the primary ways through which dictatorships are installed, this piece details measures that civilians, civil society, and governments can take to prevent and block coups d'état and executive usurpations. It also contains specific legislative steps and other measures that governments and non-governmental institutions can follow to prepare for anti-coup resistance. For [more information click here](#). 64 pp. 2003

In Defense of Creation study guide

An on-line guide for study and action.

<http://www.cokesbury.com/digitalstore.aspx?subsection=19&fid=11#downloads>

Session 3 Exploring four biblical texts

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_03.pdf

Session 5 Discussing three positions about war and peace

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_05.pdf

Session 6 Moral and spiritual issues of nuclear deterrence

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_06.pdf

Session 8 Impact of arms race

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_08.pdf

Session 9 Just and peaceable world community

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_09.pdf

Session 11 Ways to work for shalom

http://www.cokesbury.com/Pdf/indefense_11.pdf

In Search of Security

PDF version

<http://www.umc-gbcs.org/uploads/news/760Search%20of%20Security.PDF>

Bishops' "In Search of Security" Study Now Available

<http://www.umc-gbcs.org/news/viewnews.php?newsId=761>

Just War Theory

Just War Theory

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm>

Principles of the Just War

with additional readings

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/justwar.htm>

Resources on Just War Theory

<http://ethics.acusd.edu/Applied/Military/Justwar.html>

Just War Tradition <http://pewforum.org/just-war/> **ar**

The Just War

a briefing document

justifies U.S. war against Iraq, 2003

http://www.abelard.org/briefings/just_war.htm

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

War

Just War, Realism, Pacifism

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#4>

Guidelines for Justifiable Warfare

In 1939 the Calvin Theological Seminary faculty prepared a lengthy and well-balanced statement, which was adopted by that year's synod. A study committee presented the Synod of 1964 with a revised "Statement on Warfare," based on the 1939 study.

http://www.thebanner.org/cpbn_special_justifiable.htm

<http://www.faithmaps.org/war.htm>

Profile: Silent Evangelical Support Of Bush's Proposed War Against Iraq

Morning Edition: February 26, 2003

[javascript:getMedia\('ME', '26-Feb-2003', 1, 'WM,RM'\);](http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/feb/030226.hagerty.html)

[Evangelicals for War](http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/feb/030226.hagerty.html)

<http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/feb/030226.hagerty.html>

The Just War Theory

by Brother John Raymond

<http://www.monksfordoration.org/justwar.html>

A Just Cause, Not a Just War

by **Howard Zinn**

http://www.forusa.org/nonviolence/unjustwar_zinn.html

A Pastoral Message: Living With Faith and Hope After September 11

U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops

November 14, 2001

<http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/sept11.htm>

Section on "The use of military force" deals with war against Afghanistan and seems to accept military force there.

Just War Tradition

<http://pewforum.org/just-war/>

"There never was a good war or a bad peace," Ben Franklin wrote in a letter to Josiah Quincy in 1783. But for Aristotle, the distinction wasn't so simple. "We make war that we may live in peace," he wrote in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Many theologians and political philosophers throughout the centuries would agree with Aristotle that at times war is necessary and, indeed, morally justifiable. The just war tradition, developed in the West over nearly two millennia, seeks to place moral restraints on warfare by establishing criteria for determining *when* and *how* to wage war justly. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the move toward war with Iraq, Americans have once again turned to the just war tradition for moral guidance.

Discussions of what constitutes a morally justifiable war can be found in many religious traditions, but contemporary debate in the U.S. draws primarily on classic just war theory, which finds its origins in Christian theology and natural law theory. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is generally acknowledged as the first to offer a sustained treatment of war and justice in his masterpiece *The City of God*. While loathing the destruction and loss of life that attend war, Augustine nonetheless believed that a "just war" might be preferable to an unjust peace. Drawing on the apostle Paul's New Testament injunction to submit to governing authorities, "who do not bear the sword for nothing" (cf. [Romans 13:1-7](#)), Augustine recognized biblical mandates for individuals to love their neighbors (to the point of renouncing self-defense) even while defending government's duty to preserve civic peace and to secure justice. He maintained that use of force is necessary—though always regrettable—in a fallen world in order to restrain evil, but that its ultimate goal must be to restore peace.

St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-74) significantly contributed to the development of just war theory in his *Summa Theologica* in the 13th century. He formalized three criteria for a just war—right authority (a sovereign government, rather than individuals), just cause (to avenge wrongs or to restore what was unjustly seized) and right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil)—while also laying the groundwork for other criteria that would eventually be integrated into the tradition.

Protestant Reformers, as well as Catholic and Protestant natural law theorists, upheld the just war tradition. Some influential thinkers who significantly contributed to the development of just war theory include Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546); Francisco Suarez (1548-1617); Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), often called the father of international law; and Emerich de Vattel (1714-67). In modern times, just war principles, frequently divorced from their religious origins, have been encoded in international laws governing armed conflict, such as the Geneva Conventions, as well as in American military doctrine and practice.

The result of 1600 years of evolving tradition is a fairly complex set of criteria that govern both moral justifications for waging war (*jus ad bellum*) and moral conduct once engaged in war (*jus in bello*). While just war proponents agree upon the criteria, there is often considerable variation in how the principles themselves are defined, not to mention how they are applied to particular cases. These principles may be roughly summarized as follows:

Jus ad bellum

- *Legitimate authority.* Private individuals and groups are not permitted to take up arms against others, however justified their cause may appear. Only governments—those who have been entrusted with the public good—may wage war, and they must do it openly and legally.
- *Just cause.* A government may wage war in self-defense, in defense of another nation, to protect innocents or to regain something wrongfully taken. The desire for personal glory or revenge, or to impose tyrannical rule, is never an acceptable cause for waging war.
- *Right intention.* The ultimate end of a government in waging war must be to establish peace, rather than to use a "just war" as a pretext for its own gain.
- *Last resort.* A governing authority must reasonably exhaust all other diplomatic and non-military options for securing peace before resorting to force.
- *Reasonable chance of success.* A government may not resort to war unless its prospects for success are good. In this way, lives will not be needlessly wasted in the pursuit of a hopeless cause.
- *Proportionality.* A government must respond to aggression with force only when the effects of its defensive actions do not exceed the damage done by the aggression itself.

Jus in bello

- *Noncombatant immunity.* An authority waging war is morally obligated to seek to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. While civilians unfortunately may sometimes come in harm's way, a government may never deliberately target them.
- *Proportionate means.* This criterion pertains to specific tactics of warfare and seeks to restrict unnecessary use of force. It is intended to ensure that the military means used to achieve certain goals and goods are commensurate with their value, particularly when compared to the loss of life and destruction that could also occur.

While contemporary just war thinkers generally agree on these principles, changing political and military conditions often complicate their application. For instance, it's easy to say that war ought only to be waged in self-defense, but how does one know if or when it is morally permissible to defend oneself preemptively or preventatively? Moreover, what does the criterion of "last resort" really mean? As the just war theorist Michael Walzer has pointed out, "lastness" is a metaphysical concept that is never really achieved, because another effort to avert war can always be attempted. At what point, then, does a government determine that it has indeed exhausted all reasonable diplomatic solutions and must use force? New military developments, advanced forms of weaponry as well as changing tactics of contemporary warfare also influence applications of just war thought. Precision-guided munitions like "smart bombs" ensure greater accuracy and enhanced ability to limit civilian casualties. However, even just war's effort to minimize use of force can be compromised and complicated by the decision to use "human shields," especially given the growth of real-time media coverage and broadcast of military actions.

These and other considerations render current debates about U.S. involvement in warfare necessarily complex and morally ambiguous—even for those who agree, at least in theory, with the criteria established by just war thinkers. The following resources seek to apply just war

thinking to modern problems from a variety of perspectives.

Historical Resources

[Book 19 of Augustine's City of God](#)

[Question On War](#), from Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica, II-II, Question 40

[Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved](#), a letter to Assa Von Kram from Dr. Martin Luther

"[On the Right of the Government to Wage War](#)," from Book IX of John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, "Of Civil Government"

Current Discussions

Just War and Iraq

[Letter to President Bush on Iraq](#), from Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of Social Development & World Peace, September 13, 2002

"[Perils of Preemptive War; Why America's place in the world will shift—for the worse—if we attack Iraq](#)," by William Galston, September 23, 2002

"[A Just War?](#)" by Jean Bethke Elshtain, Boston Globe, Oct 6, 2002

"[War should be our last resort](#)," by David Blankenhorn, William A. Galston and John Kelsay, Orlando Sentinel, November 10, 2002

"[Now, Only Preemption is Containment](#)," by Keith Pavlischek, March 7, 2003

Just War and September 11

"[Just War Principles and Counterterrorism](#)," by Keith Pavlischek, Center for Public Justice, September 13, 2001

"[What Can Be Done? What Should Be Done?](#)" by J. Bryan Hehir, AMERICA, Oct. 8, 2001.

"[Defining a Just War](#)," by Richard Falk, The Nation, October 11, 2001

"[Jihad and Just War](#)," by James Turner Johnson, First Things, June/July 2002

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm>

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Just War Theory" 20004

by

Alex Moseley

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Just-war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and forms of warfare. The historical aspect, or the “just war tradition” deals with the historical body of rules or agreements applied (or at least existing) in various wars across the ages. For instance international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are historical rules aimed at limiting certain kinds of warfare. It is the role of ethics to examine these institutional agreements for their philosophical coherence as well as to inquire into whether aspects of the conventions ought to be changed.

[Table of Contents](#) (Clicking on the links below will take you to that part of this article)

- [Introduction](#)
- [Jus Ad Bellem Convention" The Jus Ad Bellem Convention](#)
- [Jus In Bello" The Principles Of Jus In Bello](#)

Introduction

Historically, the just-war tradition—a set of mutually agreed rules of combat—commonly evolves between two similar enemies. When enemies differ greatly because of different religious beliefs, race, or language, war conventions have rarely been applied. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve. In part the motivation is seen to be mutually beneficial—it is preferable to remove any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts. Nonetheless, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that such asymmetrical morality should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally; that is, just war theory should be universal.

The just-war tradition is as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors. They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners. Commonly they invoked considerations of honour: some acts in war have always been deemed dishonourable, whilst others have been deemed honourable. Whilst the specifics of what is honourable differ with time and place, the very fact of one moral virtue has been sufficient to infuse warfare with moral concerns.

The just war theory also has a long history. Whilst parts of the Bible hint at ethical behaviour in war and concepts of just cause, the most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the *Summa Theologicae* Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory. He discusses not only the justification of war, but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war. Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand. The most important of these are: Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-

1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767). In the twentieth century it has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. The most important contemporary texts include Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill *The Ethics of War* (1979), Richard Norman *Ethics, Killing, and War* (1995), Brian Orend *War and International Justice* (2001) and Michael Walzer on *War and Justice* (2001), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth Anscombe "War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the journals *Ethics* or *The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs*.

Since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11 academics have turned their attention to just war once again with international and national conventions developing and consolidating the theoretical aspects of the conventions - just war theory has become a popular topic in International Relations, Political Science, Philosophy, Ethics, and Military History courses. Conference proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs: e.g., Alexander Moseley and Richard Norman, eds. *Human Rights and Military Intervention*, Paul Robinson, ed., *Just War in a Comparative Perspective*, Aleksander Jokic, ed., *War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing*. What has been of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate. Generals have extolled their troops to adhere to the rules, soldiers are taught the just war conventions in the military academies, yet war crimes continue - genocidal campaigns have been waged by mutually hating peoples, leaders have waged total war on ethnic groups within or without their borders, and individual soldiers or guerilla bands have committed atrocious, murderous, or humiliating acts. Yet increasingly, the rule of law - the need to hold violators and transgressors responsible for their actions in war - is making headway onto the battlefield. In chivalrous times, the Christian crusader could seek absolution for atrocities committed in war; today, the law courts are less forgiving. Nonetheless, the idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on the battlefield (cf. Geoffrey Robinson's *Crimes Against Humanity* (1999)), often runs ahead of the traditions and customs that demean or weaken the *justum bellum* that may exist between warring factions. And in some cases, no just war conventions exist at all. In such cases, the ethic of war is considered, or is implicitly held to be, beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and therefore deserving a separate moral realm where "fair is foul and foul is fair" (Shakespeare, *Macbeth* I.i). In such examples (e.g. Rwanda 1994), a people's justification of destructiveness and killing to whatever relative degree they hold to be justifiable in this amoral world, triumphs over attempts to establish the laws of peaceful interaction into this separate bloody realm, and in some wars, people fighting for their land or nation prefer to pick up the cudgel rather than the rapier, as Leo Tolstoy notes in *War and Peace* (Book 4.Ch.2), to sidestep the etiquette of war in favour securing their land from occupational or invading forces.

Against the just war (*justum bellum*) are those of a skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war. There are various positions against the need or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. Arguments from 'military necessity' are of this type; for example, to defeat Germany in World War II, it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centers, or in the US Civil War, for General Sherman to burn Atlanta. However, intrinsicists may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war, for they may claim it can only exist in a peaceful situation in which recourse exists to conflict resolving institutions. Or intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause (the argument from righteousness) is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means

are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality—and hence just-war theories—become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework.

Whilst sceptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long-term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter-revenges.

Intrinsicists can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war; for example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: if more will be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost, the consequentialist cannot but demur to military necessity. On the other hand, intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no flexibility in war: whether it entails a Kantian thesis of respecting others or a classical rights position, intrinsicism produces an inflexible model that would restrain warrior's actions to the targeting of permissible targets only. In principle such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers.

Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (*justum bellum*) tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (*Jus In Bello*). The two are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations.

[Back to Table of Contents](#)

Jus Ad Bellem Convention" **The Jus Ad Bellem Convention**

The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used. One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems.

Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of *jus ad bellum*. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But unless 'aggression' is defined, this proscription rather open-ended. For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical injury (e.g., a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against national honor), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic activity), or even to a neighbor's prosperity (a violation of social justice). The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons of why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting

others against an oppressive government or from another external threat (interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed (e.g., to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to preempt an anticipated attack.

The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i.e., it is accountable and does not rule arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to declare war is reasonable. However, the more removed from a proper and just form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its sovereignty disintegrates. A historical example can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong; whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty, and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government.

The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. However, possessing right intention masks many philosophical problems. According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself. At what point does right intention separate itself from self-interest? On the one hand, if the only method to secure peace is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory, political aggrandizement is intimately connected with the proper intention of maintaining the peace. On the other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in their self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, some may demand that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on behalf of freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war.

The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in 1940, for the sake of national self-esteem? Besides, posturing for defense may sometimes make aggression itself too costly, even for a much stronger side. However, the thrust of the principle of reasonable success emphasizes that human

life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds. Historically, many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: the fight may seem hopeless, but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to stir a people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered the British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was threatened with defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For example: "Let us therefore brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'"And "What is our aim?....Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival." (Speeches to Parliament, 1940).

The final guide of *jus ad bellum*, is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of *Jus In Bello*. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction, it can also invoke general balance of power considerations. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back. According to the principle of proportionality, B's counter-attack must not invoke a disproportionate response: it should aim to retrieve its land. That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion will take place. But for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats is even more unsustainable.

On the whole the principles offered by *jus ad bellum* are useful guidelines. Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results. They are nonetheless a useful starting point for ethics and remain a pressing concern for statesmen and women.

[Back to Table of Contents](#)

Jus In Bello" **The Principles Of Jus In Bello**

The rules of just conduct fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination concerns who are legitimate targets in war, whilst the principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate. One strong implication of being a separate topic of analysis for just war theorists, is that a nation fighting an unjust cause may still fight justly, or vice versa. A third principle can be added to the traditional two, namely the principle of responsibility, which demands an examination of where responsibility lies in war.

In waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since non-combatants or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper. Immunity from war can be reasoned from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the essence of war, which is killing combatants. Since killing itself is highly problematic, the just-war theorist has to proffer a reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the first place, and whether their status alters if they are fighting a just or unjust war. Firstly, a theorist may hold that being trained and/or armed constitutes a sufficient threat to combatants on the other side. Voluntarists may invoke the boxing ring analogy: punching another individual is not morally supportable in a civilized community, but those who voluntarily enter the boxing ring renounce their right not to

be hit. Similarly, those who join an army renounce their rights not to be targeted in war; the rights of non-combatants (civilians, or 'innocents') remain intact and therefore they cannot be justly attacked. Others, avoiding a rights analysis, may argue that those who join the army (or who have even been pressed into conscription) come to terms with being a target, and hence their own deaths. This is argued for example by Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill in *The Ethics of War* (1979). However, since civilians can just as readily come to terms with their own deaths, their argument is not sufficient to defend the principle of discrimination. Rights-based analyses are more productive, especially those that focus on the renouncing of rights by combatants by virtue of their war status, leaving a sphere of immunity for civilians.

Warfare sometimes unavoidably involves civilians. Whilst the principle of discrimination argues for their immunity from war, the practicalities of war provoke the need for a different model. The doctrine of double effect offers a justification for killing civilians in war, so long as their deaths are not intended but are accidental. Targeting a military establishment in the middle of a city is permissible according to the doctrine of double effect, for the target is legitimate. Civilian casualties are a foreseeable but accidental effect. Whilst the doctrine provides a useful justification of 'collateral damage' to civilians, it raises a number of issues concerning the justification of foreseeable breaches of immunity, as well as the balance to strike between military objectives and civilian casualties.

Another problem arises in defining who is a combatant and who is not. Usually combatants carry arms openly, but guerrillas disguise themselves as civilians. Michael Walzer, in his *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977) claims that the lack of identification does not give a government the right to kill indiscriminately—the onus is on the government to identify the combatants. Others have argued that the nature of modern warfare dissolves the possibility of discrimination. Civilians are just as necessary causal conditions for the war machine as are combatants, therefore, they claim, there is no moral distinction in targeting an armed combatant and a civilian involved in arming or feeding the combatant. The distinction is, however, not closed by the nature of modern economies, since a combatant still remains a very different entity from a non-combatant, if not for the simple reason that the former is presently armed (and hence has renounced rights or is prepared to die, or is a threat), whilst the civilian is not. On the other hand, it can be argued that being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target. If Mr Smith is the only individual in the nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device, then he becomes not only causally efficacious in the firing of a weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target. His job effectively militarizes his status. The underlying issues that ethical analysis must deal with involve the logical nature of an individual's complicity, or aiding and abetting the war machine, with greater weight being imposed on those logically closer than those logically further from the war machine in their work. At a deeper level, one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war; to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets? This invokes the issue of collective versus individuality responsibility that is in itself a complex topic.

The second principle of just conduct is that any offence should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired. This principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause, but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light. Proportionality for *Jus In Bello* requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimise destruction and casualties. It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering, but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for instance, from harboring good will to all (Kantian ethics), or acting virtuously (Aristotelian ethics). Whilst the consideration of discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war, the principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally

permissible. In fighting a just war in which only military targets are attacked, it is still possible to breach morality by employing disproportionate force against an enemy. Whilst the earlier theoreticians, such as Thomas Aquinas, invoked the Christian concepts of charity and mercy, modern theorists may invoke either consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions, both are which remain problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted. However, it does not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed belligerent tribe. At the battle of Omdurman in the Sudan, six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes—the gunners may have been in the right to defend themselves, but the principle of proportionality demands that a battle ends before it becomes a massacre. Similarly, following the battle of Culloden, Cumberland ordered “No Quarter”, which was not only a breach of the principle of discrimination, for his troops were permitted to kill the wounded as well as supporting civilians, but also a breach of the principle of proportionality, since the battle had been won, and the Jacobite cause effectively defeated on the battle field.

The principles of proportionality and discrimination aim to temper war’s violence and range. They are complemented by other considerations that are not taken up in the traditional exposition of *Jus In Bello*, especially the issue of responsibility.

Jus In Bello requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions. This ties in their actions to morality generally. Some, such as Saint Augustine argues against this assertion: “who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals.” Those who act according to a divine command, or even God’s laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to death “have by no means violated the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’” Whilst this issue is connected to the concepts of just cause, it does not follow that individuals waging a just, or unjust war, should be absolved of breaching the principles of just conduct. Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare, but when soldiers turn their weapons against non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder. The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war. The issues that arise from this principle include the morality of obeying orders (for example, when one knows those orders to be immoral), as well as the status of ignorance (not knowing of the effects of one’s actions).

The foregoing has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war. A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here. Other areas of interest are: hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons (e.g., land mines), and interventionism.

Dear

Earlier I wrote to you about a proposal for exploration of the theology of war and peace. We have now developed this idea further, as described in the attached description of "Project on Theology of War and Peace." There are three components.

(1) Develop and post on our website, www.mupwj.org, study material on the theology of war and peace, organized around the Wesleyan Quadrilateral of Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience. The web outline is attached.

(2) Encourage formation of study groups within congregations, campus organizations, and other places to explore the theology of war and peace and to engage in web-based dialogue with others. We are suggesting that study groups start with "In Search of Security", a study guide developed by the United Methodist Council of Bishops. (For how to obtain this study guide, see <http://www.umc-gbcs.org/news/viewnews.php?newsId=761>) This would be followed by taking up the theology of war and peace, using resources that will be posted on our website, www.mupwj.org, beginning in January 2005. Local study groups can post their views on the website and read the views of other.

(3) Hold a conference on the theology of war and peace in early 2006 with representatives from local study groups and others.

In January 2005 we will initiate a major effort to develop local study groups. In the meantime we would like to find a few congregations with a strong interest in peace issues to be initial participants in this project. In addition to forming study groups, we would ask each of them to contribute at least \$100 (or \$200, \$300, \$500) to help finance the project. Would you be able to help us find one or more such churches in your conference?

So far we are getting good feedback on this project. I hope that you become involved.

Shalom,
Howard

METHODIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES

African Methodist Episcopal

- Payne Theological Seminary (OH)
- Turner Theological Seminary (GA)

African Methodist Episcopal Zion

- [Hood Theological Seminary \(NC\)](#)

Christian Methodist Episcopal

- Phillips School of Theology (GA)

Free Methodist

- [Northeastern Seminary \(NY\)](#)

United Methodist Church

- [Boston University School of Theology \(MA\)](#)
- [Candler School of Theology, Emory University \(GA\)](#)
- [Claremont School of Theology \(CA\)](#)
- [Drew University Theological Seminary \(NJ\)](#)
- [Duke University Divinity School \(NC\)](#)
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- [Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary \(IL\)](#)
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- [Methodist Theological School in Ohio \(OH\)](#)
- [Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University \(TX\)](#)
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- [United Theological Seminary \(OH\)](#)
- [Wesley Theological Seminary \(DC\)](#)

http://www.fuller.edu/provost/seminaries/Sems_on_Web_Denom.html

Methodist Peace Fellowship *RPF*

Laurie Day

PO Box 100384

Denver, CO 80250-0384

www.methodistpeace.org

National Association of Evangelicals

<http://www.nae.net>

Statement of Faith

- We believe the Bible to be the inspired, the only infallible, authoritative Word of God.
- We believe that there is one God, eternally existent in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
- We believe in the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, in His virgin birth, in His sinless life, in His miracles, in His vicarious and atoning death through His shed blood, in His bodily resurrection, in His ascension to the right hand of the Father, and in His personal return in power and glory.
- We believe that for the salvation of lost and sinful people, regeneration by the Holy Spirit is absolutely essential.
- We believe in the present ministry of the Holy Spirit by whose indwelling the Christian is enabled to live a godly life.
- We believe in the resurrection of both the saved and the lost; they that are saved unto the resurrection of life and they that are lost unto the resurrection of damnation.
- We believe in the spiritual unity of believers in our Lord Jesus Christ.

Rich Cizik

Vice President for Governmental Affairs

For the Heath of the Nations: A Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility

http://www.nae.net/images/civic_responsibility2.pdf

"We seek peace and work to restrain violence"

Supports peaceful settlement of dispute, nonviolent means. If military action, just war principles.

Old Testament

So what about war in the Old Testament?

A Mennonite perspective

http://www.thirdway.com/peace/?S=3&P_ID=5

Old Testament Foundations for Peacemaking in the Nuclear Era

by Bruce C. Birch 1985

<http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1909>

Writings on Christian Nonresistance and Pacifism from Anabaptist-Mennonite Sources
<http://www.bluffton.edu/~mastg/pacifism.htm>

Nonresistance is a central practice for the Anabaptist heritage of Christian witness and discipleship. At this location, there are links to writings by Anabaptist-Mennonite writers on the subject of nonresistance which are currently available on the World Wide Web.

Confessional Statements	Theological and Biblical Studies	Church Life and History
Communication and Conflict	Social and Political Analysis	Sermons and Songs

Confessional Statements

- [A Call to Faithfulness \(1940\), Dutch Mennonite Conference](#)
- [Agreeing and Disagreeing in Love: Commitments for Mennonites in Times of Disagreement](#)
- [Church and State Issues Related to Jury Duty](#)
- [A Christian Declaration on Peace, War, and Military Service \(1953\)](#)
- [Church and Peace Memorandum for discussion at the Second European Ecumenical Assembly \(1997\)](#)
- [Church of the Brethren Petition \(1856\)](#)
- [Confession of Faith in a Mennonite Perspective \(1995\), Article XXII, "Peace, Justice, and Nonresistance"](#)
- [The Dordrecht Confession of Faith \(1632\), Article XIV, "Of Revenge"](#)
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THE CONFLICT OF AGES

A Treatise on the Dichotomy between Military Service and the Kingdom of God

Copyright 1997, Daniel H. Shubin.

Revised 2002.

Email: danhshubin@jps.net

<http://www.christianpacifism.com/>

Christian Pacifism (under construction)

Feel free to e-mail me at webmail@jeramyt.org

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Principles of the Just War

- A just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.
- A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.
- A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause (although the justice of the cause is not sufficient--see point #4). Further, a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.
- A war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.
- The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.
- The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
- The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.

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Vincent Ferraro



*The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics
Mount Holyoke College*

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 - A powerful document, with photographic documentaton

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October 25, 2004

Rev. Douglas Sands
213 Browns Woods Road
Annapolis, MD 21401-5949

Dear Doug,

As I mentioned to you at the conference center after the meeting on health benefits, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, which I chair, is developing a project on the "Theology of War and Peace". As described on an attachment, it has two parts: (a) local church study groups related to one another through web-based dialogue and (b) a national conference. Resource material will be available on our website, as outlined on another attachment.

Would you be interested in becoming involved, particularly in the section dealing with peaceful alternatives to war? You have a rich experience on this subject. We would greatly appreciate your joining as a partner in this endeavor.

I will follow up with a telephone call. Or if you want to respond by e-mail, you can reach me at hhallman@mupwj.org.

Shalom,

Howard W. Hallman
Chair

Statement on Iraq

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

Washington, D.C.

November 13, 2002

<http://www.usccb.org/bishops/iraq.htm>

As we Catholic Bishops meet here in Washington, our nation, Iraq and the world face grave choices about war and peace, about pursuing justice and security. These are not only military and political choices, but also moral ones because they involve matters of life and death. Traditional Christian teaching offers ethical principles and moral criteria that should guide these critical choices.

Two months ago, Bishop Wilton Gregory, President of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, wrote President George Bush to welcome efforts to focus the world's attention on Iraq's refusal to comply with several United Nations resolutions over the past eleven years, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. This letter, which was authorized by the U.S. Bishops' Administrative Committee, raised serious questions about the moral legitimacy of any preemptive, unilateral use of military force to overthrow the government of Iraq. As a body, we make our own the questions and concerns raised in Bishop Gregory's letter, taking into account developments since then, especially the unanimous action of the U.N. Security Council on November 8th.

We have no illusions about the behavior or intentions of the Iraqi government. The Iraqi leadership must cease its internal repression, end its threats to its neighbors, stop any support for terrorism, abandon its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, and destroy all such existing weapons. We welcome the fact that the United States has worked to gain new action by the UN Security Council to ensure that Iraq meets its obligation to disarm. We join others in urging Iraq to comply fully with this latest Security Council resolution. We fervently pray that all involved will act to ensure that this UN action will not simply be a prelude to war but a way to avoid it.

While we cannot predict what will happen in the coming weeks, we wish to reiterate questions of ends and means that may still have to be addressed. We offer not definitive conclusions, but rather our serious concerns and questions in the hope of helping all of us to reach sound moral judgments. People of good will may differ on how to apply just war norms in particular cases, especially when events are moving rapidly and the facts are not altogether clear. Based on the facts that are known to us, we continue to find it difficult to justify the resort to war against Iraq, lacking clear and adequate evidence of an imminent attack of a grave nature. With the Holy See and bishops from the Middle East and around the world, we fear that resort to war, under present circumstances and in light of current public information, would not meet the strict conditions in Catholic teaching for overriding the strong presumption against the use of military force.*

Just cause. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* limits just cause to cases in which "the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations [is] lasting, grave and certain." (#2309) We are deeply concerned about recent proposals to expand dramatically traditional limits on just cause to include preventive uses of military force to overthrow

threatening regimes or to deal with weapons of mass destruction. Consistent with the proscriptions contained in international law, a distinction should be made between efforts to change unacceptable *behavior* of a government and efforts to end that government's *existence*.

Legitimate authority. In our judgment, decisions concerning possible war in Iraq require compliance with U.S. constitutional imperatives, broad consensus within our nation, and some form of international sanction. That is why the action by Congress and the UN Security Council are important. As the Holy See has indicated, if recourse to force were deemed necessary, this should take place within the framework of the United Nations after considering the consequences for Iraqi civilians, and regional and global stability. (Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Vatican Secretary for Relations with States, 9/10/02).

Probability of success and proportionality. The use of force must have "serious prospects for success" and "must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated" (*Catechism*, #2309). We recognize that not taking military action could have its own negative consequences. We are concerned, however, that war against Iraq could have unpredictable consequences not only for Iraq but for peace and stability elsewhere in the Middle East. The use of force might provoke the very kind of attacks that it is intended to prevent, could impose terrible new burdens on an already long-suffering civilian population, and could lead to wider conflict and instability in the region. War against Iraq could also detract from the responsibility to help build a just and stable order in Afghanistan and could undermine broader efforts to stop terrorism.

Norms governing the conduct of war. The justice of a cause does not lessen the moral responsibility to comply with the norms of civilian immunity and proportionality. While we recognize improved capability and serious efforts to avoid directly targeting civilians in war, the use of military force in Iraq could bring incalculable costs for a civilian population that has suffered so much from war, repression, and a debilitating embargo. In assessing whether "collateral damage" is proportionate, the lives of Iraqi men, women and children should be valued as we would the lives of members of our own family and citizens of our own country.

Our assessment of these questions leads us to urge that our nation and the world continue to pursue actively alternatives to war in the Middle East. It is vital that our nation persist in the very frustrating and difficult challenges of maintaining broad international support for constructive, effective and legitimate ways to contain and deter aggressive Iraqi actions and threats. We support effective enforcement of the military embargo and maintenance of political sanctions. We reiterate our call for much more carefully-focused economic sanctions which do not threaten the lives of innocent Iraqi civilians. Addressing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction must be matched by broader and stronger non-proliferation measures. Such efforts, grounded in the principle of mutual restraint, should include, among other things, greater support for programs to safeguard and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in all nations, stricter controls on the export of missiles and weapons technology, improved enforcement of the biological and chemical weapons conventions, and fulfillment of U.S. commitments to pursue good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There are no easy answers. Ultimately, our elected leaders are responsible for decisions about

national security, but we hope that our moral concerns and questions will be considered seriously by our leaders and all citizens. We invite others, particularly Catholic lay people -- who have the principal responsibility to transform the social order in light of the Gospel -- to continue to discern how best to live out their vocation to be "witnesses and agents of peace and justice" (*Catechism*, #2442). As Jesus said, "Blessed are the peacemakers" (Mt. 5).

We pray for all those most likely to be affected by this potential conflict, especially the suffering people of Iraq and the men and women who serve in our armed forces. We support those who risk their lives in the service of our nation. We also support those who seek to exercise their right to conscientious objection and selective conscientious objection, as we have stated in the past.

We pray for President Bush and other world leaders that they will find the will and the ways to step back from the brink of war with Iraq and work for a peace that is just and enduring. We urge them to work with others to fashion an effective global response to Iraq's threats that recognizes legitimate self defense and conforms to traditional moral limits on the use of military force.

*"Just war teaching has evolved...as an effort to prevent war; only if war cannot be rationally avoided, does the teaching then seek to restrict and reduce its horrors. It does this by establishing a set of rigorous conditions which must be met if the decision to go to war is to be morally permissible. Such a decision, especially today, requires extraordinarily strong reasons for overriding the presumption in favor of peace and against war. This is one significant reason why valid just-war teaching makes provision for conscientious dissent." *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (1983), #83.

The Global Spread of Active Nonviolence

Richard Deats

http://www.forusa.org/nonviolence/0900_73deats.html

In the last century Victor Hugo wrote, "An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come." Looking back over the twentieth century, especially since the movements Gandhi and King led, we see the growing influence and impact of nonviolence all over the world.

Mohandas Gandhi pioneered in developing the philosophy and practice of nonviolence. On the vast subcontinent of India, he led a colonial people to freedom through satyagraha or soul force, defeating what was at the time the greatest empire on earth, the British Raj. Not long after Gandhi's death, Martin Luther King, Jr. found in the Mahatma's philosophy the key he was searching for to move individualistic religion to a socially dynamic religious philosophy that propelled the civil rights movement into a nonviolent revolution that changed the course of U.S. history.

The Gandhian and Kingian movements have provided a seed bed for social ferment and revolutionary change across the planet, providing a mighty impetus for human and ecological transformation. Many, perhaps most, still do not recognize the significance of this development and persist in thinking that in the final analysis it is lethal force, or the threat of it, that is the decisive arbiter of human affairs. Why else would the United States continue to pour hundreds of billions into weapons even as nonmilitary foreign aid is cut, United Nations dues are not paid for years, and US armed forces are sent abroad on peacekeeping missions without being given the kind of training that would creatively prepare them for the work of peace?

Public awareness of the nonviolent breakthroughs that have been occurring is still quite minimal. This alternative paradigm to the ancient belief in marching armies and bloody warfare has made great headway "on the ground" but it is still little understood and scarcely found in our history books or in the media.

While "nonviolence is as old as the hills," as Gandhi said, it is in our century in which the philosophy and practice of nonviolence have grasped the human imagination. In an amazing and unexpected manner, as individuals, groups, and movements have developed creative, life-affirming ways to resolve conflict, overcome oppression, establish justice, protect the earth, and build democracy.

More and more, active nonviolence is taking the center stage in the struggle for liberation among oppressed peoples across the world. This is an alternative history, one that most people are scarcely aware of. What follows, in necessarily broad strokes, are some of the highlights of this alternative history.

THE PHILIPPINES

In 1986 millions of unarmed Filipinos surprised the world by nonviolently overthrowing the brutal dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, who was known at the time as "the Hitler of Southeast Asia." The movement they called "people power" demonstrated in an astounding way the power of active nonviolence.

Beginning with the assassination in 1983 of the popular opposition leader, Senator Benigno Aquino, the movement against Marcos grew rapidly. Inspired by Aquino's strong advocacy of nonviolence, the people were opened to the realization that armed rebellion was not the only way to overthrow a dictator. Numerous workshops in active nonviolence, especially in the churches,

helped build a solid core of activists - including many key leaders - ready for a showdown with the dictatorship.

In late 1985, when Marcos called a snap election, the divided opposition united behind Corazon Aquino, the widow of the slain senator. Despite fraud, intimidation and violence employed by Marcos, the Aquino forces brilliantly used a nonviolent strategy with marches, petitions, trained poll watchers and an independent polling commission. When Marcos tried to steal the election and thwart the people's will, the country came to the brink of civil war. Cardinal Sin, head of the Catholic Church in the islands, went on the radio and called the country to prayer and nonviolent resistance; he instructed the contemplative orders of nuns to pray and fast for the country's deliverance from tyranny. Thirty computer operators tabulating the election results, at risk to their very lives, walked out when they saw Marcos being falsely reported as winning. After first going into hiding, they called on the international press and publicly denounced the official counting, exposing the fraud to the world. Corazon ("Cory") Aquino called for a nonviolent struggle of rallies, vigils and civil disobedience to undermine the fraudulent claim of Marcos that he had won the election.

Church leaders fully backed her call; in fact, the Catholic bishops made a historic decision to call upon the people to nonviolently oppose the Marcos government. Crucial defections from the government by two key leaders and a few hundred troops became the occasion for hundreds of thousands of unarmed Filipinos to pour into the streets of Manila to protect the defectors and demand the resignation of the discredited government. They gathered along the circumferential highway around Manila which ran alongside the camps where the rebel troops had gathered. The highway, Epifanio de los Santos - the Epiphany of the Saints! - was popularly referred to as EDSA. Troops sent to attack the rebels were met by citizens massed in the streets, singing and praying, telling on the soldiers to join them in what has since been called the EDSA Revolution. Clandestine radio broadcasts gave instructions in nonviolent resistance. When fighter planes were sent to bomb the rebel camp, the pilots saw it surrounded by the people and defected. A military man said, "This is something new. Soldiers are supposed to protect the civilians. In this particular case, you have civilians protecting the soldiers." Facing the collapse of his support, Marcos and his family fled the country. The dictatorship fell in four days.

Ending the dictatorship was only the first step in the long struggle for freedom. Widespread poverty, unjust distribution of the land, and an unreformed military remained, undercutting the completion of the revolution. Challenges to the further development of an effective people power movement have continued with a determined grassroots movement working to transform Philippine society.

LATIN AMERICA

The dictatorships that characterized Latin America in the 1980s were ended for the most part by the unarmed power of the people. Consider Chile, for example. The Chileans, who like the Filipinos suffered under a brutal dictatorship, gained inspiration from the people power movement of the Philippines as they built their own movement of nonviolent resistance to General Pinochet. To describe their efforts, they used the powerful image of drops of water wearing away the stone of oppression.

In 1986 leftist guerillas killed five bodyguards of Pinochet in an assassination attempt on the general. In retaliation the military decided to take revenge by arresting five critics of the regime. A human rights lawyer alerted his neighbors to the danger of his being abducted and they made plans to protect him. That night cars arrived in the early morning hours carrying hooded men who tried to enter the house. Unable to break down reinforced doors and locks, they tried the

barred windows. The lawyer's family turned on all the lights and banged pots and blew whistles, awakening the neighbors who then did the same. The attackers, unexpectedly flustered by the prepared and determined neighbors, fled the scene.

Other groups carefully studied where the government tortured people and then, after prayer and reflection, found ways to expose the evil. For example, they would padlock themselves to iron railings near the targeted building; others would proceed to such a site during rush hour, then unfurl a banner saying, "Here they torture people." Sometimes they would disappear into the crowd; on other occasions they would wait until they were arrested.

In October of 1988, the government called on the people to vote "si" or "no" on continued military rule. Despite widespread intimidation against Pinochet's critics, the people were determined. Workshops were held to help them overcome their fear and to work to influence the election. Inspired and instructed by Filipino opposition to Marcos, voter registration drives and the training of poll watchers proceeded all over the country. The results exceeded their fondest expectations: 91% of all eligible voters registered and the opposition won 54.7% of all votes cast. Afterwards over a million people gathered in a Santiago park to celebrate their victory.

In the late 1980s throughout Latin America dictatorships fell like dominos, not through armed uprisings but through the determination of unarmed people - students, mothers, workers, religious groups - persisting in their witness against oppression and injustice, even in the face of torture and death. In Brazil such nonviolent efforts for justice were called *firmeza permanente* - relentless persistence. Base communities in the Brazilian countryside, for example, became organizing centers of the landless struggling to regain their land. In Argentina "mothers of the disappeared" were unceasing in their vigils and agitation for an accounting of the desaparecidos - the disappeared - of the military regime. In Montevideo, a fast in the tiny office of Serpaj (Service for Justice & Peace) brought to the fore the first public opposition to Uruguay's rapacious junta and elicited widespread sympathy that turned the tide toward democracy.

HAITI

Nowhere has the struggle for democracy been more difficult than in Haiti, yet even there the people developed courageous and determined nonviolent resistance against all odds. The people's movement is called lavalas, the flood washing away oppression. Defying governmental prohibitions and military abuse, the people demonstrated and marched and prayed. In 1986, Fr. Jean Bertrand Aristide was silenced by his religious order and directed by the hierarchy to leave his parish and go to a church in a dangerous area dominated by the military. However, students from his church in the slums occupied the front rows of the national cathedral in Port-au-Prince. Seven students fasted at the altar, persisting for six days until the bishops backed down and allowed Aristide to continue working in his parish. Then, in December 1990, Aristide was elected to the presidency. Driven from office and exiled abroad, he returned only after US troops went into Haiti.

The long term building of a democratic society there faces enormous odds. Even though the Haitian army has been abolished, a culture of violence remains.

It will require time and persistence and the strengthening of the grassroots movement from which a civil society will emerge, as happened in Costa Rica where the abolition of the army was part of a larger effort to improve education, health care, work and living conditions. Costa Rica, without a military, remained at peace during the 1980s while much of Central America was in turmoil.

CHINA

Stunning developments took place in China in the spring of 1989. What began as a memorial

march for a deceased leader quickly led into a mass expression of the pent-up longings of the Chinese people. With slogans such as "people power" and "we shall overcome," students - later joined by workers - called for democracy, an end to corruption, a free press, and other democratic reforms. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese joined the protesters in Tienanmen Square. Day after day, week after week, they peacefully called on their government to accede to their demands. First a few, then hundreds, joined in a fast. Growing numbers of citizens, including police, soldiers, even many generals, expressed sympathy for the movement. The first soldiers sent to stop the demonstrators were disarmed with gifts and goodwill, just as the Filipinos had done in Manila. The top leaders of the government, in an important concession, met in a televised session with the students. The movement spread, beyond control it seemed, to other cities. Finally, however, a confused and divided government replaced the troops in the capital with soldiers from North China who could be counted on to follow orders and use brute force. Thus, on June 4 the massacre of Tienanmen Square occurred, setting back for years the democracy movement in China.

This great tragedy was not necessarily the end of people power in China, however, any more than the Amritsar massacre of unarmed Indians by the British was the end of the Indian revolution nor the assassination of Benigno Aquino was the end of the people power movement in the Philippines. Both of those tragedies in fact, proved to be beginnings rather than endings. Martin Luther King reminded us that "unearned suffering is redemptive." This can be true for a people as well as for an individual, though years, even decades may be required to rekindle such a movement.

China has also brutally sought to destroy the democratic rights of the people of Tibet. The Tibetans' exiled leader and 1989 Nobel Prize laureate, the Dalai Lama, bravely persists in calling his people not to flag in their nonviolent efforts to gain their freedom. He believes that these efforts will resonate with China's democracy movement which was so brutally setback at Tienanmen Square. The Dalai Lama maintains that following the course of nonviolent resistance will in time bring political concessions from China that seem unimaginable at present.

BURMA

Events remarkably parallel to China's occurred in Burma 1988. In Rangoon, the capital, a students' nonviolent movement was launched in the summer of 1988 against the harshly repressive military rulers. Students began mass marches that increased week by week as professionals, middle-class, and working people joined in.

During this tumultuous period Aung San Suu Kyi quickly rose to prominence. The daughter of Aung San, the father of modern Burma, she married an Oxford professor and moved to England. She had returned to Rangoon from abroad because of her mother's illness. Suu Kyi was drawn into the democracy movement and fearlessly spoke at mass rallies, once walking through a contingent of soldiers ready to fire on her.

Finally, as would occur in China a year later, the threatened leaders ordered a bloody crackdown. Thousands of unarmed demonstrators were killed, with thousands more fleeing into the jungle. Nonetheless in the May 1990 national elections, the people voted overwhelmingly for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, even though she and the other NLD leaders had been placed under house arrest months earlier. The government refused to recognize the results of the election and continued to govern, keeping Suu Kyi under house arrest five years. Meanwhile she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. In one of her essays, she wrote, "The wellspring of courage and endurance in the face of unbridled power is generally a firm belief in the sanctity of ethical principles, combined with a historical sense that despite all setbacks the condition of man

is set on an ultimate course for both spiritual and material advancement." Her quiet determination and courage continues as a tower of strength to the Burmese in their quest for freedom.

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

"Engaged Buddhism" as articulated by the Vietnamese monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, the Cambodian monk Maha Gosananda, and the Thai activist/intellectual Sulak Sivaraksa, has contributed to nonviolent struggles in many places in Asia. Thailand has evidenced ongoing nonviolent efforts against its military, including a successful student-led movement in 1973 that brought down the dictatorship. Recurring pro-democracy movements in the 1980s and 1990s have continued this long-term struggle. In the 1990s yearly Buddhist peace marches across the killing fields of a devastated Cambodia have promoted healing and their building of trust and hope among a war-weary people.

In Taiwan and South Korea pro-democracy efforts have won out over authoritarian regimes. The twentieth century ends with South Korea under the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, a human rights crusader who finally triumphed over those who tried repeatedly to kill him. His daunting effort to bring reconciliation between bitterly divided North and South Korea has been a hallmark of his presidency.

Pro-democracy students in Indonesia have been unrelenting in their struggle against dictatorship, corruption, and military involvement in politics. Unceasing rallies and protests - a democracy in the streets - finally brought down the authoritarian Suharto in May 1998, leading to a duly elected president in October 1999.

At the same time, however, agitation for independence by East Timor, the former Portuguese colony taken over by Indonesia in 1975 was brutally crushed by Indonesian-backed paramilitaries in 1999. In 1996 Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta received the Nobel Peace Prize for their nonviolent leadership in the East Timor freedom movement. The situation demonstrates the tragic inability of central states such as Indonesia, China, Yugoslavia and Russia to deal fairly with challenges to their authority and the weakness of the UN and the world community in fostering just and peaceful resolution of such conflicts.

ISRAEL/PALESTINE

Prior to the start of the Peace Process in the Middle East, the predominant impression of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, fed by media images, was one of rock-throwing Palestinian young men fighting the Israeli soldiers. But beginning in 1967 there were two parts of the Palestinian resistance movement, the paramilitary and the civil. The Intifada (Arabic for "to shake off") was from its inception a multidimensional movement containing many nonviolent aspects such as: + strikes by schools and businesses called to protest specific policies and actions of the occupying authorities + agricultural projects, e.g. the planting of victory gardens and trees planted on disputed lands + committees for visiting prisoners and families of those who have been killed. + boycotts of Israeli-made products + tax refusal, as in the Palestinian village of Beit Sahour where the VAT (value added tax) and income taxes were not paid + when villagers were unjustly arrested, other residents went to police stations asking to be arrested as a way of showing their solidarity + the establishment of alternative institutions to build Palestinian self-sufficiency Commenting on such developments, Labor Party leader Schlomo Avineri observed, "An army can beat an army, but an army cannot beat a people... Iron can smash iron, it cannot smash an unarmed fist." Nonetheless, the Palestinian resistance was met with brute force, from deliberately breaking the bones of demonstrators to demolishing the homes of suspects' families, from

smashing the moveable goods of tax protesters to sealing off areas for months at a time, preventing people from going to their jobs or even going to the hospital.

The just demands and nonviolent actions of the Intifada strengthened the voices of Israelis working to find a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict. And, despite grave legal risks, covert meetings between Palestinians and Israelis slowly built growing areas of understanding. In March 1989 the chairman of the Palestine National Council's political committee told a New York audience how secret friendships with Jewish leaders helped Palestinian leaders to publicly adopt a two-state solution. In the fall of 1992 Norway began hosting 14 secret meetings between Palestinians and Israelis out of which the Declaration of Principles was forged that provided the basis of the Israeli-PLO Accord signed on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. The Accord was only a beginning on the long road to peace. Palestinian land was still being seized, settlements expanded and arbitrary policies imposed upon the Palestinian people. Israelis still lived in fear of terrorist attacks. Extremists on both sides were unrelenting in their efforts to undermine the Peace Process. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the electoral defeat of his government were immense setbacks to the cause of peace. Time will tell if both sides can once again build on the foundation that showed so much promise and yet face such enormous obstacles. To those who say this is impossible, Gandhi reminds us, "Think of all the things that were thought impossible until they happened."

SOUTH AFRICA

Decades of resistance to apartheid and witness for a multiracial, democratic society slowly but surely wore away the stone of oppression in South Africa. The brutal policies of the government convinced many the apartheid would only end in a violent showdown and to that end the African National Congress had an active military wing. Nonetheless, the heart of the resistance movement was classic nonviolent resistance: education, vigils, rallies, marches, petitions, boycotts, prayers, fasts and civil disobedience. Governmental attempts to stop this resistance with massive detentions, bannings of organizations and individuals, intimidation and murder, as well as emergency rule could not, in the end, stop the movement.

In 1989, the churches responded to the draconian measures of emergency rule with a nationwide effort called "effective nonviolent action" that trained citizens for grassroots campaigns to break racial barriers in housing and transportation, defend conscientious objectors, visit prisoners across racial lines, etc. Emergency rule, rather than strengthening the government, exposed its desperation and moral bankruptcy.

An unexpected breakthrough came when President de Klerk began instituting reforms. He eventually legalized the African National Congress and released Nelson Mandela who had been in prison 29 years. The dramatic changes demonstrate a concept from the civil rights movement in the U. S., "top down/bottom up," i. e., pressure for change from the grassroots is met by reforms accepted by or initiated from the top, creating a dynamic tension that fosters change. In the midst of these developments the government still carried out brutal policies. But the force for change was not to be denied. The first open elections in South Africa's history were held in an amazing manifestation of a whole nation peacefully voting for revolutionary change, moving from a white racist regime to multiracial democratic rule under the presidency of Nelson Mandela. His passion for freedom and justice for all was expressed in a greatness of spirit that reached out to his former enemies. Though he never forswore the ANC's recourse to violence, his approach has been remarkably nonviolent and reconciling. In his inaugural address, he held before the people a unifying vision "in which all South Africans . . . will be able to walk tall,

without any fear in their hearts, sure of their inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world."

THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC

The same "top down/bottom up" process occurred in the unraveling of the Soviet bloc that followed the policies of glasnost, perestroika and democratsatsiya (openness, restructuring and democracy) instituted by President Mikhail Gorbachev. Pressure from below - relentless persistence- helped to create a climate ripe for change. This ferment was long inbuilding. On the one hand there was a small but determined band of human rights advocates such as Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner who were unrelenting in their demand for the observance of universally accepted standards of human rights. Others - religious, peace and environmental groups, artists and poets - refused in varying ways to submit to totalitarian rule.

The crushing of Czechoslovakia's 1968 experiment to create "socialism with a human face" strengthened the widely held assumption that communism was incapable of peaceful change and democratic openness, that nonviolence might "work" in India or the US but never with the communist regimes. This added fuel to the Cold War and the nuclear arms race and the belief that World War III was a virtual certainty. Not many paid attention to those aspects of the Czech experiment that contained hints of the 'people power' revolutions that were to flower in the 1980s, but they were highly significant.

The 1968 invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies had been expected to crush all resistance in a few days. It took eight months. Czechoslovakia's large and well-trained army was ordered to stay in its barracks while the populace responded in unexpectedly creative, nonviolent ways. The Czech news agency refused to report the disinformation that said Czech leaders had requested the invasion. Highway and street signs were turned around to confuse the invading forces. Students sat in the path of incoming tanks; other climbed on the tanks and talked to the crews. While they did not physically fight the invaders, the people refused to cooperate with them. Clandestine radio messages kept up the morale of the people, passing on vital information and instructions, such as the calling of one hour general strikes. The Czech leaders were able to hold on to their offices and continue some of the reforms until the resistance finally began to erode, quite possibly through the work of agents provocateurs.

Twelve years later, in August, 1980, neighboring Poland took up the fallen nonviolent banner as the Gdansk shipyard workers went on strike and, with prayers and rallies, Solidarity was born. Using strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, Solidarity gave laborers an independent voice and began a grassroots movement for change that spread rapidly across Poland.

The government responded with swift imposition of martial law in December, 1981. But instead of its destroying Solidarity, the people began the creation of an alternative society at the base, choosing to live "as if they were free." A new society was born in the shell of the old.

When, finally, in 1989, open elections were held, Solidarity won by a landslide.

The Polish elections were aided by the breathtaking changes occurring in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's reforms, beginning in 1985, opened the floodgates of pent-up longings for change that were eventually to sweep away even Gorbachev and the Soviet system. One by one totalitarian rule in the nations of Eastern Europe was overturned by people armed with truth and courage. A critical mass had been reached through the power of growing numbers of people emboldened by such things as the writings of Vaclav Havel from a Czech prison and prayer meetings and discussion groups in Leipzig, East Germany. The symbol of the vast change was the peaceful breaching of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, as the old order collapsed and

its discredited regimes were swept aside with remarkably little violence or loss of life (the main exception to this being Romania).

The widespread assumption that totalitarian regimes could not be overturned by unarmed struggle was decisively shown to be wrong. Governments ultimately derive their strength from the consent - either passive or active - of the governed. Once that consent disappears and resistance spreads, governments find their power to rule weakened and, under the right circumstances, destroyed.

What happened in Eastern Europe happened in the USSR as well. There forms speeded up the stirrings for change, as thousands of grassroots groups sprang up to deal with a whole spectrum of social, economic, political, environmental, and cultural issues. In July, 1990, 100,000 coalminers went out on a strike in Siberia that spread westward to Ukraine. Strongly disciplined, the miners policed themselves, closed down mining-town liquor stores, and gathered for massive rallies.

From the local to the national level, elections became more democratic, bringing about the election of reform candidates. In the spring of 1989, two thousand persons, including Andrei Sakharov, were elected to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in the freest election since their evolution. Popularly elected legislatures came into office throughout the USSR, breaking the monopoly of the Communist Party. The lead for these changes came from popular fronts established in republic after republic, beginning with Latvia (October 1988), Ukraine (September 1989) and in Lithuania where Sajudis won multiparty elections (February 1990). Respect for the language, history, and traditions of the various nationalities challenged the Russification that had undergirded Soviet power and control.

On March 11, 1990, the Baltic state of Lithuania became the first of the Soviet republics to proclaim outright independence. This most repressed of the republics started a 'singing revolution,' defying decades of cultural repression by reviving Lithuanian folk songs, festivals, religious practices, and traditions. The movie "Gandhi" was shown nationwide on television, enhancing the nonviolent resistance of the people. Trying to halt the dissolution of the Union, Moscow retaliated with a crippling blockade. The following January crack Red Army troops moved on the capital of Vilnius, killing fourteen unarmed demonstrators protecting the nation's TV tower. Instead of surrendering or issuing a call to arms, Lithuania called on the citizenry to "hold to principles of nonviolent insubordinate resistance and political and social noncooperation." The Lithuanians did just that, continuing their nonviolent and independent course. They protected their parliament with unarmed citizens and had nonviolence training for the volunteer militia they had established.

Then in August 1991, elements of the Communist Party, the KGB, and the Army tried to stage a coup in Moscow. Despite the arrest of Gorbachev and his family, resistance was widespread. People poured into the streets to protect the Russian parliament. Women and students called on the soldiers to join the people. Religious people knelt in the streets in prayer. People trained in nonviolence passed out writings on the methods of nonviolent struggle. Closed newspapers and radio stations quickly set up alternative media. The Mayor of Leningrad told the military there not to follow the orders of the plotters and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church threatened excommunication to those who followed the coup. Even some members of the KGB refused orders, risking death for their defiance. Eventually the coup attempt collapsed, opening the way for Lithuania and the other republics to begin an independent course.

The breakup of the Soviet empire will doubtless be followed by years of upheaval as its constituent parts find their place in a world reaching for democracy but often lacking the

experience, patience, and vision to implement the hope. The collapse of Soviet-style communism was followed by a predatory capitalism that in many places left the people with the worst of both systems. At this point in history we have learned a great deal about nonviolent resistance to evil and bringing down oppressors. We still have far to go in knowing how to take the next steps in fostering the democratic evolution of society that includes justice and peace, freedom and order. Democracy is the institutionalization of nonviolent problem-solving in society. Education, conflict resolution, the struggle for justice, organizing for special needs, voting on issues, adjudicating differences, framing laws for change and reform - these are all nonviolent in essence and help build what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "the beloved community."

Democratic nations are truest to their values when they deal with other nation states nonviolently, through diplomacy, treaties, mutual respect and fairness.

The tragic warfare and ethnic cleansing that plagued the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia brought immense suffering to the region. Nonetheless a stubborn and substantial nonviolent movement in Serbia has continued to struggle against the autocratic rule of Slobodan Milosevic. Through most of the 1990s a powerful nonviolent movement in Kosova resisted Serbia's oppression of the majority Albanian population. Tragically Kosova was ignored until armed resistance started there against ethnic cleansing; then in 1999 NATO came in with a heavy bombing campaign against the Serbs. Violent assistance to armed fighters seemed natural; nonviolent assistance to a nonviolent movement was not even attempted by nations schooled in the ways of war.

THE UNITED STATES

Nonviolent movements in the United States have a long and significant history, from the abolitionist struggle against slavery; the women's movement; the labor movement; the environmental movement; the peace movement; the movements for the rights of African-Americans, gays and lesbians, as well as other minorities and oppressed groups. Peace studies in colleges, conflict resolution in schools and communities and similar developments in many areas of life give hope for the building of a culture of peace. Nonetheless, there is still far to go when one considers the degree of violence in the national life and in the foreign and domestic policies of the United States.

CONCLUSION

At the time of the Philippine overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, a Filipino writer said that whereas the past one hundred years were dominated by Karl Marx and the armed revolutionary, the next hundred years would be shaped by Gandhi and the unarmed satyagrahi, the votary of Truth. Gandhi said that 'Truth is God' and that the Truth expressed in the unarmed struggle for justice, peace, and freedom is the greatest power in the world.

During Gandhi's lifetime, many looked on him with contempt. Churchill dismissed him as a "half-naked fakir." Communists and other advocates of violent revolution branded his nonviolence as bourgeois and reactionary. King was arrested twenty-nine times; he was despised by many who were infuriated by his witness for justice and peace. Yet most advances in the human race have faced long years of ridicule and opposition. New insights of truth are often considered heresy. Prophets are driven out, their followers persecuted. But the influence of Gandhi and King, the martyred prophets, continues to grow as nonviolent movements spread around the world.

If a global, democratic civilization is to come into being and endure, our challenge is to continue developing nonviolent alternatives to war and all forms of oppression, from individuals to groups, from nation-states to the peoples of the world. We must continue to challenge the age-

old assumptions about the necessity of violence in overcoming injustice, resisting oppression and establishing social well-being. In November, 1998, the UN General Assembly unanimously proclaimed the first decade of the twenty-first century to be a Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, a prescient recognition of the future that must be built if humanity is to endure.

What if in 1980 someone would have predicted that unarmed Filipinos would overthrow the Marcos dictatorship in a four day uprising? That military regimes across Latin America would be toppled by the relentless persistence of their unarmed opponents? That apartheid would end peacefully and that in a massive and peaceful plebiscite all races of South Africa would elect Nelson Mandela to the presidency? That the Berlin Wall would be nonviolently brought down? Such a person would probably have been thought ridiculously naive and dismissed out of hand. And yet these things happened! Why do we so resist the potential of the not yet stirring in the present moment? The sociologist Elise Boulding reminds us how deadly pessimism can be, for it can undermine our determination to work for a better tomorrow. Hope, on the other hand, infused in an apparently hopeless situation can create an unexpected potential for change. This is the faith that sings, in the face of police dogs and water cannons, "We Shall Overcome." Or as Joan of Arc muses in Shaw's *St. Joan*, "Some people see things as they are and ask 'Why?' I dream of things that never were and ask, 'Why not?'"

Richard Deats is editor of *Fellowship* magazine where this article originally appeared (July/August 1996). It was updated for the book, *Peace Is The Way* (Walter Wink, editor; Orbis Press, 2000). Deats has led workshops in Active Nonviolence in many countries, including the Philippines, South Korea, Haiti, Israel, India, Hong Kong, Kenya, Thailand and South Africa. He is the author of *Martin Luther King, Jr., Spirit-Led Prophet* and *Nationalism and Christianity in the Philippines*, as well as editor of *Ambassador of Reconciliation: A Muriel Lester Reader*.

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the just war
a briefing document

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The idea of crusade or jihad can be found in the old testament of the bible (e.g. Joshua) and developed during the standoff between Islamism and Christianity.

Jihad is still regarded as a religious duty imposed on Muslims to spread Islam, one of the means being by waging war; any who professed belief in a divine revelation—Christians and Jews in particular—were given special consideration. They could either embrace Islam or, at least, submit themselves to Islamic rule and pay a poll and land tax. If both options were rejected, jihad was declared.

Cicero (106-43 BC) believed in universal standards, his view was that there was a “society of mankind rather than of states”.^[1]

Early Christianity started from a pacifist stance. Over time, under the pressure of pragmatism, there developed the notion of the ‘just war’. The ideas went into jurisprudence, and eventually we now have the Geneva Convention and the war crimes court in The Hague.

Augustine (354-430 AD) included duties of just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples, saying that mercy should be shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no longer a threat to peace.^[2]

Augustine was also heavily committed to pursuing ‘heretics’. Again, this pattern still remains, with pressure on organisations such as polygamous Mormons, Moonies, Scientologists, and a great many more.

Aquinas developed principles of ‘the just war’, in order to reconcile the moral imperatives which the Churches have traditionally upheld; with the realities of the statesmen who must deal with external threat to their citizens. Aquinas outlined his *Just War* theory in that section of his teachings which dealt with charity. The three tests for war suggested by Aquinas are

1. Just cause;
2. Competent authority;
3. Right intention.

Just cause: David Oderberg,^[3] has said that, “A state may launch a pre-emptive strike if it has very good reason for thinking that another state is preparing for war”. Both the Israeli actions in the Six Day War of 1967 and the strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 were

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morally just by this judgment. Saddam Hussein's current drive to create weapons of mass destruction, in defiance of the international community and with proven past aggressive intent, would also justify pre-emptive action.

[toptop](#)



Competent authority: the case of action against Iraq has become confused by notions of approval from the United Nations. But the Just War tradition locates competent authority in legitimate national governments, not in supranational bodies. National governments cannot ethically abnegate their responsibility by subordinating their duty to external approval. It is wisdom to seek the maximum level of international support through institutions such as the UN, or NATO, but the key issue is to act in defence of one's citizens.

Right intention: this is satisfied by the declared aims of Western leaders regarding Iraq. The desire to impede the use of weapons of mass destruction by an unstable, mass-murdering tyrant is a just cause. The nobility of that cause would, however, be morally compromised if the tyrant's defeat were to be followed by colonisation. There is a moral burden on those who are contemplating war to ensure that all understand the removal of Saddam, and the dangers he poses, should be followed by strenuous efforts to help the Iraqi people rebuild their nation on democratic principles.[toptop](#)

Grotius (1583-1645), from a secularist standpoint, says that a war is just if three basic criteria are met. [\[4\]](#)

1. The danger faced by the nation is immediate;
2. The force used is necessary to adequately defend the nation's interests;
3. The use of force is proportionate to the threatened danger.

Given current human development, **Hobbes'** (1588-1679) view that "During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" [\[5\]](#) can be seen as reasonable. This being so, it is unsurprising that common war theory has regarded the only legitimate pursuer of war to be the state; naturally that serves the interests of the rulers of states. These earlier writers might even be regarded as earlier spin-doctors allied to the interests of those rulers.

Another historical problem was that every local warlord tended to be attempting to extend their territory and that travellers were subject to widespread harassment (Note the recent similarity with Afghanistan). Thus, at the turn of the millennium around 1000 AD, the notion of the 'peace of god' emerged from the ever-strengthening power-base of the roman church. The 'peace of god' aimed to end private warfare and to limit violence



against certain categories of people and property.

The various associated peace decrees differed in detail, but in general they forbade, under pain of excommunication, every act of private warfare or violence against ecclesiastical buildings and their environs, against certain persons, such as clerics, pilgrims, merchants, women, and peasants, and against cattle and agricultural implements. All laymen and clerics in the areas adopting the Peace of God were required to take a solemn oath to observe and enforce the peace. At the Council of Bourges (1038), the archbishop decreed that every Christian 15 years and older should take such an oath and enter the diocesan militia.

However, much recent history has also shown that the state is a very dangerous enemy to the individual, usually far more dangerous than any modern 'terrorist' organisation. Thus we have **Jefferson** (1743-1826), living in more modern revolutionary times, warning that "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure." [\[6\]toptop](#)

related material

[Further commentary on just war and its relationship with modern, evolving law](#)



End notes

1. David J. Bederman, "Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius' *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis*", *Emory International Law Review*, 1996.
2. In *Augustine: Political Writings*, Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, trans, Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, eds., 1994.
3. This example is a modified outline from <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,542-406087,00.html>
4. Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace*, Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1949.
5. In 1651.
6. 1787.[toptop](#)

A Project on Theology of War and Peace

Initiated by
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
Washington, D.C.

The 20th century with two world wars and hundreds of smaller wars was one of the deadliest period in human history. In the early years of the 21st century war continues unabated. It ranges from terrorist attacks by individuals and small groups to civil war within nations to international conflicts. Wars are initiated without provocation. A doctrine of preemptive war is proclaimed.

This situation calls upon persons of religious faith to freshly examine their beliefs and theology on matters of war and peace. Among those us called United Methodists we seldom take the time to dialogue together on our theology and to prayerfully consider where we are called by God to stand and move and have our being. Methodists United for Peace with Justice, an unofficial association of laity and clergy, would like to encourage greater depth in considering theology of war and peace through a three step approach.

Wesleyan Quadrilateral

Methodist tradition has a tool known as the Wesleyan Quadrilateral that provides a basis for studying and gaining greater understanding of Christian faith. It encompasses **Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience**. We are proposing that the Quadrilateral serve as a tool for studying the theology of war and peace during 2005. To provide background information, beginning in January 2005 our website, www.mupwj.org, will post articles on different aspects and provide references to other sources.

Study and Dialogue

We encourage the **formation of study groups** on the theology of war and peace throughout the United Methodist Church: in the United States, Africa, Asia, and Europe. This can occur in local congregations, campus organizations, seminaries, and other places. Study groups can begin with discussion of *In Search for Security*, a study guide developed by a task force of the United Methodist Council of Bishops. They can continue by using the Wesleyan Quadrilateral and material from our website as a basis for studying various aspects of theology of war and peace. To **extend the dialogue** we encourage groups to post their conclusions on the website and respond to the views of others. Individuals will be welcome to join this **web-based discussion**.

Conference

We will invite representatives of study groups and other interested persons to come together in a **conference in early 2006**. Organized along the lines of the Quadrilateral, this gathering will convene in the Wesleyan tradition of holy conferencing. It will not to be a legislative event. There will be no resolutions, no pronouncements, but rather prayerful dialogue under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

November 8, 2004

War

One apt definition of war is this: war is an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities. Thus, a fistcuffs between individual persons does not count as a war, nor does a gang fight, nor does a feud on the order of the Hatfields versus the McCoys. War is a phenomenon which occurs only between political communities, defined as those entities which either are states or intend to become states (in order to allow for civil war). Similarly, the mere threat of war and the presence of mutual disdain between these communities do not suffice as indicators of war. The conflict of arms must be actual and not merely latent. Further, the actual armed conflict must be both intentional and widespread: isolated clashes between rogue officers, or border patrols, do not count as actions of war. The onset of war requires a conscious commitment, and a significant mobilization, on the part of the belligerent communities in question.

Perhaps it would be appropriate here to cite the legendary Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz famously suggested that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." As a description, this conception is both powerful and plausible. It fits in nicely with his own general definition of war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." War, he says, is like a duel, but on "an extensive scale." As Michael Gelven has written recently, in an elegant monograph on how we ought to conceive of the essence of war, war is intrinsically vast, communal (or political) and violent. It is a widespread and deliberate armed conflict between political communities. It is the entity or phenomenon falling under such a description which is the primary focus of this entry.

- [Ethics of War and Peace](#)
- [Just War Theory](#)
- [Realism](#)
- [Pacifism](#)
- [Conclusion](#)
- [Bibliography](#)
- [Other Internet Resources](#)
- [Related Entries](#)

The Ethics of War and Peace

One of the most enduring, and difficult, philosophical questions with regard to war focuses on the ethics of getting involved with it in the first place. It is most helpful, in ordering one's thoughts about this issue, to realize that there are three traditions of thought which dominate the philosophical treatment of this topic. This is not necessarily to imply that these three traditions exhaust all possible options for thinking about the ethics of war and peace, merely to note that they are hegemonic and importantly different from each other. But very few theories on the ethics of war succeed in resisting ultimate classification into one of them. The three traditions are: JUST WAR THEORY; REALISM; and PACIFISM.

Before spending some time discussing the core aspects of each tradition, let's declare, right from the start, the core conceptual differences between "the big three" perspectives. The core, and controversial, proposition of just war theory is that, sometimes, states can have moral justification for resorting to armed force in the international system. War is sometimes, but of course not all the time, morally right. The idea here is not that the war in question is merely politically shrewd, or prudent, or bold and daring, but fully moral, just. It is an ethically appropriate use of mass political violence. Realism, by contrast, sports a profound skepticism about the application of moral concepts, such as justice, to the key problems of foreign policy. Power and national security, realists claim, motivate states during wartime and thus moral appeals are strictly wishful thinking. Talk of the morality of warfare is pure bunk: ethics has got nothing to do with the rough-and-tumble world of global politics, where only the strong and cunning survive. Pacifism does not share realism's moral skepticism. For the pacifist, moral concepts can indeed be applied fruitfully to international affairs. It does make sense to ask whether a war is just. But the result of such normative application, in the case of war, is always that war should not be resorted to. Where just war theory is sometimes permissive with regard to war, pacifism is always prohibitive. For the pacifist, war is always wrong. Now let's turn to each of these three traditions.

Just War Theory

Just war theory is probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace. The just war tradition has enjoyed a long and distinguished pedigree, including such notables as Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. Hugo Grotius probably deserves credit for being the most comprehensive and formidable member of the tradition; and James T. Johnson is the authoritative historian of this tradition. Many of the rules developed by the just war tradition have since been codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflict, such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The tradition has thus been doubly influential, dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding war. It sets the tone, and the parameters, for the great debate.

Just war theory can be meaningfully divided into three parts, which in the literature are referred to, for the sake of convenience, in Latin. These parts are: 1) *jus ad bellum*, which concerns the justice of resorting to war in the first place; 2) *jus in bello*, which concerns the justice of conduct within war, after it has begun; and 3) *jus post bellum*, which concerns the justice of peace agreements and the termination phase of war.

Jus ad bellum

The rules of *jus ad bellum* are addressed, first and foremost, to heads of state. Since political leaders are the ones who inaugurate wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held accountable to *jus ad bellum* principles. If they fail in that responsibility, then they commit war crimes. In the language of the Nuremberg prosecutors, aggressive leaders who launch unjust wars commit "crimes against peace." What constitutes a just or unjust resort to armed force is disclosed to us by the rules of *jus ad bellum*. Just war theory contends that, for any resort to war to be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfil each and every one of the following six requirements:

1. Just cause. A state may launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes most frequently mentioned include: self-defence from external attack; the protection of innocents; and punishment for wrongdoing. Vitoria suggested that all of the proffered just causes be subsumed under the one category of "a wrong received." Walzer, and most modern just war theorists, speak

of the one just cause for resorting to war being the resistance of aggression. Aggression, simply put, is unjustified and harmful violence.

The key principle underlying just cause, and just war theory more broadly, is the vindication of fundamental rights and the protection of those who have such rights from serious, standard threats to them, such as aggression. Self-defence, and other-defence, from rights violating aggression are thus prime just causes for resorting to war. These rights are traditionally understood as the rights of states to political sovereignty and territorial integrity: states have the right to make their own political decisions for their own people, within their own borders. Only if these rights are violated - for instance, through an armed invasion across the border - is a country justified in resorting to a war of self-defence in response. Other countries may join the war on the victim's side, since the aggressor forfeits its state rights when it violates the victim's.

But what grounds the importance of these state rights? States have state rights, to things like sovereignty and integrity, only because their individual citizens have human rights. People create, and adhere to, state structures in order to secure the objects of their human rights. Human rights are elemental entitlements we all have to basic human dignity and to the objects of vital human need. The human rights most broadly endorsed are those to life, liberty and subsistence, for instance as enshrined in the United Nation's Universal Declaration and subsequent International Covenants.

Following John Rawls, we might establish criteria of minimal justice (MJ) which a state must fulfil if it is to be entitled to state rights: MJ 1) it is able to rule its people in accord with law and order; MJ 2) it provides its people with secure access to the objects of their human rights; and MJ 3) it adheres to basic norms of international justice, notably respect for the rights of persons and other minimally just states. Thus, a state which commits aggression against the people of another country violates principle MJ 3, and thus fails to be minimally just. A minimally just state forfeits its right not to be dealt with harshly, as a matter of appropriate punishment and rectification.

2. Right intention. A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of a just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for resorting to war secured and consolidated. If another intentions crowd in, moral corruption sets in.

3. Proper authority and public declaration. A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s).

4. Last Resort. A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation. One wants to make sure something as momentous and serious as war is declared only when it seems the only reasonable alternative to effectively punish aggression.

5. Probability of Success. A state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile.

6. (Macro-) Proportionality. A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or "worth", the costs may the war action proceed.

Just war theory insists all six criteria must each be fulfilled for a particular declaration of war to be justified: it's all or no justification, so to speak. It is important to note that the first three of

these six rules are what we might call deontological requirements, otherwise known as duty-based requirements or first-principle requirements. For a war to be just, some core duty must be violated: in this case, the duty not to commit aggression. A war in punishment of this violated duty must itself respect further duties: it must be appropriately motivated, and must be publicly declared by (only) the proper authority for doing so. The next three requirements are consequentialist: given that these first principle requirements have been met, we must also consider the expected consequences of launching a war which seems justified according to first principles. Thus, just war theory attempts to provide a common sensical combination of both deontology and consequentialism as applied to the issue of war.

Jus in bello

Jus in bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to *jus in bello* norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state. They are to be held responsible for any breach of the principles which follow below. Such accountability may involve being put on trial for war crimes.

Just war theorists insist that *jus in bello* is a category separate from *jus ad bellum*. For even if a state has resorted to war justly, it may be prosecuting that war in an unjustified manner. It may be deploying decrepit means in pursuit of its otherwise justified end. Just war theory insists on a fundamental moral consistency between means and ends with regard to wartime behaviour: justified ends may only be pursued through justified means.

Concern with consistency, however, is not the only, or even the main, reason behind the endorsement of separate rules regulating wartime conduct. Such rules are also required to limit warfare, to prevent it from spilling over into an ever-escalating, and increasingly destructive, experiment in total warfare. If just wars are limited wars, designed to secure their just causes with only proportionate force, the need for rules on wartime restraint is clear. Even though modern warfare has displayed a disturbing tendency towards totality - particularly during the two World Wars - it does not follow that the death of old-time military chivalry marks the end of moral judgment. We still hold soldiers to certain standards of conduct.

There are three widely recognized rules of *jus in bello*.

1. Discrimination. Soldiers are only entitled to target those who are, in Walzer's words, "engaged in harm." Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminate between the civilian population, which is morally immune from direct and intentional attack, and those legitimate military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm. While some collateral civilian casualties are excusable, it is wrong to take deliberate aim at civilian targets. An example would be saturation bombing of residential areas.
2. (Micro-) Proportionality. Soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek. Weapons of mass destruction, for example, are usually seen as being out of proportion to legitimate military ends.
3. No Means *Mala in Se*. Soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are "evil in themselves." These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; torturing captured enemy soldiers; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like chemical or biological agents.

Jus post bellum

Jus post bellum refers to justice during the third and final stage of war: that of war termination. It seeks to regulate the ending of wars, and ease the transition from war back to peace. It is one of

the most recent, and topical, issues in just war theory. See Orend's works in the bibliography below for more. Orend proposes the following rules for *jus post bellum*:

1. Just cause for termination. A state has just cause to seek termination of the just war in question if there has been a reasonable vindication of those rights whose violation grounded the resort to war in the first place. Not only have most, if not all, unjust gains from aggression been eliminated and the objects of the victim's rights been reasonably restored, but the aggressor is now willing to accept terms of surrender which include not only the cessation of hostilities, a formal apology and its renouncing the gains of its aggression but also its submission to reasonable principles of punishment, including compensation, war crimes trials, and perhaps rehabilitation.

2. Right intention. A state must intend to carry out the process of war termination only in terms of those principles contained in the other *jus post bellum* rules. Revenge is strictly ruled out as an animating force. Moreover, the just state in question must commit itself to symmetry and equal application with regard to the investigation and prosecution of any war crimes its own armed forces may have committed on the battlefield.

3. Public declaration and legitimate authority. The terms of the peace must be publicly proclaimed by a legitimate authority, which is to say the national government of the state victimized by the initial aggression, or perhaps an authorized international body.

4. Discrimination. In setting the terms of the peace, the just and victorious state is to differentiate between the political and military leaders, the soldiers and the civilian population within the aggressor. Undue and unfair hardship is not to be brought upon the civilian population in particular: punitive measures are to be focused upon those elites most responsible for the aggression.

5. Proportionality. Any terms of peace must be proportional to the end of reasonable rights vindication. Absolutist crusades against, and/or draconian punishments for, aggression are especially to be avoided. The people of the defeated aggressor never forfeit their human rights, and so are entitled not to be "blotted out" from the community of nations. There is thus no such thing as a morally-mandated unconditional surrender.

Any serious defection from these principles of *jus post bellum*, on the part either of the victim or the aggressor, is a violation of the rules of just war and so should be punished. At the very least, such violation of *jus post bellum* mandates a new round of good-faith diplomatic negotiations - perhaps even binding international arbitration - between the relevant parties to the dispute. At the very most, such violation gives the aggrieved party a just cause - but no more than a just cause - for resuming hostilities. Full recourse to the resumption of hostilities may be made only if all the other criteria of *jus ad bellum* are satisfied in addition to just cause.

Just war theory thus offers rules to guide decision-makers on the appropriateness of their conduct during the resort to war, conduct during war and the termination phase of the conflict. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begun only for a very narrow set of truly defensible reasons, that when wars break out they are fought in a responsibly controlled and targeted manner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an end in a speedy and responsible fashion that respects the requirements of justice.

Realism

Realism is most influential amongst political scientists, as well as scholars and practitioners of international relations. While realism is a complex and often sophisticated doctrine, its core propositions express a strong suspicion about applying moral concepts, like justice, to the conduct of international affairs. Realists believe that moral concepts should be employed neither

as descriptions of, nor as prescriptions for, state behaviour on the international plane. Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximize its expected self-interest and, above all, their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to power enjoys primacy.

Referring specifically to war, realists believe that it is an intractable part of an anarchical world system; that it ought to be resorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest; and that, once war has begun, a state ought to do whatever it can to win. In other words, "all's fair in love and war." During the grim circumstances of war, "anything goes." So if adhering to the rules of just war theory, or international law, hinders a state during wartime, it should disregard them and stick steadfastly to its fundamental interests in power and security. Prominent classical realists often mentioned include Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Modern realists include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger, as well as so-called neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz.

It is important to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive realism. Descriptive realism is the claim that states, as a matter of fact, either do not (for reasons of motivation) or cannot (for reasons of competitive struggle) behave morally, and thus moral discourse surrounding interstate conflict is empty, the product of a category mistake. States are simply not animated in terms of morality and justice: it's all about power, security and national interest for them. States are not like "big persons": they are creations of an utterly different kind, and we cannot expect them to live by the same rules and principles we require of individual persons. States inhabit a violent international arena, and they've got to be able to get in that game and win, if they are to serve and protect their citizens in an effective way over time. Morality is simply not on the radar screen for creations such as states, given their defensive function and the brutal environment in which they subsist.

Walzer offers arguments against this kind of realism, contending that states are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they fail to live up to them. States, because they are the creation of individual persons, want to act morally and justly. Walzer goes so far as to say that any state which was motivated by nothing more than the struggle to survive and win power could not over time sustain the support from its own population, which demands a deeper sense of community and justice. He also argues that all the pretence regarding "the necessity" of state conduct in terms of pursuing power is exaggerated and rhetorical, ignoring the clear reality of foreign policy choice enjoyed by states in the global arena. States are not frequently forced into some kind of dramatic, do-or-die struggle: the choice to go to war is a deliberate one, freely entered into and often hotly debated and agonized over before the decision is made. And this is leaving unspoken the argument regarding the defiant, Machiavellian amorality behind certain kinds of realism, and the moral calibre of the actions it might recommend on this basis. For example, if it's all about power and winning in the competitive struggle, does that make it alright to unleash weapons of mass destruction? Or to launch a mass rape campaign? Just war theory suggests not, and just war theorists like Walzer want to claim that the rest of us agree.

Prescriptive realism, though, need not be rooted in any form of descriptive realism. Prescriptive realism is the claim that a state ought (prudential "ought") to behave amorally in the international arena. A state should, for prudence's sake, adhere to an amoral policy of smart self-regard in international affairs. A smart state will leave its morality at home when considering what to do on the international stage. It's important to note that a prescriptive realist might, in the end, actually endorse rules for the regulation of warfare, much like those offered by just war theory. These rules include: "Wars should only be fought in response to aggression"; and "During war, non-combatants should not be directly targeted with lethal violence." Of course, the reason why a prescriptive realist might endorse such rules would be very different from the reasons offered

by the just war theorist: the latter would talk about abiding moral values whereas the former would refer to useful rules which help establish expectations of behaviour, solve coordination problems and to which prudent bargainers would consent. Just war rules, the prescriptive realist might claim, do not have independent moral purchase on the attention of states. These rules are what Douglas Lackey calls "salient equilibria", stable conventions limiting war's destructiveness which all prudent states can agree on, assuming general compliance. There might even be some room for overlap between this kind of realism and just war theory.

Pacifism

It seems best to rely on Jenny Teichman's definition of pacifism as "anti-war-ism." Literally and straightforwardly, a pacifist rejects war in favour of peace. It is not violence in all its forms that the most challenging kind of pacifist objects to; rather, it is the specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which the pacifist objects to. A pacifist objects to killing (not just violence) in general and, in particular, she objects to the mass killing, for political reasons, which is part and parcel of the wartime experience. So, a pacifist rejects war; she believes that there are no moral grounds which can justify resorting to war. War, for the pacifist, is always wrong. Mention should straight away be made of a very popular just war criticism of pacifism which will not be used here. This criticism is that pacifism amounts to an indefensible "clean hands policy." The pacifist, it is said, refuses to take the brutal measures necessary for the defense of himself and his country, for the sake of maintaining his own inner moral purity. It is contended that the pacifist is thus a kind of free-rider, gathering all the benefits of citizenship while not sharing all its burdens. Another inference drawn is that the pacifist himself constitutes a kind of internal threat to the over-all security of his state.

This "clean hands" argument is easily, and frequently, over-stated. It is important to note that, to the extent to which any moral stance will commend a certain set of actions or intentions deemed morally worthy, and condemn others as being reprehensible, the "clean hands" criticism can be so malleable as to apply to nearly any substantive doctrine. Every moral and political theory stipulates that one ought to do what it deems good or just and to avoid what it deems bad or unjust. So this popular just war criticism of pacifism is not strong. The very idea of a selfish pacifist simply does not ring true: many pacifists have, historically, paid a very high price for their pacifism during wartime (through severe ostracism and even jail time) and their pacifism seems less rooted in regard for inner moral purity than it is in regard for constructing a less violent and more humane world order. So, this argument against pacifism fails; but what of others?

Walzer, the just war theorist, contends that pacifism's idealism is excessively optimistic. In other words, pacifism lacks realism. More precisely, the nonviolent world imagined by the pacifist is not actually attainable, at least for the foreseeable future. Since "ought implies can", the set of "oughts" we are committed to must express a moral outlook on war less utopian in nature. While we are committed to morality in wartime, we are forced to concede that, sometimes in the real world, resorting to war can be morally justified.

Another objection to pacifism is that, by failing to resist international aggression with effective means, it ends up rewarding aggression and failing to protect people who need it. Pacifists reply to this argument by contending that we do not need to resort to war in order to protect people and punish aggression effectively. In the event of an armed invasion by an aggressor state, an organized and committed campaign of non-violent civil disobedience - perhaps combined with international diplomatic and economic sanctions - would be just as effective as war in expelling the aggressor, with much less destruction of lives and property. After all, the pacifist might say,

no invader could possibly maintain its grip on the conquered nation in light of such systematic isolation, non-cooperation and non-violent resistance. How could it work the factories, harvest the fields, or run the stores, when everyone would be striking? How could it maintain the will to keep the country in the face of crippling economic sanctions and diplomatic censure from the international community? And so on.

Though one cannot exactly disprove this pacifist proposition - since it is a counter-factual thesis - there are powerful reasons to agree with John Rawls that such is "an unworldly view" to hold. For, as Walzer points out, the effectiveness of this campaign of civil disobedience relies on the scruples of the invading aggressor. But what if the aggressor is brutal, ruthless? What if, faced with civil disobedience, the invader "cleanses" the area of the native population, and then imports its own people from back home? What if, faced with economic sanctions and diplomatic censure from a neighbouring country, the invader decides to invade it, too? We have some indication from history, particularly that of Nazi Germany, that such pitiless tactics are effective at breaking the will of people to resist. The defence of our lives and rights may well, against such invaders, require the use of political violence. Under such conditions, Walzer says, adherence to pacifism would amount to "a disguised form of surrender."

Pacifists respond to this accusation of "unworldliness" by citing what they believe are real world examples of effective non-violent resistance to aggression. Examples mentioned include Mahatma Ghandi's campaign to drive the British Imperial regime out of India in the late 1940s and Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights crusade in the 1960s on behalf of African-Americans. Walzer replies curtly that there is no evidence that non-violent resistance has ever, of itself, succeeded. This may be rash on his part, though it is clear that Britain's own exhaustion after WWII, for example, had much to do with the evaporation of its Empire. Walzer's main counter-argument against these pacifist counter-examples is that they only underline his main point: that effective non-violent resistance depends upon the scruples of those it is aimed against. It was only because the British and the Americans had some scruples, and were moved by the determined idealism of the non-violent protesters, that they acquiesced to their demands. But aggressors will not always be so moved. A tyrant like Hitler, for example, might interpret non-violent resistance as weakness, deserving contemptuous crushing. "Non-violent defense", Walzer suggests, "is no defense at all against tyrants or conquerors ready to adopt such measures."

As sensible as Walzer's remarks might seem, they remain quite narrow, by no means constituting an all-things-considered refutation of pacifism. Generally, there are two kinds of modern secular pacifism to consider: 1) a more consequentialist form of pacifism (or CP), which maintains that the benefits accruing from war can never outweigh the costs of fighting it; and 2) a more deontological form of pacifism (or DP), which contends that the very activity of war is intrinsically wrong, since it violates foremost duties of justice, such as not killing human beings. Most common amongst contemporary secular pacifists, such as Robert Holmes, is a doctrine which attempts to combine both CP and DP. (I might add, parenthetically, that no discussion will be made here as to religious forms of pacifism. While they have been very influential historically, especially their Christian variants, as theoretical propositions I believe they rest on core premises which are too contentious and exclusionary. But the Christian pacifist literature is a very rich source of information for those interested.)

What arguments might a just war theorist employ to overcome CP and DP? A just war theorist might, for starters, focus on the relationship in CP between consequentialism and the denial of killing. Pacifism in either form places overriding value on respecting human life, notably through its injunction against killing. But this value seems to rest uneasily with consequentialism, for there is nothing inherent to consequentialism which bans killing as such. There is no absolute rule, or side-constraint, that one ought never to kill another person, or that nations ought never to

deploy lethal armed force in war. With consequentialism, it's always a matter of considering the latest costs and benefits, of choosing the best option amongst feasible alternatives.

Consequentialism therefore leaves conceptual space open to the claim that under these conditions, at this time and place, and given these alternatives, killing and/or war appears permissible. After all, what if killing x people (say, soldiers in an aggressive army) appears the best option if we are to save the lives of $x + n$ people (say, fellow citizens who would perish under the brutal heel of an unchecked aggressor)? It is at least conceivable that a quick and decisive resort to war could prevent even greater killing and devastation in the future. So it seems problematic for the consequentialist pacifist, whose principles exhibit a profound abhorrence for killing people, to be willing in such a scenario to allow an even greater number of people to be killed by acquiescing to the violence of others less scrupulous. These are two telling points: CP does not, of itself, ground the categorical rejection of killing and war which is the essence of pacifism; and CP is open to counter-examples which question whether consequentialism would reject killing and war at all under certain conditions. Consequentialism might even, in a particular case, go so far as to recommend war under certain conditions. Casting doubt on DP is a complicated procedure. Only a sketch of plausible just war theory arguments can here be offered. The first question to ask is: which foremost duty does DP understand being violated by warfare? If the DP response is the duty not to kill another human being, then contention can be made that this is by no means uncontroversial. Consider the most obvious counter-example: aggressor A attacks B for no defensible reason, posing a serious threat to B's life. Some would suggest, in good faith, that B is not duty-bound not to kill A if such seems necessary to stop A's aggression. Indeed, they would argue that B may kill A in legitimate self-defence. The DP pacifist, however, might reply that extending B moral permission to kill A, even in self-defence, violates the human rights of A. He might contend that just war theory merely compounds the wrongness of the situation by paradoxically permitting lethal force to stop lethal force.

One just war theory rejoinder to this DP contention is this: B does no wrong whatsoever - violates no human rights - by responding to A's aggression with lethal force if required. Why does B do nothing wrong? First, it is A who is responsible for forcing B to choose between her own life and rights and those of A. We can hardly blame B for choosing her own. For if she does not choose her own, she loses an enormous amount, perhaps everything. And it is patently unreasonable to expect creatures like us to suffer catastrophic loss by default. Consider also the issue of fairness: if B is not allowed to use lethal force, if necessary, against A in the event of A's aggression, then B loses everything while A loses nothing. Indeed, A gains whatever object he desired in violating or killing B. Such would seem an unfair reward of awful behaviour. Finally, B's having rights at all provides her with an implicit entitlement to use those means necessary to secure her rights, including the use of force in the face of a serious physical threat. These powerful considerations of responsibility, reasonableness, fairness and implicit entitlement come together in support of the just war claims that: B may respond with needed lethal force to A's initial aggression; B does no wrong in doing so; it would be wrong to prohibit B's doing so; and that A bears all of the blame for the situation.

DP pacifists are not, at this point, out of options. Holmes, for example, suggests that the foremost duty of justice violated by war is not the duty not to kill aggressors, but rather the duty not to kill innocent, non-aggressive human beings. To be innocent here means to have done nothing which would justify being harmed or killed; in particular, it means not constituting a serious threat to the lives and rights of other people. It is this sense of innocence that just war theory invokes when it claims that civilians should not be directly attacked during wartime. Even if civilians support the war effort politically, or even in terms of their personal attitudes towards the war,

they clearly do not pose serious threats to others. Only armed forces, and the political-industrial-technological complexes which guide them, constitute serious threats against which threatened communities may respond in kind. Civilian populations, just war theory surmises, are morally off-limits as targets. Holmes contends that this just war rule of non-combatant immunity can never be satisfied. For all possible wars in this world - given the nature of military technology and tactics, the heat of battle, and the limits of human knowledge and self-discipline - involve the killing of innocents, thus defined. We know this to be true from history and have no good reason for expecting otherwise in the future. But the killing of innocents, Holmes says, is always unjust. So no war can ever be fought justly, regardless of the nature of the goal sought after, such as national defence from an aggressor's attack. The very activities needed to fight wars are intrinsically corrupt, and cannot be redeemed by the putative justice of the ends they are aimed at. How is a just war theorist to respond to this DP challenge?

Some respond by casting doubt on the concept of innocence in wartime. But a just war theorist subscribing to the rule of non-combatant immunity will neither want, nor logically be at liberty, to argue in this fashion. It is hard to see, for example, how infants could be anything other than innocent during a war, and as such entitled not to be made the object of direct and intentional attack. It is only those who, in Walzer's phrase, are "involved in harming us" - i.e. those who pose serious threats to our lives and rights - that we can justly target in a direct and intentional fashion during wartime.

The more appropriate just war response invokes, alongside Walzer, the doctrine of double effect (or DDE). The DDE, invented by Aquinas, is a complex idea. In spite of its apparent technicality, though, the DDE is closely related to our ordinary ways of thinking about moral life. The DDE assumes the following scenario: agent X is considering performing an action T, which X foresees will produce both good/moral/just effects J and bad/immoral/unjust effects U. The DDE permits X to perform T only if: 1) T is otherwise permissible; 2) X only intends J and not U; 3) U is not a means to J; and 4) the goodness of J is worth, or is proportionately greater than, the badness of U. Assume now that X is a country and T is war. The government of X, contemplating war in response to an attack by aggressor country Y, foresees that, should it embark on war to defend itself, civilian casualties will result, probably in both X and Y. The DDE stipulates that X may launch into this defensive (and thus otherwise permissible) war only if: 1) X does not intend the resulting civilian casualties but rather aims only at defending itself and its people; 2) such casualties are not themselves the means whereby X's end is achieved; and 3) the importance of X's defending itself and its people from Y's aggression is proportionately greater than the badness of the resulting civilian casualties. The DDE, in making these claims, refers to common shared principles regarding the moral importance of intent, of appealing to better expected consequences, and insisting that bad not be done so that good may follow from it. Just war theorists claim that civilians are not entitled to absolute immunity from attack during wartime. Civilians are owed neither more nor less than what Walzer calls "due care" from the belligerent governments that they not be made casualties of the war action in question. "Due care" involves fighting only in certain ways, applying limited force to specific targets. But does this just war claim simply beg the question against the latest DP principle? DPs insist on absolute immunity for civilians, which in our world would result in banning warfare, whereas just war theorists, acknowledging the threat, seem to dodge it by re-defining the immunity to which civilians are entitled, demoting it to mere "due care." Despite appearances, it is not question-begging but principled disagreement which roots the difference. Just war theorists will argue that civilians cannot be entitled to absolute immunity because that would outlaw all warfare. But outlawing all warfare would ignore both the responsibility for interstate aggression and the implicit entitlement of a state to use necessary means (including armed force) to secure the lives

and rights of its citizens from serious and standard threats to them. In the real world, it is neither reasonable nor fair to require a political community not to avail itself of the most effective means available for resisting an aggressive invasion which threatens the lives and rights of its citizens. It is simply not reasonable to require a state to stand down while the aggression of another state wreaks havoc - murder and mayhem - upon its people.

This is not a complete defeat for DP, merely a suggestion of how such defeat might be sought. In my view, DP constitutes the most formidable moral challenge to just war theory (whereas prescriptive realism constitutes the most formidable prudential challenge to just war theory). Suffice it for our purposes to say that the DDE is the just war principle most frequently employed to defeat the DP pacifist's assertion that it is always wrong to kill innocent human beings. Just war theorists prefer to substitute, for this DP claim, the following proposition: what is always wrong, both in peace and war, is to kill innocent human beings intentionally and deliberately. Unintended, collateral civilian casualties can be excused during the prosecution of an otherwise just war, wherein the end is the repulsion of aggression and the means are aimed at legitimate military targets.

Conclusion

This entry provides a sample of the rich and controversial argumentation surrounding philosophical discourse on war. This discourse is dominated by three major traditions of thought: just war theory; realism; and pacifism. The interaction between these three traditions structures the contemporary discussion of wartime issues, at the same time as it fuels fascinating debate about them. While just war theory occupies an especially large and influential space within the discourse, its realist and pacifist alternatives endure as provocative challenges to the philosophical mainstream which it represents.

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All the works cited in this entry, plus relevant other works, are listed below. It may be helpful to first locate and emphasize some of the major and most influential sources.

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The three best contemporary, secular works defending pacifism are: R. Holmes, *On War and Morality*; J. Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*; and R. Norman, *Ethics, Killing and War*. Two renowned critical essays on pacifism, both reprinted in R. Wasserstrom, ed. *War and Morality*

are G.E.M. Anscombe's "War and Murder" and Jan Narveson's "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis".

One prominent writer on the philosophy of war who resists easy classification into any of these categories is Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz wrote *On War*, one of the most influential general sources, cited by soldiers and statesmen as often as by philosophers or international lawyers. M. Gelven's *War and Existence* is an interesting contemporary piece on the meaning and experience of war, with a Clausewitzian flavor to it.

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Other Internet Resources

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Preliminary outline of web pages on "Theology of War and Peace"

Put on www.mupwj.org.

I. *At top of home page* of www.mupwj.org, to the right of "Issues" add:

Theology of War and Peace

Note: This title can be changed, depending on how we want to identify the project.

II. Under this listing, have the following *drop-down box*:

Wesleyan Quadrilateral

- Scripture
- Tradition
- Reason
- Experience

Interactive Dialogue

- In Search of Security
- On Scripture and Theology
- On Peaceful Alternatives to War

National Conference

Each listing will be linked with a separate page.

III. The *project "home" page*, modeled after <http://www.mupwj.org/methodistfamily.htm>

Theology of War and Peace Each item marked with * will be linked to separate page.

Short introductory paragraph to describe project.

Wesleyan Quadrilateral

One or two sentences to define

* Scripture: Biblical Perspectives

One sentence. Read more..... with linkage.

* Tradition: History

One sentence. Read more.... with linkage

* Reason: Theological Perspectives

One sentence. Read more.... with linkage

* Experience: Peaceful Alternatives to War. Read more.... with linkage

Interactive Dialogue

* In Search of Security

One sentence about bishops' study guide. Read more.... with linkage

* On Biblical and Theological Perspectives.

One sentence inviting comments. Read more.... with linkage

* On Peaceful Alternatives to War. Read more.... with linkage

National Conference

One sentence. Read more.... with linkage

IV. *Section pages for Quadrilateral* with sub-pages for each sub-element.

This will be resource material consisting of (a) fairly concise essays (which can also be provided as PDF documents) and (b) linkage to other websites, especially those with bibliographies.

Wesleyan Quadrilateral

Introduction to explain Quadrilateral,

See <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html> for a model of the introduction with the subsections outlined in left column.

Scripture: Biblical Perspective To be written by a biblical scholar

Old Testament

Gospels

Epistles

Tradition: History To be written by a seminarian

Early Christianity (pacifism)

Roman Catholic (just war)

Crusades (holy war)

Orthodox

Protestant

Peace Churches

Methodist, United Brethren

Include historic statements

Evangelical (contemporary)

Reason: Theological Perspectives Could be different author for each perspective.

Pacifism

Just War

Evangelical (contemporary)

Liberation

Feminist

Shalom (see *In Defense of Creation*, pp. 24-27)

Just Peace (see *In Defense of Creation*, pp. 36-37; linkage to related statements)

Experience: Peaceful Alternatives to War

Non-violent resistance to tyranny

Non-violent liberation movements

International law and organizations

Justice as foundation for peace

V. *Section pages for Interactive Dialogue* with sub-pages for each element
This will be where groups and individuals can post their comments.

Interactive Dialogue

Invitation for comments. How to do so. Linkage to three sub-sections

In Search of Security

Linkage to study guide

Posting comments received from local study groups

On Biblical and Theological Perspectives

Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

On Peaceful Alternatives to War

Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

VI. *Section page for National Conference*

National Conference

Initially this will be an indication of intent. As plans are developed, they will be posted here. Eventually registration form will be posted. At that time there will be a special button on home page of www.mupwj.org for the conference with its dates.

VII. The entire outline will be placed on *Site Index*.

Drafted by Howard W. Hallman
October 22, 2004

Website Outline for

Theology of War and Peace

I. Wesleyan Quadrilateral

Introduction to explain Quadrilateral

A. Scripture: Biblical Perspective

1. Old Testament
2. Gospels
3. Epistles
4. Revelation

B. Tradition: History

1. Early Christianity (pacifism)
2. Roman Catholic (just war)
3. Crusades (holy war)
4. Orthodox
5. Protestant
6. Peace Churches
7. Methodist, United Brethren

Include historic statements

8. Evangelical (contemporary)

C. Reason: Theological Perspectives

1. Pacifism
2. Just War
3. Armageddon
4. Liberation Theology
5. Feminist Theology
6. Peace with Justice

D. Experience: Peaceful Alternatives to War

1. Creative nonviolence
2. Justice as foundation for peace
3. International law and organizations

II. Interactive Dialogue

Invitation for comments. How to do so.

A. In Search of Security (UM Council of Bishops study guide)

1. Linkage to study guide
2. Posting comments received from local study groups

B. On Biblical and Theological Perspectives

1. Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

C. On Peaceful Alternatives to War

1. Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

III. National Conference

1. Initially an indication of intent.
2. Post more detailed plans as they are developed.
3. Later post registration form.

Drafted by Howard W. Hallman

November 4, 2004

Website Outline for

Theology of War and Peace

I. Wesleyan Quadrilateral

Introduction to explain Quadrilateral

A. Scripture: Biblical Perspective

1. Old Testament
2. Gospels
3. Epistles
4. Revelation

B. Tradition: History

1. Early Christianity (pacifism)
2. Roman Catholic (just war)
3. Crusades (holy war)
4. Orthodox
5. Protestant
6. Peace Churches
7. Methodist, United Brethren

Include historic statements

8. Evangelical (contemporary)

C. Reason: Theological Perspectives

1. Pacifism
2. Just War
3. Evangelical (contemporary)
4. Liberation
5. Feminist
6. Shalom (see In Defense of Creation, pp. 24-27)
7. Just Peace (see In Defense of Creation, pp. 36-37; linkage to related statements)

D. Experience: Peaceful Alternatives to War

1. Non-violent resistance to tyranny
2. Non-violent liberation movements
3. International law and organizations
4. Justice as foundation for peace

II. Interactive Dialogue

Invitation for comments. How to do so.

A. In Search of Security (UM Council of Bishops study guide)

1. Linkage to study guide
2. Posting comments received from local study groups

B. On Biblical and Theological Perspectives

1. Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

C. On Peaceful Alternatives to War

1. Posting of views and comments received from local study groups and others.

III. National Conference

1. Initially an indication of intent.
2. Post more detailed plans as they are developed.
3. Later post registration form.

Drafted by Howard W. Hallman

October 25, 2004


<http://www.umc.org/interior.asp?mid=258&GID=312&GMOD=VWD&GCAT=W>

Wesleyan Quadrilateral, the

The phrase which has relatively recently come into use to describe the principal factors that John Wesley believed illuminate the core of the Christian faith for the believer. Wesley did not formulate the succinct statement now commonly referred to as the Wesley Quadrilateral. Building on the Anglican theological tradition, Wesley added a fourth emphasis, experience. The resulting four components or "sides" of the quadrilateral are (1) Scripture, (2) tradition, (3) reason, and (4) experience. For United Methodists, Scripture is considered the primary source and standard for Christian doctrine. Tradition is experience and the witness of development and growth of the faith through the past centuries and in many nations and cultures. Experience is the individual's understanding and appropriating of the faith in the light of his or her own life. Through reason the individual Christian brings to bear on the Christian faith discerning and cogent thought. These four elements taken together bring the individual Christian to a mature and fulfilling understanding of the Christian faith and the required response of worship and service.

Source: A Dictionary for United Methodists, Alan K. Waltz, Copyright 1991, Abingdon Press. Used by Permission.

http://www.futurenet.org/article.asp?id=485
Yes magazine
Winter 2002 Issue: Can Love Save the World?



Can Love Save the World
by Walter Wink

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"I don't see myself as a pacifist. I see myself rather as a violent person trying to become nonviolent"

Michael Kelly thinks he has killed pacifism. In an editorial in the *Washington Post* of September 26, 2001, he cites George Orwell's 1944 description of pacifism as "objectively pro-Fascist." "If you hamper the war effort on one side you automatically help out that of the other," Orwell reasoned. Applied to "America's New War," Kelly finds the logic irrefutable. "Organized terrorist groups have attacked America. These groups wish the Americans to not fight. The American pacifists wish the Americans to not fight. If the Americans do not fight, the terrorists will attack America again. And now we know such attacks can kill many thousands of Americans. The American pacifists, therefore, are on the side of future mass murders of Americans. They are objectively pro-terrorist." Hence the pacifist position is "evil." Would that life were so logical! For what Mr. Kelly overlooks is a third way, neither passive nor aggressive. For millions of years his error has been endlessly repeated. It is the fight/flight response. But that third way has occasionally been tried, and, wonder of wonders, it has frequently succeeded. Religions pioneered the third way as a nonviolent protest against those two invidious alternatives. Starting with the Hebrew midwives, nonviolence was elaborated by Jainism and Buddhism, given political bite by Jews like the prophets and Jesus, articulated by Christians like St. Francis and Martin Luther King, Jr., and made programmatic and practical by the Hindu Gandhi and the Muslim Badshah Khan.

Nevertheless, I agree with Mr. Kelly that pacifism must go. It is endlessly confused with passivity. In the nations in which Christianity has predominated, Jesus' teaching on nonviolence has been perverted into injunctions to passive nonresistance, which, as we shall see, is the very opposite of active nonviolence. Jesus had said, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your outer garment, give your undergarment as well; and if one of the occupation troops forces you to carry his pack one mile, go two" (Matthew 5:38-41). As it stands, this saying seems to counsel supine surrender. If you are a woman and you are struck by your spouse on one cheek, turn the other; let him pulverize you. If you are sued for a piece of clothing, give all your clothes voluntarily, as an act of pious renunciation. And if a Roman soldier forces you to carry his pack one mile, be a chump: carry it two. And the crowning blow: don't resist evil at all.

For centuries, readers of this advice have instinctively known something was wrong with this picture. Jesus always resisted evil. Why would he tell us to behave in ways he himself refused? And that's where the trouble starts. The Greek word translated as "resist" (*antistenai*), is literally "to stand (*stenai*) against (*anti*)." The term is taken from warfare. When two armies collide, they were said to "stand against" each other. The correct translation is given in the new Scholars Bible: "Don't react violently against the one who is evil." The meaning is clear: don't react in kind, don't mirror your enemy, don't turn into the very thing you hate. Jesus is not telling us not to resist evil, but only not to resist it violently.

Jesus gives three examples to explain his point. The first is: "If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also." Most people picture a blow with the right fist. But that would land on the left cheek, and Jesus specifies the right cheek. A left hook wouldn't fit the bill either, since the left hand was used only for unclean tasks, and even to gesture with it brought shame on the one gesturing. Jesus is speaking about striking the right cheek with the back of the right hand. This was not a blow to injure. It was symbolic. It was intended to humiliate, to put an inferior in his or her place. It was given by a master to a slave, a husband to a wife, a parent to a child, or a Roman to a Jew. The message of the powerful to their subjects was clear: You are a nobody, get back down where you belong.

It is to those accustomed to being struck thus that Jesus speaks ("if anyone strikes you"). By turning the other cheek, the person struck puts the striker in an untenable spot. He cannot repeat the backhand, because the other's nose is now in the way. The left cheek makes a fine target, but only persons who are equals fight with fists, and the last thing the master wants is for the slave to assert equality (see the Mishnah, Baba Kamma 8:6). This is, of course, no way to avoid trouble; the master might have the slave flogged to within an inch of her life. But the point has been irrevocably made: the "inferior" is saying, in no uncertain terms, "I won't take such treatment anymore. I am your equal. I am a child of God." By turning the other cheek, the oppressed person is saying that she refuses to submit to further humiliation. This is not submission, as the churches have insisted. It is defiance. That may sound a bit idealistic, but people all over the globe of late have been taking their courage in their hands this way and resisting, nonviolently, those who have treated them thus.

Jesus' second example deals with indebtedness, the most onerous social problem in first century Palestine. The wealthy of the Empire sought ways to avoid taxes. The best way was to buy land on the fringes of the Empire. But the poor didn't want to sell. So the rich jacked up interest rates—25 to 250 percent. When the poor couldn't repay, first their moveable property was seized, then their lands, and finally the very clothes on their backs. Scripture allowed the destitute to sleep in their long robes, but they had to surrender them by day (Deuteronomy 24:10-13).

It is to that situation that Jesus speaks. Look, he says, you can't win when they take you to court. But here is something you can do: when they demand your outer garment, give your undergarment as well. That was all they wore. The poor man is stark naked! And in Israel, nakedness brought shame, not on the naked party, but on the one viewing his nakedness. (See the story of Noah, Genesis 9.) Jesus is not asking those already defrauded of their possessions to submit to further indignity. He is enjoining them to guerrilla theater.

Imagine the debtor walking out of the court in his altogethers. To the question what happened, he responds, That creditor got all my clothes. People come pouring out of the streets and alleys and join the little procession to his home. It will be a while before creditors in that village take a poor man to court! But, of course, the Powers That Be are shrewd, and within weeks new laws will be

in place making nakedness in court punishable by fines or incarceration. So the poor need to keep inventing new forms of resistance. Jesus is advocating a kind of Aikido, where the momentum of the oppressor is used to throw the oppressor and make him the laughing stock of the community. Jesus is not averse to using shame to kindle a moral sense in the creditor. Jesus' third example refers to the *angaria*, the law that permitted a Roman soldier to force a civilian to carry his 65 to 85 pound pack. But the law stipulated one mile only. At the second marker the soldier was required to retrieve his pack. By carrying the pack more than a mile, the peasant makes the soldier culpable for violation of military law. Again, Jesus is not just "extending himself" by going the second mile, as the popular platitude puts it. He is putting the soldier in jeopardy of punishment.

So you can see why I agree with Mr. Kelly. The examples Jesus gives are something more than nonresistance. They are gutsy, courageous, and aggressive. So I don't regard myself as a pacifist. I see myself rather as a violent person trying to become nonviolent. Mr. Kelly and I concur that the "flight" option is cowardly, irresponsible, and ineffective. But where he is still mired in the "fight" option, I am prepared to risk active, even militant, nonviolence—a third way. Far from proving impractical, nonviolence has been about the only thing that has been working of late. In 1989-90 alone, fourteen nations involving 1.7 billion people underwent nonviolent revolutions, all but one successfully (China). During the twentieth century, 3.4 billion people were thus involved. Yet the churches have, since the time of St. Augustine, embraced the Roman "just war theory," convinced that nonviolence won't work, that only violence can save or redeem us. (I call this "the myth of redemptive violence.")

The current crisis challenges both Mr. Kelly and me. Mr. Kelly, because he is unable to point to many successes for the "fight" option in the last two decades. And he is impaled on the spiritual law that says, "If I win, I lose." If we destroy the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, tens of thousands will stand in their places. All out war with Arab Muslims could lead straight to World War III, complete with biological and nuclear weapons. At the very least, we can expect a world unsafe for Americans, even in our homeland. Civil liberties will be lost, and we may find ourselves in a situation "objectively pro-Fascist." If we win, we lose. Our very lust for retaliation is proving the truth of the adage that violence can only lead to more violence.

There are causes for this war, and most of them should have been taken care of years ago. Most of what Osama bin Laden claims to be fighting for should have been the basis of America's Middle Eastern policy. We should have lifted the sanctions in Iraq, which have killed upwards of a million people, over half of them children under five—a war crime of which we are guilty. We could have easily withdrawn our troops from Saudi Arabia, since it is offensive to pious Muslims to have non-Muslim troops in their holy land. After all, it was Kuwait we fought to save; let Kuwait harbor our troops. We should have used our enormous influence to stop Israelis from settling in the West Bank, and secured for Palestinians a state. And we should quit propping up anti-democratic dictatorships in the region, many of which would collapse without our support. Not that these unjust situations adequately account for Osama bin Laden's vendetta against America. The rationale of terrorists is terror, and reasons given today may shift tomorrow. The terrorist who regretted being caught before he could kill 250,000 Americans betrayed the game. It is simply to kill Americans. No pretext can ever excuse the slaughter of innocents, whether Americans in the Twin Towers or Afghan civilians in the Middle East.

But the current crisis also challenges me. I distinguish between force and violence, arguing that force, rightly exercised, is the legitimate use of restraint to prevent some from doing harm to others. Violence, by contrast, is injurious or lethal harm deliberately intended, and can never be

justified. I am struggling with that distinction today. Is there a continuum from force to violence, or from police action to war? How, then, do we know how much force we can use before it becomes violence? Could we have sent in special forces to seize Mr. bin Laden and bring him to trial at the World Court? But we didn't know where to look! (But neither do our soldiers.) Didn't the "restrained" use of force already escalate to violence the moment President Bush declared war? Can these distinctions be anything but rationalizations unless we have committed ourselves to nonviolence from the outset?

It's easy to see why Bush declared war. It was in response to the killing of our civilians. But when we kill innocents—inevitable in a war where innocents are mingled among combatants—we write them off as "collateral damage"—as if real people weren't involved. We watch as the full military resources of the world's most commanding military are devoted to destroying an entire sector of the Afghanistan population. I cannot see how we can regard this war as anything but immoral.

Doing justice in the Middle East will not mollify true terrorists. But it could remove the source of much outrage, and thus dry up the reservoir of recruits for holy war. To that end, we must act with vulnerability and compassion to remove the causes of anger, even as we ferret out those whose terrorist violence led to the tragedy of September 11, 2001.

Walter Wink is author of The Powers That Be (Doubleday, 1998) and of the newly released The Human Being: Jesus and the Enigma of the Son of the Man (Fortress, 2001).

www.walterwink.com

http://www.cres.org/star/_wink.htm

Beyond Just War and Pacifism: Jesus' Nonviolent Way

by Walter Wink

[Dr Walter Wink is Professor of Biblical Interpretation at Auburn Theological Seminary in New York City. Previously, he was a parish minister and taught at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. In 1989-1990 he was a Peace Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. This essay is posted with Dr Wink's permission.] Walter Wink's web site is:

<http://www.WalterWink.com>

The new reality Jesus proclaimed was nonviolent. That much is clear, not just from the Sermon on the Mount, but his entire life and teaching and, above all, the way he faced his death. His was not merely a tactical or pragmatic nonviolence seized upon because nothing else would have worked against the Roman empire's near monopoly on violence. Rather, he saw nonviolence as a direct corollary of the nature of God and of the new reality emerging in the world from God. In a verse quoted more than any other from the New Testament during the church's first four centuries, Jesus taught that God loves everyone, and values all, even those who make themselves God's enemies. We are therefore to do likewise (Matt. 5:45; cf. Luke 6:35). The Reign of God, the peaceable Kingdom, is (despite the monarchical terms) an order in which the inequity, violence, and male supremacy characteristic of dominator societies are superseded. Thus nonviolence is not just a means to the Kingdom of God; it is a quality of the Kingdom itself. Those who live nonviolently are already manifesting the transformed reality of the divine order now, even under the conditions of what I call the Domination System.

The idea of nonviolent resistance was not new. The Hebrew midwives, the Greek tragedians, and Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Lao-Tzu, and Judaism were all to various degrees conversant with nonviolence as a way of life and, in some cases, even as a tactic of social change. What was new was the early church's inference from Jesus' teaching that nonviolence is the only way, that war itself must be renounced. The idea of peace and the more general rejection of violence can be found before Christianity and in other cultures, says Peter Brock, but nowhere else do we find practical anti-militarism leading to the refusal of military service.

When, beginning with the emperor Constantine, the Christian church began receiving referential treatment by the empire that it had once so steadfastly opposed, war, which had once seemed so evil, now appeared to many to be a necessity for preserving and propagating the gospel.

Christianity's weaponless victory over the Roman empire eventuated in the weaponless victory of the empire over the gospel. No defeat is so well-disguised as victory! In the year 303, Diocletian forbade any member of the Roman army to be a Christian. By the year 416, no one could be a member of the Roman army unless he was a Christian.

It fell to Augustine (d. 430) to make the accommodation of Christianity to its new status as a privileged religion in support of the state. Augustine believed, on the basis of Matt. 5:38-42, that Christians had no right to defend themselves from violence. But he identified a problem which no earlier theologian had faced: what Augustine regarded as the loving obligation to use violence if necessary to defend the innocent against evil. Drawing on Stoic just war principles, he articulated the position that was to dominate church teaching from that time right up to the present. Ever since, Christians on the left and on the right, in the East and in the West, have found it exceedingly easy to declare as "just" and divinely ordained any wars their governments desired to wage for purely national interests. As a consequence, the world regards Christians as

among the most warlike factions on the face of the earth. And little wonder; two-thirds of the people killed in the last 500 years died at the hands of fellow-Christians in Europe, to say nothing of those whom Christians killed in the course of colonizing the rest of the world.

As Gandhi once quipped, "The only people on earth who do not see Christ and His teachings as nonviolent are Christians." The time has come to look again to the rock from which we were hewn. And the key text remains Jesus' statement about resisting evil.

38You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' 39But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; 40and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; 41and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. 42Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you. (Matt. 5:38-42 NRSV; see also Luke 6:29-30).

Christians have, on the whole, simply ignored this teaching. It has seemed impractical, masochistic, suicidal--an invitation to bullies and spouse-batterers to wipe up the floor with their supine Christian victims. Some who have tried to follow Jesus' words have understood it to mean non-resistance: let the oppressor perpetrate evil unopposed. Even scholars have swallowed the eat-humble-pie reading of this text: "It is better to surrender everything and go through life naked than to insist on one's legal rights," to cite only one of scores of these commentators from Augustine right up to the present. Interpreted thus, the passage has become the basis for systematic training in cowardice, as Christians are taught to acquiesce in evil.

Cowardice is scarcely a term one associates with Jesus. Either he failed to make himself clear, or we have misunderstood him. There is plenty of cause to believe the latter. Jesus is not forbidding self-defense here, only the use of violence. Nor is he legitimating the abandonment of nonviolence in order to defend the neighbor. He is rather showing us a way that can be used by individuals or large movements to intervene on behalf of justice for our neighbors--nonviolently. The classical interpretation of Matt 5:38-42//Luke 6:29-30 suggests two, and only two, possibilities for action in the face of evil: fight or flight. Either we resist evil, or we do not resist it. Jesus seemingly says that we are not to resist it; so, it would appear, he commands us to be docile, inert, compliant, to abandon all desire for justice, to allow the oppressor to walk all over us. "Turn the other cheek" is taken to enjoin becoming a doormat for Jesus, to be trampled without protest. "Give your undergarment as well" has encouraged people to go limp in the face of injustice and hand over the last thing they own. "Going the second mile" has been turned into a platitude meaning nothing more than "extend yourself." Rather than encourage the oppressed to counteract their oppressors, these revolutionary statements have been transformed into injunctions to collude in one's own despoiling.

But that interpretation excluded a third alternative: active nonviolent resistance. The word translated "resist" is itself problematic; what translators have failed to note is how frequently *anthistemi* is used as a military term. Resistance implies "counteractive aggression," a response to hostilities initiated by someone else. Liddell-Scott defines *anthistemi* as to "set against esp. in battle, withstand." Ephesians 6:13 is exemplary of its military usage: "Therefore take the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand [antistenai, literally, to draw up battle ranks against the enemy] in the evil day, and having done all, to stand [stenai, literally, to close ranks and continue to fight]." The term is used in the LXX primarily for armed resistance in military encounters (44 out of 71 times). Josephus uses *anthistemi* for violent struggle 15 out of 17 times, Philo 4 out of 10. Jesus' answer is set against the backdrop of the burning question of forcible resistance to Rome. In that context, "resistance" could have only one meaning: lethal violence.

Stasis, the noun form of stenai, means "a stand," in the military sense of facing off against an enemy. By extension it came to mean a "party formed for seditious purposes; sedition, revolt." The NRSV translates stasis in Mark 15:7 as "insurrection" (so also Luke 23:19, 25), in Acts 19:40 as "rioting," and in Acts 23:10 as "violent dissension."

In short, antistenai means more in Matt. 5:39a than simply to "stand against" or "resist." It means to resist violently, to revolt or rebel, to engage in an insurrection. Jesus is not encouraging submission to evil; that would run counter to everything he did and said. He is, rather, warning against responding to evil in kind by letting the oppressor set the terms of our opposition. Perhaps most importantly, he cautions us against being made over into the very evil we oppose by adopting its methods and spirit. He is saying, in effect, Do not mirror evil; do not become the very thing you hate. The best translation is the Scholars Version: "Don't react violently against the one who is evil."

In the three examples that follow in Matthew, Jesus illustrates what he means.

Turn the Other Cheek

"If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also." Why the right cheek? A blow by the right fist in that right-handed world would land on the left cheek of the opponent. An open-handed slap would also strike the left cheek. To hit the right cheek with a fist would require using the left hand, but in that society the left hand was used only for unclean tasks. Even to gesture with the left hand at Qumran carried the penalty of ten days' penance. The only way one could naturally strike the right cheek with the right hand would be with the back of the hand. We are dealing here with insult, not a fistfight. The intention is clearly not to injure but to humiliate, to put someone in his or her place. One normally did not strike a peer thus, and if one did the fine was exorbitant. The Mishnaic tractate Baba Qamma specifies the various fines for striking an equal: for slugging with a fist, 4 zuz (a zuz was a day's wage); for slapping, 200 zuz; but "if [he struck him] with the back of his hand he must pay him 400 zuz." But damages for indignity were not paid to slaves who are struck (8:1-7).

A backhand slap was the usual way of admonishing inferiors. Masters backhanded slaves; husbands, wives; parents, children; men, women; Romans, Jews. We have here a set of unequal relations, in each of which retaliation would be suicidal. The only normal response would be cowering submission.

Part of the confusion surrounding these sayings arises from the failure to ask who Jesus' audience was. In all three of the examples in Matt. 5:39b-41, Jesus' listeners are not those who strike, initiate lawsuits, or impose forced labor, but their victims ("If anyone strikes you...wants to sue you...forces you to go one mile..."). There are among his hearers people who were subjected to these very indignities, forced to stifle outrage at their dehumanizing treatment by the hierarchical system of caste and class, race and gender, age and status, and as a result of imperial occupation. Why then does he counsel these already humiliated people to turn the other cheek? Because this action robs the oppressor of the power to humiliate. The person who turns the other cheek is saying, in effect, "Try again. Your first blow failed to achieve its intended effect. I deny you the power to humiliate me. I am a human being just like you. Your status does not alter that fact. You cannot demean me."

Such a response would create enormous difficulties for the striker. Purely logistically, how would he hit the other cheek now turned to him? He cannot backhand it with his right hand (one only need try this to see the problem). If he hits with a fist, he makes the other his equal, acknowledging him as a peer. But the point of the back of the hand is to reinforce institutionalized inequality. Even if the superior orders the person flogged for such "cheeky"

behavior (this is certainly no way to avoid conflict!), the point has been irrevocably made. He has been given notice that this underling is in fact a human being. In that world of honor and shaming, he has been rendered impotent to instill shame in a subordinate. He has been stripped of his power to dehumanize the other. As Gandhi taught, "The first principle of nonviolent action is that of noncooperation with everything humiliating."

Give the Undergarment

The second example Jesus gives is set in a court of law. Someone is being sued for his outer garment. Who would do that, and under what circumstances? The Hebrew Scriptures provide the clues. When you make your neighbor a loan of any sort, you shall not go into his house to fetch his pledge. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you make the loan shall bring the pledge out to you. And if he is a poor man, you shall not sleep in his pledge; when the sun goes down, you shall restore to him the pledge that he may sleep in his cloak (himatio) and bless you....You shall not...take a widow's garment (himation) in pledge. (Deut. 24:10-13, 17; see also Exod. 22:25-27; Amos 2:7-8; Ezek. 18:5-9.) Only the poorest of the poor would have nothing but a garment to give as collateral for a loan. Jewish law strictly required its return every evening at sunset.

Matthew and Luke disagree whether it is the outer garment (Luke) or the undergarment (Matthew) that is being seized. But the Jewish practice of giving the outer garment as a pledge (it alone would be useful as a blanket for sleeping) makes it clear that Luke's order is correct, even though he does not preserve the legal setting. In all Greek usage, according to Liddell-Scott, himation is "always an outer garment...worn above the chiton," whereas the chiton is a "garment worn next to the skin." Consistent with this usage, the Greek translation of the Old Testament (LXX) reads himation in the passages just cited. S. Safrai and M. Stern describe normal Jewish dress: an outer garment or cloak of wool and an undergarment or tunic of linen. To avoid confusion I will simply refer to the "outer garment" and the "undergarment."

The situation Jesus speaks to is all too familiar to his hearers: the debtor has sunk ever deeper into poverty, the debt cannot be repaid, and his creditor has summoned him to court (krithehai) to exact repayment by legal means.

Indebtedness was endemic in first century Palestine. Jesus' parables are full of debtors struggling to salvage their lives. Heavy debt was not, however, a natural calamity that had overtaken the incompetent. It was the direct consequence of Roman imperial policy. Emperors had taxed the wealthy so stringently to fund their wars that the rich began seeking non-liquid investments to secure their wealth. Land was best, but it was ancestrally owned and passed down over generations, and no peasant would voluntarily relinquish it. Exorbitant interest, however, could be used to drive landowners ever deeper into debt. And debt, coupled with the high taxation required by Herod Antipas to pay Rome tribute, created the economic leverage to pry Galilean peasants loose from their land. By the time of Jesus we see this process already far advanced: large estates owned by absentee landlords, managed by stewards, and worked by tenant farmers, day laborers, and slaves. It is no accident that the first act of the Jewish revolutionaries in 66 C.E. was to burn the Temple treasury, where the record of debts was kept.

It is to this situation that Jesus speaks. His hearers are the poor ("if any one would sue you"). They share a rankling hatred for a system that subjects them to humiliation by stripping them of their lands, their goods, finally even their outer garments.

Why then does Jesus counsel them to give over their undergarments as well? This would mean stripping off all their clothing and marching out of court stark naked! Imagine the guffaws this

saying must have evoked. There stands the creditor, covered with shame, the poor debtor's outer garment in the one hand, his undergarment in the other. The tables have suddenly been turned on the creditor. The debtor had no hope of winning the case; the law was entirely in the creditor's favor. But the poor man has transcended this attempt to humiliate him. He has risen above shame. At the same time he has registered a stunning protest against the system that created his debt. He has said in effect, "You want my robe? Here, take everything! Now you've got all I have except my body. Is that what you'll take next?"

Nakedness was taboo in Judaism, and shame fell less on the naked party than on the person viewing or causing the nakedness (Gen 9:20-27). By stripping, the debtor has brought the creditor under the same prohibition that led to the curse of Canaan. And much as Isaiah had "walked naked and barefoot for three years" as a prophetic sign (Isa. 20:1-6), so the debtor parades his nakedness in prophetic protest against a system that has deliberately rendered him destitute. Imagine him leaving the court, naked: his friends and neighbors, aghast, inquire what happened. He explains. They join his growing procession, which now resembles a victory parade. The entire system by which debtors are oppressed has been publicly unmasked. The creditor is revealed to be not a legitimate moneylender but a party to the reduction of an entire social class to landlessness, destitution, and abasement. This unmasking is not simply punitive, therefore; it offers the creditor a chance to see, perhaps for the first time in his life, what his practices cause, and to repent.

The Powers That Be literally stand on their dignity. Nothing depotentiates them faster than deft lampooning. By refusing to be awed by their power, the powerless are emboldened to seize the initiative, even where structural change is not immediately possible. This message, far from being a counsel to perfection unattainable in this life, is a practical, strategic measure for empowering the oppressed, and it is being lived out all over the world today by powerless people ready to take their history into their own hands.

Jesus provides here a hint of how to take on the entire system by unmasking its essential cruelty and burlesquing its pretensions to justice. Here is a poor man who will no longer be treated as a sponge to be squeezed dry by the rich. He accepts the laws as they stand, pushes them to absurdity, and reveals them for what they have become. He strips naked, walks out before his fellows, and leaves this creditor, and the whole economic edifice which he represents, stark naked.

[Go the Second Mile](#)

Jesus' third example, the one about going the second mile, is drawn from the relatively enlightened practice of limiting the amount of forced or impressed labor (*angareia*) that Roman soldiers could levy on subject peoples to a single mile. The term *angareia* is probably Persian, and became a loanword in Aramaic, Greek and Latin. Josephus mentions it in reference to the Seleucid ruler, Demetrius who, in order to enlist Jewish support for his bid to be king, promised, among other things, that "the Jews' beasts of burden shall not be requisitioned (*angareuesthai*) for our army" (Ant. 13.52). We are more familiar with its use in the Passion Narrative, where the soldiers "compel" (*angareuousin*) Simon of Cyrene to carry Jesus' cross (Mark 15:21//Matt. 27:32). Such forced service was a constant feature in Palestine from Persian to late Roman times, and whoever was found on the street could be compelled into service. Most cases of impressment involved the need of the postal service for animals and the need of soldiers for civilians to help carry their packs. The situation in Matthew is clearly the latter. It is not a matter of equisitioning animals but people themselves.

This forced labor was a source of bitter resentment by all Roman subjects. "*Angareia* is like

death," complains one source. The sheer frequency, even into the late empire, of legislation proscribing the misuse of the *angareia* shows how regularly the practice was used and its regulations violated. An inscription of 49 C.E. from Egypt orders that Roman "soldiers of any degree when passing through the several districts are not to make any requisitions or to employ forced transport (*angareia*) unless they have the prefect's written authority" --a rescript clearly made necessary by soldiers abusing their privileges. Another decree from Egypt from 133-137 C.E. documents this abuse: "Many soldiers without written requisition are travelling about in the country, demanding ships, beasts of burden, and men, beyond anything authorized, sometimes seizing things by force...to the point of showing abuse and threats to private citizens, the result is that the military is associated with arrogance and injustice." In order to minimize resentment in the conquered lands, at least some effort was made by Rome to punish violators of the laws regarding impressment.

The Theodosian Code devotes an entire section to *angareia*. Among its ordinances are these: If any person while making a journey should consider that he may abstract an ox that is not assigned to the public post but dedicated to the plow, he shall be arrested with due force by the rural police...and he shall be haled before the judge [normally the governor] (8.5.1, 315 C.E.). By this interdict We forbid that any person should deem that they may request packanimals and supplementary posthorses. But if any person should rashly act so presumptuously, he shall be punished very severely (8.5.6, 354 C.E., ital. added). When any legion is proceeding to its destination, it shall not hereafter attempt to appropriate more than two posthorses (*angariae*), and only for the sake of any who are sick (8.5.11, 360 C.E.).

Late as these regulations are, they reflect a situation that had changed little since the time of the Persians. Armies had to be moved through countries with dispatch. Some legionnaires bought their own slaves to help carry their packs of sixty to eighty-five pounds (not including weapons). The majority of the rank and file, however, had to depend on impressed civilians. There are vivid accounts of whole villages fleeing to avoid being forced to carry soldiers' baggage, and of richer towns prepared to pay large sums to escape having Roman soldiers billeted on them for winter. With few exceptions, the commanding general of a legion personally administered justice in serious cases, and all other cases were left to the disciplinary control of his subordinates. Centurions had almost limitless authority in dealing with routine cases of discipline. This accounts for the curious fact that there is very little codified military law, and that late Roman military historians are agreed, however, that military law changed very little in its essential character throughout the imperial period. No account survives to us today of the penalties to be meted out to soldiers for forcing a civilian to carry his pack more than the permitted mile, but there are at least hints. "If in winter quarters, in camp, or on the march, either an officer or a soldier does injury to a civilian, and does not fully repair the same, he shall pay the damage twofold." This is about as mild a penalty, however, as one can find. Josephus' comment is surely exaggerated, even if it states the popular impression: Roman military forces "have laws which punish with death not merely desertion of the ranks, but even a slight neglect of duty" (J.W. 3.102-8). Between these extremes there was deprivation of pay, a ration of barley instead of wheat, reduction in rank, dishonorable discharge, being forced to camp outside the fortifications, or to stand all day before the general's tent holding a clod in one's hands, or to stand barefoot in public places. But the most frequent punishment by far was flogging.

The frequency with which decrees were issued to curb misuse of the *angareia* indicates how lax discipline on this point was. Perhaps the soldier might receive only a rebuke. But the point is that the soldier does not know what will happen.

It is in this context of Roman military occupation that Jesus speaks. He does not counsel revolt. One does not "befriend" the soldier, draw him aside and drive a knife into his ribs. Jesus was surely aware of the futility of armed insurrection against Roman imperial might; he certainly did nothing to encourage those whose hatred of Rome was near to flaming into violence.

But why carry his pack a second mile? Is this not to rebound to the opposite extreme of aiding and abetting the enemy? Not at all. The question here, as in the two previous instances, is how the oppressed can recover the initiative and assert their human dignity in a situation that cannot for the time being be changed. The rules are Caesar's, but how one responds to the rules is God's, and Caesar has no power over that.

Imagine then the soldier's surprise when, at the next mile marker, he reluctantly reaches to assume his pack, and the civilian says, "Oh no, let me carry it another mile." Why would he want to do that? What is he up to? Normally, soldiers have to coerce people to carry their packs, but this Jew does so cheerfully, and will not stop! Is this a provocation? Is he insulting the legionnaire's strength? Being kind? Trying to get him disciplined for seeming to violate the rules of impressment? Will this civilian file a complaint? Create trouble?

From a situation of servile impressment, the oppressed have once more seized the initiative. They have taken back the power of choice. The soldier is thrown off balance by being deprived of the predictability of his victim's response. He has never dealt with such a problem before. Now he has been forced into making a decision for which nothing in his previous experience has prepared him. If he has enjoyed feeling superior to the vanquished, he will not enjoy it today. Imagine the situation of a Roman infantryman pleading with a Jew to give back his pack! The humor of this scene may have escaped us, but it could scarcely have been lost on Jesus' hearers, who must have been regaled at the prospect of thus discomfiting their oppressors. Jesus does not encourage Jews to walk a second mile in order to build up merit in heaven, or to exercise a supererogatory piety, or to kill the soldier with kindness. He is helping an oppressed people find a way to protest and neutralize an onerous practice despised throughout the empire. He is not giving a non-political message of spiritual world-transcendence. He is formulating a worldly spirituality in which the people at the bottom of society or under the thumb of imperial power learn to recover their humanity.

One could easily misuse Jesus' advice vindictively; that is why it must not be separated from the command to love enemies integrally connected with it in both Matthew and Luke. But love is not averse to taking the law and using its oppressive momentum to throw the soldier into a region of uncertainty and anxiety where he has never been before. Such tactics can seldom be repeated. One can imagine that within days after the incidents that Jesus sought to provoke, the Powers That Be would pass new laws: penalties for nakedness in court, flogging for carrying a pack more than a mile! One must be creative, improvising new tactics to keep the opponent off balance.

To those whose lifelong pattern has been to cringe before their masters, Jesus offers a way to liberate themselves from servile actions and a servile mentality. And he asserts that they can do this before there is a revolution. There is no need to wait until Rome has been defeated, or peasants are landed and slaves freed. They can begin to behave with dignity and recovered humanity now, even under the unchanged conditions of the old order. Jesus' sense of divine immediacy has social implications. The reign of God is already breaking into the world, and it comes, not as an imposition from on high, but as the leaven slowly causing the dough to rise (Matt.13:33//Luke 13:20-21). Jesus' teaching on nonviolence is thus of a piece with his proclamation of the dawning of the reign of God.

In the conditions of first-century Palestine, a political revolution against the Romans could only be catastrophic, as the events of 66-73 C.E. would prove. Jesus does not propose armed revolution. But he does lay the foundations for a social revolution, as Richard A. Horsley has pointed out. And a social revolution becomes political when it reaches a critical threshold of acceptance; this in fact did happen to the Roman empire as the Christian church overcame it from below.

Nor were peasants and slaves in a position to transform the economic system by frontal assault. But they could begin to act from an already recovered dignity and freedom, and the ultimate consequences of such acts could only be revolutionary. To that end, Jesus spoke repeatedly of a voluntary remission of debts.

It is entirely appropriate, then, that the saying on debts in Matt. 5:42//Luke 6:30//Gos. Thom. 95 has been added to this saying-block. Jesus counsels his hearers not just to practice alms and to lend money, even to bad-risks, but to lend without expecting interest or even the return of the principal. Such radical egalitarian sharing would be necessary to rescue impoverished Palestinian peasants from their plight; one need not posit an imminent end of history as the cause for such astonishing generosity. And yet none of this is new; Jesus is merely issuing a prophetic summons to Israel to observe the commandments pertaining to the sabbatical year enshrined in Torah, adapted to a new situation.

Such radical sharing would be necessary in order to restore true community. For the risky defiance of the Powers that Jesus advocates would inevitably issue in punitive economic sanctions and physical punishment against individuals. They would need economic support; Matthew's "Give to everyone who asks (aitounti--not necessarily begs) of you" may simply refer to this need for mutual sustenance. Staggering interest and taxes isolated peasants, who went under one by one. This was a standard tactic of imperial "divide and rule" strategy. Jesus' solution was neither utopian nor apocalyptic. It was simple realism. Nothing less could halt or reverse the economic decline of Jewish peasants than a complete suspension of usury and debt and a restoration of economic equality through outright grants, a pattern actually implemented in the earliest Christian community, according to the Book of Acts.

Jesus' Third Way

Jesus' alternative to both fight and flight can be graphically presented by a chart:

Jesus' Third Way Seize the moral initiative

Find a creative alternative to violence

Assert your own humanity and dignity as a person

Meet force with ridicule or humor

Break the cycle of humiliation

Refuse to submit or to accept the inferior position

Expose the injustice of the system

Take control of the power dynamic

Shame the oppressor into repentance

Stand your ground

Make the Powers make decisions for which they are not prepared

Recognize your own power

Be willing to suffer rather than retaliate

Force the oppressor to see you in a new light

Deprive the oppressor of a situation where a show of force is effective

Be willing to undergo the penalty of breaking unjust laws

Die to fear of the old order and its rules
Seek the oppressor's transformation

Flight Fight
Submission Armed revolt
Passivity Violent rebellion
Withdrawal Direct retaliation
Surrender Revenge

Gandhi insisted that no one join him who was not willing to take up arms to fight for independence. They could not freely renounce what they had not entertained. One cannot pass directly from "Flight" to "Jesus' Third Way." One needs to pass through the "Fight" stage, if only to discover one's own inner strength and capacity for violence. We need to learn to love justice and truth enough to die for them, by violence if nothing else.

Jesus, in short, abhors both passivity and violence. He articulates, out of the history of his own people's struggles, a way by which evil can be opposed without being mirrored, the oppressor resisted without being emulated, and the enemy neutralized without being destroyed. Those who have lived by Jesus' words--Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Dorothy Day, César Chavez, Adolpho Pérez Esquivel--point us to a new way of confronting evil whose potential for personal and social transformation we are only beginning to grasp today. Beyond Just War and Pacifism

Just war theory was founded in part on a misinterpretation of "Resist not evil" (Matt. 5:39), which Augustine regarded as an absolute command to non-resistance of evil. No Christian, he argued, can take up arms in self-defense, therefore, but must submit passively even to death. Nor can Christians defend themselves against injustice, but must willingly collaborate in their own ruin. But what, asked Augustine, if my neighbors are being thus treated? Then the love commandment requires me to take up arms if necessary to defend them.

But Jesus did not teach non-resistance. Rather, he disavowed violent resistance in favor of nonviolent resistance. Of course Christians must resist evil! No decent human being could conceivably stand by and watch innocents suffer without trying to do, or at least wishing to do, something to save them. The question is simply one of means. Likewise Christians are not forbidden by Jesus to engage in self-defense. But they are to do so nonviolently. Jesus did not teach supine passivity in the face of evil. That was precisely what he was attempting to overcome!

Pacifism, in its Christian forms, was often based on the same misinterpretation of Jesus' teaching in Matt. 5:38-42. It too understood Jesus to be commanding non-resistance. Consequently, some pacifists refuse to engage in nonviolent direct action or civil disobedience, on the ground that such actions are coercive. Non-resistance, they believe, only licenses passive resistance. Hence the confusion between "pacifism" and "passivism" has not been completely unfounded.

Jesus' third way is coercive, insofar as it forces oppressors to make choices they would rather not make. But it is non-lethal, the great advantage of which is that, if we have chosen a mistaken course, our opponents are still alive to benefit from our apologies. The same exegesis that undermines the Scriptural ground from traditional just war theory also erodes the foundation of non-resistant pacifism. Jesus' teaching carries us beyond just war and pacifism, to a militant nonviolence that actualizes already in the present the ethos of God's domination-free future.

Out of the heart of the prophetic tradition, Jesus engaged the Domination System in both its outer and spiritual manifestations. His teaching on nonviolence forms the charter for a way of being in the world that breaks the spiral of violence. Jesus here reveals a way to fight evil with all our

power without being transformed into the very evil we fight. It is a way--the only way possible--of not becoming what we hate. "Do not counter evil in kind"--this insight is the distilled essence, stated with sublime simplicity, of the meaning of the cross. It is time the church stops limping between just war theory and nonresistant pacifism and follows Jesus on his nonviolent way.

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