

START II: Too Timid for Post-Cold War Era

by Howard W. Hallman¹

The START II nuclear arms reduction agreement signed by U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3 in Moscow can be viewed from two perspectives.

Looking backward to the Cold War, START II accomplishes far more than any previous strategic nuclear arms control agreement. SALT I and SALT II, the two agreements of the 1970s, placed ceilings on nuclear arms competition but allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals. START I, signed in 1991 and not yet completely ratified, requires reductions of 25 to 35 percent in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range strategic missiles and bombers. However, reduction would come mainly by eliminating outmoded delivery systems without destroying any nuclear warheads.

In comparison, START II will reduce the number of strategic warheads deployed by the United States and Russia to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side. It will eliminate all multi-warhead, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by the year 2003. These are the ones which nuclear weapons theorists consider to be the most destabilizing because they tempt one side to destroy its adversary's land-based, multi-warhead ICBMs through a preemptive attack. It's considered an advantage for one missile to take out three to ten warheads, but using a missile to destroy only a single

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warhead is no bargain.

Under START II the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenal would consist of single warhead ICBMs, strategic submarines which cannot be destroyed through preemptive attack, and long-range bombers. By 2003 the U.S. arsenal would be back to the level of the 1960s, and the Russian arsenal would be similar to the Soviet arsenal of the 1970s.

Looking forward to the world we want to live in, that's not nearly good enough. START II signifies that the United States and Russia intend to continue to actively target one another with strategic nuclear weapons forever. By the time START II is fully implemented in 2003, the Cold War will have been over for 12 years, but the Cold War doctrine of strategic nuclear deterrence will still reign. Both U.S. and Russian homelands will still be subject to nuclear attack by weapons 20 minutes away!

A Better Way: Immediate Deactivation

There's a much better way available: immediately deactivate the entire strategic arsenal by separating all warheads from delivery vehicles. With this accomplished, actual dismantlement, including destruction of warheads, could occur in an agreed sequence over a period of years. While this is occurring, strategic weapons would be out of service but under mutual surveillance to assure that warheads and delivery vehicles are not re-attached.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy, has advocated this course since the fall of 1991. More than thirty national peace and arms control organizations registered their support for the idea in a letter to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in February

1992. The United Methodist General Conference included this approach in a broader resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", adopted in Louisville in May 1992. This was a follow-on to the United Methodist bishops elegant 1986 statement, *In Defense of Creation*, denying the moral legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, a viewpoint affirmed by the 1988 United Methodist General Conference.

Even more significant for international relations, Russia has indicated a willingness to consider the possibility of strategic deactivation. This came in a speech by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on February 12, 1992 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He stated:

First, we may consider taking off the alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers, which are targeted on one another's territories or facilities, thus placing nuclear weapons on a "zero alert posture".

Second, keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart could prove a useful idea. In other words, ICBMs on launchers would carry no front sections, submarines berthed in home ports would carry no SLBMs or SLCMs, and heavy bomber nuclear weapons including nuclear ALCMs would be kept in central-run storages. In this way, we would be guaranteed against their unauthorized or accidental use. Another benefit of this measure is its verifiability. The details of verification could be agreed upon.

Unfortunately the Bush Administration chose not to accept this remarkable offer. Moreover, the American press gave it almost no attention. Even so, the Russia offer is probably still on the table. It is something that President Bill Clinton should take up immediately and quickly work out an

agreement with Russia. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan should be included so as to disarm strategic missiles still on their territories. Then Great Britain, France, and China should be brought it, though this could be safely deferred until after the United States and Russia reach agreement.

Strategic nuclear deactivation could occur by the United States on one side and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan on the other simultaneously removing all warheads from their ICBMs and placing them in observed storage and bringing all their submarines into port and removing their missiles. Since the fall of 1991 both sides have kept nuclear weapons off their strategic bombers and in storage. This can be continued with proper surveillance.

Verification

Proper verification would be essential. Fortunately there is already practical experience to draw upon from the Intermediate Nuclear Force Reduction (INF) Treaty. Moreover, the START I agreement has relevant provisions to draw upon. Because there are only a few dozen U.S. and Russian strategic missile fields, airbases, and submarine bases, observation teams could easily be organized and dispatched so that each side could verify the other's deactivation. Both nations have plenty of personnel available for mutual verification activities.

On-site U.S. observation teams could provide an effective safeguard from surreptitious rearming by some future reactionary regime that might come to power in Russia. If this occurred, the United States would have time to reestablish a more active deterrent by reinstalling warheads on ICBMs and rearming strategic submarines and sending them to sea.

In this manner, the powerful Russian, multi-warhead

Russian S-18s, which U.S.

military strategist fear the most, could be taken out of active service within seven to ten weeks rather than waiting for staged dismantlement over a seven to ten year period as contemplated under START

II. This would immediately increase U.S. homeland security against an unexpected nuclear attack from afar.

Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to join this deactivation process. But even if they don't do so immediately, there would be no great danger. They would know that the United States and Russia would retain much of their strategic arsenal in reserve and would have plenty of missiles available to rearm in the event of a surprise attack by one of the other nuclear powers.

Any other nation producing nuclear weapons would likewise know that they could not safely attack the United States or Russia without risking retaliation by rearmed strategic missiles. Moreover, a vigorous nonproliferation campaign to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles is essential to go along with nuclear arms elimination by the current possessors.

Fallacy of Nuclear Deterrence

I have tried hard to find reasons why the United States would not want to accept the Russian offer to take the strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. One reason may be because the policy of nuclear deterrence is so longstanding and the habit of deployment is so strong that U.S. policy makers cannot conceive of not keeping at least one U.S. strategic submarine on duty at all times. It has become a kind of psychological dependency regardless of security needs. Yet, our true security would be much better served if mutual deactivation occurred as soon as possible.

Another reason may be because policy makers believe that U.S. global responsibilities require

maintaining an active nuclear deterrent into the foreseeable future. However, if you consider the doctrine of nuclear deterrence pragmatically by examining the last 47 years of experience rather than relying on thinktank theories, you will notice that strategic deterrence has a very limited function. Indeed, history shows it is vastly overrated.

At the moment all that U.S. strategic weapons deter is the use of strategic weapons by other nations. At one time many persons insisted that a second function was to reinforce NATO's deterrence of Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but that is now moot. There is nothing else that strategic weapons now deter.

In the years since 1945, U.S. nuclear weapons did not deter many grievous events. They include:

- North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950)
- North Vietnam's conquest of South Vietnam (1956-73)
- Repeated Soviet acts of repression in Eastern Europe (East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, several times)
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979)
- Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1990)
- Repeated Israeli-Arab conflict
- Other regional and civil wars, bringing the total to 125 wars since 1945
- Terrorist attacks and hostage-taking

If you take the knowledge of what wasn't deterred by strategic weapons and apply it to current strife and possible future conflict during the next ten to twenty years, you will discover that U.S.

strategic submarines and other legs of the triad have no capacity to deter these events. For example:

- Internal conflict in disintegrated Yugoslavia, independent states of the former Soviet Union, African nations, and elsewhere
- Arab-Israeli conflict (negotiations are the answer)
- War between Arab states
- War between India and Pakistan (even if they are nuclearly armed)
- Russian invasion of Baltic states and other independent states with Russian enclaves (experience of Eastern Europe repeated, undeterred by U.S. nuclear might)
- A new Korean War
- Regional wars elsewhere
- Threatened use of biological or chemical (if a military deterrent is relied upon, it most likely would be through conventional forces; but even if a nuclear deterrent were brought into play, it would not be through strategic submarines, ICBMs, or long-range bombers)
- Terrorist attacks

The United States may conclude that it has global responsibilities to deal with these events, but strategic nuclear weapons have no relevance. Their awesome power is far out of proportion to the events to be deterred, so they provide no credible threat. Neither do they have military utility in these kinds of wars, as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower concluded for the Korean War and Presidents Johnson and Nixon decided during the Vietnam War.

Practical Value of Deactivation

This leads us back to the initial finding that all that strategic nuclear weapons are now deterring is other strategic weapons. Because this is their only utility, all sides would be better off if all strategic

weapons were taken off alert simultaneously by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. This would enhance every nuclear state's national security during the period when strategic weapons are being dismantled in a balanced and staged manner, as will occur under START I, START II, and future strategic weapons dismantlement treaties.

Some persons, though, wonder what if Russia or one of the other states surreptitiously hid a dozen or a hundred strategic warheads and missiles, especially cruise missiles. There are two answers. First, Russia could not be certain whether that the United States has done likewise, and this uncertainty itself would act as a deterrent. Second, there is nothing Russia wants to accomplish that would bring strategic nuclear weapons into play. Russian leaders will not say, "Give us more economic assistance, or we'll attack Washington and New York." If reactionary leaders come to power and try to expand Russia territory, the United States will not threaten nuclear attack to prevent it, just as the U.S. did not when the Soviet Union was the aggressor against Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.

Some persons also insist that the United States need to keep its strategic arsenal armed to deter nuclear attack by a terrorist state or a terrorist group. They also argue for a limited strategic defense for the same reason. The first response is that vigorous nonproliferation measures are the best defense. The nonproliferation problem is challenging but finite, and it is interwoven with political instability in several regions of the globe. Through a combination of diplomacy and international pressures, new nations can be blocked from developing nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems.

Secondly, the United States has no protection from a suitcase-size nuclear explosive device. It can enter the country in a small plane wrapped in a bail of marijuana or on a fishing boat along with a

shipment of cocaine. It can be carried aboard a chartered passenger plane and dropped on Washington, New York, or some other target. Ballistic missile defense cannot prevent this kind of attack. Even if one believes that the threat of strategic retaliation is needed to deter a small state, such Libya, Iraq, or Iran, from sneaking a bomb into this country, the United States has plenty of conventional firepower to do the job. Only a strong, international nonproliferation regime will keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.

Deactivation of the strategic nuclear is a way to make a significant breakthrough in the quest for global nuclear disarmament. It is a matter that President Clinton should elevate to a top spot on his foreign policy agenda.

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January 4, 1993

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January 4, 1993

Mr. James M. Wall, Editor
The Christian Century
407 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, IL 60605

Dear Mr. Wall:

I am submitting an article entitled "START II: Too Timid for the Post-Cold War Era" for your consideration for publication in *The Christian Century*.

My point is that the recently signed START II agreement is significant compared to previous Cold War arms reduction treaties but is not good enough for the post-Cold War era. I indicate that the Russians have proposed going to a "zero alert posture" by removing all warheads from ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keep nuclear weapons off bombers, all with proper verification. This would require reciprocal action by the United States. It would be a good deal because it would take the powerful Russian SS-18 missiles out of service immediately rather than waiting until 2003 as contemplated under START II. It is an approach that President Bill Clinton should pursue.

I also point out that the doctrine of strategic nuclear deterrence has no practical purpose any more except to deter other strategic weapons. If

these weapons were deactivated, nuclear deterrence would no longer be necessary. The U.S. homeland would be much safer under these circumstances.

I write from my experience working on issues of nuclear disarmament for the past ten years. I served as executive director of Methodists United for Peace with Justice from 1989 until June 1992 and now serve as issues chair of that organization. On a personal note (though I don't expect it to influence your editorial judgement), I believe you know my brother, Bob Hallman in Elmhurst, for I met your wife when I visited Bob and Mary last September. Also, my cousin, Walter Brueggemann, is a regular contributor to *The Christian Century*.

If you would like the article on computer disc (WordPerfect 5.0), I can supply you a copy. If you decide that my article is not suitable for *The Christian Century*, please return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

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DEACTIVATION OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC ARSENAL

A Proposal by
Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a national association of laity and clergy. We formed in 1987 in response to a call from the United Methodist Council of Bishops for greater witness and action on issues of nuclear disarmament and other peace and justice concerns. We have participants from several Methodist denominations but are not an official part of any of them.

Basic Proposal

As a step toward global denuclearization, we advocate that all possessors of strategic nuclear weapons should deactivate them by separating warheads from delivery vehicles and by bringing all strategic submarines into port and placing their missiles in safe storage. All of this should be done with thorough verification.

We are pleased that steps have been taken in this direction. Through an initiative of President Bush in September 1991 and reciprocal response by then Soviet President Gorbachev, strategic bombers were taken off alert and their bombs placed in storage. The United States has withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons from forward basing in Europe and Korea (except for 500-700 tactical bombs remaining in Europe). When Soviet troops left Eastern Europe, they removed their tactical nuclear weapons, and all such weapons have been returned to Russia from the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union. The United States and Russia have started to

dismantle ICBMs and strategic submarines covered by START I even before the treaty officially goes into effect.

We believe that now is the time to accelerate this process and achieve total deactivation, followed by complete dismantlement over the course of several years. As a goal, we propose that all strategic nuclear weapons throughout the globe be deactivated by August 6, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, and that total dismantlement be completed before the year 2000.

To move toward this goal the Clinton Administration should approach the Russian government and say that the United States is ready to discuss an offer made by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva in February 1992 to consider a "zero alert posture", achieved by "keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart", carried out with proper verification.

U.S. negotiators could tell the Russians that the United States is far along in dismantling the strategic weapons covered by START I, that Russia needs to catch up, and that both sides should quickly complete START I demobilization. This might be achieved by the end of 1993.

Simultaneously the ratification process for START II should be completed. Then the additional weapons covered by START II should have warheads removed from launchers and placed in safe, verified storage during the first eight months of 1994. START I and START II deactivation would be complete by August 6, 1994.

In the following twelve months the remaining strategic warheads should be taken off the delivery vehicles and stored. This process could have

monthly or quarterly phases so that both sides would have equal security during the final deactivation period. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to join this final phase, but the United States and Russia could safely go ahead even if they did not.

This would set the stage for gatherings for thanksgiving and celebration on August 6, 1995, marking the end of a 50 year era. Such action by the United States and Russia would also facilitate adoption of a much stronger Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty when the present treaty comes up for renewal in 1995.

Support for Concept

We have been advocating this course since the fall of 1991. We are pleased to realize that there is support for this concept from a number of persons who hold key positions in Russia and the United States. Thus, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev spoke favorably about this idea on February 12, 1992 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He stated:

First, we may consider taking off the alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers, which are targeted on one another's territories or facilities, thus placing nuclear weapons on a "zero alert posture".

Second, keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart could prove a useful idea. In other words, ICBMs on launchers would carry no front sections, submarines berthed in home ports would carry no SLBMs or SLCMs, and heavy bomber nuclear weapons including nuclear ALCMs would be kept in central-run storages. In this way, we

would be guaranteed against their unauthorized or accidental use. Another benefit of this measure is its verifiability. The details of verification could be agreed upon.

At about this time with signers from more than 30 national organizations in the United States, we wrote to President Bush and President Yeltsin in support of zero alert. The latter instructed personnel at the Russian Embassy in Washington to seek us out and assure us that this is the Russia policy, as evidenced by Kozyrev's statement in Geneva.

In the fall of 1992 three American policy practitioners, Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner (two of them now serving in the Clinton Administration), authored a report entitled *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*. published by the Brookings Institution. They indicated (pp.15-16):

An example of such a cooperative approach would be to attempt to forge cooperative agreements that focused on warheads instead of launchers. An important precedent for this approach was the September 1991 reciprocal initiative covering tactical nuclear weapons, wherein the United States and the then-Soviet Union pledged to withdraw many thousands of tactical warheads from active service and to dismantle many of them.

An analogous scheme for strategic weapons would allow the security benefits of the START agreement and the follow-on framework agreement [START II] to be achieved well before 2003. The parties could agree to the immediate removal of the warheads from all launchers slated for eventual deactivation under these agreements.

Judging from the pace at which tactical nuclear weapons were removed from active service to central storage depots by both sides since September 1991, removal of strategic warheads could probably be accomplished in less than a year.

Such a bold form of denuclearization would extend the process begun with tactical nuclear weapons to strategic weapons. It would remove the danger of unauthorized or accidental launch of weapons covered by the agreements, since launch would be harmless if the delivery vehicles had no warheads. It would accomplish in one year the removal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, heading off any possibility of nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet Union. It would dramatically underscore the deemphasizing of nuclear weapons that is so much in the interests of the great powers.

Since they wrote, the United States has unilaterally deactivated 90 percent of strategic nuclear warheads covered by START I by removing warheads from delivery vehicles and bringing submarines into port. Russia has done likewise with about 40 percent of its START I warheads but is held up from moving faster by budgetary restraints.

Merits

We concur in the advantages that Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner indicate for deactivating all nuclear weapons covered by START I and START II. We further believe that it would be a tremendous benefit for the United States to extend this approach to all strategic weapons throughout the globe. By encompassing all strategic weapons of the former Soviet Union (including those still based in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), it would quickly remove all the powerful S-18s and S-24s from active service. Mutual zero

alert would vastly increase U.S. homeland security against an unexpected nuclear attack from afar and would safeguard against actively deployed Russian missiles falling into the hands of a reactionary regime should President Yeltsin be overthrown.

Zero alert status can be achieved if the United States and Russia will agree reciprocally to remove warheads from all of ICBMs, bring all submarines into port and removing their missiles, and continue to keep nuclear weapons off our strategic bombers. Once off alert, Russian and U.S. strategic weapons can be dismantled in a staged and balanced manner, beginning with an accelerated START I and START II schedule with later additions. Other possessors can join this process.

Useless Weapons

Total deactivation is a very realistic step because nuclear weapons have no utility except to deter other nuclear weapons. If all possessors deactivated their nuclear arsenals simultaneously that one possible utility would no longer prevail.

The lack of utility for nuclear weapons is shown in the following table. It lists events that are taking place or may occur around the globe during the next ten to twenty years and examines whether the U.S. nuclear arsenal can deter them, or if not deter, can be useful in fighting wars in these situations. For every conceivable event, the answer is "no" on both questions. U.S. nuclear weapons, including strategic submarines, cannot deter these events from happening and have no warfighting utility if they should occur.

| Possible event | Are U.S. nuclear weapons useful for Deterrence? | Warfighting? |
|----------------|--|--------------|
|----------------|--|--------------|

| | | |
|--|----|----|
| Ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia | No | No |
| Ethnic conflict in states of former Soviet Union | No | No |
| Russian revanchism (attempts to recover lost territory) | No | No |
| Terrorist operations of Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, any other state or terrorist group | No | No |
| War between Israel and Arab states | No | No |
| Aggression of Iraq, Iran, Syria against their neighbors | No | No |
| Civil war in Africa | No | No |
| War between India and Pakistan | | |
| Border war between Russia and China | No | No |
| Chinese invasion of neighboring states | No | No |
| North Korean invasion of South Korea | No | No |
| Warfare in Southeast Asia | No | No |
| Communist insurgency in the Philippines | No | No |
| Civil war in Latin America | No | No |

We come to this conclusion inductively by reviewing (1) similar events of the past 48 years that actually happened and thus were not deterred by U.S. nuclear might and (2) wars in which U.S. political and military leaders

decided that U.S. weapons would not be used. This manner of thinking differs from most nuclear weapons theorists who reason deductively and never test their exotic theories by relating them to real-world experience.

Without going through the entire list, we can note that the 125 wars occurring since the end of World War II reveal that the U.S. nuclear arsenal cannot deter civil and ethnic wars and wars between divided nations (Korea, Vietnam). Furthermore, nuclear weapons have no warfighting utility in these situations, as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower concluded in the Korean War and Presidents Johnson and Nixon concluded in the Vietnam War.

U.S. nuclear weapons have not deterred small and medium-sized military powers from invading their neighbors, as Iraq did against Iran and then Kuwait. When the United States got involved in the latter situation, it had plenty of firepower without invoking nuclear weapons. If North Korea invaded South Korea, nuclear weapons would not be necessary or useful (among others Admiral Noel Gayler, who was once commander-in-chief of the Pacific Basin including Korea, has so testified).

U.S. nuclear weapons did not deter the Soviet Union from sending troops into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) and would not deter a reactionary Russian regime from seeking to regain Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic states, or enclaves of Russian population within those states. This would be true even if Russia no longer had active nuclear weapons, for U.S. national interest in protecting freedom of Russia's neighbors is insufficient to go to war with nuclear weapons. The only event for which the United States might have used nuclear weapons was Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and that is now totally moot.

U.S. nuclear weapons do not deter regional rivals from fighting, such as India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states, nations of Southeast Asia. Nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists. Nuclear weapons are not needed to deal with the threat of a small power, such as Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, or North Korea, which might surreptitiously acquire a few nuclear bombs.

An analogous situation was the concern during the Gulf War that Iraq might use chemical weapons. U.S. policy makers concluded that the United States had many other ways to retaliate without itself using chemical weapons. This was sufficient deterrent. The United States is now moving toward destruction of its total supply of chemical weapons on a reciprocal basis with other nations. It can properly do likewise with nuclear weapons.

Practicality

Although we are not military or arms control technical experts, the task of mutual deactivation doesn't seem that difficult. We already have experience under the INF treaty, the removal and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and the initial steps in START I deactivation.

For the latter we note a description in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1992, pp.48-49) on how the U.S. Air Force is retiring Minuteman II missiles.

Disarming the missiles is the first step in the retirement process. The Mark IIC reentry vehicles (RVs), with W56 warheads inside, are removed from the top of each missile. The RVs are transferred to a special van and, under heavy security, transported back to base. There the warheads are removed from the RVs, put in a special container, and placed in weapon storage igloos. ...Eventually, a C-141 will be used to

take a load of these warheads to an air force depot -- in this case, probably to Barksdale, in Louisiana, for temporary storage. When scheduling permits, they will be transported to the Pantex warhead assembly plant in Texas, where they will be disassembled.

It doesn't seem overwhelming to work out similar procedures for all of the former Soviet ICBMs and the remaining U.S. ICBMs. The whole operation could be observed by inspection teams from the other side with surveillance 24 hours a day. In a similar manner, observation teams can watch missiles come off strategic submarines and placed in storage, with or without warheads still attached (preferably the latter). And the stored weapons removed from bombers can similarly be kept under surveillance. Thereafter, warheads can be disassembled in stages.

As part of this process, it would not be totally inappropriate on an interim basis for unarmed strategic submarines to go to sea occasionally for training exercises (perhaps with observers from the other side aboard) so that they would be in shape for reinstallation of their missiles if the adversary put some of its strategic weapons back on alert status.

Other Nations

What about other possessors beyond Russia and the United States? Obviously Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have to be part of the arrangement. This seems quite possible in spite of the maneuvering now occurring. These nations have a self-interest in seeing that the Russian missiles are taken out of service. Their other concerns can be resolved. Moreover, we note that the United States has recently proposed that strategic missiles based in Ukraine be taken out of service and kept under surveillance, just the approach we are proposing for broader application.

Great Britain, France, and China should, of course, be invited to join this deactivation process. But even if they don't do so immediately, there would be no great danger. They would know that the United States and Russia would retain much of their strategic arsenal in reserve for a period and would have plenty of missiles available to rearm in the event of a surprise attack by one of the other nuclear powers. Any other nation producing nuclear weapons would likewise know that they could not safely attack the United States or Russia without risking retaliation by rearmed strategic missiles or by a powerful conventional force.

In addition, it is exceedingly important for the United States to carry out a vigorous nonproliferation campaign on nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles so that other nations do not join the nuclear weapons club. This is a demanding task, as current negotiations with North Korea indicate. But globally it is a finite task, for only a small number of nations have active nuclear ambitions.

In sum, we believe that moving quickly to deactivate all strategic weapons on a global basis is both desirable and practicable.

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For further information on the views of Methodists United for Peace with Justice on this issue, contact Howard W. Hallman, issues chair, on Monday through Thursday at (301) 694-2859 and on Friday and Saturday at (301) 897-3668.

September 9, 1993

METHODIST OPTION FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Executive Summary

1. In the 1986 the United Methodist Council of Bishops adopted a pastoral letter and foundation document entitled *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*. Based upon their biblical faith, the bishops said "a clear and unconditional No to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons." As part of their public policy proposals, the bishops supported "the earliest possible negotiation of phased but rapid reduction of nuclear arsenals", looking "to the eventual goal of a mutual and verifiable dismantling of all nuclear armaments.
2. In 1988 the United Methodist General Conference, the official policy body of the United Methodist Church, affirmed and supported the statements of the Council of Bishops in *In Defense of Creation*. In 1992 the General Conference adopted a fresh resolution entitled "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option." This resolution recognized that the United States and the Soviet Union had taken strategic bombers off alert in the fall of 1991. It recommended that the United States and successor states of the Soviet Union "immediately and concurrently deactivate their entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal." Then they "should work out a schedule for dismantling all strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and destroying their warheads. Great Britain, France, and China should join this schedule."
3. Building on this General Conference resolution, **Methodists United for Peace with Justice**, a national association of laity and clergy, has outlined a

phased approach to achieving zero alert of all strategic weapons. They advocate completion of START I deactivation, now underway, then deactivation of all strategic weapons covered by START II, and finally deactivation of the rest of the nuclear arsenal. "The goal for completion would be August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of dropping the atom bomb on Hiroshima."

This summary has been prepared by Methodists United for Peace with Justice. 421 Seward Square, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

September 9, 1993

METHODIST OPTION FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

During the past ten years the United Methodist Church, its leaders, and its members have seriously studied issues dealing with nuclear weapons and have offered recommendations pointing toward the goal of nuclear disarmament. Thus, there is a "Methodist Option" that should be considered as the Clinton Administration defines its policies on nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

United Methodist Council of Bishops

In 1986 the United Methodist Council of Bishops, after nearly two years of prayerful and penitent study, adopted a pastoral letter and foundation document entitled *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*. The bishops' statement was deeply rooted in biblical faith, which was spelled out in the foundation document. Based upon this faith the bishops in their pastoral letter stated unequivocally that:

we say a clear and unconditional No to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons. We conclude that nuclear deterrence is a position that cannot receive the church's blessing.¹

The bishops then offered a set of public policy proposals, one of which stated:

We support the earliest possible negotiation of phased but rapid

¹ United Methodist Council of Bishops, *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*. Nashville: United Methodist Publishing House, Graded Press, 1986. p. 92.

reduction of nuclear arsenals, while calling upon all other nuclear-weapon states to agree to parallel arms reductions, to the eventual goal of a mutual and verifiable dismantling of all nuclear armaments.²

Numerous local United Methodist congregations around the country studied *In Defense of Creation*, both its theological and biblical foundation and its policy recommendations. A new national organization of laity and clergy, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, formed to work for implementation of the bishops' recommendations.

United Methodist General Conference

In the United Methodist polity, only the General Conference, a quadrennial body with elected delegates, speaks for the entire United Methodist Church. The 1988 General Conference, meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, considered the ideas offered by the Council of Bishops and added to a standing resolution on "Christian Faith and Disarmament" the following statement:

² Op. cit., p. 76.

We especially affirm and support the statements of the Council of Bishops in their 1986 pastoral letter, "In Defense of Creation", and the accompanying foundation document. We urge our bishops to keep this concern before the Church.³

The 1992 General Conference, meeting in Louisville, Kentucky, returned to this subject, and adopted a fresh resolution entitled "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" (copy attached).⁴ The resolution explained:

With the Cold War ended, now is the time to exercise the zero option: to eliminate all nuclear weapons throughout the globe. That means reducing to zero the supply of all types of nuclear weapons held by all possessors. It means a halt to all testing and weapons production. It means preventing all non-possessor nations from acquiring weapons. (pp. 601-2)

Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, the resolution stated:

- We recommend that the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States immediately and concurrently deactivate their entire land- and sea-based strategic arsenal. They should:
 - bring all strategic submarines into port, remove their missiles, and take off the warheads;
 - open all ICBM silos, take out the missiles, place them on the

³ *The Book of Resolutions of the United Methodist Church, 1988.* Nashville: United Methodist Publishing House, 1988. p. 503.

⁴ *The Book of Resolutions of the United Methodist Church, 1992.* Nashville: United Methodist Publishing House, 1992. pp. 600-605.

ground, and remove the warheads.

- We hope that Great Britain, France, and China will understand the necessity to deactivate immediately their strategic arsenal: land-, air-, and sea-based.
- After deactivation is accomplished, the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States should work out a schedule for dismantling all strategy nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and destroying their warheads. Great Britain, France, and China should join this schedule. The process should be implemented in an agreed and verified sequence that is balanced so that at no stage could any nation gain an advantage. (p. 602)

In the flow of events Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the four inheritors of the Soviet strategic weapons, are acting more-or-less independently rather than through the Commonwealth of Independent States. Thus, these recommendations are applicable to each of them separately.

The 1992 United Methodist General Conference also adopted a separate resolution in support of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁵

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

⁵ *The Book of Resolutions, 1992.* pp. 568-570.

As an advocacy organization of laity and clergy, Methodists United for Peace with Justice has added details to the recommendations of the United Methodist General Conference for deactivating the global strategic arsenal. Methodists United advocates a phased approach to achieving zero alert of all strategic weapons around the globe. The goal for completion would be August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

In a separate proposal (copy attached), Methodists United has spelled how this might be achieved in phases.

To move toward this goal the Clinton Administration should approach the Russian government and say that the United States is ready to discuss an offer made by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva in February 1992 to consider a "zero alert posture", achieved by "keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart", carried out with proper verification.

U.S. negotiators could tell the Russians that the United States is far along in dismantling the strategic weapons covered by START I, that Russia needs to catch up, and that both sides should quickly complete START I demobilization. This might be achieved by the end of 1993.

Simultaneously the ratification process for START II should be completed. Then the additional weapons covered by START II should have warheads removed from launchers and placed in safe, verified storage during the first eight months of 1994. START I and START II deactivation would thereby be completed by August 6, 1994.

In the following twelve months the remaining strategic warheads

should be taken off the delivery vehicles and stored. This process could have monthly or quarterly phases so that both sides would have equal security during the final deactivation period. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to join this final phase, but the United States and Russia could safely go ahead even if they did not.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice suggests that completion of this course of action would set the stage for gatherings for thanksgiving and celebration on August 6, 1995, marking the end of a 50 year era.

Such action by the United States and Russia would also facilitate adoption of a much stronger Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty when the present treaty comes up for renewal in 1995.

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This statement on the Methodist Option was prepared by Methodists United for Peace with Justice, 421 Seward Square, SE, Washington, DC 20003. For further information, contact Howard W. Hallman, issues chair, on Monday through Thursday at (301) 694-2859 and on Friday and Saturday at (301) 897-3668.

September 9, 1993

January 7, 1993

Dr. Alton Frye, Washington Director
Council on Foreign Relations
2400 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Dr. Frye:

I was very interested in your article on "The ZBM Solution" that appeared in the Outlook section of the Washington Post on January 3. We have developed a proposal that moves in the same direction but goes farther. We advocate complete deactivation of the global strategic nuclear arsenal by separating warheads from ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Our views are expressed more fully in the enclosed letter to President-elect Clinton.

At the moment the only function of strategic nuclear weapons is to deter adversaries from using strategic nuclear weapons. They have no other purpose in the kinds of conflict and potential conflict of the post-Cold War era. Therefore, all parties would be better off by simultaneous deactivation.

For us this is part of a broader approach to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. Other components include a vigorous nonproliferation regime, encompassing both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, an end to testing and production, and a halt to strategic defense measures. This is spelled out in the enclosed resolution which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May.

I would be interested in what you think of our ideas.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please address reply to: 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

January 7, 1993

Mr. David Cortright, President
The Fourth Freedom Forum
803 North Main Street
Goshen, IN 46526

Dear David:

I was very interested in the recent issue of *Inforum* that told about your trip to Russia and the denuclearization project. Global nuclear disarmament is a major goal of Methodists United for Peace with Justice.

To move toward this goal, we are advocating immediate deactivation of the global strategic nuclear arsenal by separating warheads from ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Our views are expressed more fully in the enclosed letter to President-elect Clinton.

For us this is part of a broader approach to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. Other components include a vigorous nonproliferation regime, encompassing both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, an end to testing and production, and a halt to strategic defense measures. This is spelled out in the enclosed resolution which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May.

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Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please address reply to: 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

Similar letter sent to President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet President Mikail Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Mazarbayev.

Similar letter sent to President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet President Mikail Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Mazarbayev.

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Similar letter sent to President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet President Mikail Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Mazarbayev.

February 1, 1993

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Gottemoeller:

Sherman Harris and I appreciate the opportunity we had to talk with you on Friday and to offer our views on nuclear disarmament. We hope to be able to continue the dialogue.

Upon reflection I have one further thought about our discussion. When I stated that the only function of U.S. strategic weapons was to deter other strategic weapons, you said that some persons insist that U.S. strategic weapons help to deter other nations not armed with similar weapons from actions that threaten U.S. interests. Therefore, the U.S. should keep strategic submarines at sea even if Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union completely disbanded all their strategic weapons. I disagree with this perspective for two reasons. First, strategic submarines are not needed as a deterrent for any likely event of the next 20 years, all of them minor compared to all-out warfare between the United States and the successors to the Soviet Union. Long-range, strategic nuclear attack is not a credible threat to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and any other small-nation adversary. Even if a nuclear deterrent theorists believe that a nuclear threat is necessary (which I firmly believe is not), it could be accomplished by air-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, the very great value of taking the Russia strategic arsenal completely out of service (including the remainder in the three other states) far

outweighs any residual deterrent use of U.S. strategic submarines. Under the zero alert concept the United States and Russia (plus three) would remove all warheads from ICBMs and keep them in inspected storage, would bring all strategic submarines into port and place their missiles in inspected storage, and would keep all nuclear weapons off strategic bombers with proper verification. What a great deal for U.S homeland security! The marginal loss in dealing with other potential adversaries pales in comparison.

Robert McNamara and many other experts are right. The only thing that strategic nuclear weapons deter is similar weapons deployed by other nations. That's why zero alert with full verification, followed by stage dismantlement, also with full verification, makes sense.

Sincerely yours,

Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859

Howard W. Hallman

Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Issues Chair

February 1, 1993

The Honorable Samuel Lewis
Director of Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Lewis:

We are pleased to see that you have become director of policy planning at the State Department. We have followed the creative leadership you provided to the U.S. Institute of Peace, and I know something of your work as ambassador to Israel.

As a national association of laity and clergy, we have been working since 1987 to implement ideas offered by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in their pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation*. Among other things we led an effort to get the United Methodist General Conference to adopt the enclosed resolution, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" at its quadrennial session last May. Because the resolution passed the legislative committee 75-6, it was adopted by the whole body through the consent calendar.

We are particularly interested in getting the Clinton Administration to take up the idea of achieving a global zero alert of all strategic weapons, starting with those deployed by the United States and Russia (including those still based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). This would be accomplished by separating warheads from all ICBMs, returning all strategic submarines to port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off all

strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed a willingness to consider this action. We think that it would be a great deal to enhance U.S. homeland security.

Our views are more fully developed in the enclosed letter we wrote to President Clinton in December during the transition period. We would like an opportunity to meet with you or one of your top staff and discuss our ideas more completely. I'll call your office to request an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 1, 1993

The Honorable Lee N. Hamilton
2187 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Lee:

We're very pleased that you have become chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. You will provide creative leadership.

As you may recall, we have been promoting the idea of a global zero alert for all strategic weapons. This would be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Therefore, we are urging President Clinton to take up this idea, as indicated in the enclosed letter. We ask you also to request our new president to give consideration to this idea.

In addition, if the Foreign Affairs Committee or one of its subcommittees is holding hearings on nuclear disarmament or US/Russian relationships in the coming weeks or months, we would like an opportunity to testify and present our views.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 1, 1993

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
2136 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Dellums:

We're very pleased that you have become chair of the House Armed Services Committee. You will provide creative leadership.

For the last eighteen months we have been promoting the idea of a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This would be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Therefore, we are urging President Clinton to take up this idea, as indicated in the enclosed letter. We ask you also to request our new president to give consideration to this idea.

In addition, if the Armed Services Committee or one of its subcommittees is holding hearings on nuclear disarmament or US/Russian relationships in the coming weeks or months, we would like an opportunity to testify and present our views.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Brad Van Dam
Office of Senator Daschle
317 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Brad:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because even if their strategic weapons are off alert they will be held in reserve. After strategic weapons are off alert, they can be dismantled in stages, beginning with those specified in START I and START II, although on an accelerated schedule.

Our proposal comes from a broader approach that is stated in the enclosed resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May. Other components include elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, an end to further testing and production, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and termination of the futile attempt to develop strategic defense.

We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Daschle. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Ms. Julia Frifield
Office of Senator Wofford
283 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Juila:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Wofford. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. David Lewis
Office of Senator Levin
459 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear David:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Levin. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Ms. Julie MacGregor
Office of Senator Hatfield
711 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Julie:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Hatfield. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Kirk Robertson
Office of Senator Pryor
267 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Kirk:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Pryor. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Ms. Sarah Sewall
Office of Senator Mitchell
S-221 U.S. Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Sarah:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Senator Mitchell. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Bob DeGrasse
Office of Representative Spratt
1533 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Bob:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Spratt. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Jerry Hartz
Office of Representative Bonior
2242 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Jerry:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Bonior. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Ms. Tori Holt
Office of Representative Tom Andrews
1724 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Tori:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

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We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Tom Andrews. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Stewart Ishimaru
Office of Representative Schroeder
2208 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Stewart:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

even if their strategic weapons are off alert they will be held in reserve. After strategic weapons are off alert, they can be dismantled in stages, beginning with those specified in START I and START II, although on an accelerated schedule.

Our proposal comes from a broader approach that is stated in the enclosed resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May. Other components include elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, an end to further testing and production, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and termination of the futile attempt to develop strategic defense.

We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Schroeder. We would be interested in learning her response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Ben McMakin
Office of Representative Kopetski
1520 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Ben:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

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Our proposal comes from a broader approach that is stated in the enclosed resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May. Other components include elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, an end to further testing and production, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and termination of the futile attempt to develop strategic defense.

We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Kopetski. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Charles Monfort
Office of Representative Sabo
2201 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Charles:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

even if their strategic weapons are off alert they will be held in reserve. After strategic weapons are off alert, they can be dismantled in stages, beginning with those specified in START I and START II, although on an accelerated schedule.

Our proposal comes from a broader approach that is stated in the enclosed resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May. Other components include elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, an end to further testing and production, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and termination of the futile attempt to develop strategic defense.

We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Sabo. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 2, 1993

Mr. Joe Cirincione
House Government Operations Committee
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Joe:

At the Monday Lobby retreat at Coolfont in December I briefly presented our idea for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons. This idea is elaborated in the enclosed letter to President Bill Clinton.

Zero alert can be accomplished by removing warheads from all ICBMs, bringing all strategic submarines into port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed an interest in this idea, but the Bush Administration never took it up.

We believe that this would be an excellent way to enhance U.S. homeland security by taking the entire Russian strategic arsenal out of service while constructive leadership is in charge, adding in ICBMs based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This can come about if the United States is willing to take reciprocal action. Great Britain, France, and China should be invited to move to zero alert, too, but Russia and the United States can safely go ahead by themselves because

even if their strategic weapons are off alert they will be held in reserve. After strategic weapons are off alert, they can be dismantled in stages, beginning with those specified in START I and START II, although on an accelerated schedule.

Our proposal comes from a broader approach that is stated in the enclosed resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the United Methodist General Conference adopted last May. Other components include elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons, an end to further testing and production, a vigorous nonproliferation regime, and termination of the futile attempt to develop strategic defense.

We urge you to share our idea of zero alert with Representative Conyers. We would be interested in learning his response to this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 4, 1993

The Honorable Strobe Talbot
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Talbot:

We are pleased to note your appointment to coordinate U.S. dealings with the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Because of your knowledge of arms control, we want to share with you a proposal for a major breakthrough in dealing with strategic nuclear weapons. We request an opportunity to meet with you in the near future to discuss our proposal in greater depth.

As a national association of laity and clergy, we have been working since 1987 to implement ideas offered by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in their pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation*. Among other things we led an effort to get the United Methodist General Conference to adopt the enclosed resolution, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" at its quadrennial session last May (Attachment A). Because the resolution passed the legislative committee 75-6, it was adopted by the whole body through the consent calendar.

We are particularly interested in getting the Clinton Administration to take up the idea of achieving a global zero alert of all strategic nuclear weapons. This is expressed in the enclosed letter we wrote to President Clinton in December during the transition period (Attachment B). The move to zero

alert should start with those deployed by the United States and Russia (including those still based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). This would be accomplished by separating warheads from all ICBMs, returning all strategic submarines to port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off all strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed a willingness to consider this action. We think that it would be a great deal to enhance U.S. homeland security.

We have been working on this concept for the past 18 months. In October 1991 our Board of Directors adopted a policy statement that became the basis for the United Methodist General Conference Resolution. In November 1991 we sent this statement to top U.S., Soviet, and Russian leaders, highlighting the zero alert concept (Attachment C). In February 1992 representatives of 33 U.S. peace and arms control joined us in letter to President Bush and President Yeltsin (Attachment D) favoring zero alert. That same month Foreign Minister Kozyrev expressed interest in the zero alert concept in his speech to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Perhaps our letters to him and President Yeltsin three months earlier planted the seed.

The Honorable Strobe Talbot

February 4, 1993

Page two.

In January 1992 we met with General John Gordon on the staff of the National Security Council and in March with Robert Einhorn at the State Department and found no interest in the Bush Administration for zero alert. We sent copies of the Bush-Yeltsin letter both to Moscow and the Russian Embassy in Washington. We tried unsuccessfully to make contact at the Russian Embassy, but apparently our letter to Moscow reached Yeltsin himself. He instructed the Embassy to seek us out, which Igor Neverov, first secretary (arms control), did. We met with him in May, and he told us that zero alert was the Russian policy. After our visit he sent us the enclosed written statement (Attachment E) and excerpts from Kozyrev's Geneva speech.

We presume that Russia still favors zero alert on a mutual basis although may be in no position to press it openly. We urge you and others in the State Department to explore Russian interest and at same time have arms reduction experts within the U.S. government develop detailed plans on how zero alert can be implemented.

Having worked on this concept for 18 months, we have heard a lot of arguments against it and have developed responses to these objections. Therefore, we would welcome an opportunity to meet with you to discuss practical ways for achieving zero alert. I'll call your office to request an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

*Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair*

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

February 8, 1993

Dr. Ashton Carter
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Dr. Carter:

We note that you have been tapped for an appointment to deal with nuclear security and nonproliferation for the Defense Department. Therefore, we want to share some thoughts with you.

As a national association of laity and clergy, we have been working since 1987 to implement ideas offered by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in their pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation*. Among other things we led an effort to get the United Methodist General Conference to adopt the enclosed resolution, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option" at its quadrennial session last May. Because the resolution passed the legislative committee 75-6, it was adopted by the whole body through the consent calendar.

We are particularly interested in getting the Clinton Administration to take up the idea of achieving a global zero alert of all strategic weapons, starting with those deployed by the United States and Russia (including those still based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). This would be accomplished by separating warheads from all ICBMs, returning all strategic submarines to port and removing their missiles, and keeping nuclear weapons off all strategic bombers, all this with proper verification. Last February in Geneva Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed a willingness to consider

this action. We think that it would be a great deal to enhance U.S. homeland security.

Our views are more fully developed in the enclosed letter we wrote to President Clinton in December during the transition period. We would like an opportunity to meet with you and discuss our ideas more completely. In a week or I'll call your office to request an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: February 16, 1993

To: The Honorable Samuel Lewis
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

FAX No. (202) 647-0753

Telephone No. (202) 647-2372

From: Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair

FAX No. (301) 695-0192

Telephone No. (301) 694-2859

We are faxing you a copy of a letter we mailed to you on February 1, 1993. Upon your return from traveling abroad, we would like an opportunity to talk with you about our ideas on strategic nuclear disarmament.

We are convinced that it is possible to work out an agreement that would take all of the Russian strategic missiles off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles if the United States will reciprocate. We consider this to be a good deal to enhance U.S. homeland security. We hope that the Clinton Administration will take advantage of this opportunity.

February 16, 1993

Mr. Jeffrey Garrison
EUR/ISCA
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520-6511

Dear Mr. Garrison:

Following up our telephone conversation, I am sending a copy of the letter we wrote to Strobe Talbot and a set of enclosures. We would welcome an opportunity to discuss our ideas in greater depth with you in the near future, and after that with Ambassador Talbot.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

March 1, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you prepare to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin next month, we urge you give in-depth consideration to the idea of simultaneously taking the Russian and U.S. strategic arsenal off alert. Just such a proposal was made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on February 12, 1992 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He stated:

First, we may consider taking off the alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers, which are targeted on one another's territories or facilities, thus placing nuclear weapons on a "zero alert posture".

Second, keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart could prove a useful idea. In other words, ICBMs on launchers would carry no front sections, submarines berthed in home ports would carry no SLBMs or SLCMs, and heavy bomber nuclear weapons including nuclear ALCMs would be kept in central-run storages. In this way, we would be guaranteed against their unauthorized or accidental use. Another benefit of this measure is its verifiability. The details of verification could be agreed upon.

Assuming that all strategic weapons of the former Soviet Union are encompassed in this arrangement (including those still based in Belarus,

Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), we think that this would be a great deal for the United States. Among other benefits it would quickly remove all the powerful Russian S-18s and S-24s from active service. Mutual zero alert would vastly increase U.S. homeland security against an unexpected nuclear attack from afar and would safeguard against activated Russian missiles falling into the hands of a reactionary regime should President Yeltsin be overthrown.

Zero alert status can be achieved if the United States will agree to reciprocate by removing the warheads from all of our ICBMs, bringing all our submarines into port and removing their missiles, and continuing to keep nuclear weapons off our strategic bombers (a practice President Bush initiated in the fall of 1991). Once off alert, Russian and U.S. strategic weapons can be dismantled in a staged and balanced manner, beginning with an accelerated START I and START II schedule with latter additions.

We have been advocating this course for a year and a half. Many citizen organizations look favorable upon this approach and so do some leading members of Congress. We have also found persons who are skeptical of this approach for three reasons in particular. They doubt its practicality. And they believe that the United States will always need to keep strategic

The Honorable Bill Clinton

March 1, 1993

Page two.

submarines at sea for deterrent purposes, if not directed against Russia then some other adversary. Some also ask what about other possessors, such as China, Great Britain, and France. I would like to address these three concerns, starting with the second.

Doing without strategic submarines. Having nuclearly-armed, strategic submarines at sea has become a habit for the United States. Yet, their only purpose at this point is to deter Russia and the three other independent states of the former Soviet Union from launching a strategic nuclear attack against the United States. Zero alert would remove that threat. If Russia later reactivated its strategic nuclear weapons, the United States could reciprocate by putting nuclear missiles back on submarines and sending them to sea.

Short of that the United States has no use for strategic submarines, either as a deterrent or for warfighting purpose for any events likely to occur during the next 10 to 20 years. To make this determination for yourself, we urge you and your national security advisers to explore the top global security concerns of the United States of the United States and determine whether strategic submarines have any utility either for deterrence or warfighting. As a point of departure, we offer the following chart with blanks to be completed.

| Possible event | Nuclear deterrence (0=none 5=definite) | Warfighting utility (0=none 5=definite) |
|----------------|---|--|
|----------------|---|--|

Ethnic conflict in former

Jugoslavia

Ethnic conflict in states of

former Soviet Union

Russian revanchism (attempts

to recover lost territory)

Terrorist operations of Libya,

Syria, Iraq, Iran, any other
state or terrorist group

War between Israel and Arab

states

Aggression of Iraq, Iran, Syria

against its neighbors

Civil war in Africa

War between India and Pakistan

Border war between Russia and

China

Chinese invasion of neighbor-

ing states

North Korean invasion of South

Korea

Warfare in Southeast Asia

Communist insurgency in the

Philippines

Civil war in Latin America

The Honorable Bill Clinton

March 1, 1993

Page three.

We believe that the answer is "none" for both questions on all these possible events. That is, U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, including submarines, cannot deter these events from happening and have no warfighting utility if they should occur. We come to this conclusion inductively by reviewing (1) similar events of the past 48 years that actually happened and thus were not deterred by U.S. nuclear might and (2) wars in which U.S. political and military leaders decided that U.S. weapons would not be used. This manner of thinking differs from most nuclear weapons theorists who reason deductively and never test their exotic theories by relating them to real-world experience.

Without going through the entire list, we can note that the 125 wars occurring since the end of World War II indicate that the U.S. strategic force cannot deter civil and ethnic wars and wars between divided nations (Korea, Vietnam). Furthermore, nuclear weapons have no warfighting utility in these situations (as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower concluded in the Korean War and Presidents Johnson and Nixon concluded in the Vietnam War).

U.S. strategic weapons have not deterred small and medium-sized military powers from invading their neighbors, as Iraq did against Iran and then Kuwait. When the United States got involved in the latter situation, it had plenty of firepower without invoking nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons would have been used, they would not have been long-range strategic missiles. If North Korea invaded South Korea, nuclear weapons would not be necessary or useful (among others Admiral Noel Gayler, who

was once commander-in-chief of the Pacific Basin including Korea, has so testified).

U.S. strategic weapons did not deter the Soviet Union from sending troops into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) and would not deter a reactionary Russian regime from seeking to regain Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic States, or enclaves of Russian population within those states. This would be true even if Russia no longer had active nuclear weapons, for U.S. national interest in protecting freedom of Russia's neighbors is insufficient to go to war. The only event for which the United States might have gone to war and used nuclear weapons was Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and that is now totally moot.

U.S. nuclear weapons do not deter regional rivals from fighting, such as India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states, nations of Southeast Asia. Nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists.

Perhaps, though, you or some of your national security advisers would think that U.S. strategic nuclear weapons have a slight deterrent capacity for a few of these possible events, that is a rating of "1" or even "2". If so, we suggest that you weigh this value against the worth of getting the entire Russia strategic nuclear arsenal completely out of service. This ought to be a supreme objective of the United States and should far outweigh any other minor deterrent value of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, to the extent that the United States wants to deter these other events (and we can't deter everything), there are other means.

The Honorable Bill Clinton

March 1, 1993

Page four.

In sum, we are firmly convinced that the United States can safely bring its strategic submarines into port and remove the missiles and take the warheads off all its ICBMs and place them in storage if Russia and the other three independent states do the same thing at the same time.

Practicality. This brings us to the second objection to this proposal which we hear: that it is impractical. For instance, a Hill staffer said, "It may be a good concept, but it can't be accomplished easily. The `devil is in the details.'" (The latter is a phrase used around town as an excuse for avoidance.) Although we are not military or arms control technical experts, the task doesn't seem that difficult for intelligent people on your staff to figure out.

For instance, we note a description in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1992, pp.48-49) on how the U.S. Air Force is retiring Minuteman II missiles.

Disarming the missiles is the first step in the retirement process. The Mark IIC reentry vehicles (RVs), with W56 warheads inside, are removed from the top of each missile. The RVs are transferred to a special van and, under heavy security, transported back to base. There the warheads are removed from the RVs, put in a special container, and placed in weapon storage igloos. ...Eventually, a C-141 will be used to take a load of these warheads to an air force depot -- in this case, probably to Barksdale, in Louisiana, for temporary storage. When scheduling permits, they will be transported to the Pantex warhead assembly plant in

Texas, where they will be disassembled.

It doesn't seem overwhelming to work out similar procedures for all of the former Soviet ICBMs and the remaining U.S. ICBMs. The whole operation could be observed by inspection teams from the other side with surveillance 24 hours a day. In a similar manner, observation teams can watch missiles come off strategic submarines and placed in storage, with or without warheads still attached (preferably the latter). And the stored weapons removed from bombers can similarly be kept under surveillance. Thereafter, warheads can be dismantled in stages. There is already experience with similar operations under the INF treaty, and the START I agreement has applicable procedures.

Other nations. As to the third objection to the off-alert concept -- what about other possessors beyond Russia and the United States, we reply that obviously Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have to be part of the arrangement. That doesn't seem overwhelming in spite of the current maneuvering now occurring. They have a self-interest in seeing the Russian missiles are taken out of service. Their other concerns can be resolved.

Great Britain, France, and China should, of course, be invited to join this deactivation process. But even if they don't do so immediately, there would be no great danger. They would know that the United States and Russia would retain much of their strategic arsenal in reserve and would have plenty of missiles available to rearm in the event of a surprise attack by one of the other nuclear powers. Any other nation producing nuclear weapons would likewise know that they could not safely attack the United States or Russia without risking retaliation by rearmed strategic missiles.

The Honorable Bill Clinton

March 1, 1993

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In addition, it is exceedingly important for the United States to carry out a vigorous nonproliferation campaign on nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.

Celebration. We are convinced that achieving mutual zero-alert status for Russian and U.S. strategic weapons is quickly achievable. Bringing this about is the kind of creative leadership we and other Americans are expecting of you. It requires some new thinking, discarding outgrown habits. You are the one to lead the nation in this direction.

We believe that it might be possible to achieve zero alert by July 4 this year. Then Independence Day could have a second significant meaning: independence from the fear of nuclear attack. Or maybe it would take until August 6 to complete the task: the 48th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

As the submarines come in and the warheads come off the ICBMs, there can be local celebrations. When it's all accomplished, there might even be a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue with personnel who have served in the deterrent force.

We have an opportunity this year to remove the threat of nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. We urge you to use your meeting with President Yeltsin to bring this about.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

March 1-14: (301) 897-3668. Thereafter,
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

March 1, 1993

Dr. Anthony Lake, Director
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Dr. Lake:

As President Clinton prepares to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin next month, we want again to raise with you the idea of taking the global strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. It is a subject I wrote you about a couple of times during the transition period. Several weeks ago we had an opportunity to discuss this idea with Rose Gottemoeller on your staff. Now we request an opportunity to talk with you directly prior to the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting.

Our ideas are presented in the enclosed letter to President Clinton. We are sending you the original with the hope that you might give it to him as part of briefing material you are undoubtedly preparing for his trip.

To summarize this letter, we believe that it would be a good deal for the United States to get the Russian strategic arsenal to zero alert status. This would include deactivation of all SS-18 and SS-24 missiles along with all other Russian ICBMs and strategic submarines (including former Soviet missiles still based in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). This can be accomplished if the United States is willing to reciprocate.

Among American nuclear weapons strategists the biggest hangup to this idea is bringing the entire U.S. strategic submarine fleet to port and placing the

missiles in storage. Yet if all Russian strategic missiles were deactivated, U.S. strategic submarines would have no remaining function that cannot be accomplished by other means. We spell this out more completely in our letter to President Clinton. We also suggest some matters that deserve full study by your staff and other governmental agencies with national security concerns.

We have explored many aspects of this issue and will welcome an opportunity to meet with you and others in the Clinton administration to make the case in person and respond to possible objections.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Telephone: March 1-14 - (301) 897-3668. Thereafter:
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March 2, 1993

The Honorable Strobe Talbot
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Talbot:

Several weeks ago we shared with you some ideas on taking the global strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. Now we note that President Bill Clinton will be meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on April 4. We hope that this subject can be discussed. Accordingly we have written the enclosed letter to President Clinton to reiterate our views.

We believe that it would be a good deal for the United States to get the Russian strategic arsenal to zero alert status. This would include deactivation of all SS-18 and SS-24 missiles along with all other Russian ICBMs and strategic submarines (including former Soviet missiles still based in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). This can be accomplished if the United States is willing to reciprocate.

Among American nuclear weapons strategists the biggest hangup to this idea is bringing the entire U.S. strategic submarine fleet to port and placing the missiles in storage. Yet if all Russian strategic missiles were deactivated, U.S. strategic submarines would have no remaining function that cannot be accomplished by other means. We spell this out more completely in our letter to President Clinton.

Since you are a close advisor to President Clinton on dealings with Russia, we would like to talk with you in person about the concept of zero alert, to make the case for a U.S. initiative in this direction, and to respond to possible objections.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Telephone: March 1-14 - (301) 897-3668 Thereafter:
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March 2, 1993

Mr. Jeffrey Garrison
EUR/ISCA
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520-6511

Dear Mr. Garrison:

We continue to pursue the idea of taking the global strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. Noting that President Bill Clinton will be meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on April 4, we have written the enclosed letter to President Clinton to reiterate our views.

We would welcome an opportunity to discuss our ideas with you in greater depth. We also request you to help us arrange a meeting with Ambassador Strobe Talbot, to whom we have sent a copy of our latest letter to President Clinton.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

Telephone: March 1-14 - (301) 897-3668 Thereafter:
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

March 2, 1993

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Gottemoeller:

We are continuing to pursue the idea of zero alert. Therefore, we have written a fresh letter to President Clinton, urging him to take up this approach when he meets with Russian President Boris Yeltsin next month. A copy is enclosed. We sent this letter to Dr. Anthony Lake, hoping that he might include it in briefing material prepared for President Clinton. We have also requested an appointment to meet with Dr. Lake. I'm writing to keep you informed of what we are doing.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

Telephone: March 1-14 - (301) 897-3668 Thereafter:
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

March 23, 1993

Ms. Mary McGrory
The Washington Post
1150 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20071

Dear Ms. McGrory:

Your article today on "A Cure for Yeltsin's Blues?" reminded me of a something I wrote in June 1991 at a time Mikhail Gorbachev was in serious trouble. It was a proposed op-ed article entitled "How to Help the Soviet Union and Ourselves at the Same Time: Mutual Dismantlement of the Strategic Nuclear Arsenal" (copy enclosed). However, no major newspaper would published it, including the Washington Post.

I proposed shutting down the entire U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals simultaneously and virtually instantly by bringing all strategic submarines into port, grounding the strategic bombers, and sealing the underground ICBM silos. Since then Methodists United for Peace with Justice incorporated this idea into a broader statement, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", which the General Conference of the United Methodist Church adopted in May 1992. Starting in November 1991, we pressed this case with Soviet, Russian, and U.S. leadership. The Russians accepted the concept, as indicated in a speech by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in February 1992. However, the Bush Administration refused to consider this approach because they believed that the United States should maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent forever, especially through deployed submarines.

We are now urging President Clinton to consider this course, as indicated in

the enclosed letter. Like you we are saying that now is the time for "getting about the matter of disarming nuclear weapons." Kozyrev laid out the proper course: separate all ICBM warheads from delivery vehicles, bring all strategic submarines into port and put their missiles in storage, keep nuclear weapons off and away from all strategic bombers, all this with proper verification.

Not only would this make both nations safer but it would also free up billions dollars that could be used for other purpose. For Russia the savings would surpass the economic aid requested from the West. For the United States the savings could be used to speed deficit reduction and put more funds into programs meeting human and community needs.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

March 31, 1993

The Honorable Samuel Lewis
Director of Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW, Room 7311
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Lewis:

We appreciate the opportunity to talk with you and John Riker and offer our ideas favoring zero alert for strategic nuclear weapons. We covered a lot of ground, but there were a couple more points I should have made.

First, when we were discussing who supported zero alert on the Hill and in the arms control community, I should have pointed out that there is solid support from religious organizations and other peace organizations. This is indicated in the enclosed letter we sent to Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in February 1992.

Second, we didn't talk much about targeting of U.S. and Russian strategic weapons. But why should we continue to actively target one another? This point is made in a statement we issued in January 1992. Since then START II has provided for further reduction in strategic weapons, but even so, ten years from now Russia and the United States will still have numerous strategic weapons targeted on one another. Why?

A mutual pledge to remove active targeting of deployed missiles, as was floating around a year or so ago, has very little meaning. We understand that missiles can be retargeted in 10 to 15 minutes. Only separation of

warheads and delivery vehicles with adequate verification can promptly and effectively bring an end to active targeting.

We hope that we can continue to dialogue with you and others in the Clinton Administration about our ideas.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: April 27, 1993

To: Ambassador Strobe Talbot
U.S. Department of State

FAX No. (202) 647-2699

Telephone No. (202) 647-3566

From: Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair

FAX No. (301) 695-0192

Telephone No. (301) 694-2859

Now that President Yeltsin has emerged victorious in the Russian referendum, we would like to renew our request to meet with you to discuss our proposal for achieving zero alert of the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles.

This idea is spelled out in the attached letter we wrote to President Clinton on March 1. This letter contains an excerpt from a speech that Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev made in Geneva a year ago February, indicating a Russian willingness to consider going to zero alert. Unfortunately the Bush Administration didn't take up this offer.

We believe that it would be a good deal for the United States to get the Russian strategic arsenal to zero alert status. This would include deactivation of all SS-18 and SS-24 missiles along with all other Russian ICBMs and strategic submarines (including former Soviet missiles still based in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). This can be accomplished if the United States is willing to reciprocate.

Among American nuclear weapons strategists the biggest hangup to this idea is bringing the entire U.S. strategic submarine fleet to port and placing the missiles in storage. Yet if all Russian strategic missiles were deactivated, U.S. strategic submarines would have no remaining function that cannot be accomplished by other means. We spell this out more completely in our letter to President Clinton.

These are the ideas we would like to talk with you in greater depth.

Sincerely yours,

*Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair*

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: 1 (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please send any written reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: June 1, 1993

To: Ambassador Strobe Talbott
U.S. Department of State

FAX No. (202) 647-2699

Telephone No. (202) 647-3566

From: Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair

FAX No. (301) 695-0192

Telephone No. (301) 694-2859

We would like to repeat a request for an appointment to discuss with you our ideas on strategic disarmament, particularly our proposal for achieving zero alert of the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles.

We have previously requested such an appointment in letters and faxes sent on February 4, March 2, and April 27. At first we were told that you were not talking with outsiders until you were confirmed. Next we were told that you were out of the country. Finally on May 18 we were told that you are too busy but that one of your deputies would get in touch with us. Two weeks later we still haven't heard anything.

Frankly we are disappointed. For twelve years organizations like ours were virtually shut out by the State Department and others in the national security apparatus during the Reagan and Bush presidencies. In contrast, President Clinton during the presidential campaign promised a more open administration. We are still waiting for this to occur.

Furthermore, we believe that we have an important idea to discuss. A year ago Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev supported the concept of zero alert at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The General Conference of the United Methodist Church gave its endorsement in May 1992. A variety of U.S. religious and peace organizations support this approach. We believe that it is a matter which the Clinton Administration should consider and work to achieve.

That's why we keep pursuing you and especially because of your assignment to deal with Russia and

because of your considerable knowledge of nuclear weapons issues.

Sincerely yours,

*Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair*

Please send any written reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

June 21, 1993

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-0001

Dear General Powell:

Although we have never met, like you I am a member of the National Academy of Public Administration. I remember a superb speech you gave to the Academy when you were national security adviser to President Reagan on the proper role for that office. I write to you, though, as issues chair of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy.

We formed in 1987 in response to a call from the United Methodist Council of Bishops for greater witness and action on issues of nuclear disarmament and other world peace concerns. Since the fall of 1991 we have been advocating that all possessors of strategic nuclear weapons place them in a zero-alert status by separating warheads from delivery vehicles and by bringing all strategic submarines into port and placing their missiles in safe storage. All of this should be done with thorough verification.

We have been urging President Clinton and his civilian advisors to consider this course. We ask for your support of the idea because we believe that is within the military interests of the United States. We would like an opportunity to meet with you or one of your top staff aides discuss this proposal.

We note that Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev spoke favorably about this idea on February 12, 1992 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He stated:

First, we may consider taking off the alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers, which are targeted on one another's territories or facilities, thus placing nuclear weapons on a "zero alert posture".

Second, keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart could prove a useful idea. In other words, ICBMs on launchers would carry no front sections, submarines berthed in home ports would carry no SLBMs or SLCMs, and heavy bomber nuclear weapons including nuclear ALCMs would be kept in central-run storages. In this way, we would be guaranteed against their unauthorized or accidental use. Another benefit of this measure is its verifiability. The details of verification could be agreed upon.

General Colin L. Powell

June 21, 1993

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We think that this would be a great deal for the United States -- assuming that all strategic weapons of the former Soviet Union are encompassed in this arrangement (including those still based in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). Among other benefits it would quickly remove all the powerful Russian S-18s and S-24s from active service. Mutual zero alert would vastly increase U.S. homeland security against an unexpected nuclear attack from afar and would safeguard against actively deployed Russian missiles falling into the hands of a reactionary regime should President Yeltsin be overthrown.

Zero alert status can be achieved if the United States will agree to reciprocate by removing the warheads from all of our ICBMs, bringing all our submarines into port and removing their missiles, and continuing to keep nuclear weapons off our strategic bombers (a practice President Bush initiated in the fall of 1991). Once off alert, Russian and U.S. strategic weapons can be dismantled in a staged and balanced manner, beginning with an accelerated START I and START II schedule with latter additions.

We have been advocating this course for a year and a half. Many citizen organizations look favorably upon this approach and so do some leading members of Congress. We have also found persons who are skeptical of this idea, in particular for three reasons. They doubt its practicality. They believe that the United States will always need to keep strategic submarines at sea for deterrent purposes, if not directed against Russia then some other adversary. And some persons ask whether other possessors, such as China, Great Britain, and France, would be included. I would like to address these three concerns, starting with the second.

Doing without strategic submarines. Having nuclearly-armed, strategic submarines at sea has become a habit for the United States. Yet, their only purpose at this point is to deter Russia and the three other independent states of the former Soviet Union from launching a strategic nuclear attack against the United States. Zero alert would remove that threat. If Russia later reactivated its strategic nuclear weapons, the United States could reciprocate by putting nuclear missiles back on submarines and sending them to sea. Otherwise, the United States has no use for strategic submarines, either as a deterrent or for warfighting purpose for any events likely to occur during the next 10 to 20 years.

To make this determination for yourself, we urge you and your staff advisers to explore the top global security concerns of the United States and determine whether strategic submarines have any utility either for deterrence or warfighting. As a point of departure, we offer a chart on the next page with blanks to be completed.

General Colin L. Powell

June 21, 1993

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Usefulness of U.S. strategic submarines

Possible event

Nuclear deterrence Warfighting utility
(0=none 5=definite)(0=none 5=definite)

Ethnic conflict in former
Yugoslavia

Ethnic conflict in states of
former Soviet Union

Russian revanchism (attempts
to recover lost territory)

Terrorist operations of Libya,
Syria, Iraq, Iran, any other
state or terrorist group

War between Israel and Arab
states

Aggression of Iraq, Iran, Syria
against its neighbors

Civil war in Africa

War between India and Pakistan

Border war between Russia and
China

Chinese invasion of neighbor-
ing states

North Korean invasion of South
Korea

Warfare in Southeast Asia

Communist insurgency in the

Philippines
Civil war in Latin America

We believe that the answer is "none" for both questions on all these possible events. That is, U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, including submarines, cannot deter these events from happening and have no warfighting utility if they should occur. We come to this conclusion inductively by reviewing (1) similar events of the past 48 years that actually happened and thus were not deterred by U.S. nuclear might and (2) wars in which U.S. political and military leaders decided that U.S. weapons would not be used. This manner of thinking differs from most nuclear weapons theorists who reason deductively and never test their exotic theories by relating them to real-world experience.

Without going through the entire list, we can note that the 125 wars occurring since the end of World War II reveal that the U.S. strategic force cannot deter civil and ethnic wars and wars between divided nations (Korea, Vietnam). Furthermore, nuclear weapons have no warfighting utility in these situations, as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower concluded in the Korean War and Presidents Johnson and Nixon concluded in the Vietnam War.

U.S. strategic weapons have not deterred small and medium-sized military powers from invading their neighbors, as Iraq did against Iran and then Kuwait. When the United States got involved in the latter situation, it had plenty of firepower without invoking nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons would

General Colin L. Powell

June 21, 1993

Page four.

have been used, they would not have been long-range strategic missiles. If North Korea invaded South Korea, nuclear weapons would not be necessary or useful (among others Admiral Noel Gayler, who was once commander-in-chief of the Pacific Basin including Korea, has so testified).

U.S. strategic weapons did not deter the Soviet Union from sending troops into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) and would not deter a reactionary Russian regime from seeking to regain Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic States, or enclaves of Russian population within those states. This would be true even if Russia no longer had active nuclear weapons, for U.S. national interest in protecting freedom of Russia's neighbors is insufficient to go to war with nuclear weapons. The only event for which the United States might have used nuclear weapons was Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and that is now totally moot.

U.S. nuclear weapons do not deter regional rivals from fighting, such as India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states, nations of Southeast Asia. Nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists.

Perhaps, though, some military analysts in the Pentagon believe that U.S. strategic nuclear weapons have a slight deterrent capacity for a few of these possible events, that is a rating of "1" or even "2". If so, we suggest that you weigh this value against the worth of getting the entire Russia strategic nuclear arsenal completely out of service. This ought to be a supreme objective of the United States and should far outweigh any other minor deterrent value of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, to the extent that the United States wants to deter these other events (and we can't deter

everything on Earth), there are other means.

In sum, we are firmly convinced that the United States can safely bring its strategic submarines into port and remove the missiles and take the warheads off all its ICBMs and place them in storage if Russia and the other three independent states do the same thing at the same time.

Practicality. This brings us to the second objection to this proposal which we hear: that it is impractical. For instance, a Hill staffer said, "It may be a good concept, but it can't be accomplished easily. The 'devil is in the details.'" (The latter is a phrase used around town as an excuse for avoidance.) Although we are not military or arms control technical experts, the task doesn't seem that difficult for intelligent people on your staff to figure out.

For instance, we note a description in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1992, pp.48-49) on how the U.S. Air Force is retiring Minuteman II missiles.

Disarming the missiles is the first step in the retirement process. The Mark IIC reentry vehicles (RVs), with W56 warheads inside, are removed from the top of each missile. The RVs are transferred to a special van and, under heavy security, transported back to base. There the warheads are removed from the RVs, put in a special container, and placed in weapon storage igloos. ...Eventually, a C-141 will be used to take a load of these warheads to an air force depot -- in this case, probably to Barksdale, in Louisiana, for

General Colin L. Powell

June 21, 1993

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temporary storage. When scheduling permits, they will be transported to the Pantex warhead assembly plant in Texas, where they will be disassembled.

It doesn't seem overwhelming to work out similar procedures for all of the former Soviet ICBMs and the remaining U.S. ICBMs. The whole operation could be observed by inspection teams from the other side with surveillance 24 hours a day. In a similar manner, observation teams can watch missiles come off strategic submarines and placed in storage, with or without warheads still attached (preferably the latter). And the stored weapons removed from bombers can similarly be kept under surveillance. Thereafter, warheads can be disassembled in stages. There is already experience with similar operations under the INF treaty, and the START I agreement has applicable procedures.

Other nations. As to the third objection to the off-alert concept -- what about other possessors beyond Russia and the United States, we reply that obviously Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have to be part of the arrangement. That doesn't seem overwhelming in spite of the current maneuvering now occurring. They have a self-interest in seeing that the Russian missiles are taken out of service. Their other concerns can be resolved. Moreover, we note that the United States has recently proposed that strategic missiles based in Ukraine be taken out of service and kept under international surveillance, just the approach are proposing.

Great Britain, France, and China should, of course, be invited to join this deactivation process. But even if they don't do so immediately, there would

be no great danger. They would know that the United States and Russia would retain much of their strategic arsenal in reserve and would have plenty of missiles available to rearm in the event of a surprise attack by one of the other nuclear powers. Any other nation producing nuclear weapons would likewise know that they could not safely attack the United States or Russia without risking retaliation by rearmed strategic missiles.

In addition, it is exceedingly important for the United States to carry out a vigorous nonproliferation campaign on nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles so that other nations do not join the nuclear weapons club. This is a demanding task, as current negotiations with North Korea indicate. But globally it is a finite task, for only a small number of nations have active nuclear ambitions.

In sum, we believe that moving quickly to zero alert of all strategic weapons on a global basis is both desirable and practicable. That's why we would like to meet with you or your staff assistants who work on these issues to discuss our ideas in greater detail.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: 1 (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: July 8, 1993

To: Dr. Ashton Carter
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security
U.S. Department of Defense

FAX No. (703) 693-9146

Telephone No. (703) 695-0942

From: Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair

FAX No. (301) 695-0192

Telephone No. (301) 694-2859

Earlier this year we requested an appointment to discuss with you our ideas on strategic disarmament, particularly our proposal for achieving zero alert of the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. Your office indicated that you were not making appointments with outside groups until after you were confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Now that this has been accomplished, we renew our request for an appointment.

The ideas we want to discuss are contained in a letter we wrote on March 1 to President Clinton. Although parts of letter refer to what was then an upcoming meeting with Russian President Yeltsin in April, the remainder of the letter presents our proposal and our reasons for championing this approach. They are still relevant.

We believe that mutual, zero alert would be a good deal for the United States. We believe that it is an objective that can and should be incorporated into the reformulation of U.S. defense policy, now underway. That's why we want to talk with you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please send any written reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 28, 1993

Dr. Anthony Lake, Director
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Dr. Lake:

During the presidential transition period and in the early days of the Clinton Administration we offered you a proposal for taking the global strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles, achieved with proper verification. This proposal has the support of the United Methodist General Conference (the official governing body) and a number of religious and peace organizations. Since then we have an opportunity to discuss this idea with a number of people in the Clinton Administration (a welcome openness). Now we would like to talk with you directly and request you to share our ideas with President Clinton.

As a refresher, I am enclosing a March 1, 1993 letter to President Clinton, which outlines our views. In this present letter we elaborate on our ideas, based upon discussion we have had with people in the Clinton Administration.

Specifically, shortly after inauguration we presented our ideas to Dr. Rose Gottemoeller on your staff. In March we conferred with Ambassador Samuel Lewis at the State Department and his aide, John Riker. We wanted to talk with Ambassador Strobe Talbot and Assistant Secretary Ashton Carter at the Defense Department, but this was delayed because of

slowness in their confirmation. Finally this month we talked with Eric Edelman and Bill Danvers on Ambassador Talbot's staff and with Franklin Miller and Commander Charles Hasbrouck in Dr. Carter's office. We have also offered our proposal to General Colin L. Powell, which he graciously acknowledged.

All of these persons were receptive to listening to our ideas even though they were not ready to adopt our proposal on the spot. To each of them we requested that the Clinton Administration include "the Methodist option" in the strategic policy options now under review (for us "zero alert" is part of a broader set of policies, including a strong emphasis upon nuclear nonproliferation). We asked them to simulate the course to zero alert with warheads separated from delivery vehicles, to consider practical ways to carry out this approach with proper verification and other safeguards, to identify problems and come up with possible solutions. According to Mr. Miller, the Pentagon has indeed examined something resembling this option in the course of "deposturing" studies and concluded that it is not now timely and would not be worth considering until democracy has take a stronger hold in Russia.

Dr. Anthony Lake

July 28, 1993

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We also found that no one seriously disagreed with our premise that the only function of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is to deter similar weapons deployed by Russia, and to a lesser extent by China and those remaining in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. They basically agreed that no other current event in the world can be affected by strategic nuclear weapons, either for deterrence or warfighting. A couple of persons, however, think that some unpredictable contingency may arise in which strategic weapons would have a deterrent utility. We disagree.

The biggest roadblock to acceptance of our proposal seems to be the fear of vulnerability -- along with the long habit of deploying strategic nuclear weapons. The concern over vulnerability relates to uncertainty of the future of the reform government in Russia and the risk that a reactionary regime could take over and quickly rearm enough strategic missiles to threaten the ports where U.S. strategic submarines are based, the strategic airbases, and the facilities where warheads removed from ICBMs would be stored. Our rebuttal is that a very secure on-site verification and monitoring regime could be installed with no opportunity for rapid redeployment of strategic warheads. Furthermore, it would be wise to achieve zero alert while the Yeltsin government is in power, thus removing the nuclear option from a less friendly, successor government. As part of this arrangement, it would not be totally inappropriate for unarmed U.S. strategic submarines to go to sea occasionally for training exercises (perhaps with Russian observers aboard) so that they would be in shape for reinstallation of their missiles if Russia put some of its strategic weapons back on alert status.

This leads us to a further proposal for a phased approach to achieving zero

alert of all strategic weapons around the globe. The goal for completion would be August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

To move toward this goal the Clinton Administration could first approach the Russian government and say that the United States is ready to discuss the offer made by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva in February 1992 to consider a "zero alert posture", achieved by "keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads apart", carried out with agreed upon verification.

U.S. negotiators could tell the Russians that the United States is far along in dismantling the strategic weapons covered by START I, that Russia needs to catch up, and that both sides should quickly complete START I demobilization. This might be achieved by the end of 1993.

The next aspect would be completion of START II ratification within the next several months. This would set the stage to implement a proposal to focus "on warheads instead of launchers", made by Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner in *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Brookings Institution, 1992; p. 17):

The parties could agree to the immediate removal of the warheads from all launchers slated for eventual deactivation under these [START] agreements.

Judging from the pace at which tactical nuclear weapons were removed

Dr. Anthony Lake

July 28, 1993

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from active service to central storage depots by both sides since September 1991, removal of strategic warheads could probably be accomplished in less than a year.

With START I demobilization already underway, it might be safe to assume that the additional weapons covered by START II could have warheads removed from launchers and placed in safe, verified storage during the first eight months of 1994. Then in the next twelve months the remaining strategic warheads could be taken off the delivery vehicles. This could have monthly or quarterly phases so that both sides would have equal security during the final deactivation period. Great Britain, France, and China could be invited to join this final phase, but the United States and Russia could safely go ahead even if they did not.

This would set the stage for gatherings for thanksgiving and celebration on August 6, 1995, marking the end of a 50 year era. Such action by the United States and Russia would also facilitate adoption of a much strong Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty when the present treaty comes up for renewal in 1995.

The course proposed here is no radical measure, even though it breaks a habit of nearly five decades. Rather it is continuation of a policy of nuclear weapons deactivation begun by the INF Treaty which President Reagan and President Gorbachev signed in 1987, continued by President Bush's initiative of September 1991, reciprocated by President Gorbachev the next month, and since carried on with the recall of tactical nuclear weapons and deactivation of strategic weapons encompassed in START I. Currently the

United States is working with Ukraine and Russia to achieve separation of warheads from strategic missiles based in Ukraine. The Ashton-Perry-Steinbruner proposal to remove warheads from strategic weapons covered by START II takes it the next step. The "Methodist option" (if we may call it that) will complete the task.

We firmly believe that this would be good deal for both the United States and Russia. It represents a convergence of idealism and practicality which seems to be a strong attribute of President Clinton. Therefore, we hope that you will share our ideas with him. Also, we request an opportunity to meet with you personally to present our proposal in greater detail.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 28, 1993

Dear Colleague:

I would like to share with you a letter to Dr. Anthony Lake, national security advisor to President Clinton. In it we reiterate our proposal for taking the global strategic arsenal off alert by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. We suggest a timetable that would complete the task by August 6, 1995 -- the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

In this letter we make reference to a previous letter we sent to President Clinton on March 1, 1993 in which we made the case for zero alert. If you want a copy of that letter, please let me know.

If you have comments on our proposal, please give me a call.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

For written response: 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

The Honorable Samuel Lewis
Director of Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW, Room 7311
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Lewis:

Since we met with you and John Riker in March, we have talked with other people in Clinton Administration about our proposal for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, to be achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. We remain convinced that this is a highly desirable policy.

Our latest thinking on this issue is contained in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake. In it we propose a phased approach that would achieve deactivation of all strategic weapons by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

We would be interested in knowing what you think of this idea.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

cc. John Riker

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

The Honorable Strobe Talbott
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW, Room 7531
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Ambassador Talbott:

A couple of weeks ago we met with Bill Danvers and Eric Edelman on your staff to discuss our proposal for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, to be achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. Since then we have had a similar discussion with staff of Dr. Ashton Carter at the Pentagon. We remain convinced that what we advocate is a highly desirable policy.

Our latest thinking on this issue is contained in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake. In it we propose a phased approach that would achieve deactivation of all strategic weapons by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

We would be interested in knowing what you think of this idea.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

cc. Bill Danvers, Eric Edelman

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

Dr. Ashton Carter
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Dr. Carter:

We greatly appreciate the opportunity we had this week to meet with Franklin Miller and Commander Charles Hasbrouck on your staff to discuss our proposal for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, to be achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification.

Based upon this discussion and previous meetings we had at the State Department, we have refined our thinking, as expressed in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake. We propose a phased approach that would achieve deactivation of all strategic weapons by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

This phased approach would continue the trend that started with President Bush's initiative in September 1991 and current efforts to take out of service strategic weapons covered by START I. The next phase would be the step which you, William Perry, and John Steinbruner proposed in your Brookings study, that is, to remove warheads from all launchers slated for eventual deactivation under START II.

The final phase -- the "Methodist option" -- would take similar action with the remaining strategic nuclear weapons.

We urge you to give this scenario serious consideration in the strategic policy review which is now underway.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

Mr. Franklin Miller
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Security
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Miller:

We greatly appreciate the opportunity we had to meet with you and Commander Hasbrouck to discuss our proposal for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, to be achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. For us it was beneficial to learn from your expertise as well as to present our ideas.

Based upon this discussion and previous meetings we had at the State Department, we have refined our thinking, as expressed in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake. We propose a phased approach that would achieve deactivation of all strategic weapons by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

I double checked and found that the "cooperative security" study of Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner did indeed contain a proposal to remove warheads from all launchers slated for eventual deactivation under START II. We encompassed that as the next-to-last phase of mutual deactivation. The final phase would be the "Methodist option" to take the remaining strategic nuclear weapons off alert in a similar manner. We also noted that it would be possible for unarmed strategic submarines to conduct training exercises even after zero alert is achieved.

As we said at our meeting, we urge you to give consideration to our total proposal as contained in the resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option", which we left with you. Perhaps we can talk again some time.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman
Joint Chief of Staffs
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-9999

Dear General Powell:

We appreciate your letter of July 1 in response to our proposal for a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, to be achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. We have also presented our ideas to civilian officials at the Pentagon and to persons at the State Department and National Security Council.

Based upon our discussions and what we have learned in the process, we have refined our thinking, as expressed in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake. We propose a phased approach that would achieve deactivation of all strategic weapons by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

Our proposal for zero alert is derived from a broader resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option", adopted by the United Methodist General Conference in May 1992 (copy enclosed). We hope that these policy recommendations might be given consideration in the strategic review which is now underway.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

Mrs. Hillary Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mrs. Clinton:

Knowing your interest in a broad range of issues beyond the ones you are now working on, we would like to share with you some ideas on nuclear disarmament as developed by people associated with the United Methodist Church.

Our own organization is a national association of laity and clergy, originally organized in 1987 by the Peace Mission of the Foundry United Methodist Church, which you are attending. I myself was a member of Foundry (and organizer of the Housing Mission) before my wife entered the ordained ministry in 1985, and I followed her in itinerancy.

Our latest thinking is contained in the enclosed letter to Dr. Anthony Lake in which we propose a global zero alert for all strategic nuclear weapons, achieved by separating warheads from delivery vehicles with proper verification. We propose that this be accomplished in phases, to be completed by August 6, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

The rationale for this approach is offered in the enclosed letter of March 1, 1993 to President Clinton.

This idea comes out of a broader resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: the Zero Option", adopted by the United Methodist General Conference in May 1992. As you know, this is the official governing body of the United Methodist Church. There was so little opposition to this resolution in committee that it was adopted as part of the consent calendar, in effect by unanimous consent.

The 1992 resolution contains policy recommendations that build upon the pastoral letter and foundation document, *In Defense of Creation*, which the United Methodist Council of Bishops adopted in 1986 and the General Conference affirmed in 1988. A copy is enclosed in case you don't have one handy.

Mrs. Hillary Clinton

July 29, 1993

Page two.

We are recommending that the "Methodist option" be given consideration in the comprehensive strategic review which is now underway. We urge you to use your influence to see that this occurs.

If you or your staff would like to discuss our ideas in greater detail, please let us know.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: 1-301 694-2859; Fri-Sat: 301 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

July 29, 1993

Ms. Melanne Verveer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of the First Lady
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Verveer:

We kindly request you to place the enclosed letter to Mrs. Clinton and the attachments in her "summer reading" pile.

We are offering some ideas on nuclear disarmament, as developed by some United Methodists. We believe that they contain a combination of idealism and practicality that should appeal to the Clinton Administration.

Specifically we are proposing that by August 6, 1995 (the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima) all strategic nuclear weapons around the globe be deactivated by removing warheads from delivery vehicles, achieved in phases during the next two years with proper verification. Dismantlement could occur thereafter.

We have presented our ideas to personnel of the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department. We have found them cordial and willing to listen, but they come mostly from the arms control community and would settle for "minimal deterrence" rather than "zero alert" and eventually complete nuclear disarmament. We believe that the latter is possible with creative U.S. leadership.

If you or others on Mrs. Clinton's staff would like to discuss our ideas in greater detail, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

FAX TRANSMITTAL MEMO

Date: August 9, 1993

To: Mr. Robert Bell
National Security Staff
The White House

FAX No. 202 395-1185

Telephone No. 202 395-3330

From: Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair

FAX No. 301 695-0192

Telephone No. 301 694-2859

As the attached letter indicates, we have requested an opportunity to meet with Dr. Anthony Lake to discuss our ideas on nuclear disarmament. His office has indicated that we should make arrangements through you.

As our letter indicates, we have conferred with persons at the State Department and the Defense Department and now want to confer with President Clinton's immediate advisors. We are willing to meet with you prior to talking with Dr. Lake, but we still would like to have an opportunity to present our ideas directly to him.

We usually have a three person delegation consisting of myself, Sherman Harris, chair, Board of Directors, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, and Ms. Robin Ringler, peace with justice coordinator, United Methodist General Board of Church and Society.

Ordinarily I am available by phone on Monday-Thursday at 1-301 694-2859 in Frederick and on Friday and Saturday at 301 897-3668 in Bethesda.

September 9, 1993

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
2187 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Lee:

During the last 18 months we have been in touch with you about our proposal for deactivation of the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. Since the Clinton Administration took office, we have presented this idea to persons on the National Security Council staff, at the State Department, and at the Pentagon.

We have learned that a working group is developing options on "denuclearization" or "detargeting", to be reviewed by President Clinton sometime this fall. We would like the president to be aware of the "Methodist Option" as he makes his policy choices, but we are doubtful that staff we have talked to will forward our ideas to him. Therefore, we would like your advice on and possible your assistance in reaching the president.

As a minimum, we would like to get the enclosed papers on the "Methodist Option" into the president's hands. Better yet, we would like to put together a small delegation of United Methodist bishops and laity to talk with him directly. United Methodists have studied this issue for ten years and have serious proposals to present. How can we do this?

Would you be willing to hand or transmit the "Methodist Option" to President Clinton, not necessarily with your endorsement (though that would be great), but at least to assure that he learns of this viewpoint? Or can you or

someone on your staff guide us to a person on the White House staff we can talk to about requesting a meeting with the president?

If somebody on your staff would like to discuss this request with me, I am available at 1-301 694-2859 in Frederick on Monday-Wednesday, September 13-15, and then I'll be out of town until Thursday, September 23. Whatever help you can give, we will appreciate.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817

September 9, 1993

Mr. George Withers
Office of Representative Dellums
2136 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear George:

Over a year ago I talked with you about our idea to deactivate the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. Since that time there has actually been activity in that direction with the weapon systems covered by START I. Last fall in a Brookings report, Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner proposed that this approach be applied to START II systems. Now two of them are at the Pentagon.

We are still pursuing this idea and have talked with persons on the National Security Council staff, in the State Department, and at the Pentagon. We understand that a major study is underway, looking toward "denuclearization" or "detargeting", though not going as far as we propose.

The latest expression of our ideas is contained in the enclosed set of papers on the Methodist Option. We want you to know our thinking at this time and request that you share our ideas with Representative Dellums. Furthermore, if the House Armed Services Committee is planning to hold hearings on the new defense posture or other subjects where our views would be relevant, we would like an opportunity to testify.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 11, 1993

Bishop Joseph Yeakel
9226 Colesville Road
Silver Spring, MD 20910

Dear Joe:

Since the first of the year we have been offering our views on nuclear disarmament to people in the Clinton Administration: National Security Council staff, State Department, Defense Department. Speaking for Methodists United for Peace with Justice, we make clear that we are an association of laity and clergy and do not represent the United Methodist Church officially. In several instances Robin Ringle, peace with justice director of the UM General Board of Church and Society, has joined us and given out the 1992 General Conference resolution, "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option".

We have had a friendly reception, have found encouraging progress in attitudes toward nuclear arms reduction, but not full acceptance of our recommendations. We have learned that the Administration is moving toward some major policy decisions on denuclearization this fall, ultimately to be decided by President Clinton. Our impression is that our ideas are not going beyond the bureaucracy so that the president is not aware of the "Methodist Option."

We're trying to overcome this. For this purpose I've developed the enclosed papers on the Methodist Option and am seeking help from a member of Congress to get them into Clinton's hands. I'm also seeking assistance to line up an appointment with President Clinton for a United Methodist delegation to offer our views in person. This might be small delegation of bishops and

laity. It's a long shot but worth a try.

If that should come about, would you be willing to join such a group, assuming that it would occur at a time when you have no irrevocable commitment? We may also try to get Bishop Dale White since he has played the leading role for the Council of Bishops on this issue. You may have other suggestions. Sherman Harris and I have been doing the visitations and would represent Methodists United if we can set up this meeting with the president.

I'll be in touch with you as a follow up to this letter.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 15, 1993

Mr. Brian Moran
Office of Senator Dale Bumpers
229 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Moran:

During 1992 I had a series of conversations with Bruce MacDonald on ideas developed by Methodists United for Peace with Justice on nuclear disarmament, particularly a proposal for deactivation of the global strategic arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles. He was interested in this idea and indicated that Senator Bumpers was, too, although it wasn't on his active agenda for advocacy.

Since the Clinton Administration took office, we have presented this idea to persons on the National Security Council staff, at the State Department, and at the Pentagon. There seems to be general acceptance of our view that nuclear weapons have no utility for deterrence and warfighting in the post-Cold War era except to deter other nuclear weapons, but there isn't yet an acceptance of total global elimination, started by mutual deactivation leading to phased dismantlement of all warheads and delivery vehicles.

The latest version is of our ideas is contained in the enclosed set of papers on the "Methodist Option". I request that you show this material to Senator Bumpers. I would like to discuss our deactivation proposal with you in the near future and to learn Senator Bumpers current thinking on this approach.

The Clinton Administration has a working group which is developing options

on "denuclearization" or "detargeting", to be reviewed by President Clinton sometime this fall. Therefore, this is a good time to influence the president, who will have to address this issue along with the many other issues on the front burner. We are trying to reach the president, and we hope that Senator Bumpers will use his influence with President Clinton at this crucial moment.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 30, 1993

Ms. Nancy Hernreich
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Hernreich:

We kindly request an appointment to meet with President Clinton to discuss ideas on nuclear disarmament developed by the United Methodist Church. We make this request because we are aware that he will soon be considering policy proposals for denuclearization. We want him to be aware of the "Methodist Option" when he makes his decisions on this matter.

Depending upon their schedules, our delegation would consist of the following persons:

Bishop C. Dale White. He chaired the committee of the United Methodist Council of Bishops which in 1985-86 developed the pastoral letter and foundation document *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace*. He was chosen by his peers to deliver the Episcopal Address at the 1992 General Conference, the quadrennial policy-making body of the United Methodist Church.

Bishop Joseph H. Yeakel, resident bishop in the Washington area and president of the United Methodist General Board of Church and Society. Last year he was president of the Council of Bishops and negotiated with the Russian Federation and Russian Orthodox Church so that the United

Methodist Church could establish an office in Moscow.

Rev. Thomas White Wolf Fassett, general secretary of the United Methodist General Board of Church and Society, the official social action agency. As a Native American, he understands the human rights dimension of continued nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Sherman W. Harris, chair of the Board of Directors, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy which undertakes education and advocacy on peace and justice issues. He is a member of Asbury United Methodist Church in Washington and a leader in the Baltimore-Washington Annual Conference.

Mr. Howard W. Hallman (myself), issues chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice. I am author of 50 articles and papers on nuclear disarmament and related issue. I was a member of Foundry United Methodist Church before my wife became an ordained minister and am now a member of church she serves in Frederick, Maryland.

Ms. Nancy Hernreich
September 30, 1993
Page two.

The ideas we want to discuss with President Clinton are contained in the enclosed documents. They include a summary entitled "Methodist Option for Nuclear Disarmament"; "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", a resolution adopted by the 1992 United Methodist General Conference; and "Deactivation of the Global Strategic Arsenal", a proposal by Methodists United for Peace with Justice.

During the last several months Sherman Harris, Ms. Robin Ringler, peace with justice director of the General Board of Church and Society, and I have had an opportunity to present these ideas to persons on the staff of the National Security Council, in the State Department, and at the Pentagon. They received us courteously and listened carefully to what we had to say.

Now we want to be certain that President Clinton is fully aware that there is a carefully developed Methodist Option for Nuclear Disarmament. It emphasizes that the greatest national security for the United States would be total deactivation and dismantlement of the global nuclear arsenal. It offers practical ways that this can be achieved. We sincerely believe that our ideas are worthy of his consideration as he comes to decisions on nuclear weapons policy. That is why we want to talk with him directly.

If this is possible, I would like to talk with you about a precise time. The bishops particularly are heavily scheduled but would do their best to rearrange their schedules in order to meet with President Clinton.

Sincerely yours,

*Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair*

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 30, 1993

Mr. Daniel B. Ponneman, Senior Director
Nonproliferation and Export Controls
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building, #380
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Ponneman:

During the past ten years United Methodists in the United States have carefully studied issues dealing with nuclear weapons and have developed sets of policy proposals. These ideas can be considered the "Methodist Option for Nuclear Disarmament", as summarized in the enclosure. Also enclosed are (1) a resolution on "Nuclear Disarmament: The Zero Option", adopted by the 1992 United General Conference (the official governing body) and (2) a proposal for "Deactivation of the Global Strategic Arsenal" from our organization, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, a national association of laity and clergy.

We have discussed our ideas with a number of persons within the Clinton Administration and in Congress. Representative Lee Hamilton suggested that we share these documents with you. We would like to follow up by meeting with you in the near future. Previously we have an opportunity to discuss our thinking with your colleague, Robert Bell. We would like to confer with you, too, because our proposals relate very much to the goal of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

For such a meeting I would be joined by Sherman Harris, chair of the Board of Directors, Methodists United for Peace with Justice, and Ms. Robin Ringler,

peace with justice director, United Methodist General Board of Church and Society (the official social action agency).

Because these matters are now under policy review by the Clinton Administration, we request that you forward our statements to Dr. Anthony Lake and through him to President Clinton so that they may be fully aware of the "Methodist Option."

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

cc. Rep. Lee H. Hamilton

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 29, 1993

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
2187 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Lee:

We have followed through on your response to our letter of September 9 by sending the "Methodist Option" to Daniel Ponneman on the staff of the National Security Council and requesting a meeting with him.

We have also written to Ms. Nancy Hernreich, President Clinton's assistant for appointments and scheduling, requesting a meeting with him that would include Bishop C. Dale White and Bishop Joseph H. Yeakel, two top leaders of the United Methodist Church on issues of peace and nuclear disarmament. We know that the president is extremely busy but because crucial issues on nuclear weapons policy are under consideration we would like to discuss the "Methodist Option" with him in person.

Perhaps you might support our request to see President Clinton. Indeed, it might be desirable to ask you and Senator Bumpers to join in such a meeting and introduce the bishops and others to the president. However, we would defer to your judgment of what would be most appropriate.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman

Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 29, 1993

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
229 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Bumpers:

In recent years we have shared with you our ideas on nuclear disarmament, including a proposal to deactivate the global nuclear arsenal by separating warheads from delivery vehicles pending their total dismantlement. We have recently summarized our thinking and the official policies of the United Methodist Church on these issues in the enclosed summary of "Methodist Options for Nuclear Disarmament."

We understand that President Clinton will soon be considering key policies related to denuclearization and related matters. Therefore, we have written to Ms. Nancy Hernreich, President Clinton's assistant for appointments and scheduling, requesting a meeting with him that would include Bishop C. Dale White and Bishop Joseph H. Yeakel, two top leaders of the United Methodist Church on issues of peace and nuclear disarmament. We know that the president is extremely busy but because crucial issues on nuclear weapons policy are under consideration we would like to discuss the "Methodist Option" with him in person.

We are wondering if you would be willing to support our request to see President Clinton. Indeed, it might be desirable to ask you and Representative Lee Hamilton (both of you active Methodist laymen) to join in such a meeting and introduce the bishops and others to the president. However, we would defer to your judgment of what would be most

appropriate.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817
Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

September 30, 1993

Ms. Melanne Verveer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of the First Lady
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Verveer:

I realized that Mrs. Clinton and all of you on her staff are overwhelmingly busy working on health care reform -- and doing a great job, too. Meanwhile, we continue to work on our main issues, which is nuclear disarmament. Enclosed is a set of papers on the "Methodist Option", which restates and updates material I sent to Mrs. Clinton in July.

We understand that this fall President Clinton will be making major policy decisions on denuclearization. For that reason we have asked Ms. Nancy Hernreich if a delegation of United Methodist bishops and laypersons could have a meeting with the President to present the "Methodist Option" for his consideration. We share this request with you because we want to keep Mrs. Clinton informed on what United Methodists are up to.

With best regards,

Howard W. Hallman
Issues Chair

Telephone -- Mon-Thurs: (301) 694-2859; Fri-Sat: (301) 897-3668

Please reply to 6508 Wilmett Road, Bethesda, MD 20817