421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is an association of laity and clergy who are working to implement recommendations contained in the pastoral letter and foundation document, In Defense of Creation, issued by the United Methodist Council of Bishops in May 1986. The next issue of our newsletter, Peace Leaf, will take up the matter of Star Wars and will deal with the bishops' recommendation for a ban on both defensive and offensive space weapons. This issue of Peace Leaf will be widely distributed to Methodists throughout the United States. The contents will be as follows:

<u>Page</u>

- 1 Update on the work of Methodists United, indicating a commitment to work for the end of Star Wars.
- 2 Summary of the bishops' recommendations. Author: a United Methodist bishop.

InIn Defense of Creation the bishops had this to say about the U.S.

Strategic Defense Initiative:

We are impressed by the doubts of many eminent scientists.

We are concerned about the possible offensive implications.

We are worried about the consequences for arms reduction.

We are appalled at the probable costs.

Therefore, the next four pages of Peace Leaf will take up these issues. Each article should be 700 to 750 words in length.

- 3 "Doubts of Scientists and Engineers" Source: Union of Concerned
 Scientists
- 4 "Offensive Implications of SDI" Author: Admiral Eugene L. Carroll,

 Center for Defense Information.
- 5 "Effects of Strategic Defense on Arms Reduction" Author: Ambassador
 Gerard Smith (requested)
- 6 "Enormous Cost of Star Wars" Author: Congressman Ronald Dellums (requested)
- 7 "What You Can Do"

Legislative Alternatives

During This Year's Election Campaign

8 "Local Church Activities" Author: Diane Stanton-Rich

Please send completed articles to: Howard W. Hallman

6508 Wilmett Road

Bethesda, MD 20817

If you have questions, call him at (301) 897-3668

MUPJ.11 September

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

August 5, 1988

Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.

Center for Defense Information

1500 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Admiral Carroll:

Thank you for your willingness to write a short article related to Star Wars for the next issue of Peace Leaf, the newsletter of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. Specifically we would like you to deal with the "Offensive Implications" of SDI in an article of 700 to 750 words. It would be one of a series of four short articles responding to concerns raised by United Methodist bishops in their pastoral letter and foundation document, In Defense of Creation.

Enclosed is a perspectus of this issue of Peace Leaf so that you can see how your article

relates to others. As you will notice, we have asked others to deal with other concerns

about Star Wars and want you to concentrate on the offensive implications. On the

same page as your article, we want to mention the Center for Defense Information as a

source for further information.

Would you please send the completed article to me no later than August 31 to my home

address:

6508 Wilmett Road

Bethesda, MD 20817

If you have any questions, please call me at 897-3668. We greatly appreciate your

cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

August 5, 1988

Wolfe, Executive Director

ABM Campaign

1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Room 704

Washington, DC 20009

Dear Mr. Wolfe:

Thank you for your willingness to see if Ambassador Gerard Smith would provide us with a short article related to Star Wars for the next issue of Peace Leaf, the newsletter of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. Specifically we would like him to deal with "Effects of Strategic Defense on Arms Reduction" in an article of 700 to 750 words. It would be one of a series of four short articles responding to concerns raised by United Methodist bishops in their pastoral letter and foundation document, In Defense of Creation.

Enclosed is a perspectus of this issue of Peace Leaf so that you can see how his article

relates to others. As you will notice, we have asked others to deal with other concerns

about Star Wars and want Ambassador Smith to concentrate on the impact on arms

reduction negotiations. On the same page we want to mention sources for further

information, such as the ABM Campaign, Arms Control Association, and Committee for

National Security.

Would you please send the completed article to me no later than August 31 to my home

address:

6508 Wilmett Road

Bethesda, MD 20817

If you have any questions, please call me at 897-3668. We greatly appreciate your

cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

August 5, 1988

For the next issue of Peace Leaf, the newsletter of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, we intend to focus our attention on Star Wars. This is a first step in a campaign we would like to initiate to join with others in seeking an end of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

As the enclosed perspectus indicates, we plan to have four short articles written by national authorities dealing with concerns raised by the United Methodist bishops in In Defense of Creation. As a lead into these articles, would you provide us a brief article of 500 to 700 words to summarize the bishops concerns on this issue. As background to assist you, I have roughed out a third person draft that deals with what the bishops wrote. However, if you are willing to provide an article, I assume that you might make it more personal. But we would like you to mention the four concerns which relate to articles which will follow.

We would need this article from you no later than August 31. You can send it to me at my home address:

 $6508 \ Wilmett \ Road$

Bethesda, MD 20817

I'll try to reach your office the week of August 8 to find out whether you would be able to help us in this manner. If you want to reach me, my number is (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

September 13, 1988

A. Wolfe, Director

National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty

1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, #704

Washington, DC 20009

Dear Mr. Wolfe:

Thanks for your article on the relationship of the ABM Treaty and Star Wars.

You covered the material we are interested in and offered observations that should be useful to our members.

I have done some editing, mainly to fit the article to space available and to eliminate some material that duplicates other articles. A copy of the proposed revision is enclosed. If you have any problems with my editing, please call me immediately at 897-3668 because we are about to go to press.

I'll send you a copy of the issue of Peace Leaf as soon as it is available.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

February 2, 1989

David Hackett, Executive Director

Youth Policy Institute

1221 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite B

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Dave:

Would you be willing to write an article of 1,200 to 1,500 words on "Youth Issues of the Next Four Years"? It would be printed in the next issue of Peace Leaf, the newsletter of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. This issue will focus on Children and Youth. We are asking Marian Wright Edelman to write a similar article on children's issues. Our newsletter goes to our members around the country and to all United Methodist bishops, district superintendents, and annual conference directors (even if they are not members). We would want to receive your draft by the end of October.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is an action-oriented association of laity and clergy. Our first emphasis has been to seek implementation of policy proposals in the United Methodist bishops' pastoral letter and foundation document, In Defense of Creation, which deals especially with the need for nuclear disarmament. For the

coming year we intend to give particular attention to seeking the end of Star Wars.

enclosed issue of Peace Leaf is an opening step in this campaign. We intend to make

children and youth the principal focus of our justice concerns, and the Peace Leaf in which

your article will appear is our opening effort in this direction.

As part of our mission we seek to influence the policies and programs of the United

Methodist Church. When the quadrennial General Conference met in St. Louis this

past spring, we were influential in getting the delegates to affirm and support In Defense

of Creation and to make Peace with Justice a special program of the United Methodist

Church for the 1989-92 Quadrennium. We are now encouraging the General Board of

Church and Society to carry out a vigorous Peace with Justice Program. This issue of

Peace Leaf on children and youth is part of this effort. By coincidence the United

Methodist quadrennium parallels the term of the U.S. president. Therefore, talking

about youth issues of the next four years has a double relevance.

Because you are on top of youth issues, especially with your focus in Youth Policy on

"Challenges for the Next President," you would be an ideal author for this brief article for

Peace Leaf. I'll call you in a few days to find out if you can help us in this manner.

Or if you want to call me, my telephone number is now 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

October 7, 1988

Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.

Center for Defense Information

1500 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Admiral Carroll:

We are now off the press with our latest issue of Peace Leaf which includes the article on

"Offensive Implications of SDI" that you wrote for us. A copy of the issue is enclosed.

We greatly appreciate your assistance.

We are now in the process of membership recruitment. One of the purposes is to

mobilize United Methodists around the country in opposition to Star Wars and to build

support for ending this unwise program next year. As we go about this task, we look

forward to working with you and your colleagues at the Center for Defense Information.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

October 7, 1988

Steven A. Wolfe, Director

National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty

1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Room 704

Washington, DC 20009

Dear Steve:

We are now off the press with our latest issue of Peace Leaf which includes your article on "ABM Treaty: A Necessity for Strategic Arms Reduction." A copy is enclosed. We greatly appreciate your assistance.

We are now in the process of membership recruitment so that we can expand our base and be better able to mobilize United Methodists in support of existing arms control treaties, in opposition to Star Wars, and in a push for further arms reduction. As we go about this task, we hope that we can stay in touch with you and your organization.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

October 7, 1988

Charles Monfort

Union of Concerned Scientists

1616 P Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Monfort:

In the latest issue of our newsletter, Peace Leaf, we made use of your issue backgrounder, "Scientific Opposition to Star Wars." A copy is enclosed. Because of space limitations we were able to cite only ten examples, but we referred people to your office for more examples and for sources.

We appreciate the significant work that UCS has done in opposition to Star Wars during the last five years. We are mobilizing United Methodists to seek an end to this unwise program. As we do, we hope that we can work closely with your organization.

Sincerely yours,

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

October 7, 1988

Sandy Thomas

2941 Viewpoint Road

Alexandria, VA 22315

Dear Sandy:

Here is the latest issue of Peace Leaf, which deals with Star Wars. The information you supplied me was exceedingly useful in preparing these articles. Thanks for your help.

As soon as Congress adjourns and you might have more time to talk, I would like to stop by and discuss ways in which we can mobilize Methodists to seek and end to SDI.

Sincerely yours,

Also in This Issue

Offensive Implications of SDI3
ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction4
Scientific Opposition to Star Wars5
Budgetary Costs of Strategic Defense6
What You Can Do; Sources of Information7
Local Church Activities8

PCLF4.01A

September 12, 1988

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

On March 23, 1983 President Reagan spoke to the nation in a television address. He talked about "the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security." He then offered an alternative:

Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of allies?

To fulfill this vision Reagan announced a long-term program of research and development known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

In subsequent statements he indicated that SDI would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Because a large part of the hoped-for missile defense would be deployed in space above the earth, the media have referred to this initiative as "Star Wars."

At the time the president spoke, the United States had been long engaged in basic research on possible components of space-based defense. So had the Soviet Union. Both nations had developed prototype antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. The U.S. budget for this purpose was about \$1 billion a year. Subsequently U.S. funding for this purpose has risen to \$4 billion for the 1988 Fiscal Year. A Pentagon unit known as the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) has taken charge of the program.

Although President Reagan has retained his vision of a leakproof shield against Soviet ballistic missiles, the Pentagon SDI program has lowered the objective to a partial shield -- at least through the 1990s. SDIO has initiated a Phase I program that might be ready for deployment by 1996. It would consist of a combination of space-based and ground-based defenses. There would be space-based interceptors (SBIs), relying on kinetic-energy to attack Soviet missiles by direct hits during their boost phase as they are leaving the earth and in midcourse. There would also be a ground-based Exoatmospheric Reentry-Vehicle System (ERIS) to intercept warheads above the earth's atmosphere in midcourse. The space-based defense would consist of 300 defense battle stations carrying 3,000 SBIs. The ground-based layer would have 1,000 to 2,000 ERIS missiles.

Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, director of SDIO, estimates that the cost of developing and producing the Phase I system would be between \$75 and \$150 billion. This does not include launch costs or operations and maintenance of the system.

In this issue of Peace Leaf we present the views of the United Methodist Council of Bishops on Star Wars and four articles which respond to concerns the bishops have raised in their foundation document, In Defense of Creation.

PCLF4.02A

September 13, 1988

United Methodist Bishops' Perspective on Star Wars

In their pastoral letter, In Defense of Creation, the United Methodist bishops, after reviewing biblical and theological foundations for a just peace, firmly stated:

Therefore, we say a clear and unconditional No to nuclear war and to any use of nuclear weapons. We conclude that nuclear deterrence is a position that cannot receive the church's blessing. We state our complete lack of confidence in proposed "defenses" against nuclear attack and are convinced that the enormous cost of developing such defenses is one more witness to the obvious fact that the arms race is a social justice issue, not only a war and peace issue.

In the foundation document which elaborated on the pastoral letter, the bishops laid out a set of policies for a just peace. As a path to a nuclear weapon free world, they recommended four measures for prompt action:

- 1. Comprehensive test ban to inaugurate a nuclear freeze.
- 2. Consolidation of existing treaties and phased reductions of nuclear weapons.
- 3. Bans on space weapons.
- 4. No-first-use agreements.

On the issue of banning space weapons, the bishops devoted several pages of the foundation document to considering strategic defense as a possible alternative to deterrence. They came to the conclusion that space defense could not achieve that objective. In summarizing their concerns, they explained:

oWe are impressed by the doubts of many eminent scientists.

- o We are concerned about the possible offensive implications.
- o We are worried about the consequences for arms reduction.
- o We are appalled at the probable costs.
- o And we remember once again how often the Scriptures warn us against false hopes for peace and security.

The bishops commended to all United Methodist churches "the most searching and candid exploration of these disturbing questions." To help local churches and concerned clergy and laity, this issue of Peace Leaf presents the views of nationally-known authorities on these questions about strategic defense. References to sources for further information are also offered.

The United Methodist bishops themselves, after studying these issues on the basis of the best information they could assemble during 1985 and 1986, came to the following conclusion:

We support agreements banning both offensive and defensive weapons, which now threaten the increasing militarization of space.

A ban on the further testing and development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons would help to restore confidence in the satellite systems that monitor arms treaties and control the deployment of military force.

A ban on space-based "defenses" would:

- -- forestall their offensive and even first-strike implications,
- -- reinforce the ABM Treaty,
- --facilitate negotiations on offensive force reductions, and
- -- avert what could become the most costly and most illusory weapons system ever produced.

PCLF4.02B

September 13, 1988

From Our Readers

"Your three issues of Peace Leaf are really well done." -- Judge Woodrow Seals, Houston, Texas.

"More power to you as you work at the very important task of arousing United Methodists!"

-- Harvey, Seifert, Claremont, California, who also reports:

"Several congregations hereabouts have made good use of my book What on Earth?! Making Personal Decisions on Controversial Issues. Designed for both personal and group study, this aims to deal with the most basic issues in peace and justice, analyzing both arguments for and against proposed solutions and then emphasizing the position of church leaders. It is published by and available from the Board of Church and Society."

PCLF4.02C

September 20, 1988

New Officers for Methodists United

Recently the Steering Committee of Methodists United for Peace with Justice elected new officers. They are Sherman Harris, chair; Bob Griffin, vice chair; Diane Stanton-Rich, secretary; and Howard Hallman, treasurer. Adrien and Ed Helm, who were previously co-chairs along with Sherman Harris, have moved to Florida and plan to continue their active peace with justice work in that setting.

PCLF4.02D

September 20, 1988

Scientific Opposition to Star Wars

Explained by

Union of Concerned Scientists

Since 1983, funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) has increased fivefold to over \$4 billion per year. Yet scientific opposition to the program has increased as well: there is an overwhelming consensus within the U.S. scientific community that a perfect or near-perfect defense against nuclear weapons cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future.

There is a clear agreement that the proposed early deployment of the Space-Based Interceptor -- a defense of limited capability based on 1960's technology -- would be obsolete before completion. The following are highlights of scientific opposition to SDI:

March 1984 - A Union of Concerned Scientists' study, which assumes that SDI systems would work as well as scientific law permits, concludes that Soviet countermeasures "will be cheaper and far more reliable than U.S. defenses, and available as those defenses emerge."

May 1985 - Over half of the members of the National Academy of Sciences, including 57 U.S. Noble laureates, sign a Union of Concerned Scientists' petition urging a U.S.-Soviet ban on testing and deployment of weapons in space.

March 1986 - A Senate report based on interviews with SDI scientists contradicts Administration claims that a comprehensive population defense is technically feasible, and concludes that SDI is far more difficult than first anticipated.

March 1986 - A national poll indicates U.S. physicists oppose SDI by a 2:1 margin; more than 80% believe that SDI would be defeated by Soviet countermeasures.

May 1986 - Over 7,000 scientists in the academic areas must critical to SDI pledge not to accept SDI research funds. The signers included 15 Nobel Laureates and a majority of the nation's top 20 physics departments.

June 1986 - Over 1,700 (now over 2,000) scientists and engineers at government and private research labs call on Congress to reduce SDI funding, claiming that an SDI "shield" is not feasible in the foreseeable future.

October 1986 - A survey of the National Academy of Sciences shows that 98% of its members in disciplines most relevant to SDI research (physics, mathematics, and engineering) think SDI will never provide an "effective defense of the U.S. civilian population" if the Soviets employ countermeasures. Almost 80% believe that SDI cannot be made survivable or cost-effective in the next 25 years.

March 1987 - Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and George Miller, Associate Director at Livermore National Laboratory, state that the Soviets could easily and cheaply defeat any strategic defense that the U.S. could deploy by the end of the century.

March 1987 - A Union of Concerned Scientists' analysis concludes that the SDI budget is "increasingly dominated by experiments of questionable scientific merit, many of which threaten to erode the ABM Treaty." U.C.S. recommends an alternative program which focuses on basic research and avoids flashy testing projects.

April 1987 - A panel of the American Physical Society concludes after an 18-month investigation that so many breakthroughs are required to develop lasers and other directed-energy weapons for SDI that it will take at least a decade of intensive research just to determine if the technology can be developed. The panel received full cooperation and classified briefings from the Defense Department and the SDI Organization.

July 1987 - A report from researchers at Livermore National Laboratory, one of the nation's leading centers of SDI research, finds that the Space-Based Interceptor would be totally ineffective against improved, faster-burning Soviet missiles planned for the 1990s. The report urges Pentagon planners to pay more attention the challenges of SDI systems posed by improvements in the Soviet arsenal.

<u>February 1988</u> - Government analysts at Sandia National Laboratory conclude that early deployments Space-Based Interceptors would be destroyed by "plausible Soviet countermeasures."

March 1988 - A study sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility finds that "the feasibility of the SDI can never be determined from computer simulation." CPSR recommends termination of SDI's National Test Bed computer simulation network.

April 1988 - The American Mathematics Society decides not to participate in any activities that could be interpreted as supporting the SDI.

April 1988 - The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment finds that "...there would be significant probability that the first (and presumably the only) time the ballistic missile defense system were used in a real war, it would suffer a catastrophic failure."

May 1988- The Pentagon's Defense Science Board recommends a complete reorientation of the SDI toward partial defenses "in view of the technical, budgetary, political, and arms control uncertainties surrounding" the program. The DSB suggests that early deployment of Space-Based Interceptors be postponed indefinitely while the country considers deploying limited, ground-based defenses consistent with the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

June 1988 - A U.S. Senate staff report, based on interviews with 120 SDI scientists,

concludes that a treaty reducing nuclear arsenals by half would destroy far more Soviet

warheads than the proposed first phase SDI system. The report confirmed earlier

findings that the Space-Based Interceptor early deployment system could destroy no more

than 16% of attacking Soviet warheads.

Despite the conclusion of the American scientific technical community that even

partially-effective defenses are decades away, the Reagan Administration refuses to accept

continuation of limits on SDI testing, as contained in the ABM Treaty. This position

has become the major obstacle to a treaty cutting nuclear weapon stockpiles in half.

From an "Issue Backgrounder" of August 1988, which presents findings in reverse

PCLF4.03

September 2, 1988

Scientific Opposition to Star Wars

Explained by Union of Concerned Scientists

Since 1983, funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) has increased fivefold to over \$4 billion per year. Yet scientific opposition to the program has increased as well.

Within the U.S. scientific community there is an overwhelming consensus that a perfect or near-perfect defense against nuclear weapons cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. And there is a clear agreement that the proposed early deployment of the Space-Based Interceptor -- a defense of limited capability based on 1960s technology -- would be obsolete before completion.

By way of illustration, a brief summary of ten examples of scientific opposition to SDI follows:

March 1984 - A Union of Concerned Scientists' study, which assumes that SDI systems would work as well as scientific law permits, concludes that Soviet countermeasures "will be cheaper and far more reliable than U.S. defenses, and available as those defenses emerge."

March 1986 - A Senate report based on interviews with SDI scientists contradicts Administration claims that a comprehensive population defense is technically feasible, and concludes that SDI is far more difficult than first anticipated.

October 1986 - A survey of the National Academy of Sciences shows that 98% of its members in disciplines most relevant to SDI research (physics, mathematics, and engineering) think SDI will never provide an "effective defense of the U.S. civilian population" if the Soviets employ countermeasures. Almost 80% believe that SDI cannot be made survivable or cost-effective in the next 25 years.

March 1987 - A Union of Concerned Scientists' analysis concludes that the SDI budget is "increasingly dominated by experiments of questionable scientific merit, many of which threaten to erode the ABM Treaty." U.C.S. recommends an alternative program which focuses on basic research and avoids flashy testing projects.

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urges Pentagon planners to pay more attention the challenges of SDI systems posed by improvements in the Soviet arsenal.

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June 1988 - A U.S. Senate staff report, based on interviews with 120 SDI scientists, concludes that a treaty reducing nuclear arsenals by half would destroy far more Soviet warheads than the proposed first phase SDI system. The report confirmed earlier findings that the Space-Based Interceptor early deployment system could destroy no more than 16% of attacking Soviet warheads.

Precise citation of these and other examples of scientific opposition to SDI, plus analytical information, is available from Union of Concerned Scientists, 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036.

PCLF4.03A

September 12, 1988

Offensive Implications of SDI

by Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.

U.S. Navy (Ret.); Deputy Director,

Center for Defense Information

A defense which will render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete -- a world in which humans will live free of the fear of nuclear annihilation. This is the inspiring vision which President Ronald Reagan offered to the American public in his famous "Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983.

Certainly every thoughtful person would prize and support a program to achieve that vision. Unfortunately, the President has turned his vision of a "peace shield" over to the Pentagon and they are using it as justification for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. SDI does absolutely nothing to render nuclear weapons impotent or obsolete -- it only adds to the risk of nuclear annihilation. Worst of all, the SDI system will have frightening offensive capabilities.

The offensive character of SDI is the result of two factors. First, some of the weapons to be placed in space to destroy ballistic missile warheads could be used to destroy targets on earth. The most ominous example of this fact is evident in nuclear weapons under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California.

Research is proceeding to create the so-called nuclear pumped X-ray laser system. The heart of this system is nothing more than a hydrogen bomb modified to release a portion of its explosive energy in the form of X-ray beams aimed to destroy hundreds or thousands of nuclear missiles and warheads in outer space.

Because progress on this weapon has been much slower than promised by Dr. Edward Teller, research is also underway on other special applications of nuclear weapons for possible use in the SDI program. Primary weight, however, is being given today to non-nuclear kill mechanisms including kinetic energy weapons, directed energy, particle beams and chemical lasers. Some of these systems have the potential to attack targets on earth.

For example, the nuclear weapons could be given an alternative capability to explode on targets in the Soviet Union rather than to explode in space. Certain of the kinetic weapons and lasers could also be used against critical Soviet facilities on earth by destroying missile silos or starting intense, widespread fires.

The Soviets could never have any confidence that SDI space platforms were not carrying offensive weapons designed specifically for attacks on their most valuable installations on earth rather than against missiles in space and such attacks would provide absolutely no warning time at all. It is difficult not to appreciate the Soviet's real concern that SDI platforms orbiting overhead might be the source of a sudden, devastating surprise attack rather than comprising a benign defense system.

The second offensive potential of SDI is equally alarming to the Soviets. At the present time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are locked together in a suicidal relationship we call MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). Neither side can attack the other with nuclear weapons without provoking a catastrophic retaliatory attack. But if one side were to create a ballistic missile defense, that relationship would change dramatically. Bystriking first, the side with the defense system could severely damage the retaliatory capability of its adversary, reducing it to a level which might be effectively countered by even an imperfect defense. For example, a defense system which could not stop 1,000 missiles might be adequate against a surviving threat of only 50 to 100 missiles. This is described as the "sword and shield" theory of nuclear warfare.

Unfortunately, at the same time President Reagan calls for a "peace shield", the Pentagon is deploying MX missiles plus preparing to deploy as early as 1989 the new, even more destructive Trident II (D-5) missiles on our missile firing submarines. These two new weapons will create an awesome "sword", ultimately capable of destroying all hardened nuclear missile silos, command posts and communication facilities in the Soviet Union.

Faced with the impending reality of a U.S. "sword and shield" (built at the cost of countless hundreds of billions of dollars) the Soviets would be compelled to take drastic countermeasures. These would certainly include a major expansion of their offensive weapon systems and the creation of an anti-satellite system to attack our weapon

platforms in space. They would also increase the readiness of their strategic systems to

reduce the chances that they could be completely destroyed in a surprise attack.
In the

time of future crisis such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 or the Yom Kippur War of

1973, both sides would have to consider striking first in order to insure that they did not

lose their retaliatory forces.

In short, SDI will not only produce an expansion of U.S. offensive capabilities, it will

also provoke a parallel expansion of Soviet offensive forces and then place both arsenals on

a nuclear hair trigger in the event of a future military or political crisis between the U.S.

and U.S.S.R. SDI will, in fact, make a first strike more likely -- not prevent one. It is

utterly incredible that in the name of defense we are pursuing a program that will expand

offensive capabilities in a way which will make both nations less secure.

Original draft from Admiral Carroll

pclf4.03

September 2, 1988

Offensive Implications of SDI

by Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. U.S. Navy (Ret.); Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information

A defense which will render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete is an inspiring vision offered by President Ronald Reagan. Unfortunately, the president has turned his vision of a "peace shield" over to the Pentagon, and they are using it as justification for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. SDI does absolutely nothing to render nuclear weapons impotent or obsolete -- it only adds to the risk of nuclear annihilation. Worst of all, the SDI system will have frightening offensive capabilities.

Could Destroy Targets on Earth

The offensive character of SDI is the result of two factors. First, some of the weapons to be placed in space to destroy ballistic missile warheads could be used to destroy targets on earth. The most ominous example of this fact is evident in nuclear weapons under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California. Research is proceeding to create the so-called nuclear pumped X-ray laser system. The heart of this system is nothing more than a hydrogen bomb modified to release a portion of its explosive energy in the form of X-ray beams aimed to destroy hundreds or thousands of nuclear missiles and warheads in outer space.

Because progress on this weapon has been much slower than promised by Dr. Edward Teller, research is also underway on other special applications of nuclear weapons for possible use in the SDI program. Primary weight, however, is being given today to non-nuclear kill mechanisms including kinetic energy weapons, directed energy, particle beams and chemical lasers. Some of these systems have the potential to attack targets on earth.

For example, the nuclear weapons could be given an alternative capability to explode on targets in the Soviet Union rather than to explode in space. Certain of the kinetic weapons and lasers could also be used against critical Soviet facilities on earth by destroying missile silos or starting intense, widespread fires.

The Soviets could never have any confidence that SDI space platforms were not carrying offensive weapons designed specifically for attacks on their most valuable installations on earth rather than against missiles in space and such attacks would provide absolutely no warning time at all. It is difficult not to appreciate the Soviet's real concern that SDI platforms orbiting overhead might be the source of a sudden, devastating surprise attack rather than comprising a benign defense system.

A Sword with the Shield

The second offensive potential of SDI is equally alarming to the Soviets. At the present time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are locked together in a suicidal relationship we call MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). Neither side can attack the other with nuclear weapons without

provoking a catastrophic retaliatory attack. But if one side were to create a ballistic missile defense, that relationship would change dramatically. By striking first, the side with the defense system could severely damage the retaliatory capability of its adversary, reducing it to a level which might be effectively countered by even an imperfect defense. For example, a defense system which could not stop 1,000 missiles might be adequate against a surviving threat of only 50 to 100 missiles. This is described as the "sword and shield" theory of nuclear warfare.

Unfortunately, at the same time President Reagan calls for a "peace shield", the Pentagon is deploying MX missiles plus preparing to deploy as early as 1989 the new, even more destructive Trident II (D-5) missiles on our missile firing submarines. These two new weapons will create an awesome "sword", ultimately capable of destroying all hardened nuclear missile silos, command posts and communication facilities in the Soviet Union.

Faced with the impending reality of a U.S. "sword and shield" (built at the cost of countless hundreds of billions of dollars) the Soviets would be compelled to take drastic countermeasures. These would certainly include a major expansion of their offensive weapon systems and the creation of an anti-satellite system to attack our weapon platforms in space. They would also increase the readiness of their strategic systems to reduce the chances that they could be completely destroyed in a surprise attack. In the time of future crisis both sides would have to consider striking first in order to insure that they did not lose their retaliatory forces.

In short, SDI will not only produce an expansion of U.S. offensive capabilities, it will also provoke a parallel expansion of Soviet offensive forces and then place both arsenals on a nuclear hair trigger in the event of a future military or political crisis between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. SDI will, in fact, make a first strike more likely -- not prevent one. It is utterly incredible that in the name of defense we are pursuing a program that will expand offensive capabilities in a way which will make both nations less secure.

pclf4.04A

September 12, 1988

The ABM Treaty and Offensive Reductions A Necessary Partnership

By Stephen A. Wolfe, Director National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty

The main obstacle to achieving an agreement for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the Reagan Administration's refusal to affirm the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. In order to preserve President Reagan's unachievable goal of deploying a Star Wars defense shield over the United States, the Administration is passing up a concrete opportunity to achieve real arms control.

The ABM Treaty was the first US/Soviet strategic arms treaty. Signed by President Nixon in 1972 and ratified by the Senate by an 88-2 vote, the ABM Treaty prohibits both the U.S. and the Soviet Union from deploying nationwide strategic defense systems.

The past three American presidents were committed to observing the ABM Treaty's ban on nationwide strategic defenses. Ronald Reagan broke from this policy when in 1983 he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars. The primary objective of SDI

is to deploy a space-based strategic defense of the United States, which would violate the

central provisions of the Treaty. To pursue Star Wars, the U.S. would ultimately have to abandon the ABM Treaty.

Defense experts in and out of government, including former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, admit that Star Wars cannot provide the U.S. with a leakproof shield against attacking ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future.

In fact the current Phase I SDI system, which the Administration would like to deploy next decade, could intercept only 30 percent of the attacking warheads in a Soviet first strike. This means that if the system worked as planned, several thousand warheads would still explode on U.S. territory, and the Soviets would then have over 5,000 warheads in reserve. Clearly, President Reagan's SDI could not defend the U.S. in any meaningful way. The current estimate for the cost of the Phase I system is \$150 billion.

Although SDI would not effectively defend the United States, it would destabilize the nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Each of the superpowers concluded years ago that if the other did not build strategic defenses the effectiveness of its own retaliatory capability would be assured. Thus, in a crisis neither side would fear a first strike by the other, and neither would consider striking first. Conversely if both sides deploy large area ABM systems, both would see an enormous advantage in striking first. In a serious crisis both would fear that the other might be planning to attack. These interacting fears of a first strike could lead both sides to stumble into a war that

neither wanted.

If the ABM Treaty is undermined or abandoned, offensive reductions cannot be achieved. Instead of the stability necessary for force reductions, deployment of nationwide defenses would generate a spiraling arms race: if one side deploys a nationwide defense, the other side will build up its offensive forces to overcome that defense, and then move to deploy defenses of its own. This alternating escalation process would continue uncontrolled, raising the risk of nuclear war.

The Administration, however, refuses to accept the undeniable fact that the ABM Treaty is a prerequisite for offensive reductions. President Reagan insists on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, which ultimately requires that the ABM Treaty be abandoned, at the same time that the superpowers cut their offensive arsenals in half. This approach simply makes no sense.

Furthermore, President Reagan refuses to reaffirm the ABM Treaty in order to preserve a policy option -- development, testing, and deployment of a space-based strategic defense over the next decade -- that leads to a dead end. This system would not work, and would cost tens of billions more than any defense program in U.S. history. Congress has already indicated that it would not approve the system even if the Administration withdraws from the ABM Treaty.

The nation realized two decades ago that to limit offenses without limiting defenses

would be a dangerous mistake. For this reason President Nixon signed the ABM

Treaty, and Presidents Ford and Carter upheld it. There has been no change in

circumstances since then to suggest that principle is any less true today.

The nation faces a choice.
It can uphold this time-tested treaty that has reduced

the risk of nuclear war and give the superpowers the chance to cut their nuclear arsenals.

Or else it can rush headlong to deploy a Star Wars system that will fail to defend us while

shutting the door on weapons cuts. The choice is clear. Our leaders must reaffirm

the ABM Treaty, and let it continue as the foundation for peace in the nuclear age.

Text as submitted by Steve Wolfe.

PCLF4.05

September 9, 1988

ABM Treaty: A Necessity for Strategic Arms Reductions

By Stephen A. Wolfe, Director National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty

The main obstacle to achieving an agreement for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the Reagan Administration's refusal to affirm the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. In

order to preserve President Reagan's unachievable goal of deploying a Star Wars defense shield over the United States, the Administration is passing up a concrete opportunity to achieve real arms control.

The ABM Treaty was the first US/Soviet strategic arms treaty. Signed by President Nixon in 1972 and ratified by the Senate by an 88-2 vote, the ABM Treaty prohibits both the U.S. and the Soviet Union from deploying nationwide strategic defense systems.

The past three American presidents -- Nixon, Ford, and Carter -- were committed to observing the ABM Treaty's ban on nationwide strategic defenses. Ronald Reagan broke from this policy when in 1983 he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The primary objective of SDI

is to deploy a space-based strategic defense of the United States, which would violate the central provisions of the Treaty. To pursue SDI, the U.S. would ultimately have to abandon the ABM Treaty.

Defense experts in and out of government, including former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, admit that Star Wars cannot provide the U.S. with a leakproof shield against attacking ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future. Scientists quoted on page 5 affirm this conclusion.

Destabilizing the Nuclear Balance

Although SDI would not effectively defend the United States, it would destabilize the nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Each of the superpowers concluded years ago that if the other did not build strategic defenses the effectiveness of its own retaliatory capability would be assured. Thus, in a crisis neither side would fear a first strike by the other, and neither would consider striking first. Conversely if both sides deploy large area ABM systems, both would see an enormous advantage in striking first. In a serious crisis both would fear that the other might be planning to attack. These interacting fears of a first strike could lead both sides to stumble into a war that neither wanted.

If the ABM Treaty is undermined or abandoned, offensive reductions cannot be achieved. Instead of the stability necessary for force reductions, deployment of nationwide defenses would generate a spiraling arms race: if one side deploys a nationwide defense, the other side will build up its offensive forces to overcome that defense, and then move to deploy defenses of its own. This alternating escalation process would continue uncontrolled, raising the risk of nuclear war.

The Administration, however, refuses to accept the undeniable fact that the ABM Treaty is a prerequisite for offensive reductions. President Reagan insists on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, which ultimately requires that the ABM Treaty be abandoned, at the same time that the superpowers cut their offensive arsenals in half. This approach simply makes no sense.

Need to Reaffirm ABM Treaty

Furthermore, President Reagan refuses to reaffirm the ABM Treaty in order to preserve a policy option -- development, testing, and deployment of a space-based strategic defense over the next decade -- that leads to a dead end. This system would not work, and would cost tens of billions more than any defense program in U.S. history. Congress has already indicated that it would not approve the system even if the Administration withdraws from the ABM Treaty.

The nation faces a choice. It can uphold this time-tested treaty that has reduced the risk of nuclear war and give the superpowers the chance to cut their nuclear arsenals. Or else it can rush headlong to deploy a Star Wars system that will fail to defend us while shutting the door on weapons cuts. The choice is clear. Our leaders must reaffirm the ABM Treaty, and let it continue as the foundation for peace in the nuclear age.

PCLF4.05A

September 12, 1988

Cost of Strategic Defense Initiative

No one knows for certain what the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative would cost if fully implemented. That's because of the uncertain outcome of current research and lack of predictability in development and deployment costs.

The Reagan Administration has not supplied a total budget estimate, but one nongovernmental study has estimated that a land-and-space-based anti-missile defense would cost from \$630 to \$770

billion, including 10 year operating costs of \$220 billion to \$271 billion. Two former secretaries of defense, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown have calculated that defense against ballistic missiles would cost more than \$1 trillion.

(These sources are cited in a report of the Defense Budget Project.)

Staff of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have provided an estimate of costs over the next 15 years in a report entitled Budgetary Effects of Deploying A Strategic Defense System, 1993-2002. The following are key excerpts from this report:

"The Administration has established a phased plan to achieve its goals for the Strategic Defense System (SDS). In recent years, it has been exploring concepts to determine their feasibility. Several concepts have now moved into a more advanced phase involving the demonstration and validation of specific approaches. Under Administration plans, by the mid-1990s, these approaches -- if successful would proceed

into a phase called full-scale engineering development that would develop working systems. The systems would then be deployed in the latter 1990s and would constitute Phase I of an SDS. Phase I is designed to provided limited protection against a large nuclear attack by the Soviets, but it is not intended to be sufficiently leak proof to avoid substantial destruction of property and the population.

"Parallel with efforts on Phase I, the Administration plans the development of a Phase II system that would provide greater protection—against a Soviet attack. Protecting the population -- and not some more limited objective -- remains the key Administration goal...."

"The Administration may also begin development and deployment of Phase III during the years addressed by this analysis. No prediction has been made as to the number of phases that would be required before the Administration could meet its goal of protecting the population from the effects of a large nuclear attack. It is clear, however, that substantial capability would be required beyond that available from Phase I. Thus, it is quite possible that two phases could be required."

"The Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) has estimated the development and acquisition costs of Phase I at between \$75 billion and \$150 billion; the range reflects uncertainty about technical requirements and design trade-offs for hardware that has not yet been developed. SDIO has not publicly estimated the cost of later phases of an SDS. In Case I, CBO assumed that development and acquisition of each phase would cost the same amount in real dollars as development and acquisition of Phase I."

"Average annual costs over the 1993-1997 period range from \$17 billion to \$28 billion (all costs are in 1988 dollars of budget authority). The range represents costs based on the lower and upper bound respectively of SDIO's estimate of Phase I costs -- \$75 billion to \$150 billion. Average annual costs in the later period (1998 through 2002) range from \$33 billion to \$63 billion.

"Perspective on the magnitude of these costs can be gained by comparing them with existing defense budget totals, such as the total for all strategic nuclear forces. The budget for all strategic forces, of which strategic defense is a part, grew in real terms by an average of 19 percent per year between 1980 and 1984 -- the early years of the Administration's strategic modernization program. At its peak in 1984, the budget for strategic forces was about \$40 billion (in 1988 dollars) and made up about 14 percent of the defense budget. Thus, in some years in the late 1990s, the costs of deploying an SDS could exceed total funds allocated to all strategic forces during a peak year of funding."

"In the absence of large increases in the defense budget, funding an SDS under the Administration assumptions of Case I (under the assumption of similar costs for later phases) would require substantial reallocations of resources from other strategic nuclear programs and from conventional forces."

The CBO study indicates that the cost of a Strategic Defense System for the ten year

period of 1993-2002 would range from a low estimate of \$247 billion to a high estimate of \$452.

PCLF4.06A

September 7,1988

Budgetary Cost of Strategic Defense Initiative

The Reagan Administration has not presented a budget estimate on the total cost of its Strategic Defense Initiative. However, one nongovernmental study has estimated that a complete land-and-space-based anti-missile defense would cost from \$630 to \$770 billion, including 10 year operating costs of \$220 billion to \$271 billion. And two former secretaries of defense, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, have calculated that defense against ballistic missiles would cost more than \$1 trillion. (These sources are cited in a report of the Defense Budget Project.)

Another estimate comes from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in a report entitled Budgetary Effects of Deploying A Strategic Defense System, 1993-2002. This report recognizes that the Reagan Administration is approaching the goal of achieving an effective Strategic Defense System (SDS) in phases. "Phase I," the report explains, "is designed to provide limited protection against a large nuclear attack by the Soviets, but it is not intended to be sufficiently leak proof to avoid substantial destruction of property and the population. Parallel with efforts on Phase I, the Administration plans the development of a Phase II system that would provide greater protection against a Soviet attack.... The Administration may also begin development and deployment of Phase III during the years addressed by this analysis."

The CBO report indicates, "The Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) has estimated the development and acquisition costs of Phase I at between \$75 billion and \$150 billion; the range reflects uncertainty about technical requirements and design trade-offs for hardware that has not yet been developed." Although SDIO has not publicly estimated the cost of later phases of a Strategic Defense System, the Congressional Budget Office CBO assumed that "development and acquisition of each phase would cost the same amount in real dollars as development and acquisition of Phase I." By the mid-1990s

research and development of Phase II would be underway as Phase I components move into production and deployment. Later Phase III would overlap Phases II deployment and Phase I operations.

Based upon this assumption of overlapping phases, the CBO report states: "Average annual costs over the 1993-1997 period range from \$17 billion to \$28 billion (all costs are in 1988 dollars of budget authority). The range represents costs based on the lower and upper bound respectively of SDIO's estimate of Phase I costs -- \$75 billion to \$150 billion. Average annual costs in the later period (1998 through 2002) range from \$33 billion to \$63 billion." For the ten year period of 1993 to 2002, the cost of a Strategic Defense System would range from \$247 to \$452 billion, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Budgetary Perspective

In reviewing the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1966, the United Methodist bishops pointed out:

SDI bids to become the most expensive project ever undertaken by any government

or any other institution, with enormous and social consequences.

This calls to mind what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said 25 years ago when he insisted:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

And so it is with SDI.

PCLF4.06B

September 13, 1988

What You Can Do

As the articles in this issue reveal, the Strategic Defense Initiative is wrongful policy from the perspective of true national security. Yet there are powerful forces within the military-industrial complex pushing for SDI. Therefore, church peace groups and other concerned citizens will have to act decisively and vigorously to put an end to Star Wars.

Legislative Action

Congress has nearly completed its action on SDI for this year. It is, however, useful to review the major legislative battles over SDI funding because similar issues are likely to arise in 1989. It went as follows:

Administration proposal: \$5.0 billion for SDI for 1989 Fiscal Year.

<u>Bennett amendment</u>: \$3.5 billion, passed by the House of Representatives, 223-195.

Senate action: \$4.5 billion.

<u>Conference committee</u>: \$4.1 billion, accepted by both Houses; overall defense bill vetoed by President Reagan; amount still pending.

<u>Dellums-Boxer amendment</u>: Terminate SDI program but retain \$1.3 billion for basic research on strategic defense. Defeated 118-299.

<u>Harkin bill</u>: Introduced in Senate to ban all weapons in space and shift to peaceful uses of space. Not acted upon this year.

It is time now to prepare for the next Congress. If you are interested in working with us and want us to keep you informed about key issues and crucial votes, let us know. Write to Methodists United for Peace with Justice, 421 Seward Square, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

Electoral Action

The president of the United States has a decisive role in determining the future of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Therefore, it is appropriate to find out the presidential candidates' position on Star Wars. You can follow what they say on television, what newspapers and news magazines report about their positions, and you can ask their campaign workers.

Closer to home, you can inquire directly to candidates for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. For incumbents, find out how they voted on the above issues. For all candidates, ask them how they will vote in the next Congress on the following matters:

- (a) Full funding (if the next president wants to continue SDI at a high level).
- (b) Some reduction (along the lines of this year's Bennett amendment in the House).
- (c) Cut back to only basic research (as the Dellums-Boxer bill has proposed).
- (d) Complete ban on all weapons in space (along the lines of the Harkin bill).

After the election we would be interested in hearing from you about the positions of the winning candidates on Star Wars.

PCLF4.07A

September 15, 1988

Sources of Information

Arms Control Association 11 Dupont Circle, NW Washington, DC 20036

Center for Defense Information 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005

Committee for National Security 1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20009

Defense Budget Project Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Suite 401 Washington, DC 20002

Federation of American Scientists 317 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002

Institute for Space and Security Studies 7833 C Street Chesapeake Beach, MD 20732

National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty 1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 704 Washington, DC 20009

Physicians for Social Responsibility 1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20009

Union of Concerned Scientists 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 310 Washington, DC 20036

PCLF4.07B September 12, 1988

Methodists Unite	d for Peace wi	th Justice has n	nade bringing a	an end to Sta	r Wars a top priority for	
the coming year.	You are invit	ed to join with	us for this an	d other pead	ce and justice activities.	
All members rece	ive a subscrip	otion to Peace	Leaf and a c	opy of "Wi	tnessing for Peace and	
Justice," a peacem	aker's handbo	ok.				
Yes,I want to	join Methodis	ts United for Po	eace with Justi	ice.		
I'm enclosing my	nembership co	ontribution for				
\$15\$25	\$35	_\$50\$100	\$250 _	\$500	Other \$	
Name		Telephone				
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AddressStreet		City	Stat	te Zip	Code	
		Annual Conference				
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Congressional Rep	resentative or	District				
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Star Wars Quotes

"I think any system is going to have considerable leakage, and therefore, the idea that we could expand it to protect our cities is not practical in my judgment." -- General David Jones, former chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 22, 1983.

"There is no technical solution to safeguarding mankind from nuclear explosives." -- Charles Townes, Noble Prize winner in physics and defense consultant, quoted in New York Times, January 11, 1983.

"Certainly any attempt to be able to defend against 10,000 nuclear weapons is, in my judgment, surely infeasible in our lifetime, our children's, and probably our grandchildren's." --Harold Brown, former secretary of defense, interview with USA Today, published March 27, 1985.

"The problem is, it won't work and it's dangerous to try. For any defense to be viable, it must be perfect and we just can't achieve that. If a fraction of the Soviets' 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads got through, the United States would be destroyed." -- Richard Garwin, IBM physicist and defense consultant, quoted in Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1984.

"Such systems would be destabilizing if they provide a shield so that you could use the sword." -- Former President Richard Nixon, interview Los Angeles Times, September 24, 1985.

"The fear of attack and the stimulus to preemption is the greatest danger in the nuclear age. SDI will increase that fear." -- Robert McNamara, former secretary of defense, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, April 10, 1986.

"The ABM Treaty was and is of preeminent importance for U.S. security." -- Senator Dale Bumpers, (D-AR), speech on the Senate floor, October 24, 1985.

PCLF4.08

September 13, 1988

Produce Your Own Star Wars Umbrella

As a way to convey the essential fallacy of Star Wars, Physicians for Social Responsibility offers instructions on how to make your own Star Wars Umbrella.

Metaphorically the Star Wars Umbrella is the 95 percent effective defense against ballistic missiles that SDI's most starry-eyed supporters claim is possible. Physically it is a standard, inexpensive black umbrella with five percent of its surface removed in the form of 80 quarter-sized holes cut into its fabric.

Step 1: Holding two consecutive ribs of the closed umbrella, make a fold in the middle of the segment and cut a series of four semi-circles at about four inch intervals along its length.

Step 2: Grasping the center fold, make a second fold half-way between the first fold and the ribs. You will have four layers of fabric in hand. Cut three holes along the length of this second fold, staggering them with the four cut into the middle fold and cutting through all four layers of fabric. The unfolded segment will have three vertical rows of three, four, and three holds, respectively.

Step 3: Repeat steps 1 and 2 for each segment of the umbrella.

pclf4.09

September 15, 1988

PEACE LEAF #4

Special Issue on Star Wars

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3		Offensive Implications of SDI by Admiral Carroll
4		Effect on Arms Reduction Negotiations
5		Scientific Opposition to Star Wars
6		Budgetary Cost of Strategic Defense
7	Top two-thirds: Left column: Right column:	What You Can Do Legislative Electoral
	Bottom third:	Membership form
8	Top two-thirds:	Local Church Activities by Diane Stanton-Rich
	Bottom third:	Return address, permit, mailing label space

PCLF4.11 September 7, 1988

WordPerfect Directory of Star Wars Articles for Peace Leaf

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.05A	ABM Treaty: A Necessity for Strategic Arms Reduction		
.06B	Budgetary Cost of Strategic Defense Initiative		
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PCLF4.12 September 20, 1988

What A Local Church Can Do to Help Poor Children

This article is adapted from the United Methodist Women (UMW) booklet, <u>Campaign for Children</u>. In the adaptation, some references to UMW units are broadened to encompass the whole local church.

There are many ways to raise awareness about children's needs in your congregation during the year. Local churches can foster adult study groups and the entire congregations can commit themselves to at least one new activity that helps children. The following are some ways in which members can celebrate children throughout the year. We are sure you can create many others.

Organize and Adult Bible Study Focused on Children

By studying the scriptures, you can help reaffirm the traditional value of children and family life. Examine your own responses to children in light of these teachings. The UMW publication, Campaign for Children, contains biblical references and also facts and case examples of poverty affecting children. Ask what God demands of each of us in trying to help families in need.

Educate Yourself and Others

Plan a four-to-six week course to learn more about the needs of children in your congregation, community, state, or around the nation. This can be under the auspices of the United Methodist Women or some other unit within the congregation. The study group can first seek an overview of the conditions of children and families and then focus on a single issue or area of concern to study in depth, such as child care, child health, or teenage pregnancy prevention. In each of these areas, booklets and materials can be order from the Children's Defense Fund, the United Methodist Church, and the National Council of the Churches of Christ. A resource list is provided in Campaign for Children.

At the end of the course, the study group can decide what actions they and the congregation can take to help children. The members should commit themselves to that action until it produces concrete results. It is a good idea for the United Methodist Women, or whoever else is studying the needs of children, to share the information and the decision for action with other members and committees within the congregation. The study group can recommend that an ongoing child advocacy program be developed, either by United Methodist Women or on behalf of the whole congregation.

Celebrate Children

Each year, sponsor a children's Sabbath. Get consent to set aside one Sunday as a special occasion for focusing on children. Begin by choosing a theme, thinking of ways to involve children in the service, and asking your pastor to make children the subject of the sermon. Use bulletin inserts available from the Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries to inform worshipers of the needs of children. The children's Sabbath can be an occasion for an "offering of letters" to your elected officials in support of positive legislation and fair policies for children.

(More on this below in the section on advocacy).

Reach Out and Serve Children and Families Directly

Analyze the human, financial, and space resources in your congregation and decide whether you can help meet the needs of the following:

- o Working parents and those under stress who need decent child care, which is often not available or affordable.
- o Latchkey children who need positive activities after school. Recreation options for poor children are often missing. Buy a VCR and show movies to help keep children off the streets.
- o Adolescent mothers and fathers who need a place to be less lonely and to learn how to be better parents.
- o Pre-teenagers and teenagers who need counseling to prevent too-early sexual activity and pregnancy.
- o Children failing in school who would benefit from tutoring.
- o Teens and parents unaware of health resources in your community. Consider conducting a series of health education workshops for parents and other concerned adults about the danger of AIDS or other health threatening conditions.
- o Foster children who need permanent, loving families. If every congregation decided to see that one child in foster care was adopted, the number of children needing permanent homes would decrease dramatically.
- o Families and children who need temporary support. One church may support a refugee family, another may help make rent payments for a family that would otherwise be homeless when unemployment strikes.
- o The poor, hungry, and jobless near you who need food and shelter. This may be done through your congregation's food bank or emergency loan fund, or you may help people obtain temporary shelter or permanent housing.

Plan a Project with Young People

Join with children in your congregation on a specific project and find ways for young people to feel and be useful in your workshop service and with you in community service. The churches are major channels for leadership development among the young. For example, at a church in Washington, D.C., senior citizens and children have teamed up to plant and tend a vegetable garden on the church grounds. The produce is given to poor neighbors and people who come to the church's lunch program.

Your group or youth ministry can organize projects such as tutoring, babysitting and child care, paint-up and fix-up days for the church building, and so on. Examine your ministries with children, youths, and families and determine how they may be strengthened.

Work with Other Churches and Community Organizations

If you are a suburban or rural church, join with an inner-city congregation, or vice versa, to study and take action together on the problems of children in your area.

You can also form partnerships with community organizations. For instance, there is a

Teen-Link Program in Durham, North Carolina where six churches and three community-based organizations are working together with a community health center to plan, develop, and implement a teenage pregnancy prevention program.

Be a Public Policy Advocate for Children and Families

Private charity is not a substitute for a just society. We must not only feed hungry children but help change policies that make them hungry in the first place. A local church, UMW group, or some other unit can:

- Support the legislative agenda that the Children's Defense Fund (CDF) formulates each year (see page 5 for address).
- o Hold your public officials accountable for their votes affecting children and the poor. CDF can supply you with its annual analysis of the voting record of your senators and representative.
- o Develop a concise and easy-to-use handout for your UMW and local congregation, listing your elected officials. Include their addresses and phone numbers and voting record on key children's issues.
- o Arrange a meeting with your senators and representative when they are in the area. Request a desired action on one specific children's issue.
- Organize a letter-writing campaign at a UMW unit meeting or church fellowship hour. Focus on specific federal legislation identified as a result of your study sessions. Prepare a basic face sheet and sample letter. Have envelopes, paper, and stamps available.

-30-

Launched by United Methodist Women in January 1988, the Campaign for Children is already active in 66 annual conferences. For more information, contact:

Chiquita G. Smith, Secretary for Community Action United Methodist Women's Division 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10115 (212) 870-3766

[November 30, 1988]

United Methodist Women Campaign for Children

United Methodist Women (UMW) and the Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries have a long history of ministries to children. Having this concern, these two organizations have become deeply disturbed by the growing crisis on the needs of children in the United States. This is a crisis with many aspects: poverty, health care, child care, education, mental health, child abuse. Accordingly, they have renewed their commitment to action on behalf of children and their families.

The response is a **Campaign for Children**, which began in January 1988. As specified in an October 1987 resolution of the Women's Division governing board, this Campaign:

- o Calls on each local unit of United Methodist Women to study the overall problem of children with emphasis on the children in their own community, particularly children in poverty.
- o Calls on local units to choose one particular aspect of the problems of children and determine action steps in the chosen area.
- o Urges local units to join with other community groups and churches to work through political action, education, and other means.
- o Encourages local units to enlist the support of their whole congregation in these efforts.

Working with the assistance of the Children's Defense Fund (CDF), a leading national organization, the Women's Division produced a packet of information, including a booklet entitled Campaign for Children. In January 1988 this information went to all local, district, and conference UMW presidents. By the first of November 365 local units representing 66 annual conferences had filed a commitment form for study and action on behalf of children. As one local president reported, "The Campaign for Children has really electrified our local United Methodist Women."

As a major resource, the Campaign is promoting use of a videotape, Who Speaks for Children, dealing with issues of child care, nutrition, homelessness, health care, and domestic violence. As a focus for public policy advocacy, the Campaign encouraged support for the Act for Better Child Care (ABC bill), which Congress considered but did not enact during its last session.

The Women's Division and United Methodist Women are now developing a five-year plan to broadened and intensify the Campaign for Children. Further information is available from:

Chiquita G.Smith, Secretary for Community Action United Methodist Women's Division 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10115 (212) 870-3766

[November 8, 1988]

Protecting and Sustaining Our Nation's Children

by Marian Wright Edelman President, Children's Defense Fund

The first high school graduating class of the 21st century entered first grade in September 1988. They are the future workers, parents, college students, taxpayers, soldiers, leaders, and the American hope of the 21st century. Many of them are off to a healthy start. But millions of them are not. Today:

- o One in four of them is poor;
- One in five is at risk of becoming a teen parent;
- o One in six has no health insurance;
- o One in seven is at risk of dropping out of school;
- One in two has a mother in the labor force but only a minority have safe, affordable, quality child care.

Of every 100 children born today, 13 will be born to teenage mothers, 15 will be born into households where no parent is employed, 15 will be born into households with a working parent earning a below-poverty wage, and 25 will be on welfare at some point prior to adulthood.

The national investment priorities of this decade, which have paced missiles and bombs ahead of mothers and babies, have bequeathed us the highest child poverty rates in 15 years. There are 6 million more poor people, 7 million Americans without work that gives meaning to life, and 35 million uninsured Americans whose only shield against sickness is prayer.

Unemployment coupled with an eroding family wage base and a shrinking housing supply for low- and moderate-income families have left hundreds of thousands of defenseless children and their families in economic limbo. Young families struggling to get off the ground face a future mortgaged to foreign investors. And a generation of children are indentured to a national debt of \$2 trillion -- an amount that exceeds the gross national product of every nation but our own. The interest payments alone -- about \$157 billion a year --could eliminate child poverty almost ten times over.

Willingness to protect children is a moral litmus test of any nation seeking to preserve itself and its future. In a report of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Economically Disadvantaged, 225 corporate executive officers and university presidents stated the national self-interest in investing in children:

This nation cannot continue to compete and prosper in the global arena when more than one-fifth of our children live in poverty and a third grow up in ignorance. And if the nation cannot compete, it cannot lead. If we continue to squander the talents of millions of our children, America will become a nation of limited human potential. It would be tragic if we allow this to happen. America must become a land of opportunity -- for every child.

Time to Change Course: An Alternative Vision

They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. -- Isaiah 2:4;

And the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in its streets. -- Zechariah 8:5

These visions of the Old Testament prophets -- Isaiah and Micah of a warless world and Zechariah of city streets where children can safely play -- are as urgent and fresh for our arms-crazed and money-mad world today as they were centuries ago. That they still elude us does not exempt us from our quest. Indeed, the pervasive poverty and suffering of children at home and all over the world, the oppressive clouds of racial and religious conflicts and of nuclear holocaust, render our strivings for peace and economic justice more urgent than ever before.

Now is the time to hang on rather than be lulled into easing up or assuming that a post-Reagan administration will meet children's needs without our continuing efforts. All Americans must come together to stop publicly sanctioned child abuse and neglect. We must urge those seeking and holding public office to commit themselves to making preventive investments in our children and families the cornerstone of national domestic policy in the coming political era.

This commitment must go beyond rhetoric and be bolstered by a comprehensive, well-conceived national investment strategy in specific, cost-effective, successful programs for children and families -- beginning in 1989 and sustained over the next four years.

Although there are no cheap, quick, easy or single fixes for the too-long neglected needs of our children and families, there are solutions within our means now to save millions of children. We know a lot about what works and have a foundation of cost-effective successes for children upon which to build. We know much more than we did 20 years ago when the War of Poverty was beginning.

What is missing is the moral and political urgency required to make children and families a leading national priority. That is why the Children's Defense Fund (CDF) this year launched a broad-based, public awareness campaign to combat convenient ignorance about the needs of our children, their profound implications for the economic and social well-being of all Americans, the positive choices we have, and the steps we can take to strengthen families and to make our nation a safe place for children and for all of us.

The Next Four Years

Between 1989 and 1992, our nation must mount a comprehensive preventive investment effort to ensure that every child has basic health, nutrition, and early childhood services.

<u>Investment 1</u>: A mandated health floor under every low-income mother and child in the nation. This includes increased investments in the Medicaid program to prevent rising infant mortality rates and to increase access to prenatal care and preventive health coverage. Also, further investments should be made to the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) to assure adequate nutritional supplements for every eligible mother and child. And to prevent the rising incidence of infectious childhood disease, a larger investment in immunization grants is required.

<u>Investment 2</u>: Enactment of the Act for Better Child Care Services (ABC). This investment will provide safe child care for a modest percentage of the 9.5 million preschool children whose mothers are in the labor force. ABC will increase the safety, quality, and quantity

of day care, increased parental choice and access to adequate care, as well as make child care more affordable to low- and middle-income families.

<u>Investment 3</u>: An incremental increase in the successful Head Start program. This investment is a five year plan to extend Head Start to 50 percent of the eligible children (presently only 18 percent are reached) and to full-day, full-year services as needed. The program provides the basic academic skills which are so important to teen pregnancy prevention and later success in life.

<u>Investment 4</u>: Expansion of the Chapter 1 Compensatory Education program with a goal of serving all eligible children by 1992. The federal Chapter 1 program of special educational assistance for disadvantaged children has demonstrated success in helping children develop strong basic skills.

<u>Investment 5</u>: Bolstering family wages against inflation by raising the minimum wage. Adjusting the minimum wage in 1989 and succeeding years to its 1979 value would immediately lift millions of American families out of poverty and help alleviate some of the child suffering rampant in our land.

The total proposed federal investment for all of these urgently needed steps in the 1990 Fiscal Year (the next budget that Congress will consider) is less than \$8 billion. This is less than the \$12.4 billion annual revenue loss from the special tax break provided those who inherit corporate stock with untaxed capital gains. Current national policy favors the wealthy dead over the living young and poor.

Beyond Investments

These investments are critical to the well-being of children in America. But more is needed. While we work to prevent child neglect by making the proper investments, we must also challenge the structures and moral attitudes which perpetuate the unjust cycle of poverty that traps so many of our children and youths. We must go beyond a "prevention of damage" agenda to formulate an aggressive "promotion of development" agenda. This requires programs and strategies that focus on giving disadvantaged children and youth the continuous resources and support they need to "move up the queue" toward economic self-sufficiency.

Enveloping all of these short- and long-term steps must be a new climate in America that transmits to all young people a sense that they are valued and valuable. We must help them develop and strive for adult family and leadership roles as a result of parental and leadership roles worthy of emulation.

The year 1989 is a time for leaders and citizens who can combine positive vision with realistic individual and community actions to build new paths toward a nation and world fit to be the children's playground in the City of God. But that will take the greater inner strength which comes only from inner silence, meditation, and faith. We will need inner strength more than ever in the 1990s as we face a discouraging federal deficit and political leaders too readily intimidated by special interest bullies.

But we must not stop working hard. We must not let the media and politicians tell us what we believe and what children need. You who have been doing the work and caring over such long years must remain confident and strong about your mission's importance.

Marian Wright Edelman is founder and president of the Children's Defense Fund, a national organization which exists to provide a strong and effective voice for the children of America who cannot vote, lobby, or speak for themselves. For additional information, write to Children's Defense Fund, 122 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001.

Poverty is a root cause of many problems confronting numerous children and youth in America. What should be done about poverty? This question was put to poor people themselves by the Coalition on Human Needs. Among the conclusions were these:

If the views of poor people are to be taken seriously, policy-makers at all levels would devote their attention to the following goals:

- o A living family wage, at least basic health care and a chance to advance for those occupying the lowest level jobs in society.
- o Economic development, targeted on under-developed communities, sufficient to give them a sound base from which to employ all who are able to work.
- o Education and training sufficient to equip the poor to compete on an equal footing with others for the "better" jobs in the economy.
- o Public assistance program(s) that adequately meet the needs of those not working in the paid labor force and that minimize bureaucratic procedures and discriminatory treatment.

This study, entitled How the Poor Would Remedy Poverty, is available from Coalition on Human Needs, 1000 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20007 for \$10.95 plus \$1.00 for postage.

[December 1, 1988]

Problems of Youth:

A Process for Solutions

by David Hackett

Executive Director, Youth Policy Institute

One of our most popular presidents asked a question in a campaign debate in 1980,

"Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" It was and is a simple query
that brings up some alarming responses.

For the young, moving from childhood into adulthood is tough, and it can be argued that it is even more burdensome today than it was 25 years ago. It is an uphill battle, and there are no discernible signs that the time of life between 16 and 24 years of age -- also known as youth -- will be any easier four years from now.

Issues on the minds of today's youth include: how to finance college, what can be done about drugs and AIDS, the environment, how to find a job after high school or college in an increasingly skilled market, and what can be done to ensure that tomorrow's adults live comparably to their parents. The last concern was clearly articulated in Youth and America's Future, a report issued by the William T. Grant Foundation:

"Younger families just starting out are particularly at risk. Given current trends, young men and women can expect to earn an average of 25 percent less throughout their lifetimes than the generation 10 years earlier -- a reversal of the American dream."

Youth have reasons to be concerned. According to Robert Haveman of the Lafollette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the economic position of youth has deteriorated in America. Regardless of education, young people in the 1980s are earning less relative to older workers (aged 45-54) than they did 25 years ago. For individuals without a high school diploma, that ratio has deteriorated from 61 to 54 percent over the same period of time. Among blacks and whites, the youth unemployment rate has increased radically: for black men aged 16-24, an unemployment rate of 13.4 percent in 1960 grew to a 1986 high of 28.6 percent.

Haveman concludes that increasingly, and for a complex set of reasons, this younger group of working-aged people has drifted toward the bottom of the income distribution. Relative to such groups as blacks, the elderly, and women, youth have made no economic gains at all. Clearly one of the most critical youth issues of the next four years will be how to change these discouraging statistics. As today's adolescents reflect on these issues, there is a challenge to find a means to reverse this trend.

In my opinion, the objective for the next four years is how to empower youth to effect change, to become more involved in the policy-making process at the neighborhood level. If society were to recognize that young individuals are aware of the issues which affect them and that they can make the commitment to finding ways to solve these problems, a process can be defined to provide youth with feasible methods to change and control the issues.

Youth can be given the opportunity to share in responsible planning by implementing a three stage approach through (1) collection of information; (2) discussion, debate, and dissemination of proposed solutions in a forum situation; and finally (3) participation in neighborhood development and revitalization programs.

Collection of Information

The first step is to gather knowledge because the key to effecting change is the ability to make decisions based on information that has been complied by previous generations. For example, a student interested in the drug abuse problem should actively research the topic independently in a class or an internship. Indeed many high school and college students research and write about a myriad of problems each year, but much of this useful research never goes beyond the classroom.

At the Youth Policy Institute, however, we urge individuals to go beyond theories.

We extract short versions (10-15 pages) of long papers, put the results into our database -to which everyone as access -- and then publish the critical findings. The critical
findings concentrate on proposed solutions to a problem; proposed solutions can be
legislation, a demonstration program, or a concept. For example, proposed solution to
the drug problem includes options from legalization to a war on drugs.

Before placing the research into the database, however, a number of established experts representing all sides of the issue certify that the paper is an accurate portrayal of the scope of the problem, of past and current policies, and of exemplary programs which

document success. We envision our database being linked to and maintained by youth-serving organizations with the latest computer technology. Rather than repeating the research tasks of previous students, the succeeding research needs only to update the status of the issue and is then free to concentrate on researching fully the options for resolving a problem.

Discussion and Dissemination of Information

After the information has been collected, the next step is to hold forums/discussions of the proposed solutions to resolve specific issues. To solicit interest in these forums, press releases and summaries of the papers should be distributed to the media and nonprofit organizations. A youth-serving organization, such as COOL (Campus Opportunity Outreach League), might organize a forum, acting on behalf of youth organizations, also ensuring that participants receive a copy of the paper prior to the forum so that they will understand each of the options that will be presented.

From large panel forums to small group discussions, a variety of meetings would be held at the community level and involve concerned neighborhood people, including college and non-college bound youth. The proposed solutions would be monitored and updated in the database. Forum participants might discuss the issues informally to hold more forums as needed.

Action

Once the information has been collected into the database, disseminated to the media and to nonprofit organizations and a forum/discussion has been held, the scene is set for action. The three step process is complete when the neighborhoods use the information that has been collected and disseminated to engage proposed solutions -- and, of course, youth can be the catalyst for this change. Summaries of proposed solutions to a variety of problems will be made available to local neighborhoods who would then use the findings to hold community "action" meetings to decide what type of program they would like to implement in their own backyards.

In addition to voting, citizens need to have a voice in the planning, implementation, and integration of the programs which affect them. Unlike the forum of phase two, which might be organized by an outside youth-serving group, the neighborhood action meeting would involve people who live in the neighborhood. The desire to have this meeting must come from within the neighborhood, led by the people who will benefit from the action taken. Residents decide for themselves how much money is needed and for what. Ideally, this dialogue would take place between the neighborhoods and different levels of government. As neighborhoods begin to talk with federal, state, and local bodies about budgets and funding programs, young people can share in the responsibilities.

From a sound planning process with individual participation at the neighborhood level, we can begin to reverse the decline of youth. The question in my mind is no longer how do we begin, but rather when?

David Hackett is executive director of the Youth Policy Institute (1221 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite B, Washington, DC 20005), which publishes <u>Youth Policy</u>, a monthly report on national youth programs and issues. He was executive director of President Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and since then has continued to work on youth issues.

 $\left[\text{December 1, 1988} \right]$

Children at Risk: Observations and Priorities

To: The 41st President of the United States

From: Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter

In the U.S. today, one child in five is poor. This is intolerable in history's richest nation. Children make up the biggest single segment of the 32 million Americans who live below the official poverty line.

The number of poor adults and senior citizens declined in recent years as Social Security benefits went up; but the number of poor children increased. Now the nation has 13 million children in poverty and at risk, and the number continues to increase.

Their problem is both human and economic.

First, children born into poverty today, particularly in our troubled inner-city neighborhoods, face a much greater prospect of life without hope -- marked by a higher probability of crime and drug abuse, of dropping out of school, of becoming a teenage parent, of being in a continuing cycle of welfare dependency.

Second, children in poverty have a national economic impact as well, now and over the long term. The U.S. will need all of its children educated and trained for the tight labor market and increasingly complex skills of the 1990's and beyond. Each year's high school dropout class costs the country \$340 billion in lost productivity and foregone taxes.

1

All the evidence available suggests that helping a poor child is a good public investment. The Committee on Economic Development estimates that \$1 spent in early intervention saves \$5 in the cost of remedial education, welfare, and crime control.

There is no easy answer to the problem of ingrained poverty. But early intervention in the lives of poor children offers the best opportunity to break the cycle of poverty.

There is solid evidence that Federal programs such as Head Start, prenatal care, immunization, the Women's Infant and Children feeding program and compensatory education do work, and offer one of the best investments the country can make in its own people. To cover all eligible children with these programs would cost from \$9 to \$13 billion yearly. Because of the lack of funds, only about 20 percent of eligible children can participate in Head Start now.

Spending these public funds for these young Americans is not wasteful; it is wasteful not to invest in medical attention, the education and the job training that will provide poor children with a share in the American opportunity.

We understand the budget constraints on any expansion of Federal spending programs; but we believe that it would be imprudent to delay any longer on taking Federal action to begin the long process of assisting these children of poverty.

We recommend that you:

- o set a goal of full Federal funding for Head Start, WIC, Compensatory

 Education, prenatal care, immunization and preventive health care for all eligible disadvantaged children within eight years; and
- o move toward that goal by recommending in your Fiscal 1990 budget annual

increases of \$2 billion until the goal is reached.

We also urge you to publicly encourage successful state, local and voluntary initiatives, and to provide funding for selected model demonstration projects focused on good parenting and child support.

This article is an excerpt from a report entitled <u>American Agenda</u>, written by former presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter and addressed to the 41st president of the United States. It was written before the recent election but not released until the results were in and George Bush was chosen to become president.

"We see two Americas, one increasingly wealthy, one tragically poor, a land of opportunity for most and of idle hopelessness for too many, a nation never so prosperous or so profligate. And in between are middle Americans, many of whom are struggling to hold their own." -- Presidents Ford and Carter.

 $\left[\text{December 5, 1988} \right]$

Directory for Peace Leaf 5

PL50l.wp What A Local Church Can Do

PL502.wp UMW Campaign for Women [not used]

PL503.wp Edelman article

PL504.wp Hackett article

PL505.wp Also in This Issue -- MUPJ information

 $PL506.wp \qquad Ford/Carter\ article$

PL507.wp This directory

December 5, 1988

Methodists United
for Peace with Justice
421 Seward Square, SE
Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

December 29, 1988

Coalition for Human Needs 1000 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20007

Dear Susan:

In the enclosed issue of Peace Leaf on Children and Youth, we mentioned your study on How the Poor Would Remedy Poverty. I hope that this leads to some orders for this useful publication.

As I indicated on the phone several weeks ago, I would like to get Methodists United to affiliate with the Coalition on Human Needs. Therefore, could you send me a membership application form and also send notices of future meetings to me at the above address.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

October 7, 1988

David Hackett, Executive Director

Youth Policy Institute

1221 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite B

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Dave:

Would you be willing to write an article of 1,200 to 1,500 words on "Youth Issues of the Next Four Years"? It would be printed in the next issue of Peace Leaf, the newsletter of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. This issue will focus on Children and Youth. We are asking Marian Wright Edelman to write a similar article on children's issues. Our newsletter goes to our members around the country and to all United Methodist bishops, district superintendents, and annual conference directors (even if they are not members). We would want to receive your draft by the end of October.

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is an action-oriented association of laity and

clergy. Our first emphasis has been to seek implementation of policy proposals in the United Methodist bishops' pastoral letter and foundation document, In Defense of Creation, which deals especially with the need for nuclear disarmament. For the coming year we intend to give particular attention to seeking the end of Star Wars. The enclosed issue of Peace Leaf is an opening step in this campaign. We intend to make children and youth the principal focus of our justice concerns, and the Peace Leaf in which your article will appear is our opening effort in this direction.

As part of our mission we seek to influence the policies and programs of the United Methodist Church. When the quadrennial General Conference met in St. Louis this past spring, we were influential in getting the delegates to affirm and support In Defense of Creation and to make Peace with Justice a special program of the United Methodist Church for the 1989-92 Quadrennium. We are now encouraging the General Board of Church and Society to carry out a vigorous Peace with Justice Program. This issue of Peace Leaf on children and youth is part of this effort. By coincidence the United Methodist quadrennium parallels the term of the U.S. president. Therefore, talking about youth issues of the next four years has a double relevance.

Because you are on top of youth issues, especially with your focus in Youth Policy on "Challenges for the Next President," you would be an ideal author for this brief article for Peace Leaf. I'll call you in a few days to find out if you can help us in this manner. Or if you want to call me, my telephone number is now 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

October 7, 1988

Marian Wright Edelman, President

Children's Defense Fund

122 C Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

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Because you are on top of children's issues through the varied activities of the Children's Defense Fund, you would be an ideal author for this brief article for Peace Leaf. I'll call you in a few days to find out if you can help us in this manner. Or if you want to call me, my telephone number is 897-3668.

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by Marian Wright Edelman President, Children's Defense Fund

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Time to Change Course: An Alternative Vision

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<u>Investment 4</u>: Expansion of the Chapter 1 Compensatory Education program with a goal of serving all eligible children by 1992. The federal Chapter 1 program of special educational assistance for disadvantaged children has demonstrated success in helping children develop strong basic skills.

<u>Investment 5</u>: Bolstering family wages against inflation by raising the minimum wage. Adjusting the minimum wage in 1989 and succeeding years to its 1979 value would immediately lift millions of American families out of poverty and help alleviate some of the child suffering rampant in our land.

The total proposed federal investment for all of these urgently needed steps in the 1990 Fiscal Year (the next budget that Congress will consider) is less than \$8 billion. This is less than the \$12.4 billion annual revenue loss from the special tax break provided those who inherit corporate stock with untaxed capital gains. Current national policy favors the wealthy dead over the living young and poor.

Beyond Investments

These investments are critical to the well-being of children in America. But more is needed. While we work to prevent child neglect by making the proper investments, we must also challenge the structures and moral attitudes which perpetuate the unjust cycle of poverty that traps so many of our children and youths. We must go beyond a "prevention of damage" agenda to formulate an aggressive "promotion of development" agenda. This requires programs and strategies that focus on giving disadvantaged children and youth the continuous resources and support they need to "move up the queue" toward economic self-sufficiency.

Enveloping all of these short- and long-term steps must be a new climate in America that transmits to all young people a sense that they are valued and valuable. We must help them develop and strive for adult family and leadership roles as a result of parental and leadership roles worthy of emulation.

The year 1989 is a time for leaders and citizens who can combine positive vision with realistic individual and community actions to build new paths toward a nation and world fit to be the children's playground in the City of God. But that will take the greater inner strength which comes only from inner silence, meditation, and faith. We will need inner strength more than ever in the 1990s as we face a discouraging federal deficit and political leaders too readily intimidated by special interest bullies.

But we must not stop working hard. We must not let the media and politicians tell us what we believe and what children need. You who have been doing the work and caring over such long years must remain confident and strong about your mission's importance.

national organization which exists to provide a strong and effective voice for the children of America who cannot vote, lobby, or speak for themselves. For additional information, write to Children's Defense Fund, 122 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001.

Poverty is a root cause of many problems confronting numerous children and youth in America. What should be done about poverty? This question was put to poor people themselves by the Coalition on Human Needs. Among the conclusions were these:

If the views of poor people are to be taken seriously, policy-makers at all levels would devote their attention to the following goals:

- o A living family wage, at least basic health care and a chance to advance for those occupying the lowest level jobs in society.
- o Economic development, targeted on under-developed communities, sufficient to give them a sound base from which to employ all who are able to work.
- o Education and training sufficient to equip the poor to compete on an equal footing with others for the "better" jobs in the economy.
- o Public assistance program(s) that adequately meet the needs of those not working in the paid labor force and that minimize bureaucratic procedures and discriminatory treatment.

This study, entitled How the Poor Would Remedy Poverty, is available from Coalition on Human Needs, 1000 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20007 for \$10.95 plus \$1.00 for postage.

[December 1, 1988]

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

November 8, 1988

a Smith

Secretary for Community Action

United Methodist Women's Division

475 Riverside Drive

New York, NY 10115

Dear Ms. Smith:

Thank you for the packet and other information on the Campaign for Children. I'm very excited about what you are doing. Methodists United for Peace with Justice wants to do what we can to support this important Campaign.

As I indicated on the phone, the next issue of our newsletter, Peace Leaf, will focus on Children and Youth. We will have an article by Marian Wright Edelman on the needs of children in the years ahead, and an article by David Hackett, executive director, Youth Policy Institute, on the needs of youth.

We also want to present our readers with information on your Campaign for Children, in case they have not heard about it. Therefore, I have drafted the two enclosed pieces. One is a basic description of the Campaign for Children. The other deals with what a local church can do. It is adapted (with proper credit) from Section III of your booklet, Campaign for Children, changing it slightly to refer to local churches instead of UMW units.

I would appreciate receiving your approval on these two drafts. We would also like to use some of your illustrations, with credit given to the artist. This includes the cover in its reduction to the 3"x 4 1/2" card you sent me; the illustration of "Children for Peace" on p. 6; and the children, women, church illustration on p. 19. Is this acceptable? If so, could you supply us black and white copies of these illustrations?

Methodists United for Peace with Justice, as an independent association of laity and clergy, is now broadening our base in preparation for public policy advocacy during the next presidential administration and Congress. Last month we sent the issue of Peace Leaf dealing with Star Wars to members of annual conference boards of church and society and to district superintendents, and we invited them to join with us. We got the D.S. list from the General Council on Finance and Administration, and the others from annual conference council directors. In a similar manner, we would like to send the upcoming Peace Leaf on Children and Youth to UMW conference and district presidents. Thus, we are wondering if we could obtain from you a list of these officers, preferably on peel-off mailing labels, arranged in zip code order. If there is a cost for such labels, we

will gladly pay it.

If you would like to discuss this request for the mailing list or to make comments on the draft articles, please call me at (301) 897-3668.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

cc. Joyce V.Hamlin

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-5551

December 29, 1988

ta Smith

Secretary for Community Action

United Methodist Women's Division

475 Riverside Drive

New York, NY 10115

Dear Ms. Smith:

By now you should have received 600 copies of our issue of Peace Leaf on Children and

Youth. I want to thank your for your help in making this issue possible, especially your

permission to use an extract and illustrations from your publication, Campaign for

Children. Along with the other articles, I believe that we produced a useful and

attractive issue.

Methodists United is launching a Peace/Justice Alert, which will go out approximately

once a month to encourage people to take a specific action on some pending legislative or

executive decision in Washington, D.C. Within the United Methodist Church we are

directing Peace/Justice Alert to members of Methodists United, bishops, district

superintendents, conference staff, conference church and society chairs, conference peace

with justice coordinators, and district representatives and coordinators to the extent that

we can identify them. The first issue, which deals with the Outer Space Protection Act,

is enclosed.

We would be interested in devoting at least one issue of Peace/Justice Alert in the next six

months to some legislative issue affecting children, such as the Act for Better Child Care.

We would appreciate your suggestion on this matter -- both the precise focus and the best

time for such an Alert to be mailed. When you are in Washington some time, perhaps

we can get together and talk about this and related matters.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

cc. Joyce V.Hamlin

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

December 29, 1988

David Hackett, Executive Director

Youth Policy Institute

1221 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite B

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Dave:

We are now off the press with the issue of Peace Leaf containing your article on "Problems of Youth: A Process for Solutions." Several copies are enclosed.

I wish to thank you for helping us in this manner and look forward to continue working with you on matters of mutual concern.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

METHODISTS UNITED FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE

421 Seward Square, SE

Washington, DC 20003

December 29, 1988

Marian Wright Edelman, President

Children's Defense Fund

122 C Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

Dear Marian:

We are now off the press with the issue of Peace Leaf containing your article on "Protecting and Sustaining Our Nation's Children." Several copies are enclosed. I thank you for your contribution.

With permission we borrowed most of the drawings from the United Methodist Women's Division publication, Campaign for Children. By error the artist's name was placed under your logo, and we apologize for this mistake.

As I mentioned to Kathy Guy a couple of weeks ago, we are starting a Peace/

Justice Alert to encourage Methodists to take specific actions on pending legislative and

executive decisions. The first issue is enclosed. Sometime in the next six months we want to devote at least one edition to a children's issue, such as the Act for Better Child Care. We will seek the advice of the Children's Defense Fund as well as the United Methodist Women on what issue to highlight and when. In this and in other ways we hope to work closely with CDF on mutual endeavors.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

cc. Kathy Guy

Biblical Foundation

To the people of his time Amos, the shepherd of Tekoa, spoke strongly of justice: Thus, says, the Lord:

"For three transgressions of Israel,

and for four, I will not revoke the punishment;

because they sell the righteous for silver,

and the needy for a pair of shoes;

they trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the afflicted.

Likewise, Hosea:

You have plowed iniquity,

you have reaped injustice,

you have eaten the fruit of lies.

Because you have trusted in your chariots

and in the multitude of your warriors,

therefore the tumult of war shall arise among

your people,

and all your fortresses shall be destroyed.

Jesus of Nazareth simply put it:

For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

In our own era the use of our treasure is guided by the budgets we make: for our household, our business, our government (and our church, too). Particularly in governmental budgets, a basic question is: what does justice require?

The answer must have a spiritual and moral foundation, but it will have to be framed in the financial details of the budget, authorizing legislation, and appropriations. And as Jesus observed in talking about the dishonest, though clever, steward, "the sons of this world are wiser in their own generation than the sons of light."

If children of light want the federal budget to provide justice, they must master budget technicalities. And they must exercise their influence at the right place at the right time. Timing is especially important. This issue of Peace Leaf is intended to provide instruction for this purpose.

Key Justice Issues

Distribution of wealth. The federal budget, in setting forth a plan for governmental spending and taxation, determines who benefits and who pays. It is a significant instrument for distributing income and wealth: among economic classes, among generations, among regions of the country. Through patterns of taxation and expenditures, the budget can redistribute wealth from the richer to the poorer (generally described as "progressive") or from the poor to the rich (called "regressive").

The authorizing legislation and appropriations that implement the budget can shift financial resources from the young to the old (as occurs under social security) or vice versa (such as in educational expenditures and child welfare programs). To some

extent the budget and implementation measures can transfer wealth from city and suburbs to rural areas, from rich neighborhoods to poorer ones, from booming regions to depressed areas; or can extract wealth from poor areas to benefit better-off sections.

Military versus domestic. During the first half of the 1980s military spending grew tremendously. Since then it has leveled off at a high plateau and has left an enormous number of new weapon systems in the pipeline, to be paid for in future years. Increased military spending, combined with a large tax cut in 1981, has lead to huge annual deficits in the federal budget.

The domestic side of the budget has "entitlement" and "discretionary" programs. Entitlement programs allow all people meeting specified eligibility criteria to participate. In discretionary programs administrators have greater leeway in determining who will benefit. The biggest funding losers in the 1980s were domestic discretionary programs, particularly those serving children and the poor. Means-tested entitlement programs directed to low-income people, such as Medicaid, food stamps, child nutrition, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), barely held even from 1981 to 1988, even though there was a more than 10 percent growth of persons living in poverty.

Greater justice needed. In this issue we first look at the budget deficit problem, military and domestic spending, then we offer ideas on how the federal budget should be changed to respond better to peace and justice concerns.

Also in This Issue

A Budget Primer

Dealing with the Deficit

The Military Budget

The Domestic Budget

More Peace, More Justice Needed

Membership Information

Peace/Justice Alert

PL601E.WP February 24, 1989

A Budget Primer

Harold Lasswell once defined politics as "Who Gets What, When, How."

This formula applies to the beneficiary side of the federal budget. With one change it can also apply to the budget-making process: "who gives what, when, how."

In federal budget-making the "who" are officials of the Executive Branch and members of Congress responsible for making budgetary decisions. The "what" are budget allocations which then become appropriations of money to be spent. "When" is the budget schedule. "How" is the budget process. Anyone wanting to influence federal budget decisions must understand each element: who, what, when, and how.

Who Decides

The main actors and their roles are:

The President -- submits a budget to Congress for its consideration.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) -- receives budget requests from federal departments and prepares the President's budget.

Congressional Budget Committees -- develops a congressional budget resolution that sets the framework for appropriations.

Congressional Authorization Committees -- writes substan-

tive legislation to authorize the expenditure of

funds.

Congressional Appropriation Committees -- writes legis-

lation to appropriate money for specific purposes.

Congressional Committees on Taxation (House Ways and Means, Se

Senate Finance

writes legislation on taxes and other

revenue measures.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) -- conducts studies and

provides advice to Budget Committees.

When and How: Budget Process and Timetable

The federal fiscal year begins on October 1 and runs to September 30 of the

on September 30, 1990.

About 15 months before a new fiscal year begins, federal departments begin

working on their budget submissions. These go to the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB), which puts together the total budget that the president submits to

Congress.

According to law, the timetable for the congressional budget process for any

fiscal year is as follows:

On or before:

Action to be completed:

2-2

1st Monday President submits budget to Congress

after Jan.3

February 15 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) sub-

mits report to Budget Committees

February 25 Congressional Committees submit views

and estimates to Budget Committees

April 1 Senate Budget Committee reports con-

current resolution on the budget

April 15 Congress completes action on con-

current resolution on the budget

May 15 Annual appropriation bills may be

considered in the House

June 10 House Appropriations Committee reports

last annual appropriation bill

June 15 Congress completes action on recon

ciliation legislation

June 30 House completes action on annual

appropriation bills

October 1 Fiscal year begins

This year President Ronald Reagan submitted an FY 1990 budget in January before his term expired. Then on February 9 President Bush proposed certain changes to Congress but did not provide details for a complete budget.

Key resolutions. In practice Congress doesn't always keep to this schedule,

often falling behind, but it's an indicator of important dates. The budget resolution, due for passage by April 15 but sometimes delayed, is an important policy decision because it allocates spending among the various congressional committees. It is here, for instance, that the competition for funds between the military and domestic programs comes into focus. And the revenue side of the budget resolution offers guidance to tax-writing committees. The reconciliation resolution, due by June 15, adjusts spending proposals and revenue projections to match an earlier decision on the level of the anticipated federal budget deficit (or surplus, should that every occur). In 1981 a host of major policy changes were wrapped up in the reconciliation resolution.

The deficit. Because the federal deficit is a matter of great concern, the budget resolution sets a maximum level of allowable deficit in the federal budget. If spending and revenue measures don't provide sufficient deficit reduction, a special sequestering arrangement goes into effect. The schedule for this process runs from mid-July to mid-November.

Points of Influence

Influencing the budget is a matter of reaching the right person at the right time. Here are some opportunities:

Pre-submission phase -- departmental officials.

February -- heads of congressional committees and sub-

committees who make the case for programs they favor.

March -- members of the Budget Committees who are

drafting the budget resolution.

April -- all members of Congress as they prepare to vote budget resolution and possible amendments.

on the

April-June -- Authorization Committees, which set the maximum expenditures for authorized programs.

April-September -- Appropriation Committees, which determine actual spending levels.

June -- all members as they vote on the reconciliation resolutions.

July-September (sometimes longer) -- all members as they vote on appropriation bills and possibly on a continuing resolution that keeps the government going until appropriations are completed.

PL602C.WP

February 24, 1989

Dealing with the Deficit

The number one issue of the federal budget this year is the deficit. This concern has arisen because of the enormous growth of federal debt during the past eight years: from \$909 billion on September 30, 1980 (the end of the fiscal year) to \$2.6 trillion eight years later. The \$1.9 trillion which the Reagan administration added to the federal debt is nearly twice as much as the total debt accumulated from Presidents George Washington through Jimmy Carter.

[Insert graph showing trend of federal debt, 1980-88]

Reasons for Debt Increase

The federal debt got out of hand during the 1980s because flaws policies of the Reagan administration. In his first year in office President Reagan pushed through Congress a very large tax cut, the beginning of an enormous military buildup, and some restraints on domestic spending. The "supply side" economists who advised the president predicted that tax cuts would stimulate so much economic growth that the revenue lost through tax rate reduction would be replaced.

But, alas, their theory was erroneous. Tax revenues did not keep up with spending increases, led by the military budget and greater interest payments on the growing national debt. As a result, the federal deficit snowballed.

In response conservatives in Congress in 1985 initiated a deficit control procedure.

Known by the name of its sponsors in the Senate, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act sets a yearly target for deficit reduction. As amended in 1987, the targets are:

Fiscal Year Ending Maximum Deficit

September 30		Allowed
1989	\$136 billion	
1990	100 billion	
1991	64 billion	
1992	28 billion	
1993	0	

President Bush's Deficit Reduction Proposals

Faced with the need to achieve a FY 1990 budget with a deficit no higher than \$100 billion, President Bush has taken an eight-step approach:

- (1) Determine available resources, based upon a prediction of national economic growth, the tax revenues that this yields, and any new revenue measures.
- Determine the amount necessary to reach the deficit target -- and, as first priority, allocate a portion of revenue increases to necessary deficit reduction.
- (3) Calculate the expected expenditure decreases in mandatory programs, such as farm price supports which are expected to decline.
- (4) Determine funds available for allocation for spending increases in selected priority programs.
- (5) Allocate funds for increased interest expenses, determined by projecting the level of national debt and anticipated interest rates.
- (6) Determine lower expenditures to be achieved by program reform and restructuring.
- (7) Determine clear priorities for program increases and initiatives from available funds.

(8) Apply a "freeze" to all remaining programs.

An Economic Critique

Economists who have examined the underlying assumptions of the Bush budget believe that it is based upon an unduly rosy view of the economy. The Bush administration predicts a real growth of 3.5 percent in the gross national product (GNP) during 1989. In comparison, the Congressional Budget Office projects a 2.9 percent growth rate in 1989, and the consensus forecast of 50 "blue chip" economists is 2.3 percent. If the latter is accurate, there will be \$20 billion less in federal revenues available.

The Bush budget assumes that interest rates on federal borrowing will decline in the coming months. In contrast, these interest rates are now rising, and many economists predict that they will rise more or hold steady but not decline substantially. If the government has to pay more to service the national debt, it will have less funds for other purposes, or the deficit will become even larger.

A Justice Critique

In his February 9 budget document President Bush revealed what he meant by his campaign commitment to a "flexible freeze" in the federal budget. It turns out to be a double standard that is highly favorable to the military budget at the expense of programs meeting the needs of the poor and responding to other urgent social concerns.

In federal budget nomenclature, "budget authority," expressed as appropriations, makes money available to be spent now and in future years. An "outlay" is what is actually spent in a particular year, often with funds appropriated in previous years.

Because appropriations for ongoing programs tend to increase each year and it takes a while for the money to be spent, budget authority for a particular program is usually higher than outlays in a given year.

In the Bush FY 1990 budget the "freeze" on military spending starts with budget authority for FY 1989 and adds an inflation factor. In contrast, the domestic spending "freeze" is tied to current outlay but makes no adjustment for inflation. So, the military budget has the advantage.

PL603D.WP

February 24, 1989

The Military Budget

During his eight years in office President Reagan doubled the military budget of the United States. It rose from \$144 billion for the 1980 Fiscal Year to \$299 billion for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989. The largest increases came during the first five years of the decade as President Reagan conjured the dangers of the "evil empire" in the Soviet Union, Secretary of Defense Weinberger came up with a huge array of new weapon systems, and Congress pretty much accepted what they asked for.

But as the federal deficit seemed to get out of control in the mid-80s, Congress put on the brakes. Since then military appropriations have been nearly level. President Reagan proposed sizable increases each year, but Congress did not go along.

insert graph showing increase in military spending,

In his final budget proposal submitted to Congress on January 9, 1989, President Reagan again pushed for higher military spending: from \$298.8 billion authorized in the current fiscal year to \$315.2 billion for FY 1990, a 5.5 percent increase. This was broken down as follows:

Billions of dollars

FY

<u>1989</u> FY 1990

Department of Defense \$290.2 \$305.6

Atomic energy defense activities 8.1 9.0

Other defense-related activities .5 .5

\$298.8

\$315.2

President Bush's Proposals

A month later President Bush submitted his own budget ideas to Congress. For the Department of Defense the president proposed \$299.3 in spending authority for FY 1990, an increase of 3.1 percent over FY 1989. For defense activities of the Department of Energy he requested \$9.4 billion, a 16 percent increase over the current fiscal year, with most of the increase going to rebuild existing nuclear weapons production facilities and some to environmental cleanup.

The Bush budget document indicates that the proposed increase in the Defense Department budget is the amount needed to keep up with anticipated inflation. Therefore, he says that there is no "real growth" in defense spending. But next year for FY 1991 he wants a one percent increase in defense authorization beyond the inflation adjustment and a two percent increase for FY 1992. Because the Bush budget makes no cutbacks in defense spending, the burden of spending reductions to meet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target for deficit reduction falls entirely on the domestic side of the budget (see next page). It will be two months before the Bush administration makes public its spec

- Our strategic forces must continue to be modernized, including ground, sea and air-based systems.
- o The equipment available to our conventional forces... must continue to be

- upgraded. We will also maintain the combat readiness of these forces by providing sufficient training and military exercises.
- o Technological leadership must be maintained by supporting research necessary to the development of future systems. This includes the active pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

An Analysis

The Reagan budget contained similar objectives and offered detailed spending plans. In analyzing this Reagan budget, the Defense Budget Project, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reported:

- o President Reagan's defense budget request gives top priority to a new generation of weapon systems, creating a 'bow wave' of defense spending in the 1990s as these new programs enter production. These proposed increases in funding for military hardware would add significantly to the Pentagon's backlog of unexpended funds, making defense spending increasingly difficult to control in the 1990s.
- o A large number of strategic nuclear systems will enter production in the next two years, including the B-2 (stealth) bomber, the advance cruise missile, rail-garrison basing for the MX missile, and the short-range attack missile (SRAM).
- o There are large funding increases for nuclear weapons production.
- o There would be rapid funding growth for the Strategic Defense Initiative

(sometimes called Star Wars). The SDI request includes the addition of funds for full-scale engineering development, the last stage of development before production.

o New conventional hardware programs also move rapidly toward production in the new budget. The Defense Department has cancelled no major new weapons programs in the new budget request.

Because the Bush budget adopts the same basic principles for defense as articulated in the Reagan budget, it seems likely that when President Bush reveals his budget details in April that he will advocate funding a strenuous SDI program, new nuclear weapons production, production of many new strategic weapons, and lots more conventional weapons.

PL604B.WP

March 1, 1989

The Domestic Budget

The non-military side of the federal budget covers a wide, wide range of programs. The budget document groups them into a dozen major functions: general science, space, and technology; energy; natural resources and environment; agriculture; commerce and housing credit; transportation; community and regional development; education, training, employment and social services; health; income security; veterans benefits and services; and general government.

These domestic programs can be divided into two broad categories: (a) entitlements and (b) discretionary programs. Entitlements are laws that require the government to pay specified benefits to qualifying individuals. Major examples are social security, Medicare, Medicaid, federal retirement, veterans' benefits, and unemployment compensation. Farm price supports going to individual farmers and to corporate farms are also entitlements. Unless Congress changes eligibility requirements or payment levels for entitlement programs, the government is obligated to make the required payments, and the budget must provide funds for them.

In contrast, discretionary programs are subject to annual funding decisions by Congress. Some of these are direct government operations, such as the space program, law enforcement, veterans services. Others take the form of grants to states and localities, such as for highways, community development, education, health services. Where benefits go to individuals, agencies have latitude in determining beneficiaries, and there is no legal obligation to maintain benefit levels.

During the 1980s the domestic discretionary share of the budget has declined both in dollar amount and percentage as other budget categories have claimed a larger share. In FY 1989, now underway, an estimated 48 percent of governmental spending will go for entitlements, 29 percent for defense and international affairs, 15 percent for obligatory interest payments on the national debt, leaving 16 percent for domestic discretionary programs.

The Bush Domestic Budget

President Bush's proposed budget for FY 1990 foresees an increase in spending for entitlement programs, but the president proposes some reforms in medicare and federal employees health benefits to lower the rate of growth. Also, farm subsidy payments are expected to decline.

The president's budget lists a number of policy initiatives that call for spending increases. They include \$11.1 billion to cope with the savings and loan crisis, \$2 billion more for space programs, \$1.2 billion to deal with drug abuse and prisons, \$915 million to take the 1990 census, \$906 million for aviation safety, \$768 million in education, \$701 million for clean up of nuclear weapons plants, \$398 for basic science research, \$350 million for health research, \$160 for AIDS programs, \$149 million more for Head Start, \$145 million to assist the homeless, \$32 million for environmental matters, and \$21 million for a volunteer youth program.

Most other domestic programs are lumped together in a gigantic domestic discretionary funding pool. In the current FY 1989 spending (outlays) for these

programs will total \$136 billion. As part of Bush's "flexible freeze" formula, he proposes that the total spending level for these programs should remain the same in FY 1990 -- with no adjustment for inflation.

[insert graph showing trend in discretionary domestic spending, 1980-89]

Analysis

Senate Budget Committee staff have calculated that to achieve Bush budget goals, the programs lumped together as domestic discretionary programs will have to be cut \$11.2 billion below the levels needed to maintain current levels of service, after adjusting for inflation. Richard Darman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, places this figure at \$9.6. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that achieving the proposed spending freeze would require that the overall FY 1990 appropriations for the programs in this category would have to be cut 10 to 15 percent below that amount needed to maintain the FY 1989 appropriation level, adjusted for inflation. This could lead to substantial cuts in less favored programs.

One can only surmise which programs might be cut because the Bush budget offers no precise recommendations (leaving to negotiations with Congress). However, any program not mentioned specifically as protected can be presumed to be a candidate for cutbacks. These "unmentioned" programs include child nutrition, many kinds of health services, refugee assistance, low income energy assistance, public housing, bilingual

education, vocational and adult education, job training, summer youth employment, older Americans employment, ACTION volunteers.

Furthermore, close analysis reveals that some of the president's initiatives for a "kinder, gentler" nation are exaggerated. For instance, the Bush budget proposes to expand Medicaid to reach more poor pregnant women and young children, but it provides no new funds to cover this expansion, paying for it by reducing the federal share of state operating costs. Although claiming that means-tested entitlements (such as SSI, AFDC, and food stamps) would be fully funded, the Bush budget asks for less than the budget

President Reagan submitted in January. While there is a \$145 million increase to help the homeless, several billion dollars are cut from other housing programs for the poor, especially rural housing.

PL605A.WP

February 24, 1989

More Peace, More Justice Needed in Federal Budget

An Editorial by Howard W. Hallman

The FY 1990 budget which President Bush has presented to Congress poorly serves both peace and justice. The military budget prolongs Cold War thinking that heavy military spending, exotic technology, and nuclear threats are the way to peace. The domestic budget, with a few exceptions, continues an eight-year trend of cutting back on programs responsive to human needs. The deficit will continue because of a failure to levy taxes sufficient to cover projected expenditures.

What Then Shall We Do?

The challenge is to find a way to deal with the federal deficit while enhancing justice and promoting peace. In particular the bloated military budget must be brought under control. To do this we should not accept President Bush's double standard that lets the military have all they are now getting plus an inflation adjustment while insisting that discretionary domestic programs cut back service levels with no adjustment for inflation.

This can be done if we apply some reasoning of the Bush budget document to the military budget. In rejecting the idea of a "current services baseline" for domestic programs, the document states:

The "current services" approach suggests that programs funded in the past must be funded at at least equivalent service levels in the future -- with a built-in upward adjustment for inflation and other factors. In a sense, it treats

spending as immortal. One might think of this in personal terms: If one buys a new car and a new dishwasher in 1989, one does not plan one's budget for 1990 by assuming first that one will need yet another new car and dishwasher in 1990 -- with price tags adjusted up! But that's just the kind of thinking that the "current services" habit of mind tends to encourage.

If we continue the household budget comparison, we can admit that a family doesn't need a new car and a new dishwasher every year. But it needs about the same amount of money for food and clothing, about the same amount for utilities, for rent or mortgage payments. If there is inflation, the family must pay more for these necessities.

And if there is an addition to the family, household costs will increase.

So in the federal budget, programs that deal with necessities -- such as food, basic income support, housing, health care -- do indeed need to maintain the same funding level or to make upward adjustments to cope with inflation and increased number of beneficiaries. Likewise so do services that enable people to participate fully in society and the economy, such as Head Start, elementary and secondary education, job training, and targeted job creation.

But there is no reason to buy a lot of new nuclear missiles every year, more submarines, more carriers, more destroyers, more bombers, more fighter aircraft, more tanks, more rockets, more artillery shells when the stockpile is already bulging. There is no need to automatically replace weapon systems that work satisfactorily in the name of "modernization." After all many of us have quite satisfactory refrigerators and dishwashers that are 20 years old. And we often find that some older, simpler products

work better than complex, newfangled ones.

Budget Priorities

Switching metaphors, let us translate each billion of dollars of the military budget into one pound of weight. When Ronald Reagan became president, the military budget "weighed" 144 pounds. Now it weighs 299 and President Bush wants to add another nine or ten pounds to the corpulent military. Instead it needs to go on a diet. A firm regimen. We should start cutting the military budget, not adding to it.

But such cuts should be fully cognizant of national security needs -- true national security, not unwise research and development and not trumped up weapons production that yield false security. Ripest for cutbacks are the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and proposed additions to the already oversized strategic nuclear arsenal.

As shown in a previous issue of Peace Leaf, SDI, sometimes referred to as Star Wars, cannot produce a leakproof shield against incoming missiles but has the potential for extending offensive war into space. Development of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, as proposed in the military budget, if reciprocated by the Soviet Union would threaten the security of both nations by destroying a vital means of verification of arms reduction agreements and knocking out early warning facilities, navigation satellites, and communication networks. Cutting SDI from the budget would save money and at the same time enhance national security.

Presently the United States and the Soviet Union are committed in principle to a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiators from the two nations have been working on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to bring this about. To help this process along, we should declare a two-year moratorium on further production

of strategic nuclear weapons. Such a pause could help create a positive atmosphere for completing the treaty, indeed could serve as a strong incentive for the Soviets to come to agreement. Because of an overabundance of these weapons there would be no national security risk in holding off on further production. We could save \$10 billion or more in the FY 1990 by reassigned to meeting urgent human needs, such as housing for the homeless, affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families, better health care for poor families and the near-poor, Head Start for many more children, youth employment opportunities, and job training and placement for unemployed adults.

Taxes

To respond adequately to urgent human needs, we must sustain the funding level of many important federal programs falling in the "domestic discretionary" category, and in some cases increase the appropriations. Although we can have some offsetting savings by reducing excessive military expenditures, we will need to increase taxes in order to achieve federal deficit reduction so that we don't force future generations to pay for our current extravagances.

"No new taxes" was a major slogan in George Bush's presidential campaign. He basically kept that promise in his FY 1990 budget proposal, and even recommended reducing the capital gains tax on sale of stocks, bonds, and other financial securities to 15 percent. The current rate for persons in the top tax bracket is 28 and 33 percent. The budget document claims that this would increase federal revenues by encouraging greater private investment, thus spurring economic growth. However, studies by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office indicate that cutting the capital gains tax would actually reduce revenues, probably by several billion dollars a year, thus adding to the

deficit. Furthermore, tax savings from a capital gains tax cut would go overwhelmingly to the wealthiest taxpayers.

Instead, tax increases that are required for deficit reduction should be assigned to persons and corporations who have the greatest ability to pay. This can be accomplished by closing tax loopholes left open by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and by rate increases at the upper level of the federal income tax schedule.

Because neither the Bush administration nor the Congress has the courage to advocate the tax increases necessary to pay our own way in providing vital public services and meeting urgent human needs, we in the religious and civic community should take the initiative. We should lead a reversed style of "taxpayers revolt" by insisting that fair and equitable tax increases be levied. For that is what justice requires.

Howard W. Hallman is a member of the Steering Committee, Methodists United for Peace with Justice and serves as treasurer and issues chairperson.

To talk about maintaining "current services" plus an inflationary adjustment for the Pentagon is like insisting that an overweight person should get as much food as ever before, and maybe even more. Instead, the Pentagon needs a strict diet.

PL606B.WP February 24, 1989

Influential Persons in Congressional Budget-Making

Senate Budget Committee. Democrats: Senators Sasser (TN), Hollings (SC), Johnston (LA), Riegle (MI), Exon (NE), Lautenberg (NJ), Simon (IL), Sanford (NC), Wirth (CO), Fowler (GA), Conrad (ND), Dodd (CT), Robb (VA). Republicans: Senators Domenici (NM), Armstrong (CO), Boschwitz (MN), Symms (ID), Grassley (IA), Kasten (WI), Nickles (OK), Rudmamn (NH), Gramm (TX), Bond (MO). Address for the U.S. Senate is Washington, DC 20510

House Budget Committee. Democrats: Representatives Panetta (CA), Foley (WA), Russo (IL), Jenkins (GA), Leath (TX), Schumer (NY), Boxer (CA), Slattery (KS), Oberstar (MN), Guarini (NJ), Durbin (IL), Espy (MS), Kildee (MI), Beilenson (CA), Huckaby (LA), SaBo (MN), Dwyer (NJ), Berman (CA), Wise (WV), Kaptur (OH), Bryan (TX). Republicans: Representatives Frenzel (MN), Gradison (OH), Goodling (PA), Smith (OR), Edwards (OK), Thomas (CA) Rogers (KY), Armey (TX) Buechner (M)), Houghton (NY), McCrery (LA) Kasich (OH), Schuette (MI), Bentley (MD). Address for the U.S. House of Representatives is Washington, DC 20515.

Network News

"Your letter of December 16 providing me with information regarding the creation of the group called 'Methodists United for Peace with Justice' has been received. Thank you so much for taking the time to up-date me on this development. I'm delighted to know that initiative is being take to contact all district superintendents and conference council directors, church and society chairs and peace with justice coordinators to help them build a strong network of Methodists United for Peace with Justice across the nation." -- Bishop Melvin G. Talbert, San Francisco.

As established by the 1988 General Conference, the annual Peace with Justice offering will be taken on Sunday, May 21, 1989. Half of the funds from the offering support Peace with Justice activities within annual conferences, and the other half goes to national efforts. Now is the time to begin promotional plans so that your congregation will give strong support to this vital mission.

The Pax World Foundation has agreed to make available places on an October 7-21, 1989 tour of the Soviet Union to members of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. For information on costs and arrangements, write to Friendship Tours/Methodists United, Pax World Foundation, 4400 East-West Highway, Suite 130, Bethesda, MD 20814.

Sources for Further Information

	Center	on Budget	and Policy	Priorities
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236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Suite 305

Washington, DC 20002

Children's Defense Fund

122 C Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

Center for Defense Information

1500 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20005

Defense Budget Project

236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Suite 301

Washington, DC 20002

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\$		
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Address		
	Street	у
State	Zip Code	
Local Church	Annual Conference (if United Methodist)	
Congressional	Representative or District	
Please return	to Methodists United for Peace with Justice	
	421 Seward Square, SE, Washington, DC 20003	
PL607.WP	February 24, 1989	

PEACE/JUSTICE ALERT

Number 2

February 1989

How to Influence the Federal Budget

You can influence the federal budget because Congress is responsive to public opinion and pressure. But to be influential, you must reach the right persons at the right time. So the first step is to study the budget schedule on page 2 to determine what is happening at the moment and in the months ahead. Then get in touch with members of Congress who will be making decisions in the near future.

Budget Committees

In Congress the House and Senate Budget Committees have the first say.

During February and March they hold hearings and write ("mark up") a budget resolution. They may start with the president's budget, but they alter it to fit their own priorities. Key issues this year include (a) relative emphasis upon military and domestic spending, (b) how to cut the deficit, and (c) whether it is necessary to raise rates on existing taxes or to enact new taxes and user fees.

An editorial on pages 6-7 takes the position that the military budget is bloated because it goes well beyond what is prudent and sufficient for true national defense. Therefore, a proposal is offered to save \$10 billion or more by cutting out unwise and unnecessary items in the military budget. These savings should be reassigned to

programs responding to urgent human needs.

This editorial points out that we have a clear responsibility to future generations to reduce the national debt and not make our children and grandchildren pay for our current extravagances. Tax increases seem to be necessary for that purpose. They should be based on the ability to pay so that the burden doesn't fall on low and middle income persons.

As you reach your own conclusions on these issues, you should make your views known to members of the Budget Committees (listed on page 7) -- preferably before the end of March. If they come from your congressional district and state, get in touch with them directly. If not, ask your representative and senators to transmit your views.

Floor Action

According to the statutory schedule, the Budget Committees will be reporting out their budget resolution for the 1990 Fiscal Year by April 3, 1989. Just before that date members of the House of Representatives will observe what they call an "Easter District Work Period", that is, a recess, from March 24 to April 2. Many of them will be in their districts then, so that this is a good time to make direct contact with them. In preparation you can study the information provided in this issue of Peace Leaf, read newspaper and magazine reports on the budget, and seek out other information. We will send out a Peace/Justice Alert in March with up-to-date information. You can contact your representative's district office (probably listed in the phone book) to make an appointment. Perhaps you would like to organize a delegation from a number of churches to make a presentation.

The Senate will not be in session from March 20 to April 2, and many senators will be in their home states. Because they represent a larger constituency, you might have a better chance of seeing them if you organize a delegation from a number of communities. United Methodists might want to ask their bishop to join them in such a visit.

Whether you see your senator or representative in person, you should write to them about your views on the budget. And get others to write. The mailing addresses are: U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515 and U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.

Future Actions

The budget resolution is really only the beginning of a series of congressional decisions on spending and taxation. After this resolution is passed, Congress will take up authorizing legislation for numerous programs and appropriations for every activity the federal government undertakes. The appropriation bills convert broad budget outlines into precise spending decisions.

Therefore, concerned citizens need to follow the appropriations process as it comes to a focus in May, June, July, and September. We will issue Peace/Justice Alerts as measures of special concern to our agenda come up for consideration. And you may want to seek out other sources of information for your own special concerns.

Remember: Timing is especially important if you want to be influential. We can be influential if we are diligent.

Members Wanted

If you are not yet a member of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, we invite you to join. Membership information is at the bottom of page 7.

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Peace Leaf

January-March 1989

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February 24, 1989

ISSUE NO. 7 APRIL-JUNE 1989

Acheiving Arms Reduction

Beyond Containment, Beyond Deterrence

by Howard W. Hallman, Issues Chair Methodists United for Peace with Justice

"Now is the time to move beyond containment, to a new policy for the 1990s: one that recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world, and in the Soviet Union itself." -- President George Bush at Texas A&M University, May 12, 1989.

The containment that President Bush speaks about is, of course, the effort of the United States and its Western allies to contain Soviet expansion in Europe and elsewhere. This containment policy has been the primary focus of U.S. foreign policy for more than 40 years.

In an interview conducted in London on June 2 following the NATO summit meeting, the president elaborated on what it means to move beyond containment. He observed that

the Soviet Union might well be in a state of radical change. And as this change asserts itself, and as they genuinely change, our doctrine need no longer be containing a militarily aggressive Soviet Union. It means a united Europe. It means a Europe without as many artificial boundaries. It means much more freedom and democracy, not only in the Soviet Union, but in Europe. As those things happen, the role of NATO shifts, our own role shifts, from the main emphasis on deterrence to an emphasis on the economic side of things.

To be fair to the president's complete views, he said that this would occur down the line. "But before one reaches that stage," he insisted, "we have just got to be careful and we have got to keep our defenses up."

Although President Bush didn't elaborate on what it would mean for NATO's role to shift from deterrence to an economic emphasis, moving beyond containment inevitably implies moving beyond nuclear deterrence. That's because the two policies are inextricably linked.

If one removes all the phantasy scenarios, the sole purpose of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal is to deter Soviet expansion into Western Europe. Once we have firm assurances that the Soviets will not and cannot invade Western Europe — assurances guaranteed through withdrawal and demobilization of Soviet offensive forces, then we can disband the strategic nuclear arsenal because it will no longer have a mission.

To grasp the truth of this observation, we need to recall the origin of containment and to examine empirically the achievements of nuclear deterrence (if any).

Soviet Expansionism

When the United States began its containment policies in the 1940s, there was plenty of evidence of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's ambition for territorial expansion. The stage was set in August 1939 when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany entered into a nonaggression pact and signed a secret protocol dividing Poland between them. The pact gave Hitler license to invade Poland, thus starting World War II. It gave Stalin license to move into Poland from the east, to invade Finland, and to absorb the three independent Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) into the Soviet Union.

Hitler, however, broke the pact in June 1941 by invading the Soviet Union. German forces moved deeply into Soviet territory before being repulsed by heroic defense at Leningrad and Stalingrad (now Volgograd). The Red Army drove back the Nazi invaders, recaptured the Baltic republics which the Germans had occupied, and moved into Eastern Europe. Meanwhile Western forces landed in Normandy and drove back the Nazis from France and the low countries.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill extracted a commitment from Stalin that the Allied Powers would assist nations liberated from Nazi occupation "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free

elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." But Stalin systematically broke this promise and instead installed one-party, Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, completing the process in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

U.S. Containment

In this postwar period the Soviet Union tried to expand into other adjacent territory. The Soviets made attempts to retain wartime military forces in northern Iran, to take away territory from Turkey, and to assist partisans take over the government of Greece. However, the United States blocked these moves through firm diplomacy, discrete show of military power (such as dispatching the battleship Missouri to visit Istanbul), and military aid to Turkey and Greece.

In explaining the latter action, President Harry Truman stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." Within the U.S. government this publicly-stated Truman Doctrine was supplied an intellectual rationale by George Kennan, who analyzed Soviet expansionism and the need for Western containment.

Elsewhere in Europe the United States emphasized economic assistance through the Marshall Plan as the primary means of stopping the westward spread of Communism. This took away the appeal of indigenous Communist parties (for a period quite strong in Italy and France) and the danger that they could gain power through elections and "invite in" Soviet forces.

Within three years after the end of World War II in Europe, de facto division of Germany into two separate states emerged: the Russian occupation zone on the east and the U.S.-British-French zone on the west. Berlin, an enclave in the eastern zone, was similarly divided. When the Soviets tested Western will by blockading access to West Berlin in 1948, the United States and its allies responded with the massive airlift.

In this atmosphere of East/West tensions and division of Europe into two opposing blocs, the Western Allies set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, proceeded to build up a large military force, and in the 1950s added nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union reciprocated by organizing the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), increasing its forces in Eastern Europe, and giving them nuclear weapons. The overall size of the Red Army increased from 2.9 million in 1948 to 5.1 million at the beginning of 1989.

Nuclear Deterrence: Has It Worked?

In the atmosphere of growing East/West tension after World War II, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence became an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. It was, and still is, perceived as an instrument of containment, not only in Europe but elsewhere around the world. Has it succeeded?

Not for "little" events. Well, nuclear deterrence hasn't prevented numerous grievous events from happening during the past 45 years, including 120 wars costing 25 million lives. Moreover, nuclear weapons were not used in any these "little" wars because of practical disutility: damage would be disproportional to military objectives and impact on civilians would be too great. And they were not used because of moral and political considerations, especially fear of adverse world opinion.

Forty-five years of experience has shown that nuclear weapons have not and cannot deter (1) civil wars (such as occurred in Korea, Vietnam, and many other places), (2) regional wars (Middle East, Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere), (3) repression of occupied peoples (the Soviets in Eastern Europe, China in Tibet), (4) repression of one's own peoples (South Africa, Romania, Soviet Union under Stalin and a generation of successors, China, many others), (5) taking of hostages, and (6) international terrorism. And the gravest crisis of the Cold War — the Soviet Union placing nuclear missiles in Cuba — occurred because of nuclear deterrence: Khrushchev tried to overcome a U.S. advantage in strategic weapons by placing missiles within striking distance of the U.S. homeland. The crisis was resolved by diplomacy and discrete use of conventional forces, not by nuclear threats.

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Regarding the European situation, a long line of observers have insisted that Soviet invasion of Western Europe will not occur. For instance, John Foster Dulles offered this viewpoint in 1949 at U.S. Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty. In the mid-1970s Harvard Professor Richard Pipes wrote that "a direct military attack on Western Europe by the Red Army seems highly improbable." Many have pointed out that the Soviets have more to risk than gain in a European war. Even if they won, they would occupy a devastated land filled with a hostile population. Stalin seemed to understand this. So did Khrushchev and Brezhnev. They were willing to put down revolts in Eastern Europe and to put pressures on West Berlin, but they recognized the futility of a general European war. Consistently they sought trade and technological exchange with Western Europe, not warfare. With the "new thinking" of Mikhail Gorbachev, the last remnant of Stalinist expansionism seems to have come to an end. So in truth, nuclear weapons have had nothing to deter in Europe.

An illusion. This leads me to conclude that nuclear deterrence is illusory, an act of self-deception. It can't deter "minor" events. The "big" events it claims to deter wouldn't happen anyway.

Implications of "Beyond Containment"

U.S. policy makers, of course, do not accept my conclusion. They retain their belief that nuclear weapons are necessary to bolster the policy of U.S. containment of Soviet expansionism in Europe. In this manner the policies of containment and nuclear deterrence are tightly interconnected in official U.S. policy. Nuclear deterrence is necessary as long as we have a containment policy, policy makers insist.

But what happens if we can move beyond containment, as President Bush has suggested? This could come about if there was no longer any fear of Soviet expansion. In that case, nuclear deterrence would no longer be needed in Europe. And, as we have seen, nuclear deterrence has no utility anywhere else.

European disarmament. That means that for persons seeking nuclear disarmament, European

military disengagement is a key factor. For this to occur, we should be seeking far greater military reduction than now envisioned in the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (see page 3). The goal should be expanded to encompass the total withdrawal of all military forces stationed outside their homelands (Soviet, U.S., British, French, any others), demobilization of these forces back home, and dismantlement of their weapons and delivery systems, nuclear and conventional. All national forces should be cut back to a level no greater than needed for border defense with no offensive capability. In short, virtually complete disarmament of Europe.

Nuclear abolition. If we started down this path, we could also raise our horizons on what to seek in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Demilitarization in Europe would eliminate the need for U.S. strategic nuclear forces to back up conventional forces in Europe. The only other ostensible purpose of strategic weapons would be to deter a Soviet missile attack on the U.S. mainland through threat of retaliation. The converse would hold true for the Soviet Union. So we would have a situation in which the sole role of nuclear weapons would be to deter long-range attack by the adversary's nuclear weapons. In this situation, abolition would be a far safer course than maintaining the strategic arsenal, even a small one. So the goal for START should be to work out a schedule for the complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons.

Naval reductions. This combination of European disarmament and strategic nuclear abolition would open the door for eliminating naval nuclear forces. Presently they are not under consideration in any negotiations except for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Fundamentally the U.S. naval nuclear force is tied to a desire to keep open the sea lanes in the North Atlantic so that reinforcement troops can sail to Europe to help fight World War III, and to a lesser extent to protect Pacific sea lanes. So if European disarmament can be achieved, naval disarmament can likewise occur.

Thus, moving beyond containment means an opportunity to move beyond a heavily armed world. This is an ambitious agenda. Yet, it is a realistic agenda because it meets the self-interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations and their allies would gain greater security through disarmament than now obtained through the perilous security achieved by forward-based forces in Central Europe, backed by a vast strategic nuclear arsenal. And both sides would have tremendous economic gains by redirecting resources of money and human talent from war preparedness to peacetime pursuits.

Beyond containment + beyond deterrence = peace. A more secure peace at less cost than today's heavily armed stalemate.

We should be seeking virtually complete disarmament of Europe. This would make it possible to work out a schedule for the total abolition of strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time the door would open for eliminating naval nuclear forces and substantially reducing other kinds of naval armament.

[July 18, 1989]

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Acheiving Arms Reduction

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Nuclear abolition. If we started down this path, we could also raise our horizons on what to seek in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Demilitarization in Europe would eliminate the need for U.S. strategic nuclear forces to back up conventional forces in Europe. The only other ostensible purpose of strategic weapons would be to deter a Soviet missile attack on the U.S. mainland through threat of retaliation. The converse would hold true for the Soviet Union. So we would have a situation in which the sole role of nuclear weapons would be to deter long-range attack by the adversary's nuclear weapons. In this situation, abolition would be a far safer course than maintaining the strategic arsenal, even a small one. So the goal for START should be to work out a schedule for the complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons.

Naval reductions. This combination of European disarmament and strategic nuclear abolition would open the door for eliminating naval nuclear forces. Presently they are not under consideration in any negotiations except for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Fundamentally the U.S. naval nuclear force is tied to a desire to keep open the sea lanes in the North Atlantic so that reinforcement troops can sail to Europe to help fight World War III, and to a lesser extent to protect Pacific sea lanes. So if European disarmament can be achieved, naval disarmament can likewise occur.

Thus, moving beyond containment means an opportunity to move beyond a heavily armed world. This is an ambitious agenda. Yet, it is a realistic agenda because it meets the self-interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations and their allies would gain greater security through disarmament than now obtained through the perilous security achieved by forward-based forces in Central Europe, backed by a vast strategic nuclear arsenal. And both sides would have tremendous economic gains by redirecting resources of money and human talent from war preparedness to peacetime pursuits.

Beyond containment + beyond deterrence = peace. A more secure peace at less cost than today's heavily armed stalemate.

We should be seeking virtually complete disarmament of Europe. This would make it possible to work out a schedule for the total abolition of strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time the door would open for eliminating naval nuclear forces and substantially reducing other kinds of naval armament.

Arms Reduction Negotiations

The United Methodist bishops in their foundation document, *In Defense of Creation* (1986), set forth "the eventual goal of a mutual and verifiable dismantling of all nuclear armaments." Currently several sets of international negotiations are underway to move toward this goal. This article offers a progress report.*

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

Since 1982 the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in negotiations over an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear arms. These are the weapons that can strike the adversary's homeland from afar. They include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. The three in combination are called the strategic triad.

The size of the current strategic arsenal, based on counting rules established in December 1987 at the US-Soviet summit meeting in Washington, D.C., is as follows:

	Total warheads	
	USA	USSR
On ICBMs	2,450	6,572
On SLBMs	5,312	3,426
On bombers	<u>4,808</u>	1,000
	12,570	10,998

These data reveal that the Soviet Union places greater reliance on land-based ICBMs while the United States emphasizes submarine-launched missiles and bombers more.

Proposed reductions. At their first meeting in Geneva in November 1986 President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed in principle to a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons. This set the stage for accelerated START negotiations. Reagan left office with an agreement 80 percent completed. But the final 20 percent represents the most difficult issues.

Negotiators have translated "50 percent" into agreement to achieve a ceiling of 6,000 strategic warheads through phased reductions over a seven-year period. There would be a ceiling of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, consisting of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The U.S. now has a total of 1,899 and the Soviets 2,488. Also agreed is a 4,900 sublimit on the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM warheads and a sublimit of 1,540 warheads on 154 very large ICBMs (possessed only by the Soviet Union). And the two sides have agreed on counting rules for (a) warheads on existing types of ballistic missile and (b) gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles carried on bombers. Considerable progress has occurred in working out means for verification of treaty compliance.

Remaining issues. A number of issues still remain to be settled. The United States wants a sublimit of 3,000 to 3,330 ICBM warheads. The Soviet Union prefers no ICBM sublimits, but if there

is to be a 3,300 sublimit on ICBM warheads, then a 3,300 sublimit on SLBM warheads and a 1,100 sublimit bomber-carried warheads. Thus, each side wants to curtail the other's strength.

The Reagan administration wanted to ban mobile ICBMs, but the Soviets would not agree. The position of the Bush administration is not clear, especially since the president has asked Congress to authorize two mobile missile systems: placing the ten-warhead MX on railways and developing a new single-warhead Midgetman.

Recently President George Bush proposed that there be trial runs on verification procedures *before* completion of START negotiations. The Soviets have responded that they would consider this but would want a different pattern of on-site inspections than Bush proposed.

Major obstacles. Probably the two biggest sticking points are ship-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and strategic defense.

Cruise missiles are unmanned, miniature airplanes, flying horizontally near the ground, compared to the high-arching flight of ballistic missiles. They can be armed either with nuclear or conventional warheads. The Soviet Union has proposed a ceiling of no more than 400 nuclear and 600 conventional cruise missiles based on submarines or surface ships. The United States has argued that such limits are not verifiable because cruise missiles are small and easily concealed. However, the U.S. would be willing to agree to periodic unilateral declarations of nuclear SLCM inventory without verification but no restrictions on conventionally-armed SLCMs.

Some arms control experts in the United States argue that elimination of both nuclear and conventional ship-launched cruise missiles would be a U.S. advantage because likely U.S. targets are near the coast while Soviet targets are much farther inland. Furthermore, they maintain that adequate verification methods can be devised.

The other main unresolved issue in the START negotiations relates to strategic defense and to compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. This subject has been the focus of separate negotiations.

Defense and Space Talks

At their December 1987 summit meeting in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their delegations to negotiate an agreement that would commit the two nations (1) to observe the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972" while conducting research, development, and testing "as required". At issue was the Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced as an effort to defend the United States from strategic missile attack. Development of an effective SDI would require a testing program that would violate the traditional strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty but could be allowed under a broader interpretation offered by the Reagan administration. So, the phrases "as signed in 1972" and "as required" incorporated these contrasting views without resolving the issue. The two leaders also agreed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time but without deciding the length of the nonwithdrawal period.

Rationale. The basic issue is long-standing. In the late 1960s U.S. and Soviet leaders concluded that a complete anti-ballistic missile defense could be destabilizing because it might tempt a nation so

defended to launch an out-of-the blue attack against its adversary, knowing that it could defend itself against counterattack. This realization led to the ABM Treaty, which permitted ABM defense at only one site in each nation, not nationwide defense. The Soviets chose the Moscow area, and the United States selected missile bases in the Dakotas then abandoned the effort as not worth the cost.

Reagan's SDI program and the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty reopened the issue. The Soviets fear that in spite of Reagan's claim that SDI would be defensive only, the possibility exists that a U.S. strategic defense could provide enough of a shield for the United States to initiate an attack on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, some of the SDI devices could be used for offensive purposes. So the Soviets insist upon strict compliance with the ABM Treaty to prevent SDI tests in space, linked to a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. So far the Bush administration has stuck with Reagan's position of not linking the two.

Outlook. Because of these strongly contrasting views, Defense and Space Talks have made little progress. Moreover, START negotiations are unlikely to come to a successful conclusion until the issue of strategic defense is resolved.

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Beginning in 1973 the United States, the Soviet Union, and their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies carried on talks on Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) in Central Europe. The talks dragged on for years and years without results. Then from February 1987 to January 1989 the 16 NATO members and the seven Warsaw Pact members held discussions to establish a new forum for reducing conventional forces "from the Atlantic to the Urals". As a result, Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) began on March 9 in Vienna.

The group of 23, as the participants are called, agreed that the objectives of these negotiations should be:

To establish a stable conventional balance at lower force levels,

To eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and

To eliminate the capability for launching surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

NATO position. In March 1988 a NATO summit meeting established a CFE negotiation strategy calling for highly asymmetrical reductions by the Warsaw Pact that would entail the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Pact weapons, particularly tanks and artillery, relevant to surprise attack. On March 4, 1989 NATO officials agreed on the final elements of their negotiating position, calling for parity in tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers at about 90 to 95 percent of current NATO levels. This would yield roughly 20,000 tanks, 16,500 artillery weapons, and 28,000 armored troop carriers on each side, a much sharper reduction for the Pact than NATO.

NATO also proposed a 30 percent limit on any one country's share of total equipment holdings in Europe and limits on the armed forces stationed in other countries to no more than 3,200 main battle tanks, 1,700 artillery pieces, and 6,000 armored troop carriers. These limits would weigh more heavily on the Soviet Union than the United States because that Soviets have a much greater proportion of Warsaw Pact forces than the U.S. share of NATO forces.

Then in late May President Bush got NATO leaders to agree to a new proposal to reduce land-based attack aircraft and helicopters to levels 15 percent below current NATO holdings. All of the removed equipment would be destroyed. Bush also called for a 20 percent cut in combat manpower in U.S. stationed forces, and he advocated an accelerated timetable for completion of a CFE agreement.

Warsaw Pact position. On March 6, 1989 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze unveiled the Warsaw Pact's opening position. It was a detailed version of a three-stage plan originally put forth by Gorbachev at the Moscow summit meeting with Reagan in May/June 1988. The first stage would last for two to three years and would eliminate asymmetries and reduce troops and armaments to equal collective ceilings at 10 to 15 percent below the lowest level of either side. There would be zones along the inner-German boarder in which offensive weapons would be subject to withdrawal, reduction, or limitation. Tactical nuclear weapons would also be withdrawn from the zones, and their delivery vehicles would be pulled back far enough so that they could not reach the other side's territory.

In the second stage, lasting another two to three years, each side would reduce its forces by an additional 25 percent, or by approximately 500,000 troops below the equal ceilings established in the first stage. In the third stage, armed forces would be given a strictly defensive character, and agreements would be reached on ceilings for all other categories of arms.

On May 23 at CFE negotiations in Vienna the Soviets offered specific numbers on levels of personnel and weapons that are fairly close to NATO's detailed proposal. They also spelled out the proportion of Warsaw Pact cuts that would come from Soviet forces and the other Pact countries.

The Soviet Union has also asked for curtailment of short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe. However, NATO position wants to put off SNF negotiations until a CFE treaty is completed and implementation begun.

All told, prospects are favorable for successful completion of Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe.

Chemical Weapons

Since the 1960s the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament Geneva has worked on negotiations for global bans on chemical and biological weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention was completed in 1972 and has been signed by xxx nations. Negotiations on chemical disarmament are ongoing. Widespread use of chemical weapons during the 1980s in the Iran-Iraq war has heightened the need for achieving a global ban.

Draft treaty. In 1984 when he was vice-president, George Bush presented a U.S. draft of a Chemical Weapons Convention, including strict provisions for short-notice challenge inspections. This became the basis for subsequent negotiations. In 1987 the Soviet Union accepted the essence of the U.S. position on verification of a chemical weapons ban, including on-site inspections, but many important details of verification arrangements remain to be worked out.

The proposed Chemical Weapons Convention would ban all development, possession, production, acquisition, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. All existing chemical weapons would be destroyed over ten years under international inspection, and production facilities would be eliminated. Within 30 days after the Convention enters into force, each signatory party would be required to declare

whether it has chemical weapons and to give specific data on their quantity and location of all its chemical stocks and production facilities. An international authority would be responsible for monitoring and inspection.

Issues to be resolved. The negotiators in Geneva must work out details of on-site inspection, the allocation of decision-making power within the international authority, and how to ensure that all important nations become parties Convention. However, there is optimism because of President Bush's interest in the subject, the Soviet Union's flexibility since 1987, and strong support from the civilian chemical industry in several countries, including United States.

Glossary

Ballistic missile - has high arching flight; can have nuclear or conventional warhead

ABM - anti-ballistic missile (defensive)

ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile

SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile

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GLCM - ground-launched cruise missile

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position to speed conventional disarmament in Europe. We also urged him to take the following actions:

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Persons sharing these concerns might write to President George Bush, The White House, Washington, DC 20500.

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[July 18, 1989]

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[July 23, 1989]

"We support the completion at long last of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing."

"We support the earliest possible negotiation of phased but rapid reduction of nuclear arsenals...to the eventual goal of a mutual and verifiable dismantling of all nuclear armaments."

"We support agreements banning both offensive and defensive weapons, which now threaten the increasing militarization of space."

"We urge the resumption of serious negotiations to reduce conventional arms, including mutual force reductions in Europe and the arms trade in the Third World."

Regarding chemical and biological weapons, "we are categorically opposed to their production, possession, or use. We therefore urge that treaties outlawing such weapons be reaffirmed and strengthened." -- United Methodist Council of Bishops, 1986.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Extensive atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons produced widespread radioactive fallout and create considerable public pressure around the world to ban further nuclear testing. The result was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, banning all nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Now signed by xxx nations, this treaty also call for the eventual "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time."

Periodic efforts have been made to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Jimmy Carter gave the matter considerable attention, and an agreement was shaping up until negotiations were put aside in the aftermath the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After taking office President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer pursue such a treaty.

An effort is now underway to achieving a comprehensive test ban by amending the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Using provisions of this treaty, 40 nations constituting one-third of the signers, have now called for an amendment conference. The Treaty requires its three initial signers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, to facilitate holding such a conference. Afterwards all three have to agree to any amendment.

So far the Bush administration has maintained the Reagan position of opposing a comprehensive test ban, not wanting direct negotiations with the Soviet Union on this issue and reluctant to have an Amendment Conference take place.

[July 13, 1989]

Unilateral Initiatives

Suggested by Friends Committee on National Legislation

"I believe we are likely to get more disarmament by example than by agreement." -- Senator Frank Church

Arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the possible Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), may bring significant *quantitative* reductions in certain areas, but they ignore the accelerating *qualitative* arms race.

Clearly the traditional ways are not working. Arms control negotiations, held hostage by the increasing complexity of verifying agreements, are unable to match the pace of developing arms technology. Dangerously destabilizing weapons, even though militarily useless, are acquired in order to be used as "bargaining chips" but end up complicating negotiations even more. Even worse, the negotiation process promotes the idea that national security is primarily a matter of military strength instead of emphasizing public diplomacy and international cooperation.

Breaking the Cycle

In order to break the vicious cycle of the arms race, one side must take the first step by making a unilateral initiative for peace. Unilateral initiatives are actions taken by a government for the purpose of improving relations with another country or countries. Such policies are undertaken without waiting for the other side to agree to them or to reciprocate, although they are usually intended to stimulate a constructive response.

Unilateral initiatives may be taken in both military and non-military areas. Initiatives in one sphere may often lay the groundwork for initiatives in the other. Moreover, unilateral actions can lead quickly to far-reaching negotiated agreements by creating an improved climate for talks.

Making a unilateral initiative implicitly involves taking risk, but this is exactly what lends credibility to the action. It is an indication that the country sincerely intends to reduce tensions. Moreover, the underlying assumption of any initiative is that there is more national security to be found in reducing arms than in increasing them, that the risks of war are greater than the risk of peace.

Past Initiatives

This has happened several times in the past. A moratorium on nuclear testing announced by President Eisenhower in 1958 was joined by the Soviet Union and Great Britain while negotiations were started on a comprehensive test ban (CTB). These talks set the stage for the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963, which drove nuclear testing underground.

In 1969 President Nixon unilaterally renounced the use and possession of biological weapons for offensive purposes. His initiative created enough momentum to cut through the stalled negotiations on the issue and led to the Biological Weapons Convention, signed in 1972.

More recently in 1985 General Secretary Gorbachev declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and called on President Reagan to join him in negotiating a comprehensive test ban. When the United States declined the offer and continued to test, the Soviets extended the moratorium four times. Although the Soviet Union resumed testing in early 1987, Gorbachev has continued to affirm his interest a CTB.

Then in his speech at the United Nations last December 7, Gorbachev announced a unilateral cut of half a million troops out of the 5.1 million in the Soviet army. Ten thousand tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, 800 combat aircraft, even some short-range nuclear weapons will be removed from Europe and, in some cases, dismantled. Moreover, Gorbachev said on January 18 that the Soviet military budget will be cut 14.2 percent and production of arms and military technology will be reduced 19.5 by percent.

Other Warsaw Pact countries have followed suit. East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria have announced cuts in military spending, ranging from 10 to 17 percent, and armed force reductions, including elimination of more than 85,000 troops, 1,900 tanks, 900 artillery pieces, 195 armored vehicles, 130 planes, and 5 ships. Mongolia, another close Soviet ally, recently announced that it would reduce its armed forces by 13,000 troops and cut its military budget by 11 percent.

U.S. Initiatives Needed

The United States, while receptive to these announcements, has failed to respond with initiatives of its own. We believe that the United States and NATO should take unilateral initiatives toward a non-provocative defense. This could include eliminating air forces and missiles whose mission is to attack deep inside Poland and the Soviet, withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, and adoption of a "no first strike" policy. There is reason to believe that the Soviets would respond in kind.

In the current political climate, the Bush Administration needs public encouragement to move in this direction. His address is The White House, Washington, DC 20500.

[July 18, 1989]

The Friends Committee on National Legislation previously published a longer version of this article as Issues in Brief. This abridged version is used with permission. For further information, write to FCNL, 245 Second Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002.

Unilateral Initiatives

Suggested by Friends Committee on National Legislation

"I believe we are likely to get more disarmament by example than by agreement." -- Senator Frank Church

Arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the possible Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), may bring significant quantitative reductions in certain areas, but they ignore the accelerating qualitative arms race.

Clearly the traditional ways are not working. Arms control negotiations, held hostage by the increasing complexity of verifying agreements, are unable to match the pace of developing arms technology. Dangerously destabilizing weapons, even though militarily useless, are acquired in order to be used as "bargaining chips" but end up complicating negotiations even more. Even worse, the negotiation process promotes the idea that national security is primarily a matter of military strength instead of emphasizing public diplomacy and international cooperation.

Breaking the Cycle

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[July 23, 1989]

News from Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Call for Shift in Budget Priorities

In April Methodists United for Peace with Justice issued "A Call for Shift in Budget Priorities from Military to Human Needs". Directed to the U.S. Congress, the Call was signed by a representative sample of United Methodist leadership from around the country, including 31 bishops from all five jurisdictions and leaders from 59 annual conferences. The Call focused on three main concerns.

"First, we believe that the military budget for FY 1990 should be reduced by (a) sharply curtailing expenditures for development, testing, and production of all weapons that could carry war into outer space, (b) establishing a two year moratorium on the production of any more strategic nuclear weapons, and (c) cutting back on excessive funding for other military hardware, especially weapon systems with high costs and questionable value."

"Second, savings from reductions in military spending should be reassigned to programs responding to urgent human needs. Within the United States special attention should be given to the needs of children in poor families and their parents, education of children and youth from all segments of society, employment and training opportunities for youth and adults, adequate health care for all, and the needs of the homeless. And increased resources should be directed toward assisting Third World nations to achieve positive social and economic development."

"Third, as a means of reducing the huge federal deficit, significant revenue increases should occur through closing tax loopholes and through income tax rate increases, based upon the ability to pay."

Follow up. Methodists United sent copies of the Call to all members of the Senate and House Budget Committees and to President Bush. Peace/Justice Alerts for May and July have focused on defense authorization issues related to military spending. An Alert in September will deal with issues of pending appropriation bills.

Howard Hallman, our issues chair, is working with representatives from other organizations to put in motion a citizens' campaign to bring next year's budget more in line with the priorities offered in the Call.

Working with Annual Conferences

Methodists United regularly mails information to church and society leaders and peace with justice workers in the United Methodist annual conferences throughout the United States. In January we circulated two draft resolutions: on Star Wars and on strategic arms reduction negotiations. Church and society boards in a number of conferences used these drafts in writing resolutions for submission to their annual conference held this May and June. Persons from 33 conferences agreed to circulate a petition on START negotiations at their annual conference and to distribute Methodists United material.

A Peace Alliance

Several members of our Steering Committee were involved in a national "Structures for Peace" conference in February. A follow-up effort is being made to form a broad coalition of organizations concerned with structures for peace, disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice, and environmental concerns. Sherman Harris, chair of our Steering Committee, is a member of the Executive Committee of "The Alliance" (the interim name).

Electing a Board of Directors

An interim Steering Committee has governed Methodists United for Peace with Justice since we formed in 1987. Now underway is a process of nominations and election of a regular Board of Directors, to take office in September. All members of Methodists United are eligible to make nominations and vote.

Membership Information

Methodists United for Peace with Justice is a national membership association of laity and clergy committed to working for peace and justice. Membership is open to all who share this concern, but we particular seek members from the United Methodist Church and from other denominations in the Methodist tradition. Individual membership is \$15 (or more). Organizational membership (a church group, district or conference unit) is \$50 (or more). To join, send your dues, name, address, phone number, and church organizational affiliation to Methodists United, 421 Seward Square, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

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[January 26, 1990]

ISSUE NO.8 JANUARY-MARCH 1990

Federal Budget Perspectives

Prospects for a Peace Dividend by Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)

There is no question that the big debate of FY 1991 budget season will be how to spend the so-called "peace dividend". That's the expected windfall from massive cuts in the defense budget thanks to the freedom epidemic around the world. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has already started Congressional spendthrifts salivating with his recent order to find \$180 billion to cut from the Pentagon's 1992-94 budget.

Well, if every cloud has its silver lining, it is also true every silver lining has its cloud. Before we get carried away like kids in a candy store, it is important that first we look carefully at the exact dimensions of the peace dividend, two, study whether a significant cutback in defense spending is premature, and three, remind ourselves that any dividend must first be used to tackle our enormous budget deficit, rather than to finance costly new spending programs.

Real Size of the Peace Dividend

To put Secretary Cheney's request in the right perspective, it is important to understand what starting point the Defense Department uses to calculate budget cuts. Secretary Cheney's \$180 billion cut over three years is not a cut from the level of defense spending in FY 1990 or FY 1991, but from the Pentagon's earlier growth path of approximately 5 percent per year.

By asking for cuts of \$180 billion, Secretary Cheney is telling his troops to prepare to live with a budget growing at a rate of 2 percent per year -- approximately the average rate of growth in defense spending since FY 1986. Even though this spending growth path is not high enough for the Defense Department to keep pace with inflation and thus translates into "real" cuts, the current Pentagon's plan does not provide the large windfall savings eagerly anticipated by many in Congress

Avoid Drastic Cuts in Defense Spending

In this time of crumbling Berlin walls and blossoming democracies, I would like to express the unpopular view that maybe Secretary Cheney's plan for a gradual build-down in defense spending might be the right one. The dramatic changes we are witnessing through Europe have made it all too easy for some to forget the state of international affairs the United States found itself in during the late 1970s. It was the neglect of our defense requirements that contributed to those dark days when democratic forces were under severe pressure from totalitarian movements. Today, we view a different international landscape, where democratic forces are on the upswing and totalitarian ones are in full retreat. We must not forget that this new era of democracy is, in large part, the result of improved U.S. defense capabilities under President Reagan.

The question is not a matter of whether America should remain strong but rather a question of how much spending is required to maintain our security in a world that is changing so rapidly. Some

would argue that the Cold War is over and that we have won. However, if we allow euphoria and hope to overtake patience and judgment, America will put at risk the dramatic gains that we have achieved for freedom. I am excited about the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but the world is a dynamic place. Change is reversible as we witnessed in China, and we cannot allow the security of our nation to depend solely on just one man -- Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev -- staying in power. Need for Deficit Reduction

Nonetheless, I would not be surprised if all these extremely rational arguments for maintaining a strong defense fall on deaf ears. Freespenders in Congress are lining up to spend money on pet projects as if there was some sort of blank check written by Mr. Gorbachev. I agree there are many unmet needs that desperately require funds, but sometimes I wonder where these freespenders were during the most recent session of Congress.

During that session we spend almost the entire year arguing over how to reduce \$16 billion from a budget of \$1.180 trillion. In the end, we were only able to come up with spending cuts and "revenue enhancers" totaling \$11 billion. The rest of the funds had to come from automatic across-the-board cuts totaling more than \$5 billion.

This year's Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction target is \$64 billion. To meet this goal we will likely need to cut close to \$36 billion from the budget. That's well over twice the amount we unsuccessfully raised last year. No matter how optimistic your assessment of the peace dividend is, it is difficult to fathom how we in Congress can possibly meet this \$64 billion target and start a Second Great Society Program

While some people may advocate raising taxes to fill the deficit gap, I don't think a majority in either party would agree with this position. In fact, Senator Gramm's suggestion that the peace dividend be paid out to Americans by lowering taxes may well steal the thunder from those who want to increase spending on social programs.

Conclusion

While I hate to be the one to pull the rug out from under the peace dividend party, I am afraid I must. Those who see the dividend as an immediate cure-all for our nation's budget ills are underestimating the size of the budget deficit, as well as the need to continue a strong defense as the Cold War comes to an end. Cutting our armed forces before we are able to reach critical arms reduction agreements with the Soviets would be as bad as showing our hand before the final round of a poker game. Except in this game, not only would we lose significant ground but so would Eastern and Western Europe and quite possibly the rest of the world. As tempting as spending the peace dividend is, that is a risk I am not prepared to take.

Senator Bob Dole is the Senate Republican Leader. He is a member of Trinity United Methodist Church in Russell, Kansas.

[January 26, 1990]

Elements of the Budget Debate by Senator Jim Sasser (D-TN)

This nation's budget deficit currently stands at \$128 billion, and the national debt is fast approach \$3 trillion. In the last nine years we have gone from being the largest creditor nation to the largest debtor nation in the planet. This year, for the first time in our history, the interest payments on our debt will exceed payments to Social Security -- our largest government program.

We are at the threshold of a new global era. With relaxing world tensions, we have the opportunity to prepare ourselves for domestic renewal. That means reinvestment in the long-neglected domestic needs of this nation: education, housing, child care, nutrition, and anti-drug programs.

Defense Spending in Peacetime

To do that we must first put in place a true peacetime economy, one in which our productive resources are not siphoned off at the rate of \$300 billion a year for defense. The Pentagon now spends an average of \$80 billion more per year (in 1990 dollars) than it spent during the Nixon-Ford post-Vietnam peacetime period. In fact, since World War II our traditional level of peacetime spending for defense has averaged \$215 billion a year in current dollars.

In the 1990s the quality of life in this country will be determined by how quickly we come to view the \$2 trillion defense buildup of the 1980s as a crippling, long-term drain on our resources.

There has been much talk about defense cuts in the budget for the coming fiscal year, and much talk about a resulting "peace dividend". Unfortunately the dividend isn't real. Not yet anyway.

Last November, after the Berlin Wall began to crumble, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney proposed a possible \$180 billion cut in Pentagon spending. The announcement sparked a great deal of enthusiasm, but the celebration was premature. Secretary Cheney was not talking about cuts in current spending levels. He was talked about supposed savings that come off a "wish list", five-year defense budget. His budget would actually raise defense spending, even after the cuts.

To put this simply, the Pentagon budget for fiscal 1990 was \$287 billion. The President's proposed budget for fiscal 1991 is \$292 billion — an increase of \$5 billion. There is clearly no "peace dividend" here. In fact, under the Secretary's proposal we would be saddled with defense budgets in excess of \$300 billion throughout most of the 1990s. Despite the public pronouncements there is no evidence that a fundamental re-examination of our defense priorities is even under way, much less completed.

It would be a tragic waste to squander what is the greatest opportunity in decades to reshape our economy and provide for the basic social needs of the American people. A modest five percent annual defense cut in real terms over four years would result in a savings of \$60 billion. That's \$60 billion for nutrition, education, earned income tax credits for the poor, and reducing our deficit.

The American people have the right to expect a peace economy around the corner, and the right to the rich and numerous benefits that such an economy will bring.

Our Regressive Federal Tax System

Since 1980 the poorest one-fifth of the nation's taxpayers have seen their total federal tax rates rise by nearly 21 percent. At the same time the richest one-fifth enjoyed a two percent *cut* in their effective tax rates.

The fastest growing sector of the population is the "working poor", those who just cannot earn enough in spite of working. Moreover, the poverty rate for 1988, a year of relative prosperity, was higher than in any year of the 1970s, including the recession years of 1974 and 1975.

It is against this backdrop that we must view two of the most controversial issues of the coming budget debate —— a capital gains rate reduction and a cut in social security payroll taxes.

The Joint Tax Committee has determined that at least 80 percent of the benefits of any capital gains legislation would flow to the nation's wealthiest taxpayers — those with annual incomes in excess of \$200,000 per year. It is simply a giveaway of our scarce resources to those who need them least.

On the other hand, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's proposal to scale back the social security payroll tax is a fascinating counterweight to our regressive tax structure and deserves serious consideration. Counting both the employer and the employee share, fully 75 percent of all Americans now pay more in regressive payroll taxes than they do in income tax. A person making \$10,000 per year pays the same social security tax rate as a person making \$200,000.

Fairness in taxation is one of our most venerated rights as American citizens. It is essential that we halt the regressive direction of the tax burden set in motion in the 1980s.

Senator Jim Sasser, a United Methodist layman from Nashville, Tennessee, is chair of the Senate Budget Committee.

[January 26, 1990]

In Search of A Balanced Budget by Congressman Bill Goodling (R-PA)

The first session of the 101st Congress ended with the passage of budget reconciliation legislation for fiscal year 1990 (FY90) which achieved some measure of actual savings. Congress still failed to arrive at a complete package of appropriate cuts and had to resort to a partial dose of across-the-board reductions (sequestration) to arrive at the budget target set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollngs (GRH) deficit reduction law.

Deficit Reduction Goals

The GRH deficit target for FY91 is \$64 billion. The current expectation is that this figure (with a \$10 billion cushion allowed by the law) will likely be met. The question remains as to whether the new round of budget negotiations will include a significant amount of true cuts, rather than liberal use of "smoke and mirrors", as has been the case in recent years.

Many in Congress are questioning whether the GRH process, amended in 1987, is an effective way to force true deficit reduction. True, the law does provide for cuts which Congress is hesitant to make. If the GRH target is not met, however, the arbitrary cuts imposed often have an adverse effect on many people because no distinction is made between the affected programs. A notable shortcoming of the mechanism employed by Gramm-Rudman is the fact that in most cases Congress lacks the political will to make substantive reductions in necessary areas. If this deficiency were somehow corrected, what happened in 1989 might be avoided in the future.

Whether the GRH process is modified or not, a balanced federal budget remains one of our primary national goals. Are significant revisions in the budget process necessary to realize this goal, or can we muddle toward a balanced budget through a combination of selective budget cuts and economic growth? This is the \$64,000 question (or in contemporary terms, the \$64 billion question).

Defense Spending

In the area of defense, a thorough evaluation of our defense spending priorities is underway because of reduced international tensions and domestic fiscal constraints. Additional progress toward democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe coupled with continued improvement in our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union will allow the United States to pursue further reductions in defense-related spending.

Although the defense budget will be subject to welcome reductions in the coming years, we must be aware of what may be over-optimistic assumptions concerning a "peace dividend" resulting from these cuts. Most of the defense spending cuts currently being debated are not as large as they first appear because they are based on projected levels of spending in future years.

For instance, Secretary of Defense Cheney's recent proposal to cut \$180 billion from planned defense budgets in the next five years is actually based on projected funding levels for future years which have not yet been approved by Congress. If the defense budget is reduced by the amount proposed by Mr. Cheney, taking into account levels of spending which would likely be approved, the amount of money saved over the next five years will be substantially less than the \$180 billion figure which has

been quoted. This is a point which must be emphasized in any discussion about what to do with the so-called peace dividend.

Allocation of Savings

Another aspect of the debate will focus on the allocation of savings resulting from defense-related budget cuts. Should the money be used to reduce our federal budget or should it be diverted to new or bigger domestic programs? I would argue that we need to reduce our budget deficit before earmarking additional funds for other priorities. Others will likely disagree.

As we continue the debate on the future makeup of the defense budget, however, we must work to ensure that eventual cuts do not compromise U.S. security interests or our ability to negotiate additional arms control treaties.

Congressman Bill Goodling, a Republican from the 19th District of Pennsylvania, is a member of the House Budget Committee. He is belongs to the Loganville United Methodist Church.

[January 25, 1990]

Will There Be A Peace Dividend? by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN)

There has been much talk of a "peace dividend" lately, resulting from the improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Public opinion polls show overwhelming support for cutting defense spending and using the money for deficit reduction or other spending priorities, such as education, housing, and health care. While I share this desire to attain significant defense spending reductions, I am only moderately optimistic about our ability to achieve major cuts in the near term. I believe that we will attain only modest and gradual reductions in the short run which, if US/Soviet relations continue to improve, will amount to substantial savings over the next 5 to 10 years.

Sources of Defense Savings

The warming relations between East and West generate many forces that will contribute to the peace dividend. Unilateral cuts by the Warsaw Pact have reduced the military threat of a surprise attack on our NATO allies. In addition, the rapid political changes in Eastern Europe further reduce the risk of a Warsaw Pact invasion. These lowered threat assessments enable us to reduce our forces somewhat in Europe. Second, US/Soviet arms control agreements on long-range nuclear arsenals and conventional forces in Europe, if concluded quickly, could reduce the cost of building and operating expensive weapons system.

Third, the U.S. could achieve further savings by requiring allies in Europe and Asia to pay for a greater share of their own defense (a concept known as burden sharing). Fourth, the Pentagon could assist these cost-cutting efforts by streamlining its expensive and wasteful system of procuring new weapons systems and by allocating its resources more efficiently. For example, by moving more of its active forces to the reserves, or eliminating very expensive weapons systems like the B-2 bomber. Inhibiting Factors

However, there are several factors that will weigh against achieving radical reductions in U.S. defense budgets in the near term. First, even though the Soviet threat is less than it previously has been, it is still quite formidable and Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO forces in Europe. We cannot prudently make drastic unilateral cuts at this time.

Second, there are practical limits to savings from arms control agreements or burden sharing with our allies. Arms control requires costly efforts to dismantle weapons systems, transfer forces back to the United States, and meet verification requirements, which in the short term far outweigh the savings from arms reduction. Arms control agreements are likely to be long in implementing and short on savings, as they have been in the past. However, we should reconsider our arms control negotiation positions that mandate that we build costly new weapons systems, such as the Midgetman missile and more Trident submarines. Likewise, burden sharing proposals are surely reasonable, but none of our allies is jumping to increase its defense spending at a time of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Global Commitments

Third, reductions in overseas deployment, major cuts in forces, and defense budget savings are

unlikely so long as the basic conditions of U.S. security remain unchanged. Defense experts point out that it is meaningless to talk about savings in the defense budget as long as the United States is committed to defending its allies and security interests around the world.

While I believe that continued U.S. military strength is desirable, I do not argue that everything should remain the same. U.S. global commitments are expensive — the defense of our NATO allies alone is estimated to exceed \$150 billion per year in direct and indirect costs — and they continue to strain our military resources. Yet real savings in the defense budget probably will not come unless the United States is willing to scale back its global responsibilities and relinquish some of its power and influence around the world. We are only now beginning to address this question of what truly constitutes national security.

Weapons Procurement and Reform

Fourth, several features of the defense budget make it difficult to achieve immediate defense savings. One is the "bow wave" and the "stern wave" phenomena. The spending bow wave is the accumulation of required spending for weapons and equipment ordered in previous years but not yet delivered. The spending stern wave is the rising cost of operating and maintaining weapons and equipment on hand.

Furthermore, cancelling contracts requires paying cancellation fees to contractors. And, if we are to be fair to the employees and local communities dependent on defense contracts, some of the peace dividend should be targeted for economic conversion and worker retraining and relocation programs. Together these factors reduce our ability to achieve short-term savings even when we decide to begin reducing the military.

Another factor is the difficulty of achieving savings from procurement reform. Since the early 1980s, Pentagon reformers have talked about saving \$10 to 50 billion by eliminating waste, inefficiency, and fraud in the way we purchase new weapons systems. Yet most attempts at reform to date have not yielded major savings. Most defense experts agree that real procurement reform will require a very basic change in the way the Pentagon purchases weapons -- changes which would take a lot of time, money, and, above all, political will. Although reductions may be obtained through procurement reform, my view is that significant savings are not likely in the near term.

Several other factors related to the defense budget further complicate the problem. For example, achieving immediate defense savings would entail major cuts in programs which have rapid spend-out rates — such as personnel and operations and maintenance accounts — but which are essential to force readiness. Recently lowered assessments of the Soviet military threat make it possible for us to achieve some savings in this area, but they must be carefully planned before they can be implemented. Alternatives to our current policy of forward defense based on large standing armies are only now being explored.

This is not to suggest that savings are impossible in the coming years, only that they will be gradual in coming. Because of these factors, it is more likely that we will see only slightly declining defense budgets in the coming years. I think that the improving relations with the Soviets offer the Congress and President Bush an opportunity to work together to set defense priorities which would

reflect more accurately both national needs and budget realities.

Addressing National Needs

Whether the peace dividend goes toward deficit reduction or meeting overdue needs in the area of infrastructure investment, education, or pressing human needs will have to be determined politically. The challenge is to apply our defense resources in accordance with a broadly defined national security strategy and the changing international environment.

Congressman Lee Hamilton, a Democrat from Columbus, Indiana, is chair of the Joint Economic Committee and a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He is an active United Methodist layman.

[January 25, 1990]

Reordering Federal Budget Priorities by Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins (D-CA)

Budget policy is the Federal Government's primary tool for implementing our national economic, social, and moral imperatives. Over the past decade, our budget decisions have been misguided, and we have unfortunately been sending the wrong signals both at home and abroad. By indiscriminately cutting back on cost-effective domestic programs like education, job training, health care, housing, and other basic needs, we now find ourselves saddled with enormous fiscal and human deficits.

We must stop placing the goal of deficit reduction at the center of virtually all policy decisions. It has resulted in a failure to address the problems in our schools, homelessness, increased crime and drug abuse, joblessness and underemployment and other societal problems. While we must take steps to reduce the indebtedness of our fiscal affairs, it does not have to be done at the expense of meeting other national commitments.

Invest in Education

In order to meet our traditional obligations to expand opportunity, give every child equal access to a quality education and meet the challenges posed by increased economic competition in the international marketplace, we must immediately increase our investment in the basic human and economic needs of our nation. Given the rapidly changing international environment, the 1990s present us with a golden opportunity for reordering our national priorities and making strong inroads in our battle against illiteracy, poverty, and weakened competitiveness.

First and foremost, we must translate into practical reality the right of every child to a quality education. An educated citizenry is a fundamental tenet of a strong democracy. Cost effective programs like Head Start and Chapter One compensatory education for disadvantaged youngsters must be fully funded. Head Start, which returns over \$6 for every \$1 invested, is serving less than one-fifth of the pre-schoolers eligible for its comprehensive educational, nutritional, and developmental services. Likewise, Chapter One reading and writing basic skills assistance for elementary and secondary students serves less than one-half of those eligible.

By adequately investing in programs which strengthen educational attainment in the formative years, we can save millions in expenditures further down the road needed for dealing with failure. This does not require new taxes. Investing in education can be done by reprogramming current expenditures.

If America is to live up to its reputation as a beacon of democracy and equality, then we must move beyond noble rhetoric and actively provide adequate resources for fully implementing these and similar programs that invest in the productivity of our citizens, and thus strengthening of our entire economy. Such decisive action represents genuine moral, social, and economic leadership of the highest caliber.

Congressman Augustus Hawkins is chair of the House Education and Labor Committee. He is from Los Angeles and is an active United Methodist.

Congressman Hawkins is a leader of the Congressional Black Caucus, which every year offers an alternative budget that places higher priority on human needs programs and calls for lower military spending than the president's budget. The Congressional Black Caucus intends to release its budget proposal during February.

Another alternative to be offered is the "Budget for a Strong America", which calls for reduction in the military budget to make funds available for domestic programs needed for the inner strength of the United States. Among the sponsors are Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Barney Frank (D-MA), George Miller (D-CA), and Jim Moody (D-WI).

[January 26, 1990]

Ms. Kathy Ormiston
Office of the Republican Leader
Room S234, U.S. Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ms. Ormiston:

As I indicated on the phone, we want the January-March 1990 issue of our newsletter, *Peace Leaf*, to focus on the federal budget. Therefore, we are asking four United Methodist members of Congress to write short articles offering their perspective on the budget issues coming before Congress in the coming session. We would like to have Senator Dole offer his views.

Our own interests are reflected in the enclosed *Peace Leaf* we published a year ago on the same subject. The same issues will be before Congress in the coming year: what to do about the deficit, how to achieve a balance between military and domestic spending, whether tax increases are needed. Probably the greatest difference this year is the apparent lessening of the Soviet threat in Europe, which has implications for the military budget. From this there is now debate over whether there will be a peace dividend, and if so, how it should spent. And of course the deficit-reduction requirements of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings are even more onerous this year.

We are looking for a one-page article. That amounts to about 700 words, or 100 lines with 56 characters/line (leaving room for title and identification of the author). We are also requesting articles from Senator Sasser,

Representative Hamilton, and a yet to be selected House Republican. We would like to have these articles no later than January 10, 1990.

Peace Leaf goes to all the United Methodist bishops, leaders in the 72 United Methodist conference, our membership in all parts of the country, and others. We also send it to United Methodist conference newspapers and other contacts in the religious press.

We hope that this works out. If you have any questions, please call me at 897-3668 on Monday, Wednesday, or Friday and at (301) 795-7677 (long distance) on Tuesday and Thursday.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director Dr. Sam Marullo
Office of Congressman Lee Hamilton
2187 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Sam:

As I indicated on the phone, we want the January-March 1990 issue of our newsletter, *Peace Leaf*, to focus on the federal budget. Therefore, we are asking four United Methodist members of Congress to write short articles offering their perspective on the budget issues coming before Congress in the coming session. We would like to have Congressman Hamilton offer his views.

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Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman Executive Director Mr. Peter Woolfolk

House Committee on Education and Labor

2181 Rayburn Building

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Woolfolk:

As I indicated on the phone, we want the January-March 1990 issue of our newsletter, *Peace Leaf*, to focus on the federal budget. Therefore, we are asking five United Methodist members of Congress to write short articles offering their perspective on the budget issues coming before Congress in the coming session. We would like to have Congressman Hawkins offer his views.

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We are looking for a one-page article. That amounts to about 700 words, or 100 lines with 56 characters/line (leaving room for title and identification of the author). We are also requesting articles from Representatives Hamilton and Goodling and Senators Sasser and Dole. We would like to have these articles no later than January 10, 1990.

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Howard W. Hallman Executive Director