If We're Feeding the Russians, Why Do We Still Threaten to Nuke 'em?

by Howard W. Hallman¹

What a strange anomaly! The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has dissolved. The United States is now sending food supplies to the Russian people and to people in the other independent republics. But at the same time the U.S. strategic arsenal retains more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on missiles actively aimed at sites located throughout the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). If we're going to feed them, why do we continue to threaten them with nuclear destruction?

The U.S. strategic targets are set forth in a highly secret document call the Single Integrated Operations Plan, or SIOP (pronounced "sigh-op" in military jargon). I'm not privy to the listing of targets within the former Soviet Union as specified in SIOP, but I note that a learned committee of the

¹ Howard W. Hallman is executive director of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy.

National Academy of Sciences recently described three types of targets: (1) nuclear and conventional military forces; (2) the industrial and logistical base for supporting and reconstituting these forces; and (3) significant targetable command and control and leadership elements. The industrial base is located primarily in and around cities. Major command and control centers are also urban-based. Thus, a huge portion of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarus, and Kazakhstani population is within killing range of installations targeted by U.S. strategic missiles.

This means that missiles on U.S. submarines submerged in the Atlantic ocean and elsewhere and in silos scattered around the Great Plains are at this very moment targeted at airfields and ports where U.S. planes and ships will soon be arriving with food supplies. Our missiles are actively targeted at the central command and control headquarters in Moscow, where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy. U.S. missiles are currently aimed at St. Petersburg, sister city of

Los Angeles, though the SIOP probably uses the old name, Leningrad. And it seems quite likely that the United States is now targeting missiles at Minsk, sister city of Detroit, capital of Belarus and headquarters for the new Commonwealth of Independent States; and also at Kiev, capital of Ukraine, and at Odessa, sister city of Baltimore.

Why? The remnants of the Soviet Union are not a viable military adversary of the United States. Yet, SIOP keeps U.S. strategic missiles actively targeted against the people residing within the former Soviet Union. Isn't it time for drastic change in our approach?

We can do it by cutting through the outmoded nuclear deterrence doctrine that the Pentagon and the military-funded think tanks have developed. What to do is not difficult to understand, and it should not be too hard to achieve.

Think of our current situation as similar to two groups of contending boys on a schoolyard. The boys stand facing one another with rocks and

broken bricks in their hands. Each group threatens to throw rocks at the other group if one of them throws first. They've stood around for a long time and are tired of the stand-off. They would like to do other things, such as challenge the other side to a game of soccer, or just go home for supper. But they don't know how to end the impasse.

Then the leader of one group says to the opposing leader, "We'll lay down our rocks if you'll lay yours down." The other leader asks, "How do we know it's not a trick?" The first leader replies, "We'll all count to three together and then everyone drops his rocks at the same time. If somebody on your side keeps his, or even starts throwing, we'll just pick ours up again and throw back."

So they agree. "One. Two. Three." Everyone drops his rocks at once.

The threat of battle is over. Amazingly the two groups merge, and some boys previously on opposite sides walk off together.

This is a fair analogy because over the years U.S. and Soviet political and

military leaders have acted basically as grown boys. They have displayed big hunks of childhood psychology. Nuclear deterrence and warfighting theory is fancified, though more dangerous, application of the meaner side of schoolyard interaction.

So why not undertake an international equivalent of schoolyard peacemaking? One, two, three. Immediately and simultaneously bring all U.S. and former Soviet strategic submarines into port, remove their missiles, take off their warheads. Open all ICBM silos, take out the missiles, place them on the ground in plain sight, remove their warheads. Get Great Britain, France, and China to do likewise.

Does this sound preposterous? It's actually a logical extension of the initiative that President Bush launched on September 21 when he decided to take all U.S. strategic bombers off alert and remove their bombs and to take 350 Minuteman II ICBMs off alert for rapid firing. On October 5 President Gorbachev reciprocated by taking all Soviet heavy strategic bombers off alert,

removing 503 ICBMs from alert status, and keeping mobile ICBMs in permanent sites rather than moving them about.

Complete deactivation of the entire global strategic arsenal would, of course, be only the first step. Then we should go about dismantling all of the delivery vehicles and destroying the warheads. Dismantlement might begin with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years. Then the remaining US/CIS arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so. This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side.

Some might want a next-to-last stage with a few missiles remaining, certainly less than 50, as precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness. The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, bringing about the complete elimination of the strategic weapons of all

possessors. This should be accomplished no later than the year 2000.

Clearly a strong and universal system of nuclear nonproliferation should accompany the elimination of the current strategic arsenal. And also a halt in the spread of ballistic missiles capable of attacking an adversary's homeland. But in fact nonproliferation will be easier to achieve if the big boys give up their strategic missiles and nuclear warheads. In the past U.S. and Soviet preaching on nuclear nonproliferation has been like a drunkard advocating alcoholic abstinence. Conduct has contradicted words.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1969 was based upon a commitment of the nuclear possessors to work toward disarmament in exchange for other nations not acquiring nuclear capability. As the possessors live up to their side of the bargain, most of the nonpossessors will easily resist the desire for nuclear weapons of their own. For the handful of nations that retain nuclear ambition, the world community can exercise pressure and invoke sanctions to thwart their desire.

Thus, prompt deactivation of the U.S. and C.I.S. strategic submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles, joined soon by Great Britain, France, and China, would have multiple achievements. It would remove an ever-present danger of accidental launch. It could keep strategic weapons out of the hands of any future perpetrators of another coup in the fledgling Commonwealth of Independent States. It would be enormously stabilizing in US/Soviet relations. It would improve chances for nonproliferation. It would save billions of dollars. Above all it would free children everywhere from their anxiety over nuclear war.

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January 4, 1992

NOW IS THE TIME FOR GLOBAL DEACTIVATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A Proposal by Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Premise

The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has dissolved. There is no fundamental enmity between the United States and the successor Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) or any of its sovereign republics.

Yet both sides continue to target one another with strategic nuclear weapons which could reach the other's homeland within 20 minutes of launching. The only threat to homeland security of both countries is accidental, crazed, or purposeful launching of one or more strategic missiles. Both sides would be much more secure if all strategic weapons were taken off alert and then dismantled.

Who's the Target?

It is, therefore, timely to ask policy makers in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan why they continue to threaten their former adversary with nuclear destruction. The only conceivable reason is to deter the other side from launching a nuclear attack. Nuclear missiles deter other nuclear missiles. However, U.S. and C.I.S. missiles are not merely aimed at the adversary's nuclear weapons. They are aimed at military installations, command and control centers, industrial districts, and transportation networks. These targets are within areas where millions of

people reside.

Accordingly, it is appropriate for U.S. policy makers to consider carefully the following questions:

- Why does the United States target the airfields and ports within the various independent republics where U.S. planes and ships are starting to arrive with food supplies?
- Why does the U.S. target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Why does the U.S. target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Belarus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent States?
- Why does the U.S. target Kiev, capital of independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?
- Why does the U.S. target Alma Ata, capital of the independent Kazakhstan?

Policy makers in the four C.I.S. republics where strategic nuclear weapons, and also the military command of the Commonwealth of Independent States, can be asked similar questions about their targets in the United States. Why?

(over)

To ask these questions is to reveal the obsolescence and the falsity of the strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Some would approach this dilemma by reduction of deployed strategic weapons in stages but leaving thousands of warheads still targeting the other side. We believe that a better approach would be a two-phase approach consisting of (1) immediate deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal by all possessors and then by (2) dismantlement of the untargeted weapons in stages by destroying the warheads and delivery vehicles.

Phase One: Deactivation

For the first phase we recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers and some ICBMs off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

Phase Two: Dismantlement

For the second phase we recommend a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining U.S. and former Soviet arsenal could be cut in half

within another year or so, with particular emphasis upon eliminating MIRVs.

- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side, with none of them on MIRVs.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in one of the republics. It would also provide a solution to the question of why the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States should continue to target one another with strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence. For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

To go along with strategic disarmament we also recommend the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halting all further testing and production of nuclear weapons, a vigorous global nonproliferation regime, and stopping the development of strategic defense systems.

January 1992

For further information: Howard W. Hallman, Executive Director, (301) 897-3668

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For release Monday a.m. February 24, 1992 Contact: Howard Hallman

(301) 897-3668

A CALL TO TAKE THE STRATEGIC ARSENAL OFF ALERT

The United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States should promptly take all strategic weapons off alert and eliminate all active targeting of sites in each other's nation. This is the

recommendation of 33 national organizations in a letter to U.S. President George Bush and Russian

President Boris Yeltsin.

This would be accomplished by returning all strategic submarines to port and placing their

missiles in safe storage and by deactivating and safely storing all intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs). This action would build upon previous initiatives of President Bush and Soviet President

Mikhail Gorbachev that took all strategic bombers and some land-based ICBMs off alert.

To assure mutual confidence each side could send observation teams to the other nation's

strategic missile sites. This would be based upon principles already established in two previous arms control treaties: on Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START). An alternative would be to use United Nation teams for this purpose.

In writing to the two presidents, the 33 national organizations insist that taking the strategic

arsenal off alert would make both nations safer from accidental or unauthorized launching of strategic

missiles. This action would also remove the anomaly of cooperating nations targeting each other with highly lethal weapons. In this atmosphere of mutual reassurance, the world's two foremost nuclear

powers could then jointly undertake staged dismantlement of a substantial part of the nuclear arsenal.

As the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States proceed in this manner,

they can invite Great Britain, France, and China to join them in likewise taking their strategic arsenals

off alert. This will assure greater security for all the possessors of strategic weapons.

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Attachment: Letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin and list of

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signers.

Mr. Keith Henderson Christian Science Monitor One Norway Street Boston, MA 02115

Dear Mr. Henderson:

I am submitting for your consideration an op-ed article entitled "If We're Feeding the Russians, Why Do We Still Threaten to Nuke 'em?" In it I point out that presently the U.S. strategic arsenal has missiles aimed at airfields and ports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies. U.S. missiles are also targeted at Moscow where Boris Yeltsin is trying to install a free-market economy, at St. Petersburg where a reform-minded mayor is at work, at Minsk, headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, and at capitals and ports of other independent republics. It just doesn't make sense.

As a remedy I propose the immediate deactivation of the U.S. and former Soviet strategic arsenal. This would be accomplished by bringing all U.S. and former Soviet strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, taking off their warheads; also opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground in plain sight, and removing their warheads. Great Britain, France, and China would need to do likewise. This would be followed by staged dismantlement of all delivery vehicles and warheads.

There's more to my proposal, as you can see. It is based upon a statement adopted by the Board of Directors of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, as published in the enclosed issue of our bulletin, *Peace Leaf*.

If you decide that this article is unsuitable for your use, please return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. You can keep the issue of *Peace Leaf*, or give it to one of your editorial writers for background information.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director The Honorable Frank McCloskey
127 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative McCloskey:

Knowing of your interest in the targeting of U.S. strategic missiles and bombs, we ask: what are now the targets within the decentralized Commonwealth of Independent States that has replaced the Soviet Union?

- Does the United States target the airfields and ports within the various independent republics where U.S. planes and ships are starting to arrive with food supplies?
- Do we target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Do we target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Belarus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent States?
- Do we target Kiev, capital of independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?

To ask these questions is to reveal how sadly outdated the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) is. And really how ridiculous.

Clearly U.S. strategic weapons no longer have any military purpose other than deterring the strategic weapons of an adversary. I say this even in the face of the leaked report of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Advisory Group, clearly a dying gasp of the old order. Strategic weapons

being useless, the safest and wisest course would be complete abolition. This is an action we recommend.

But how to do it? We favor a two-phase approach: immediate deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal by all possessors and then staged dismantlement. We would be interested in learning your views on our recommendations and whether you would support and advocate this course.

For the first phase we recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States controlling strategic weapons, and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5

The Honorable Frank McCloskey January 6, 1992 Page two.

reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers and some ICBMs off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

For the second phase we recommend a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining U.S. and former Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so, with particular emphasis upon eliminating MIRVs.
- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side, with none of them on MIRVs.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in one of the republics. It would also provide a solution to the question of what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence. For the

cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

In this letter we are focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present danger to the United States. We are also concerned about other nuclear weapons. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous, global nonproliferation regime, and stop the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system. The full scope of our ideas is contained in the latest issue of our bulletin, *Peace Leaf*, on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" (copy enclosed).

We hope that you will provide creative leadership so that the Congress will push for far-reaching policies of nuclear weapons reduction at a time when this objective is both necessary and achievable.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

(301) 897-3668

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder 2208 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Schroeder:

During the holidays I caught a MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour in which you pleaded for the United States to take the high road in dealing with the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States. We agree. This is especially necessary in dealing with the arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, which are clearly obsolete both for national security and for international relations.

The need for creative approaches becomes particularly evident if we ask ourselves what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles and bombs within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

- Does the United States target the airfields and ports within the various independent republics where U.S. planes and ships are starting to arrive with food supplies?
- Do we target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Do we target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Belarus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent States?
- Do we target Kiev, capital of independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?

To ask these questions is to reveal how sadly outdated the U.S. Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) is. And really how ridiculous.

Clearly U.S. strategic weapons no longer have any military purpose other than deterring the strategic weapons of an adversary. I say this even in the face of the leaked report of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Advisory Group (a dying gasp of the old order). Strategic weapons being useless, the safest and wisest course would be complete abolition. This is an action we recommend.

But how to do it? We favor a two-phase approach: immediate deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal by all possessors and then staged dismantlement. We would be interested in learning your views on our recommendations and whether you would support and advocate this course.

For the first phase we recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder January 7, 1992 Page two.

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States controlling strategic weapons, and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers and some ICBMs off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

For the second phase we recommend a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining U.S. and former Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so, with particular emphasis upon eliminating MIRVs.
- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side, with none of them on MIRVs.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this

couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in one of the republics. It would also provide a solution to the question of what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence. For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

In this letter we are focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present danger to the United States. We are also concerned about other nuclear weapons. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous, global nonproliferation regime, and stop the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system. The full scope of our ideas is contained in the latest issue of our bulletin, *Peace Leaf*, on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" (copy enclosed).

We hope that you will provide creative leadership so that the Congress will push for far-reaching policies of nuclear weapons reduction at a time when this objective is both necessary and achievable.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

(301) 897-3668

The Honorable George J. Mitchell U.S. Capitol, Room S-221 Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mitchell:

With the Cold War and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States no longer has a major enemy. Such a remarkable change requires equally remarkable changes in U.S. defense policy. Certainly that is the case with the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence. All that is left is missiles deterring missiles. We wrote you about this issue in early December, and now we want to amplify our views.

When we examine the current situation, we ask who's the target of U.S. strategic weapons? The capitals of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan where reformist regimes are in charge? The airfields and seaports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies? To ask is to reveal the obsolescence and falsity of the strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

What is the way out? Our recommendation is to immediately take the entire global nuclear arsenal off alert and deactivate all strategic weapons. Already the bombers are off alert. Now let's bring the subs into port and remove their missiles. Let's take all ICBM missiles out of their silos and remove their warheads. This would apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, and China. Missiles can remain out of service with no active targets until dismantlement can occur. Observation teams can be installed to assure that the missiles

remain deactivated.

Then let's follow deactivation with step-by-step dismantlement of all strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. This can be begin with weapons specified in the START agreement, only with a much quicker schedule. Then through successive stages the U.S. and C.I.S. arsenals can be cut in half, then reduced to 1,000 warheads with no MIRVs, and eventually to zero. All other nuclear powers should be included in the final stages.

This idea is spelled out more completely in the enclosed statement. We would be interested in your views on our proposal and would like to know whether you support this idea.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director His Excellency Andrei Kolosovsky Ambassador of the Russian Federation 1125 16th Street, NW Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ambassador Kolosovsky:

The recent changes occurring in your country have made totally obsolete the old policy of mutual nuclear deterrence which the United States and the Soviet Union have pursued for more than forty years. There is no longer any enmity. We in the United States have no fear of hostile military action by the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), the Russian Federation, or any of the other sovereign republics. The people of the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the Commonwealth do not need to fear hostile military action by the United States.

Nevertheless, U.S. missiles remain targeted at cities, seaports, airfields, industrial districts, and military installations throughout the Commonwealth. Likewise C.I.S. missiles remain targeted at similar sites throughout the United States. Why? There is no legitimate answer except adherence to outmoded policy.

What should be done? Our answer is a two-phase approach: immediate deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal by all possessors and then staged dismantlement. We would like to meet with you or one of your top aides in the near future to discuss our ideas. We note that President Boris Yeltsin may be in the United States in early February, so we request an opportunity for a delegation from church and peace organizations to meet with him to

discuss these matters.

To elaborate, we recommend a first phase consisting of the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers and some ICBMs off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

For the second phase we recommend a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

■ Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.

His Excellency Andrei Kolosovsky January 18, 1992 Page two.

- Then the remaining U.S. and former Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so, with particular emphasis upon eliminating MIRVs.
- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side, with none of them on MIRVs.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the immediate danger of accidental launching or the fear of strategic nuclear weapons somehow falling into the wrong hands. It would also provide a solution to the question of what are now the targets for U.S. and C.I.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence. For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

In this letter we are focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present external danger to the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. We are also concerned about other nuclear weapons. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous global nonproliferation regime, and stop

the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system. The full scope of our ideas is contained in the latest issue of our bulletin, *Peace Leaf*, on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" (copy enclosed).

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

(301) 897-3668

The Honorable Claiborne Pell, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee 446 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Pell:

We are a national association of laity and clergy which organized in 1987 to work for policy ideas advocated by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in their 1986 pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace.* We have worked for better US/Soviet relations and participated in citizen exchanges, and we have supported negotiations of arms reduction treaty.

Because of this latter activity we request an opportunity to testify at START ratification hearings which your committee is conducting. We are generally supportive of the START agreement, but we think that the schedule for dismantlement should be greatly accelerated. Remarkable changes have occurred since the agreement was signed, and new opportunities are available. With that in mind we would like to offer your committee some ideas about what should occur beyond START.

When we look at the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence, we find that about all that is left is missiles deterring missiles. In this situation we ask: who's the target of U.S. strategic weapons? The capitals of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan where reformist regimes are in charge? The airfields and seaports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies? Similar questions can be asked about targets for the missiles of the

Commonwealth of Independent States. To ask is to reveal the obsolescence and falsity of current strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

What is the way out? Our recommendation is to immediately take the entire global nuclear arsenal off alert and deactivate all strategic weapons. Already the bombers are off alert. Now let's bring the subs into port and remove their missiles. Let's take all ICBM missiles out of their silos and remove their warheads. This would apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, and China. Missiles can remain out of service with no active targets until dismantlement can occur. Observation teams can be installed to assure that the missiles remain deactivated.

Then let's follow deactivation with step-by-step dismantlement of all strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. This can be begin with weapons specified in the START agreement, only with a much quicker schedule. Then through successive stages the U.S. and C.I.S. arsenals can be cut in half, then reduced to 1,000 warheads with no MIRVs, and eventually to zero. All other nuclear powers should be included in the final stages.

The Honorable Claiborne Pell January 18, 1992 Page two.

Our ideas are spelled out more completely in the enclosed statement. We would like to have the opportunity to introduce our thinking into the dialogue that is occurring as part of the public hearing process on the START agreement. If your staff wants to talk with me about this, I can be reached at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director The Honorable Nancy Kasebaum 302 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Kassebaum:

With the Cold War and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States no longer has a major enemy. Such a remarkable change requires equally remarkable changes in U.S. defense policy. Certainly that is the case with the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence. All that is left is missiles deterring missiles.

When we examine this issue, we ask who's the target of U.S. strategic weapons? The capitals of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan where reformist regimes are in charge? The airfields and seaports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies? To ask is to reveal the obsolescence and falsity of the strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

What is the way out? Our recommendation is to immediately take the entire global nuclear arsenal off alert and deactivate all strategic weapons. Already the bombers are off alert. Now let's bring the subs into port and remove their missiles. Let's take all ICBM missiles out of their silos and remove their warheads. This would apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, and China. Missiles can remain out of service with no active targets until dismantlement can occur. Observation teams can be installed to assure that the missiles remain deactivated.

Then let's follow deactivation with step-by-step dismantlement of all strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. This can be begin with weapons specified in the START agreement, only with a much quicker schedule. Then through successive stages the U.S. and C.I.S. arsenals can be cut in half, then reduced to 1,000 warheads with no MIRVs, and eventually to zero. All other nuclear powers should be included in the final stages.

This idea is spelled out more completely in the enclosed statement. We would be interested in your views on our proposal and would like to know whether you support this idea.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director The Honorable John McCain
111 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

With the Cold War and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States no longer has a major enemy. Such a remarkable change requires equally remarkable changes in U.S. defense policy. Certainly that is the case with the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence. All that is left is missiles deterring missiles.

When we examine this issue, we ask who's the target of U.S. strategic weapons? The capitals of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan where reformist regimes are in charge? The airfields and seaports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies? To ask is to reveal the obsolescence and falsity of the strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

What is the way out? Our recommendation is to immediately take the entire global nuclear arsenal off alert and deactivate all strategic weapons. Already the bombers are off alert. Now let's bring the subs into port and remove their missiles. Let's take all ICBM missiles out of their silos and remove their warheads. This would apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, and China. Missiles can remain out of service with no active targets until dismantlement can occur. Observation teams can be installed to assure that the missiles remain deactivated.

Then let's follow deactivation with step-by-step dismantlement of all strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. This can be begin with weapons specified in the START agreement, only with a much quicker schedule. Then through successive stages the U.S. and C.I.S. arsenals can be cut in half, then reduced to 1,000 warheads with no MIRVs, and eventually to zero. All other nuclear powers should be included in the final stages.

This idea is spelled out more completely in the enclosed statement. We would be interested in your views on our proposal and would like to know whether you support this idea.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

(301) 897-3668

Dr. Fred Iklé

Center for Strategic and

International Studies

1800 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

Dear Dr. Iklé:

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has no major enemy. Yet, we retain an enormous number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. So does the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This situation causes us to ask: who's the target of U.S. strategic weapons? The capitals of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan where reformist regimes are in charge? The airfields and seaports where U.S. planes and ships are arriving with food supplies? Similar questions can be asked about the deployed missiles of the Commonwealth of Independent States. To ask is to reveal the obsolescence and falsity of the strategic nuclear policies of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. All that left is missiles deterring missiles.

What is the way out? Our recommendation is to immediately take the entire global nuclear arsenal off alert and deactivate all strategic weapons. Already the bombers are off alert. Now let's bring the subs into port and remove their missiles. Let's take all ICBM missiles out of their silos and remove their warheads. This would apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Great Britain, France, and China. Missiles can remain out of service with no active targets until dismantlement

can occur. Observation teams can be installed to assure that the missiles remain deactivated.

Then let's follow deactivation with step-by-step dismantlement of all strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. This can be begin with weapons specified in the START agreement, only with a much quicker schedule. Then through successive stages the U.S. and C.I.S. arsenals can be cut in half, then reduced to 1,000 warheads with no MIRVs, and eventually to zero. All other nuclear powers should be included in the final stages.

This idea is spelled out more completely in the enclosed statement. I have heard that you too have been developing ideas related to taking the strategic arsenal off alert. We would be interested in learning more about your thinking and also your views on our proposal.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
2187 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

When Sherman Harris and I were talking with you the other day about the idea of taking the global strategic arsenal off alert, you asked what organizations support this idea. I have made a quick, and as yet incomplete, canvass of a number of organizations and have found considerable support in principle. Their support of a specific measure, such as a sense of Congress resolution, would depend upon the wording and sponsorship, but they are clearly sympathetic.

As a starter, support within the religious community support is likely to come from American Baptist Churches, American Friends Service Committee, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, United Church of Christ, and Unitarian—Universalist Association. This could easily broaden to include historic peace churches, some other major Protestant denominations, a number of Catholic associations, and one or more Jewish organizations.

Among arms control and peace organization, support is likely to come from Council for a Livable World, Federation of American Scientists, Greenpeace, Parliamentarians for a Global Order, Physicians for Social Responsibility, SANE/FREEZE, 20/20 Vision, and Women's Action for New Directions (WAND). Others are likely to be supportive, though I haven't reached them yet.

Prominent individuals who support taking strategic weapons off alert include William Colby and John Steinbruner, who puts this in the context of a new approach to "cooperative security." I am probing for others.

In sum, with only a little effort a fairly broad cross-section of organizations favor this idea. Many more would come to the fore if there was a specific proposal, such as a sense of Congress resolution sponsored by you and other prominent members of Congress (perhaps with some Republicans included). Therefore, we hope that you will take leadership on this issue.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

cc. Michael Van Dusen

January 27, 1992

Mr. James Hamilton National Council of Churches 110 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I would like to talk with you about ideas contained in this statement. I'll give you a call.

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

For comments, contact Howard Hallman at (301) 897-3668

The Honorable George Bush President of the United States The White House Washington, DC 20500 The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
The Kremlin
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Presidents:

We are encouraged by your respective proposals to make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. We support this effort and hope that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States and its member republics quickly begin the process of dismantling their strategic arsenals.

In the meantime we wonder why it is still necessary for the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States to maintain active targeting of one another. The Cold War is over. East-West enmity has been replaced by cooperation.

Because we have entered a new era, we propose that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States promptly take all strategic weapons off alert and eliminate all active targeting of sites in the other nation. A beginning has already occurred through the September 27 initiative of President Bush and the October 5 reciprocal response by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that took all strategic bombers and some land-based ICBMs off alert. As follow up action, we propose that all strategic submarines return to port and place their missiles in safe storage and that all remaining ICBMs be deactivated in an appropriate manner. To assure mutual confidence each side could send observation teams to the other nation's strategic missile sites, based upon principles established in the INF and START agreements.

This action would make both nations safer from accidental or unauthorized launching of strategic missiles. It would remove the anomaly of cooperating nations targeting each other with highly lethal weapons. It would serve as a significant confidence-building measure. In this atmosphere of mutual reassurance, the world's two greatest nuclear powers could then proceed with staged dismantlement of a substantial part of the nuclear arsenal along the lines of your respective proposals.

As the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States proceed along these lines, we urge you to invite Great Britain, France, and China to join you in likewise taking their strategic arsenals off alert. This will assure greater security for all the possessors of strategic weapons. In this manner the quest for global peace and security will be greatly enhanced.

Sincerely yours,

Signers' name, title, and organization

Draft of February 3, 1992

Signers invited. Please call Howard Hallman at (301) 897-3668 by Friday afternoon, February 17, 192

The Honorable George Bush President of the United States The White House Washington, DC 20500 The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
The Kremlin
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Presidents:

We are encouraged by your respective proposals to make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. We support this effort and hope that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States and its member republics quickly begin the process of dismantling their strategic arsenals.

In the meantime we wonder why it is still necessary for the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States to maintain active targeting of one another. The Cold War is over. East-West enmity has been replaced by cooperation.

Because we have entered a new era, we propose that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States promptly take all strategic weapons off alert and eliminate all active targeting of sites in the other nation. A beginning has already occurred through the September 27 initiative of President Bush and the October 5 reciprocal response by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that took all strategic bombers and some land-based ICBMs off alert.

As the next step, we propose that all strategic submarines return to port and place their missiles in safe storage and that all ICBMs be deactivated in an appropriate manner and safely stored. To assure mutual confidence each side could send observation teams to the other nation's strategic missile sites, based upon principles established in the INF and START agreements.

These actions would make both nations safer from accidental or unauthorized launching of strategic missiles. This would remove the anomaly of cooperating nations targeting each other with highly lethal weapons. It would serve as a significant confidence-building measure. In this atmosphere of mutual reassurance, the world's two foremost nuclear powers could then jointly undertake staged dismantlement of a substantial part of the nuclear arsenal along the lines of your respective proposals.

As the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States pursue this course of action, we urge you to invite Great Britain, France, and China to join you in likewise taking their strategic arsenals off alert. This will assure greater security for all the possessors of strategic weapons. In this manner the quest for global peace and security will be greatly enhanced.

Sincerely yours,

Signers' name, title, and organization

The Honorable Vladimir Petrovsky
Room 1565

J.W. Marriott Hotel
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I mentioned to you briefly after last night's session of the Second Global Structures Convocation, Methodists United for Peace with Justice has been advancing the idea that the global strategic nuclear arsenal should be taken off alert. This would entail bringing all strategic submarines into port and placing their missiles in safe storage, removing ICBM missiles from their silos and storing them safely, and keeping all strategic bombers off alert. Our ideas are spelled out in the enclosed statement.

We advocate this course because the Cold War is over. East-West enmity has ended. The United States and the Russian Federation are allies. So why should we still target one another under the outmoded doctrine of nuclear deterrence? President Bush and President Yeltsin have each proposed deep cuts in the strategic arsenal. While this is being carried out, we advocate that the two nations cease targeting each other by taking strategic missiles off alert and storing them safely.

We have presented this idea to officials in the Bush Administration but have not yet convinced them. However, some senior members of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees are looking favorably at the concept of taking the strategic arsenal off alert. Among citizen groups in the United States, support is coming from such organizations as the

Federation of American Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Council for A Livable World, American Friends Service Committee, American Baptist Churches, Friends Committee for National Legislation, Unitarian-Universalist Association, United Church of Christ, Greenpeace, SANE/ FREEZE, Women's Action for New Direction, and Women Strike for Peace. We are now circulating a letter to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin advocating this idea, and we expect to get thirty or more national organizations to sign it.

To pursue this issue further, I would like your suggestions about whom we might talk with in the Embassy of the Russian Federation.

With best regards,

Dear Friend:

We invite you to become a signer of the enclosed letter addressed to President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. The essence of the message is a proposal to take all strategic weapons off alert, to bring all strategic submarines into port and place their missiles in safe storage, and similarly to deactivate all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Already strategic bombers are off alert, following a September initiative by President Bush and a reciprocal response by President Gorbachev.

Taking strategic weapons off alert would end the active targeting of one another with strategic missiles. Once this has been accomplished, the two nations can proceed with step-by-step dismantlement of a substantial part of the nuclear arsenal.

We have developed this letter through consultation with participants in the Monday Lobby, which works on arms control issues, and through conversations with other experts. A number of organizations are committed to the idea of taking the strategic arsenal off alert and are reviewing the specific wording of this letter prior to signing.

If you want to know who has signed so far, please call me. If you are willing to be a signer, please let me know by Tuesday, February 18. You can reach me at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

Signers invited. Please call Howard Hallman at (301) 897-3668 <u>by Tuesday, February 18, 1992</u>

The Honorable George Bush President of the United States The White House Washington, DC The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
President of the Russian Federation
The Kremlin
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Presidents:

We are encouraged by your respective proposals to make deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. We support this effort and hope that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States and its member republics quickly begin the process of dismantling their strategic arsenals.

In the meantime we wonder why it is still necessary for the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States to maintain active targeting of one another. The Cold War is over. East-West enmity has been replaced by cooperation.

Because we have entered a new era, we propose that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States promptly take all strategic weapons off alert and eliminate all active targeting of sites in the other nation. A beginning has already occurred through the September 27 initiative of President Bush and the October 5 reciprocal response by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that took all strategic bombers and some land-based ICBMs off alert.

As the next step, we propose that all strategic submarines return to port and place their missiles in safe storage and that all ICBMs be deactivated in an appropriate manner and safely stored. To assure mutual confidence each side could send observation teams to the other nation's strategic missile sites, based upon principles established in the INF and START agreements or could use United Nations teams for this purpose.

These actions would make both nations safer from accidental or unauthorized launching of strategic missiles. This would remove the anomaly of cooperating nations targeting each other with highly lethal weapons. It would serve as a significant confidence-building measure. In this atmosphere of mutual reassurance, the world's two foremost nuclear powers could then jointly undertake staged dismantlement of a substantial part of the nuclear arsenal along the lines of your respective proposals.

As the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States pursue this course of action, we urge you to invite Great Britain, France, and China to join you in likewise taking their strategic arsenals off alert. This will assure greater security for all the possessors of strategic weapons. In this manner

the quest for global peace and security will be greatly enhanced.

Sincerely yours,

Signers' name, title, and organization

February 21, 1992

Dear Friend:

Here is a copy of the letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin, asking them to take the strategic arsenal off alert. We greatly appreciate your signing this letter.

In addition to sending this letter to the two presidents, we have released it to the news media. We are seeking to have a small delegation drawn from the signers meet with officials of the Bush Administration and the Russian Embassy. We are also sharing the letter with leading members of Congress.

With best regards,

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: February 21, 1992

To: General John A. Gordon Fax No. (202) 395-3380

National Security Council Telephone No. (202) 395-3330

From: Howard W. Hallman

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Fax No. (301) 652-8516 Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

Comments:

We would like to transmit the enclosed letter to President Bush through you rather than going the uncertain route through the White House mail room.

The letter offers a proposal to take the strategic nuclear arsenal off alert on a mutual basis with the Commonwealth of Independent States. Signers are representatives 33 national organizations.

We also request an opportunity for a small delegation of the signers to meet with you and General Scowcroft to discuss this idea in greater detail.

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: February 21, 1992

To: Mr. Dennis Ross Fax No. (202) 647-0753

U.S. State Department Telephone No. (202) 647-2372

From: Howard W. Hallman

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Fax No. (301) 652-8516 Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

Comments:

We would like to share with you the enclosed letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin, offering a proposal to take the strategic nuclear arsenal off alert on a mutual basis. Signers are representatives 33 national organizations.

We request you to share this letter with Secretary Baker.

We would also like an opportunity for a small delegation of the signers to meet with you to discuss this idea in greater detail.

February 21, 1992

The Honorable Andrei Kolosovsky Embassy of the Russian Federation 1125 16th Street, NW Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Kolosovsky:

Thirty-three national organizations have signed the enclosed letter, addressed President Boris Yeltsin and President George Bush, proposing that the United States and the Soviet Union take their entire strategic arsenal off alert on a mutual basis. We request that you transmit this letter to President Yeltsin through proper channels.

A couple of weeks ago I was talking with Vladimir Petrovsky, former deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, at the Global Structures for Peace Convocation. He suggested that you would be an appropriate person at the Russian Embassy to request a meeting to talk about this idea. Therefore, I am wondering if a small delegation of the signers could you meet with you to discuss this proposal in greater detail.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

(301) 897-3668

February 22, 1992

To: Paul Nielsen

Enclosed is a news release for a letter from 33 national organizations to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, advocating that the strategic nuclear arsenal be taken off alert. Also enclosed is our own statement on this issue.

In addition to the signers of the letter there are several "credentialed" persons in the U.S. arms control community who espouse this approach. If you would like their names as leads for News Hour coverage, please call me at (301) 897-3668.

On February 12 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev proposed to the 39-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the U.S. and the C.I.S. take their strategic nuclear weapons off alert status and that they keep warheads separate from missiles.

So, support is growing for this idea.

Howard W. Hallman

February 22, 1992

To: Pat Towel

Enclosed is a news release for a letter from 33 national organizations to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, advocating that the strategic nuclear arsenal be taken off alert. Also enclosed is our own statement on this issue.

In addition to the signers of the letter there are several "credentialed" persons in the arms control community who espouse this approach. You heard John Steinbrunner at the Coolfont Retreat. If you would like names of others as leads for a CQ story, please call me at (301) 897-3668.

On February 12 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev proposed to the 39-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the U.S. and the C.I.S. take their strategic nuclear weapons off alert status and that they keep warheads separate from missiles.

So, support is growing for this idea.

Howard W. Hallman

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton 2187 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

I appreciate your response of February 12 to our ideas on nuclear arms reduction. In the interest of continuing dialogue, I would like to take up a couple of points of your letter.

Our main proposal for immediate application is for the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States to take their strategic weapons off alert. This would be accomplished by bringing the submarines into port and storing their missiles and likewise deactivating all ICBMs and safely storing their warheads. Great Britain, France, and China would be encouraged to take similar measures.

This is a position shared by more than 30 national organizations, as expressed in the enclosed letter to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. Such arms control experts as John Steinbrunner, Jeremy Stone, and Fred Iklé are also advocating variations of this idea.

The United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States have moved in this direction by taking a portion of the strategic arsenal off alert, as follows:

■ Through President Bush's initiative of September 21, 1991, the United States has (a) taken all U.S. strategic bombers off day-to-day strip alert and placed their bombs and missiles in storage areas and (b) taken 450

- single-warhead Minuteman II ICBMs off alert and installed a device to prevent immediate launching.
- Through President Gorbachev's reciprocal response of October 5 the Soviet Union (a) took Soviet bombers off alert status and stored their weapons, (b) took 503 ICBMs off alert, including 134 MIRVs, and (c) placed mobile ICBMs in their bases rather than moving them about.
- Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the ICBMs based in Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been fixed so that they cannot be launched within 24 hours.
- There has apparently been some decrease in the number of strategic submarines at sea, but most of the U.S. and C.I.S. submarine fleets remains deployed. Likewise most of both nation's ICBMs remain in active deployment.

There have also been some significant proposals for strategic arms reduction and some additional proposals to lower the alert status of the strategic arsenal, as follows:

■ President Bush in his State of the Union address proposed deep cuts in the strategic arsenal beyond the START agreement.

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton February 25, 1992 Page two.

- The next day President Yeltsin advocated even deeper deep cuts. He also indicated a willingness to halt all combat submarine patrols if the United States would follow suit. Subsequently he spoke of no longer targeting U.S. cities.
- On February 12 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in a speech to the 39-nation UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva suggested that the U.S. and the C.I.S. take all their strategic weapons off alert status and keep nuclear warheads separate from their missiles (see clipping).
- On February 22 President Yeltsin told Izvestia that Commonwealth nuclear weapons targeted on the West would be transferred to "zero alert", but he offered no further details (see enclosure).
- So far the United States has not responded publicly to Russian proposals for reducing the alert status of the nuclear arsenal.

These various actions and proposals are moving in the right direction. They make it all the more timely to take the entire global strategic arsenal off alert and place all strategic missiles in safe storage under proper surveillance. The latter point is particularly important, for unverified standing down and non-targeting pledges are insufficient unless there can be verification. Missiles hidden in silos can be reactivated undetected, and it only takes 20 minutes or so to reprogram a missile for targeting purposes.

Taking the entire strategic arsenal off alert would not constitute complete nuclear disarmament. Rather it would provide a stable and secure basis for negotiating actual dismantlement of strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles along the lines proposed by President Bush and President

Yeltsin. It would end the anomaly of cooperating nations actively targeting one another with deadly weapons.

The prudence of placing the strategic arsenal on non-alert status was well illustrated by the recent collision of U.S. and C.I.S. submarines in the Barents Sea off the Kola Peninsula. Following Cold War practices, C.I.S. strategic submarines continue to come and go from the base at Severomorsk through the Barents Sea out into the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. submarines patrol those waters to keep track of them. Quite likely C.I.S. subs are tracking U.S. subs as they come and go from East Coast ports. This accident was contained, but who knows what might happen if such an incident occurred during a period of greater instability. To return all subs to port on a mutual basis and store their missiles safely is much more prudent than continuing to target one another. Likewise placing all ICBMs in storage would be a prudent course to take while arms reduction negotiations are proceeding.

Therefore, we urge you to give further consideration to this idea. Perhaps you would be willing to join with other senior members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee in sponsoring a letter to President Bush recommending consideration of this approach. If so, we and a number of other citizen organizations would be pleased to work with your staff in contacting other representatives to ask them to sign such a letter. We have some leads in this regard and think that it could be bipartisan.

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton February 25, 1992 Page three.

We also urge you to raise this idea in public hearings where witnesses from the Bush Administration are testifying.

We continue to appreciate the creative leadership you offer on foreign policy issues, including arms sales and other matters related to the Middle East.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

cc. Michael Van Dusen

The Honorable Sam Nunn 303 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Nunn:

I would like share with you a letter which more than 30 national organizations sent to President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. In this letter we propose that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States promptly take all strategic weapons off alert and eliminate all active targeting of sites in each other's nation. This could be accomplished by returning all strategic submarines to port and placing their missiles in safe storage and by deactivating all ICBMs in an appropriate manner and safely storing their warheads. We also urge that Great Britain, France, and China take their strategic missiles off alert.

To assure mutual confidence we suggest that each side could send observation teams to the other nation's strategic missile sites, based upon principles established in the INF and START agreements. Or, United Nations teams could be used for this purpose.

During the past several years you have been expressing a concern about accidental launch of ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. The only nations whose missiles have sufficient range for this purpose are the Commonwealth of Independent States and China, plus Great Britain for submarine-launched missiles. If their missiles are off alert, the danger of an accidental attack on the U.S. homeland will disappear, for no other nation has, or is about to have, missiles with sufficient range.

The prudence of placing the strategic arsenal on non-alert status was also illustrated by the recent collision of U.S. and C.I.S. submarines in the Barents Sea off the Kola Peninsula. Following Cold War practices, C.I.S. strategic submarines continue to come and go from the base at Severomorsk through the Barents Sea out into the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. submarines patrol those waters to keep track of them. Quite likely C.I.S. subs are tracking U.S. subs as they come and go from East Coast ports. This accident was contained, but who knows what might happen if such an incident occurred during a period of greater instability. To return all subs to port on a mutual basis and store their missiles safely is much more prudent than continuing to target one another. Likewise placing all ICBMs in storage would be a prudent course to take.

Taking the entire strategic arsenal off alert would provide a stable and secure foundation for negotiating actual dismantlement of strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles along the lines recently proposed by President Bush and President Yeltsin. It would end the anomaly of cooperating nations actively targeting one another with deadly weapons.

The Honorable Sam Nunn February 26, 1992 Page two.

We urge you to support this idea of taking the strategic arsenal off alert while arms reduction negotiations proceed and to convey your support to President Bush. We also request that you focus on this possibility at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee and invite some of the signers of the letter to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to testify.

Sincerely yours,

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: March 11, 1992

To: The Honorable Andrei Kolosovsky
Embassy of the Russian Federation
1125 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

FAX No. (202) 737-9307 Telephone No. (202) 737-7915

From: Howard W. Hallman

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

FAX No. (301) 652-8516 Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

Thirty-three national organizations have signed the attached letter, addressed to President Boris Yeltsin and President George Bush, proposing that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States take their entire strategic arsenal off alert on a mutual basis.

Last month I was talking with Vladimir Petrovsky, former deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, at the Global Structures for Peace Convocation. He suggested that you would be an appropriate person at the Russian Embassy to request a meeting to talk about this idea. Therefore, I am wondering if a small delegation of the signers could you meet with you to discuss this proposal in greater detail.

I would appreciate your calling me at my office in Bethesda, Maryland to talk about setting up this appointment. My phone is (301) 897-3668.

Draft. Contact: Howard Hallman, (301) 897–3668

CITIZEN INITIATIVE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

May __, 1992

The Honorable James A. Baker Secretary of State 2201 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

We wish to commend you for your diligent efforts to adapt the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to changes that occurred with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With strategic weapons based in four successor states, it is important for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to all be bound by the provisions of START. You seem to be making excellent progress to achieve this result.

With this nearing accomplishment we urge you to give careful consideration to a related proposal made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 12, 1992. He proposed that the United States and the successor states of the Soviet Union take their entire strategic arsenal off alert. As we understand his proposal, all warheads would be removed from all ICBMs and placed in storage, all strategic submarines would return to their home ports and their missiles removed, all bombs and missiles deployed with strategic bombers would be placed in central storage. We also understand that the Russian Federation is willing to accept intrusive inspection to achieve verification.

This makes a lot of sense to us. It builds on President Bush's initiative of September 27, 1991 when all U.S. strategic bombers were taken off alert and a commitment was made to commence the process of deactivating all Minuteman II missiles. This produced a positive response by then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev for similar steps, a course that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has continued to follow.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev's proposal would go further by deactivating the entire arsenal of strategic weapons by separating warheads from all delivery vehicles —— from ICBMs, submarines, and bombers. They would be out of service on a mutual basis while negotiations continue on staged reductions of the strategic arsenal through dismantlement. Because each side now has fewer than 1,500 ICBMS, strategic submarines, and strategic bombers aggregated in a finite number of missile fields, submarine bases, and airfields, it would not be difficult to develop a comprehensive observation system.

Procedures already agreed to in the INF and START agreements could be the point of departure.

The Honorable James A. Baker May __, 1992 Page two.

Taking the strategic arsenal off alert in this manner would be a tremendous confidence building measure. It would greatly enhance the security of the United States by assuring that no missiles are actively targeted at our homeland. With what were once Soviet missiles out of service and under observation, the United States would be protected from sudden attack by a renegade military group under conditions of instability in Russia and the other successor states.

Therefore, we urge you to work out arrangements with the Russian Federation, supported by agreements with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, to take all strategic weapons off alert by removing their warheads from delivery vehicles and holding them under observation on a reciprocal basis.

As this happens, we believe that Great Britain, France, and China should join in this action. This would remove the remote possibility of an attack on our homeland by the only other nations now possessing missiles capable of reaching the United States. We believe that these three nuclear powers have a self-interest in joining the United States, Russia, and the other successor states in taking all strategic missiles off alert by removing warheads from delivery vehicles.

As you pursue this objective, we will help by building favorable public opinion in the United States. We are certain that the American people will be relieved to know that they are at last safe from nuclear attack from afar. Popular support will be widespread.

Sincerely yours,

Dear Colleague:

In February a number of national organizations signed a letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin, requesting them to take their respective strategic arsenals off alert. A couple of months later we received a reply from Margaret Tutwiler, spokesman for the U.S. State Department, indicating that President Bush appreciates our public spirit in letting him know our views. In the meantime several of the signers met with Robert Einhorn of the State Department's policy planning unit. He said that the U.S. government was not now willing to consider taking all strategic weapons off alert because of (a) uncertainty of stability in Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union and (b) unresolved issues on how the four post-Soviet possessors of nuclear weapons relate to the START agreement and other arms control treaties. He said, however, that Secretary of State Baker had discussed the off-alert idea with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

In order to reach the Russian government I mailed the letter to President Yeltsin in Moscow and mailed, delivered, and faxed copies of the letter to possible contacts at the Russian Embassy in Washington. Although I was unsuccessful in getting an appointment at the Russian Embassy, our letter to Moscow apparently worked its way to President Yeltsin, who instructed the Soviet Embassy to make contact with us and affirm that the Russian Federation agreed with our ideas. Igor Neverov, first secretary (arms control) at the Russian Embassy, sought us out, and on May 11 Sherman Harris, chair of Methodists United, and I met with him. He pointed out that Foreign Minister Kozyrev had made a zero alert proposal to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 12. Kozyrev proposed that all warheads would be removed from all ICBMs and placed in storage, all

strategic submarines would return to their home ports and their missiles removed, all bombs and missiles deployed with strategic bombers would be placed in central storage. Mr. Neverov indicated that the Russian Federation is willing to accept intrusive inspection to achieve verification of this arrangement. This, of course, is what we have proposed.

As a next step to get the U.S. government to agree, I propose that we send a group letter to Secretary Baker. He seems to be succeeding in clarifying post-Soviet responsibility for START and other arms control treaties. He will be meeting again with Foreign Minister Kozyrev in a couple of weeks. Therefore, I have drafted the enclosed letter. Please call me with your comments and your willingness to be a signer. I can be reached at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

May 14, 1992

To: Robert Musil

FAX No. (202) 785-3942 Telephone No. (202) 785-3777

From: Howard W. Hallman

FAX No. (301) 652-8516 (Trio Copy Shop)

Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

Bob, I can't make today's meeting of Manhattan Project II. However, I would like to share information on developments regarding our proposal to take the strategic arsenal off alert. As a follow through, I have drafted a letter to Secretary of State Baker for comments and signatures.

Would you do me the favor of making copies and distributing them at the meeting. I'll call you later afternoon or tomorrow morning for comments.

Thanks.

To sign on, please call Howard Hallman at (301) 897-3668 by 5:00 p.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1992

CITIZEN INITIATIVE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

May 21, 1992

The Honorable James A. Baker Secretary of State 2201 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

We wish to commend you for your diligent efforts to adapt the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to changes that occurred with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With strategic weapons based in four successor states, it is important for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to all be bound by the provisions of START. You seem to be making excellent progress to achieve this result.

With this nearing accomplishment we urge you to give careful consideration to a related proposal made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 12, 1992. He proposed that the United States and the successor states of the Soviet Union take their entire strategic arsenal off alert. As we understand his proposal, all warheads would be removed from all ICBMs and placed in storage, all strategic submarines would return to their home ports and their missiles removed, all bombs and missiles deployed with strategic bombers would be placed in central storage. We also understand that the Russian Federation is willing to accept intrusive inspection to achieve verification.

This makes a lot of sense to us. It builds on President Bush's initiative of September 27, 1991 when all U.S. strategic bombers were taken off alert and a commitment was made to commence the process of dismantling all Minuteman II missiles. This produced a positive response by then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev for similar steps, a course that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has continued to follow.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev's proposal would go further by deactivating the entire arsenal of strategic weapons by separating warheads from all delivery vehicles —— from ICBMs, submarines, and bombers. They would be out of service on a mutual basis while negotiations continue on staged reductions of the strategic arsenal through dismantlement. Because each side now has fewer than 1,500 ICBMS,

strategic submarines, and strategic bombers aggregated in a finite number of missile fields, submarine bases, and airfields, it would not be difficult to develop a comprehensive observation system.

Procedures already agreed to in the INF and START agreements could be the point of departure.

The Honorable James A. Baker May 22, 1992 Page two.

Taking the strategic arsenal off alert in this manner would be a tremendous confidence building measure. It would greatly enhance the security of the United States by assuring that no missiles are actively targeted at our homeland. With what were once Soviet missiles out of service and under observation, the United States would be protected from sudden attack by a renegade military group under conditions of instability in Russia and the other successor states.

Therefore, we urge you to work out arrangements with the Russian Federation, supported by agreements with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, to take all strategic weapons off alert by removing their warheads from delivery vehicles and holding them under observation on a reciprocal basis.

As this happens, we believe that Great Britain, France, and China should join in this action. This would remove the remote possibility of an attack on our homeland by the only other nations now possessing missiles capable of reaching the United States. We believe that these three nuclear powers have a self-interest in joining the United States, Russia, and the other successor states in taking all strategic missiles off alert by removing warheads from delivery vehicles.

As you pursue this objective, we will help by building favorable public opinion in the United States. We are certain that the American people will be relieved to know that they are at last safe from nuclear attack from afar. Popular support will be widespread.

Sincerely yours,

Dear Colleague:

In February you joined with some other national organizations in signing a letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin, requesting them to take their respective strategic arsenals off alert. A couple of months later we received a reply from Margaret Tutwiler, spokesman for the U.S. State Department, indicating that President Bush appreciates our public spirit in letting him know our views. In the meantime several of the signers met with Robert Einhorn of the State Department's policy planning unit. He said that the U.S. government was not now willing to consider taking all strategic weapons off alert because of (a) uncertainty of stability in Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union and (b) unresolved issues on how the four post-Soviet possessors of nuclear weapons relate to the START agreement and other arms control treaties. He said, however, that Secretary of State Baker had discussed the off-alert idea with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

In order to reach the Russian government I mailed the letter to President Yeltsin in Moscow and mailed, delivered, and faxed copies of the letter to possible contacts at the Russian Embassy in Washington. Although I was unsuccessful in getting an appointment at the Russian Embassy, our letter to Moscow apparently worked its way to President Yeltsin, who instructed the Soviet Embassy to make contact with us and affirm that the Russian Federation agreed with our ideas. Igor Neverov, first secretary (arms control) at the Russian Embassy, sought us out, and on May 11 Sherman Harris, chair of Methodists United, and I met with him. He pointed out that Foreign Minister Kozyrev had made a zero alert proposal to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 12. Kozyrev proposed that all warheads would be removed from all ICBMs and placed in storage, all

strategic submarines would return to their home ports and their missiles removed, all bombs and missiles deployed with strategic bombers would be placed in central storage. Mr. Neverov indicated that the Russian Federation is willing to accept intrusive inspection to achieve verification of this arrangement. This, of course, is what we have proposed.

As a next step to get the U.S. government to agree, I propose that we send a group letter to Secretary Baker. He seems to be succeeding in clarifying post-Soviet responsibility for START and other arms control treaties. He will be meeting again with Foreign Minister Kozyrev in a couple of weeks. If you are willing to sign the enclosed letter, please call me by 5:00 p.m., Wednesday, May 20 at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: May 21, 1992

To: Mr. Robert Einhorn, Office of Policy Planning

U.S.Department of State

FAX No. (202) 647-0753 Telephone No. (202) 647-3548

From: Howard W. Hallman, Executive Director

FAX No. (301) 652-8516 (Trio Copy Shop) Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

I am sending a letter to Secretary James A. Baker to you with a request that you bring the letter to his attention as soon as possible. In the letter a variety of signers request Secretary Baker to give careful consideration to the proposal of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozygrev to take the strategic arsenal off alert and separate all warheads from delivery vehicles, offered in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament on February 12, 1992.

A small delegation of the signers would welcome an opportunity to meet with Secretary Baker to indicate our support for this action and our willingness to develop public support in the United States.

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: May 21, 1992

To: General John A. Gordon

National Security Council

FAX No. (202) 395-3380 Telephone No. (202) 395-3330

From: Howard W. Hallman, Executive Director

FAX No. (301) 652-8516 (Trio Copy Shop) Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

I would like to share with you a letter to Secretary James A. Baker from a variety of signers and request you to show the letter to General Scowcroft. In this letter we request Secretary Baker to give careful consideration to the proposal of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozygrev to take the strategic arsenal off alert and separate all warheads from delivery vehicles, offered in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament on February 12, 1992.

This course makes a lot of sense to us. We are prepared to develop public support in the United States for this action.

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE 421 Seward Square, SE Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: May 21, 1992

To: Igor S. Neverov, First Secretary (Arms Control)

Embassy of the Russian Federation

FAX No. (202) 347-5028 Telephone No. (202) 628-7551

From: Howard W. Hallman, Executive Director

FAX No. (301) 652-8516 (Trio Copy Shop) Telephone No. (301) 897-3668

I would like to share with you a letter to U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker from a variety of signers. In this letter we request Secretary Baker to give careful consideration to the proposal of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozygrev to take the strategic arsenal off alert and separate all warheads from delivery vehicles, offered in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament on February 12, 1992.

Sherman Harris and I appreciated the opportunity to talk with you about this idea last week. We hope that we can keep in touch.

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton 2187 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

We have previously shared with you the idea of taking the entire global strategic arsenal off alert and separating all warheads from their delivery vehicles. This would enhance security for all sides while arms reduction negotiations proceed and deep cuts in the strategic arsenal occur through step-by-step dismantlement.

On February 21, 1992 a number of American organizations advocated this course in a letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin (Attachment A). As follow up, a delegation of the signers met with Mr. Robert Einhorn in the State Department's Policy Planning Division on March 27. He told us the idea was not timely because of the uncertainty of who controls the former Soviet strategic arsenal and anyway the United States would never want to go to zero alert.

At first we were unsuccessful in reaching anyone in the Russian Embassy to discuss this idea, but a letter we sent by mail to Moscow apparently reached President Yeltsin himself. He instructed the Embassy in Washington to get in touch with us. Mr. Igor Neverov, first secretary (arms control) sought us out, and we met with him on May 11. He told us that the Russian Federation accepted the idea of zero alert and that Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had stated this in Geneva on February 12. Following our conversation, Mr. Neverov put in writing the Embassy's reply, including

language from Minister Kozyrev's speech in Geneva (Attachment B). You will note a willingness to separate warheads from delivery vehicles and to have intrusive verification.

On May 21 a number of American citizen organizations wrote to Secretary of State James Baker (Attachment C), urging him to accept the Russian offer and to work out arrangements for the United States and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to take all strategic weapons off alert.

We understand that when President Bush and President Yeltsin meet later this month they will discuss strategic weapons reduction beyond START and also lowering the alert status (though not necessarily "zero" alert). In anticipation of this meeting we would encourage you and your colleagues in the House of Representative to write President Bush, urging him to accept the proposal that Minister Kozyrev advanced in Geneva. This would consist of separating warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all submarines into port and removing their missiles, and placing all bombs in central storage, achieved with appropriate verification. We would hope that you could get members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to join you in such a letter, and also other Democrats and Republicans who favor nuclear arms reduction.

The Honorable Lee Hamilton June 3, 1992 Page two.

If you decide to circulate such a letter to members of the House, we are available to work with your staff to make contacts with other offices. We can also get help from other organizations.

We also want you to know that we took this idea to the United Methodist General Conference in Louisville. A legislative committee endorsed a resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option" by a vote of 75-6 with two abstentions (Attachment D). The measure went on the consent calendar and was adopted by the whole body. The resolution favors mutual deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal followed by staged and verified dismantlement of all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, a halt in further production and testing, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and an end to the futile effort to achieve strategic defense.

On a personal note, I was pleased to meet your brother at General Conference.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director

cc. Michael Van Dusen

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
229 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Bumpers:

We have previously shared with you the idea of taking the entire global strategic arsenal off alert and separating all warheads from their delivery vehicles. This would enhance security for all sides while arms reduction negotiations proceed and deep cuts in the strategic arsenal occur through step-by-step dismantlement.

On February 21, 1992 a number of American organizations advocated this course in a letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin (Attachment A). As follow up, a delegation of the signers met with Mr. Robert Einhorn in the State Department's Policy Planning Division on March 27. He told us the idea was not timely because of the uncertainty of who controls the former Soviet strategic arsenal and anyway the United States would never want to go to zero alert.

At first we were unsuccessful in reaching anyone in the Russian Embassy to discuss this idea, but a letter we sent by mail to Moscow apparently reached President Yeltsin himself. He instructed the Embassy in Washington to get in touch with us. Mr. Igor Neverov, first secretary (arms control) sought us out, and we met with him on May 11. He told us that the Russian Federation accepted the idea of zero alert and that Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had stated this in Geneva on February 12. Following our conversation, Mr. Neverov put in writing the Embassy's reply, including

language from Minister Kozyrev's speech in Geneva (Attachment B). You will note a willingness to separate warheads from delivery vehicles and to have intrusive verification.

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We understand that when President Bush and President Yeltsin meet later this month they will discuss strategic weapons reduction beyond START and also lowering the alert status (though not necessarily "zero" alert). In anticipation of this meeting we would encourage you and your colleagues in the Senate to write President Bush, urging him to accept the proposal that Minister Kozyrev advanced in Geneva. This would consist of separating warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all submarines into port and removing their missiles, and placing all bombs in central storage, achieved with appropriate verification. We would hope that you could get both Democrats and Republicans who favor nuclear arms reduction to join you in this letter.

The Honorable Dale Bumpers June 3, 1992 Page two.

If you decide to circulate such a letter to members of the Senate, we are available to work with your staff to make contacts with other offices. We can also get help from other organizations.

We also want you to know that we took this idea to the United Methodist General Conference in Louisville. A legislative committee endorsed a resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option" by a vote of 75-6 with two abstentions (Attachment D). The measure went on the consent calendar and was adopted by the whole body. The resolution favors mutual deactivation of the entire strategic arsenal followed by staged and verified dismantlement of all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, a halt in further production and testing, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and an end to the futile effort to achieve strategic defense.

With best regards,

The Honorable Richard Cheney
U.S. Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

What extraordinary events are occurring within the former Soviet Union! The latest move is the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States by the three slavic republics with the possibilities of others joining. This seems to be a positive development, but a lot of uncertainty remains.

We are particularly concerned that the strategic nuclear arsenal is still in place. U.S. missiles remain actively targeted at sites throughout the independent states and republics, including those controlled by reformers. Meanwhile, Soviet missiles remain actively targeted at sites throughout the United States. But what happens if another coup occurs in what remains the Soviet government and military and these strategic missiles fall into the hands of irresponsible hardliners?

From the perspective of both the United States and the independent states and republics of the former Soviet Union, the wisest and most secure course would be to take the entire strategic arsenal completely out of service as quickly as possible. President Bush started in this direction with his September 21 initiative, and President Gorbachev moved in the same direction with his October 5 reciprocal response. Now is the time to go much farther and much faster.

Therefore, we propose the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the globe. Already U.S. and Soviet strategic bombers are off alert. The next steps should be to:

- Bring all strategic submarines into port, remove their missiles, and take off their warheads, and
- Open all ICBM silos, take out the missiles, place them on the ground, and remove their warheads.

The lead should be taken the United States and the four former Soviet republics where strategic missiles are based, plus the remaining Soviet central command. Great Britain, France, and China should join in. As a safeguard there could be reciprocal observation teams, or international observers under United Nations auspices, to assure that missiles and delivery vehicles remain deactivated.

With the immediate threat of strategic nuclear attack eliminated, the nuclear possessor nations should then embark upon a carefully balanced program to dismantle all strategic delivery vehicles and their warheads. Dismantlement can begin with the weapons specified in the START agree-ment, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7

The Honorable Richard Cheney December 10, 1991 Page two.

years. Then the remaining US/Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so. This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side. The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness. The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors.

This two-phase approach would be very stabilizing. Immediate deactivation would quickly eliminate the threat of surprise, accidental, or diabolical strategic nuclear attack. Then over a period of time the strategic arsenal would be totally dismantled in a carefully balanced sequence.

We believe that these recommendations are achievable because the Cold War is over and no nation on Earth has any self-interest to attack another nation with nuclear weapons. We request an opportunity to meet with some one on your staff in order to present our ideas more fully.

Sincerely yours,

December 10, 1991

The Honorable David J. Gribbin, III

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs

U.S. Department of Defense

The Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Gribbin:

You may recall that we met at Foundry United Methodist Church last spring when I was leading a discussion at the Peace Mission.

I am channeling this letter to Secretary Cheney through you with a request that you help me arrange a meeting with someone on his staff who deals with policies on nuclear strategic weapons. I'll greatly appreciate your assistance. You can reach me at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

December 10, 1991

To: Ivo Spalatin

Here's the letter to Congressman Fascell that I mentioned over the phone. I would like to discuss our ideas with you when you return to town. You can reach me at (301) 897-3668.

Howard W. Hallman

Messrs. Robert MacNeil and Jim Lehrer The News Hour 3620 S. 27th Street Arlington, VA 22206

Gentlemen:

As usual I enjoyed your informed discussion last night, this time on the issue of Soviet nuclear weapons. At the same time I was disappointed that the primary emphasis was upon control while the most important issue is the need for total abolition. And that includes U.S. nuclear weapons, and those of the other possessors. I was also disappointed, as I often am with your program, that you brought in the views only of establishment persons from university, thinktank, and the defense community. Seldom do you offer the views on these issue from the religious community and the non-establishment citizen peace movement.

I suppose that in part I am writing out of frustration that our own views on how to eliminate nuclear weapons globally have been almost totally ignored by the news media. In the enclosed statement, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option: Now Is the Time", we build upon the rejection of nuclear deterrence by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in 1986. Then we take the position that not only is strategic deterrence immoral but it is also unnecessary in the post-Cold War, post-defeated Soviet coup era. This leads us to recommend a two-phase approach to getting rid of the strategic nuclear arsenal: immediate deactivation and then staged dismantlement.

We recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire

land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the Soviet Union and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

Deactivation would be followed by a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining US/Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so.

Messrs. Robert MacNeil and Jim Lehrer December 17, 1991 Page two.

- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in the remnants of the Soviet Union. It would also provide a solution to the question: what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence?

- Does the United States target the airfields and ports where U.S. planes and ships may be soon be arriving with food supplies?
- Do we target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Do we target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Byelorus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent Republics?
- Do we target Kiev, capital of the independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?

For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until

mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

I am focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present danger to the United States. We are also concerned about other nuclear weapons, as our statement reveals. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous, global nonproliferation regime, and stop the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system.

Do you think that these are legitimate views that deserve airing as you cover the full scope of possibilities in the News Hour?

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Bruce von Voorst Time Magazine 1040 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. von Voorst:

I appreciate the informative piece that you narrated on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour last night on the issue of Soviet nuclear weapons. At the same time I was disappointed that the primary emphasis was upon control while the most important issue is the need for total abolition. And that includes U.S. nuclear weapons, and those of the other possessors.

We lay out this view in the enclosed statement, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option: Now Is the Time". We build upon the rejection of nuclear deterrence by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in 1986. Then we take the position that not only is strategic deterrence immoral but it is also unnecessary in the post-Cold War, post-defeated Soviet coup era. This leads us to recommend a two-phase approach to getting rid of the strategic nuclear arsenal: immediate deactivation and then staged dismantlement.

We recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the Soviet Union and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

Deactivation would be followed by a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining US/Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so.
- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing.

Mr. Bruce von Voorst December 17, 1991 Page two.

with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.

■ The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in the remnants of the Soviet Union. It would also provide a solution to the question: what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence?

- Does the United States target the airfields and ports where U.S. planes and ships may be soon be arriving with food supplies?
- Do we target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Do we target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Byelorus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent Republics?
- Do we target Kiev, capital of the independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?

For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

I am focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present danger to the United States. We are also concerned about other nuclear

weapons, as our statement reveals. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous, global nonproliferation regime, and stop the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system.

We hope that you will consider these legitimate views that deserve attention as you cover the full scope of possibilities in Time Magazine and in any further segments you develop for the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. R. Jeffrey Smith Washington Post 1150 15th Street, NW Washington, DC 20071

Dear Mr. Smith:

I appreciate the informative articles you write from time to time on issues dealing with nuclear weapons and their reduction. I notice, though, that you tend to concentrate mostly on the views of establishment figures from the defense community, universities, and thinktanks. I urge you also to bring into your articles views of the religious community and peace organizations.

For example, these days most discussion centers on the need to assure that the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are kept under control. Neglected is discussion of the need to get rid of them altogether, and those of the United States and other possessors at the same time.

We lay out this view in the enclosed statement, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option: Now Is the Time". We build upon the rejection of nuclear deterrence by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in 1986. Then we take the position that not only is strategic deterrence immoral but it is also unnecessary in the post-Cold War, post-defeated Soviet coup era. This leads us to recommend a two-phase approach to getting rid of the strategic nuclear arsenal: immediate deactivation and then staged dismantlement.

We recommend the immediate and concurrent deactivation of the entire

land- and sea-based strategic arsenal throughout the world. This would be accomplished by

- Bringing all strategic submarines into port, removing their missiles, and taking off their warheads, and
- Opening all ICBM silos, taking out the missiles, placing them on the ground, and removing their warheads.

This action should commence with the United States and the Soviet Union and then bring in Great Britain, France, and China. It builds upon President Bush's September 21 initiative and President Gorbachev's October 5 reciprocal response which have already taken strategic bombers off alert. Our proposal, though, goes much farther and much faster.

Deactivation would be followed by a staged and balanced program to dismantle all strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles. For example:

- Begin dismantlement with the weapons specified in the START agreement, except accomplished in 7 weeks or at most 7 months rather than 7 years.
- Then the remaining US/Soviet arsenal could be cut in half within another year or so.

Mr. Jeffrey Smith December 18, 1991 Page two.

- This could be followed by reduction to a level that some advocate as "minimal deterrence", such as 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads on each side.
- The next-to-last stage could keep a small number of strategic warheads, certainly 50 or less, as a precautionary measure for dealing. with potential new nuclear-weapon states until a rigorous nonproliferation regime has proven its effectiveness.
- The final stage would go the rest of the way to zero, encompassing all of the strategic weapons of all possessors. There is no reason why this couldn't be achieved by the year 2000, or even before.

Immediate deactivation would take away the danger of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands in the remnants of the Soviet Union. It would also provide a solution to the question: what are now the targets for U.S. strategic missiles in the name of nuclear deterrence?

- Does the United States target the airfields and ports where U.S. planes and ships may be soon be arriving with food supplies?
- Do we target the command and control center in Moscow where Russian President Boris Yeltsin is leading a strong effort to achieve a free-market economy? Or St. Petersburg (sister city of Los Angeles) where the mayor is leading a movement of democratic reform?
- Do we target Minsk (sister city of Detroit), the capital of independent Byelorus, and also headquarters of the new Commonwealth of Independent Republics?
- Do we target Kiev, capital of the independent Ukraine and the port of Odessa (sister city of Baltimore)?

For the cautious, deactivation would hold a supply of missiles in reserve until

mutual dismantlement can be completed, but there would be no specific targets.

I am focusing on strategic nuclear weapons because that is the only present danger to the United States. We are also concerned about other nuclear weapons, as our statement reveals. We want to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons globally, halt all testing and production, achieve a vigorous, global nonproliferation regime, and stop the development of an unnecessary strategic defense system.

We hope that you will consider that these legitimate views deserving attention as you cover the full scope of possibilities in your writing for the Washington Post.

Sincerely yours,