

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <ashton_carter@harvard.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 11:00:02 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
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X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Carter:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
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Atlantic Council of the United States

<http://www.acus.org/InternationalSecurity/FurtherReins.html>

Program on International Security

Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers

This project is part of a long-term program to develop a common vision for international leaders on how to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), began the program in 1991 when he recognized that the new strategic environment called for rethinking the context which shapes the purposes, types, numbers, and deployment plans for nuclear weapons. This reassessment resulted in a series of bulletins and reports, including a consultation paper *Further Reins on Nuclear Arms: Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers* (1993). The "Next Steps" address the key prerequisites for a series of reductions in nuclear arms inventories. Attention to the prerequisites for each step is particularly important for military planners and arms control negotiators. By directly involving these responsible officials at each stage of the project, the Atlantic Council helps bridge the gap between the arms control community and military planners.

Building a common vision on the role of nuclear weapons involves stimulating the rethinking of nuclear strategies. This is accomplished through consultations with foreign leaders and analytic exchanges among our international network of strategic thinkers which enable us to test new ideas and build consensus in key countries. Our discussions are based in large part on a series of recent and forthcoming consultation papers.

Policy and Consultation Papers

[Building an Asia-Pacific Security Community: The Role of Nuclear Weapons,](#)

James E. Goodby and Tomohisa Sakanaka, CO-CHAIRS; C. Richard Nelson, PROJECT DIRECTOR; W. Neal Anderson, Tomohide Murai, and Shinichi Ogawa, CO-RAPPORTEURS. May 1999.

[What Should Be Done About Tactical Nuclear Weapons?](#) *George Lewis & Andrea Gabbitas (with additional commentary by Edward Rowny & John Woodworth), March 1999*

[Ballistic Missile Defense Revisited,](#) *Leon Sloss, January 1999.*

[Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach,](#) *Andrew J. Goodpaster. January 1998.*

[The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go?,](#) *Jonathan Dean, March 1997.*

[START-III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast?,](#) *Oleg N. Bykov; Jack Mendelsohn, October 1996.*

[Nuclear Weapons and European Security,](#) *General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), CHAIR; C. Richard Nelson, PROJECT DIRECTOR ; Steven Philip Kramer, RAPPORTEUR. April 1996.*

[Further Reins on Nuclear Arms: Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers,](#) *General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), August 1993.*

[Tighter Limits on Nuclear Arms: Issues and Opportunities for a New Era,](#) *General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), May 1992.*

Available Bulletins

[Implementing the European Security and Defense Policy: A Practical Vision for Europe](#), General Klaus Naumann (Ret.), August 2000

[Building Consensus on the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Northeast Asia](#), James E. Goodby, Tomohisa Sakanaka and Henry C. Stackpole, III, co-chairs, August 1999.

[Managing Nuclear Arms Competition in South Asia: Work the Problem, Don't Fight It!](#), Chas. Freeman, Jack Matlock, Dick Nelson, and Ken Weisbrode, July 1998.

[The Future of Nuclear Weapons in World Affairs](#), Sir Michael Quinlan, November 1996.

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[The Indivisibility of Arms Control: Saving the CFE Treaty](#), Jeffrey D. McCausland, September 1995.

[Ukraine's Key Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation](#), C. Richard Nelson, Scott A. Kocher, September 1995.

[Strengthening Security Relations Between Russia and the United States](#), C. Richard Nelson, August 1995.

[A Minimum Deterrence Regime for South Asia](#), Naeem Salik, Maroof Raza, June 1995.

[Interim Arrangements for North Korea: Are They Secure?](#), C. Richard Nelson, Kenneth Weisbrode, December 1994.

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[Weapons](#), James E. Goodby and Tomohisa Sakanaka, CO-CHAIRS; C. Richard Nelson, PROJECT DIRECTOR; W. Neal Anderson, Tomohide Murai, and Shinichi Ogawa, CO-RAPORTEURS. May 1999.

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From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <ecarroll@cdi.org>
Subject: Request for your ideas
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear Gene:

The switch in control of the U.S. Senate may make our task more difficult, but the challenge remains.

Having put a lot of energy into the effort to stop the rush to war with Iraq, I am returning to our web site, www.zero-nukes.org, which I have discussed with you. Our intent is to promote dialogue on how to achieve deep, deep cuts in nuclear weapons and eventually reach zero. We pick up some of your ideas at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/militaryleaders.html#eugenecarroll>

Therefore, I repeat my request to you to write a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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Shalom,
Howard

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Draft Proposal
An Executive Agreement
between the United States and Russia
to De-alert Their Nuclear Arsenals

- 1) We affirm that:
 - a) The United States has no intent of initiating an attack against the territory of Russia.
 - b) Russia has no intent of initiating an attack against the territory of the United States.
- 2) Nevertheless, we observe that
 - a) The United States deploys nuclear weapons with capability of attacking Russia from afar.
 - b) Russia deploys nuclear weapons with capability of attacking the United States from afar.
- 3) We note that because of this possibility both the United States and Russia maintain considerable numbers of nuclear weapons on a high state of alert in order to respond quickly to unexpected nuclear attack.
- 4) We realize that this high state of readiness runs the risk of unintended launch by accident, misinterpretation of early warning data, and other reasons and that this can lead to rapid counterattack resulting in catastrophic destruction on both sides.
- 5) We acknowledge that the security of both the United States and Russia would be enhanced if the two nations would carry out lower the alert status of their nuclear weapons.
- 6) Therefore, we agree that the following actions will be undertaken.

ACTIONS

[to be completed]

Drafted by Howard W. Hallman, February 7, 2003

Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues
Union of Concerned Scientists
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December 19, 2002

Getting Serious About Nuclear Disarmament

Current Situation of Nuclear Disarmament

Next to war itself, nuclear weapons represent the greatest continuing danger to humanity, extending, at least in theoretical calculations, to the extinction of the human species. Viewed objectively, that danger appears to be increasing at this time.

Even those opposed to possible war in Iraq must admit that the Bush administration has energetically pursued the issue of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists. But the administration has done this unilaterally and at the cost of ignoring or even condoning the nuclear weapons activities of states which already possess nuclear arsenals. There is justified worry about the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal from theft and diversion. It is also a fact that Russia has revoked its no-first-use policy and has repeatedly failed to reach agreement with the United States on transparency exchange of information about the numbers and locations of each government's nuclear warheads. China, France, the UK, two recent proliferants, India and Pakistan, and Israel, a long-time proliferant, have joined the United States in the partnership against terrorism, and their nuclear arsenals are apparently viewed as benign, although, for one, India and Pakistan continue at loggerheads. The administration argues

that both Iraq and Iran are moving toward development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has revealed itself as a two-time violator of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Obviously, the state of non-proliferation is not good.

Nor is the situation of nuclear disarmament. In the May, 2002 Moscow agreement, the U.S. and Russia agreed to take several thousand warheads off operational alert and to reduce the levels of deployed strategic warheads to about 2,000 for each country. But there is nothing enduring about this transaction. The reduced warheads will be stored for possible redeployment. There is no commitment to further reductions. Tactical nuclear warheads were not constrained or reduced.

For its part, the U.S. has annulled the ABM Treaty with its limit on the number of deployed missile interceptors, and is energetically pursuing a program of missile defense including ultimate weaponization of space. In the long term, these actions will result in increasing the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear weapon states. U.S.-Russian negotiation in the Clinton administration to carry out monitored destruction of warheads withdrawn from operational deployment has been dropped. The U.S. has retained its own first-use policy and has lowered the nuclear threshold for possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons: The U.S. nuclear posture review submitted to Congress at the beginning of 2002 threatened use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical and biological weapons and “unforeseen circumstances” and broadened the circle of potential target states. The administration followed this action with a security doctrine which threatened preemptive attack, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, on those preparing to attack the United States. In the 2002 Prepcom for the 2005 Review Conference on

performance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush administration representative indicated that the administration considered null and void commitments undertaken by the Clinton administration at the 2000 NPT review conference.

Of the eight known nuclear weapon states – U.S., Russia, China, UK, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel – only two, the U.S. and Russia, have accepted specific limits on the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals. The United States has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and appears to be edging toward resumption of nuclear tests to develop earth penetrating warheads. There has been no progress towards a treaty to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The evidence seems incontrovertible that the situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated and risks becoming even more serious.

Action Needed

If this situation is viewed rationally (rather than from the viewpoint of current political feasibility), then, logically, what is needed to cope with it is international action to get serious about nuclear disarmament while simultaneously tightening the non-proliferation regime for both nuclear and biological weapons. The dangers from chemical weapons appear more under control, given a relatively effective international regime and the very large amounts of chemical weapons needed for strategic attack, though dangers of small-scale, localized, terrorism remain. However, given greatly increased concern over the use of biological weapons, there is little prospect of gaining agreement to far-reaching moves on nuclear disarmament without dealing at the same

time with the biological weapons issue by establishing a more effective non-proliferation regime for both types of weapons. At the same time, only serious moves of nuclear disarmament will make politically feasible this second action of tightening the non-proliferation regime.

Neutralizing Nuclear Arsenals

Nuclear disarmament might best be pursued through a program of “neutralizing” nuclear arsenals. Neutralizing nuclear arsenals can be achieved by reducing the national holdings of all known nuclear weapon states to a minimal residual force which is then immobilized by separating warheads from launchers and storing both under international monitoring on the territory of the owner state.

The following individual steps are needed: (1) The U.S. and Russia should agree to reduce their total arsenal of nuclear weapons to one thousand warheads each, this total to include all strategic and tactical, deployed and stored warheads. (2) The two governments would agree to exchange full information on the nature, types, amounts and location of existing warheads and fissile material, to conclude a bilateral (later multilateral), agreement to formally end production of fissile material for weapons, to dismantle all reduced warheads under bilateral supervision, and to turn over fissile material from these weapons to the IAEA for monitored secure storage. (3) These actions would be dependent on agreement by the remaining nuclear weapon states – China, UK, France, Israel, India and Pakistan – to join in a system of nuclear controls, to include no increase agreements and exchange of information on their nuclear arsenals and their agreement to an international treaty ending production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons. (4)

In a second stage, all the nuclear weapon states would drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals to a level of 200 each total warheads for the NPT weapon states – U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France – and 100 each for India, Pakistan and Israel. (5) Reduced weapons would be dismantled and the fissile material turned over to the IAEA for secure storage. (6) Remaining arsenals would be placed in storage on the territory of the owner state and placed under multilateral monitoring, either by the IAEA, by mixed teams of owner state nationals, or by a combination of the two. (7) Delivery systems – missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft – would be reduced and limited in conformity with warhead reductions in order to reduce the danger from concealed weapons. (8) For the same reason, warhead storage could be in up to ten separate sites on the territory of owner states, which could be hardened and defended by owner state forces, including on-site missile defenses. (9) Stored nuclear weapons could be withdrawn by the owner state in a situation of national emergency, but not without giving notice. Monitors would not seek to prevent reopening of storage sites, but would warn all other participants in the system if this occurred. (10) If concern over possible cheating remains high, in order to further protect against the possibility of concealed weapons, each weapon state could be permitted to retain up to three operational warheads with an equal number of single warhead ground or sea launchers, sufficient for damaging retaliation against an offender, but not enough to launch decisive attack on another state. (11) Weapon state governments would agree among themselves to retaliate jointly against any of their number or any other state or organization which used or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

Also necessary is (12) a more effective non-nuclear proliferation regime, to include compulsory adherence both to normal IAEA safeguards and to the additional (post-Iraq 1991) protocol of the IAEA, acceptance of the right of the IAEA to place sensors of all kinds on the territory of member states, and agreement among all states parties to the NPT that efforts to avoid these requirements will be met with sanctions by other parties to the treaty, including the use of military force.

This system would make large-scale nuclear surprise attack, and accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch nearly impossible, as well as diversion of nuclear warheads or fissile material. It would be a giant step toward nuclear disarmament, representing the final stage of nuclear disarmament before elimination of nuclear weapons.

(13) This degree of nuclear disarmament would be possible only if there is effective control of biological weapons, including an effective compliance regime. Therefore, it could be accepted only if there were an agreed compliance system, including full transparency, for the Biological Weapons Convention, backed by explicit agreement among member states to take joint military action against violators as an integral part of the compliance regime.

(14) If there still is strong continuing concern about the possibility of non-compliance and concealed weapons after the steps described, it could also be agreed that, in the event there is evidence of non-compliance on either nuclear or biological control agreements, but the UN Security Council cannot agree on a course of remedial action, any five parties to the Treaty may take joint action against the offender. In these circumstances,

insistence on retaining nuclear or biological weapon capability would be considered a greater evil than the use of armed force.

These steps and the greatly decreased possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons they will bring will create the conditions, including greater cooperation among nuclear weapon states, dependable transparency, and enhanced effectiveness of the Security Council and the UN system, necessary for final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

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Jonathan Dean

PDF document [use Dean.pdf]

[block in on left as a paragraph insert
photo of Jonathan Dean, somewhat reduced in size
from <http://www.ucsusa.org/news.cfm?newsID=217>]

[text on right in italics]

As a member of the U.S. Foreign Service, [Ambassador Jonathan Dean] served as U.S. representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in Vienna between 1973 and 1981. Since 1984 he has been advisor on international security issues to the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Getting Serious about Nuclear Disarmament

December 2002

[sub-box. Arial. "Summary" in 12 pt., text in 11 pt.]

Summary

The danger that nuclear weapons might be used appears to be increasing at this time. The situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated and risks becoming even more serious.

Action is needed to neutralize nuclear arsenals. Fourteen steps are proposed:

- (1) In stage one reduction of U.S. and Russia arsenals to 1,000 warheads each.
- (2) U.S. and Russia end production of fissile material, dismantle all reduced warheads, and turn over fissile material to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- (3) China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan join a system of nuclear controls.
- (4) In stage two a level of 200 warheads for U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France and 100 each for India, Pakistan, and Israel.
- (5) Reduced weapons dismantled and fissile material turned over to IAEA.
- (6) Remaining arsenals put in monitored storage.
- (7) Delivery systems reduced.
- (8) Warhead storage hardened and defended by owner states.
- (9) With advanced notice, stored nuclear weapons could be withdrawn in a national emergency.

- (10) Each weapon state could retain up to three operational warheads.
- (11) Weapon states could retaliate jointly against use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.
- (12) Establish a more effective non-nuclear proliferation regime.
- (13) Achieve effective control of biological weapons.
- (14) If UN Security Council cannot agree on remedial action to deal with non-compliance on nuclear or biological control agreements, five states may take joint action against the offender.
[end sub-box]

[return to Times New Roman 12 pt]

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There is justified **worry about the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal** from theft and diversion. It is also a fact that Russia has revoked its no-first-use policy and has repeatedly failed to reach agreement with the United States on transparency exchange of information about the numbers and locations of each government's nuclear warheads.

China, France, the UK, two recent proliferants, India and Pakistan, and Israel, a long-time proliferant, have joined the United States in the partnership against terrorism, and their nuclear arsenals are apparently viewed as benign, although, for one, India and Pakistan continue at loggerheads. The administration argues that both Iraq and Iran are moving toward development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has revealed itself as a two-time violator of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Obviously, **the state of non-proliferation is not good.**

Nor is the situation of nuclear disarmament. In the **May 2002 Moscow agreement**, the U.S. and Russia agreed to take several thousand warheads off operational alert and to reduce the levels of deployed strategic warheads to about 2,000 for each country. But there is **nothing enduring about this transaction.** The reduced warheads will be **stored for possible redeployment.** There is **no commitment to further reductions.** **Tactical nuclear warheads were not constrained or reduced.**

For its part, the **U.S. has annulled the ABM Treaty** with its limit on the number of deployed missile interceptors, and is energetically pursuing a program of missile defense including ultimate weaponization of space. In the long term, these actions will result in increasing the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear weapon states. U.S.-Russian negotiation in the Clinton administration to carry out monitored destruction of warheads withdrawn from operational deployment has been dropped.

The U.S. has retained its own first-use policy and has **lowered the nuclear threshold for possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons**: The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress at the beginning of 2002 threatened use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical and biological weapons and “unforeseen circumstances” and broadened the circle of potential target states. The administration followed this action with a security doctrine which threatened preemptive attack, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, on those preparing to attack the United States.

In the 2002 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference on performance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush administration representative indicated that the administration considered null and void commitments undertaken by the Clinton administration at the 2000 NPT review conference.

Of the eight known nuclear weapon states – U.S., Russia, China, UK, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel – only two, the U.S. and Russia, have accepted specific limits on the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals. The **United States** has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and appears to be **edging toward resumption of nuclear tests** to develop earth penetrating warheads. There has been no progress towards a treaty to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The evidence seems incontrovertible that **the situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated** and risks **becoming even more serious.**

Action Needed

If this situation is viewed rationally (rather than from the viewpoint of current political feasibility), then, logically, what is needed to cope with it is international action to **get serious about nuclear disarmament** while simultaneously **tightening the non-proliferation regime for both nuclear and biological weapons.** The dangers from chemical weapons appear more under control, given a relatively effective international regime and the very large amounts of chemical weapons needed for strategic attack, though dangers of small-scale, localized, terrorism remain. However, given greatly increased concern over the use of biological weapons, there is little prospect of gaining agreement to far-reaching moves on nuclear disarmament without dealing at the same time with the biological weapons issue by establishing a more effective non-proliferation

regime for both types of weapons. At the same time, only serious moves of nuclear disarmament will make politically feasible this second action of tightening the non-proliferation regime.

Neutralizing Nuclear Arsenals

Nuclear disarmament might best be pursued through a program of “neutralizing” nuclear arsenals. Neutralizing nuclear arsenals can be achieved by reducing the national holdings of all known nuclear weapon states to a minimal residual force which is then immobilized by separating warheads from launchers and storing both under international monitoring on the territory of the owner state. The following individual steps are needed:

(1) **The U.S. and Russia** should agree to reduce their total arsenal of nuclear weapons to **one thousand warheads each**, this total to include all strategic and tactical, deployed and stored warheads.

(2) The two governments would agree to **exchange full information** on the nature, types, amounts and location of existing warheads and fissile material, to conclude **a bilateral (later multilateral) agreement** to formally **end production of fissile material** for weapons, to **dismantle all reduced warheads** under bilateral supervision, and to **turn over fissile material** from these weapons to the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** for monitored secure storage.

(3) These actions would be dependent on agreement by **the remaining nuclear weapon states** – China, UK, France, Israel, India and Pakistan – to **join in a system of nuclear controls**, to include no increase agreements and exchange of information on their nuclear arsenals and their agreement to an international treaty ending production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons.

(4) **In a second stage**, all the nuclear weapon states would drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals to **a level of 200 each total warheads for the NPT weapon states** – U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France – and **100 each for India, Pakistan and Israel**.

(5) **Reduced weapons would be dismantled** and the **fissile material turned over to the IAEA** for secure storage.

(6) **Remaining arsenals would be placed in storage** on the territory of the owner state and placed under multilateral monitoring, either by the IAEA, by mixed teams of owner state nationals, or by a combination of the two.

(7) **Delivery systems** – missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft – **would be reduced** and limited in conformity with warhead reductions in order to reduce the danger from concealed weapons.

(8) For the same reason, **warhead storage** could be in up to ten separate sites on the territory of owner states, which could be **hardened and defended** by owner state forces, including on-site missile defenses.

(9) **Stored nuclear weapons could be withdrawn** by the owner state in a situation of **national emergency**, but not without giving notice. Monitors would not seek to prevent reopening of storage sites, but would warn all other participants in the system if this occurred.

(10) If concern over possible cheating remains high, in order to further protect against the possibility of concealed weapons, **each weapon state** could be permitted to **retain up to three operational warheads** with an equal number of single warhead ground or sea launchers, sufficient for damaging retaliation against an offender, but not enough to launch decisive attack on another state.

(11) Weapon state governments would agree among themselves to **retaliate jointly** against any of their number or any other state or organization which used or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

(12) Also necessary is **a more effective non-nuclear proliferation regime**, to include compulsory adherence both to normal IAEA safeguards and to the additional (post-Iraq 1991) protocol of the IAEA, acceptance of the right of the IAEA to place sensors of all kinds on the territory of member states, and agreement among all states parties to the NPT that efforts to avoid these requirements will be met with sanctions by other parties to the treaty, including the use of military force.

This system would make large-scale nuclear surprise attack, and accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch nearly impossible, as well as diversion of nuclear warheads or fissile material. It would be **a giant step toward nuclear disarmament**, representing the final stage of nuclear disarmament before elimination of nuclear weapons.

(13) This degree of nuclear disarmament would be possible only if there is **effective control of biological weapons**, including an effective compliance regime. Therefore, it could be accepted only if there were an agreed compliance system, including full transparency, for the Biological Weapons Convention, backed by explicit agreement among member states to take joint military action against violators as an integral part of the compliance regime.

(14) If there still is strong continuing **concern about the possibility of non-compliance and concealed weapons** after the steps described, it could also be agreed that, in the event there is evidence of non-compliance on either nuclear or biological control agreements, but the UN Security Council cannot agree on a course of remedial

action, any five parties to the Treaty may take **joint action against the offender**. In these circumstances, insistence on retaining nuclear or biological weapon capability would be considered a greater evil than the use of armed force.

These steps and the greatly decreased possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons they will bring **will create the conditions**, including greater cooperation among nuclear weapon states, dependable transparency, and enhanced effectiveness of the Security Council and the UN system, **necessary for final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons**.

[end box]

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Getting Serious about Nuclear Disarmament

by Jonathan Dean

December 2002

As a member of the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Jonathan Dean served as U.S. representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in Vienna between 1973 and 1981. Since 1984 he has been advisor on international security issues to the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Current Situation of Nuclear Disarmament

Next to war itself, nuclear weapons represent the greatest continuing danger to humanity, extending, at least in theoretical calculations, to the extinction of the human species. Viewed objectively, that danger appears to be increasing at this time.

Even those opposed to possible war in Iraq must admit that the Bush administration has energetically pursued the issue of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists. But the administration has done this unilaterally and at the cost of ignoring or even condoning the nuclear weapons activities of states which already possess nuclear arsenals. There is justified worry about the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal from theft and diversion. It is also a fact that Russia has revoked its no-first-use policy and has repeatedly failed to reach agreement with the United States on transparency exchange of information about the numbers and locations of each government's nuclear warheads. China, France, the UK, two recent proliferants, India and Pakistan, and Israel, a long-time proliferant, have joined the United States in the partnership against terrorism, and their nuclear arsenals are apparently viewed as benign, although, for one, India and Pakistan continue at loggerheads. The administration argues that both Iraq and Iran are moving toward development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has revealed itself as a two-time violator of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Obviously, the state of non-proliferation is not good.

Nor is the situation of nuclear disarmament. In the May, 2002 Moscow agreement, the U.S. and Russia agreed to take several thousand warheads off operational alert and to reduce the levels of deployed strategic warheads to about 2,000 for each country. But there is nothing enduring about this transaction. The reduced warheads will be stored for possible redeployment. There is no commitment to further reductions. Tactical nuclear warheads were not constrained or reduced.

For its part, the U.S. has annulled the ABM Treaty with its limit on the number of deployed missile interceptors, and is energetically pursuing a program of missile defense including ultimate weaponization of space. In the long term, these actions will result in increasing the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear weapon states. U.S.-Russian negotiation in the Clinton administration to carry out monitored destruction of warheads withdrawn from operational deployment has been dropped. The U.S. has retained its own first-use policy and has lowered the nuclear threshold for possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons: The U.S. nuclear posture review submitted to Congress at the beginning of 2002 threatened use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical and biological weapons and "unforeseen circumstances" and

broadened the circle of potential target states. The administration followed this action with a security doctrine which threatened preemptive attack, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, on those preparing to attack the United States. In the 2002 Prepcom for the 2005 Review Conference on performance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush administration representative indicated that the administration considered null and void commitments undertaken by the Clinton administration at the 2000 NPT review conference.

Of the eight known nuclear weapon states – U.S., Russia, China, UK, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel – only two, the U.S. and Russia, have accepted specific limits on the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals. The United States has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and appears to be edging toward resumption of nuclear tests to develop earth penetrating warheads. There has been no progress towards a treaty to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The evidence seems incontrovertible that the situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated and risks becoming even more serious.

Action Needed

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These steps and the greatly decreased possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons they will bring will create the conditions, including greater cooperation among nuclear weapon states, dependable transparency, and enhanced effectiveness of the Security Council and the UN system, necessary for final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <jdean@ucsusa.org>
Subject: Web site article
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 11:56:09 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Jonathan:

The switch in control of the U.S. Senate may make our task more difficult, but the challenge remains.

Having put a lot of energy into the effort to stop the rush to war with Iraq, I am returning to our web site, www.zero-nukes.org, which I have discussed with you. Our intent is to promote dialogue on how to achieve deep, deep cuts in nuclear weapons and eventually reach zero. We pick up some of your ideas at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#jonathandean>.

Therefore, I repeat my request to you to write a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

On a related manner I am still exploring the possibility of getting some experts to draft a treaty, or the main outlines, on deep cuts in nuclear weapons to the 100 to 200 level. This would be to apply the ideas of "The Nuclear Turning Point" and other reports listed at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#deepcuts>. One of your suggestions was that Jack Mendelsohn might help. I talked with Jack, and he referred me back to you, saying that UCS has developed such a draft treaty. Is that true? At any rate I want to explore this further with you.

Shalom,
Howard

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of

Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Filling out the section on Deep Cuts on the How to Get to Zero page.

1. For the index at the top of the page, add:

Deep Cuts

- *Atlantic Council* [link to below]
- *Stimson Center (1995)* [link to below]
- *National Academy of Sciences (1997)* [link to below]
- *Brookings Institution (1999)* [link to below]

2. Later in the page where the Deep Cuts section begins, add a sub-index, formatted like other section indices.

Deep Cuts

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In the 1990s four organizations based in Washington, D.C. issued reports and a book on how to achieve deep cuts in nuclear strategic weapons. Although each report has a different emphasis, amongst them are several common elements.

[to be completed]

[brown box: ***Deep Cuts***]

[new box]

Atlantic Council

[logo from <http://www.acus.org/> if permission granted]

[bold] The Atlantic Council of the United States [end bold] is a nonpartisan network of leaders who support the central role of the Atlantic community in the contemporary world situation. In 1991 under the leadership of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.) the Atlantic Council began a Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Its purpose was to develop a common vision for international leaders on how to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons.

[bold] Consultation Papers by General Goodpaster [end bold]

[inset in paragraph photo of General Goodpaster from Military Leaders page]

Pivotal to the project were three consultation papers written by General Goodpaster. The first was a paper entitled "Tighter Limits on Nuclear Arms: Issues and Opportunities for a New Era" (May 1992). The paper proposed two interrelated policy initiatives:

- Narrow the role of existing weapons solely to prevention of their use or threatened use by others.

- For nations that do not possess nuclear weapons pursue an approach of dissuasion from building, deterrence from use, and ability to defeat any who do.
- Bilateral reductions by the United States and Russia to a level of 2,000 to 3,000 total weapons each.
- Further reduction by the five major nuclear powers: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States.
- Examination of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Feedback from this first paper led General Goodpaster to write a second paper: "Further Reigns on Nuclear Arms: Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers" (August 1993). He wrote, "it now seems desirable to propose a [bold] 'no-first-use' [end bold] commitment by the major nuclear powers, with certain minimum specified exceptions." He further developed his ideas for [underline] three progressively lower arms levels. [end underlining] [http://www.rc.net/hartford/st_joseph/deacon/nucleararms.html]

- The first level would be [bold] **bilateral** [end bold] between the United States and Russia in the range of 1,500 to 2,000 total warheads each, strategic and tactical.
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- The third and ultimate goal would be a [bold] **"zero level"** [end bold] -- the complete abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

*General Goodpaster's third paper was entitled [underline] "Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach" [end underlining] [http://www.acus.org/Publications/occasionalpapers/internationalsecurity/ShapingNuclearFuture.pdf] (December 1997). He offered a more concrete schedule of five discrete steps for the nuclear powers to reduce to 100 to 200 warheads each by 2015 or very soon thereafter. For a more comprehensive approach General Goodpaster presented a new strategic concept -- [bold] **reassurance** [end bold] -- to guide policy decisions on nuclear force posture. Reassurance, he wrote, is:*

- Transformation of adversarial Cold War relations to more cooperative, peaceful relationships on a global basis.
- Positive measures necessary to reassure all parties that nuclear weapons will [italics] *not* [end italics] be used.
- No longer posing the threat of enormous immediate destruction that larger numbers of nuclear weapons on a high state of readiness can inflict.

Other Papers

Among other papers of the Atlantic Council's Project on Nuclear Arms Control were "START III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast" (October 1996) by Oleg N. Bykov and Jack Mendelsohn and "The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go?" (March 1997) by Jonathan Dean.

[end box]

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[brown box: *Deep Cuts*]

[new box]

Henry L. Stimson Center (1995)

[Logo from <http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI200110174> if permission granted.]

*[bold] The Henry L. Stimson Center [end bold] [<http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI200110174> is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to public policy research on international security issues. In 1994 the Center launched a multi-year Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction. In December 1995 the Project Steering **Committee issued a report entitled "An Evolving US Nuclear Posture" which laid out four phases for moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.***

[sub-box with Steering Committee members in smaller type in columns]s

Marie,

Here are the items that have dropped out of Deep Cuts. Note the use of italics and boldface.

Go to <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero3-deepcuts.html#whatsnext>

I. After the index listing of five items, add the following introduction.

In the 1990s four organizations based in Washington, D.C. issued reports and a book on how to achieve deep cuts in nuclear strategic weapons. Although each report has a different emphasis, amongst them are several common elements.

- **Three to four stages of reduction.**
 - Initially **bilateral reductions** by the United States.
 - Then **multilateral reductions** by all possessors of nuclear weapons.
 - Eventually **total elimination** (recommended in three of the four reports)
- **De-alerting** weapons at each stage.
- **Dismantlement** of weapons taken out of service.
- **Transparency, verification, and monitoring.**

In 2002 this subject came up again in hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Witnesses offered observations on what might be next for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons.

II. Then add new sections for Atlantic Council and Stimson Center, as follows. Use same formatting as for National Academy of Sciences and Brookings Institution.

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

Atlantic Council of the United States

[logo from <http://www.acus.org/>]

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Deep Cuts [in brown box]

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[Logo from <http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI200110174>]

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[sub-box with Steering Committee members in smaller type in two columns; model of Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page]

Members, Project Steering Committee

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA,ret) chair

Representative Howard Berman

Dr. Barry M. Blechman

General William F. Burns (USA, ret)

General Charles A. Horner (USAF, ret)

Senator James M. Jeffords

Mr. Michael Krepon

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara

Mr. Will Marshall

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

Dr. Janne E. Nolan

Mr. Philip A. Odeen

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway

Dr. Scott D. Sagan

General W.Y. Smith (USAF, ret)

Dr. John Steinbruner

Dr. Victor Utgoff

[end sub-box]

*The Stimson Center report made the **case for change** in U.S. nuclear posture on the basis of:*

- **Declining utility** of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war world.
- **Significant costs and risks** in continued possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence, including:
 - Economic costs

- Political costs (especially negative effect on nuclear non-proliferation)
- Nuclear accidents and incidents
- Risk of nuclear use

*The report laid out [bold] **four phases for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.**[end bold] It would begin in the United States with a "Presidential statement of renewed, decisive commitment to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons." The nuclear force levels and operational status for each phase would be as follows:*

Phase I

- **Bilateral reductions** by the United States and Russia to roughly **2,000 warheads each**.
- Reduced alert status.
- New measures to increase the transparency of each nation's nuclear forces.

Phase II

- **Multilateral reductions** to approximately **100 warheads each**.
- Reduced alert status for all declared nuclear powers.
- Nuclear transparency measures extended to smaller nuclear powers.

Phase III

- All remaining arsenals cut to **tens of weapons** for each possessor.
- Possible nuclear "trustee" arrangement.

Phase IV

- **Residual arsenals eliminated**.
- Internationally monitored/controlled reconstitution capability.

back to top

"The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations." -- *Joint Declaration by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir V Putin, May 22, 2002*

On this web site we show how the United States and Russian can reduce their strategic arsenals to 100 to 200 warheads on each side.

Filling out the section on Deep Cuts on the How to Get to Zero page.

1. For the index at the top of the page, add:

Deep Cuts

- *Atlantic Council* [link to below]
- *Stimson Center (1995)* [link to below]
- *National Academy of Sciences (1997)* [link to below]
- *Brookings Institution (1999)* [link to below]

2. Later in the page where the Deep Cuts section begins, add a sub-index, formatted like other section indices. Continue with text for four sub-sections, as indicated.

Deep Cuts

- *Atlantic Council* [link to below]
- *Stimson Center (1995)* [link to below]
- *National Academy of Sciences (1997)* [link to below]
- *Brookings Institution (1999)* [link to below]

In the 1990s four organizations based in Washington, D.C. issued reports and a book on how to achieve deep cuts in nuclear strategic weapons. Although each report has a different emphasis, amongst them are several common elements.

- **Three to four stages of reduction.**
 - Initially **bilateral reductions** by the United States.
 - Then **multilateral reductions** by all possessors of nuclear weapons.
 - Eventually **total elimination** (recommended in three of the four reports)
- **De-alerting** weapons at each stage.
- **Dismantlement** of weapons taken out of service.
- **Transparency, verification, and monitoring.**

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

Atlantic Council of the United States

[begin box]

[logo from <http://www.acus.org/>]

[bold] The Atlantic Council of the United States [end bold] is a nonpartisan network of leaders who support the central role of the Atlantic community in the contemporary world situation. In 1991 under the leadership of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, (US Army, ret), the Atlantic Council began a [bold] Project on Nuclear Arms Control.[end bold] Its purpose was to develop a common vision for international leaders on how to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons.

[bold] Consultation Papers by General Goodpaster [end bold]

[inset in paragraph photo of General Goodpaster from Military Leaders page]

*Pivotal to the project were three consultation papers written by General Goodpaster. The first was entitled "**Tighter Limits on Nuclear Arms: Issues and Opportunities for a New Era**" (May 1992). The paper proposed two interrelated policy initiatives:*

- **Narrow the role** of existing weapons solely to prevention of their use or threatened use by others.
- For nations that do not possess nuclear weapons pursue **an approach of dissuasion** from building, deterrence from use, and ability to defeat anyone builds them.
- **Bilateral reductions** by the United States and Russia to a level of **2,000 to 3,000 total weapons each**.
- **Further reduction by the five major nuclear powers:** Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States.
- Examination of the **ultimate elimination** of nuclear weapons.

*Feedback from this first paper led General Goodpaster to write a second paper, "**Further Reigns on Nuclear Arms: Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers**" (August 1993). He wrote, "it now seems desirable to propose a **[bold] 'no-first-use'** [end bold] commitment by the major nuclear powers, with certain minimum specified exceptions." He further developed his ideas for three progressively lower arms levels. [end underlining]*

[http://www.rc.net/hartford/st_joseph/deacon/nucleararms.html]

- The first level would be **bilateral** between the United States and Russia in the range of **1,500 to 2,000 total warheads each**, strategic and tactical.
- The second level would require **multilateral** agreement among the five major nuclear powers reducing weapon stockpiles to no more than **100 to 200 each**.
- The third and ultimate goal would be a **"zero level"** -- the complete abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

*General Goodpaster's third paper was entitled **[bold,underline] "Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach"** [end bold, underlining]*

*[<http://www.acus.org/Publications/occasionalpapers/internationalsecurity/ShapingNuclearFuture.pdf>] (December 1997). He offered a more concrete schedule of **[bold] five discrete steps** [end bold] for the nuclear powers to reduce to **[bold] 100 to 200 warheads each by 2015** [end bold] or very soon thereafter. For a more comprehensive approach General Goodpaster presented **[bold] a new strategic concept -- reassurance** [end bold] -- to guide policy decisions on nuclear force posture. Reassurance, he wrote, is:*

- Transformation of adversarial Cold War relations to more cooperative, peaceful relationships on a global basis.
- Positive measures necessary to reassure all parties that nuclear weapons will *[italics] not* [end italics] be used.
- No longer posing the threat of enormous immediate destruction that larger numbers of nuclear weapons on a high state of readiness can inflict.

Other Papers

Among other papers of the Atlantic Council's Project on Nuclear Arms Control were "START III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast" (October 1996) by Oleg N. Bykov and Jack Mendelsohn and "The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go?" (March 1997) by Jonathan Dean.

[end box]

back to top

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995

[begin box]

[Logo from <http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI200110174>]

The Henry L. Stimson Center [<http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI200110174>] is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to public policy research on international security issues. In 1994 the Center launched a multi-year ***Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction.*** In December 1995 the Project Steering Committee, chaired by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, (USA, ret) issued a report entitled ***"An Evolving US Nuclear Posture"*** which laid out four phases for moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

[sub-box with Steering Committee members in smaller type in two columns; model of Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page]

Members, Project Steering Committee

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA,ret) chair

Representative Howard Berman

Dr. Barry M. Blechman

General William F. Burns (USA, ret)

General Charles A. Horner (USAF, ret)

Senator James M. Jeffords

Mr. Michael Krepon

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara

Mr. Will Marshall

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

Dr. Janne E. Nolan

Mr. Philip A. Odeen

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway

Dr. Scott D. Sagan

General W.Y. Smith (USAF, ret)

Dr. John Steinbruner

Dr. Victor Utgoff

[end sub-box]

*The Stimson Center report made the **case for change** in U.S. nuclear posture on the basis of:*

- **Declining utility** of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war world.
- **Significant costs and risks** in continued possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence, including:
 - Economic costs
 - Political costs (especially negative effect on nuclear non-proliferation)
 - Nuclear accidents and incidents
 - Risk of nuclear use

*The report laid out [bold] **four phases for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.**[end bold] It would begin in the United States with a "Presidential statement of renewed, decisive commitment to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons." The nuclear force levels and operational status for each phase would be as follows:*

Phase I

- **Bilateral reductions** by the United States and Russia to roughly **2,000 warheads each**.
- Reduced alert status.
- New measures to increase the transparency of each nation's nuclear forces.

Phase II

- **Multilateral reductions** to approximately **100 warheads each**.
- Reduced alert status for all declared nuclear powers.
- Nuclear transparency measures extended to smaller nuclear powers.

Phase III

- All remaining arsenals cut to **tens of weapons** for each possessor.
- Possible nuclear "trustee" arrangement.

Phase IV

- **Residual arsenals eliminated**.
- Internationally monitored/controlled reconstitution capability.

[end of box]

back to top

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

National Academy of Sciences, 1997

[begin box]

1. Transfer from <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#nas>

2. Eliminate PDF document

3. Keep statue of Albert Einstein on the grounds of the National Academy of Sciences and Text: There is no secret and there is no defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world. -- Albert Einstein, January 22,

1947

4. Keep the opening paragraph with slight editing and Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences in bold, as follows:

*In the mid-1990s the [bold] **Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences** [end bold] embarked upon a study of the nuclear weapons policies in the post-cold war era. The study group was chaired by Major General William F. Burns (U.S.Army, ret.). It produced a report entitled **The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy** [<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/5796.html>].*

5. Add:

[sub-box] [names in smaller type in two columns; follow model of Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page]

Members, Committee on International Security and Arms Control

John P. Holdren, chair

John D. Steinbruner

General William F. Burns (USA, ret)

General George Lee Butler (USAF, ret)

Paul M. Doty

Steve Fetter

Alexander H. Flax

Richard L. Garwin

Rose Gottemoeller

Spurgeon M, Keeny, Jr.

Joshua Lederberg

Matthew Meselson

Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky

C. Kumar N. Patel

Jonathan D. Pollack

Admiral Robert H. Wertheim (USN, ret)

[end sub-box]

5. Strike out from Summary to the end of the National Academy section. Replace it with the following:

Summary

The report from the National Academy of Sciences describes how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. It sets forth a two-part program of change.

Near- and mid-term

- Reductions in nuclear forces.
- Changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety.
- Measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Long term

- Foster international conditions so that nuclear weapon would no longer be seen as necessary or legitimate for preservation of national and global security.

Progressive Constraints

For near- and mid-term the Committee offered a program of progressive constraints. It would start with the United States and Russia and then bring China, France, and the United Kingdom into the reduction process. (The report was completed before India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear weapon tests.)

Immediate Step

- Reduction to **2,000 deployed strategic warheads** each for the United States and Russia.

Further Transformation

- Limits on the total inventory of warheads, strategic and tactical.
- Eliminating the hair trigger.
- Revising targeting policy and war planning.
- Reaffirming the integral relationship between restrictions on offensive and defensive systems.

Nonproliferation

- Engaging the undeclared nuclear states (India, Israel, Pakistan)
- Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including:
 - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 - Nuclear weapon free zones
 - Controlling fissile material
- No first use to reassure states that forego nuclear weapons

Further Reductions

- Reducing U.S. and Russian forces to **1,000 total warheads each**.
- Reducing to **a few hundred warheads**.

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The report from the National Academy of Sciences also discussed the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. A news release on the report noted:

The second and long-term phase of the program recommended by the committee calls for examining how continuing changes in international relations could make it both desirable and possible to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons. The path to a complete ban on nuclear weapons is not now clear, the committee acknowledged, but the potential benefits of a ban warrant serious efforts to identify and promote the conditions that would make this possible.

One such condition would be comprehensive verification of potential weapons-related activities, which would require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and openness.

[end of box]

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

Brookings Institution: Deep Cuts Study Group, 1999

[begin box]

[As a graphic to inset in the first paragraph, go to <http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815709536/html/index.html> and copy the top half of the book cover, that is, the title and the graphic around it. Cut off before the subtitle.]

*In 1998 the [begin bold] **Deep Cuts Study Group, Brookings Institution** [end bold] in Washington, D.C. held a series of meetings to consider the possibility of deep reductions in nuclear arms. After exchanging drafts of chapters, the nine members produced a book entitled [bold italic underline] **The Nuclear Turning Point** [end bold, underlining] [<http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/press/books/nucturn.htm>] (Brookings Institution, 1999). The book's subtitle describes its purpose: [bold] **A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons.** [end bold]*

[Have a sub-box for the authors' names in smaller type, in two columns. Like Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page.]

Authors

Harold A. Feiveson, editor
Bruce G. Blair
Jonathan Dean
Steve Fetter
James Goodby
George N. Lewis
Janne E. Nolan
Theodore Postol
Frank N. von Hippel
[end sub-box]

A Strategy of Staged Reductions and De-alerting Nuclear Forces

*The authors concentrated on how to achieve very deep cuts but not complete abolition of nuclear weapons. They offered a [bold] **three-stage program for deep cuts** [end bold] in which all the weapons remaining at each stage are [bold] **de-alerted** [end bold] and a large part are [bold] **deactivated.** [end bold] Excerpts from their summary description in chapter two are as follows:*

Definitions

- By **de-alerting**, we mean measures that substantially increase to hours or days the time required to launch nuclear weapons in the active operational forces.

- **Deactivation** means that most weapons are unusable for weeks or months. This could be achieved, for example, by removing the warheads from ballistic missiles.

First Stage

In the first stage (our version of START III) the United States and Russia would:

- ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
- reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty),
- eliminate most of their tactical nuclear weapons,
- reduce to **2,000 operational strategic warheads each**,
- de-alert or deactivate their strategic forces, and
- begin to put into place a comprehensive bilateral accounting system for warheads and fissile materials.

All warheads withdrawn from deployment (or a specified proportion) would be dismantled, with their fissile material transferred to monitored storage; and all missiles and launchers withdrawn from the operational forces would be destroyed.

Second Stage

In the second stage, which we call START IV:

- **A verified ceiling of 1,000 each** would be imposed on the total number of warheads (stored as well as deployed) held by Russia and the United States.
- By this time Britain, France, and China, and it is hoped, India, Pakistan, and Israel, would be engaged in the nuclear arms control process.

Third Stage

In the third stage, START V:

- The United States, western Europe, Russia, and China would each reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles to **200 warheads or fewer**,
- Most of these would be deactivated, primarily by verified separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

Relationship

There is a **close relationship between** the two central strands of our program directed at strategic nuclear forces: the **stand-down** from high alert of the forces and **deep cuts** in deployed nuclear weapons.

- **First**, we propose that where possible the strategic systems destined to be eliminated under START II, START III, and subsequent treaties be deactivated years earlier in anticipation of their eventual destruction.
- **Second**, we propose that at every stage of the deep cuts program the launch readiness of the remaining ballistic missiles would be decreased in a manner that does not increase their vulnerability.

Relationship to Abolition

This is not complete abolition, but it amounts to the longest steps in that direction that can be realistically projected under current international conditions.

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[end box]

[back to top](#)

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <feiveson@princeton.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:15:21 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Feiveson:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

If you visit the site, you will find that we have drawn on The Nuclear Turning Point, which you edited [<http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#brookings>].

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can attach your article as a Word document or a .rtf file.

If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at
<http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of
laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Status: U

Return-Path: <feiveson@Princeton.EDU>

Received: from Princeton.EDU ([128.112.129.120])

by kendall.mail.mindspring.net (Earthlink Mail Service) with ESMTP id 18efnFsn3Nl3pM0
for <mupj@igc.org>; Tue, 19 Nov 2002 15:53:59 -0500 (EST)

Received: from smtpserver1.Princeton.EDU (smtpserver1.Princeton.EDU [128.112.129.65])

by Princeton.EDU (8.12.6/8.12.6) with ESMTP id gAJKrvDx025421
for <mupj@igc.org>; Tue, 19 Nov 2002 15:53:57 -0500 (EST)

Received: from princeton.edu (wws-8zm9x01.Princeton.EDU [128.112.146.25])

(authenticated bits=0 netid=feiveson)

by smtpserver1.Princeton.EDU (8.12.2/8.12.2) with ESMTP id gAJKru9m019707
(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-MD5 bits=128 verify=NOT);
Tue, 19 Nov 2002 15:53:57 -0500 (EST)

Message-ID: <3DDAA4E4.542E0297@princeton.edu>

Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 15:53:56 -0500

From: Harold A Feiveson <feiveson@Princeton.EDU>

X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U)

X-Accept-Language: en

MIME-Version: 1.0

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>, Hal Feiveson <feiveson@Princeton.EDU>

Subject: Re: Request for your ideas

References: <007c01c28519\$b9f4cce0\$d057f7a5@default>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Hi Mr. Hallman

I am pleased that you found the nuclear turning point useful. If only political leaders did as well. In principle, I would be happy to contribute a piece; but I am under a deadline for two articles and think I should get these done before embarking on another paper. Could you write me again after the first of the year? I will, in meantime however visit your web site. All the best in your new endeavors. Hal F.

"Howard W. Hallman" wrote:

> Dear Dr. Feiveson:

>

> Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession
> of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United
> States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a
> major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step
> in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and
> Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual
> assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

>

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> convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a
> new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a
> source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations,
> military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international
> bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue
> on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

>

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> Turning Point, which you edited
> [<http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#brookings>].
>
> We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by
> writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps
> required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or
> only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal
> with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action,
> methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.
>
> We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we
> will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at
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> You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can
> attach your article as a Word document or
> a .rtf file.
>
> If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at
> <http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.
>
> Thank you for your cooperation,
>
> Howard W. Hallman
>
> Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
> Methodists United for Peace with Justice
> 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
> Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org
>
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--

Harold A. Feiveson
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
609-258-4676
FAX: 609-258-3661

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <sfetter@wam.umd.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:22:38 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Fetter:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

If you visit the site, you will find that we have referred to the report of the National Academy of Sciences that you helped write. See <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#nationalacademyofsciences>.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <rgarwin@cfr.org>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 10:54:57 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Garwin:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

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Refinements for How to Get to Zero page.

1. Although the no-nuke symbols are where I suggested, I don't like the appearance. It's too formal and rigid. Instead, I suggest that one no-nuke symbol be used as an inset for the re-written introductory paragraph.

Perhaps the quote of Butler and anon. (needs a period) could move up so that it would show on the opening screen. How to Get to Zero could move right.

2. Re-write the introductory paragraph as follows, in italic with margins suitable to the space, with no-nuke symbol inset.

Other pages of this web site present recommendations from religious organizations, military leaders, and civil-sector organizations [linkages to these pages] for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. This web page explores practical steps for achieving this goal.. It offers:

- *Recommendations from major reports of the past ten years.*
- *Consideration of interim measures, such as de-alerting and deep cuts in nuclear arms.*
- *Proposals from military professionals and civilian experts for getting to zero.*
- *An invitation for others to offer their proposals.*

3. Reports of Commissions and International Bodies (index)

a. Commissions should be plural.

b. Put "Common Elements" at the end of the list of reports. Later relocate this element.

c. Add "INVITATION FOR YOUR PROPOSALS" as another major heading (in CAPS like "REPORTS....", "PROPOSALS....", "INTERIM MEASURES").

4. Formatting. (a) For report excerpts, use the box arrangements that you used with the Holy See on Religious Statements page. (b) Use color for some of the headings.

5. Common Elements. (a) Relocate to after Final Document. (b) Add a blank line after # 5. This makes the list easier to read.

6. Canberra Commission.

a. As graphic, an outline of Australia with a star and name to identify location of Canberra.

b. In introductory paragraph, highlight the two main elements of the report as follows:
...issued in 1996:

- *Made the case for the elimination of nuclear weapons.*
- *Offered concrete recommendations on how this could be accomplished.*

c. Members. (i) Visually separate the list of members, such as with horizontal lines above and below, or put them in an inset box. (ii) Perhaps use one size smaller type. (iii) In the list where United Kingdom and United States carry over, keep them together indented on second line.

d. Reinforcing Steps. Indent to match numbers of previous section.

7. National Academy of Sciences

a. I like the way you placed Einstein and his quote.

b. Recommended Near-term and Mid-term Actions. For the three items inset after the second paragraph, use bullets (arrows), such as:

➤ Eliminate.... etc.

8. New Agenda Coalition.

a. I couldn't think of a graphic, like Einstein and the map of Australia. Do you have any suggestion? One possibility would be the Mercator projection of Earth (or a more modern) with these countries identified. But they are probably too small to show. What else? Maybe I could find a photo of the foreign ministers releasing the report.

b. Add a blank line after #4.

9. Tokyo Forum

a. Suggested graphic.

b. In list a blank line after #5, 10, and 15.

10. 2000 NPT Review Conference

a. Good job with photo.

b. When we get the Arsenals and Treaties page, there will be a linkage for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

c. In introductory paragraph, the last sentence in italic. Bring "follows" under "undertaken". It's lost on the left margin.

d. In list, one less blank line before #10.

11. SCENARIOS

a. Introductory paragraph in italic.

b. When this page goes on line, can you help set up e-mail for proposals@zero-nukes.org and moderator@zero-nukes.org (from home page) and tell me how to access incoming messages.

c. Maybe after each of "Ideas of Military Professionals" and "Ideas of Civilians" we should indicate: [To be added.]

12. INTERIM MEASURES

a. Same type size as SCENARIOS

b. Introductory paragraph in italic.

c. After De-alerting and Reductions Approaching Zero, indicate: [To be added.]

13. INVITATION FOR YOUR PROPOSALS

a. I would like to add a new section for an invitation, even though we've made an invitation in the introduction to Scenarios. This will be listed at the beginning of this page so that users can make quick reference to how to submit their ideas.

b. Here is the wording (in italic):

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament invites you who have an interest in achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons to offer your ideas for achieving this goal. You can present a scenario for reaching zero or for carrying out an interim measure.

Send your ideas to proposals@zero-nukes.org. To facilitate the process, please send them as Word attachments or similar format. We offer no compensation, but we will post your ideas on this web page. We reserve the right to edit submissions for length and format.

Persons who want to comment on proposals of others can reach us through [Your Feedback](#).
[linkage to that page]

St. Joseph Church
Bristol, Connecticut
Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.
Pastoral Minister

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Atlantic Council,
Further Reins On Nuclear Arms (August 1993).

Proposes three phases: bilateral, multilateral, and "zero level," and explores the corresponding pre-conditions for complete disarmament.

Phase I

ACTIONS	FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
<p>US and Russia reduce to 1500-2000 Total warheads each. Five declared NWSs adopt NFU policies. Threefold nuclear states:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolve nuclear issues between Israel and Pakistan • Create NWF-zone in South Asia. <p>Reinforcing measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Efforts to build and maintain highly capable detection mechanisms. • Assess adequacy of interim level of 200 for all NWSs. • Mideast peace efforts, and Israeli commitment to 200 warhead level. • Agreement on positive security assurances. • Discussions of response mechanisms for violations. • Discussions of cut-off of fissile material production for military purposes. • Discussion of CTB. • Study of desirability/feasibility of global ban on intermediate and long-range land-based ICBMs. 	<p>Start Ratification Denuclearization agreement between Russia and Ukraine Russian progress toward democratization, internal stability, non-confrontational foreign policy.</p>

Phase II

ACTIONS	FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
<p>Five declared NWSs reduce Stockpiles to 100-200 each</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative security environment among industrialized democracies including Japan and Germany. • Continued Russian progress toward democracy, internal stability • Adoption on NFU by 5 declared nuclear powers. • Strengthened non-proliferation regime. • Agreement to reassess and halt reductions if "rogue" is detected to have built or be near to building nuclear weapons.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement by Israel, India, Pakistan to a level not exceeding 200, and commitment that nuclear weapons are "defensive last resort". • Acceptance of START Verification procedures
Phase III	
ACTIONS	FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Abolish and eliminate all nuclear weapons.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-confidence in procedural safeguards and response capabilities against proliferation. • Additional NWF zones. • Monitored ban on fissile material • Ban on nuclear testing. • Elimination of land-based ballistic missiles. • Tactical ballistic missile defense as safeguard against breakout/cheating. • Rigoursly enforced nonproliferation regime.
[Top] [Home] [Diaconate Page]	
Compiled by Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min. Document: http://www.rc.net/hartford/st_joseph/deacon/nucleararms.html Created 5/19/2000	

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http://www.rc.net/hartford/st_joseph/deacon/nucleararms.html

WHERE NEXT FOR NUCLEAR ABOLITIONISTS?

By Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Ret'd)

November 2002

Following the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the April 2002 preparatory meeting at the UN in New York for the next review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2005, and the 2002 UN General Assembly Disarmament Session, this is an appropriate moment to assess where the international anti-nuclear movement should focus their energies. First, however, consideration will be given to how prospects for nuclear abolition could be affected by US responses to growing doubts about nuclear deterrence, including its plans for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).

The focus on the US reflects the overwhelming influence of the world's first and sole remaining nuclear-armed superpower. The Bush administration has a lengthening track record of rejection of international treaties, linked to its near-contempt for international law and single-minded drive for military "full spectrum dominance". There is thus an urgent need to explore "outside the box" ways to make progress towards nuclear abolition. These should try to build upon the few current campaigns which seem to have some traction, and lessons learned from three successful past campaigns: the World Court Project; the "Ottawa Process" which led to a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, and the campaign for an International Criminal Court.

Responses to Doubts about Nuclear Deterrence

Almost the only encouraging aspect of current US nuclear policy is Bush's public admission of doubt about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence against the primary threat: extremists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What is more, both his Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell rejected use of nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces in the Gulf War, [1] which means that any future comparable US nuclear threat would lack credibility.

One of Bush's responses has been to revive BMD in both its national and "theatre" forms, and to augment conventional offensive strike systems. Through this combination, he hopes to strengthen conventional deterrence and raise the threshold for use of strategic nuclear weapons. At first sight, this would appear to be a positive development for nuclear disarmament, especially after Bush and Putin signed the "Strategic Offensive Reductions" Treaty and with inauguration of the new NATO-Russia Council in May 2002.

Unfortunately, Bush's piecemeal approach with Russia excludes China, the only other nuclear-armed state with superpower potential. There are no plans for a NATO-China Council, or for sharing BMD technology with China. On the contrary, China understandably perceives current US collaboration with both Japan and Taiwan to develop theatre BMD systems as threatening its land-based nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which currently it is believed to have less than 20. As it modernises its arsenal of only about 400 nuclear warheads, China will be able to use US theatre BMD plans to justify expanding its nuclear capability. This will inevitably ratchet up India's, to which Pakistan will feel pressured to respond. Thus one long-

term consequence of deploying BMD will be to stifle any further progress in nuclear disarmament, because the US will argue that it cannot make further reductions in light of these developments, and Russia will feel forced to follow suit.

Another US response to doubts about nuclear deterrence has been to make nuclear weapon use more likely. The NPR recommends using low-yield nuclear weapons against hardened or deeply buried non-nuclear WMD targets or bunkers where conventional weapons might be ineffective. This might be driven by the perceived need to restore US credibility in light of the Cheney/Powell decision in the Gulf War. However, it is an incitement to nuclear proliferation, as it would gut US assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT signatory states, including the "axis of evil" trio of Iran, Iraq and North Korea plus Libya and Syria. Since this became clear, the UK government has echoed its "master's voice" by warning that it too is prepared to use nuclear weapons if its forces, not just national territory, are subjected to WMD attack.

Where Next for Nuclear Abolitionists?

One positive spin-off from US nuclear plans, the South Asian nuclear crisis, and US allegations of revived nuclear weapon development by Iraq and North Korea is that the issue of nuclear weapons is again high on the international media agenda. Of course, use of even one low-yield nuclear weapon by the US for the first time since Nagasaki (or by Israel) would cause worldwide outrage and reawaken the anti-nuclear mass movement - as would a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, acquisition by the five recognised nuclear states of their nuclear arsenals involved probably their greatest investment in financial, political and human terms since the Second World War. After over fifty years of their own propaganda, none of these governments would risk breaking out of the nuclear club without finding a replacement system with clear advantages to balance the perceived loss of security.

In struggles to overthrow oppression and injustice like the abolition of slavery and South African apartheid, there was often a phase when progress stalled before the status quo was shifted. The seemingly invincible regressive forces, no longer bothering to pay lip-service to progress, openly hardened their positions. One reason for this was awareness by the regressive forces that their arguments were failing, especially on the two anvils of practicality and the law.

At such moments, the key to further progress is to focus on practical projects which go to the heart of the issue and uphold the law, while helping to reduce the risk of nuclear war and shift the pro-nuclear mindset. Using these criteria, the following four candidates are offered for consideration:

- 1) **Challenge Launch-on-Warning.** The NPR claims that US strategic nuclear forces are not on "hair-trigger" alert. How does this square with persisting reports that, despite Bush's determination to transform the US relationship with Russia and to "replace Mutual Assured Destruction with Mutual Cooperation", some 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads on each side

are still held at "launch-on-warning" readiness? This must be challenged, using Alan Phillips' excellent Canadian Ploughshares paper, and perhaps by expanding the US "Back from the Brink" campaign. [2]

2) **Challenge Nuclear Deterrence.** Following directly from (1), the world must be told that the pro-nuclear deterrence lobby is faltering. Winning this argument is crucial to shifting the mindset against nuclear weapons, especially among the military. Little further progress towards nuclear abolition is possible without explaining why nuclear deterrence does not work, is immoral and unlawful, and there are more credible and acceptable alternative security strategies. [3]

3) **Offer More Credible Alternatives.** The UK holds most promise of becoming the first nuclear state to reject nuclear deterrence. It has cut its nuclear arsenal to about 185 warheads, the smallest of the recognised nuclear states, deployed in one delivery system: 16 submarine-launched US Trident ballistic missiles in each of four submarines, one of which is deployed at a notice to fire of "days". The UK government has to decide whether to replace Trident by around 2007. Exploiting US plans to convert four Ohio class Trident-equipped submarines to conventional armament, I have therefore proposed that the UK government should replace its nuclear arsenal with precision-guided, conventionally-armed cruise missiles plus special forces. [4] This would provide a more credible deterrence system, which the Navy would in principle support. The first "breakout" by one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council would be sensational: the UK government would throw its weight behind the nuclear abolition movement, as Canada did so effectively in the campaign for a treaty banning landmines.

4) **Intensify Non-Violent Direct Action Upholding The Law.** Meanwhile, as another incentive for the governments of nuclear states to consider non-nuclear security options, carefully focused and sustained non-violent direct action campaigns in the nuclear states to uphold the law should be intensified. The UK Trident Ploughshares campaign, relying on legal attrition supported by the Acronym Institute, World Court Project, CND and other anti-nuclear groups, continues to embarrass the government, Royal Navy and police, with growing support from church leaders, politicians and such stars as Sir Sean Connery. The judiciary and government have been forced into a legal debate. This has moved beyond the 1996 World Court advisory opinion to confront the legal status of nuclear deterrence and possessing specific types of nuclear weapon with readiness and intent to use them, even against non-nuclear states and extremists. [5]

Notes

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5. See www.tridentploughshares.org, www.acronym.org.uk, www.gn.apc.org/wcp, www.cnduk.org.

Editing of entree for Commander Robert Green at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/militaryleaders.html#commandergreen>

(1) As paragraph inset on left use his picture from [<http://www.disarmsecure.org/people/.html>]

(2) Replace current paragraph with the following on the right side, in italic:

*[underline] Commander Robert Green [end underline]
[<http://www.disarmsecure.org/people/.html>] served in the British Royal Navy from 1962 to 1982. He flew nuclear-armed aircraft for nine years and then served in the intelligence service. During his navy career Commander Green became disillusioned with nuclear deterrence. In 1991 he became chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project. He is now co-coordinator with his wife, Kate Dewes, of the Peace Foundation's Disarmament & Security Centre in New Zealand. He presented his views in [underline] The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence (2000). [end underline]
[<http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/books/books.html>]*

(3) At the end of the entree add the following in italic.

Commander Green's current thinking is offered in an article on [underline] "Where Next for Nuclear Abolition" [end underline] found on the How to Get Zero page of this website. [link to this new entree]

Where Next For Nuclear Abolitionists?

by Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Ret'd)

November 2002

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5. See www.tridentploughshares.org, www.acronym.org.uk, www.gn.apc.org/wcp, www.cnduk.org.

Status: U

Return-Path: <mhalperin@osi-dc.org>

Received: from snake-eyes.soros.org ([204.168.83.222])

by bissell.mail.mindspring.net (Earthlink Mail Service) with ESMTP id 18cqdc6Bp3NI3rE0
for <mupj@igc.org>; Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:03:38 -0500 (EST)

Received: by snake-eyes.soros.org with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

id <W428SBMC>; Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:03:35 -0500

Message-ID: <5FCF899547931845B276514EF3F4E2220BD52D@osidcexch.soros.org>

From: Morton Halperin <mhalperin@osi-dc.org>

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

Subject: RE: Request for your ideas

Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:03:26 -0500

MIME-Version: 1.0

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Content-Type: text/plain

I have written my views on this subject and they have been published as "Defining
"Eliminating Nuclear Weapons," in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 19 October 1997 pp.4-6.

I assume you can get permission from the published to post on your web site and
would be pleased to have you do that.

-----Original Message-----

From: Howard W. Hallman [mailto:mupj@igc.org]

Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2002 10:58 AM

To: mhalperin@cfr.org

Subject: Request for your ideas

Dear Dr. Halperin:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of
weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and
Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for
the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction,
the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that
in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in
place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that
the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a
new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a
source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military
leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2)
offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero
nuclear weapons.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a
short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate
nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't
see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of
weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to
address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can attach your article as a Word document or an .rtf file.

If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

[entire entree in a box]

Morton H. Halperin

[On left as paragraph inset photo of Halperin, from]

[on right in italic:]

Morton H. Halperin [<http://www.cfr.org/bio.php?id=43>] is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has served in the Department of Defense and National Security Council in the Clinton, Nixon, and Johnson administrations. He was also director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). He offered his ideas on steps toward zero nuclear weapons in an article on "Defining 'Eliminating' Nuclear Weapons" [<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd19/19zero.htm>] in *Disarmament Diplomacy*, October 1997.

Defining "Eliminating" Nuclear Weapons

October 1997

Excerpts

In international disarmament negotiations there is a stalemate between non-nuclear weapon states which call for a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapon states which have refused to commit to a timetable. The way out of this impasse is to redefine the end state of "zero" nuclear weapons.

"The current definition of zero assumes that nuclear States, as well as all other States, will progressively destroy their entire nuclear arsenal until there are no nuclear weapons left in existence. . . ."

". . . . Since nuclear weapons pose a threat to international security, any viable long-run solution must be based on the equality of all States, prevent all States from relying on the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose, and eliminate the danger of accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

"A redefinition of zero nuclear weapons that meets this criteria, is verifiable, and does not depend on fundamental changes in the nature of international politics could consist of the following:

"First, firm international security assurances - both negative and positive - must be put in place with the support of the UN Security Council. The international community should pledge to respond collectively if a State threatens to use nuclear weapons against any other State - regardless of the context - or if a State reverses the process of nuclear disarmament described below. In addition, all States should agree not to threaten to initiate the use of nuclear weapons or to use such nuclear threats first (i.e., not to seek to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy).

"**Second**, all nations must **accept the ruling of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons and commit to the complete nuclear disarmament** contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. . . .

"Third, this international cooperation on nuclear disarmament should take the form of all States agreeing to **implement a step by step plan to remove nuclear weapons from their arsenals and render them useless**. . . .This process. . . would dictate that all States:

1. Agree to **destroy all warheads in excess of 2,000** and publicly describe both their arsenal of nuclear warheads and the delivery systems to which they are or may be mated.
2. Agree **not** to make any efforts to **improve or expand their nuclear arsenals**.
3. Agree to **progressively separate their existing nuclear warheads from delivery systems** by removing a certain percentage of such warheads each year.
4. Begin a process of **separating nuclear cores from nuclear warheads** once all warheads had been separated from their delivery systems.
5. Begin a process of reducing the number of nuclear cores from the maximum of 2,000 agreed to at the start of the disarmament process. Over a period of an additional five years, all States would **reduce their storage of nuclear cores to no more than two hundred**.

"**Zero nuclear weapons** would thus be defined as **an end state of no more than eight nuclear States, each with no more than two hundred nuclear cores separated from their warheads and delivery systems**. (States that now have fewer than two hundred warheads would not increase to that number). . . .

"This end state would further dictate that the **remaining nuclear cores** be separated from their warheads and delivery systems in a manner ensuring that they **could not be mated within hours or days**. . . ."

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Disarmament Diplomacy

[Issue No. 19, October 1997](#)

Defining "Eliminating" Nuclear Weapons

By Morton H. Halperin

Introduction: The Current Stalemate

During the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva in 1996, an important stalemate occurred between the nuclear weapons States and other States over the issue of nuclear elimination. In those negotiations, the Ambassador of India to the United Nations in Geneva stated categorically that India would not sign the treaty until it addressed India's demands regarding nuclear weapons development and disarmament. "India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons," she affirmed.(1) When the final draft included no timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons, India - and as a result of India's decision, Pakistan - refused to sign the treaty. Because the CTBT contains an entry-into-force provision conditioned on concurrence by all nuclear capable States, India's opposition threatens the treaty's authority and effectiveness.

India has not been alone in this emphasis. In August 1997, the Group of 21 - non-aligned countries that are members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - proposed a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, as contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); the program includes establishing a negotiating committee on nuclear disarmament within the Conference. For several of these countries, some mechanism within the Conference on Disarmament for addressing such nuclear disarmament is necessary to further progress on the non-proliferation front.

Despite these developments, the nuclear-weapons States have refused to commit to a timetable for the elimination of their nuclear arsenal. The United States, for example, believes that if the nuclear-weapons States move toward zero nuclear weapons, there will be insurmountable problems related to verification, instability generated by the disarmament process, and possibly increased proliferation due to reduced disparities in nuclear capability. Rather than agreeing to negotiate elimination, the nuclear-weapons States have instead concentrated on cutting off the production of nuclear weapons; in this manner, according to the Indian Ambassador, the "stubborn position" of the nuclear-weapons States has "paralyzed the debate on nuclear disarmament."(2)

Defining a Way Out of The Impasse

This stalemate - which poses a serious threat to further steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war - is surmountable. The issues raised by both nuclear-weapons States and other States can each be addressed effectively by redefining the end state of "zero" nuclear weapons.

The current definition of zero assumes that nuclear States, as well as all other States, will progressively destroy their entire nuclear arsenal until there are no nuclear weapons left in existence. As noted by many skeptics, achieving this end state would be extremely difficult; thus many supporters of the elimination of nuclear weapons have had to "concede" that fundamental changes in the nature of international politics would have to precede the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, a fatal concession. Absent such a fundamental change, it is very difficult to answer the arguments of critics relating to the verification of destruction (particularly of the Russian stockpile), detection of small clandestine programs (in light of the experience in

Iraq), and the instabilities that would occur as States approached zero. The way to approach this problem lies in redefining zero in such a way as to meet both these concerns and the objectives of those who seek the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In redefining zero, we must first focus on why we seek to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have the capability to destroy the planet. Thus, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger of inadvertent, unauthorized, or accidental use with disastrous consequences.

Furthermore, as long as some nations maintain nuclear weapons or rely on the threat of their use for any purpose, other nations will be tempted to secure such weapons; this increases the likelihood of accidental or deliberate use. Only a commitment by the nuclear-weapons States to nuclear disarmament would result in a viable non-proliferation regime. Since nuclear weapons pose a threat to international security, any viable long-run solution must be based on the equality of all States, prevent all States from relying on the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose, and eliminate the danger of accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

A redefinition of zero nuclear weapons that meets this criteria, is verifiable, and does not depend on fundamental changes in the nature of international politics could consist of the following:

First, firm international security assurances - both negative and positive - must be put in place with the support of the UN Security Council. The international community should pledge to respond collectively if a State threatens to use nuclear weapons against any other State - regardless of the context - or if a State reverses the process of nuclear disarmament described below. In addition, all States should agree not to threaten to initiate the use of nuclear weapons or to use such nuclear threats first (i.e., not to seek to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy).

Second, all nations must accept the ruling of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons and commit to the complete nuclear disarmament contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In July 1996, the Court found that in the long run, international law - and with it international stability - would "suffer from the continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as nuclear weapons." The most appropriate solution, the Court further decided, lay in "the long-promised complete nuclear disarmament." Stressing the treaty obligation of NPT signatories to disarm their nuclear arsenals, the Court concluded that: "In these circumstances, the Court appreciates the full importance of the recognition by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmament. The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations on the matter of good faith. This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the 182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or in other words the vast majority of the international community. Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all States."(3)

Third, this international cooperation on nuclear disarmament should take the form of all States agreeing to implement a step by step plan to remove nuclear weapons from their arsenals and render them useless. The obligation to disarm would apply equally to all States regardless of their status under the NPT. This process, which would be written in a treaty on nuclear disarmament and implemented serially after international assurances were in place, would dictate that all States:

1. Agree to destroy all warheads in excess of 2,000 and publicly describe both their arsenal of nuclear warheads and the delivery systems to which they are or may be mated. The inspection

arm of the international nuclear disarmament regime would be authorized to both conduct inspections of the declared arsenals and search for undeclared nuclear warheads. In addition, States with peaceful nuclear power programs would declare their weapons grade material, describe possible delivery systems, and disclose any planning to convert these capacities into a nuclear weapons capability.

2. Agree not to make any efforts to improve or expand their nuclear arsenals. Thus, States would pledge not to: test nuclear weapons, conduct other research into improving the capability of nuclear warheads, manufacture any additional weapons grade fissionable material or additional warheads, or mate any existing warheads with delivery systems. States with peaceful nuclear programs would agree not to take any steps that shortened the time to deploy nuclear weapons.

3. Agree to progressively separate their existing nuclear warheads from delivery systems by removing a certain percentage of such warheads each year. Over a period of five years or so, all warheads would be separated from delivery systems. States would be allowed to store their warheads so that they were not vulnerable to a surprise attack, as long as such locations were revealed to the inspection unit. However, States would have to store warheads so that they could not be re-mated with their delivery systems without being readily detected by the inspection unit.

4. Begin a process of separating nuclear cores from nuclear warheads once all warheads had been separated from their delivery systems. Again, this would be completed over a period of several years, with a set percentage separated each year. Both the nuclear core and the remainder of the warhead would be stored so as to be invulnerable to surprise attack, but with locations known to the inspection unit. In addition, States would agree to store nuclear cores so that they could not quickly be mated with the warheads - or the warheads with delivery systems; thus any steps toward reconstituting a deliverable weapon would be instantly and readily detectable by the inspection unit.

5. Begin a process of reducing the number of nuclear cores from the maximum of 2,000 agreed to at the start of the disarmament process. Over a period of an additional five years, all States would reduce their storage of nuclear cores to no more than two hundred.

Zero nuclear weapons would thus be defined as an end state of no more than eight nuclear States, each with no more than two hundred nuclear cores separated from their warheads and delivery systems (States that now have fewer than two hundred warheads would not increase to that number). However, the number of remaining nuclear cores - suggested in this text as two hundred - is open to discussion. Two hundred was chosen because such a number of nuclear cores would be both verifiable and significant enough to reassure those opposed to total nuclear elimination. In addition, equating zero nuclear weapons with two hundred nuclear cores separated from their warheads is more egalitarian than the logic of the NPT, which limits nuclear weapons to five States and no others; because the premise is more egalitarian, it makes the international cooperation that is needed for nuclear disarmament more likely.

This end state would further dictate that the remaining nuclear cores be separated from their warheads and delivery systems in a manner ensuring that they could not be mated within hours or days. For example, nuclear cores and warheads could be stored separately in empty silos sealed with concrete and with cameras trained on this. In this manner, no State would be able to begin the process of mating warheads with their delivery systems without being immediately detected by the inspection unit of the nuclear disarmament regime and subjected to immediate sanctions, including conventional attack.

So defined, "eliminating" nuclear weapons can serve to address the concerns of both the nuclear-weapons States and other States in negotiating arms control agreements such as the CTBT.

Conclusion

This is only a preliminary sketch, and it clearly needs much refinement. Nonetheless, it can provide a basis for those governments and individuals committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons to come to an agreement on a definition of zero and a process for getting there; such a process both could be pursued immediately without waiting for fundamental changes in the international situation and could produce the nuclear non-proliferation objectives that nations are currently seeking. Once States agreed generally on this end point, technical discussions about defining this state in more detail and the steps to getting there would be possible. In the meantime, Track II discussion of these issues would be useful. By treating all States equally, stalemates over non-proliferation approaches - such as the one that emerged during the CTBT negotiations - might be avoided and the dangers of nuclear accident or war reduced.

Notes

1. Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India, to the CD Plenary, June 20, 1996, CD/PV.740.
2. "Non-Aligned Countries Restate Proposal for Creation of Committee on Nuclear Disarmament within Disarmament Conference," UN Press Release DCF/310, 8 August 1997.
3. "The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Question of Legality of Nuclear Weapons - Summary," ICJ Press Communiqué No. 96/23.

Morton H. Halperin is Senior Vice-President of the Twentieth Century Fund/The Century Foundation. He served in the Department of Defense and the National Security Council in the Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administrations and is the author of numerous books and articles on nuclear strategy and arms control, including 'Nuclear Fallacy'. The ideas in this piece were first presented in a paper for the University of Pennsylvania conference on "The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A US-India Dialogue" on 6 May, 1997.

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Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <mhalperin@cfr.org>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 10:57:41 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Halperin:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can attach your article as a Word document or an .rtf file.

If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <john_holdren@harvard.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:23:41 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

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If you visit the site, you will find that we have referred to the report of the National Academy of Sciences that you helped write. See <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#nationalacademyofsciences>.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

HOW TO GET TO ZERO

[Frame the introductory paragraph with the "no-nukes" symbol on each side]

This web page explores practical steps for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It starts with recommendations from major reports of the past ten years. It continues with proposals from military professionals and civilian experts. It also gives detailed consideration to interim measures, such as de-alerting and nuclear arms reductions approaching zero.

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"Standing down nuclear arsenals requires only a fraction of the ingenuity and resources as were devoted to their creation." -- [General Lee Butler](#), December 4, 1996 [linkage to [General Butler on Military Leaders Speak Out page](#)]

"Where there's will, there's a way." -- anon.

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Reports of Commissions and International Bodies

- **Canberra Commission (1996)**
- **National Academy of Sciences (1997)**
- **New Agenda Coalition (1998)**
- **Tokyo Forum (1999)**
- **Final Document, 2000 NPT Review Conference (2000)**

Scenarios for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons

- **By Military Professionals**
- **By Civilians**

Interim Measures

- **De-Alerting**
- **Reductions Approaching Zero**

Reports of Commissions and International Bodies

Common Elements

Efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons in this first decade of the 21st century can build upon ideas developed in the 1990s by distinguished commissions and study groups. From their reports and recommendations a consensus has emerged on some of the major steps along the road toward zero nuclear weapons. They are as follows:

1. De-alerting and standing down deployed nuclear weapons.
2. Comprehensive test ban.

3. Cease development and production of new nuclear weapons.
4. Halt attempts to develop national missile defense.
5. Commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons.
6. Bilateral (U.S. and Russia) nuclear arms reduction.
7. Bring other possessors of nuclear weapons into multilateral reductions.
8. Total dismantlement of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
9. International system for transparency and verification.
10. International control of fissile materials.

Canberra Commission, 1996

[PDF document]

[as a graphic, an outline map of Australia with a star showing the location of Canberra]

*On October 24, 1995 (United Nations Day) Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating announced the formation of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Its members were 17 international experts. **The Report of the Canberra Commission**, [<http://www.gsinsitute.org/archieves/000007.shtml>] issued in August 1996, made the case for the elimination of nuclear weapons and offered concrete recommendations on how this could be accomplished.*

Members

Celso Amorin, Brazil

General Lee Butler, United States

Richard Butler, Australia

*Field Marshall Lord Michael Carver,
United Kingdom*

Jacques-Yves Cousteau, France

Jayantha Dhanapala, Sri Lanka

Rolf Ekeus, Sweden

Mabil Elaraby, Egypt

Ryukichi Imai, Japan

Ronald McCoy, Malaysia

Robert McNamara, United States

Robert O'Neill, United Kingdom

Qian Jiadong, China

Michael Rocard, France

Joseph Rotblat, United Kingdom

Roald Sagdeev, United States

Maj Brit Theorin, Sweden

Statement of the Commissioners

The Canberra Commission report opened with the following statement of the commissioners:

The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is immense. Any use would be catastrophic.

Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to all humanity and its habitat, yet tens

of thousands remain in arsenals built up at an extraordinary time of deep antagonism. That time has passed, yet assertions of their utility continue.

These facts are obvious but their implications have been blurred. There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them, and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need for self-defense.

Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.

The world faces threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. These threats are growing. They must be removed.

For these reasons, a central reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states. Indeed, states which possess them become themselves targets of nuclear weapons.

The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, to make a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear weapons and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the Canberra Commission call upon the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China to give the lead by committing themselves, unequivocally, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a commitment would propel the process in the most direct and imaginative way. All other governments must join this commitment and contribute to its fulfillment.

The Commission has identified a series of steps which can be taken immediately and which would thereupon make the world safer.

The Commission has also described the practical measures which can be taken to bring about the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and the full safeguarding of militarily usable nuclear material.

A nuclear weapon free world can be secured and maintained through political commitment, and anchored in an enduring and binding legal framework.

Recommendations for Immediate Steps

The Canberra Commission offered recommendations for a set of immediate steps that

could lead to a world free of nuclear weapons:

The first requirement is for the five nuclear weapon states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement....

The commitment by the nuclear weapon states to a nuclear weapon free world must be accompanied by a series of practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps. There are a number of such steps that can be taken immediately.... The recommended steps are:

1. Taking nuclear forces off alert.
2. Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles.
3. Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
4. Ending nuclear testing.
5. Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals.
6. Agreement amongst the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

Reinforcing Steps

The Canberra Commission also recommended the following reinforcing steps:

1. Action to prevent further horizontal proliferation.
2. Developing verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world.
3. Cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes.

National Academy of Sciences, 1997

[PDF document]

[As a graphic, photo of statue of Albert Einstein on the grounds of the National Academy of Sciences or a portrait. Text: Regarding nuclear weapons, Albert Einstein said: "there is no secret and there is no defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world." -- January 22, 1947]

In the mid-1990s the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences embarked upon a study of the nuclear weapons policies in the post-cold war era. The study group was chaired by Major General William F. Burns

*(U.S. Army, ret.). It produced a report entitled **The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy** [<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/5796.html>].*

Summary

The report describes how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The Committee evaluated a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy, including further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Committee examined the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.

Recommended Near-term and Mid-term Actions

In its report the Committee noted the need for progressive constraints by the United States and Russia and laid out a course of action, as follows:

The first phase would include a set of near-term and mid-term reductions in nuclear arms, changes in operations and policies, and measures to increase the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials worldwide....

Changing the ground rules for nuclear operations is an equally important objective that should be pursued in parallel with, but not linked to arms reduction talks. Recommendations include the following:

Eliminate the practice of maintaining nuclear forces on continuous alert status so that the launch sequence for nuclear weapons would require hours, days, or even weeks rather than minutes. Such a provision would have to be accompanied by reliable means of determining compliance.

End targeting policies based on large-scale, prompt retaliation. Any actual use of nuclear weapons would involve the smallest possible number of weapons, which would be used in response to immediate circumstances.

Continue to restrict missile defense systems as required by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

As nuclear arsenals are dismantled, it is also important to ensure the safe storage of weapons and nuclear materials removed from them. Enforcing strict security standards will reduce the dangers of theft or unauthorized use of nuclear arms.

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Committee also discussed the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. A news release on the report noted:

The second and long-term phase of the program recommended by the committee calls for examining how continuing changes in international relations could make it both desirable and possible to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons. The path to a complete ban on nuclear weapons is not now clear, the committee acknowledged, but the potential benefits of a ban warrant serious efforts to identify and promote the conditions that would make this possible.

One such condition would be comprehensive verification of potential weapons-related activities, which would require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and openness.

New Agenda Coalition, 1998

[PDF document]

[Graphic: perhaps an octagon, representing the eight nations]

*In 1998 the foreign affairs ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden joined together to offer their ideas in a statement entitled **Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for A New Agenda.*** [<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1998/980609-new-agenda.html>]

Recommended Actions

Among the measures recommended by the New Agenda Coalition are the following:

1. Bilateral U.S.-Russian mechanisms (such as START) and subsequently plurilateral mechanisms including all the nuclear-weapon states (adding United Kingdom, France, and China) for practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments.
2. Abandoning present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons.
3. Removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites.
4. Reverse of nuclear weapons development and deployment by the three nuclear-weapon-capable states [Israel, India, Pakistan].
5. All states sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
6. International ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. Joint no-first use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon-states.
8. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia.

Tokyo Forum, 1999

[PDF document]

[As graphic, an outline map of Japan with Tokyo shown with a star, Hiroshima and Nagasaki by dots.]

*The Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was organized in August 1998 at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ryutaro Hashimoto and was continued by his successor, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Its 21 members were experts drawn from 15 countries, including all the nuclear-weapon states. The four meetings of the Forum were held in Tokyo; Hiroshima; Pocantico, New York; and again in Tokyo. In July 1999 the Forum issued its report, **Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century.***

[<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1999/990725facingnucleardangers.html>]

Recommendations

The key recommendations of the Tokyo Forum are as follows:

1. Stop and reverse the unraveling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime by reaffirming the treaty's central bargain.
2. Eliminate nuclear weapons through phased reductions.
3. Bring the nuclear test ban into force.
4. Revitalize START and expand the scope of nuclear reductions.
5. Adopt nuclear transparency measures.
6. Zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.
7. Control fissile material, especially in Russia.
8. Prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of extremist, fanatical or criminal groups.
9. Strengthen measures against missile proliferation.
10. Exercise caution on missile defense deployments.

11. Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia.
12. Eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
13. Eliminate nuclear and missile dangers on the Korean Peninsula.
14. No vetoes in support of proliferation in the United Nations Security Council.
15. Revitalize the Conference on Disarmament.
16. Strengthen verification for disarmament.
17. Create effective non-compliance mechanisms for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

2000 NPT Review Conference

[PDF document]

[As graphic, photo the United Nations buildings in New York.]

*The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which first went into effect in 1970, provides for a review conference every five years to assess progress in achieving the treaty's objectives. The 2000 Review Conference that met at United Nations headquarters in New York was a culmination of efforts to get the nuclear-weapon states to make a firmer commitment to eliminate their nuclear arms, an objective set forth in Article VI. This led to inclusion in the **Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference** [<http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/FinalDocAdvance.htm>] a set of practical steps that should be undertaken to fulfill the purpose of Article VI. They are as follows:*

Practical Steps on Article VI

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to

Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Scenarios for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons

In this section we present scenarios for achieving zero nuclear weapons as proposed by military professionals, civilian experts, and ordinary citizens. Others who want to

present their own scenarios can send them to proposals@zero-nukes.org. To facilitate the process, please send them as Word attachments or similar format. Persons who want to comment on proposals of others can reach us through [Your Feedback](#).

Ideas of Military Professionals

Ideas of Civilians

Interim Measures

The elimination of nuclear weapons is most likely to occur through sequential steps. A frequent beginning step recommended by many experts is de-alerting, that is, taking weapons off quick-launch alert. Some experts are uncertain about the final course to the total elimination of nuclear weapons but want them reduced to low numbers approaching zero. Their ideas are presented here.

De-Alerting

Reductions Approaching Zero

View the PDF version of this [MPI Briefing Paper](#).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Middle Powers Initiative urges countries to work together on the following priority steps in fulfillment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives under the NPT:

- 1. Strategic arms reductions:** Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; dealert remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- 2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles:** Negotiate regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevent missile proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
- 3. Tactical arms reductions:** Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- 4. Non-use of nuclear weapons:** Reverse trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.
- 5. Ban on nuclear testing:** Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing; achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or modified nuclear weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.
- 6. Control of fissile materials:** Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

A new strategic context has emerged that is profoundly disturbing and demonstrates the imperative of renewed and intensified efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and to reinforce

non-proliferation. It is formed by several developments: 1) U.S. abandonment of the START process and the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in May 2002; 2) U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, effective June 2002; 3) the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; 4) heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear explosives and materials; 5) the India-Pakistan confrontation; and 6) erosion of the NPT through disregard of commitments made in 1995 and 2000. These commitments include: the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals, preservation of the ABM Treaty, making nuclear disarmament steps irreversible, negotiation of a fissile materials ban, and ratification of the CTBT. The first four developments are discussed in the body of this briefing paper. Regarding the present crisis in South Asia, it underlines the urgency of near-term measures of nuclear restraint in that region, among them verified non-deployment of nuclear weapons; limits on missile development and deployment, including through a flight test ban; and commitments to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and producing fissile materials for weapons. It further demonstrates the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, which undermine rather than enhance the security of any country. Reliance on nuclear "deterrence" by the declared nuclear weapon states, their failure over the more than three decades since the NPT entered into force to meet their disarmament obligation, and the consequent discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime have formed an environment in which India and Pakistan, and potentially other states, can reason, erroneously, that nuclear arsenals bolster their security. It must be forcefully emphasized to the declared nuclear weapon states that the crisis in South Asia again demonstrates that the non-proliferation regime must be revitalized through far-reaching disarmament measures. India and Pakistan should be pressed to commence the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and as a means to this end, to participate in processes related to nuclear disarmament such as development of verification capabilities.

Erosion of the NPT was evident at the first meeting of the April 2002 meeting at the UN of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, an exercise in frustration. Not only did the nuclear weapon states, and the United States in particular, step back from commitments made in 2000, the states parties to the treaty could not even agree on how implementation reports will be made. Nonetheless, the 1995 and 2000 commitments by and large remain valid as guidelines for the implementation of the Article VI disarmament obligation. Based upon those commitments, this paper sets out priorities for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the new context.

1. U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

In its Nuclear Posture Review released in early 2002, the United States announced that it will reduce "operational" strategic deployed nuclear weapons to 3800 by 2007, and to 1700-2200 by 2012. Russia in recent years had indicated a willingness to go to 1000-1500 strategic weapons. Although there is no recent Russian document similar to the U.S. NPR, it is clear that Russia intends long term continued reliance on a substantial nuclear arsenal.

Reflecting the U.S. plan, the short and starkly simple Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed on May 24, 2002 in Moscow requires only that the United States and Russia limit "strategic nuclear warheads" to 1700-2200 by the year 2012. Unlike START II, signed but never entered into force, the treaty places no restrictions on multiple warhead land-based missiles or any category of delivery system whatever, providing instead that each party "shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms".

The extent to which reductions will be transparent and verified remains to be determined. A non-binding Joint Declaration setting forth political commitments made in connection with the treaty states that START I provisions "will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed". Verification is not addressed in the treaty or declaration. Transparency issues may be dealt with in a Consultative Group for Strategic Security established by the declaration, a Bilateral Implementation Commission established by the treaty, or START I consultative bodies.

The treaty will expire in 2012 unless renewed. It is subject to termination on three months notice based only on the exercise of "national sovereignty". The typical security treaty provision for withdrawal in case of "extraordinary events" jeopardizing a state? "supreme interests" has been dropped.

The treaty fails in several respects to meet criteria set forth by the 2000 NPT 13 Steps for practical implementation of the Article VI disarmament obligation, discussed below. Viewed pessimistically, it spells the end, or at least the suspension, of arms control, rather confirming in the barest outlines existing U.S. plans for rationalization of nuclear forces, and requiring only that at a single point in time, the year 2012, deployed strategic warheads not exceed a certain number, 2200. If good faith in implementation of NPT obligations is to be assumed, then the treaty can be regarded as a framework capable of being filled in with measures that do conform to the 13 Steps. The following analysis proceeds from that assumption.

Irreversibility: A key principle agreed as part of the 13 Steps (Step 5) is that of irreversible arms control and disarmament. As now configured, the treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review do not conform to this principle, indeed are expressly intended to preserve flexibility contrary to the principle.

The U.S. plan in general does not call for destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. 50 MX missiles are to be deactivated, but their silos will be retained, as will missile stages and the warheads. Four of 18 U.S. Trident submarines will be withdrawn from the strategic nuclear force, but will then be converted to carry conventional cruise missiles. Beyond these measures, no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from nuclear forces. In contrast, START I required, and START II would have required, the destruction of delivery systems, and the 1997 Helsinki commitment to START III additionally envisaged accounting for and dismantling of warheads. In addition, the United States is planning for a new ICBM to be operational in 2020, a new SLBM and SSBN in 2030, and a new heavy bomber in 2040, as well as new warheads for all of them.

Beyond the operational deployed strategic forces, and based in part on the retention of reduced delivery systems and warheads, the United States plans to retain large numbers of warheads in a "responsive force" capable of redeployment within weeks or months. According to one report, current U.S. plans are to have 2,200 deployed strategic warheads in 2012 plus 2,400 in the responsive force. The responsive force is flatly contradictory to the commitment to irreversible disarmament.

The United States and Russia should, in implementing the new treaty or in additional agreements, return to the premise of the START process: delivery systems and warheads are to be irreversibly destroyed and dismantled in an accountable manner. Ideally, this could present an opportunity for multilateralization of disarmament; other countries, the IAEA or another international agency could participate in overseeing the process.

Transparency and verification: Russia and the United States have no common understanding of the meaning of the term "strategic nuclear warheads", having failed to agree on a definition during negotiations. Thus work regarding transparency of reductions has very far to go. Moreover, it is unclear how transparency will be achieved absent destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. Destruction of delivery systems is the primary method of verification under START I, referred to by the Joint Declaration as a basis for confidence, predictability and transparency.

The best path towards fulfillment of NPT commitments to transparency and verification (Step 9(b), Step 13; see also Step 7 referring to the START process) would be also to meet the commitment to irreversible disarmament. Absent irreversible measures, transparency and verification with respect to the planned reductions and maintenance of a "responsive force" amount to monitoring of dealtering. Certainly it is important that this be done as vigorously and effectively as possible. There is room here also for multilateral involvement.

Dealtering: Neither the United States nor Russia have indicated plans to reduce the readiness level of the operationally deployed strategic arms. Today both have about 2,000 warheads on high alert, ready for delivery within minutes of an order to do so. Projecting present practices forward, it has been estimated that at the 2012 level of 1700-2200 operationally deployed warheads, the United States would have about 900 on high alert. One could see this as a sort of slow-motion dealtering process, all the more so given that the "responsive force" planned by the United States essentially is in a dealtered status. But there is no reason the reductions in operationally deployed forces have to be spread out over so many years. Nor should they be maintained in a high alert status whatever their numbers.

The NPT commitments to "concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems" (Step 9(d)) and "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" (Step 9(e)) should be applied to deployed as well as stored warheads.

2. CONTROL OF MISSILE DEFENSES AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES

The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is effective June 13, 2002, and the United States continues to stress the role of missile defenses in overall military strategy. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, missile defenses, advanced offensive nuclear and conventional strategic forces, and a "responsive defense infrastructure" capable of developing and producing nuclear weapons and resuming nuclear testing, form a "new triad," replacing the triad of nuclear-armed land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and heavy bombers. The NPR anticipates limited deployment of strategic missile defenses by 2008. The May 2002 Joint Declaration seeks to assuage Russian concerns regarding missile defenses by providing for information exchange, study of possible areas for cooperation on defenses, etc. However, there is no evidence that the Bush administration is prepared to make concrete practical commitments to restrict missile defenses.

In the U.S.-Russian context, this may drastically impede dealtering measures and reductions below the levels outlined in the May 2002 treaty, or indeed reductions approaching those levels in the years prior to 2012 or after then, when it expires. Russia may decide to maintain existing multiple warhead land-based missiles, and may also decide to deploy new ones, because this is a cost-effective way of fielding large numbers of deliverable warheads capable of overwhelming missile defenses. Russia may also experience pressure from deployment of missile defenses, especially in combination with increased U.S. capabilities to mount conventional precision strikes against Russian nuclear forces, to continue to maintain portions of its forces on high alert. Both of these factors in turn can cause U.S. reluctance to proceed with reductions beyond those

required by the May 2002 treaty or to pursue dealerting. U.S. development and deployment of missile defenses will also stimulate a further Chinese build-up of its arsenal and a consequent arms race in Asia.

All of the above makes grappling with missile defenses and missile proliferation in the NPT context of the highest urgency if the 13 Steps are to be carried out. Disarmament of missiles was always understood to be part of the nuclear disarmament process, as is reflected in the NPT preamble, which calls for "the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (emphasis added). In 2000, Step 7 called for "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty" and described it as a "cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." That step is now out of date, given U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Attention must now be focused on principles to govern the new situation, and on measures for missile non-proliferation and control. In general, the development and deployment of missile defenses must not obstruct the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, and must be consistent with international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all (Step 9). Plans for missile defenses should be subjected to transparency and negotiation to achieve these ends. It is also urgent to prevent missile proliferation, especially of intermediate and long-range systems. Ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, can be pursued here. Proposals for missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives should also be developed, as middle power countries like Canada and Germany have already indicated. A missile flight test moratorium would be a good first step.

3. U.S.-RUSSIAN TACTICAL ARMS REDUCTIONS

Step 9(c) calls for "further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process." There has been no publicly reported progress in this regard since 2000. Indeed, the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev parallel unilateral withdrawals of non-strategic arms from deployment have yet to be subjected to the requirements of the "reduction and disarmament process," that is, they are not transparent, they are not irreversible, they have not been verified, and they have not been codified in legally binding form. No official figures are available on tactical arsenals of the United States and Russia. One estimate is that as of 2001 the United States had 1,670 operational tactical weapons, and Russia 3,590; however, a high degree of uncertainty attaches to estimates of Russian stocks. According to one estimate, approximately 150 U.S. bombs for delivery by aircraft are deployed under NATO auspices at 10 air bases in seven European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review refers to a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe with recommendations presented to defense ministers in summer of 2002. It states: "Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." The NPR also contains plans for further development of earth-penetrating, low yield nuclear warheads that could be deployed on tactical systems.

There is widespread interest in pursuing control of tactical warheads, including among U.S. arms control groups and in the U.S. Senate, as a next step after the new strategic arms treaty, in conjunction with the hoped for process of developing dismantlement and verification mechanisms regarding reduced strategic arms. The new NATO-Russian partnership arrangement may make measures regarding tactical weapons more feasible.

Reduction and elimination of tactical warheads should be promoted vigorously. The U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe ?the only nuclear weapons deployed on non-nuclear weapon state territory ?should be removed unilaterally. A wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons should also be created. A German working paper for the NPT PrepCom provides a useful checklist, including:

- 1) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives;*
- 2) formalization of those initiatives, including verification;*
- 3) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocal exchange of information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and*
- 4) commencement of U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.*

4. NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In the post-Cold War years the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, have integrated nuclear forces into their military strategies and expanded their role. In 1993, Russia abandoned its declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and its January 2000 Security Concept stated that nuclear weapons could be used to "repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted." The United States continues to plan for a massive retaliation or preemptive counterforce attack in response to an actual or imminent nuclear attack, and for first use of nuclear weapons against an overwhelming conventional attack. The Nuclear Posture Review also reveals some new trends. It states that nuclear weapons will be "integrated with new nonnuclear strategic capabilities" including advanced conventional precision-guided munitions, and contemplates enlarging the range of circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used. It calls for contingency planning for use of nuclear weapons against Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya; identifies possible "immediate contingencies" requiring U.S. nuclear use as "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan"; and states that nuclear weapons "could be employed against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack," or in retaliation for use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or "in the event of surprising military developments." The new NPR options for use of nuclear weapons have not, so far as is known, been codified in a presidential directive (the last publicly known directive was that of President Clinton in 1997), and top U.S. officials have sought to downplay their significance. However, the NPR was signed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and certainly indicates at the very least a strong trend in U.S. nuclear planning.

Thus, far from diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, as called for by Step 9(e), the United States is expanding options for nuclear use, and Russia is maintaining first use options. In addition, the U.S. plans in particular undermine assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. Those assurances are at minimum political commitments essential to the bargain underlying the NPT, and arguably have become legally binding, notably because they were reiterated in connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Regarding nuclear use in response to a chemical or biological attack, the use of nuclear weapons, or any weapon, including in reprisal, must always meet fundamental requirements of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. Thus the International Court of Justice affirmed that states must "never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets." Given that the radioactive effects of nuclear explosions are, as the ICJ observed, uncontainable in space and time, there are no realistic situations in which nuclear weapons could meet those requirements. Moreover, regardless of

whatever hypothetical scenarios of retaliatory nuclear use with limited "collateral damage" can be conjured up, in general making nuclear weapons more usable as a matter of policy and operation undermines the non-proliferation regime and risks unleashing nuclear chaos in the world.

There should be insistence upon diminishing, not expanding, the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, in accordance with the NPT commitment, and upon respect for the NPT negative security assurances. Countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States should absolutely refuse any participation in or support of first use of nuclear weapons or preparation for such use, as a matter of policy or operation.

5. BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Of the five NPT nuclear weapon states, the United States and China have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as called for by Step 1; India and Pakistan have yet to sign it. All five NPT nuclear weapon states, including the United States, continue to affirm the moratorium on testing (Step 2). A troubling sign, though, is that the Nuclear Posture Review calls for reduction of the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test, currently at 24-36 months of a decision to do so. To date Congress has not approved such a reduction. The Bush administration has cut back on financial support of development of the verification capabilities of the CTBT Organization. There are also reports that some U.S. officials favor "unsigned" the CTBT. Additionally, the NPR cites the need to improve earth-penetrating nuclear weapons; however, a budget request for development of one such weapon has met with resistance in the U.S. Congress. Development of such weapons, depending on the device in question, could increase pressure for a U.S. resumption of testing.

It should be made clear that abiding by the moratorium is imperative. There should be a continued push for funding of the CTBT Organization and ratification of the CTBT, and a call for the closure of the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya. There should also be strong opposition to development of new or modified nuclear weapons, which is contrary, inter alia, to the commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies (Step 9(e)) and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.

6. CONTROL OF FISSILE MATERIALS

The 1995 and 2000 commitments (Step 3) to commence formal negotiation of a fissile materials treaty have not been met. U.S.-Russian plans to place some "surplus" military fissile material holdings under IAEA monitoring are proceeding slowly. The United States has released information regarding its plutonium holdings and is still working on a report regarding HEU. The size of Russian fissile material holdings is uncertain. Russia is working on an inventory of civil plutonium; an inventory of HEU is far in the future. France and Britain have released information regarding their holdings. Fissile materials holdings as well as warhead inventories of China and of the non-NPT nuclear weapon possessing states are opaque. The IAEA maintains information regarding non-nuclear weapon state holdings of civil, but weapons-usable, fissile materials; however, it is available only in summary form. The IAEA has an eight-point plan to improve protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including in the areas of physical protection, detection of trafficking, and assessment of vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities. The plan costs \$12 million annually, and is funded through voluntary measures.

The September 2001 attacks, and subsequent reports of Al Qaeda interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, have raised the specter of terrorist use of nuclear explosive devices and radiological bombs. Consequently, the imperative of accounting for and controlling fissile

materials, including non-military stocks of weapon-usable plutonium, as well as warheads, is now widely understood. In a 2002 NPT working paper, Germany noted that existing stockpiles of weapon-usable fissile materials amount to more than 3,000 metric tons, enough for more than 200,000 nuclear weapons, and called for the establishment of a reliable inventory of all nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material usable for military purposes. U.S. arms control groups and members of the U.S. Congress have increasingly emphasized the need for control of fissile materials, especially but not only in Russia, and legislation in this area is pending in Congress. ***There should be insistence upon implementation of the principles of transparency and irreversibility with respect to fissile material holdings and their control and disposition by the nuclear weapon states (Steps 5, 8, 9(b) and 10), and on commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty (Step 3). Russia and the United States should be pressed to accelerate their efforts to inventory fissile materials, both military and civilian. IAEA information on holdings of weapon-usable fissile materials should be made available in detailed form (consistent with security concerns). A process should be initiated to create a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons. The IAEA plan to improve protection against acts of terrorism should be better funded and not rely on voluntary contributions. In this connection, relevant measures set forth in the 2000 Final Document in addition to the 13 Steps must be fully implemented, including strengthening of IAEA safeguards (Pt.I, Art. III), further adherence to and possible revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Art. III, para. 56), improving national standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material (para. 42), establishing stronger regulatory control over radioactive sources (para. 43), and enhancing international cooperation against illicit trafficking in nuclear material (para. 43).***

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Middle Powers Initiative

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The Middle Powers Initiative [<http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/about/>] is an international civil society coalition formed to work with respected non-nuclear countries in persuading the nuclear-armed states to reduce nuclear risks and initiate the elimination of nuclear arsenals. The campaign is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Canadian Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.. The Middle Powers Initiative now functions as a program of the Global Security Institute. [<http://www.gsinsitute.org/index.shtml>]

In August 2002 the Middle Powers Initiative published a briefing paper entitled Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context.

[<http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000116.shtml>] The recommendations of the briefing paper lay out an agenda for next steps toward zero nuclear weapons.

Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Concept

Recommendations

The Middle Powers Initiative urges countries to work together on the following priority steps in fulfillment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives under the NPT:

1. Strategic arms reductions:

- ◆ Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that reduced warheads and their delivery systems are *irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner*;
- ◆ *De-alert* remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles:

- ◆ Negotiate regarding plans for missile defenses to *avoid obstruction of the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament* and to promote international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all;
- ◆ *Prevent missile proliferation*, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

3. Tactical arms reductions:

- ◆ *Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe*;

- ◆ *Create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through*
 - a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives;
 - b) formalizing those initiatives, including verification;
 - c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and
 - d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

4. Non-use of nuclear weapons:

- ◆ *Reverse trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review;*
- ◆ *Establish the absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.*

5. Ban on nuclear testing:

- ◆ *Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing;*
- ◆ *Achieve entry into force of the CTBT;*
- ◆ *Close the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya;*
- ◆ *Renounce development of new or modified nuclear weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.*

6. Control of fissile materials:

- ◆ *Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials,*
 - a) *create a process of accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons;*
 - b) *commence negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and*
 - c) *mandate and increase funding of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.*

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Middle Powers Initiative

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logo of Middle Powers Initiative
from <http://www.gsinsitute.org/programs/index.shtml>]

[on the right place the following text in italic]

The Middle Powers Initiative [<http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/about/>] is an international civil society coalition formed to work with respected non-nuclear countries in persuading the nuclear-armed states to reduce nuclear risks and initiate the elimination of nuclear arsenals. The campaign is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Canadian Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.. The Middle Powers Initiative functions as a program of the Global Security Institute. [<http://www.gsinsitute.org/index.shtml>]

In November 2002 the Middle Powers Initiative published a Consultation Report on Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context. [<http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000116.shtml>] The recommendations of the briefing paper lay out an agenda for next steps toward zero nuclear weapons.

Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Concept

November 2002

Recommendations

[to be added]

[end of box]

back to top

On the How to Get to Zero page, transfer from Reports of Commissions and International Bodies the section on National Academy of Sciences to the section on Deep Cuts. In the index at the top of the page, similarly transfer the National Academy of Sciences entry.

Amend the entree as follows:

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

National Academy of Sciences, 1997

1. Keep:

PDF document

[Statue of Albert Einstein on the grounds of the National Academy of Sciences or a portrait.

Text: Regarding nuclear weapons, Albert Einstein said: "there is no secret and there is no defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world." -- January 22, 1947]

2. Keep the opening paragraph but put in bold: Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences:

*In the mid-1990s the **Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences** embarked upon a study of the nuclear weapons policies in the post-cold war era. The study group was chaired by Major General William F. Burns (U.S.Army, ret.). It produced a report entitled **The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy** [<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/5796.html>].*

3. Add:

[sub-box] [names in smaller type; follow model of Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page]

Members, Committee on International Security and Arms Control

John P. Holdren, chair, Harvard University

John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution

General William F. Burns, U.S. Army (retired)

General George Lee Butler, Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc.

Paul M. Doty, Harvard University

Steve Fetter, University of Maryland

Alexander H. Flax, National Academy of Engineering

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Corporation

Rose Gottemoeller, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Arms Control Association

Joshua Lederberg, Rockefeller University

Matthew Meselson, Harvard University

Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Stanford University

C. Kumar N. Patel, University of California at Los Angeles

Jonathan D. Pollack, RAND Corporation

Admiral Robert H. Wertheim, U.S. Navy (retired)

Affiliations at time of publication.

[end sub-box]

4. Strike out from Summary to the end and replace it with the following:

Summary

The report describes how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. It sets forth a two-part program of change.

Near- and mid-term

- Reductions in nuclear forces.
- Changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety.
- Measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Long term

- Foster international conditions so that nuclear weapon would no longer be seen as necessary or legitimate for preservation of national and global security.

A Regime of Progressive Constraints

For near- and mid-term the Committee offered a program of progressive constraints. It would start with the United States and Russia and then bring China, France, and the United Kingdom into the reduction process. (The report was completed before India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear weapon tests.)

Immediate Step

- Reduction to **2,000 deployed strategic warheads** each for the United States and Russia.

Further Transformation

- Limits on the total inventory of warheads, strategic and tactical.
- Eliminating the hair trigger.
- Revising targeting policy and war planning.
- Reaffirming the integral relationship between restrictions on offensive and defensive systems.

Nonproliferation

- Engaging the undeclared nuclear states (India, Israel, Pakistan)
- Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including:
 - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 - Nuclear weapon free zones
 - Controlling fissile material
- No first use to reassure states that forego nuclear weapons

Further Reductions

- Reducing U.S. and Russian forces to **1,000 total warheads each**.
- Reducing to a few hundred warheads.

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Committee also discussed the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. A news release on the report noted:

The second and long-term phase of the program recommended by the committee calls for examining how continuing changes in international relations could make it both desirable and possible to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons. The path to a complete ban on nuclear weapons is not now clear, the committee acknowledged, but the potential benefits of a ban warrant serious efforts to identify and promote the conditions that would make this possible.

One such condition would be comprehensive verification of potential weapons-related activities, which would require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and openness.

[end of box]

Deep Cuts [in brown box]

Brookings Institution: Deep Cuts Study Group (1999)

[begin box]

[As a graphic to inset in the first paragraph, go to

<http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815709536/html/index.html> and copy the top half of the book cover, that is, the title and the graphic around it. Cut off before the subtitle.]

*In 1998 the [begin bold] **Deep Cuts Study Group, Brookings Institution** [end bold] in Washington, D.C. held a series of meetings to consider the possibility of deep reductions in nuclear arms. After exchanging drafts of chapters, the nine members produced a book entitled [bold italic underline] **The Nuclear Turning Point** [end bold, underlining] [<http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/press/books/nucturn.htm>] (Brookings Institution, 1999). The book's subtitle describes its purpose: [bold] **A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons.** [end bold]*

[Have a sub-box for the authors' names in smaller type, in two columns if possible. Like Canberra Commission on How to Get to Zero page.]

Authors

Harold A. Feiveson, editor, Princeton University

Bruce G. Blair, Brookings Institution

Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists

Steve Fetter, University of Maryland

James Goodby, Carnegie Melon University

George N. Lewis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Janne E. Nolan, Twentieth Century Fund

Theodore Postol, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Frank N. von Hippel, Princeton University

Affiliation at time of publication.

[end sub-box]

A Strategy of Staged Reductions and De-alerting Nuclear Forces

The authors concentrated on how to achieve very deep cuts but not complete abolition of nuclear weapons. They offered a three-stage program for deep cuts in which all the weapons remaining at each stage are de-alerted and a large part are deactivated. Excerpts from their summary description in chapter two are as follows:

Definitions

- By **de-alerting**, we mean measures that substantially increase to hours or days the time required to launch nuclear weapons in the active operational forces.
- **Deactivation** means that most weapons are unusable for weeks or months. This could be achieved, for example, by removing the warheads from ballistic missiles.

First Stage

In the first stage (our version of START III) the United States and Russia would:

- ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

- reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty),
- eliminate most of their tactical nuclear weapons,
- reduce to **2,000 operational strategic warheads** each,
- de-alert or deactivate their strategic forces, and
- begin to put into place a comprehensive bilateral accounting system for warheads and fissile materials.

All warheads withdrawn from deployment (or a specified proportion) would be dismantled, with their fissile material transferred to monitored storage; and all missiles and launchers withdrawn from the operational forces would be destroyed.

Second Stage

In the second stage, which we call START IV:

- **A verified ceiling of 1,000 each** would be imposed on the total number of warheads (stored as well as deployed) held by Russia and the United States.
- By this time Britain, France, and China, and it is hoped, India, Pakistan, and Israel, would be engaged in the nuclear arms control process.

Third Stage

In the third stage, START V:

- The United States, western Europe, Russia, and China would each reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles to **200 warheads or fewer**,
- Most of these would be deactivated, primarily by verified separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

Relationship

There is a close relationship between the two central strands of our program directed at strategic nuclear forces: the stand-down from high alert of the forces and deep cuts in deployed nuclear weapons.

- **First**, we propose that where possible the strategic systems destined to be eliminated under START II, START III, and subsequent treaties be deactivated years earlier in anticipation of their eventual destruction.
- **Second**, we propose that at every stage of the deep cuts program the launch readiness of the remaining ballistic missiles would be decreased in a manner that does not increase their vulnerability.

Relationship to Abolition

This is not complete abolition, but it amounts to the longest steps in that direction that can be realistically projected under current international conditions.

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[end box]

[back to top](#)

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <pief@slac.stanford.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:41:29 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Panofsky:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

If you visit the site, you will find that we have referred to the report of the National Academy of Sciences that you helped write. See <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#nationalacademyofsciences>.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can attach your article as a Word document or a .rtf file.

If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at
<http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of
laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <wjerry@leland.stanford.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 11:21:38 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Perry:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

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If you visit the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/mastheadstory.html#dodphotosunflower>, you will find that we have shown you planting sunflowers at a former missile site in Ukraine.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <john.rhineland@shawpitman.com>
Subject: Model deep cuts treaty
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 11:18:42 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear John,

I'm wondering if you have made progress on developing a prospectus on what a truly deep cuts treaty between the United States and Russia would look like. Such a working document would be quite useful to organizations in the faith community which are dissatisfied with the inadequacies of the Moscow Treaty of 2002. I know that many in the civic sector are also dissatisfied.

My interest stems from my position as chair of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, an advocacy organization, and also as chair of the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (see our web site: www.zero-nukes.org). At the moment many of us are working hard to stop the rush to war against Iraq, but we know that one day we will be able to return to our quest for nuclear disarmament.

On the theory that you can't beat something with nothing, we want to encourage arms control experts to develop a deep cuts treaty that would lay out a schedule for getting to, say, 1,000 warheads on side. It should include provisions for de-alerting, deactivation, and dismantlement along with procedures for reliable verification. The next step would be a multilateral treaty to achieve reductions to 100 to 200 for each nation possessing nuclear weapons.

Such a model treaty would provide specificity for recommendations for staged reductions made during the last ten years by General Goodpaster, the Stimson Center, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Brookings book, *The Nuclear Turning Point*. It would also show how to implement a portion of the Bush-Putin Joint Declaration of May 2002 that indicates "their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations". We would argue that 100 to 200 warheads are sufficient for now and that eventually the zero level should be attained.

Once you come with a draft I would encourage seeking input from other U.S. experts and from Russian contacts and try to achieve a consensus of what is desirable and workable. With such a treaty outline in hand the Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament would work to build support within the United States from both the faith and civil sector communities. We would reach out to faith networks in Canada and Europe in order to seek the

support of NATO members. We would work with the World Council of Churches and Pax Christi International and with international civic sector organizations for global outreach.

If we do this right, we could fulfill President Eisenhower's warning that someday citizens will insist that their governments give them the peace they crave, in this case, nuclear disarmament. To do this we need something specific to advocate.

Therefore, I look forward to receiving your ideas.

Shalom,
Howard

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1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Status: U

Return-Path: <robwcpuk@chch.planet.org.nz>

Received: from protov.plain.co.nz ([202.36.174.23])

by hazard.mail.atl.earthlink.net (Earthlink Mail Service) with ESMTP id 189bOK5xj3NI3qG0 for <mupj@igc.org>; Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:05:01 -0500 (EST)

Received: from oemcomputer (ppp65168.cyberxpress.co.nz [202.49.65.168])

by protov.plain.co.nz (Postfix) with SMTP id 53F263C279; Wed, 6 Nov 2002 11:04:58 +1300 (NZDT)

Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20021106102539.00799100@mail.cyberxpress.co.nz>

X-Sender: robwcpuk@mail.cyberxpress.co.nz

X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32)

Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2002 10:25:39 +1300

To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>

From: Rob Green <robwcpuk@chch.planet.org.nz>

Subject: Re: Writing request

Cc: kate@chch.planet.org.nz

In-Reply-To: <002f01c284dc\$6e8867e0\$d057f7a5@default>

Mime-Version: 1.0

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Dear Howard,

Many thanks for your remarkable message: very good to be in touch again! I am full of admiration for your initiative, and your website is excellent: I am in august company.

I of course have no objection to my photo from our website being reproduced on yours. However, may I suggest that you replace the current biographical notes with the following which, though rather too long, are more accurate and expand on my military experience:

"Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired) served in the British Royal Navy from 1962-82. As a Fleet Air Arm Observer (Bombardier-Navigator), he flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike aircraft (1968-72), then in anti-submarine helicopters equipped with nuclear depth-bombs (1972-77). On promotion to Commander, he spent 1978-80 in the Ministry of Defence in London as Personal Staff Officer to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy), an Admiral who was closely involved in recommending the replacement for the Polaris nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine force. In his final job, he was Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet at Northwood HQ near London, in charge of round-the-clock intelligence support for Polaris as well as the rest of the Fleet. Having taken voluntary redundancy in 1981, he was released after the 1982 Falklands War.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 1980 decision to replace Polaris with Trident was one reason he left the Royal Navy. The unsolved murder of his aunt Hilda Murrell, an anti-nuclear energy campaigner, in 1984 led him to challenge the hazards of nuclear electricity generation. The break-up of the Soviet Union followed by the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War caused him to speak out against nuclear weapons.

In 1991 he became Chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project (WCP),

an international campaign by a network of citizen organisations which led to a successful legal challenge to nuclear deterrence in the International Court of Justice in 1996. As a member of the WCP International Steering Committee, he met Kate Dewes a WCP pioneer from Christchurch, New Zealand. After they were married in 1997, he emigrated to New Zealand in 1999, and in 2001 became a NZ citizen. As Co-Coordinator with Dr Dewes of the NZ Peace Foundation's Disarmament & Security Centre, he is now using his military experience to promote alternative thinking about security and disarmament. He is the author of the books 'Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons' (1998), 'The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence' (2000) and many related articles."

I would be honoured to write an article on my latest thinking. Currently I'm revising and updating "The Naked Nuclear Emperor" for a new US edition, to be published next year by the Pamphleteer's Press.

By the way, you will be interested to see a relevant oped on Iraq by the new Archbishop of Canterbury, which I will copy separately to you. I've also just seen that support for invading Iraq has dropped to 32% in the UK.

Warm wishes,
Rob
* * *

At 10:02 AM 11/5/02 -0500, you wrote:

>Dear Rob,

>

>You may recall that we were together in Geneva during the 1998 session of
>NPT PrepCom. Since then I have formed in the U.S. the Interfaith Committee
>for Nuclear Disarmament.

>

>Among other tasks we have established a new web site called
>www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for
>statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military
>leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies;
>and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how
>to get to zero nuclear weapons.

>

>If you visit the site, you will find that we have reference to your views at
><http://www.zero-nukes.org/militaryleaders.html#commandergreen>. I recently
>discovered your photo on your web site, which we want to add.

>

>We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by
>writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps
>required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or
>only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal
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>If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at
><http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.
>
>Thank you for your cooperation,
>
>Howard W. Hallman
>
>
>Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
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>1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
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>
>
>
>

Commander Robert D Green, Royal Navy (Retired)
International Chair, World Court Project UK

Disarmament & Security Centre
PO Box 8390
Christchurch
Aotearoa/New Zealand

Tel/Fax: (+64) 3 348 1353

Email: robwcpuk@chch.planet.org.nz

Website: <http://www.disarmsecure.org>

[The DSC is a specialist branch of the NZ Peace Foundation]

Briefing Book on Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation
<http://www.clw.org/control/sort-briefing-book.pdf>

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <js526@umail.umd.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 11:29:18 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. Steinbruner:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

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<http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

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Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

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laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <fvhippel@princeton.edu>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:19:59 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Dr. von Hippel:

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

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If you visit the site, you will find that we have made references to some of your writings as co-author. See <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#brookings> and <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#bruceblair>.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

We are suggesting an article in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 words, but we will accept less and more. We will post your article on the site at <http://www.zero-nukes.org/howtogettozero.html#scenarios>. We are unable to provide compensation, but we hope that you will be willing to contribute your ideas to this forum for public discussion.

You can send your submission to me at proposal@zero-nukes.org. You can attach your article as a Word document or a .rtf file.

If you want to comment on the views of others, you can do so at
<http://www.zero-nukes.org/yourfeedback.html#comments>.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Howard W. Hallman

Howard W. Hallman is Chair of
Methodists United for Peace with Justice
1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Phone/fax: 301 896-0013; e-mail: mupj@igc.org

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a membership association of
laity and clergy. It has no affiliation with any Methodist denomination.

Reply-To: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
From: "Howard W. Hallman" <mupj@igc.org>
To: <alynw@attglobal.net>
Subject: Request for your ideas
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 10:50:06 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4807.1700

Dear Alyn,

Even as Iraq is receiving the world's attention for its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction, the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia and the lesser arsenals of other known possessors remain a major concern for the peace and security of Earth. In spite of being a step in the right direction, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 retains so many U.S. and Russian strategic warheads that in practice the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains in place.

The Interfaith Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, which I chair, is convinced that the world can do better. Accordingly we have established a new web site called www.zero-nukes.org. It has two purposes: (1) provide a source for statements on nuclear disarmament by religious organizations, military leaders, civil sector organizations, commissions and international bodies; and (2) offer opportunity for presentation of proposals and dialogue on how to get to zero nuclear weapons.

If you visit the site, you will find that we have included reference to the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which you worked on. We're still developing the page with civil sector statements that will deal with other efforts you have been involved in.

We invite you to contribute to the dialogue on nuclear disarmament by writing a short article on your current thinking about concrete steps required to eliminate nuclear weapons. Your scenario might go to zero or only approach zero if you don't see how to go all the way. You might deal with stages of reduction, categories of weapons, priorities for action, methods of verification, or however you want to address the issue.

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What's Next after the Moscow Treaty of 2002?

by Howard W. Hallman

<http://www.zero-nukes.org/religiousstatements2.html#methodistsunitedforpeace>
Chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Now that the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma have ratified the Moscow Treaty of 2002, [<http://www.zero-nukes.org/arsenalsandtreaties.html#moscowtreatyof2002>] it is timely to consider what should happen next to achieve further reductions in nuclear weapons. This is relevant because many persons believe that the Moscow Treaty doesn't go nearly far or fast enough in eliminating strategic nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the two presidents who signed the treaty, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, stated in a joint declaration: "The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations." They indicated that the Moscow Treaty was a major step but recognized that more is needed and possible.

Views of Eight Experts

Insights about what might come next are provided in the testimony of eight American experts at hearings conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and published and made available on-line as [*Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty*] [<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate>] (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). These experts are:

James Goody, Brookings Institution and former ambassador
Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
General Eugene E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), former commander, U.S. Strategic Command
John P. Holdren, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Fred C. Iklé, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Sam Nunn, Nuclear Threat Initiative and former U.S. senator
Christopher Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council
William J. Perry, Stanford University and former U.S. secretary of defense

Here is a sample of what they said.

Reductions Are Desirable but No Timetable

General Habiger pointed out that "there is only one thing in the world that can destroy the United States of America today, and that is the Russian nuclear warheads. That is why this treaty and . . . follow-on steps . . . are so essential to our security." (p. 141)

Senator Nunn noted, however, that "concerns have been raised that the treaty includes no benchmarks for progress or mechanism for verification, no timetable for reductions, no obligations to eliminate warheads, launches, or silos." (p. 128) Christopher Paine noted the lack

of "any interim reduction milestones for assessing compliance." (p. 169) Dr. Gottemoeller agreed that absence of a timetable is a significant problem. (p. 218)

De-alerting

Professor Holdren observed that the treaty "does not address the 'alert' status of the strategic nuclear forces that remain." He noted that "this is both the most anomalous and the most dangerous characteristic of the Russian and US strategic nuclear forces persisting into the post-Cold war era." (p. 239)

Senator Nunn also expressed concern about "the high alert status of our arsenals that gives our countries the capacity for a rapid massive nuclear attack that would incinerate our nations and the world as we know it." (p. 129) He advocated taking nuclear weapons off high alert. "We could begin," he indicated, "by ordering an immediate operational stand-down of weapons on both sides that are now scheduled for reductions." (p. 130) Ambassador Goodby supported "early deactivation of systems scheduled for withdrawal from the deployed force." (p. 230)

General Habiger specifically recommended immediate stand-down of "four Ohio class Trident submarines and all 50 Peacekeepers." Moving more weapons off alert status, he said, would give leaders more decision time." He recommended that "the teams working on this matter be led in large measure by the people who actually built the weapons themselves. They... understand them, and they are key to designing the system to take weapons off alert status in ways that make sense, are transparent but not intrusive, and do not compromise our security." (p. 140)

Secretary Perry indicated that the treaty "misses the opportunity to reduce the danger to both countries of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. He supported General Habiger's suggestion for "a mutual reduction of the high alert status of our strategic forces." (p. 205) Dr. Iklé, who was a top defense official during the Reagan Administration, agreed. He pointed out, "A cushion of time gives an opportunity to correct an error if you find it." (p.208)

Dismantlement

Senator Nunn pointed out, "The Treaty includes no obligation to eliminate warheads, launchers or silos." He added, "The goal of stability would be substantially advanced by both sides dismantling a large number of nuclear weapons from each nation's stockpile." (p.134)

Secretary Perry also expressed concern that the treaty "does not provide for the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons taken off deployment status." (p. 206) Ambassador Goodby stressed the need for "irreversibility in connection with dismantlement of excess nuclear weapons." (p. 230)

On this issue Dr. Gottemoeller picked up the words of the 1997 Helsinki statement by former Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin to "promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of rapid increase in the number of warheads." She noted that this "would in particular begin to address the uncertainties that have followed from U.S. statements under the Nuclear Posture Review that it will maintain a very large reserve of warheads available for redeployment, rather than eliminating them." (p.233)

General Habiger advocated, "We and the Russians should agreed to destroy a significant number of warheads planned for reduction under the treaty. . . . We should be identifying weapons we do not need and begin destroying them. This is not as simplistic as it may appear, since most of our dismantlement capability was eliminated in the mid-1990s." (p. 140-141)

Senator Dick Lugar (R-IN) noted that the Russians are dismantling missiles taken out of service because they receive financial support from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which he and Senator Nunn co-authored. (p. 212) Ambassador Goodby pointed out the need to permanently eliminate the need for annual waiver of certain provisions. (p. 228)

Transparency and Verification

Several experts noted the lack of provisions for transparency and verification in the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Secretary Perry spoke of the importance of transparency. (p. 205). Professor Holdren indicated, "Lack of transparency is hobbling US-Russian cooperation to improve the protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials against theft." (p. 241) "Only through transparency," General Habiger insisted, "can former enemies convince themselves that we wish them well and mean them no harm." (p. 139)

Senator Nunn said, "I hope that in the future the United States will put forward a comprehensive transparency proposal that includes all of our operationally deployed systems, and at this time Russia will respond constructively to that suggestion." (p. 128)

Dr. Gottemoeller indicated that transparency measures should relate to conversion and other treatment of launch vehicles and also to warheads. She believes that "the United States and Russia could readily establish transparency measures in warhead storage facilities." (p. 219)

Ambassador Goodby stated that measures to enhance transparency of reductions should include exchanges of data, schedules for removing systems from operational deployment, and spot checks of systems removed from deployment. (pp. 229-230)

Christopher Paine recommended that inactive stockpile weapons should be "stored in secure facilities subject to periodic US-Russian bilateral cooperative monitoring measures." (p. 178)

General Habiger favors a system of verification tailored to the specific treaty. He indicated that "the verification protocol should be developed by the operators themselves....The operators know all the games and the tricks. They know what you would need to see to be satisfied in order to get a complete picture." (p. 140)

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In their testimony several experts indicated that dealing with tactical nuclear weapons -- the ones used for shorter range than strategic weapons -- is important unfinished business. Secretary Perry warned, "the most serious security threat to America today is theft or purchase of a nuclear weapon by a well-organized, well-financed terrorist group." (p. 205)

General Habiger stated, "We need a signed agreement on these weapons, one that will help us count them, secure them, monitor them, and begin to eliminate them. These are nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists. We need to move on this issue immediately." (p. 141)

Senator Nunn recommended, "The United States and Russia should insist on accurate accounting and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, including most importantly a baseline inventory of these weapons with sufficient transparency to assure each other that these weapons are being handled in a safe and secure manner." (p. 1290)

Intermediate-range Missiles

Ken Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan Administration, also testified in support of the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Unlike the experts quoted above, he didn't call for formal verification provisions and other measures of greater specificity. However, he advocated that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and President Gorbachev in 1987 that eliminated U.S. and Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons should now be open to all nations. He believes that "weapons of mass destruction carried on ballistic missiles are among the threats facing America and all democratic civilized nations". Therefore, "an internationalized INF treaty would help to make the world safer." (p. 149)